



# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

## THESIS

**EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF A MODEL OF TEAM  
COLLABORATION USING SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS  
FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

by

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June 2009

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USING SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The extraordinary events that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001, left Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controllers in New York, Boston, Washington, and Cleveland and their colleagues at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), without precedent as to how to respond to the hijacking of four American commercial airliners. Despite the chaos and confusion, the two agencies put forth a joint effort in order to decide when and how to scramble fighter aircraft to escort the airliners. The collaboration that occurred between the agencies was recorded in radio transcripts between NORAD and FAA air traffic controllers. The goal of this thesis is to utilize the September 11, 2001, NORAD/FAA channel three transcripts to offer a real-world example of how a team works together on a one-of-a-kind problem. Further, transcript of recorded audio were coded and analyzed in an effort to empirically validate the Office of Naval Research model of team collaboration. The model focuses on individual and team cognitive processes used during team or agency collaboration with the goal of understanding how individuals and teams work together in order to reach a decision.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

The following is a chronological list of events that occurred on Tuesday, September 11, 2001. It is merely a loose timeline, compiled from several sources, including the Cable News Network (CNN). It is neither official, nor all-inclusive. However, it illustrates the immediate impact of that day's tragic events and the complexity faced by the collaborating government and civilian organizations.

### 1. Chronology of Events

- 0759 American Airlines flight 11 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA.
- 0814 United Airlines flight 175 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA.
- 0820 American Airlines flight 77 departs Washington Dulles International Airport for Los Angeles, CA.
- 0825 Boston Center is made aware of a hijacking.
- 0837 Boston Center notifies NEADS of a hijacked aircraft.
- 0842 United Airlines flight 93 departs Newark, NJ, for San Francisco, CA.
- 0844 NORAD orders a fighter aircraft launch to escort a hijacked aircraft in New York City (Bronner, 2006).
- 0845 A hijacked passenger jet, American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767, flying from Boston to Los Angeles, crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC), tearing a hole in the building and setting it on fire.
- 0903 A second hijacked airplane from Boston, United Airlines Flight 175, crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) and explodes. Now, both buildings are on fire.
- 0917 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shuts down all New York City airports.

- 0921 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey closes all bridges and tunnels in the New York area.
- 0930 President Bush, speaking in Sarasota, Florida, declares the country has suffered an "apparent terrorist attack."
- 0940 The FAA halts all flight operations at all United States (U.S.) airports, for the first time in U.S. history.
- 0943 American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757, flying from Washington's Dulles International Airport to Los Angeles, crashes into the Pentagon. Evacuation begins immediately.
- 0945 The White House is evacuated.
- 1005 The south tower of the WTC collapses.
- 1010 A portion of the Pentagon collapses. Additionally, United Airlines Flight 93, another hijacked airplane, crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, southeast of Pittsburgh.
- 1013 The United Nations (UN) building evacuates.
- 1022 In Washington D.C., the State and Justice Departments are evacuated, as well as the World Bank.
- 1024 The FAA begins diverting all inbound transatlantic aircraft flying into the U.S. to Canada.
- 1028 The WTC's north tower collapses from the top down.
- 1045 All federal office buildings in Washington, D.C. are evacuated.
- 1053 New York's primary elections, scheduled for Tuesday, are postponed.
- 1057 New York Gov. George Pataki closes all state government offices.
- 1102 New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani urges all New Yorkers to stay at home and orders an evacuation of the area south of Canal Street.
- 1116 CNN reports that the Center for Disease Control and Prevention is preparing precautionary emergency-response teams.

- 1126 United Airlines confirms that United Flight 93, from Newark to San Francisco, has crashed in Pennsylvania. The airline also claims it is "deeply concerned" about Flight 175.
- 1159 United Airlines confirms that Flight 175, from Boston to Los Angeles, has crashed into the WTC's south tower.
- 1204 Los Angeles International Airport, the destination of three of the crashed airplanes, is evacuated.
- 1215 San Francisco International Airport, the destination of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania, is evacuated.
- 1215 The Immigration and Naturalization Service says U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico are on the highest state of alert, but not closed.
- 1230 The FAA reports that 50 flights are in U.S. airspace, but none are reporting any problems.
- 1304 Bush, speaking from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, says that all appropriate security measures are being taken, including placing the U.S. military on high alert worldwide. He asks for prayers for those killed or wounded in the attacks and says, "Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."
- 1327 The city of Washington, D.C. declares a state of emergency.
- 1344 The Pentagon says five warships and two aircraft carriers will leave the U.S. Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia, to protect the East Coast from further attacks, also reducing the number of military vessels in port. The two carriers, USS George Washington and USS John F. Kennedy, will head for the New York coast. The other ships that will head to sea are frigates and guided missile destroyers, capable of shooting down aircraft.
- 1400 Senior FBI officials tell CNN they assume that the four crashed airplanes were hijacked as part of a coordinated terrorist attack.
- 1430 The FAA announces there will be no U.S. commercial air traffic until 1200 EDT Wednesday.
- 1449 At a news conference, Mayor Giuliani announces the partial restoration of subway and bus services in New York City.

- 1555 A White House counselor says the President is at an undisclosed location, later revealed to be Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and is conducting a National Security Council meeting by phone. Additionally, Mayor Giuliani now says the number of critically injured in New York City is up to 200 with 2,100 total injuries reported.
- 1600 CNN reports that U.S. officials say there are "good indications" that Saudi militant Osama bin Laden, suspected of coordinating the bombings of two U.S. embassies in 1998, is involved in the attacks.
- 1606 California Governor Gray Davis dispatches urban search-and-rescue teams to New York.
- 1610 Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex is reported on fire.
- 1625 The American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) say they will remain closed Wednesday.
- 1715 CNN reports that fires are still burning in part of the Pentagon. No death figures have been released yet.
- 1720 The 47-story Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex, which was damaged and evacuated when the twin towers across the street collapsed earlier in the day, collapses. Other nearby buildings remain on fire.
- 1730 CNN reports that U.S. officials say the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania could have been headed for one of three possible targets: Camp David, the White House or the U.S. Capitol building.
- 1800 Explosions are heard in Kabul, Afghanistan, hours after terrorist attacks targeted financial and military centers in the United States. Afghanistan is believed to be where bin Laden, who U.S. officials say is possibly behind Tuesday's deadly attacks, is located. U.S. officials say later that the United States had no involvement in the incident whatsoever. The attack is credited to the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban group fighting in the country's ongoing civil war.
- 1840 U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, holds a news conference in the Pentagon, stating that the building is still operational.
- 1902 CNN reports the Marriott Hotel near the WTC is on the verge of collapse and says some New York bridges are now open to outbound traffic.

- 1945 The New York Police Department claims that at least 78 officers are missing, and that as many as half of the first 400 firefighters on the scene were killed.
- 2030 President Bush addresses the nation, saying "thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve." The President says the U.S. government will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and those who harbor them. He adds that government offices in Washington are reopening for essential personnel Tuesday night and for all workers Wednesday.
- 2122 CNN reports the fire at the Pentagon is still burning and is considered contained but not under control.
- 2157 Mayor Giuliani says New York City schools will be closed Wednesday and no more volunteers are needed for Tuesday evening's rescue efforts. He says there is hope that there are still people alive in rubble. He also says that power is out on the west side of Manhattan and that health department tests show there are no airborne chemical agents about which to worry.
- 2249 CNN reports that Attorney General Ashcroft told members of Congress that there were three to five hijackers on each plane armed only with knives.

## **2. National Defense Response**

On September 11, 2001, the defense of U.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), the regional headquarters for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is a joint U.S. and Canadian organization that employs a network of space-based, aerial-and ground-based sensors, refueling capabilities and fighter aircraft to detect and deter any airborne threats to North America. NEADS is the regional headquarters for NORAD located at Griffiss Air Force Base in Rome, New York. It is responsible for protecting one of three NORAD regions, which covers half of a million square miles of North American airspace over the U.S. and Canada. NEADS was the key command and control (C2) center for the U.S. military response during the terrorist attacks.

Despite the fact that no specific protocols existed concerning suicide hijackers who used commercial planes as weapons of mass destruction, the civilian and military personnel at the FAA and NEADS attempted to rapidly improvise an effective home-land defense against an unprecedented attack. The conduct of NEADS personnel that day is commendable. Individual FAA controllers and command center managers proactively sought as much information and intelligence as they could process, and made seemingly sound decisions. The standard response to an aircraft hijacking is to launch fighter aircraft from the nearest military installation to follow the aircraft in order to observe and take the appropriate action when necessary (Bronner, 2006).

However, poor communication between more senior levels of the chain of command rendered this standard response, as well as the collective national response, ineffective (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Since the President, Secretary of Defense, and other senior military and FAA officials were not communicating effectively with each other, Air National Guard units with differing rules of engagement and standard operating procedures were launched without NORAD's consent or knowledge. Then, once airborne, they received conflicting instructions. Further illustrating this confusion is the fact that the order to shoot down the final hijacked airplane, United Flight 93, was not relayed to NEADS until almost thirty minutes after the plane crashed in Pennsylvania (Bronner, 2006).

Ultimately, the FAA realized it had lost situational awareness and control of U.S. air space, and ordered the grounding of all civilian aircraft. This decision unfortunately came after the hijackers intentionally crashed all four hijacked airplanes. It is NEADS standard procedure to record all internal and external radio communications on multi-channel tape recorders. This thesis analyzes a transcript of one of those channels, focusing on the team collaboration and cognitive processes that occurred between the different government agencies that day.

### **3. Emergency Response**

The emergency response to the casualties suffered on September 11, 2001, not unlike the national defense response, had to be improvised. The Fire Department of New

York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, as well as the employees and occupants of the affected buildings coordinated their efforts to the best of their ability. They were able to minimize the effects of surprising and destructive events, the brunt of which spanned a period of roughly 100 minutes (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

Almost all personnel casualties occurred at or above the point where the hijacked airplanes impacted the buildings. Most immediate responders, who intentionally remained on scene in order to try to save as many lives as possible, were lost. Despite the lack of disaster preparation, absence of a unified incident command, and inadequate interagency communications, the responding agencies were able to save the lives of all but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians working below the impact zone (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Additionally, the Pentagon handled their emergency response far more effectively than they handled the national defense response. The unaffected parts of the building were never shut down and continued to attempt to provide C2 to the larger response effort.

## **B. THESIS GOALS**

The primary goal of this thesis is to empirically evaluate the model of team collaboration, developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored Collaboration and Knowledge Integration (CKI) Program, using the September 11, 2001, NEADS/FAA channel 3 transcripts. A secondary goal is to apply the model to real-world team collaboration domains. The model of team collaboration focuses on how individuals use cognitive processes to develop information and knowledge to make an informed decision. For this research, we applied the macro-cognitive process definitions to the team communications in the transcripts, to determine whether these definitions accurately represent how teams collaborate to make real world decisions, or if the model is more suitable for analyzing controlled, laboratory situations. Additionally, this thesis provides suggestions for enhancements and additions to the existing list of definitions.

The audio from one of the primary communications channels used by the mission control commander (MCC), channel three MCC Operations (channel 3), was professionally transcribed. The resulting transcript provides a realistic example of an inter-agency collaborative team's response to a real-world emergency. Each speech turn in the transcript was coded, in whole or in part, by each coder using definitions included in the model of team collaboration. Several definitions were clearly designed for use in controlled, laboratory experimental environments, and were not applicable to this, or any, real-world scenario. However, this is not evidence that these definitions should be excluded from the model. Additional codes were included to represent additional team communications that occur in real-world task domains.

### **C. PREVIOUS RESEARCH**

Previous research was conducted with a similar goal of validating the initial structural model of team collaboration, including a thesis by Ensign Maura Garrity, 2007; a thesis by Lieutenant Luis Socias, 2008; a thesis by Lieutenant Commander Catherine Donaldson and Lieutenant David Johnson, 2008; and multiple studies by Hutchins and Kendall from a series of both field and laboratory experiments in which teams collaborated during air warfare and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) scenarios (Garrity, 2007), (Socias, 2008), (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008), (Hutchins and Kendall, 2008).

Garrity applied the definitions of the macrocognitive processes included in the initial version of the model of team collaboration to analyze the Fire Department of New York's (FDNY) response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, offering suggestions for improving both the performance of the FDNY and the model (Garrity, 2007). The Socias thesis focused on audio channel 4 from the NEADS response to the hijackings on September, 11 (Socias, 2008), while Donaldson and Johnson focused on audio channel 2. Their research was also aimed toward validating the structural model of team collaboration; however they used a second version of the model (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008). Their individual research efforts, like ours, are autonomous. However, pairing them with this thesis and potential future analysis of all the audio channels should create

a comprehensive account of the inter-agency team collaboration that occurred on September 11, 2001, between the military and civilian individuals and organizations.

MIOs are U.S. Navy-conducted operations that delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area before they are in a position to harm friendly forces. During MIOs, suspicious vessels are often boarded by a trained military team to ensure compliance with embargos and other maritime laws. Hutchins and Kendall employed the structural model of team collaboration to analyze transcripts from a series of simulated MIOs and communications from air warfare teams on two U.S. warships, equipped with the Aegis fire control system, to observe how teams collaborated in unique, complex situations (Hutchins and Kendall, 2008), (Hutchins, Kendall, and Bordetsky, 2008).

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## **II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND**

### **A. THE FAA AND ITS COLLABORATION WITH NORAD**

The airspace of the continental U.S. is monitored and protected by two main entities: the FAA, who is charged with navigating and controlling air traffic, and NORAD, who is charged with protecting the North American continent against air attack. In discharging its responsibilities, NORAD utilizes the airspace that is monitored by the FAA and must conduct their operations according to FAA regulations and with their active participation (Memorandum of understanding between FAA and NORAD, 1987). Thus, close coordination between the FAA and NORAD is required in order to maintain safety of the U.S. airspace. In order to interpret how the FAA and NORAD collaborated on the morning of September 11, 2001, this thesis will examine their missions and working relationships.

### **B. FAA MISSION AND STRUCTURE**

As stated in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the FAA was granted authority to regulate and oversee all aspects of civil aviation in the U.S. Among its responsibilities the FAA is to regulate U.S. commercial air space by navigating and controlling air traffic (FAA, 2009). Twenty-two air route traffic control centers have been established to monitor the U.S. airspace. Controllers at these centers provide information to, and receive feedback from, the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, which is tasked with overseeing daily traffic flow within the entire airspace system. However, ultimate responsibility for the National Airspace System lies with FAA headquarters located in Washington D.C. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). The operations center within the FAA headquarters will receive notifications of all major incidents, including hijackings and accidents.

The aircraft hijacked, on the morning of September 11, 2001, were monitored by the FAA control centers located in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis as depicted in Figure 1.



Figure 1. FAA Air Traffic Control Centers (From The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004)

Although every center obtained some general knowledge of the happenings in the national airspace, each of the control centers involved received its information independently. Consequently, what was known to the controllers in the Boston command center was not necessarily known to those in New York, Cleveland, Indianapolis and vice versa.

### C. NORAD MISSION AND STRUCTURE

NORAD was established in 1958 through a bi-national agreement between the U.S. and Canada. The primary goal of NORAD is to defend the North American airspace and protect the continent. Specifically, NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America (NORAD, 2009). Included

in the mission of aerospace warning is the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against the continent whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, through mutual support arrangements made between commands (NORAD, 2009). The job of aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the airspace of Canada and the U.S. (NORAD, 2009). The NORAD mission does not make a distinction between national and international threats. However, since its establishment was a counter measure to protect U.S. airspace from a Soviet threat, it came to define its objective as defending against external attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Since the end of the cold war brought about a decreased threat of a Soviet air strike, the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from twenty-six to seven. The seven alert sites are called upon by one of NORAD's three sectors: the Canadian NORAD Region, the Alaskan NORAD Region, and the Continental United States Region (CONR). It is important to note that the CONR region is further divided into two sectors: the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). NEADS, based out of Rome, NY, reports to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, who in turn reports to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, as depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Reporting Structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector (From The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004)

According to the 9/11 Commission Report: During the late 1990s, threats of terrorists using aircraft as weapons were recognized, but training to counter this threat was not based on actual intelligence. Further, the biggest threat NORAD perceived from these aircraft was their use in transporting weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles.

Any order to shoot down a commercial airplane before the September 11, 2001, attacks would have to have come from the National Command Authority, a phrase used to describe the President and the Secretary of Defense (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Since officials had the impression that any threat or hijacked aircraft that would require intervention (in the form of shooting it down) would come from another country, they felt that sufficient time would be available to

identify the target and scramble interceptor aircraft. Further, the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the U.S.—and using them as guided missiles – was not recognized by NORAD before September 11, 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

On the morning of September 11, 2001, all four of the hijacked aircraft were flying in the NEADS sector, in Rome, New York. NEADS is charged with safeguarding a half million square miles of North American airspace that stretches from the east coast to Tennessee through the Dakotas to the Canadian border, including Boston, New York, Washington D.C. and Chicago (Bronner, 2006). That morning, NEADS could call upon two alert sites: Otis Air National Guard Base, in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Both Otis and Langley had one pair of ready fighter planes on alert. Other facilities not on alert would be delayed in providing additional interceptor aircraft, as they would need time to arm fighters and organize crews (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Figure 3 illustrates NORAD’s organizational structure during the attacks on September 11, 2001.




Figure 3. NORAD Organizational Structure

## **D. THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

### **1. FAA and the 9/11 Hijackings**

Under FAA regulations, all aircraft flying above 10,000 feet are required to emit a unique signal in order to distinguish the aircraft's identity and determine its altitude. The hijackers were able to "hide" their aircraft by disabling the transponders on three of the four aircraft they commandeered. Without transponders, air traffic controllers can only track aircraft through their primary radar returns. However, this process is much more difficult and does not reveal the aircraft's identity and altitude. Consequently, air traffic controllers seem to be so dependent on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns on their radar scopes (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). However, after losing three of the four transponder signals, air traffic personnel changed the configuration settings on their radar scopes so that they could see the primary radar returns (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Before 9/11, incidents of commercial aircraft deviating slightly off course, or occasions where an FAA controller lost radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time did occur. Although it happened much less frequently, a controller could also lose a commercial airliner's transponder signal. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signals, which did happen during the hijackings, would be a rare and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an airplane crash (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). According to procedure, the controller's job in this instance would be to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other nearby planes in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. As these efforts could take five or more minutes, alarm bells would not start ringing until this protocol was attempted and failed (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Once air traffic personnel had attempted to implement this operational procedure and were still unable to contact the aircraft, they knew something was gravely wrong.

## **2. FAA, Department of Defense (DoD), and White House Teleconferences**

After learning of the hijackings, personnel at FAA headquarters initiated teleconferences with various agencies at approximately 0920 Eastern Standard Time (EST). According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the National Military Chain of Command (NMCC) officer, who participated in the call between the FAA and the DoD, said “the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks” (National Commission of Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36). The 9/11 Commission Report further indicates that the teleconference did not play a role in coordinating a response to the attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

At approximately 0930 EST, the FAA, DoD and the White House engaged in a teleconference. However, since the teleconferences that occurred before 1000 EST did not include the correct officials from the FAA or the DoD, they were not successful in producing a meaningful, coordinated response to the hijackings by the military and the FAA (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in the video teleconference that was conducted from the White House by Richard Clark, special assistant to the President. Although records indicate that this teleconference began at 0925 EST, the FAA did not join the discussion until 0940. The 9/11 Commission Report did not determine who from DoD participated in this conference, but it does indicate that, in the first hour, no personnel involved in crisis management were present. Also, the 9/11 Commission Report states that, throughout the first hour of this teleconference, no information was conveyed to the NMCC. A witness stated, “it was almost like there were parallel decision-making processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC and then there was the White House video teleconference. In my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision making” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36).

## **E. INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION**

On the morning of September 11, 2001, NORAD and the FAA had established protocols for dealing with the threat of a hijacked aircraft. The 9/11 Commission Report states, “on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest level of government” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004, p. 17). Established procedures required the pilot of the hijacked aircraft to inform the air traffic controllers of the hijacking via radio or by squawking 7500, which is the universal code that represents a hijacked aircraft. Once controllers were notified they were to inform their supervisors, who would then relay the information up the chain of command to management at FAA headquarters. When determination of a hijacking was confirmed, the information would then be reported to the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. Operating procedures then indicate that the Pentagon’s NMCC is to be notified and a military escort aircraft is to be requested. The military escort is to shadow the hijacked flight, to report anything unusual, and to aid in search and rescue in the event of an emergency. Only then would the NMCC seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for military assistance. Once approved, orders would then be transmitted through NORAD’s chain of command (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

The NMCC updated the FAA hijack coordinator who also assisted FAA centers in their coordination with the military. FAA traffic control facilities, along with radars helped NORAD track the hijacked aircraft. These protocols, though, did not plan for the possibility of an intercept. The protocol assumed that fighter escort would be discreet, vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft where it could monitor the aircraft’s flight path (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). As outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report, the protocols established for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking assumed that: the hijacked aircraft would be easily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear, there would be time to address the problem through appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command, and hijackings would take the traditional form, in that they would not be

suicide missions designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile. As concluded in the 9/11 commission report, these previously established protocols were unsuited for the events that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

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### **III. LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **A. COLLABORATION AND KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION (CKI) PROGRAM**

In recent years, modern warfare trends have caused National Defense Policy to transition away from focusing on large-scale battles fought by independent platforms, to confronting unique scenarios requiring a rapid response by increasingly mobile, coalition forces. Associated challenges in team decision making have emerged along with this policy shift, including distributed, joint command level, crisis-driven decision making. Success in this environment requires a renewed focus on understanding the human ability to perform complex and collaborative analysis and decision making under severe time pressure (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). The mission of ONR is: “to foster, plan, facilitate and transition scientific research in recognition of its paramount importance to enable future naval power and the preservation of national security” (ONR, History & Mission of ONR). With the knowledge that accomplishing this mission means recognizing the evolving nature of modern warfare and policy, ONR organizes U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ science and technology programs, one of which is the CKI program.

The objective of the CKI program is to better understand cognitive processes employed by team members when responding to one-of-a-kind complex, information-rich problems, and improve the effectiveness of team decision making to solve unique, time-sensitive problems. ONR’s interest in team collaboration research focuses on a cognitive perspective, aiming to develop cognitive science-based tools, models, and interfaces to provide common situational awareness to a diverse, distributed team collaborating to decide on a course of action (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Through the CKI program, ONR hopes to create new operator interfaces with supporting automated systems, allowing teams to analyze a large volume of uncertain data. The military can greatly increase its

warfighting effectiveness by refining its understanding of team knowledge sharing (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).

## **B. COGNITION**

In general terms, cognition refers to the way individual minds, groups, and organizations of varying size develop concepts (Cognition, Merriam-Webster). Cognition includes the mental processes that humans engage in to gain knowledge, remember concepts, judge situations, and attempt to solve problems. Higher level functions of the human brain fall under the concept of cognition. These functions include, but are not limited to, spoken language, imagination, perception, and planning (Cognition, Wikipedia). Perception, introspection, memory, imagination, conception, belief, emotions and reasoning are all examples of cognitive processes. There are several levels of cognition which attempt to explain all of the different things humans can do with their minds, including metacognition, microcognition and macrocognition (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008).

### **1. Metacognition**

Metacognition refers to the way humans think, process information and perform cognitive tasks. Researchers initially began to study metacognition in teams in the early 1990s. The September 11, 2001 attacks inspired real-world studies of metacognition within groups and teams, focusing on human reaction and performance under stress (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008). One important notion within metacognition is metamemory, the concept of how familiar humans are with what they remember. In group situations, accurate memory performance is essential to team success (Salas and Fiore, 2004). Two factors that contribute to group recognition and memory performance are consensus and correctness (Hinsz, 1990). The consensus factor demonstrates the willingness of the team to choose a similar or alternative outcome. The correctness factor demonstrates that collaborating groups are more likely to choose the correct alternative. Existing research on team problem solving is consistent with the idea of the correctness

factor, in that it shows that, when collaborating, groups are more likely to choose a correct response than they are to choose an incorrect response (Laughlin, 1980).

## **2. Macrocognition and Microcognition**

Macrocognition refers to the way human cognition occurs in realistic decision-making situations, and is defined as the internalized and externalized high-level mental processes employed by teams to create new knowledge during complex, unique, collaborative problem solving situations. Simply stated, macrocognition describes the way cognition emerges in natural environments (Letsky et al., 2007). Conceptually, macrocognition provides a framework for comprehending cognitive processes and their direct influence on task performance (Klein et al., 2000). Letsky et al., (2007) define the term “high-level” as “the process of combining, visualizing, and aggregating information to resolve ambiguity in support of the discovery of new knowledge and relationships.”

Internal processes are defined as high-level mental processes, occurring at either the team or individual level, which cannot be expressed through external means (Letsky et al., 2007). These external means include: writing, speaking, and gestures. Internal processes can only be evaluated by qualitative metrics, such as cognitive mapping or think out loud protocols or by using alternate quantitative metrics, such as pupil size (Letsky et al., 2007). Externalized processes are defined as high-level mental processes, occurring at either the team or individual level, associated with actions that can be explicitly observed and measured in a consistent, reliable, repeatable manner (Letsky et al., 2007). Teams in complex environments, collaborating to solve unique problems, employ these processes (Fiore, 2007). Historically, cognitive psychologists have conducted contrived experiments, based on puzzle solving and controlled laboratory experiments. These functions are referred to as microcognition, since they investigate the processes that are believed to be invariant and serve as the foundation of human cognition.

## **3. Relevant Terms**

Throughout this document, terms will be used that hold specific meanings in the context of the study of cognition. Here, we provide definitions for a number of these

terms, as they relate to team collaboration. Consensus refers to an opinion or position reached by, and agreed upon by, the group as a whole (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Data refers to a raw fact or statement of event, independent of other entities (Bellinger, 2004). Data may be usable, yet still has no significance in and of itself (Ackoff, 1989). Decision refers to making a judgment on an issue that is being considered (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Decision Making is a form of problem solving in which an individual attempts to choose the best course of action from a given set of alternatives (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).

Distributed cognition is the cognitive work that is done, not in isolation inside an individual's mind, but among teams, between individuals and artifacts, and over a period of time (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Information refers to data that are processed and deemed to be useful (Ackoff, 1989). The term information implies the understanding of some sort of relationship, potentially cause and effect (Bellinger, 2004). Knowledge refers to the deterministic application of data and information, such as memorization (Ackoff, 1989). Knowledge implies the recognition of a pattern that provides a high level of predictability about what will occur next (Bellinger, 2004). Knowledge Building is a process, through which individuals increase not only their own understanding, but also the team's collective understanding (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Knowledge Interoperability refers to the exchange of relevant, actionable knowledge between team members (Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2005).

Macrocognition in teams refers to the behavior that a team demonstrates when working together to solve a complex problem. It consists of both verbal (team discussions and negotiations) and non-verbal (hand gestures, bodily cues, visual aids and text messages) actions, and is comprised of several macrocognitive processes (Warner & Letsky, 2005). Process refers to a series of related actions, measured over time, engaged in by individuals or a team in order to create an outcome, result or product. Team

collaboration refers to individuals collaborating to solve a problem or complete an intellectual task (Merriam-Webster, 2002). Team problem solving refers to interactive decision-making between several team members with differing fields and levels of expertise, aimed at generating creative solutions to defined problems. The outcome of team problem solving is a solution that could not be reached independently by the individual team members (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).

Understanding refers to an analytical, cognitive process that synthesizes current knowledge with new knowledge, thus supporting the transition from data to information, and the transition of information to knowledge (Bellinger, 2004). Understanding implies an appreciation of the reasons leading up to a certain event (Ackoff, 1989). The difference between knowledge and understanding is that knowledge implies memorization, and understanding implies learning. Humans with understanding are able to execute useful actions by building upon currently held information, knowledge and understanding itself. Artificial intelligence (AI) systems possess understanding to the extent that a machine is programmed to be able to synthesize new knowledge from previously stored information and knowledge (Bellinger et al., 2004). Wisdom refers to evaluated understanding. It goes beyond understanding, itself, by giving humans an understanding about that which there has previously been no understanding. It is a predictive process, which calls on all previous levels of perception. Wisdom implies the ability to discern between right and wrong, good and bad, and is thus a uniquely human state, which cannot be achieved by a machine (Ackoff, 1989).

#### **4. Using Macrocognition to Understand Complex Cognition**

As previously noted, ONR perceives an increased need to understand how individuals and teams work together to plan, think, decide, solve problems, and take action as integrated units relying on interconnected and interdependent systems, as today's military teams typically do (Fiore et al., in press). ONR believes that cognition and collaboration in dynamic environments must be studied in great detail in order to be fully understood. These studies have led to the development of theoretical models

capable of capturing complex collaborative processes (Fiore et al., in press). The ultimate goal of these theoretical models is to exploit the understanding of human decision making in order to gain a military advantage over our adversaries.

Macro cognition, as opposed to micro cognition, describes cognition at a more complex level as a means of distinguishing differing levels of cognitive processes. The concept of macro cognition was developed simultaneously in separate disciplines at the end of the 20th century. Macro cognition was described in the cognitive sciences as cognitive processes occurring at levels greater than a single processing unit, such as communication and reasoning (Fiore et al., in press). Cognitive engineers used the term to describe how cognition emerges when individuals and teams perform realistic tasks in natural environments, where complex cognitive processes are known to most often occur (Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995). Psychologists and behavioral scientists have found great value in studying macro cognition in the context of team collaboration. They have been and continue to be able to understand important aspects of human cognition and problem solving in collaborative settings (Warner et al., 2005).

### **C. DATA, INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE TRANSFORMATION (DIK-T)**

Simply stated, the DIK-T process is the combining of data and information to create actionable knowledge that did not explicitly exist before the collaboration, which can be considered synonymous with the term knowledge building (Sharma, 2008). This process involves more than just those three components, however. Ackoff, a systems theorist and professor of organizational change, classifies the content of the human mind into five categories: Data, Information, Knowledge, Understanding and Wisdom (Bellinger et al., 2004). He holds that the first four categories deal only with the past, with what is already known, and that wisdom is the only category that deals with the future. Wisdom is evaluated understanding, and incorporates vision and design (Sharma, 2008). Wisdom, however, is not easily reached. Humans must move their minds in order through the first four categories to be able to create the future, as opposed to merely grasping the events of the present (Ackoff, 1989).

## **1. Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DIKW) Hierarchy**

Ackoff was not the first, and not the last for that matter, to mention the DIKW hierarchy. The hierarchy is mentioned as early as 1982 in the information science domain, when Cleveland pointed to the origin of the hierarchy (Sharma, 2008). Surprisingly, the hierarchy's first mention is neither in the knowledge management nor information science field, but in early 20th century poetry (Cleveland, 1982). Cleveland names T.S. Eliot as the first to mention the hierarchy in his 1934 poem, "The Rock" (Eliot, 1934):

Where is the Life we have lost in living?

Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?

Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?

To this day, researchers struggle to answer those questions. With Eliot's hierarchy as a starting point, Ackoff's version points out that information ages most quickly, followed closely by knowledge and that understanding only appears to be permanent. Wisdom, however, is truly permanent (Ackoff, 1989), and is most quickly achieved in teams. Conceptions of data, information and knowledge have evolved since Eliot wrote his poem in 1934. However, he was able to point out some very real relationships that continue to influence the way researchers approach the study of cognition (Hey, 2004).

## **2. Knowledge Transfer in Teams**

Modern research on team collaboration aims to uncover truths about cognition by harnessing the power of collaboration in teams. A team is a group of several interdependent people who cooperate dynamically and flexibly to achieve a common goal (Salas et al., 1992). Teams can also be considered interdependent collections of individuals who share a common goal of achieving specific outcomes for themselves and their organization (Sundstrom et al., 1990). Military and government decision making teams are characterized by diverse knowledge, distinct roles, rotating members, and a hierarchical command structure (Letsky et al., 2007). They work in an environment distinguished by ambiguous situations with little margin for error (Letsky et al., 2007).

Further, military teams have short developmental stages and are comprised of heterogeneous team members. This combination serves to intensify the problems that arise during team collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007).

ONR's focus is to develop ways to expedite military teams' progression to the top of the DIK-T hierarchy. Military commands are geographically dispersed and support locations across the globe, causing most decision making teams to act as ad hoc virtual organizations (Socias, 2008). These hybrid organizations involve many team members at several locations with little time to collaborate to make an informed decision, such as the NORAD/FAA team analyzed in this thesis. During its progression through this hierarchy, a military decision making team will encounter many obstacles such as uncertain circumstances, rapidly unfolding events, and hostility (Elliot et al., 2001). Decision makers must be able to work through these obstacles. Problem solving must be geared toward identifying and disregarding inaccurate and unnecessary information in order to act on necessary information in a timely manner (Elliot et al., 2001). Executing a rehearsed strategy is challenging enough. Attempting to execute the plan as situations and mental models change, on the other hand, is even more difficult. It requires constant re-evaluation and adjustment of the plan in order for each team member to maintain an accurate awareness of the situation.

#### **D. DECISION-MAKING MODELS**

Decision making in groups of several members or organizations presents the unique challenge of arriving at a decision based upon the input of multiple individuals (Lahti, 1996). There are various styles that describe the processes groups use to decide upon the best course of action. This section mentions several of these models, relevant to team collaboration. In order to compare and contrast each decision making model, we will refer to the notion of interests, which are formed by an individual's organizational task, career and personal life. In any group decision making situation, the different participating individuals, and organizations, often have differing interests which they wish to pursue (Morgan, 1996).

## **1. The Rational Model**

The rational model, also referred to as the classical model, focuses on the manner in which decisions ought to be made, and is the baseline against which other models are compared (Cheshire & Feroz, 1989). It focuses on objectives, alternatives, consequences and optimality. This model assumes that the decision maker, which can be an individual or team, is made aware of all of the available information required to make a decision. The decision maker then considers all possible alternatives with objectives in mind, and selects the best possible decision. The rational model presumes that the decision maker is completely rational and searches for a decision using a planned, orderly, and consistent process. This process must proceed, in order, through the following steps: problem identification, development of criteria against which all potential solutions can be evaluated, identification of alternative courses of action, evaluation of these alternatives, selection and implementation of the best alternative (Lahti, 1996).

## **2. The Administrative Model**

The administrative model, also referred to as the behavioral model, focuses on the manner in which decisions are actually made, in situations where the decision makers do not possess all of the information needed to make a decision. Similar to the rational model, the decision making proceeds sequentially and the alternatives are examined one at a time. However, in this model, the first satisfactory alternative that is found is chosen. Decision makers' individual experience, or lack thereof, and capabilities, along with limitations on information processing and resources, act as constraints to the decision making process (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008). Thus, the decision maker seeks to simplify the problem. Within the simplified model that the decision maker has created, this model assumes the decision maker identifies and examines a limited assortment of highly visible, previously tested, easily accessed alternatives. The decision maker then selects one of the alternatives which they deem satisfactory to the extent that it meets the minimum criteria for a desired solution (Lahti, 1996).

### **3. The Implicit Favorite Model**

The implicit favorite model focuses on describing the manner in which decisions are actually made, as well. In this model, decision making is essentially a process of substantiating a choice or decision that the decision maker has already made in an intuitive and unscientific manner. In this model, the decision maker seeks to simplify the decision making process, a recurring theme among these models, by identifying an "implicit favorite". The decision maker does so before the alternatives are evaluated, often subconsciously, rendering themselves neither rational nor unbiased (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008). After choosing a favorite solution, the decision maker will attempt to appear rational and unbiased by developing decision criteria and by identifying and evaluating various alternatives in a subjective fashion, in order to ensure that the favorite solution emerges superior. Thus, it can justifiably be selected as the best solution (Lahti, 1996).

### **4. The Political Model**

The political model focuses on describing another manner through which decisions are actually made. The political model considers the preconceived notions that decision-makers bring to the table in the decision-making process, such as the interests that motivate them. Since the group members have different agendas, they need to negotiate with each other. As in the implicit favorite model, the decision maker is irrational and biased (Lahti, 1996). The process involves bargaining among the decision makers, through which each individual or entity attempts to influence the team, as a whole, to agree with their chosen solution (Cheshire & Feroz, 1989). Once the more powerful decision makers have been persuaded to support a particular alternative, the less powerful members of the decision making team typically consent. This model is based on personal influence and negotiation, and often involves withholding information in order to better relate a given perspective, but the associated bargaining and social pressures can produce negative effects. Decision-making criteria may be overshadowed

by personal agendas, which may prevent the selection of the best solution. Only by acknowledging the human propensity to push these personal agendas, can potential problems and conflicts be foreseen and minimized (Lahti, 1996).

## **5. The Emotional Model**

The emotional model, suggests that human emotions are essential to rational decision making. Since emotions are generally regarded as irrational occurrences, and are thought to cloud judgment, this model has often been ignored by researchers. Recent research suggests that emotions act as indicators in our memory, which allow humans to associate them, positively or negatively, with a prospective decision (Thagard & Barnes, 1996). Unlike the rational and political models, the emotional model is most applicable when teams are faced with high technical uncertainty and forced to make decisions in rapidly changing environments. In this context of an assortment of possibly occurring outcomes, the value of rational analysis is reduced (Courtney, 2001). The benefit of this process is that it allows groups to draw upon their collective psychological assets to make decisions based on more than just the facts. However, the danger in this process is groupthink, which is characterized by team members making a decision together that they would not make individually, based purely on emotion (Thagard & Barnes, 1996). Interestingly enough, these dangers are best mitigated by exercising greater emotional aptitude (Goleman, 1995).

## **6. The Anarchy Model**

The anarchy model, also referred to as the garbage can model, addresses the situation in which a group faces not only external uncertainty, but also internal conflict. Under these circumstances, the decision making process becomes anarchy, which does not follow a linear progression. This model describes the manner in which organizations are often combining “garbage cans” of randomly assorted problems and alternatives (Beach, 1997). These situations are rare and truly ambiguous (Courtney, 2001). This model does not adequately address the entire decision making process, but does illustrate that order can come out of chaos (Beach, 1997).

## **7. Reflection on Decision-Making Models**

The study of group decision making is both a science and an art form. The rational and political models are easily applied to most planned decision-making situations. Conversely, the emotional and anarchy models are best suited to confronting unplanned decision-making situations. However, researchers have yet to reach a consensus on decision-making (Beach, 1997). Reflecting on currently used decision-making processes is a good start, but the understanding of team collaboration can only reach the next level by encouraging mutual trust, common vision and motivation (Courtney, 2001).

### **E. THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (ONR) MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION**

Team collaboration is becoming increasingly dynamic, especially in a military context, allowing communication flow to follow virtually any path. Cognitive processes within each stage of collaboration are represented at two levels: metacognitive, guiding the overall problem solving process, and macrocognitive, supporting team member activities within the respective collaboration stage. Additionally, there are verbal and non-verbal communication mechanisms, used to develop the metacognitive and macrocognitive processes (Warner et al., 2005).

The ONR model of team collaboration focuses on macrocognitive processes. Microcognitive processes are not emphasized, since there are limited metrics for measuring microcognitive team processes, such as information and neural-cognitive processing. However, measuring verbal protocols and team communications allow for the empirical assessment of macrocognitive level activities, such as knowledge building, knowledge interoperability, shared team understanding, and team negotiation to reach team consensus (Warner et al., 2005).

Over the years, there have been several incarnations of the model. However, the model evaluated in this thesis consists of five phases: Individual Knowledge Building, Team Knowledge Building, Internalized Team Knowledge, Externalized Team Knowledge, and Team Problem Solving Outcomes; each with several associated

collaborative macrocognitive processes. The model focuses on the manner in which teams build new knowledge within a problem solving context, at the individual and team levels, as they move through these phases. New knowledge is viewed as the product of the team's collaboration, positioned within a particular problem solving situation. Process refers to a series of related actions, measured over time, engaged in by individuals or a team in order to create an outcome, result or product (SUMMIT, 2008). The processes begin with input, which is the initial information that a team receives, informing them of the task at hand and its desired outcome. Contributing factors include: time constraints, changing information, technology, team configurations and the tasks involved.

There is an additional sixth phase, or macrocognitive process category, which is essential for describing team collaboration during real-world events. This additional macrocognitive process emerged during previous research when other task domains were analyzed (Hutchins et al., 2008). These other problem-solving situations were MIO, air warfare and firefighting scenarios. This phase addresses team members' critical need to tell another team member to take a specific course of action (Hutchins et al., 2008). Decision to Take Action (DTA) is the additional macrocognitive process, which consists of a team member issuing an order for a Course of Action (COA) or making a Request to Take Action (RTA). Understanding the difference between the two requires an understanding of the severity of the action to be taken, as well as the relationship between the team member issuing the order and the team member receiving the order (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008). RTAs occur between two team members of similar rank or status, and the outcome of the action is typically not critical to the scenario outcome. The outcome of most COAs is, however, critical to the scenario outcome. Consequently, a COA order is typically given by a superior team member to a junior team member (Hutchins et al., 2008).

The six phases of the model seem chronological in nature, and in many cases they are. However, especially during an extended scenario, it is possible for a team or individual to move from an early phase to a later phase and vice versa. In these cases, it is also possible for teams to skip phases, entirely. Since team thought processes and

collaborative efforts are both parallel and continuous, the model and the cognitive processes will likely continue to evolve as researchers continue to study the cognitive processes involved in team collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007). Additionally, several of the macrocognitive processes used in this thesis were modified by: altering, excluding and adding several macrocognitive process definitions. Justification for these modifications can be found in the Chapter IV of this thesis. Explanations and examples of each macrocognitive process can be found, in their original verbiage, under the applicable cognitive phase below (SUMMIT, 2008).

## **1. Individual Knowledge Building Processes**

The first phase of team collaboration involves Individual Knowledge Building Processes, which begin with an initial input of data or information and focuses on team members acting individually to use that input to build their own task knowledge. The metacognitive processes occurring during this phase are highlighted by each team member becoming aware that, in order to solve the collaborative problem, knowledge needs to be developed from data and information. Actions that team members engage in during this stage include, but are not limited to, reading, beginning to form mental models and accessing electronic displays (SUMMIT, 2008). All of the macrocognitive processes in the Individual Knowledge Building phase focus on supporting the development of individual and team knowledge, which will be put to use in future phases of team collaboration to develop solution alternatives (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

### ***a. Individual Information Gathering***

Individual information gathering involves actions individuals engage in to add to their existing knowledge such as reading, asking questions, accessing displays, etc. Measurement methods include eye-tracking, communication audio, computer-generated messages and searches, asking behavior logged by experimenter on collaboration logger. Possible indices include the ‘depth and breadth’ of information seeking behaviors (e.g., searching for an appropriate vehicle for a given objective or searching for the location of

a needed personnel resource); dwell times in ‘areas of interest’. For example, team member studies the personal as well as collaborative maps which display the waypoints where resources may be held.

***b. Individual Information Synthesis***

Individual information synthesis involves comparing relationships among information, context, and artifacts to develop actionable knowledge. Measurement methods include information relationship density, nodal linkages, concept maps, similarity among knowledge objects; post-performance debrief/questionnaire, written or verbal probes during scenario. Possible indices include nature of connectedness between concepts, quantity of connections between concepts. For example, the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist synthesizes information about the different personnel he is in charge of and about the objective of the first operation into a set of criteria of what resources he should send to which grid.

***c. Knowledge Object Development***

Knowledge object development involves creation of cognitive artifacts that represent actionable knowledge for the task. Measurement methods include analysis of created notes, diagrams, tables, sketches. Possible indices include quantity of diagrams/tables, structure of diagrams/tables, number of pushpins created, and relation between pushpins. For example, the Air Vehicle Specialist creates a table on a document outlining the three most appropriate means for moving parcels to zone 3A and provides it to the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist so that they may refer to it when planning how to get parcels to pickup zones.

**2. Team Knowledge Building Processes**

The majority of collaboration occurs during the next phase, Team Knowledge Building, where team members begin to collectively construct team knowledge (Bellinger, 2004). The Team Knowledge Building phase includes actions taken by teammates to communicate data, information and knowledge with the intent of transforming that information into actionable knowledge (SUMMIT, 2008). The

metacognitive processes occurring during this phase involve team members sharing and integrating knowledge, so that the team can come up with a common representation of the problem (Bellinger, 2004). Changes in the collective mental representation of the problem can begin to occur as the team gains more complete understanding of the problem's elements, goals and overlooked information (McComb, 2005). The macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on supporting the development of team situational awareness. Although the focus is different, many of the macrocognitive processes occurring in this stage are similar to those occurring in the Individual Knowledge Building phase. Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

*a. Team Information Exchange*

Team information exchange involves passing relevant information to the appropriate teammates at the appropriate times. Possible indices include quality, amount, flow/sequencing, and timing of information exchanged; anticipation ratio (i.e., the ratio of passing to asking behavior) collected from the collaboration logger. For example, during the discussion of where to establish the land base, the Military Personnel Specialist points out that the land base location suggested by other team members is extremely far from any military personnel, which may be critical to completing mission.

*b. Team Knowledge Sharing*

Team knowledge sharing involves explanations and interpretations shared between team members or with the team as a whole. These explanations may be augmented by graphic visualizations on shared workspaces. Possible indices include quality, amount, flow/sequencing, and timing of knowledge exchanged, percentage of teammates sharing knowledge. For example, the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist posts pushpins (i.e., information memos) on the shared map that highlight for all team members where resources such as pallets and humanitarian workers are located.

***c. Team Solution Option Generation***

Team solution option generation describes offering potential solutions to a problem. Possible indices include the number of potential options offered, the percentage of teammates offering options, the timing of option generation, and solutions generated in proportion to total communications. For example, the team develops specific options regarding the transportation of supplies from the base to a grid where it is needed.

***d. Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives***

Team evaluation and negotiation of alternatives describes clarifying and discussing the pros and cons of potential solution options. This could include clarifying pieces of information, verbally simulating the ripple effects of offered alternatives, or attempting to persuade other teammates regarding the relative efficacy of alternatives. Possible indices include the number of clarifications requested and provided, the number of supporting information points and/or conflicting information points offered per solution ultimately chosen; percentage of teammates who participated in the evaluation of alternatives; flow pattern of communication among members regarding evaluation of alternatives; and degree of following behavior within a team communication. For example, after the transportation specialist suggests that even though the helicopter at the base is more expensive to operate it can still deliver the supplies faster than the helicopter on the carrier, the team discusses the pros and cons of either option, such as what the impact of each option is on the refugees.

***e. Team Process and Plan Regulation***

Team process and plan regulation involves discussing or critiquing the team's knowledge building process or plan following feedback on its effectiveness. Possible indices include the number of times a critique is offered, the percentage of teammates contributing to the critique or re-evaluation of the team's plan, and the timing of regulation or replanning efforts. For example, after completing one operation, the team receives feedback that one of their planes was lost due to bad weather. The air

vehicle specialist adamantly states that the cost of the airplane far exceeds what they would spend on higher reliability weather reports. Team members unanimously agree to purchase the highest reliability information possible in all subsequent planning.

