



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

J-5
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CJCSI 2311.01
3 August 1994

IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES FOR THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA ON THE
PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES

References: See Enclosure D

1. Purpose. This instruction:
 - a. Provides guidance on the implementation of reference a.
 - b. Defines the roles of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Chiefs of the Services.
 - c. Provides procedures for preventing dangerous military activities (DMA) and for resolving and reporting incidents that may arise therefrom.
 - d. Establishes the US element of the US-Russian Joint Military Commission (JMC), which will periodically review implementation of the agreement.
2. Cancellation. CJCS MOP 2, 26 September 1992, is canceled.
3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Services, and Defense agencies.
4. Policy
 - a. The DMA agreement, in general, commits the United States and the Russian Federation to (1) ensure the safety of the personnel and equipment of their respective Armed Forces when operating in proximity to one another in peacetime by avoiding certain dangerous activities and (2) expeditiously and peacefully resolve any incidents between their Armed Forces that may arise from such activities.

b. The agreement specifically commits the Armed Forces of the United States and Russia to refrain from engaging in the following DMA when operating in the same vicinity: dangerous use of lasers, dangerous interference with command and control, and certain activity in mutually agreed upon Special Caution Areas. The two countries further agree to follow similar procedures for unintentional or force majeure entry by the personnel or units of one country into the national territory of the other. A detailed explanation of the activities covered under this agreement and the procedures to be followed by US forces are to be found in Enclosure B.

c. The provisions of the agreement, and the protection it provides, apply to equipment and personnel, both military and civilian, of the US and Russian Armed Forces, including the US Coast Guard and the Border Troops of the Russian Federation.

d. The agreement and this instruction do not affect rights of individual or collective self-defense or navigation and overflight rights. Nothing in the agreement or this instruction replaces or derogates from the provisions of references b and c.

e. The agreement and this instruction apply only to activity by the Armed Forces of the United States and Russia. Should an incident covered by the agreement occur on or over the territory of a third country, the United States may consult with that country to determine the appropriate action to be taken, consistent with the provisions of the agreement. The agreement's applicability to other successor states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) is a matter to be determined through bilateral discussions with those states.

f. The agreement applies to the Armed Forces of the United States when under authority of multinational organizations (such as NATO or NORAD).

5. Responsibilities. Responsibilities are provided in Enclosure A.

6. Procedures. See Enclosure B.

7. Definitions. See Enclosure C.
8. Summary of Changes. Changes the words Soviet Union to Russia to reflect Russia's succession to the DMA agreement, removes the text of the agreement from the instruction, and reorganizes information to CJCSI format.
9. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WALTER KROSS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:

- A--Responsibilities
- B--Procedures
 - Appendix A--Communications
 - Appendix B--Procedures for US Forces
 - Appendix C--US/Russian Checklist for Aircraft Landing in
the Other Party's Territory
- C--Definitions
- D--References

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ENCLOSURE A

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will:
 - a. Provide policy oversight on the Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) agreement and its implementation.
 - b. Ensure that CJCS directives are reviewed and updated, as necessary, to implement the provisions of the agreement.
 - c. Convey to Russia information concerning DMA or incidents and the scheduling of meetings of the Joint Military Commission (JMC). This information will be conveyed through the US Defense Attache in Moscow.
 - d. Establish communications procedures for the NMCC to interface with the Russian Ministry of Defense to resolve dangerous military incidents that cannot be resolved at the platform or unit level.
 - e. Direct testing to confirm the interoperability and reliability of the US and Russian communications specified in Appendix A to Enclosure B.
 - f. Ensure that joint training and exercises of the procedures established in this instruction are conducted.
 - g. Designate a Joint Staff principal point of contact to monitor and coordinate implementation of the agreement with Russia, the combatant commands, and the Services. Ensure Joint Staff directorates provide policy guidance and monitor implementation within their respective functional areas as specified in reference d, and as noted below.
 - (1) The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) is the Joint Staff principal point of contact for overall implementation of the agreement and coordination with Russia. Specific functions are:
 - (a) Nominate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a two-star general/flag officer to serve as US Chairman of the JMC.
 - (b) Communicate with foreign governments on behalf of the Joint Staff through the appropriate Defense Attache Office or the Department of State.

- (c) Coordinate, schedule, and manage the JMC meetings with Russia.
- (d) Revise and publish CJCS Instruction 2311.01.
- (e) Ensure all taskings received from a JMC meeting are assigned to the appropriate Joint Staff directorate for action.
- (f) Provide updates on JMC taskings, contacts, tests, and future JMC issues to the designated US Chairman of the JMC on DMA matters.

(2) The Director for Operations (J-3), through the National Military Command Center (NMCC/J--36), will monitor implementation of operational training, procedures, and reporting of tests and DMA communications contacts. Specific functions are:

- (a) Compile and report results of all DMA tests to J-5, J-6, and J-7 on an as required basis.
- (b) Maintain a chronological log of all reported DMA contacts and tests for use at the annual JMC meeting.
- (c) Coordinate with combatant commands on operational training and procedures used in the DMA testing regimes, test regimes and required forces, reimbursement requirements for planned DMA projects, and roles and responsibilities of DMA test participants.

(3) The Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J-6) is responsible for frequency management and reviewing communications equipment standards and procedures, testing standards, and the J-3 DMA contact chronology report.

(4) The Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) functions as the Joint Staff DMA test coordinator conducting direct liaison with the Services and combatant commands on all DMA test proposals and execution planning. Specific functions are:

- (a) Review roles and responsibilities of DMA test participants when tasked or requested by an affected command.

(b) Ensure that test regimes have been fully coordinated with all affected agencies.

(c) Provide Joint Staff oversight of taskings on DMA tests and test proposals.

2. Commanders of the Combatant Commands and Commanders of US Elements of Multinational Commands. The CINCs are responsible for ensuring implementation of the agreement by forces under their command or control. Specifically, CINCs are responsible for:

a. Providing authoritative direction to subordinate commanders regarding all aspects of the agreement.

b. Reviewing and modifying combatant command directives and rules of engagement to comply with the agreement.

c. Reporting DMA or incidents involving or affecting US forces under their command or control in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

d. Periodically conducting exercises to ensure full understanding and implementation of the procedures contained in this instruction for preventing, reporting, and resolving DMA or incidents.

e. Recommending, when appropriate, the establishment of Special Caution Areas (SCAs) within their AORs, commenting on requests by Russia to establish SCAs, and providing guidance to subordinate commanders on activities and procedures in SCAs. (During negotiation of the agreement, the types of circumstances envisioned as a potential basis for establishment of a SCA included heightened tension because of third party activities and advanced military preparedness.)

3. Chiefs of the Services. The Chiefs of the Services are individually responsible for:

a. Conducting unit-level training, as described in Enclosure B, paragraph 4, to familiarize Service personnel with the requirements of the agreement and this instruction.

b. Designating a Service representative to the JMC.

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ENCLOSURE B

PROCEDURES

1. Procedures. The following procedures will be employed to prevent DMA or expeditiously resolve any resulting incidents involving or affecting US forces:

a. General

(1) US forces will exercise great caution when operating near the national territory of Russia.

(2) If US forces become involved in, or affected by, an incident arising from a dangerous military activity, they will immediately attempt to contact the Russian forces involved, using the communications procedures defined in paragraph 2 and Appendixes A and B to this enclosure.

(3) DMA will be terminated and incidents will be resolved by peaceful means without the threat or use of force. If Russian forces demonstrate hostile intent or commit hostile acts, commanders will use all necessary means available and take all appropriate action in unit self-defense and defense of other US forces in the vicinity.

(4) US forces will report dangerous military incidents involving US or Russian forces or equipment in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 3.

b. Entering National Territory. The following procedures are to be followed when US or Russian forces unintentionally enter the other's national territory, including the territorial sea and airspace above, or when they enter the other nation's territory because of an unforeseeable incident or act of God (force majeure).

(1) Russian Entry Into US Territory. If US forces determine that Russian forces have entered US territory, either unintentionally or because of a force majeure situation, US forces will make every effort to establish communications with the Russian forces. (Russian forces also may attempt to establish communications.) The communication is intended to alert the Russian forces to the entry or possibility of entry; clarify the reasons for their actions; recommend actions to avoid entry, if

possible; or render assistance as appropriate. Unless entitled to proceed in the exercise of international navigation or overflight rights (e.g., right of innocent passage of ships or transit passage of ships and aircraft), Russian forces will be expected to depart US territory or to proceed to a designated location within US territory. If Russian forces elect to proceed to a designated location, upon arrival they will be provided the assistance prescribed in Appendix B to this enclosure.

(2) US Entry Into Russian Territory. If US forces enter Russian territory because of force majeure, they will make every effort to communicate with Russian forces using the procedures in Appendixes A and B to this enclosure. If US forces are entering or have entered Russian territory unintentionally, they should expect Russian forces to attempt to establish communications. In any case, US forces will take into consideration any instructions received from Russian forces appropriate to the circumstances. Unless entitled to proceed in the exercise of international navigation or overflight rights (e.g., right of innocent passage of ships or transit passage of ships and aircraft),* US forces will elect to either depart Russian territory or proceed to a location designated by the Russian forces. If US forces elect to proceed to a location designated by Russian forces, US forces should expect to receive assistance as specified in Appendix B.

c. Dangerous Laser Use. When in proximity to Russian forces, US forces will not employ lasers in such a manner that its radiation could cause harm to Russian forces or damage their equipment. US forces will follow the procedures for dangerous laser use outlined in Appendixes A and B to Enclosure B, if US forces (1) intend to use a laser in proximity to Russian forces and such laser use could harm Russian personnel or damage their equipment, (2) are notified by Russian forces that ongoing US laser activity could harm Russian personnel or damage their equipment, or (3) believe that Russian forces are using a laser in a manner that could harm US personnel or damage their equipment.

* US and Russian interpretations of international navigation and overflight rights may vary. The agreement has no impact on navigation and overflight rights.

d. Dangerous Interference with Command and Control. US forces will not conduct C2 interference or other activities that could interfere with the C2 of Russian forces in their vicinity, if such interference could result in harm to Russian personnel or damage to Russian equipment. If US forces have been advised by Russian forces of dangerous interference to Russian C2 systems, and US forces determine that their activity is the cause, the US forces will immediately terminate the activity. If US forces suspect Russian interference with US C2 that could harm US personnel or damage US equipment, they will notify Russian forces in the immediate vicinity, using the communications channels and procedures in Appendixes A and B to this enclosure and will request immediate termination of the dangerous activity.

e. Special Caution Areas. The US and Russian Governments, using the methods outlined in the agreement, may agree to designate a region as an SCA as a result of circumstances in that particular area that have increased the potential for accidental confrontation, which could result in harm to their personnel or damage to their equipment. An SCA normally will be identified with a region in which heightened tension and increased military readiness exist (such as was the case in the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1988). The forces of the respective countries are to avoid hampering each other's activities in the SCA. Special measures may be agreed upon by the governments to prevent or resolve dangerous military incidents in such an area. Each government has the right to terminate an agreement on an SCA upon timely notification to the other. Responsibilities pertaining to SCAs are as indicated below:

(1) The commanders of combatant commands may propose to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the establishment or termination of SCAs within their AORs.

(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will ensure that US and Russian proposals to designate SCAs are coordinated with the appropriate combatant command, the Services, OSD, the Department of State, and other appropriate civil agencies.

(3) The senior commanders of US and Russian forces operating in the designated area will, at a minimum, maintain communications with each other using the procedures outlined in Appendix A. US and Russian forces operating in such an area also will abide by any

additional, special measures that have been mutually agreed upon by the two governments.

2. Incident Resolution. Specific communications procedures are provided for under the agreement to facilitate prevention and rapid resolution of dangerous military incidents.

a. If possible, DMA or resulting incidents should be resolved expeditiously by the forces involved or affected without the threat or use of force. US forces involved in or affected by a DMA or a resultant incident with Russian forces should immediately contact Russian forces using the communications channels and procedures in Appendixes A and B.

b. If unable to quickly establish direct contact with the Russian forces, the US unit involved should attempt to establish contact through other US forces in the area.

c. If contact cannot be established through other US forces, the US unit involved should immediately contact the NMCC using any available means of communication. The NMCC will contact the Russian Ministry of Defense through the respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

d. Russian forces are similarly encouraged to immediately contact US forces at the lowest possible level to expeditiously resolve incidents. US forces receiving these communications from Russian forces will immediately advise other US forces in the area and higher echelons. US forces will immediately investigate the Russian report. If US activity is causing the incident, US forces will terminate or modify the activity.

3. Reporting. All incidents arising from DMA involving US and Russian forces will be reported by means of an initial OPREP and a followup Incident Report using the formats contained in reference e. A meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference (MIJI) report* in the format contained in reference f, is required concurrently with an OPREP when dangerous command and control interference or lasing is experienced by US forces. Perceived violations of the spirit or intent of the agreement also may be reported for review using these procedures.

* Although new joint reporting procedures are under development, incidents will continue to be reported under existing guidance.

a. The US unit involved will provide an initial FLASH precedence OPREP to the appropriate geographic CINC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (NMCC). Followup reports will be provided using IMMEDIATE precedence as additional information becomes available.

b. The geographic CINC will investigate the incident and provide a detailed summary report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 48 hours of the incident. The report should include a recommendation as to whether a meeting of the JMC should be requested to discuss the incident. In addition to the reporting procedures required above, followup reporting on incidents involving dangerous interference with C2 or dangerous use of lasers will be accomplished by a MIJI report (reference f). Incidents involving dangerous use of lasers occurring on and over the high seas also will be reported in accordance with reference b.

4. Training. Training will be conducted by the Services to ensure that US forces are familiar with the agreement and the implementing provisions in this instruction. The Services will conduct training that focuses on mission-ready personnel at the unit level. Training will include initial familiarization, annual refresher, and specialized training before deployments for operations in which the potential for incidents is increased. The following personnel, at a minimum, should receive this training:

a. US Army. Air traffic controllers and units located in Alaska.

b. US Navy. Aircrews, shipboard personnel, and air traffic controllers.

c. US Air Force. Mission-ready aircrews, radar weapons controllers, air traffic controllers, and EW personnel.

d. US Marine Corps. Aircrews, air traffic controllers, and deployed forces.

e. US Coast Guard. Shipboard personnel, aircrews, and air traffic controllers.

5. Joint Military Commission. The agreement establishes a US-Russian JMC to consider (a) compliance with the obligations assumed under the agreement, (b) possible ways to ensure a higher level of safety for personnel and equipment of the

respective Armed Forces, and (c) other measures to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the agreement.

a. Composition. The composition of the US element of the JMC will be determined on a case-by-case basis. In general, the US element will consist of:

(1) Chairman. A two-star general/flag officer nominated by the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Service Representatives. One representative each from the US Army, US Navy, US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and, as appropriate, the US Coast Guard.

(3) Joint Staff Representatives. One representative each from the Directorates for Operations (J-3); Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5); and Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J-6).

(4) Legal Representative. A representative of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(5) Other Representatives

1. Representatives from OSD and the Department of State.

2. Representatives from the combatant commands and functional experts from the Services, Defense agencies, and Joint Staff will be included based on the purpose and agenda of each JMC meeting.

b. Scheduling. The JMC will meet annually but may meet more often if agreed upon by the two Governments. The time, date, location, and agenda for meetings will be coordinated with the Chairman of the Russian Delegation by the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, through the US and Russian Defense Attache Offices. Final US approval of the schedule for the meetings will be obtained through the interagency process.

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE B

COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION I--COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS

1. For the purpose of implementing the agreement, the US Armed Forces will establish, as necessary, communications at the following levels:
 - a. US Task Force Commander operating in a SCA with Russian forces operating in the same area.
 - b. Commander or officer in charge of a US ship, aircraft, ground vehicle, or ground unit (including shore facility) with the commander of a Russian ship, aircraft, ground vehicle, or ground unit (including shore facility).
 - c. Commander or officer in charge of a US aircraft with a Russian air traffic control or monitoring facility, and US air traffic control or monitoring facility with Russian aircraft.

SECTION II--RADIO FREQUENCIES

2. To establish radio communication, the following frequencies will be used:
 - a. Between US and Russian aircraft or between an aircraft and air traffic control or monitoring facility of the two Armed Forces: on 243.0 MHz (agreed international Distress and Emergency frequency) or 121.5 MHz (agreed international Aeronautical Emergency frequency); or on HF band frequency 4125.0 kHz AM (alternate 6215.5 kHz AM), both agreed international Distress and Safety Calling/Reply frequencies, for contact beyond line of sight. After the phrase "Radio Contact" is exchanged, use frequencies 278.0 MHz, 130.0 MHz, or 4125.0 kHz AM, respectively, for sustained radio communications.
 - b. Between US and Russian ships and between ship-to-shore facilities of either of the two forces: on VHF band (Channel 16) frequency 156.8 MHz FM (agreed international Distress and Safety Calling frequency), or on HF band frequency 2182.0 KHz AM (agreed international Distress and Calling frequency), for contact beyond line of sight.

c. Between a US or Russian ship and an aircraft of the opposite force: on 243.0 megahertz (MHz) (agreed international Distress and Emergency frequency) or 121.5 MHz (agreed international aeronautical emergency frequency). After initial contact is made and the parties agree, they will move to 278.0 MHz or 130.0 MHz, respectively, when sustained communications are required.

d. Between US ground force personnel and Russian ground force personnel: on VHF band frequency 44.0 MHz FM (alternate 46.5 MHz FM) or on HF band frequency 4125.0 kHz Upper Side Band (USB) (alternate 6215.5 kHz USB) (agreed international Distress and Safety Calling/Reply frequencies) for contact beyond line of sight.

Table B-1. Table of Communications Frequencies

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Frequencies</u> ^{1/}			
	<u>Initial Contact</u>		<u>Sustained Communications</u>	<u>Type of Service</u>
	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Alternate</u>		
<u>Air-Related:</u>				
VHF	121.5 MHz		130.0 Mhz	6A3E
UHF	243.0 Mhz		278.0 Mhz	6A3E
HF(AM)	4125.0 kHz	6215.5 kHz	4125.0 kHz	6A3E, 3H3E
<u>Sea-Related:</u>				
VHF	156.8 Mhz		156.8 Mhz	16F3E
HF(AM)	2182.0 kHz		2182.0 kHz	6A3E, 3H3E
<u>Ground-Related:</u>				
VHF	44.0 Mhz ^{2/}	46.5 Mhz ^{2/}	44.0 Mhz ^{2/}	30F3E
HF(USB)	4125.0 kHz	6215.5 kHz	4125.0 kHz	3J3E

^{1/} Contact will be initiated on the primary frequency. If contact cannot be made, personnel will attempt contact on the alternate frequency (where available). The sustained communications frequency will be used when extended communications are required and after the phrase "Radio Contact" is exchanged.

^{2/} Radio equipment to be set in the "Old" squelch position.

SECTION III--RADIO CALL SIGNS AND PROCEDURES

3. For expeditious identification of an aircraft, ship, ground control station, or ground unit, the agreed call signs in Table B-2 will be used.

Table B-2. Call Signs

<u>PLATFORM</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	
	<u>Russian</u>	<u>US</u>
Ship	"Bugel" Phonetic: (BOO-gel)	"Port Mast"
Aircraft	"Sedlo" Phonetic: (Sed-LOW)	"Ivory Eagle"
Air Traffic Control or Monitoring Facility	"Zemlya" Phonetic: (Zem-le-YAW)	"Electric Light"
Ground Force or Unit	"Polya" Phonetic: (POLE-yaw)	"Post Pounder"

4. Communications procedures for initial contact will use full, not abbreviated, radio telephone procedures, bearing in mind that the Russian operator who will be initiating the call or responding may not speak or fully understand English. For example, the following procedure for initiating radio contact will be used:

a. To initiate radio contact, the procedure will be as follows:

(1) The aircraft, ship, air traffic control or monitoring facility, or ground unit initiating contact will transmit the agreed call sign of the party to be contacted three times.

(2) Followed by the words "Delta Echo" (meaning "from" in the context of these procedures).

(3) Followed by the caller's agreed call sign one time. The word "Over" is optional at the end of each transmission.

b. The response will be as follows:

(1) The aircraft, ship, air traffic control or monitoring facility, or ground unit being called will transmit the agreed call sign of the party that has attempted to contact it three times.

(2) Followed by the words "Delta Echo" (meaning "from" in the context of these procedures).

(3) Followed by the respondent's agreed call sign one time. The word "Over" is optional at the end of each transmission.

c. The procedures for switching to a frequency for sustained communications is as follows (after the initial call, the call signs will be stated only once by the parties):

(1) The aircraft, ship, air traffic control or monitoring facility, or ground unit initiating contact will transmit the agreed call sign of the party to be contacted.

(2) Followed by the words "Delta Echo" (meaning "from" in the context of these procedures).

(3) Followed by the caller's agreed call sign one time and the words "Radio Contact" ("Over," if necessary).

(4) The aircraft, ship, or air traffic control or monitoring facility being contacted will transmit the agreed call sign of the party first initiating contact.

(5) Followed by the words "Delta Echo."

(6) Followed by the respondent's agreed call sign and the words "Radio Contact" (and the word "Over," if necessary).

EXAMPLE:

POLYA POLYA POLYA . DELTA ECHO . POST POUNDER . (OVER)

POST POUNDER POST POUNDER POST POUNDER . DELTA ECHO .
POLYA . (OVER).

POLYA . DELTA ECHO . POST POUNDER . RADIO CONTACT . (OVER)

POST POUNDER . DELTA ECHO . POLYA . RADIO CONTACT . (OVER)

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SECTION IV--SIGNALS AND PHRASES

5. Both US and Russian Armed Forces recognize that the lack of radio communication can increase the danger to the personnel and equipment of their Armed Forces who are involved in any incident that may arise as a result of DMA. US military personnel involved in such incidents who are unable to establish radio communication, or who establish radio communication but cannot be understood, will try to communicate using the signals referred to in this Appendix. In addition, US personnel will attempt to communicate with their higher headquarters or their operational command, which in turn will attempt to communicate with its Russian counterpart, to resolve the incident through the communications channels set forth in this agreement and using the procedures set forth in this Appendix.

6. Ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications will be conducted using signals and phrases contained in the International Code of Signals of 1965 and the Special Signals developed in accordance with reference b.

7. Aircraft-to-aircraft communications will be conducted using signals and phrases for intercepting and intercepted aircraft contained in reference f. The additional signals and phrases contained in Table B-3 also will be used.

8. US aircrews will ensure that the guard channel (frequency 243.0 MHz or 121.5 MHz, as appropriate to the-aircraft) is operational and monitored. The monitoring of guard channels is especially important whenever aircraft of the two forces are in visual contact. If exchange of information is necessary, but communication in English is not possible, attempts will be made to convey essential information and acknowledge instructions by using prearranged phrases contained in Table B-3. If radio communication is not possible, visual signals will be used.

9. Table B-3 contains additional signals and phrases for communications between US and Russian aircraft, ships, and ground forces in accordance with the basic agreement.

Table B-3. Additional Signals, Phrases, and Appropriate Responses

<u>Meaning of Signal Phrase</u>	<u>Visual Signals for Aircraft</u>	<u>Phrase</u>	<u>Pronunciation</u>	<u>Appropriate Response</u>
You are in close proximity to our national territory.	Day and Night--The intercepting aircraft, flying abeam and parallel to the intercepted aircraft, rocking wings, and flashing navigation lights at slow regular intervals, followed by a series of shallow bank "S" turns approximately 10 degrees either side of center.	"CLOSE TO TERRITORY"	CLOSE-TO TERR-I-TORY	Intercepted aircraft turns away from national territory, as appropriate.
You have entered into our national territory.	Day and Night--The intercepting aircraft, flying abeam and parallel to the intercepted aircraft, rapidly flashing navigation lights while rocking wings, followed by a shallow bank (15 to 20 degrees) turn in the direction of the intercepted aircraft. The approach will be accomplished with great caution and not closer than one wing span. Repeat until intercepted aircraft acknowledges or radio contact is established.	"TERRITORY ENTERED"	TERR-I-TORY EN-TERED	Intercepted aircraft will follow the appropriate instructions of the intercepting aircraft, or exit national territory, as appropriate.

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Appendix A to Enclosure B

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<p>I need to land.</p>	<p>Day and Night--Repeated flashing of navigation lights while rocking wings, followed by a gentle porpoising of the aircraft.</p>	<p>"REQUEST LANDING"</p>	<p>RE-QUEST LAN-DING</p>	<p>Intercepting aircraft assists intercepted aircraft.</p>
<p>My aircraft requests contact with your ship on 243.0 MHz (or 121.5 MHz, if on Civil Band).</p>	<p>Day and Night--Aircraft circling the ship, in a left hand turn, at a safe distance and altitude until radio contact is established.</p>	<p>"RADIO CONTACT"</p>	<p>RA-DI-O CON-TACT</p>	<p>After the ship and aircraft each exchange the phrase "RADIO CONTACT," the ship or aircraft will switch to 278.0 MHz (or 130.0 MHz, as appropriate) for further communications.</p>
<p>I request radio contact on 278.0 MHz or 130.0 MHz. (Make initial contact on 243.0 MHz (or 121.5 MHz, if on Civil Band).)</p>	<p>Day and Night (for aircraft, if 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz is inoperative)--Intermittent flashing of anticollision lights while rocking wings.</p>	<p>"RADIO CONTACT"</p>	<p>RA-DI-O CON-TACT</p>	<p>Acknowledge requesting aircraft, ship, or air traffic control or monitoring facility with the phrase "RADIO CONTACT." After this phrase is exchanged, tune to 278.0 MHz or 130.0 MHz, if operating on civil bands.</p>

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Appendix A to
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<p>I am experiencing a dangerous level of interference with my C2 network. (Transmit PHRASE on contact frequency.)</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>"STOP INTERFERENCE"</p>	<p>STOP IN-TER-FER-ENCE</p>	<p>Investigate and, as appropriate, terminate any activities that may be causing the dangerous interference.</p>
<p>My intended use of a laser may create danger in this area. (Transmit PHRASE on contact frequency.)</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>"LASER DANGER"</p>	<p>LA-SER DAN-GER</p>	<p>Take appropriate measures to prevent harm to personnel or damage to equipment.</p>
<p>I am experiencing a dangerous level of laser radiation. (Transmit PHRASE on contact frequency.)</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>"STOP LASER"</p>	<p>STOP LA-SER</p>	<p>Investigate and, as appropriate, terminate any use of a laser that could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment.</p>

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Appendix A to
Enclosure B

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10. Additional agreed terminology:

WILCO	Understood and will comply
CANNOT	Understood and unable to comply
REPEAT	Say again
AM LOST	Position unknown
MAYDAY	I am in distress
DESCEND	I require descent

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APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE B

PROCEDURES FOR US FORCES*

SECTION I--PROCEDURES RELATING TO SHIPS

1. Procedures To Be Followed When a Russian Ship Approaches or Enters the Territorial Seas of the United States

a. Actions When a Russian Ship Approaches the US Territorial Sea. Russian ships approaching the US territorial sea will be monitored by traditional means. Commanders of US forces that observe or track a Russian ship must be capable of communicating using the frequencies and procedures described in Appendix A to Enclosure B.

b. Actions When Entry by a Russian Ship Appears Imminent. If entry into the US territorial sea by a Russian ship appears imminent and the ship commander's intentions are unknown, the ship will be contacted using the call signs, primary or alternate frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B. The phrase "Close to Territory" may be used to notify the ship of its proximity to the US territorial sea.

c. Actions When a Russian Ship Has Entered the US Territorial Sea. If a Russian ship enters the US territorial sea and the reason for such entry is unknown, the ship will be contacted using the call signs, primary or alternate frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B. The phrase "Territory Entered" will be used to advise the ship of its entry into the territorial sea. The ship also will be questioned (if language capability exists) as to the reason for its entry, its name (or hull number), and its destination. A ship engaged in innocent or transit passage will be allowed to proceed. If the entry is a result of force majeure, the Russian ship will be offered assistance and, if desired, escorted to a suitable port. If

* The procedures contained in this Appendix have been exchanged with the Russian Armed Forces. Russian forces can be expected to assume that these procedures will be followed by US forces using primary or alternate frequencies and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B. The phrase "Close to Territory" may be used to notify the ship of its proximity to the territorial sea.

a Russian ship has entered the US territorial sea unintentionally, it will be requested to depart or, if circumstances do not permit this, to proceed, if possible, to a location designated by higher US authority. For these purposes, higher US authority will be representatives of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (NMCC), if time permits, or intervening authority or the on-scene commander if time does not. Reporting of the incident will be in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

d. Action When a Russian Ship Elects To Proceed to a Location Designated by US Forces. If a Russian ship, which has entered the US territorial sea unintentionally or because of force majeure, elects to proceed to a location designated by US forces, the US forces will:

- (1) Immediately report the incident in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.
- (2) Provide an opportunity for the commander of the Russian ship to contact the Russian Defense Attache or consular authorities as soon as possible (the telephone number of the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., is (202) 332-3741).
- (3) Ensure that proper physical security is provided to the Russian vessel.
- (4) If requested and within available resources, assist in repairing equipment required to allow the Russian ship to resume its voyage.
- (5) Allow the Russian ship to depart US territory at the earliest opportunity.

2. Actions When a US Ship Approaches or Enters the Territorial Sea of the Russian Federation

a. Actions When a US Ship Operates in the Vicinity of the Russian Territorial Sea. Commanding officers will take positive measures to avoid unintentional entry into the Russian territorial sea. Additionally, commanding officers will, as operationally feasible, guard the primary and alternate frequencies specified in Appendix A to Enclosure B and be alert to Russian forces advising "Close to Territory" or "Territory Entered."

b. Actions When, Because Of Force Majeure, a US Ship Requires Entry Into, or Has Entered, the Russian Territorial Sea. In this case, the commanding officer will initiate communications using the frequencies and procedures of Appendix A to Enclosure B to advise Russian forces of the reason for entry, necessary assistance, and intentions. Commanding officers will consider appropriate instructions from Russian forces and either leave the territorial sea as soon as circumstances permit, conduct innocent or transit passage through the territorial sea, or proceed to a location designated by the Russians. If the commanding officer elects to proceed to a port designated by the Russians, he should expect to receive assistance as specified in subparagraph 1d above and must report the incident immediately in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

c. Actions When a US Ship Unintentionally Enters the Russian Territorial Sea. When a commanding officer ascertains that he has unintentionally entered the Russian territorial sea, he will expeditiously leave the territorial sea or, if operationally appropriate, conduct an innocent passage through the territorial sea. If in communication with Russian forces, the commanding officer will consider appropriate instructions given by the Russian forces and advise them of his intentions. The incident will be reported in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 9.

d. Actions When a US Ship is Advised "Close To Territory" or "Territory Entered" While Operating in International Waters. If a US ship is in international waters and does not foresee the need to enter the territorial sea because of force majeure, and is advised "Close to Territory" or "Territory Entered" by Russian forces, the commanding officer should confirm his ship's position and, if appropriate, respond, "I am operating in international waters," and should take steps to remain in international waters. If the confirmation of position indicates that the ship has, in fact, unintentionally entered the Russian territorial sea, the commanding officer will follow the procedures indicated in the preceding subparagraph. Receipt of such advice, the circumstances, and subsequent ship actions will be reported in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 9.

SECTION II--PROCEDURES RELATING TO AIRCRAFT

1. Procedures To Be Followed When a Russian Aircraft Approaches or Enters US Airspace

a. Actions When a Russian Aircraft Approaches US Airspace.

Russian aircraft approaching US airspace will be monitored by traditional means. (Russian aircraft can be expected to begin monitoring applicable frequencies listed in Appendix A to Enclosure B when within 150 km (81 nm) of US airspace.)

Commanders of US forces, aircraft, and ships that track Russian aircraft will maintain the capability to communicate using the frequencies outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure B, and will use the procedures described below in making contact with Russian aircraft.

(1) Launch and escort procedures for interceptors remain in accordance with NORAD rules of engagement.

(2) When a Russian aircraft flies within 50 km (27 nm) of US airspace and it appears likely that the aircraft will enter US airspace, transmit the "Close to Territory" caution using the call signs, frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B.*

(3) Once having transmitted the "Close to Territory" caution, if no course correction is observed, attempt to establish radio contact with the Russian aircraft by using the call signs, frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B.

b. Actions When a Russian Aircraft Enters US Airspace. If a Russian aircraft enters US airspace and the reason for such entry is unknown, the aircraft will be contacted using the call signs, frequencies, and phrases described in

* In the event that there are two or more unknown aircraft near or within 50 km (27 nm) of US airspace, the magnetic course of the aircraft in question could be transmitted to help eliminate ambiguity. This transmission is not required or recognized as yet by Russian forces. If in practice it appears that the "Course" transmission would be useful, the issue will be addressed at the annual meeting of the JMC.

Appendix A to Enclosure B. Reporting will be made in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

(1) Use the phrase "Territory Entered" to advise the aircraft of its entry into US airspace.

(2) If radio contact and subsequent communications are not possible, interceptor aircraft should use the appropriate visual signals described in Appendix A to Enclosure B to communicate with the Russian aircraft.

(3) Expect the Russian aircraft either to exit US airspace or request navigational and landing assistance.

c. Actions When a Russian Aircraft Requests Landing in the United States. If a Russian aircraft requests landing in the United States, offer assistance to safely recover the Russian aircraft using the call signs, frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B.

(1) Attempt to establish radio contact as soon as possible.

(2) If the Russian aircraft visually signals "Request Landing," the interceptor will escort the aircraft to a suitable airfield (determined, when feasible, by representatives of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (NMCC), or by intervening authority or the interceptor flight lead when time does not permit).*

(3) Report immediately in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

d. Actions When a Russian Aircraft Lands in the United States. If a Russian aircraft lands in the United States, offer necessary assistance to safeguard and protect the aircraft, personnel, and equipment. The aircraft is not subject to inspection. In exceptional cases, when the aircraft poses a clear hazard to the health of personnel or to the environment, appropriate action may be taken to terminate the hazard. If the Russian aircraft is forced to land at a civilian airfield, every effort should be made by

* A suitable airfield should have a runway at least 2,500 meters or 8,000 feet long, but 3,000 meters or 9,500 feet long is preferred. In addition, suitable airfields should have crash and rescue equipment.

area military commanders to ensure that the same support is provided. Appendix C to Enclosure B provides an expeditious means of ensuring that minimum essential communication takes place quickly. This Appendix also is printed in DOD Flight Information Publication (FLIP) en route publications. The following actions should be taken by appropriate authorities:

- (1) Park the aircraft on a remote part of the airfield or in the hazardous cargo area.
- (2) Assist the aircrew in securing the aircraft.
- (3) Assist the aircrew in contacting the Russian Defense Attache in Washington, D.C. (telephone number is (202) 332-3741).
- (4) Assist, as practical, if maintenance support is requested.
- (5) Assist with filing a flight plan for exiting US airspace.
- (6) Make necessary billeting, messing, and transportation arrangements for the aircrew and passengers.
- (7) In the event of an accident, follow normal procedures until a Russian representative arrives on scene.
- (8) Assist, as practical, to enable the Russian aircraft to depart US territory at the earliest opportunity.

2. Procedures To Be Followed When a US Aircraft Operates in the Vicinity of Russian Airspace

a. Actions When a US Aircraft Approaches Russian Airspace. Aircraft commanders will take positive measures to avoid unintentional entry into Russian airspace.* Additionally, aircraft commanders will, if operationally feasible, guard the primary and alternate frequencies specified in Appendix A to Enclosure B and be alert to Russian forces advising "Close to Territory" or "Territory Entered."

* "Russian airspace" will be determined in accordance with the definition of "national territory" contained in Enclosure C.

