Accession Number : ADA509218


Title :   Assessing the Parameters for Determining Mission Accomplishment of the Philippine Marine Corps in Internal Security Operations


Descriptive Note : Research paper


Corporate Author : MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA


Personal Author(s) : Hernandez, Eugenio V.


Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA509218


Report Date : 2009


Pagination or Media Count : 45


Abstract : The Philippines Marine Corps has been fighting a war against internal threats who have achieved some degree of success in derailing Philippine prosperity for the past 38 years. The Marine Corps has perceived internal security operations (ISO) primarily as a mere force on force employment (combat operations) against armed internal threats and, to some extent, the occasional use of noncombat means (civil-military operations) to mitigate community life disruption as a result of the combat operations. The Marine Corps' ISO are guided by the government-issued National Internal Security Plan (NISP) as well as the Operation Plan "Bantay Laya" that was crafted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as the security component to the NISP. "Bantay Laya" prescribes the use of three lines of operations to defeat the Communist Terrorist Movement (CTM), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Jemaah Islamiyah (II). Lines of Operations prescribed by "Bantay Laya" include combat operations, intelligence operations, and civilian-military operations (CMO). Although the most violent and extreme of all activities employed in counterinsurgency, the Marine Corps puts a premium on combat operations over other lines of operations in ISO. Military response is vital and necessary, but it is not a stand-alone solution to deter and crush insurgency. The success of the counterinsurgency against the HUKBALAHAP in the 1950s and the Indirect Approach to the Basilan Model in 2002 serve as lessons that winning the hearts and minds of the people from whom the insurgents derive their strength is the key to successful ISO. And winning hearts and minds can only be attained through robust civilian-military operations. Using a MOE for counterinsurgency set forth by U.S. Field Manual Number 3-24, CMO offers a measurable, discrete, relevant, and responsive approach to ISO.


Descriptors :   *MILITARY HISTORY , *COUNTERINSURGENCY , *COMMUNITY RELATIONS , *PHILIPPINES , *MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS , *CIVILIAN POPULATION , *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) , MISSIONS , COUNTERTERRORISM , INSURGENCY , CASE STUDIES , THREATS , ISLAM , GOVERNMENT(FOREIGN) , LESSONS LEARNED , INTELLIGENCE , TERRORISTS , MILITARY OPERATIONS


Subject Categories : HUMANITIES AND HISTORY
      MILITARY FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONS
      UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE


Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE