Accession Number : ADA475906
Title : Alternative Salary Auction Mechanisms for the Navy: An Experimental Program
Descriptive Note : Master's thesis
Corporate Author : NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
Personal Author(s) : Resare, Nils A.
Full Text : http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA475906
Report Date : DEC 2007
Pagination or Media Count : 89
Abstract : An experimental program was developed to test the impact of bidding behavior on two matching mechanisms proposed by prior research for use in the U.S. Navy's Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) program AIP is one compensation program used by the Navy to encourage sailors to volunteer for less desirable assignments. Unlike other compensation programs, sailors negotiate AIP rates through an auction-like system. Previous research has proposed new mechanisms to effectively match sailors to assignments based on the sailors' bids and Navy valuations. However, the two mechanisms provide different incentives for sailors to truthfully reveal their minimum acceptable AIP through their bids. The experimental program has been developed to help determine which matching mechanism gives better incentives for sailors to bid closer to their true valuations and how bidding differently than these valuations impacts the effectiveness and cost of the matching mechanisms. The proper operation of the expenmental program was verified through 60 simulated sessions of ten participants bidding their true values. The program was further tested on a trial run with 20 volunteer subjects completing 20 bidding rounds each.
Descriptors : *NAVAL PERSONNEL , *ENLISTED PERSONNEL , *SALARIES , *COMPENSATION , *ALLOCATIONS , NAVY , MATCHING , MOTIVATION , VOLUNTEERS , COSTS , MECHANICS
Subject Categories : ECONOMICS AND COST ANALYSIS
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE