



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

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CJCSI 3520.02B
5 March 2015

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ACTIVITY PROGRAM

References: Enclosure C

1. Purpose. This instruction sets forth policy and provides procedures for the planning and execution of U.S. military support to the PSI activity program. Authorized military support includes security cooperation (SC) with PSI partner nations to improve their national operational capabilities and domestic legal authorities to interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials. These SC activities may include planning and execution of PSI exercises, games, related training, meetings, and conferences. This instruction implements references a through l.

2. Superseded/Cancellation. CJCSI 3520.02A, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program," 1 March 2007, is hereby superseded.

3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, and Defense Agencies who report to, or through, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Copies are provided to the Secretary of Defense for information and use as appropriate.

4. Policy

a. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," December 2002, reference a, emphasizes that combating WMD is a top national security priority and calls for enhanced interdiction including transport, isolation, deterrence, HAZMAT, radiological, chemical, and biological capabilities. NSPD 20, "Counterproliferation Interdiction," November 2002, reference b, establishes responsibilities for agencies to develop an effective WMD interdiction effort. In May 2003, the President announced the PSI to focus on the common threat that WMD presents to national security, build the resolve and capacity of partner nations, and foster a norm for action. In September 2003, the United States and 10 nations agreed to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles

(SOIP), reference c. The PSI SOIP reflects a commitment to take proactive national actions and cooperate with other PSI participants as appropriate to interdict WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials moving to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities, relevant international law, and multilateral counterproliferation cooperative frameworks.

b. The Guidance for Employment of the Force, reference d, translates national security priorities and strategy into guidance for the Department's most important operational planning efforts. These priorities and strategy are described in the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), reference e, the National Security Strategy (NSS), reference f, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), reference g, and other strategic reviews. Reference d articulates Global Prioritized End States and describes Global Strategic Assumptions; it also promulgates General, Functional and Regional Planning Guidance. Reference d, Chapter VII, Section 5 promulgates Planning Guidance for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(1) DoD Global Prioritized End States. After securing the U.S. homeland from attack and prevailing in current conflicts, preventing the proliferation of WMD and associated technologies is the Department's highest priority. Secondary considerations also listed among the 10 Prioritized End States are that alliances and partnerships are strengthened and expanded and the United States is viewed by key countries as the partner of choice, that the threats to U.S. interests posed by fragile and failing states are mitigated, that partner nations provide for their own security and contribute effectively to broader regional or global security challenges, and that major world powers contribute effectively to addressing shared global challenges and to the maintenance of the international order.

(2) Global Strategic Assumptions. There are three global strategic assumptions. Nation-states will continue to be the basis of international order, but the role of non-state actors in world affairs will continue to increase in significance. Adversaries will attempt to employ non-traditional or asymmetric means and more ambiguous forms of coercion against the United States, its allies, and partners. WMD will continue to be the single most potentially damaging capability in an adversary's hands. Although the United States prefers to act with the support of international partners whenever it engages in military operations, it will be prepared to act alone when necessary. The capacity of other U.S. Government Agencies and components for planning and execution will continue to be limited for the period covered by this document. Crises will not permit adequate time or involvement by senior policy makers to allow planners to rely on crisis action planning in lieu of contingency planning for developing acceptable response options. Actions designed to have an impact at the local or regional level are likely to have global implications.

(3) Planning Guidance for Countering WMD (CWMD). Reference d contains specific planning guidance for CWMD, describes the strategic context of this effort, and explains the threat posed by proliferation of WMD. This guidance also describes the Strategic End States for this effort, which includes a global environment that is inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities.

(4) PSI is an effective tool through which to pursue these priorities and enhance the capacity of our allies and partners to do the same.

c. Because PSI is not an international or national organization, it has no headquarters, no chain of command, and no assigned forces. Instead, the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) meets periodically to consider ways to build and enhance WMD interdiction capacities of all PSI endorsing nations and to build support for the PSI. General coordination responsibilities for U.S. military support to PSI activities are outlined in Enclosure A. Specific tasks and responsibilities for PSI exercises, games, and related training are detailed in Enclosure B.

d. The PSI exercise program is designed to demonstrate a collective commitment to act against proliferation-related shipments, send a strong signal of deterrence to would-be proliferators, enhance interdiction capabilities of PSI endorsing nations, and extend outreach to non-endorsing nations that observe the exercise. PSI exercises involve a broad range of U.S. Government organizations (e.g., military, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic) participating with the counterpart organizations of PSI partner countries. Combatant Commands will support PSI exercises pursuant to Secretary of Defense direction, consistent with reference h.

e. Like U.S. military-conducted counterproliferation (CP)-interdiction operations, CP-interdiction operations conducted by partner states deny or stop the movement of WMD, WMD delivery systems, related materials, technologies, and expertise between states and state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. PSI partners are also responsible for the disposition of interdicted material uncovered by their operations. To date, guidance regarding the execution of CP-interdiction operations has been provided via Secretary of Defense-approved execute order. As appropriate, all CP-interdiction operations are coordinated through the interagency process established by reference b.

f. All PSI exercises and CP-interdiction operations are conducted consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.

5. Responsibilities. See Enclosure B.

6. Summary of Changes. This revision clarifies the types of exercises and other activities conducted within the PSI, and reflects the role of PSI within the context of Strategic Guidance. It also better defines the coordination of activities between the Joint Staff and other entities and clarifies Joint Staff and Combatant Command roles resulting from the elimination of Joint Forces Command. This version eliminates all references to PSI interdictions, a term favored by some partner nations, and refers instead to CP-interdictions, consistent with reference f. Finally, it clarifies the relationship and distinction between PSI and CP-interdiction.

7. Releasability. UNRESTRICTED. This directive is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited on NIPRNET. DoD Components (to include the Combatant Commands), other Federal Agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this directive through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/. Joint Staff activities may also obtain access via the SIPR Directives Electronic Library Web sites.

8. Effective Date. This INSTRUCTION is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



MARK E. WEATHERINGTON, Brig Gen, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures

- A - U.S. Military Support to the PSI Activity Program
- B - Tasks, Responsibilities, and Levels of Participation for U.S. Military Support to the PSI Activity Program
- C - References

DISTRIBUTION

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ENCLOSURE A

U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PSI ACTIVITY PROGRAM

1. Responsibilities. Specific responsibilities are outlined in Enclosure B.

2. General. This chapter assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for U.S. military support to the PSI activity program. The PSI activity program is the principal framework for conducting CP-interdiction exercises at the joint, interagency, and multinational levels, as well as building partner states' capacity to conduct WMD-related interdiction operations. For the U.S. Armed Forces, these exercises provide an opportunity to assess overall Combatant Command readiness and supportability across the full range of military operations, including the core capabilities relevant to countering WMD. PSI is also a framework to provide technical and legal training to partners, bolster partner nation resolve to undertake interdiction efforts, and exercise the national decision-making processes and authorities of PSI partners. Nations participating in the PSI are attempting to improve national operational capabilities to interdict and are developing solutions to national and international policy and legal barriers to successful WMD interdiction.

3. PSI Exercises. There are two basic types of PSI exercises: Stand-Alone PSI Exercises and PSI Exercise Injects. Mission permitting, Combatant Commanders should be prepared to support both types of exercise in accordance with reference e.

a. Stand-Alone PSI Exercises. A Stand-Alone PSI Exercise features PSI and CP-interdiction as the central focus of the exercise. It may include Field Training Exercise (FTX), Tabletop Exercise (TTX), or other components and may involve the maritime, air and/or overland transport domains. Stand-alone PSI exercises may vary somewhat in scale, but all will involve some type of facilitated discussion, during the TTX or a separate component, where delegations from various countries discuss aspects of the PSI such as authorities, political commitment, and inter-ministerial processes.

(1) Scope of Stand-Alone PSI Exercises. The FTX is often the most visible aspect of an exercise and can tangibly portray the multinational commitment to the SOIP. An FTX also sends a powerful deterrent message to would-be proliferators. Many partner nations perceive a highly visible, large FTX as the preponderance of the benefit of an exercise. Theoretically, an FTX involves an exchange of interdiction-related tactics, techniques, and procedures between the militaries of the participating nations, followed by an exercise to validate the training. Almost without exception, the underlying military skills that pertain to CP-interdiction and shared with PSI tend to be basic (compliant visit, board, search, and seizure operations, for example) and

unclassified. Although military planners tend to prefer a sophisticated exercise, a simple demonstration is actually ideal to meet PSI objectives, including building communication and habits of cooperation between PSI partners (versus a U.S.-centered hub-and-spoke model). While an FTX offers operational relevance, its most significant value is that participating nations are seen convening under the banner of PSI and demonstrating their political commitment to CP-interdiction, as well as their capabilities to enforce that commitment. This contributes to the global norm of CP and sends an important deterrence signal.

(2) Tone and Design of Stand-Alone PSI Exercises. Exercises should convey an appropriate strategic message that accurately portrays PSI aims and tactics to participating nations and the public. The exercise should clearly emphasize that all activities conducted within the exercise are legal and consistent with international frameworks. An exercise that is too sophisticated in design may suggest that such sophistication is required to participate, and thereby dissuade non-endorsing nations from joining the PSI. Similarly, an exercise that is too focused on the use of military force, as opposed to diplomacy, customs, and law enforcement, can lead a nation to believe its participation requires sophisticated military capabilities, which is unattainable by many nations. This tone may also increase its sensitivity to inaccurate arguments from opponents of the PSI that the PSI promotes illegal activity that attempts to limit the sovereignty of the world's nations. Often, the most substantive partner learning derives from an FTX or TTX, where participants exercise strategic and operational rapid decision making.

b. PSI Exercise Injects. These exercises involve a PSI or CP-interdiction scenario that is contained within a broader exercise, such as CP-interdiction scenarios that are routinely included in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Exercise PANAMAX.

c. Other PSI-Related Events

(1) Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meetings. Currently, 21 PSI-endorsing nations comprise the OEG. States become OEG members based on their political importance, involvement in international shipping, or the strength of their commitment to CP norms. OEG members are leaders in their respective regions in preventing the proliferation of WMD and its means of delivery. The OEG sets the strategic direction for PSI, and is responsible for outreach within the PSI, as well as to potential endorsing nations, international organizations, industry, civil society, and the public. The OEG convenes annual, action-oriented meetings to address all of the diplomatic, law enforcement, and military elements associated with interdiction activities. Regional OEG members should be invited to all PSI exercises in their region, and can provide a depth and breadth of interdiction experience to enrich these

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activities. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD(P)) heads the U.S. delegation to the OEG. Strong roles for OEG nations at PSI activities also assist in preventing an overly prominent U.S. role and highlight the truly multilateral nature of PSI.

(2) PSI Key Industry Workshops. OEG nations will periodically host workshops with key elements of the shipping industry. These workshops are designed to facilitate cooperation between elements of the shipping industry and PSI participants to minimize the impact of WMD interdictions on legitimate trade and facilitate rapid action in interdiction scenarios.

(3) Other Fora. PSI is routinely discussed at think tanks, seminars, and other policy gatherings. DoD officials' participation in these events can improve public understanding of the PSI and DoD's role in CP-interdiction. When feasible, DoD representatives are encouraged to attend these gatherings.

4. PSI and CP-Interdiction Operations. PSI activities are designed to improve international legal authorities and frameworks, as well as the legal authorities, operational capabilities, decision-making capacity, and coordination mechanisms of PSI endorsing nations as each of these applies to WMD interdiction. These activities are critical to enhancing the willingness and capacity of the likeminded nations that comprise the PSI to conduct effective interdiction operations. Likewise, these activities directly support the U.S. strategy for countering the proliferation of WMD and WMD-related materials and expertise. U.S. CP-interdiction operations are conducted pursuant to reference h.

5. Coordination

a. The Joint Staff, OSD(P), Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) will coordinate, as appropriate, the participation of U.S. military forces in PSI activities. GCCs are encouraged to incorporate PSI exercises and WMD interdiction components into their existing exercise program (including bilateral and multilateral exercises), pursuant to reference e. USSTRATCOM will serve as the supporting Combatant Command for integration, synchronization, and execution of DoD countering WMD efforts and will support GCC PSI exercise planning efforts.

b. The PSI OEG process reviews proliferation activity on a periodic basis and formulates capacity-building strategies to meet current and emerging threats. Combatant Commands should be represented at the OEG meetings as required or as requested by OSD(P) and the Joint Staff to ensure they remain involved in planning for capacity-building activities.

c. Unless otherwise directed, each GCC is responsible for planning and conducting all DoD PSI activities within its area of responsibility (AOR). The Joint Staff, OSD(P), and USSTRATCOM will participate in planning for PSI activities. All requests for non-DoD interagency participation will be coordinated through the Joint Staff and OSD(P).

d. Because scheduling procedures for U.S. military exercises differ from those involving interagency and multinational coordinated exercises, the Joint Staff, with the assistance of USSTRATCOM, will coordinate with relevant commands, Services, and agencies on the PSI exercise schedule to provide the required scheduling information in a timely manner to facilitate maximum participation. PSI exercise schedules are normally promulgated through the OEG process. Linkage of GCC exercises and/or level of support to these exercises may be updated at the CJCS-hosted Worldwide Joint Training Conference (WJTC), the Integration and Exercise Workshop (IEW), or the Worldwide Joint Training and Scheduling Conference (WJTSC). These PSI-related exercises will be listed in the Combatant Command's joint training plan and entered into the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS). However, since interagency and/or international exercises do not follow the DoD scheduling process, the Joint Staff, with the assistance of USSTRATCOM, will formally task any additional requirements outside the WJTC, IEW or WJTSC planning processes.

e. The Joint Staff and OSD(P) will ensure appropriate coordination of U.S. military support to the PSI activity program with USSTRATCOM in accordance with USSTRATCOM's responsibility as the lead Combatant Command for integrating and synchronizing DoD countering WMD efforts.

6. Reports. To the extent possible, existing systems and processes will be used to document PSI-related training assessments and lessons learned during CJCS or Combatant Command-sponsored events. For all other activities, an after-action report (AAR), to include lessons learned, will be submitted to the Joint Staff (J-3, J-5, J-7), with copies to the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). The supported Combatant Commander will submit this report no later than 90 working days after the end of the exercise, and should include cost and funding line data associated with the exercise. Commanders are encouraged to solicit comments from non-DoD agencies for inclusion in AARs.

7. Funding

a. PSI activities will be supported through GCC operations and maintenance (O&M) funding. Programming of exercise funds will be based on estimates and assumptions for a typical exercise. Annual estimates for programming will be based on one exercise each for all GCCs. Exercises

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should be scheduled as delineated in subparagraph 5.d. Combatant Commanders will also plan for and participate in other short-notice regional or functional PSI exercises occurring periodically throughout the year within their AOR, to the maximum extent possible. These Combatant Commanders should also budget to send representatives to PSI OEG meetings or other events each calendar year as requested by the Joint Staff. The number of personnel participating in each event will vary depending on the nature of the event and level of U.S. involvement.

b. Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement (CE2) funds may be used to support strategic lift requirements for PSI exercises conducted by Combatant Commanders as part of their approved Joint Exercise Program (JEP).

c. The O&M costs associated with PSI will be executed within the existing budgets of the Combatant Commander's executive agent and/or Service component, the existing budget of U.S. Special Operations Command for special operations forces, or the agency conducting the exercise. Participating agencies and departments will bear their respective costs.

d. Services will fund the deployment, employment and redeployment of self-deploying command, control, communications, and computer and weapon systems.

e. Through the Joint Staff or OSD(P), other appropriations may be available to fund discrete aspects of exercises or extraordinary requirements.

8. Exercise Name. The nation hosting a PSI exercise will be responsible for naming the exercise. The lead Combatant Command/U.S. Government department or agency will name PSI exercises hosted by the United States.

9. Planning and Execution Sequence. The timetable for planning and execution of PSI exercises in particular will vary according to the level and complexity of exercise play and the desires of the host nation. Every exercise will be different and may have a varied planning and execution sequence. USSTRATCOM, through the SCC-WMD, will support GCCs in exercise planning, scenario development and execution. The Joint Staff will coordinate planning between appropriate Combatant Commands and other U.S. Government departments and agencies. The timetable for planning and execution of other PSI activities will vary according to the nature and complexity of the event.

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ENCLOSURE B

TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION FOR U.S.
MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PSI ACTIVITY PROGRAM1. Joint Staffa. Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J-2)

(1) Provide support as required. This will normally include providing regional or topical experts from the national intelligence agencies to coordinate on scenario development.

(2) For CJCS exercises, support exercise planning and execution.

(3) Participate as players during the exercise, as required.

b. Directorate for Operations, Joint Staff (J-3)

(1) Provide operational guidance and support to the Combatant Commands for PSI activities when appropriate.

(2) Participate as an exercise player, observer, and controller, as required.

(3) Provide military representation to international PSI meetings and activities, as required.

(4) Coordinate with operational elements of other U.S. Government Agencies, as required.

c. Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff (J-5)

(1) Serve as the Joint Staff office of primary responsibility for interagency and international coordination of PSI activities.

(2) Provide policy guidance to the Combatant Commands for PSI activities, including guidance on applicable international agreements related to WMD and CP.

(3) Provide military representation to international PSI meetings and activities.

(4) Provide information on the PSI exercise schedule for presentation at the WJTC or IEW.

(5) Participate as an exercise player, observer, or controller as required.

(6) Coordinate with OSD(P), its components, and other U.S. departments and agencies as required.

(7) Formally task additional GCC PSI activity requirements that occur outside the WJTSC planning process.

d. Directorate for Joint Force Development, Joint Staff (J-7)

(1) Consider PSI exercises nominated by Combatant Commanders for inclusion into the JEP.

(2) Coordinate PSI exercises with the Combatant Commands, in support of Joint Staff/J-5.

(3) Provide exercise design and execution assistance as requested.

(4) Provide military representation to PSI meetings and activities, as required.

2. Services

a. Provide planning support, as required.

b. Coordinate subordinate organizations' participation in accordance with plans and procedures.

c. Provide support to Service operational elements, to include Combatant Command components, and the Joint Staff during exercise planning and execution, as required. This support may include development of exercise scenarios and objectives.

d. Provide necessary operations, communications, and logistics support in accordance with established procedures.

e. Participate as observers or controllers during exercises, as required.

3. USSTRATCOM

a. In collaboration with the Combatant Commands, identify and assess required U.S. military WMD interdiction capabilities to support CP-interdiction operations and PSI exercises and related training.

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b. In coordination with Joint Staff/J-8, advocate, support, and monitor research and development associated with U.S. military WMD interdiction capabilities to support CP-interdiction operations, PSI exercises and related training.

c. In coordination with Joint Staff/J-2, coordinate military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support consistent with USSTRATCOM Unified Command Plan responsibilities.

d. Designate a PSI support cell that supports U.S. PSI exercise requirements, as coordinated in accordance with subparagraph 5.d of Enclosure A. This exercise support cell will work closely with Joint Staff and OSD(P) in its roles to:

(1) Serve as the primary conduit to ensure PSI and GCC CWMD Theater Campaign Plan objectives are incorporated into PSI exercises.

(2) Support GCC staffs in the development, planning, and execution of U.S.-hosted, cohosted, and as required, partner nation-hosted exercises.

(3) Advocate for and support GCC staffs in developing, planning, and executing regional PSI exercises.

(4) When requested, support GCC staffs and other U.S. Agencies in coordinating participation in foreign-hosted PSI exercises.

(5) Advocate for the inclusion of CP-interdiction elements that support the PSI into existing GCC exercises.

(6) Support Joint Staff/OSD(P) in the planning and execution of international PSI exercises/war games involving other U.S. departments and agencies, as required, to include securing and administrating funding for exercises.

(7) Support U.S. exercise control teams as required during all PSI exercises.

e. In conjunction with the Joint Staff, advocate CP-interdiction and PSI exercise “best practices” to Combatant Command staffs.

f. Provide subject-matter experts (SMEs) and/or support to international PSI activities, as required and arranged by the Joint Staff and OSD(P).

g. Act as supporting command to GCCs for planning and conducting PSI activities.

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4. GCCs. GCCs will be prepared to conduct PSI activities as required and directed. Combatant Commands will participate in PSI exercises in accordance with reference e. It is recommended that GCCs incorporate PSI scenarios into existing exercises when possible for ease of scheduling and budget considerations. It is also advisable that GCCs plan and execute regional workshops or multinational engagements in support of PSI objectives. When participating in PSI exercises, GCCs will include the following in planning efforts:

a. Serve as the lead for U.S.-hosted and co-hosted PSI exercises within their AOR, unless otherwise directed. GCCs will coordinate with subordinate commands and other participating organizations within the AOR. The Joint Staff and/or OSD(P) are the focal point of GCC coordination with national elements of the interagency.

b. Identify, support, and execute PSI exercise objectives.

c. In conjunction with OSD(P)/Joint Staff, and with USSTRATCOM support, develop exercise scenarios to accomplish PSI objectives consistent with AOR-specific situations.

d. Attend all applicable exercise planning conferences and meetings.

e. Participate in partner-led exercises at the appropriate level.

f. Provide SMEs and/or support to international PSI events, as required.

g. Provide feedback and lessons learned to Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM on exercise issues.

h. Track and maintain a record of expenditures and personnel and asset participation (e.g., flight time, deployment days, etc.) in support of PSI activities and exercises.

i. GCCs are encouraged to support the PSI activity program using Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) funding. PSI and CDI are mutually complementary programs that support strategic WMD objectives.

5. U.S. Transportation Command

a. Provide assistance to the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM, and participating commands and agencies on all matters involving the utilization of common-user transportation assets during planning and execution of PSI activities.

b. Monitor and coordinate movements/deployments in support of PSI exercises and related training in accordance with established procedures.

c. Provide SMEs and/or support to international PSI events as required.

6. Other Departments, Agencies and Activities. DoD exercise planners will seek, in coordination with OSD(P), the Joint Staff, GCCs and USSTRATCOM, to incorporate major non-DoD departments and agencies into PSI exercises and related training, as appropriate, and will encourage participating federal departments and agencies to participate in exercise planning and execution.

a. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP plays an integral role to the PSI generally, and has historically provided invaluable support to DoD-related PSI activities. In addition to subject matter expertise, CBP provides exercise scenario development, game design, and TTX facilitation.

b. Military Academic Institutions. These organizations, such as National Defense University (NDU), Naval War College (NWC), and the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies provide strategic level advice to the Joint Staff and OSD(P) as well as subject matter expertise. These organizations also provide support in game design and TTX facilitation. NDU and NWC in particular have a longstanding involvement in this activity and also possess substantial institutional knowledge and memory.

c. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG offers vital operational capability and subject matter expertise that can provide great value to PSI activities.

d. Department of State (DOS). The DOS conducts outreach for and during DoD PSI activities. The DOS also conducts diplomatic communications regarding DoD PSI activities, including “save the date” notifications for events and invitations to events.

e. Provide SMEs and/or support to international PSI events as required and authorized.

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ENCLOSURE C

REFERENCES

- a. NSPD 17, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," December 2002
- b. NSPD 20, "Counterproliferation Interdiction," November 2002
- c. PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, September 2003
- d. "Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)," February 2015
- e. "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," January 2012
- f. "National Security Strategy," February 2015
- g. "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," March 2014
- h. Secretary of Defense memorandum, "U.S. Military Support to the Multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Program and Related Training," 8 August 2005
- i. CJCSI 5715.01 Series, "Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs"
- j. DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), " 8 December 1999
- k. CJCSI 3500.01 Series, "Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States"
- l. CJCSI 5113.03 Series, "Counterproliferation Interdiction Policy"

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