(1) US aircrews flying within 50 km (27 nm) of Russian airspace can expect a responsible Russian agency to transmit a "Close to Territory" caution. If the US aircrew had not planned to be within 50 km (27 nm) of Russian airspace, exercise great caution and prudence and correct the course to the preplanned route of flight. Attempt to establish radio contact with the Russian agency using the call signs, frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B. If further communication is desired or necessary, switch to appropriate sustained communications frequency in accordance with agreed procedures.

(2) If the US aircrew had planned to be within 50 km (27 nm) of Russian airspace, when the Russian interceptor has transmitted the "Close to Territory" caution, establish radio contact using call signs, frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B, add the word "WILCO," and continue the mission.

(3) US aircrews operating beyond 50 km (27 nm) of Russian airspace are not obligated to respond to "Close to Territory" cautions or "Territory Entered" warnings. If a response is made, it should be that US aircraft are operating in international airspace.

(4) If force majeure is a factor or entry into Russian airspace is likely, radio contact with a Russian agency may clarify the situation and result in Russian assistance as quickly as possible.

(5) Expect Russian interceptors to be available to offer assistance. If radio contact is not established, visual signals can be used to communicate.

(6) Any time the "Territory Entered" phrase is transmitted by Russian forces, US forces will report in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

b. Actions When a US Aircraft Enters Russian Airspace. If a US aircraft enters Russian airspace, the aircraft commander will exercise great caution and prudence and expect a responsible Russian agency to contact the aircrew using call signs, frequencies, and phrases described in Appendix A to Enclosure B. Whatever the reason for entry, whether unintentional or the result of force majeure,

reporting will be made in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

(1) If the Russian warning "Territory Entered" is received, attempt to establish radio contact using procedures established in Appendix A to Enclosure B.

(2) If radio contact and subsequent communication are not possible, visual signals can be used to communicate with Russian interceptors.

(3) Depending on the circumstances of entry, exit Russian airspace or request landing assistance.

c. Actions When a US Aircraft Requests Landing in the Russian Federation. If a US aircraft requests landing in Russia, expect some assistance from a Russian ground control facility or Russian interceptor. Report the incident immediately in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

(1) Attempt to establish radio contact as soon as possible and transmit the phrase "Request Landing."

(2) If intercepted and unable to establish radio contact, use the visual signals described in Appendix A to Enclosure B to request landing.

(3) Expect the Russian interceptor to lead the US aircraft to a suitable airfield.

d. Actions When a US Aircraft Lands in the Russian Federation. If a US aircraft lands in the Russia, expect necessary assistance to safeguard and protect the aircraft and to care for the aircrew and passengers.

(1) Expect to be parked on an isolated part of the airfield or in a separate hangar.

(2) Use the US-Russian Checklist in the DOD FLIP en route publications to ensure minimum essential information is expeditiously provided to the airfield manager (format provided in Appendix C to Enclosure B).

(3) Secure the aircraft. It may be desirable to use aircrew members or passengers to provide a continuous presence at or in the aircraft.

(4) The aircraft is not subject to inspection. Any question involving inspection will be resolved jointly by representatives of the Armed Forces of the two countries. In exceptional cases, when the aircraft poses a clear hazard to the health of personnel or to the environment, appropriate action may be taken to terminate the hazard.

(5) Request assistance in contacting the US Defense Attache in Moscow as soon as possible. During duty hours, the American Embassy's telephone numbers are 252-2451 through 2459. During nonduty hours, contact the Marine guard at 252-1898 or 255-5123.

(6) Determine maintenance and logistic support necessary to expeditiously launch the aircraft. Convey this information to Russian officials and the US Defense Attache. Sign no documents. Request that all bills be forwarded to the US Embassy for payment. Request copies of all bills.

(7) Request necessary billeting, messing, and transportation arrangements for aircrew and passengers.

(8) As soon as practical, depart the Russian airfield.

SECTION III--PROCEDURES FOR COMMANDERS OF US FORCES IN
CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVING THE DANGEROUS USE OF LASERS
OR IN DANGEROUS COMMAND AND CONTROL INTERFERENCE

1. Procedures To Be Followed by Commanders of US Forces When
Using Lasers in Proximity to Russian Forces

a. When operating in close proximity to Russian forces, commanders of US forces will exercise great caution and prudence and will monitor the appropriate frequencies designated in Appendix A to Enclosure B. For US forces (except aircraft), monitoring of communications can be accomplished by communications elements that have the capability of performing this task for units within their sectors.

b. Commanders will know the maximum distance at which use of lasers will cause harm to personnel or damage equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

- c. When in close proximity to Russian forces, US personnel will not operate lasers if the direction and intensity of emission is expected to cause harm to Russian personnel or equipment.
- d. Before operating lasers that could conceivably cause harm to personnel or damage equipment when used in proximity to Russian forces, US commanders will attempt to establish contact in accordance with call signs, primary or alternate frequencies, and phrases in Appendix A to Enclosure B.
- e. Incidents in which US forces are suspected of the dangerous use of lasers will be reported in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

2. Procedures To Be Followed by Commanders of US Forces Who Detect Dangerous Levels of Laser Energy When in Proximity to Russian Forces

- a. When operating in close proximity to Russian forces, commanders of US forces will exercise great caution and prudence and will monitor the appropriate frequency designated in Appendix A to Enclosure B.
- b. Upon detecting dangerous levels of laser energy, commanders will try to determine the source. If the source is thought to be Russian forces, the commander will attempt to establish contact using the call signs, primary or alternate frequencies, and phrases in Appendix A to Enclosure B and attempt to end the danger.
- c. Incidents in which Russian forces are suspected of employing lasers in a manner that poses a potential threat to US personnel or equipment will be reported in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

3. Procedures To Be Followed by Commanders of US Forces in Instances Involving Dangerous Interference with Command and Control Networks

- a. When operating in close proximity to Russian forces, commanders of US forces will monitor the appropriate frequency designated in Appendix A to Enclosure B.

b. US personnel will not operate EW equipment when in proximity to Russian forces if the emission will interfere with Russian C2 networks in a manner that could reasonably cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment.

c. Commanders, having received from Russian forces an indication that they are experiencing dangerous levels of interference with their C2 networks, will investigate and ensure that the US equipment is not the source of such interference. The transmission of the "Stop Interference" phrase by Russian forces indicates that harm to personnel or equipment may have occurred. For this reason, regardless of whether or not US forces believe they were the cause, reports will be forwarded in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

d. Upon experiencing dangerous levels of interference with C2 nets, commanders will try to determine the source. If the source is thought to be Russian forces, the commander will attempt to establish contact in accordance with the call signs, primary or alternate frequencies, and phrases listed in Appendix A to Enclosure B and seek termination of the interference.

e. Incidents involving dangerous interference with C2 networks, caused by either Armed Forces, will be reported in accordance with Enclosure B, paragraph 3.

SECTION IV--PROCEDURES FOR US FORCES OPERATING IN SPECIAL CAUTION AREAS

By their very nature, Special Caution Areas describe areas in which additional attention to the spirit and letter of the agreement is required. US forces will, therefore, ensure that the following procedures are strictly applied.

a. US forces operating in Special Caution Areas will maintain the ability to communicate on the frequencies and will use the procedures described in Appendix A to Enclosure B.

b. The commander of a US force operating in a Special Caution Area will attempt to establish and maintain communication with the commander of Russian forces operating in the same area.

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c. US forces will avoid hampering the activity of Russian forces in a manner that could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment.

d. US forces will become familiar and comply with all additional procedures established for a specific Special Caution Area.

APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE B

US/RUSSIAN CHECKLIST FOR AIRCRAFT
LANDING IN THE OTHER PARTY'S TERRITORY

US/USSR CHECKLIST FOR AIRCRAFT
LANDING IN THE OTHER PARTY'S
TERRITORY

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ О САМОЛЕТЕ СССР или
США, СОВЕРШИВШЕМ ПОСАДКУ НА
ТЕРРИТОРИИ ДРУГОЙ СТОРОНЫ

On board the aircraft:

- Number of crewmembers _____
(attach crew list)
- Number of passengers _____
(attach passenger list)
- Hazardous cargo Yes No

На борту самолета:

- Численность экипажа _____
(Приложить список экипажа)
- Количество пассажиров _____
(Приложить список пассажиров)
- Опасный груз Да Нет

Does anyone need medical Assistance? Yes No

Требуется ли медицинская помощь? Да Нет

Does the aircraft require maintenance? Yes No

Требуется ли ремонт (техническое обслуживание) самолета Да Нет

I request to telephone the American Embassy immediately. Please dial Moscow 252-24-51 through 252-24-59. If after 18:00 hours Moscow time, dial Moscow 252-18-98 or 255-51-23.

Прошу немедленной телефонной связи с Советским посольством в Вашингтоне. Набирать вашингтонский номер (202) 332-3741.

I request to telephone the Soviet Embassy immediately. Please dial Washington, DC phone number (202) 332-3741.

Прошу немедленной телефонной связи с Американским посольством в Москве. Набирать московские номера 252.24.51-59. После 18 часов по московскому времени, набирать 252.18.98 или 255.51.23 в Москве.

Surname of aircraft commander:

Фамилия командира самолета:

Date: _____

Дата: _____

Note: All bills will be forwarded to the respective embassies.

Примечание: Все счета направляются в соответствующие посольства.

ENCLOSURE C

DEFINITIONS*

- a. aircraft. Any military aircraft of the Armed Forces of the parties to the agreement, excluding spacecraft.
- b. Armed Forces. For the United States, this term means the Armed Forces of the United States, including the Coast Guard; for Russia, this term means the Armed Forces and the Border Troops of the Russian Federation.
- c. equipment. Any ship, aircraft, or ground hardware of the Armed Forces of the parties to the agreement.
- d. force majeure. Extraordinary circumstances that threaten the safety of a ship or aircraft and the lives and health of people on board and as a result of that threat, cause the crew of the ship or aircraft to enter into the national territory of the other state either deliberately or as a result of the irresistible force. Such circumstances can be brought about by malfunction of a ship or an aircraft, shortage of fuel, fire on board, illness of members of the crew or passengers, difficult weather conditions, etc.
- e. ground hardware. Any materiel of the Armed Forces of the parties to the agreement designed for use on land.
- f. incident. A situation that results from the occurrence of a dangerous military activity. An incident may involve potential or actual harm to personnel or damage to equipment (e.g., a "Stop Laser" or "Stop Interference" transmission as described in Appendix A to Enclosure B) or the occurrence of an unintentional entry or a force majeure entry into the national territory of the other party to the agreement.
- g. interference with command and control networks. Actions that hamper, interrupt, or limit the operation of the signals and information transmission means and systems providing for the control of personnel and equipment of the Armed Forces of the parties to the agreement.

* Terminology herein is not standardized within the Department of Defense and is applicable only in the context of this document.

- h. laser. Any source of intense, coherent, highly directional electromagnetic radiation in the visible, infrared, or ultraviolet regions that is based on the stimulated radiation of electrons, atoms, or molecules.
- i. national territory. As intended by the parties to the agreement, national territory means the land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and the airspace above the same. With respect to Russia, US forces are guided by existing US national policy and regulation concerning the limits of recognized national territory.
- j. personnel. Any individual, military or civilian, who is serving in or is employed by the Armed Forces of the parties to the agreement.
- k. ship. Any warship or auxiliary ship of the Armed Forces of the parties to the agreement.
- l. Special Caution Area. A region, designated mutually by the parties to the agreement, in which personnel and equipment of their Armed Forces are present and, because of circumstances in the region, in which special measures will be undertaken in accordance with the agreement (reference a, Article V).

ENCLOSURE D

REFERENCES

- a. "Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities," 12 June 1989.
- b. "Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas," 25 May 1972.
- c. "Treaty on Open Skies," Instrument of Ratification for the United States deposited 2 December 1993.
- d. Joint Pub 1.1, 1 August 1992, "Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff."
- e. CJCSI 3150.03, December 1993, "Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports."
- f. Joint Service Regulation: AFR 55-3, AR 105.3, OPNAVINST 3430.18D, MCO 3430.3C, "Reporting Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference of Electro-magnetic Systems," RCS: JCS-1066 (MIN) of 31 July 1986.
- g. Rules of the Air, Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 9th Edition (as amended), July 1990.