SIGNIT capability is documented only as a "potential future capability," and not a validated requirement as implied by Navy officials to Congress. The Navy also proposes to prematurely remove high-skill personnel from the EP-3/SPA programs, resulting in a reduction of the number of available aircraft to support GFMAP and wartime requirements. Congress is concerned that releasing personnel to support an early version of TRITON that provides only optical and radar sensing, but little or no SIGINT capability, does not maximize utilization of high-skill personnel with perishable skill sets. Furthermore, the lack of a validated requirement for a robust SIGINT capability raises concerns that the capability and capability decline will turn out to be a permanent ISR capability loss.

We have serious concerns about the Navy's non-compliant EP-3/SPA to P-8 QRC/TRITON Multi-INT transition plan. Therefore, we direct that:

1. The JROC and report to Congress the combatant commander requirements for the simultaneous ISR collection capability required by EP-3/SPA assets under current Operational Plans and for the GFMAP.
2. The Joint Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, working with the Navy, identify and report to Congress alternative EP-3/SPA to P-8 QRC/TRITON Multi-INT transition options that do not result in a capacity and capability gap, including such options as using Navy reserve personnel to stand up the baseline TRITON system.
3. The JROC and report to the Navy to develop and deploy a formal requirement for TRITON Multi-INT.
4. The USD develop, and report to Congress, a mitigation plan to address the ELINT issues identified in the Senate report accompanying S. 1197 (S. Rept. 113-44) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014; and,
5. The JROC and USD work to determine, and report to Congress, the force structure quantity and type of federated ISR systems and sensors required to wholly replace the EP-3/SPA force structure of aircraft to meet or exceed the current capacity and diversity of ISR collection capability inherently resident on the EP-3/SPA aircraft.

Multiservice procurement authority for Ground-Based Interceptors

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1H) that would provide multi-year procurement authority and advance procurement authority to the Director of the Missile Defense Agency for the procurement of 14 Ground-Based Interceptors.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

Sense of Senate on the United States helicopter industrial base and its future

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 192) that would express the sense of Senate on the health of the helicopter industrial base.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SUBTITLE A—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Authorization of appropriations (sec. 201)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 201) that would authorize the Secretary of Defense for research, development, test, and evaluation as specified in the funding table in section 4201.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained an identical provision (sec. 201).

The agreement provides:

Modification of requirements on biennial strategic plans for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 212) that would modify the biennial strategic plan requirement for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to make explicit the linkage between the strategic objectives of the agency and the missions of the armed forces. This provision would reassign responsibility for submission of the plan from the Secretary of Defense to the Director of DARPA, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes this provision.

We recognize the value that DARPA brings to the Department of Defense, especially in terms of high risk that can be potentially game changing. We believe that such research has the highest probability of successful transition when it is linked early with the operational community. For example, DARPA’s Phoenix program has the potential to change radically how the United States approaches space systems development and servicing. As the only program looking at satellite servicing and advanced robotics for geosynchronous earth orbit systems, this program has significant national security, civil, and as well as, commercial potential. However, we note that the development of such capabilities may raise complex policy issues, as well as pose as a disruptive technology to established approaches and operations. We encourage DARPA to not only continue its technical leadership in this field, but also to work with other entities in the Department of Defense—such as the Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Intelligence—to determine and develop operational concepts for this capability.

Limitation on availability of funds for ground combat vehicle engineering and manufacturing phase

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 211) that would prohibit the Army from obligating funds for the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program until the Secretary of the Army submits a report to the congressional defense committees.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes this provision with a technical amendment.

Limitation on availability of funds for defensive counter-air operations in the United States and defense committees detailing the Air Force's plan for sustainment of the Application Software Assurance Center of Excellence (ASACOE) across the Future Years Defense Program.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision but included elsewhere in the committee-reported bill $150 million in PE 33140F for sustainment of the ASACOE.

The agreement includes this provision.

Limitation on availability of funds for precision extended range munition program

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 216) that would limit funds for the precision extended range munition program until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provides the congressional defense committees with certain written certifications and a sufficient business case analysis.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the House provision with a clarifying amendment.
Long-range standoff weapon requirement; prohibition on availability of funds for non-competitive procedures for offensive anti-surface warfare weapons contracts of the Department of Defense.

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 218) that would require the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a follow-on air-launched cruise missile, Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) standoff weapon that achieves initial operating capability for both conventional and nuclear missions by not later than 2030 and is certified for internal carriage and employment for both conventional and nuclear missions on the next-generation long-range strike bomber by not later than 2025.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that requires the LRSO to achieve initial operating capability for conventional missions prior to the retirement of the AGM–86, for nuclear missions prior to the retirement of the nuclear armed AGM–109A and is capable of internal carriage and employment for both conventional and nuclear missions in the long-range strike bomber. The amendment provides that the Secretary may carry out the construction of the AGM–109A only after the retirement of the AGM–86. The agreement contains no similar provision.

The amendment further includes a provision that would prohibit, during fiscal year 2014, using available funds to contract for Navy offensive anti-surface warfare weapons using software or other than than through competitive procedures. Development, testing, and fielding of aircraft-launched offensive anti-surface warfare weapons would be exempted from that prohibition. Included in the provision is a waiver of the prohibition by the Secretary of Defense if the Secretary determines that waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

Review of software development for F-35 aircraft (sec. 218)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 219) that would require the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to establish an independent team consisting of subject matter experts to review the development of software that will be part of the F-35 aircraft and to report on the results of that review.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that would require the USD(AT&L) to provide a plan for the sustainment of the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) for F-35 aircraft in the biennial defense strategic plan. The agreement contains no similar provision.

Evaluation and assessment of the distributed common ground system (sec. 219)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 220) that would require that spending for fiscal year 2015, future budget submissions include separate project codes for each capability component within each program element for each service within the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS); (2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) conduct a technical link analysis tools that could be used to meet the requirements of each of the service versions of the DCGS; and (3) If one or more commercial link analysis tools were found to meet the requirements of the program, the responsible service secretary would be required to initiate a request for proposals to purchase those tools.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that would include the requirement that: (1) The services’ budget submissions include separate project codes for each capability component within each program element for each service version of the DCGS; and (2) The USD(AT&L) conduct an analysis of capability components with the intelligence community data standards and could be used to meet the requirements of the DCGS program. The provision would require the Under Secretary of Defense to conduct an analysis of the competitive acquisition options for capability components within DCGS shows that expanded competition shows promise.

Operational responsive space (sec. 220)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 225) that would prohibit expending more than 50 percent of the funds authorized or expended for the space-based infrared system (SBIRS) space segment until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees, the Secretary of Defense is carrying out the Operational Responsive Space program office in accordance with title 10, U.S.C. 2273a.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes an amendment requiring a report no later than 60 days from the date of enactment regarding a potential mission that would seek to leverage all the policy objectives of the Operationally Responsive Space Program in a single mission.

Sustainment or replacement of Blue Devil intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (sec. 221)

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 226) that would require the Secretary of the Air Force to procure the currently deployed Blue Devil intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system or to develop a plan to replace that system with a comparable or improved system.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the Senate provision with an amendment that would require the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan to sustain the operational capabilities of the Blue Devil ISR Systems, including the capability to provide precision signal geolocation, by procuring the existing Blue Devil I aircraft, developing a new system, or adapting and integrating capabilities from existing and development programs. The Secretary is required to submit a report that addresses the cost of procuring, operating, and sustaining Blue Devil I aircraft system; the ability of other platforms to provide similar intelligence capabilities; and a listing of related U.S. Air Force and Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency (DARPA) programs. The report should be coordinated with the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and the Director of DARPA.

We agree that the necessary capability to sustain is both wide-area motion imagery combined with precision signal geolocation. The integration of these two capabilities provides significant utility.

SUBTITLE C—MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Improvements to acquisition accountability reports on ballistic missile defense system (sec. 231)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 231) that would require the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to make certain improvements to the cost estimates in its annual acquisition accountability reports on the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), and to provide a report on the plans and schedule for making such improvements.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes a provision that would require that each cost estimate shall include all of the operation and sustainment (O&S) costs for which the Director is responsible, and also include a summary description of the O&S funds for which the military departments are responsible, consistent with the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum of June 10, 2011, on funding responsibilities for two increments.

We note that, although the MDA is required to provide life-cycle cost estimates of its acquisition programs—including O&S costs—it does not include in those cost estimates the O&S costs for which the military departments are responsible for the BMDS. As the Government Accountability Office has noted, this makes it difficult to understand the comprehensive life-cycle costs of BMDS elements. Therefore, we direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to work with the military departments that own and operate elements of the BMDS to improve this understanding as soon as possible.

Furthermore, we expect the Director of the MDA to take steps to ensure that cost estimate improvements required by the provision are made in a manner as consistent as practicable with the guidance issued pursuant to section 832 of Public Law 112–81, relating to O&S costs, and with the guidance issued pursuant to section 2334(d) of title 10, United States Code, relative to confidence levels of baseline cost estimates.

Prohibition on use of funds for MEADS program (sec. 232)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 231) that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2014 funds for the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), and would also place conditions on the harvesting of MEADS technology.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a similar provision (sec. 236) that would prohibit the use of fiscal year 2014 funds for MEADS.

The agreement includes the Senate provision.

We note that the Department of Defense has invested more than $2.5 billion in the development of MEADS, which has a substantial interest in making constructive use of any MEADS data and technology owned by the United States. We direct the Secretary of Defense to work with the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, providing: (1) An explanation of the technology developed under the tri-national MEADS development program; (2) How the Secretary intends to ensure that the Department gets the maximum benefit from the funds spent in MEADS, including by making such technology and data available for any MEADS technology harvesting for those programs, including the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) program system of record, taking into account the report required by House
Report 113–102, “Technology harvesting of the Medium Extended Air Defense System”; and (3) U.S. policy regarding 3rd Party Sales of such technology, which we believe could be of benefit to the Secretary of Defense and its allies. The agreement commits the United States and Israel to develop a joint military defense cooperation between the United States and Israel. We believe the cooperation will significantly reduce the risk for the United States. The agreement includes a provision that would require the Missile Defense Agency to deploy an additional missile defense radar for homeland missile defense, and would authorize $30.0 million for initial costs toward such deployment.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes a provision that would require the Missile Defense Agency to deploy an additional missile defense radar for homeland missile defense, and would authorize $30.0 million for initial costs toward such deployment.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the Senate provision requiring the report, with a clarifying amendment.

The agreement authorizes an additional $80.0 million for the Missile Defense Agency to continue efforts to understand the cause of the problem that resulted in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system flight test failure on July 5, 2013, using the Capability Enhancement-1 (CE-1) kill vehicle, and take the necessary steps to correct the problem and demonstrate the correction in an intercept flight test. The CE-1 flight test failure occurred after the budget was submitted, and no funds were planned or budgeted to analyze and correct the problem, or to conduct another intercept flight test to demonstrate the correction of the problem. The Missile Defense Agency has stated that its highest priority is correcting the problems associated with the flight test failures of the CE-1 and CE-1 kill vehicles, and demonstrating the successful corrections through additional intercept flight tests.

We direct that, not later than 60 days after the submission of the report required by the provision, the Government Accountability Office provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the subject matter required in the report not later than April 1, 2014.

The agreement authorizes $100.0 million for design and development of common kill vehicle technology for an upgraded enhanced exo-atmospheric kill vehicle for the GMD system, an increase of $30.0 million above the budget request, to accelerate design and development efforts, as reflected in the tables in section 4201.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 231) that would express the sense of Congress concerning the importance of homeland missile defense against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran, and would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on potential options for enhancing homeland ballistic missile defense.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the Senate provision requiring the report, with a clarifying amendment.

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Report on potential future homeland ballistic missile defense options (sec. 238)

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 231) that would express the sense of Congress concerning the importance of homeland missile defense against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran, and would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on potential options for enhancing homeland ballistic missile defense.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the Senate provision requiring the report, with a clarifying amendment.

The agreement authorizes an additional $80.0 million for the Missile Defense Agency to continue efforts to understand the cause of the problem that resulted in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system flight test failure on July 5, 2013, using the Capability Enhancement-1 (CE-1) kill vehicle, and take the necessary steps to correct the problem and demonstrate the correction in an intercept flight test. The CE-1 flight test failure occurred after the budget was submitted, and no funds were planned or budgeted to analyze and correct the problem, or to conduct another intercept flight test to demonstrate the correction of the problem. The Missile Defense Agency has stated that its highest priority is correcting the problems associated with the flight test failures of the CE-1 and CE-1 kill vehicles, and demonstrating the successful corrections through additional intercept flight tests.

We direct that, not later than 60 days after the submission of the report required by the provision, the Government Accountability Office provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the subject matter required in the report not later than April 1, 2014.

The agreement authorizes $100.0 million for design and development of common kill vehicle technology for an upgraded enhanced exo-atmospheric kill vehicle for the GMD system, an increase of $30.0 million above the budget request, to accelerate design and development efforts, as reflected in the tables in section 4201.

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The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 231) that would express the sense of Congress concerning the importance of homeland missile defense against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and Iran, and would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on potential options for enhancing homeland ballistic missile defense.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the Senate provision requiring the report, with a clarifying amendment.

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We direct that, not later than 60 days after the submission of the report required by the provision, the Government Accountability Office provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the subject matter required in the report not later than April 1, 2014.

The agreement authorizes $100.0 million for design and development of common kill vehicle technology for an upgraded enhanced exo-atmospheric kill vehicle for the GMD system, an increase of $30.0 million above the budget request, to accelerate design and development efforts, as reflected in the tables in section 4201.
provide, not later than 180 days after the completion of the site evaluation study required by section 227(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239), and (2) a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the status of current efforts and plans to implement the requirements of section 227. The agreement also authorizes an additional $20.0 million for the Missile Defense Agency to continue activities relative to the site evaluation study, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, and planning activities consistent with the requirements of section 227(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, including the development of the contingency plan for the deployment of an additional homeland missile defense interceptor site. Such planning activities should include efforts to update the relevant planning documents from the deployment of missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, and plans for the possible deployment of additional interceptors in Europe, to prepare for the potential deployment of an additional missile defense site in the continental United States, should such efforts be required to fulfill the planning activities as can practically be commenced prior to site selection, or updated upon site selection.

**Sense of Congress and report on NATO and missile defense burden-sharing.**

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 238) that would require the President to seek specific levels of funding from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for various phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes a provision that would express the sense of Congress concerning the increasing importance of burden-sharing among NATO allies for future missile defense, and would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees providing: (1) The estimated costs for the EPAA; (2) A description of the level of NATO burden-sharing for the costs of NATO missile defense, including the EPAA; and (3) An assessment of, and recommendations for, areas where, in the opinion of the Secretary, burden-sharing among NATO allies could make additional burden-sharing contributions to NATO missile defense, including the EPAA.

We note that, as declared at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the United States and its NATO allies share a strong interest in developing an operationally-active and cost-effective missile defense capability to defend the territory, population, and military forces of NATO—including forward deployed United States forces in Europe. The United States and its NATO partners are making a variety of contributions, both individually and collectively, to NATO missile defense, including through national contributions, host-nation basing agreements, and collective funding arrangements. The United States is contributing to the EPAA implementation and is providing support for NATO missile defense, and a number of NATO allies are providing important support for the EPAA, as well as other support for NATO missile defense, including cancellation of the EPAA. The cancellation of the EPAA eliminated the contribution that the EPAA would have made toward augmenting U.S. homeland missile defenses against potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles.

We believe that burden-sharing is an important NATO principle, and is important to the recently adopted NATO mission of missile defense of NATO territory, population, and military forces. The EPAA is reckoning the important support provided by a number of NATO allies for key aspects of the EPAA. We believe the U.S. Government should encourage and ensure that NATO provides additional support for NATO missile defense, including the EPAA, to ensure an appropriate level of burden-sharing.

**Sense of Congress on procurement of capability enhancement II exomorphetic kilovolt vehicle (sec. 242).**

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 239) that would express the sense of Congress concerning the deployment of regional ballistic missile defense capabilities in East Asia until after certain conditions are met.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes a provision that would express the sense of Congress concerning the deployment of regional ballistic missile defense capabilities in East Asia until after certain conditions are met.

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 253) that would limit the use of funds to remove United States missile defense equipment in East Asia until after certain conditions are met.

The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 263) that would extend section 219 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 (Public Law 110–417) to September 2020. In addition, this provision would allow for funds to be accumulated for not more than 5 years for individual Department of Defense laboratory revitalization projects with costs up to $20.0 million for the Missile Defense Agency to provide additional support for NATO missile defense, including the EPAA, to ensure an appropriate level of burden-sharing.

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The House bill contained a provision (sec. 221) that would make a series of findings and express the sense of Congress regarding the importance of aligning the common missile compartment included as an element of the Ohio-class submarine program with the Vanguard-class successor program of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes this provision with an amendment clarifying the findings contained in the House provision.

Sense of Congress on counter-electronics high power microwave project (sec. 267)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 224) that expressed a sense of Congress urging the Air Force to consider the Counter-electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Program (CHAMP) technology capability demonstration as a potential weapon option available to combatant commanders by 2016.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment clarifying the need to complete developmental planning for such weapon systems if requirements are established by the combatant commanders in the future.

LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS NOT ADOPTED

Conventional Prompt Global Strike program

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 221) that would prohibit the Department of Defense from expending any funds for the Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) program until 60 days after they deliver a report to the congressional defense committees addressing the policy consideration concerning the ambiguity problems regarding the launch of CPGS missiles from submarine platforms.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We agree that no more than 75 percent of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for the submarine buildup bill should be obligated or expended for any activities relating to the development of a submarine-launched capability under that program until 60 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report that addresses the policy considerations concerning any policy problems regarding the launch of a conventionally-armed missile from submarine platforms, potential verification measures, any target sets the Secretary believes a submarine-launched conventionally-armed missile could reach that a missile on board another platform could not reach, the comparative cost considerations of submarine-launched conventionally-armed missiles and such systems launched by other platforms.

We also note that in congressional testimony, the U.S. Strategic Command, stated that “today, the only prompt global strike capability to engage potentially time-sensitive, fleeting targets continues to be that of the missile systems associated with nuclear weapons. We continue to require a deployed conventional prompt strike capability to provide the President a range of flexible military options to address a small number of highest-value targets, including in an anti-access and area denial environment.”

Unmanned combat air system demonstration testing requirement

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 217) that would require the Secretary of the Navy to establish a demonstration program for an autonomous aerial refueling within the X-47B aircraft testing and evaluation program. The X-47B is an unmanned aircraft being tested under the Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) demonstration program.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We understand that the Chief of Naval Operations has decided that, unlike the original recently-introduced M855A1 standard X-47B during fiscal year 2014, and will pursue a number of risk reduction activities. We support these Navy plans for continuing risk reduction activities and encourage the Navy to consider performing the aerial refueling demonstration as part of these additional risk reduction activities.

Requirement to complete individual carbine testing

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 221) that would require the Department of the Army to complete planned testing for an individual carbine.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We understand that during the Army’s testing of eight candidate carbines under the individual carbine program that none of the carbines met the Army’s reliability requirements. We further understand that these results may be attributable to the interactions between the carbines and the recently-introduced M855A1 standard 5.56mm rounds that were used during the test and evaluation. These test results suggest that the Army may have used an unrealistically-high reliability standard, and encourage the Army to consider a process for continuous test and evaluation of alternatives to the M4A1 carbine that is based on realistic operational requirements and significantly improved, but reasonably achievable, performance and reliability. We note that, while the Army may have reduced needs and limited funds to procure large numbers of new rifles or carbines in the near future, maintaining research and development efforts for new small arms in this class is essential to ensure that the industrial base can respond to sudden increases in demand as it did during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In this regard, the Secretary of the Army, or designee, is directed to provide the congressional defense committees a briefing that details the Army’s long range standard rifle and carbine modernization strategy. This briefing shall be provided not later than April 1, 2014, and shall include: the Army’s plans, including where appropriate, schedules and funding profiles, for research and development, procurement, and test and evaluation of commercially available and militarily suitable alternatives.

Establishment of funding line and fielding plan for a Navy laser weapon system

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 222) that would establish a funding line and fielding plan for a Navy laser weapon system for fiscal year 2018 and beyond.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We are supportive of accelerating the development and transition of directed energy weapons to programs of record, in the Navy as well as the other military departments. However, we believe that it is premature to create such a funding line. We also note that many of the current activities supporting development of directed energy weapons are already embedded in existing research and development program elements, and therefore the creation of a new funding line at this stage could be disruptive to those efforts and potentially detrimental to overall efforts to develop and field a militarily-relevant system.

