DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

OVERVIEW

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $90.6 billion for procurement. This represents a $3.0 billion decrease over the amount authorized for fiscal year 2014.

The committee recommends authorization of $91.0 billion, an increase of $1.5 billion from the fiscal year 2015 request.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 procurement program are identified in division D of this Act.

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $5.1 billion for Aircraft Procurement, Army. The committee recommends authorization of $5.3 billion, an increase of $147.4 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Aircraft Procurement, Army program are identified in division D of this Act.

Items of Special Interest

Armed aerial scout strategy

The committee notes that because of sequestration and limited resources, the Army has announced the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) which retires older platforms and defers the armed reconnaissance requirement for a replacement to the current OH–58 Kiowa series helicopter. The committee understands that as a result of the ARI, the Army will utilize AH–64 Apache helicopters, teamed with the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Systems, as an interim solution to meet the armed reconnaissance mission. However, the committee is concerned that the Army’s plan does not address how the Army intends to eventually meet the enduring requirement for a manned armed scout helicopter.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 15, 2015, that includes a description of the interim Apache scout implementation plan, as well as the concept for what a follow-on plan and necessary resources would be required to replace the interim solution with a platform that fully meets the validated requirement.
Army Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance aircraft

The committee is aware of the Department of the Army’s Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 2020 vision. The committee recognizes that there are a variety of platforms and capabilities, both Government and contractor owned, that are being transitioned from a wartime environment to a more stable strategic posture, but the committee is concerned that the Army has not clearly identified the current and future capacity and capability requirements for Aerial ISR. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by December 1, 2014, on the Army’s Aerial ISR requirements and how those requirements will be addressed in the future.

Army Signals Intelligence modernization

The committee understands that there are at least six Army Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) programs in use or planned for near-term fielding, including: Guard Rail Common Sensor; Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System; Tactical SIGINT Program; Quick Reaction Capability C–12s; Airborne Reconnaissance Low; and the Prophet ground SIGINT collection platform. The committee is concerned that maintaining six different SIGINT collection systems for these platforms is costly and inefficient, as well as potentially unsustainable given the current fiscal environment.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report to the congressional defense committees and the congressional intelligence committees by February 16, 2015, that would present a SIGINT modernization plan, including a detailed plan of action and milestones with anticipated costs and schedules. The report should also consider the advisability and feasibility of potentially converging all six Army SIGINT programs to a common hardware baseline that is contractor independent, with open architecture that could allow for the use of software reprogrammable radios, as well as provide the capability for insertion of emerging technologies and collection capabilities.

Divestiture of rotorcraft through Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative

The committee is aware of the Army’s plan to divest certain rotorcraft, such as the OH–58D Kiowa Warrior, OH–58 A/C, and TH–67 primary training helicopters, as part of its Aviation Restructure Initiative. While the committee understands the fiscal pressures facing the Army and supports its efforts to restructure the rotorcraft force, the committee is concerned that the planned divestiture of more than 750 aircraft between fiscal years 2015–19 could have a negative impact on the rotorcraft industrial base which has already been impacted by declining defense spending.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by September 1, 2014, on the criteria for transferring these helicopters as excess defense articles into the domestic and international markets. As part of this briefing, the Army should include an assess-
ment of how its criteria for divestiture meet all Federal laws and regulations governing such equipment, including:

1. A statement outlining the purposes for which the article is being provided to any foreign country, including whether such article has been previously provided to that country;
2. An assessment of the impact of the transfer on the military readiness of the United States;
3. An assessment of the impact of the transfer on the national technology and industrial base and, particularly, the impact on opportunities of entities in the national technology and industrial base to sell new or used equipment to foreign countries to which such articles might be transferred; and
4. A statement describing the current value of such articles and the value of such articles at acquisition.

Improved MQ–1C Gray Eagle modifications

The budget request contained $190.5 million in Aircraft Procurement, Army for the MQ–1C Gray Eagle Unmanned Aerial System. The committee notes that the MQ–1C Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System provides critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to combatant commanders. The committee understands that development efforts have already been completed to modify the current Gray Eagle platform in order to provide extended range capabilities. This capability, known as the Improved Gray Eagle, includes significant expansion of the fuselage to accommodate larger fuel capacity and additional payloads as well as integration of an improved heavy fuel engine to support takeoff at heavier weights. However, funding for these modifications was not included in the budget request. The committee believes the increased endurance of a modified Gray Eagle would provide combatant commanders greater employment options at increased ranges, expanded payload options, and improved basing flexibility in support of the Global ISR mission.

The committee recommends $239.5 million, an increase of $49.0 million, for improved MQ–1C Gray Eagle modifications.

MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $1.0 billion for Missile Procurement, Army. The committee recommends authorization of $1.0 billion, full funding of the request, for fiscal year 2015. The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Missile Procurement, Army program are identified in division D of this Act.

PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, ARMY

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $1.5 billion for Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army. The committee recommends authorization of $1.7 billion, an increase of $230.2 million, for fiscal year 2015.
The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army program are identified in division D of this Act.

Items of Special Interest

**Combat vehicle industrial base management**

The committee notes that as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (Public Law 112–25), the Army is in the process of reducing its Active Duty end strength to 420,000, unless sequestration is resolved. In addition, the Army has also announced plans to reduce Active Component Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from 45 to 32. The active Army has 17 Armor BCTs (ABCT), 20 Infantry BCTs, and 8 Stryker BCTs. The committee notes that the ABCT, which is comprised of Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, is the only full-spectrum force in the Army’s force structure. With regard to the future utility of armored forces, the committee notes that a RAND Corporation report from 2010 concluded that, “Heavy forces—based on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles—are key elements of any force that will fight hybrid enemies that have a modicum of training, organization, and advanced weapons. Light and medium forces can complement heavy forces, particularly in urban and other complex terrain; they do not provide the survivability, lethality, or mobility inherent in heavy forces. Quite simply, heavy forces reduce operational risks and minimize friendly casualties.”

The committee remains concerned that the Army may eliminate too many ABCTs based on resource constraints rather than meeting the needs of combatant commanders. Although the committee has been informed that the Army will add a third maneuver battalion back into the Active Component Armor and Infantry BCTs, the committee has not been briefed on final force structure and BCT mix decisions. The committee is supportive of all BCTs having a third maneuver battalion and notes that in the committee report (H. Rept. 109–452) accompanying the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the committee opposed the Army’s original decision of having two maneuver battalions per BCT.

In addition to the mix of BCTs, the committee needs to better understand the ramifications to the future combat vehicle industrial base capabilities with regard to the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Paladin howitzer, Hercules recovery vehicle, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, and the Stryker combat vehicle. Specifically, the committee is concerned about the Army’s position that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) alone is sufficient to sustain the viability of the combat vehicle industrial base. The committee believes that the associated impact this position has on the industrial base at both the prime contractor and vendor level poses an unacceptable level of risk. The committee acknowledges that the Army has made positive strides in regards to FMS cases. However, FMS cases often take years longer than originally planned to materialize. In addition, many FMS cases procure less capable variants which do not always equate to positive workload at the prime and vendor levels. The committee continues to believe that insufficient information is available to Congress to make an informed decision.
regarding current and potential future risks to the combat vehicle industrial base at the prime and vendor levels. The committee encourages the Army for beginning the process to finally collect the necessary analytical information required to make informed decisions about the long-term sustainment of the combat vehicle industrial base.

Finally, the committee applauds the Army for its efforts to accelerate the Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) programs for the M1 Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle and Stryker combat vehicle. The out-year funding reflected in the budget request for fiscal year 2015 indicates a commitment by the Army to move forward with the next major technology upgrades for the existing fleet of weapons systems that would ensure fielding of the highest quality combat vehicles to a smaller force and also sustain the fragile industrial base. However, the committee remains concerned about the stability of Army modernization funding in fiscal year 2016 and beyond given the implications of sequestration. The committee believes multiyear procurement contracts may reduce overall cost and help stabilize the industrial base and notes that there is precedent for successful Army combat vehicle multiyear procurements. Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Army, in accordance with section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, to request multiyear procurement authority in future budget requests for the Abrams ECP 1, Bradley ECP 2, and Stryker ECP 1 programs.

**Abrams tank upgrades**

The budget request contained no funding for the M1A2 Abrams tank upgrade program.

The committee continues to believe that the Army must maintain the capability of Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) formations to overmatch any possible threat. The committee notes that in a hearing before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, senior Army officials testified that the Army does not plan to close down the industrial facilities used to upgrade M1 Abrams tanks. In addition, the same senior Army officials testified that these critical industrial base facilities would have been at serious risk had it not been for additional funding authorized and appropriated by Congress. The committee understands the next scheduled upgrade for the Abrams tank has been moved up to 2017 from 2019. The committee commends the Army’s decision to accelerate this upgrade, and notes that in the committee report (H. Rept. 113–102) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee encouraged the Army to take this action. The committee continues to believe this course of action will mitigate risk within the combat vehicle industrial base.

While the committee understands that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) alone are enough to keep the Abrams tank line “warm” until the 2017 time frame, based on current world events, the committee continues to believe that reliance upon FMS alone poses an unacceptable level of risk to our combat vehicle industrial base and thus to our national security. As a result, the committee believes that the best course of action would be a combination of continued tank upgrades for the Abrams tank pro-
gram and ongoing FMS; the combination of which should maintain production lines and suppliers until the next Abrams tank upgrade program begins. The committee acknowledges that if all FMS cases materialize as planned, the Army may not need additional funding in fiscal year 2015 in order to mitigate risk through the 2017 timeframe. However, according to the information provided to the committee by the Army, the committee will not know if these FMS cases have been funded until the December 2014 timeframe.

With regard to the military need for more M1A2 Abrams tank upgrades, the committee notes that six National Guard ABCTs are currently equipped with a less capable version of the Abrams tank. Therefore, the committee believes that as long as the National Guard has a less capable version of the Abrams tank, there will be a requirement for additional modernized M1A2 Abrams tanks.

The committee recommends $120.0 million in Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army for the Abrams tank upgrade program.

Hercules recovery vehicle

The budget request contained $50.5 million for the M88A2 improved recovery vehicle program.

The committee is aware that in order to provide greater protection for soldiers, the Army’s current and future fleet of combat vehicles has grown significantly in weight. As a result, the current fleet of M88A1 recovery vehicles is approaching its maximum capability, and its capability will be greatly exceeded by the future fleet of combat vehicles. The committee notes that the M88A2 is the only vehicle that can single-handedly recover a main battle tank, and that it was the only vehicle in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that could recover larger mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles. The committee understands that the Army has recently increased the M88A2 acquisition objective to 933 systems, of which only 749 have been funded for procurement through fiscal year 2015. The committee supports the Army’s decision to include funding in the budget request for procurement of M88A2 vehicles, but believes additional funding is necessary to maintain production. The committee encourages the Army to pursue a “pure fleet” strategy in future budget requests.

The committee recommends $121.2 million, an increase of $70.7 million, for the M88A2 improved recovery vehicle program.

Stryker combat vehicle modifications

The budget request contained $385.1 million in Weapons and Tracked Compact Vehicles, Army for continued procurement of upgraded Stryker combat vehicles and $90.2 million in PE 23735A to continue the Stryker Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) program.

The committee continues to support the Army’s Stryker program and in particular the Double-V Hull (DVH) program that makes Stryker one of the most survivable and mobile vehicles in the Army’s inventory. The budget request included funding for the second year of a 3-year procurement of DVH Strykers for a third brigade set. The committee is aware the Army has a documented requirement to equip all nine of its Stryker Brigade Combat Teams with the DVH Stryker. The committee understands the Army
wants to begin procurement of a fourth brigade set of DVH Strykers starting in fiscal year 2016. The Army also has an unfunded requirement to accelerate the Stryker ECP program. The Stryker ECP effort includes increased horsepower, network integration, and other improvements. The committee notes that the Army wants to accelerate Stryker ECP development in order to produce DVH Strykers for the fourth brigade set that incorporate the ECP upgrade.

The committee supports this initiative and recommends $435.1 million, an increase of $50.0 million, for Stryker procurement and $115.2 million, an increase of $25.0 million, in PE 23735A to accelerate Stryker ECP development.

**M9 upgrades**

The committee understands the Army is preparing to competitively pursue a non-developmental item, commercial-off-the-shelf replacement handgun for the current M9 pistol. The committee notes that the Army’s modular handgun system (MHS) is intended to provide soldiers with improved lethality, accuracy, ergonomics, reliability, durability, and maintainability over current systems. While the committee supports the MHS program, the committee is aware that there may be an upgrade configuration for the M9 that could provide increased operational effectiveness while reducing life-cycle costs as well as enhancing training capabilities. The committee notes that because there are approximately 240,000 M9 pistols in the current inventory and that the current procurement objective for the MHS is still being determined, the committee encourages the Army to consider an M9 upgrade program as a potential complementary program to the MHS.

**Transmission industrial base**

The committee notes that the Army commissioned a comprehensive assessment of the combat vehicle industrial base to better understand the issues and challenges facing the vendor industrial base. The first phase of the assessment, which was completed last year, identified combat vehicle transmissions as a significant area of concern. The assessment concluded that combat vehicle transmissions are unique in that they not only provide power to combat vehicles but also control braking and steering. In other words, combat vehicle transmissions are entirely different than commercial transmissions, such as those that power the military’s tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. Although it has not been provided the Army’s final report, the committee understands the assessment and recommends mitigation measures for the tracked combat vehicle transmission industrial base.

The committee notes that although the Army has terminated the Ground Combat Vehicle program, the Army has several tracked vehicle programs in development or production. These include the Armored Multi-purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program, the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program, M88 recovery vehicle program and major upgrades called “Engineering Change Proposals” (ECP) for both the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle. All of these vehicles are eligible for upgraded or improved transmissions. The committee understands there are only a few companies that
produce transmissions for tracked combat vehicles within the United States. Based on the results of the Army’s assessment, the committee is concerned about the future viability of transmissions for tracked combat vehicles based on low production rates and projected levels of funding in the out years that may not support minimum sustaining rates of production. The committee believes it may be necessary to consider consolidation of production capabilities through a partnership with existing suppliers.

The committee notes the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy continues to direct a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier review of the defense industrial base and includes findings from that review in the annual Industrial Base Capabilities Report to Congress, which is required by section 2504 of title 10, United States Code. However, the last annual report, delivered to Congress in October 2013, did not specifically address the committee’s concerns related to combat vehicle transmissions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than February 15, 2015, on the combat vehicle transmission industrial base. The report should not continue to summarize the challenges confronting the U.S. tracked vehicle transmission industrial base, but should instead detail specific mitigation measures and their implementation. Specifically, the report should include the Army’s plans and potential funding profile that would be necessary to procure new or improved combat vehicle transmissions for the AMPV, PIM, M88 and Abrams and Bradley ECP programs, to include the opportunity to exploit new technologies such as electric drives. In addition, the report should include an assessment of the potential to begin a 2-year pilot combat vehicle transmission program that would address the feasibility of consolidating production capabilities through a partnership with existing and potential suppliers.

**PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY**

**Overview**

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $1.0 billion for Procurement of Ammunition, Army. The committee recommends authorization of $1.0 billion, a decrease of $23.4 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Procurement of Ammunition, Army program are identified in division D of this Act.

**Items of Special Interest**

*Munitions industrial base management*

The committee notes that declining defense resources will likely result in a smaller munitions industrial base and that efforts are on-going to achieve a right-sized base that remains fully capable and viable. The committee is aware of the collaborative work being done by the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) and industry to develop management tools to help manage the in-
Industrial base. In particular, the committee notes that the Industrial Base Assessment Tool (IBAT) and the Minimum Sustaining Rate (MSR) database will use an iterative process to enable analysis of proposed ammunition procurement to identify potential negative impacts on the viability or capability of the munitions industrial base. The committee understands that avoidance of such impacts is essential for a base that, although considerably smaller, must continue to meet the many, varied needs of the military services. To that end, the committee believes that early knowledge of the budgetary plans of the military services would allow the SMCA to assess the capability of the munitions industrial base to respond, identify potential impacts, and point out alternatives for meeting immediate needs that do not jeopardize long-term viability of the munitions industrial base.

The committee expects the Secretary of Defense to ensure that adequate funds are made available through the annual budget process to develop, operate, and maintain the management tools required to support the foregoing iterative process, including but not limited to, the IBAT and the MSR database.

M982 Excalibur program

The budget request contained $35.6 million for 416 Excalibur precision guided artillery Ib rounds.

The M982 Excalibur round is a precision guided 155mm artillery round that is used by the Army and the Marine Corps. The committee notes that over 745 Excalibur rounds have been used by the Army and the Marine Corps in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom with high success rates.

The committee supports the Excalibur program and believes that this precision guided capability is a combat multiplier. The committee understands the program remains on cost and schedule with a full-rate production decision scheduled for June 2014. The committee also understands that the Army is now procuring the Excalibur Ib round, which has significantly decreased program costs, while also providing increased performance and reliability. The committee notes the Army is currently conducting a comprehensive precision fires capability portfolio review and that the total procurement objective for Excalibur rounds could increase in future years. The committee encourages the Army to consider, as part of this precision fires capability portfolio review, the advisability and feasibility of replacing the current inventory of Excalibur Ia–1 and Ia–2 rounds with Ib rounds.

The committee recommends $35.6 million, the full amount of the request, for the procurement of Excalibur Ib rounds.

Utilization of Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support initiative

In the committee report (H. Rept. 113–102) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee directed the Secretary of the Army to provide a report on potential improvements to the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) program initiative. The committee has not received this report and understands the Secretary of the Army plans to deliver it in June 2014.
The committee continues to believe the Army’s Government-owned ammunition plants are critical to the Nation's readiness and to equipping the U.S. Armed Forces. The committee understands the ARMS program was created to allow the Army to rent to commercial companies portions of its Army Ammunition Plants (AAPs) that were not being used in production. The committee notes that revenues from the property rental are used to pay for the operation, maintenance and environmental clean-up at the facilities, and that the savings in overhead cost lowers the production cost of the goods manufactured, as well as funds the environmental clean-up at no cost to the taxpayer. The committee understands the following AAPs are participating in the ARMS program: Hawthorne Army Depot, Holston AAP, Iowa AAP, Lake City AAP, Milan AAP, Radford AAP, and Scranton AAP. The committee encourages the Army to maximize available capacity at these AAPs. For example, the committee notes that Milan AAP is using over 800,000 square feet for ARMS activities.

The committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to continue to effectively utilize the ARMS program, and encourages the Army to find new and effective ways to improve upon cooperation and coordination among the Army, property managers, commercial interests, local and state agencies, and local economic development organizations to promote effective utilization of ARMS.

**OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY**

**Overview**

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $4.9 billion for Other Procurement, Army. The committee recommends authorization of $4.7 billion, a decrease of $192.4 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Other Procurement, Army program are identified in division D of this Act.

**Items of Special Interest**

*Army ultra-light reconnaissance robot programs*

In the committee report (H. Rept. 113–102) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee directed the Secretary of the Army to provide a report on the advisability and feasibility of incorporating ultra-light reconnaissance robot (ULRR) capability as an enduring requirement. The report submitted to the committee by the Secretary stated that the current Army Unmanned Systems Management Plan validated the advisability of developing a variety of ULRR sensors to operate at the lowest tactical levels as part of an enduring requirement for all Active and Reserve Component units. In addition, the Secretary’s report noted that tactical micro-robotic systems could free soldiers from direct exposure to a multitude of lethal threats across a host of common, squad-level mission sets. However, the report also noted some technical challenges, including radio frequency spectrum issues involved in systems used during Operation Enduring Freedom, once back in the United States.
Given the substantial investment in ULRR by the Army to-date and the conclusions provided in the report, the committee encourages the Army to transition ULRR into a formal program-of-record so that any technical, logistical, or training issues associated with incorporation of ULRR into Army units may be resolved.

**Body armor industrial base risk mitigation**

The committee understands that the body armor industrial base includes the combat helmet industrial base, soft armor industrial base, and hard body armor industrial base. In the committee report (H. Rept. 112–479) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the committee directed the Secretary of the Army to provide an assessment of the long term sustainment requirements for the body armor industrial base, to include supply chains for combat helmets, soft armor, and hard armor components. The committee received this assessment in March 2014.

The committee understands that the military services would prefer to maintain at least two viable industrial base vendors for each area of the industrial base in order to mitigate serious risk, maintain competition for better body armor technology, as well as to retain required surge capacity. The committee is concerned that current funding profiles may not allow for two viable vendors in each area. The committee understands that without additional resources or additional contracts the industrial base would default to only one supplier in August 2015. The committee understands that specialty materials such as ballistic fibers and ceramics are raw material building blocks for body armor systems, and that few profitable applications for these materials exist outside of Department of Defense body armor programs. While foreign military sales (FMS) could offer industry an additional means for the manufacture and sale of various body armor components, there has been limited FMS interest from foreign countries.

Based on this required assessment, as well as other assessments the committee has reviewed from the Defense Logistics Agency, the committee understands that there is significant risk to the hard armor industrial base both in the near-term and the long-term. The committee is concerned that the two qualified manufacturers are producing at below minimum sustaining rates, and that this could jeopardize their financial stability and viability beginning in fiscal year 2015. The committee also notes that one of the hard armor vendors is the sole supplier of a particular ceramic raw material to the Department of Defense and believes that the Department of Defense may lose the capability to meet surge requirements beginning in fiscal year 2015. The committee is concerned that once a capability, such as hard body armor, disappears and production lines are dismantled, it is projected that it would take at least 18 months to reconstitute that capability.

Elsewhere in this Act, the committee recommends an increase of $80.0 million in operation and maintenance, Army, to help mitigate risk to the hard armor industrial base and maintain two viable vendors.
Tactical generator recapitalization

The committee is aware that generators are the biggest consumers of diesel fuel in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Army and Marine Corps. Given Department of Defense directives to reduce costs through increased fuel efficiency, the committee supports service decisions to procure next generation tactical generators like the Advanced Medium Mobile Power Sources (AMMPS), which could produce over 20 percent greater fuel efficiency and 40 percent greater reliability than the current fleet of Tactical Quiet Generators (TQGs). The committee understands that when the AMMPS fleet is fully deployed and operating, the Department of Defense estimates it will realize an annual savings of $745.0 million and 52.0 million gallons of diesel fuel over TQGs.

The committee expects the military services to consider robust goals for increased fuel efficiency and reliability as part of any tactical generator recapitalization strategy. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees no later than November 3, 2014 on service plans to recapitalize tactical generator systems, associated fuel efficiency and reliability targets, and the financial impact that achieving these targets would have on fuel expenditures.

Family of heavy tactical vehicles

The budget request contained $28.4 million for the family of heavy tactical vehicles (FHTV). The budget request also contained $89.2 million for the Palletized Load System (PLS) Extended Service Program (ESP). The budget request contained no funding for the Heavy Expanded Mobile Tactical Truck (HEMTT) extended service program (ESP).

The committee notes with concern that the budget request included no funding for the HEMTT ESP within the FHTV program. As noted elsewhere in this report, the committee is concerned about the long-term viability of the tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base. The committee notes the Army had originally programmed $250.0 million for HEMTT ESP over the Future Years Defense Program, but that funding has now been reinvested into other outstanding, higher-priority requirements within FHTV, notably the PLS ESP. The committee understands that there still remains at least a 3-year requirement for HEMTT ESP.

The committee is aware that based on the HEMTT ESP requirement identified in previous Army budget submissions, the Secretary of the Army does plan to include funding for HEMTT ESP in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request for fiscal year 2015. While the actual timing of the submission of the OCO budget request is still uncertain, the committee believes additional funding would be required to help maintain balance in the heavy tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base.

The committee recommends $50.0 million, an increase of $50.0 million, for continued production of HEMTT ESP vehicles.

Family of medium tactical vehicles

The budget request contained no funds for the family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTVs).
The committee is concerned about the current and future viability of the tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base. The committee is concerned that while budget request justification materials indicate that no funding is required for new FMTV procurement in fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016, the out-year funding requests include $248.9 million and $249.1 million in fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018, respectively. The committee believes that this strategy of stopping and restarting mature production lines is inefficient and problematic for the medium tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base.

The committee believes that smooth and predictable funding levels, and not abrupt and large swings in funding and production requirements, would result in the best outcome for taxpayers, the industrial base, the military services, and, ultimately, the warfighter. The committee recommends mitigating any unnecessary breaks in FMTV production, and where possible, encourages the Army to maintain at least minimum sustaining rates of production. The committee understands the Secretary of the Army has requested additional funding for new FMTV production in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request. The committee believes that these funds would help to mitigate some breaks in FMTV production, but notes that there is uncertainty over the timing of the OCO budget request. The committee believes the Army should realign the current funding profile for FMTV production across the Future Years Defense Program.

The committee recommends $50.0 million, an increase of $50.0 million, for continued production of new FMTVs.

Military combat eye protection program

The budget request contained no funds for a military combat eye protection program.

The committee notes that requests for military combat eyewear are usually included in the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request, which is based on providing RFI equipment to all deploying soldiers. The committee has not yet received the OCO budget request for fiscal year 2015. The committee understands the RFI leverages current programs, lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as commercial-off-the-shelf technology to give soldiers increased survivability, lethality, and mobility. The committee expects funding for military combat eyewear to be requested through the OCO budget request.

The committee understands the Army’s military combat eye protection program was developed to ensure a standardized level of ballistic and environmental performance for protective eyewear. The committee understands the Army has created an Authorized Protective Eyewear List (APEL) that allows Program Executive Office-Soldier to offer more choices in combat ballistic eyewear, which improves soldier acceptance and use of protective eyewear.

The committee commends the Army for establishing the APEL, encourages the continued rapid fielding of ballistic protective eyewear to all military personnel so that they can “train as they fight”, as well as to provide protection against a wide array of threats while deployed and in training. The committee encourages
the Secretaries of the military departments to consider the potential training and operational benefits of issuing combat protective eyewear to all basic military trainees.

**Mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles**

The budget request contained $14.7 million for mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle modifications.

The committee recognizes that mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles were rapidly procured to address critical warfighter requirements in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of Iraq. The committee notes these vehicles proved invaluable at protecting military service personnel from improvised explosive devices, and saved lives. The committee understands that current MRAP vehicle quantities exceed future requirements set forth by the military services. The committee recognizes the military services have carefully considered current and future requirements, as well as their ability to man, equip, train, and sustain MRAP vehicles to determine which vehicles should be retained as part of their enduring capability of protected mobility, route clearance, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal platforms. The committee understands the military services will retain the most capable MRAP vehicles to meet military operational and training needs.

The committee notes that approximately 13,000 excess MRAP vehicles will first be offered to other U.S. Government entities and then to potential foreign military sales (FMS) or excess defense article (EDA) customers. The committee understands that if there are no U.S. Government, FMS, or EDA claimants, the vehicles will follow approved disposition procedures for demilitarization.

The committee believes there may be some operational value in using MRAP vehicles as mobile command posts at echelons above brigade. Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Staff of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 13, 2015, on the advisability and feasibility of using MRAP vehicles as part of current mobile command post modernization strategies. The briefing should include the following:

1. An assessment of the potential cost savings, manpower requirement reductions, and other associated operations and maintenance savings;
2. The status and results of vehicle testing to meet the goals of mobile command post modernization;
3. An assessment of the current status of command vehicle configurations, including age of the vehicles, number of vehicles required, manpower requirements per command post, and guidance on active fielding timelines for replacement vehicles; and
4. The suitability, cost, and cost avoidance available through adaptive reuse of existing vehicles, including the MRAP vehicle.

**Personal dosimetry for protection in Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive environments**

The committee remains concerned about the increasing proliferation of Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Weapons of Mass Destruction, and believes that maintaining adequate modern protective equipment is of critical impor-
tance for the safety of U.S. forces in CBRNE environments. The committee notes that in regard to radiological hazards, accurate dosimetry is critical to the forecast of type, severity, and expected time of onset of symptoms, information needed to predict a person's fitness for duty, and the provision of combat readiness information. The committee notes that the Department of the Army last validated a requirement for Individual Personal Dosimeters in 1975. However, the nuclear and radiological threat environment facing the Joint Force has changed dramatically over the past four decades and dosimeter technology has also improved. The committee is aware of efforts within the Department of Defense to develop a Joint Personal Dosimeter (JPD) and validate an updated requirement for the JPD. The committee understands that the JPD is expected to enter milestone C late in fiscal year 2015. The committee is concerned, however, that procuring JPDs to replace legacy Army systems will not begin until 2020, at the earliest. In addition, the committee notes that the Army currently has nearly 8,500 legacy systems programmed for replacement.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Army to begin JPD procurement to replace legacy Army systems as soon after the milestone C decision as the availability of funds will allow. Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the committee by September 1, 2014, on the status of the JPD program and the efforts to validate an updated dosimetry requirement for the JPD. The briefing should include any recommendations that the Secretary has to begin procurement of JPDs earlier than 2020.

Replacement of Enhanced Position Location Reporting system

The committee notes that the Army currently has a mix of brigade combat teams (BCTs) with different tactical communications architectures, with most Army BCTs equipped with the Blue Force Tracker system. Some Army units, and elements of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force still use the Enhanced Position Location Reporting system (EPLRS) for certain communications functions. In addition, some allied nations also use EPLRS. The committee understands that the Army intends to retire the remaining EPLRS systems it uses between fiscal years 2014–17.

Overall, the committee supports the Army's plan to modernize its tactical communications network. However, the committee is concerned about the potential impact the retirement that the EPLRS system may have on the Army's ability to operate effectively in joint and combined operations. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than October 1, 2014, on the details of the Army's plan to retire the EPLRS system. The briefing should address any potential joint or combined operational issues with other military services and allied nations that may result from the Army retiring the system while it remains in use. In addition, the briefing should be coordinated with the appropriate Joint Staff offices that oversee requirements in the area of tactical communications.
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $13.1 billion for Aircraft Procurement, Navy. The committee recommends authorization of $13.5 billion, an increase of $411.6 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Aircraft Procurement, Navy program are identified in division D of this Act.

Items of Special Interest

EA–18G Stretch

The committee understands and supports the Department of the Navy's requirement for additional airborne electronic attack (AEA) aircraft; based on the Department's Congressional testimony and formal war fighting campaign analysis. Controlling the electromagnetic spectrum is paramount to strike capability in future contested environments. The EA–18G Growler provides full spectrum capabilities for the Navy and Joint Forces. However, the Department insufficiently funded the Growler requirement, threatening shutdown of the manufacturing line. In concert with the procurement of 5 Growlers in FY15, the committee encourages the Chief of Naval Operations to utilize the Advanced Procurement funds for F/A–18 E/F aircraft in FY14 ($75 million) to extend the production line to a minimum production rate of 2 aircraft per month. This extended production will ensure an AEA manufacturing line is in place for future procurement. The committee directs the Department of the Navy to brief the House Committee on Armed Services by September 1, 2014 on the ability to extend the production line to a minimum production rate of 2 aircraft per month. The committee urges the Navy to provide the necessary funds to fulfill its AEA requirement in Fiscal Year 2016, and if needed, beyond.

H–1 engine program upgrade

The budget request contained $45.0 million for H–1 upgrades, but included no funding to upgrade the AH–1Z's legacy T700–401 engine to the T700–401C configuration.

The T700–401C engine is used in the Marine Corps' AH–1Z and UH–1Y helicopters, has unique parts and provides improved power compared to the older T700–401 engine. The committee notes that the Marine Corps plans to procure 189 AH–1Z helicopters, and understands that 36 of those aircraft are not currently planned to be upgraded with T700–401C engines. The committee further understands that having 2 different engines for the fleet of 180 AH–1Zs will result in a reduction of available helicopters since the T700–401 engine is becoming increasingly obsolete.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than September 19, 2014, on the Marine Corps' plan for either upgrading the 36 AH–1Z helicopters to the T700–401C engine configuration, or how the Marine Corps plans to incorporate the 36 AH–1Z helicopters with the T700–401 engine into the AH–1Z fleet with maintenance and logistic support.
The budget request contained $40.7 million for MQ–8 Fire Scout procurement.

The MQ–8 Fire Scout is vertical take-off and landing unmanned aerial vehicle (VTUAV) which provides real-time and non-real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data to tactical users without the use of manned aircraft or reliance on limited theater or national assets. The committee notes that the budget request contained no funds for procurement of MQ–8 Fire Scout VTUAVs, but contained funds for procurement of MQ–8 control stations, ancillary equipment, training equipment, support equipment, technical support and logistics, which are critically needed to outfit the ships on which the MQ–8 is deployed.

While the committee supports the budget request, it is disappointed that the Department of the Navy has chosen not to fund procurement of aerial vehicles in fiscal year 2015. The committee continues to view the MQ–8 VTUAV as a critical ISR asset and encourages the Department of the Navy to fully execute its fiscal year 2015 budget request, and include the procurement of additional MQ–8 VTUAVs in the budget request for fiscal year 2016 as well as in subsequent years.

The committee understands that the Department of the Navy has conducted an assessment of whether the MV–22 could be used to replace the C–2A Greyhound aircraft currently performing the carrier onboard delivery (COD) mission for the Department of the Navy. The committee further understands that the MV–22’s unique combination of speed, range, and vertical agility creates possibilities for transforming the way that carrier onboard delivery is accomplished.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than October 24, 2014, on the Department of the Navy’s assessment of the MV–22 to perform the COD mission, any analysis of alternatives accomplished to replace the C–2A aircraft, key performance parameters required of a C–2A replacement aircraft, health and status of the C–2A fleet, and the current schedule to procure a C–2A Greyhound replacement aircraft.

The committee understands that aircrew members have been ejected from helicopters and seriously injured during crashes and hard landings. The committee notes that the Mobile Aircrew Restraint System (MARS) is a device developed and designed to prevent highly mobile aircrew from being ejected during a crash event and to provide fall protection when working near open aircraft doors or hatches. The committee encourages the Marine Corps to use available funding to procure and install additional MARS kits in Marine Corps UH–1Y and other aircraft.
Weapons Procurement, Navy

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $3.2 billion for Weapons Procurement, Navy. The committee recommends authorization of $3.3 billion, an increase of $63.0 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Weapons Procurement, Navy program are identified in division D of this Act.

Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $771.9 million for Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps. The committee recommends authorization of $771.9 million, full funding of the request, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps program are identified in division D of this Act.

Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $14.4 billion for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy. The committee recommends authorization of $15.1 billion, an increase of $659.6 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy program are identified in division D of this Act.

Items of Special Interest

Integrated communication systems

The committee is aware that advances in technology have enabled the development and fielding of integrated communications systems that combine the capabilities of legacy platforms, including Integrated Voice Communications System, Tactical Variant Switch and Secure Voice System, into a single system. Examples in the U.S. inventory include the U.S. Coast Guard’s newly fielded National Security and Fast Response Cutter program.

The committee recognizes that the combination of legacy systems into one system has the potential to reduce acquisition and maintenance costs while simplifying training and providing increased operational effectiveness to ship commanders and crews. These benefits apply to both retrofit of legacy platforms and the outfitting of new platforms.

The committee encourages the Navy to examine these new integrated communications systems, and if proven cost effective and beneficial, to consider changing program requirements to specify the use of such systems.
Joint High Speed Vessel

The committee is aware of the premium that the Department of Defense places on the ability of U.S. military forces to deploy quickly to a full spectrum of engagements. In addition, the Department values the ability of U.S. forces to debark and embark in a wide range of port environments, from modern to austere. The committee notes that the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), crewed by Military Sealift Command mariners, has demonstrated the ability to transport military forces, as well as humanitarian relief personnel and materiel, in a manner that is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, and sustainable. The USNS Spearhead (JHSV–1) is currently deployed to the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility.

The JHSV is designed to transport 600 short tons of military cargo 1,200 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots in sea state 3. JHSVs support Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and riverine forces, theater cooperating missions, Seabees, and Marine Corps and Army transportation. The original procurement objective for the JHSV was 18 ships. This procurement number was lowered to 10 JHSVs as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2013.

The committee notes that the JHSV has the ability to support multiple branches of the military services, provide high-speed intra-theater sealift, operate in littoral environments and austere port environments, and support humanitarian and disaster relief activities. The committee also notes that the ship's construction line is still operational. For these reasons, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees by April 1, 2015, on the operational benefits and cost savings associated with continuing to procure JHSVs. The report should specifically address the costs and benefits of buying the eight additional JHSVs that were originally part of the program.

Littoral Combat Ship

The committee is concerned about the survivability, lethality and endurance of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), as noted by the Government Accountability Office and others. In February 2014, after reviewing preliminary assessments and evaluations of the LCS, the Secretary of Defense reduced the total number of LCS seaframes to 32 from the planned procurement of 52 and also directed the Navy to submit alternate proposals to procure “a capable and lethal small surface combatant generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.” The Secretary noted the importance of not only presence but capability and power projection as the foundation of the Navy’s effectiveness and directed the Navy to study options to include a completely new design, existing ship designs (including the LCS), and a modified LCS. The Chief of Naval Operations has directed a Small Surface Combatant Task Force to report on these results by July 31, 2014.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by April 1, 2015, that examines the Department of the Navy’s study and its implications for the procurement of future small surface combatants. This report should assess:
(1) The study’s methodologies and key assumptions;
(2) Any alternate ship design(s) and modifications to the Littoral Combat Ship that the Navy evaluated, including expectations of cost, schedule, and requirements; and
(3) The extent to which the study was consistent with the approach of a formal analysis of alternatives, as set forth in the Department of Defense acquisition policy.

Mobile Landing Platform Afloat Forward Staging Base

The committee notes that the most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan projects a requirement for a third Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) variant ship in fiscal year 2017. Full funding for the second MLP AFSB ship was provided in fiscal year 2014. No advance procurement funds for the third MLP AFSB ship are currently programmed in either fiscal year 2015 or fiscal year 2016. Considering the expanded requirement for the MLP AFSB variant ships and the success of the ongoing shipbuilding program, the committee is concerned that a 3-year procurement gap between ships will increase costs, impact the industrial base, and delay delivery of important capabilities. Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to explore possible approaches to minimize a production break between ships, including advance procurement funding, for the third AFSB ship.

Moored Training Ship

The budget request contained $801.7 million in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, for the Moored Training Ship program.

The committee notes that the Moored Training Ship program is intended to convert two decommissioned nuclear attack submarines into training platforms for nuclear propulsion crew members. The committee also notes that this program has experienced a $556.8 million cost overrun for the two conversions compared to fiscal year 2014 budget projections, and that this represents an 34 percent cost increase. The committee further notes that $229.7 million of this cost increase is included in the fiscal year 2015 budget request. While the committee understands that the Moored Training Ship program is not a formal acquisition program, the committee remains concerned that the 34 percent cost increase would be significantly over the critical cost growth threshold for major defense acquisition programs, established pursuant to section 2433, title 10, United States Code, also known as a “Nunn-McCurdy breach”. As a result, elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would require a review to be provided to Congress similar to that required for a “Nunn-McCurdy breach”.

The committee recommends $572.0 million, a decrease of $229.7 million, in shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, for the Moored Training Ship program.

National Defense Sealift Fund

The committee notes that the Navy is proposing to disestablish the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) and, as part of this, is proposing to shift funding for new construction ships from the NDSF to the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
NDSF was created by section 1077 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102–484) in part to fund new ship construction related to Department of Defense sealift ships and was later amended to permit the funding of new construction Navy auxiliary ships. NDSF is not a procurement account, but a revolving fund, and appropriations made available to the fund are not executed in the same way as dollars made available to SCN. In addition, new-construction ships funded through the NDSF, unlike SCN-funded ships, must have certain major components manufactured in the United States. The committee is concerned that transferring appropriations from NDSF to SCN for certain ships could result in potential cost increases as well as a reduction in major shipboard components that are manufactured in the United States.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to review the proposal to disestablish the NDSF and the budget recommendation to appropriate new construction Navy auxiliary ships through the SCN account. The Secretary is directed to prepare a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2015, detailing how the Navy would proceed if the NDSF were disestablished, how the Navy would ensure that there would be no cost increases, and how the Navy would plan to maximize the use of major shipboard components manufactured in the United States in the construction of Department of Defense sealift and Navy auxiliary ships.

Shipbuilding warranties and guarantees

The committee notes that the Government Accountability Office recently reported that the Navy continues to accept delivery of ships with large numbers of deficiencies. Depending on the contract type under which the ships were constructed, the Government may share a significant portion of the costs associated with fixing these deficiencies. In order to better assess the magnitude of this issue, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a report to the congressional defense committees by October 1, 2015, on the efficacy of warranties, guarantees, and other such mechanisms that are used in U.S. shipbuilding programs. This report should have a particular focus on:

1. The extent to which these mechanisms are used in Government and commercial shipbuilding programs;
2. How the Government assigns responsibility for a defect and corrects such problems; and
3. The extent to which these mechanisms may reduce the Government’s exposure to additional costs resulting from defective workmanship or equipment.

Surface ship test platform

The committee notes that the Manta test platform concept has been successfully used to evaluate submarine sensors at a greatly reduced cost compared to using a full-size submarine for test and evaluation. The committee believes that a similar surface ship test system could be utilized to test and evaluate existing and emerging sonar systems for surface ships. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional
defense committees by March 1, 2015, to include a cost-benefit assessment of designing and fabricating a purpose-built surface ship test craft that could be utilized to test and evaluate existing and emerging sonar systems for surface ships.

**OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY**

**Overview**

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $6.0 billion for Other Procurement, Navy. The committee recommends authorization of $6.2 billion, an increase of $222.3 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Other Procurement, Navy program are identified in division D of this Act.

**PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS**

**Overview**

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $983.4 million for Procurement, Marine Corps. The committee recommends authorization of $958.2 million, a decrease of $25.1 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Procurement, Marine Corps program are identified in division D of this Act.

**Items of Special Interest**

*Marine Corps Video Scout MC/3 System*

The committee supports the potential procurement and rapid fielding of the Marine Corps Video Scout MC/3 Remote Video Viewing Terminal (RVVT) to provide full motion video communications and improve tactical processing exploitation and dissemination capability. The committee notes that RVVT systems allow viewing and exploitation of video and metadata from multiple unmanned air, ground, surface, sub-surface systems. The committee understands that the Video Scout MC/3 RVVT program is intended to be an element of the Marine Corps air operations command and control system and is intended to increase Marine Corps intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and direct fire effectiveness through improved software capability, two-way communications, and smart antenna capability.

**AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE**

**Overview**

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $11.5 billion for Aircraft Procurement, Air Force. The committee recommends authorization of $11.4 billion, a decrease of $122.7 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Aircraft Procurement, Air Force program are identified in division D of this Act.
Items of Special Interest

Air National Guard MQ–1/MQ–9 ground-based sense and avoid systems

The committee acknowledges that the operating configuration and equipment for Air National Guard (ANG) MQ–1/9 units, along with international and Federal aviation safety requirements, may limit the ability to operate in international and domestic airspace outside of military restricted areas. MQ–1/9 flight operations require specific, International Civil Aviation Organization, Federal Aviation Administration, or foreign authority approval which restricts the aircraft to insufficient airspace, and specific or limited routing and altitudes. Such restrictions prevent optimal aircrew training and degrade operational flexibility during Federal and state missions. However, the committee notes that the Department of Defense has made significant progress developing ground-based sense and avoid (GBSAA) systems, and that the Department of the Army is expected to begin GBSAA operations at five locations in fiscal year 2015. The committee believes that ANG MQ–1/9 operations centers configured with a GBSAA system could improve and expedite the assimilation of the MQ–1/9 into operations in both international and domestic airspace, and encourages the Department of the Air Force to work with the Department of the Army to deploy GBSAA systems where appropriate.

Battlefield Airborne Communications Node program

The committee notes that the Department of the Air Force Battlefield Airborne Communication Node (BACN) program has been an effective program fielded through rapid acquisition authorities to support Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn. The BACN program currently uses EQ–4B and E–11A aircraft to host the BACN communications relay system. The committee is concerned, however, that in the absence of continued Overseas Contingency Operations funding that the program may be at risk.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to rapidly transition the BACN program to a base budget program of record to ensure that this capability is maintained in the Department of the Air Force for the long term.

C–130H Avionics Modernization Program and propulsion system upgrades

The budget request contained $35.9 million for C–130H aircraft modifications, but contained no funding for the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) or propulsion system upgrades.

The committee notes that the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that the Air Force will maintain 300 combat-coded C–130H and C–130J aircraft in the tactical airlift fleet inventory to support requirements and objectives in support of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–66) and the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014 (division C of Public Law 113–76), Congress authorized and appropriated $47.7 million for AMP and $41.7 million for propulsion system upgrades.
The committee is disappointed that the Secretary of the Air Force invested nearly $1.5 billion of taxpayer dollars for engineering, manufacturing, development, and testing of the C–130H AMP program, but has no plans to continue procurement and installation of C–130H AMP onto C–130H aircraft. In addition, the committee notes that the Secretary has no plans to modernize or upgrade the C–130H propulsion system in order to increase reliability, capability, fuel efficiency and on-wing time of the engine, as well as decrease the overall cost and maintenance burden of the current propulsion system. The Secretary has not provided the committee with a coherent plan for fleet-wide recapitalization of the C–130H fleet or explained how the Air Force plans to maintain medium-sized intra-theater airlift capacity and capability within both the Active and Reserve Components. The committee understands that the cost to continue the C–130 AMP program, as compared to the costs to individually complete modernization and upgrade requirements to keep the C–130H aircraft capable and relevant, are roughly the same. However, the committee believes that by failing to take actions to modernize the C–130H fleet in the very near term with C–130 AMP and propulsion systems upgrades, recapitalization costs, mitigation of obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources costs, or operating and sustainment costs will become so cost prohibitive in the future that the only course of action available to the Secretary will result in the divestiture of the C–130H aircraft from the Air Force inventory. Knowing that the majority of the C–130H fleet resides within the Reserve Components of the Air Force and that the C–130H should remain reliable, capable, and relevant to meeting current and future warfighter needs, the committee is concerned with the approach that the Secretary has taken with regard to the lack of robust modernization and upgrade of C–130H aircraft, if the aircraft is to have a service-life through 2040 as currently planned. Furthermore, C–130 AMP is estimated to reduce total ownership costs of the C–130H fleet by over 25 percent as compared to not modernizing the aircraft. The committee believes that if the Secretary is willing to expend at least $3.2 billion for two new presidential aircraft to achieve a benefit of a modernized and digital cockpit for the aircrew to execute an important mission in a benign flight environment, the Secretary should apply similar logic by spending significantly less than $3.2 billion for 179 C–130H aircraft that would provide a modernized and digital cockpit for C–130 aircrews that are required to tactically employ in more strenuous and dangerous flight conditions.

Elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would preserve the $1.5 billion taxpayer investment in the C–130 AMP program and would prohibit the Secretary from canceling the C–130 AMP program. Further, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to notify the congressional defense committees at any time the combat-coded fleet of C–130H and C–130J aircraft decreases below the 300 combat-coded aircraft prescribed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Finally, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Secretary of the Air Force to immediately obligate authorized appropriations pro-
vided in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 to continue C–130 AMP.

Therefore, the committee recommends $109.7 million, an increase of $73.8 million, for C–130H propulsion system propeller and engine control upgrades, continued acquisition and installation of C–130 AMP kits, and no funding to begin an alternative communications, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) system program.

**F–16 block 40/50 mission training centers**

The budget request contained no funds for the procurement of F–16 block 40/50 mission training centers for the Air National Guard. An F–16 block 40/50 mission training center (MTC) is a distributed mission operations-capable flight simulator for F–16 block 40 and 50 weapon systems. Each MTC includes high-fidelity simulator cockpits, instructor operator stations, a threat server, and briefing and debriefing capability. Each MTC is also capable of linking to geographically distributed high-fidelity combat and combat support training devices, including command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. This capability allows warfighters at home station to exercise and train at the operational and strategic levels of war as well as to conduct networked unit-level training.

The committee notes that F–16 block 40/50 MTCs are currently planned in the continental United States for Hill Air Force Base (AFB) in Utah, Shaw AFB in South Carolina, and Holloman AFB in New Mexico. The committee understands that other F–16 block 40 or 50 pilots located in the continental United States would need to travel to one of the three MTC locations, and believes that locating two additional MTCs in the Midwestern United States would save travel costs and make the F–16 block 40/50 MTC more available to Active Duty, Reserve and Air National Guard F–16 block 40 and 50 pilots, resulting in decreased travel costs and enhanced readiness.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to budget for two additional MTCs which would be located at F–16 Air National Guard units in the Midwestern United States.

**F–16 modernization**

The budget request contained $133.1 million in PE 27133F for development of F–16 capabilities, but contained no funds for the development of the combat avionics programmed extension suite (CAPES), development of the computer modular receiver exciter (C–MoRE), or for development of the scalable agile beam radar (SABR) upgrade.

CAPES would upgrade the F–16 blocks 40, 42, 50, and 52 with a new active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar, a new electronic warfare system, an integrated broadcast system, and a center display unit. The CAPES upgrade would increase the F–16's survivability against emerging threats. C–MoRE is a reliability improvement demonstration program for the APG–68(V1) radar of the Air National Guard’s F–16 block 30 aircraft fleet that would demonstrate an electronic system upgrade while retaining the radar’s
mechanically-scanned array. SABR is an F–16 radar modernization program that would replace the mechanically-scanned array with an AESA radar that would enhance F–16 mission capabilities, provide improved electronic protection, and provide a three-fold increase in radar reliability.

The committee notes that the budget request proposes the cancellation of CAPES. While the committee is disappointed that CAPES could not be funded, it understands that difficult choices were required due to budget reductions. The committee understands that the Department of the Air Force is reviewing future F–16 capability upgrade options for fiscal year 2016, and believes that the Department of the Air Force may have more affordable options to improve the capability of the F–16 fleet. Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of the Air Force to consider both the C–MoRE and the SABR upgrade.

The committee further notes that the Department of the Air Force’s 976-aircraft F–16 fleet is 50 percent of the Department’s fighter force, and that the F–16 block 40, 42, 50, and 52 fleets are likely to remain in the Department’s inventory for the next 15 to 20 years. The committee believes that capability upgrades to the F–16 fleet are vitally important to address future threats. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than February 16, 2015, that describes the plan for capability upgrades to the F–16 fleet including costs by year and by appropriation, risks of not upgrading the F–16 block 40, 42, 50, and 52 fleets with the CAPES upgrade, and the effect of the cancellation of CAPES on the Air National Guard’s F–16 fleet.

**High-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance**

Over the past 2 years, the committee has supported the Global Hawk Block 30 high-altitude unmanned aerial system and supports the current Department of the Air Force plan to retain the Global Hawk Block 30 for the high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. The committee notes that the Department of the Air Force has determined that Global Hawk operating costs have decreased while the Global Hawk Block 30 fleet has flown an increased number of hours compared to previous years in support of the combatant commanders.

While the committee was pleased that the Air Force requested funding for Global Hawk Block 30 in the budget request for fiscal year 2015, the committee is concerned with the Department of the Air Force’s plan to retire the U–2 fleet in fiscal year 2016. While the committee realizes that the Department can never fully meet the ISR demand of combatant commanders, reasonable and necessary ISR requests appear very likely to go unfilled if the current high-altitude airborne ISR collection capabilities of the U–2 are terminated. The committee notes that section 143 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–66) required the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit a report on all high-altitude ISR systems. The committee has not yet received this report and believes that any action to retire, or prepare to retire U–2 aircraft would be premature prior to the committee’s review of the re-
port. To ensure that no actions are taken to retire or prepare to retire the U–2 aircraft in fiscal year 2015, elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 to make significant changes to retire, prepare to retire, or place U–2 aircraft in storage.

The committee also notes that section 133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81) limits the retirement of U–2 aircraft until equal or greater ISR capability is available to commanders of the combatant commands, and believes that the Department of the Air Force plan to retire the entire fleet of U–2s in fiscal year 2016 is inconsistent with this provision.

The committee supports the Department of the Air Force efforts to upgrade the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders, but notes that this will take several years beyond the planned retirement of the U–2. In light of the known gaps, the committee has concerns with any plan that will leave the combatant commanders with less overall capacity and capability than they have today.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees and the congressional intelligence committees by February 16, 2015, that would establish a phased high-altitude airborne ISR transition plan which fields capability at the same time or before the U–2 aircraft retirement, and which would result in equal or greater capability available to the commanders of the combatant commands. This plan should include the costs, schedule, and identification of fielded high-altitude ISR capability and capacity. If retirement of the U–2 would result in decreased capability or capacity for high-altitude reconnaissance, the report should also include the Department of the Air Force plans to mitigate the effects of the decreased capability or capacity.

**KC–10 Aerial Refueling Aircraft Force Structure**

The committee notes that the President’s request for the Future Years Defense Program 2016–19 did not take into account Budget Control Act of 2011 (Public Law 112–25) sequestration level Department of Defense spending limitations.

The committee understands that if the spending limitations in Public Law 112–25 are imposed on the Department of the Air Force beyond fiscal year 2015, then additional reductions in critical capabilities and aircraft force structure will likely be necessary in order for the Department of the Air Force to comply with its share of spending authority. The committee understands from briefings and discussions with Air Force officials that the KC–10 Stratotanker aircraft could succumb to sequestration impacts. The committee is concerned that a divestment of a high-demand, low-density aircraft such as the KC–10 could have detrimental impacts for the Department of Defense in meeting its global reach and global power objectives, as it relates to supporting the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. The committee also notes that the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (CUSTC) has validated that the requirement
for aerial refueling aircraft capability is 567 aircraft. The Department of the Air Force currently has only 454 aerial refueling aircraft, resulting in a deficit of 113 aircraft short of the CUSTC requirement. The Air Force is not projected to have 567 aerial refueling tankers in its inventory, assuming that no KC–10 or KC–135 are divested, prior to delivery of the 112th KC–46 tanker aircraft in the next decade.

Therefore, elsewhere in this title, the committee includes a provision that would prohibit the Secretary of the Air Force from using any funds or taking any action during fiscal year 2015 to divest or transfer, or prepare to divest or transfer, any KC–10 aerial refueling aircraft of the Air Force. In addition, if the President’s request for fiscal year 2016 proposes to divest the KC–10 aerial refueling aircraft from the Department of the Air Force, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit to the congressional defense committees at the time of the fiscal year 2016 budget submission, an operational risk assessment and mitigation strategy that evaluates the military’s ability to meet the requirements and objectives stipulated in the Department’s Guidance for Employment of the Force, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and all geographical combatant commander steady-state rotational and warfighting surge contingency operational planning documents.

**KC–46 Aerial Refueling Aircraft program**

The budget request contained $1.6 billion for KC–46 Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 1 (LRIP 1) procurement of seven aircraft. The committee notes that the KC–46 program has been executing to date without any requirements changes, and appreciates the requirements discipline that the Secretary of the Air Force has maintained since the beginning of the program. The committee supports the KC–46 program and the capability the aircraft will bring to the Air Force when it is eventually fielded. The committee also realizes that fiscal efficiencies can be garnered from the program at this point in time without a significant impact to program execution.

Therefore, the committee recommends $1.4 billion, a decrease of $226.1 million, for KC–46 LRIP 1 procurement of six aircraft to support higher priorities contained elsewhere in this Act. The committee expresses that the Secretary of the Air Force should not consider this as punitive action against the KC–46 program, and the committee expects the Secretary to maintain the same Future Years Defense Program procurement quantity of aircraft despite the one aircraft decrease in the fiscal year 2015 budget. The committee understands from discussions with Air Force program officials that a decrease of 1 aircraft in LRIP 1 will not have a significant impact to program execution and should not hinder the ability for 18 KC–46 aircraft to be delivered by the contractual required assets availability date of the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017.
Spare engine requirements and inventory for F–15E and F–16 aircraft

The committee is aware that the Air Force has established a requirement for 25 additional spare engines for its F–15E and F–16 aircraft fleets, as validated by the Propulsion Requirements Study (PRS). The committee believes that, given the key role that the F–15 and F–16 aircraft will play in meeting fighter requirements until the F–35 aircraft is fielded in sufficient numbers, the extension of the F–15 and F–16 fleets will require a reliable base of spare engines. The committee is concerned, however, that while the Department of the Air Force has identified this requirement, it has not yet taken action to fulfill it. In addition, the committee understands that the F–100 production line is currently planned to terminate at the end of 2016 based on current orders.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services by October 1, 2014, which details the Department of the Air Force’s plan to address the unfulfilled requirement for F–15 and F–16 spare engines.

PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, AIR FORCE

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $677.4 million for Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force. The committee recommends authorization of $677.4 million, full funding of the request, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force program are identified in division D of this Act.

MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $4.7 billion for Missile Procurement, Air Force. The committee recommends authorization of $4.8 billion, an increase of $132.0 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Missile Procurement, Air Force program are identified in division D of this Act.

OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Overview

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $16.6 billion for Other Procurement, Air Force. The committee recommends authorization of $16.5 billion, a decrease of $64.0 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Other Procurement, Air Force program are identified in division D of this Act.
Items of Special Interest

Air Force explosive ordnance disposal unmanned systems repairs and upgrades

The committee notes that over the past 10 years, the Department of the Air Force has invested in hundreds of unmanned systems to support critical explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) missions. The committee also notes that many of these systems are in need of repair and upgrade after being used extensively in deployed environments. Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a formal acquisition program for fiscal year 2016 to properly facilitate and manage the repair, maintenance, and upgrade of the Department of the Air Force’s EOD unmanned systems.

Aircraft tug vehicles

The committee supports the Air Force’s goal to develop advanced power and energy technologies that promote energy efficiency and allow the force to meet mission objectives. To this end, the committee supports further study of the battery powered towbarless tow vehicles. The committee is aware that in a preliminary Air Force study, a battery powered towbarless tow vehicle demonstrated an ability to complete the same task as current aircraft tow vehicles using less energy while saving money and creating a safer work environment. The committee believes that if further studies confirm initial assessments of this capability, the Air Force should explore replacing additional existing aircraft tow vehicles with the new electric towbarless alternatives.

Beyond line of sight command and control for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems

The committee is encouraged by the advances in distribution of full motion video and the bridging of disparate radio wave forms for enhanced interoperability as part of the Joint Aerial Layered Network. The committee recognizes that the fielding of beyond line of sight command and control and associated tactical pods in support of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance will provide valuable capabilities in response to stated urgent combatant commander requirements.

Yet, the committee is concerned that a joint capability, called Tactical Airborne Communications Pod (TACPod) was developed using Air Force Quick Reaction Capability funding and processes, but is not being used across the military services. Rather than deploying the capability to meet combatant commander validated requirements, TACPod is instead being stored indefinitely. Separately, the committee is concerned that the Air Force is procuring an entirely different capability to meet essentially the same requirements that TACPod was originally developed to fulfill.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to provide a briefing to the committee by November 1, 2014, on the existing and planned activities in support of beyond line of sight com-
mand and control for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

**Emergency Airfield Lighting System**

The committee notes that the Department of the Air Force awarded a small-business set-aside contract to develop the Emergency Airfield Light System II (EALS II), but subsequently canceled the program after a successful 2013 operational utility evaluation where only minor deficiencies were found. The committee believes that the capability of the EALS II will be a lasting requirement and is concerned that the costs associated with a new development effort for a system with comparable requirements to EALS II may have significant schedule and cost risks. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than July 30, 2014, on the decision not to proceed with EALS II production. The briefing should include the Air Force's current plan to meet requirements for emergency airfield lighting and the projected funding required through fiscal year 2019.

**Joint threat emitter procurement**

The budget request contained $26.6 million in other procurement, Air Force, for combat training range equipment. Of this amount, $13.5 million was requested for procurement of one joint threat emitter (JTE).

The committee is aware of the importance of maintaining the proficiency of combat aircrews and their capability to respond to, survive and defeat the most advanced enemy air defenses they could encounter on any current battlefield. The committee is also aware that the JTE is intended to provide realistic electronic warfare training that can simulate the multiple threat scenarios of a hostile integrated air defense system. In addition, while older emitters are employed at numerous training ranges, the committee notes that they mostly simulate antiquated Soviet air defense systems designed during the Cold War. The committee believes that these older legacy emitters may not be adequate to train aircrews expected to challenge the most sophisticated enemy systems, such as the SA–20, SA–23 or HQ–9 surface-to-air missile systems. Given the importance of the JTE, the committee is concerned that the Air Force Budget request only includes funding to procure one JTE in fiscal year 2015. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to evaluate options for potentially accelerating the production and fielding of JTE units and brief the committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the program by January 31, 2015.

The committee recommends $26.6 million, the full amount requested, for combat training range equipment.

**PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE**

**Overview**

The budget request for fiscal year 2015 contained $4.2 billion for Procurement, Defense-Wide. The committee recommends authoriza-
tion of $4.4 billion, an increase of $172.1 million, for fiscal year 2015.

The committee recommendations for the fiscal year 2015 Procurement, Defense-Wide program are identified in division D of this Act.

Items of Special Interest

Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system and U.S.-based coproduction

The budget request contained $176.0 million in PE 28866C for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system.

The committee has supported the Iron Dome Weapons System since the State of Israel’s first request for U.S. funding in fiscal year 2011. Since the first authorization of Missile Defense Agency (MDA) funding, U.S. taxpayers have provided $720.0 million for the program. The committee is aware that the Israeli requirement may necessitate up to $175.0 million in addition to the $176.0 million contained in the President’s request.

The committee has received “The Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System Procurement,” signed on March 5, 2014. The committee is pleased that this agreement resolves many details of U.S. coproduction of Iron Dome components and interceptors in the United States. The committee is aware that MDA and the Israeli Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) have entered into an international agreement to govern how the United States funds up to $680 million between fiscal years 2012–15 for Iron Dome. The committee is concerned that the agreement does not cover the full amount it recommends for fiscal year 2015. Given the significant U.S. taxpayer investment in this system, the committee believes that coproduction of parts and components should be done in a manner that will maximize U.S. industry participation in intercep tor and battery deliveries for Israel’s defense needs. The committee recommends $351.0 million, an increase of $175.0 million, in PE 28866C for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system.

However, the committee expects that the Director, Missile Defense Agency will not obligate or expend $175.0 million of that amount, and instead hold it in reserve and disburse it incrementally until receipt and acceptance by the MDA of sufficiently detailed cost and schedule justification from the Government of Israel. Such detailed cost and schedule justification must include:

1. A timeline for Iron Dome expenditure of funds above the President’s request for the fiscal year for which the funds were appropriated or made available;

2. Copies of signed and ratified contracts, subcontracts, and teaming arrangements between Israeli and U.S. industry for all Iron Dome coproduction efforts;

3. Delivery to MDA of all technical data packages as accepted by U.S. industry suppliers for coproduction; and

4. A common cost model of Iron Dome components, to be jointly developed and agreed upon by MDA and IMDO that includes: recurring and non-recurring engineering costs; estimates for future
buys and actual costs beginning with fiscal year 2013; the required quantities for all components through fiscal year 2019; and component lead-times and delivery schedules.

Additionally, the committee expects the Director, Missile Defense Agency will ensure that: Iron Dome operational data has been provided per previous commitments; this additional funding be applied to the work share percentage for fiscal year 2015 funding between U.S. and Israeli industry as proscribed under the recently signed Iron Dome Procurement Agreement; and that the additional funds are required to meet Israeli defense needs. Any funds found to be in excess of Israel's justified and documented needs during fiscal year 2015 may be transferred by the MDA to appropriations available for the procurement of weapons and equipment according to priority needs.

The committee also believes that if there is a request for Iron Dome funding for fiscal year 2016, the Director, Missile Defense must establish for the committee how those funds will resolve details and agreements needed for U.S.-based coproduction of all-up-rounds and cover the export of Iron Dome technology to U.S. and Israeli allies, including coproduction of parts, components, and all-up-rounds of those exports.

The committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than October 1, 2014, on the information provided in the required detailed cost and schedule justification, including the views of the Director and the Under Secretary on its sufficiency.

Further, the committee directs the Director, Missile Defense Agency to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not less than once each quarter in fiscal year 2015, starting October 1, 2014, on the progress in achieving the requirements established in “The Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System Procurement.”

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

SUBTITLE A—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Section 101—Authorization of Appropriations

This section would authorize appropriations for procurement at the levels identified in section 4101 of division D of this Act.

SUBTITLE B—ARMY PROGRAMS

Section 111—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Airborne Reconnaissance Low Aircraft

This section would limit the obligation or expenditure of funds for the communications intelligence subsystem of the airborne reconnaissance low program until the Secretary of the Army submits a report to the congressional defense committees on the plan to in-
tegrate such subsystem into the signals intelligence modernization plan of the Army.

Section 112—Plan on Modernization of UH–60A Aircraft of Army National Guard

This section would require the Secretary of the Army to submit a plan to the congressional defense committees on the Army’s strategy to modernize the National Guard’s fleet of UH–60A Black Hawk helicopters.

**SUBTITLE C—NAVY PROGRAMS**

Section 121—Multiyear Procurement Authority for Tomahawk Block IV Missiles

This section would authorize the Secretary of the Navy to enter into a multiyear contract for up to 5 years beginning in fiscal year 2015, pending submission to Congress of the certification requirements of section 2306b, title 10, United States Code, not later than 45 days prior to entering into the multiyear procurement contract.

Section 122—Construction of San Antonio Class Amphibious Ship

This section would provide the Secretary of the Navy incremental funding authority to enter into a contract for the ship construction of a *San Antonio* class amphibious ship.

Section 123—Additional Oversight Requirements for the Undersea Mobility Acquisition Program of the United States Special Operations Command

This section would modify the current oversight requirements for the undersea mobility acquisition program of U.S. Special Operations Command, and require the Secretary of the Navy to review a transition plan for the undersea mobility capabilities developed by the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. This section would also repeal section 144 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81).

Section 124—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Moored Training Ship Program

This section would limit the obligation to no more than 80 percent of the fiscal year 2015 shipbuilding and conversion, Navy funding for the Moored Training Ship program until certain certifications and reviews regarding requirements and cost growth are provided to the congressional defense committees.

Section 125—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Mission Modules for Littoral Combat Ship

This section would limit fiscal year 2015 funds for the procurement of additional mission modules for the Littoral Combat Ship program until the Secretary of the Navy submits milestone B program goals for cost, schedule, and performance for each mission module increment, and certification by the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation that sufficient mission modules are available to perform all necessary operational testing.

Section 126—Extension of Limitation on Availability of Funds for Littoral Combat Ship

This section would amend section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–66) and extend the funds limitation to include funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise available for fiscal year 2015. This section would therefore prohibit the expenditure of funds associated with Littoral Combat Ship 25 and 26 until the Secretary of the Navy submits a report of the Littoral Combat Ship program that was requested in section 124 of Public Law 113–66.

SUBTITLE D—AIR FORCE PROGRAMS

Section 131—Prohibition on Cancellation or Modification of Avionics Modernization Program for C–130 Aircraft

This section would prohibit the Secretary of the Air Force from modifying or canceling the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program in fiscal year 2015 and would also prohibit the Secretary from beginning an alternative C–130H modernization program (except for developing and installing an Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast system modification for the C–130H). The committee is concerned that any alternative modernization program the Air Force would pursue would offer less capability than the program of record.

This section would also limit the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for operation and maintenance of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to not more than 75 percent until a period of 15 days has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that the Secretary has obligated the funds authorized to the appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal years prior to fiscal year 2015 for the avionics modernization program of record for C–130 aircraft.

Section 132—Prohibition on Availability of Funds for Retirement of A–10 Aircraft

This section would prohibit funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for the Department of Defense to be obligated or expended to retire A–10 aircraft. This section would also require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study evaluating the platforms of the Air Force used, as of the date of the study, to conduct close air support missions, and submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, which would include the cost per airframe carrying out the close air support missions, the capabilities of each platform evaluated under such study, and a determination by the Comptroller General with respect to whether such airframes other than A–10 aircraft are able to successfully carry out such close air support missions.
Section 133—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Retirement of U–2 Aircraft

This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 to make significant changes to retire, prepare to retire, or place U–2 aircraft in storage.

Section 134—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Divestment or Transfer of KC–10 Aircraft

This section would prohibit the Secretary of the Air Force from using any funds or taking any action during fiscal year 2015 to divest or transfer, or prepare to divest or transfer, any KC–10 aerial refueling aircraft of the Air Force.

Section 135—Limitation on Availability of Funds for Divestment of E–3 Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft

This section would limit funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2015 for the Department of Defense to be obligated or expended to divest more than four E–3 airborne warning and control system aircraft, or disestablish any units of the active or reserve components associated with such aircraft, until a period of 15 days has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary of the Air Force submits to the congressional defense committees a report consisting of a certification that the Secretary is able to meet all priority requirements of the commanders of the combatant commands relating to such aircraft with a planned force of 24 such aircraft and a detailed explanation how the Secretary will meet such requirements with such planned force.

SUBTITLE E—DEFENSE-WIDE, JOINT, AND MULTISERVICE MATTERS

Section 141—Comptroller General Report on F–35 Aircraft Acquisition Program

This section would require the Comptroller General of the United States to review the F–35 acquisition program, and to submit a report not later than April 15, 2015, and each year thereafter until the F–35 acquisition program enters full rate production. Each report would include the extent to which the F–35 aircraft acquisition program is meeting cost, schedule and performance goals; the progress and results of developmental and operational testing; the progress of the procurement and manufacturing of the F–35 aircraft; and an assessment of any plans or efforts of the Secretary of Defense to improve the efficiency of the procurement and manufacturing of the F–35 aircraft.