Analysis of alternatives for successor to Precision Tracking Space System

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 235) that would require the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to perform an analysis of alternatives for a successor sensor system to the Precision Tracking Space System.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

Sense of Congress on 30th anniversary of the Strategic Defense Initiative

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 240) that would express the sense of Congress concerning the 30th anniversary of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

Sense of Congress on negotiations affecting the missile defenses of the United States

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 242) that would express the sense of Congress concerning negotiations with the Russian Federation that would affect the missile defenses of the United States.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

Report on main battle tank fuel efficiency

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 253) that would require the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on a fuel efficiency improvement of the main battle tank.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We note that the Army and Marine Corps currently have no plans to replace the M1A2 or M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. We are also aware that the Army intends to proceed with a series of engineering change proposals that will incrementally enhance the platform’s capabilities. We believe that the Army should accelerate the next series of Abrams upgrades where warranted by capabilities and other needs.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

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the technology development and engineering change proposal processes to include a modern efficient fuel engine and transmission for the M1 Abrams series main battle tank.

Report on powered rail system

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 255) that would require the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the congressional defense committees that comprehensively reviews and compares powered rail systems for the M4 Carbine system.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

The Secretary of the Army, or designee, is directed to provide a report to the congressional defense committees not later than April 1, 2014 on an assessment of the current M4/M16-battery requirements associated with a 3-day dismounted mission for an Army infantry platoon compared to the same unit and mission if the members were equipped with an integrated weapon-mounted power source. The assessment should compare the battery requirements, weights, and performance of the dismounted soldier with the operational functionality of the M4/M16 equipped with an integrated power source, including weapons system effectiveness, efficiency, and operational sustainability, reliability, and related risk. The assessment should also include a business case analysis of the potential acquisition and sustainment costs associated with transitioning to an integrated M4/M16-battery power technology to replace batteries for individual weapon-mounted components. Finally, the assessment should address the potential utility, if any, of incorporating a data link via such a weapon-mounted power source between soldier components and soldier weapon mounted sensors. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation is also directed to oversee the Army’s live fire or other operational testing, if any, conducted as part of gathering data for this report.

Report on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics scholarship program

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 255) that would require the Secretary of Defense Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART) scholarship program to report to the congressional defense committees on the undergraduate and graduate science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce needs of the intelligence community.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We note that the national security community, in general, faces growing challenges with meeting its STEM workforce needs, in particular top-level U.S. government requirements that are eligible for security clearances. The SMART program was established by the Department of Defense to attract and retain promising candidates and STEM leaders into the Department, including components of the IC. SMART provides scholarships to students pursing technical degrees in disciplines of interest to the Department and the IC. We recognize that the SMART program has been useful in meeting its intent and believe that data provided on the program will be useful to the SMART program could be used by a broader community within the IC, but any further expansion would require further solidification to increase participation, to include additional resources to support any additional students supporting the needs of the IC.

Clarification of eligibility of a State to participate in defense experimental program to stimulate competitive research

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 262) that would modify the eligibility requirement to ensure that Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCOR) bring it more in line with the eligibility requirements of the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCOR) under the National Science Foundation (NSF).

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We note that while the Department of Defense maintains the statutory authority for EPSCOR, the Department has not included funds to support the program since 2009 due to changing research needs and priorities. Additionally, even should funds be made available for EPSCOR in the future, we would be concerned about potential duplication with NSF’s EPSCOR. EPSCOR was originally established as a separate activity from EPSCOR in section 257 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1986 (Public Law 100–526–337) because the needs of the Department were not being met by the EPSCOR. Should the Department choose to reinvigorate the EPSCOR activity, we believe it should retain a separate and distinct eligibility requirement to ensure that it is able to meet the separate and distinct research needs of the Department of Defense.

Briefing on power and energy research conducted at university-affiliated research centers

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 266) that would require the Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees on power and energy research conducted at university-affiliated research centers.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

Approval of certain new uses of research, development, test, and evaluation land

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 267) that would prohibit the Secretary of Defense from authorizing committees on power and energy research conducted at university-affiliated research centers.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We direct the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the congressional defense committees on power and energy research conducted at university-affiliated research centers.

Cannines as stand-off detection of explosives and explosive precursors

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 268) that would require the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide a report on the capability and infrastructure required to support canines as stand-off detection of explosives and explosive precursors.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include this provision.

We direct the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the congressional defense committees on power and energy research conducted at university-affiliated research centers.

Operation and maintenance funding (sec. 301)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 301) authorizing appropriations for fiscal...