### **3. Internalized Team Knowledge**

The Internalized Team Knowledge phase deals with the collective knowledge held in the individual minds of team members (SUMMIT, 2008). The metacognitive process occurring during this stage is highlighted by the team's awareness of obvious knowledge overlap. The macrocognitive processes in this stage focus on supporting the team in fostering a common understanding and common goals (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

#### ***a. Team Knowledge Similarity***

Team Knowledge Similarity can involve the degree to which differing roles understand one another (e.g., how well a land/sea vehicle specialist understands a humanitarian specialist), or how well the team members understand the critical goals and locations of important resources (shared situation awareness). Team Knowledge Similarity is indexed as an average distance score, a correlation, or percentage of agreement. Specific Forms include: (1) Task mental model similarity: The degree to which teammates' mental models of relatively stable task characteristics (e.g., equipment, procedures) converge (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993); (2) Team interaction knowledge similarity: The degree to which teammates' knowledge of their relatively stable positional roles, interdependencies and interaction patterns converge. This is referred to in the shared mental model literature as team interaction mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993); (3) Teammate knowledge similarity: The degree to which teammates' mental models of one another's relatively stable levels of skill, knowledge, experience, dispositions and/or habits converge. This dimension is referred to in the shared mental model literature as shared mental models of teammates (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993) and in the transactive memory literature as teammate knowledge consensus (Austin, 2003); (4) Shared situation awareness: The degree to which teammates'

awareness and interpretation of moment-to-moment changes in their collective situation converge. This can also be evaluated by determining critical landmarks or by inserting perturbations and then observing team member interaction in response to this. This construct has been defined previously by Cooke et al. (2001), Endsley (1995), and Stout et al. (1994).

***b. Team Knowledge Resources***

Team members' collective understanding of resources/responsibilities associated with the task. This could be examined through a performance assessment survey given to all members of the team at the end of each operation. Each individual team member would respond as to the relevant knowledge they have via paper and pencil method. Then, the whole team would be asked what relevant knowledge the team as a whole knew. This could also be examined through visual analysis of the eye tracking videos in conjunction with an assessment of the plan. If a team member did not see a critical and relevant piece of information, then that could lead them to make a plan that was not optimal and would then lead the team to receive a lower score on their plan.

Team Knowledge Resources can be indexed as a sum or average of all team members' knowledge, or as a percentage of the relevant knowledge (defined a priori as the criterion space) that is held by at least one team member. Specific forms include: (1) Task knowledge stock: Accurate task-relevant knowledge held by team members. This would include knowledge about task strategy and equipment. This dimension is included within the components of transactive memory (Austin, 2003) and is referred to as task mental model accuracy within the shared mental model literature (Cooke et al., 2001; Rouse et al., 1992); (2) Interpositional knowledge: Accurate knowledge regarding position-specific roles, goals, responsibilities, access to information, constraints, and interdependencies with other team positions. This dimension is referred to as team interaction mental model accuracy within the mental model literature and as interpositional knowledge within the general team literature (Volpe et al., 1996); (3) Recognition of teammate expertise: Total amount of accurate knowledge regarding teammates' expertise and behavioral habits. This dimension is referred to in the literature

on transactive memory as teammate knowledge accuracy (Austin, 2003), in the literature on shared mental models as teammate mental model accuracy (Mathieu et al., 2005; Rouse et al., 1992), and in the schema literature as teammate schema accuracy (Rentsch, 1993); (4) Individual situation awareness: Accurate awareness of moment to moment changes in the team's environment. The construct has been defined previously by Endsley (1995).

#### **4. Externalized Team Knowledge**

During the Externalized Team Knowledge phase, all information has been analyzed, in some form or another, by team members, and they concentrate on refining the accuracy and completeness of their collective knowledge. During this phase, after all individual knowledge has been openly shared, the team's representation of the problem ceases to evolve. All components of the shared knowledge not agreed upon have been disregarded, leaving a more accurate and only relevant view of the problem at hand. It is interesting to note the degree to which a team's problem representation has matured through the problem solving process up to this point. The metacognitive process occurring during this phase is highlighted by the team's awareness that the final solution option must meet the problem solving goals. The macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on aiding the entire team in choosing the optimal solution option in the context of achieving the ultimate goal (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

##### *a. Externalized Cue-strategy Associations*

Externalized cue-strategy associations describe the team's collective agreement as to their task strategies and the situational cues that modify those strategies (and how). Possible indices include the percent or number of cues explicitly planned for and the quality of those cue-strategy associations. For example, linkages between weather data and resources appropriate for use in certain weather conditions.

***b. Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis***

Pattern recognition and trend analysis is the accuracy of the patterns or trends explicitly noted by members of a team that is either agreed upon or unchallenged by other team members. Possible indices include the number or percent of trends and task related patterns collectively agreed upon that are correct or incorrect, or the amount of time needed to correctly agree upon those patterns or trends. For example, there is an optimal plan that can be determined based on cost and resources moved. If the air specialist creates a route for an aircraft to leave a carrier, go over to a site to pick up personnel, and then drop them off in another location, it could be considered a pattern, especially if it is not challenged by the other members of the team.

***c. Uncertainty Resolution***

Uncertainty resolution is the degree to which a team has collectively agreed upon the status of problem variables (e.g., hostile/friendly). Possible indices include the number or percentage of problem variables in which a team-level assessment has been agreed upon and that assessment is correct or incorrect, the amount of time needed to correctly agree upon those assessments; or the nature of “consensus” events logged by experimenter. For example, the resolution of the plan, and the individual components of the plan, would be an example of uncertainty resolution. Each team member is responsible for his or her resources, but also for communicating with teammates to move those resources to their respective locations. At first, there is a certain degree of uncertainty about the best method to move those resources, and it is the job of the team members to resolve that and come to a consensus with their plan they submit.

**5. Team Problem Solving Outcomes**

During the Team Problem Solving Outcomes phase, the team compares the solution option they selected with the problem solving goal. The team is then able to refine the chosen solution option to fully meet the goal (Bellinger, 2004). This phase serves to ensure that the team’s solution effectively, expeditiously and efficiently meets the criteria for problem resolution. The final output simply marks the accomplishment of the assigned task. The model of team collaboration was designed to study how a team

functioned through all of the collaboration stages, not to appraise the output of the collaboration process in any way. The metacognitive process occurring during this stage is highlighted by the team's assessment of the quality of their solution or plan (SUMMIT, 2008). The macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on aiding the entire team in evaluating their chosen solution option in the context of achieving the ultimate goal (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

*a. Quality of Plan (Problem Solving Solution)*

Quality of plan (problem solving solution) involves the degree to which the solution adopted by a problem solving team achieves a resolution to the problem (e.g., limit fatalities, limit destruction). Measurement methods include the output from function hooks in the program that shows number of objectives achieved (e.g., 67 refugees out of 100 rescued) at end of operation. Possible indices include the number of objectives completed, quality of the resolution to a problem. For example, each operation has an objective to complete, for example, rescuing a certain number of refugees from a particular zone. The percentage of refugees actually extracted from this zone would show the quality of a plan in regards to its problem solving solution. If one team rescues all 100 refugees and another only 80, then the first team has a higher quality plan in terms of solving the problem. However, efficiency remains a factor (see below).

*b. Efficiency of Planning Process*

Efficiency of planning process describes the amount of time it takes a problem solving team to arrive at a successful resolution to a problem. Measurement methods include the operation time provided by the master control panel; anticipation ratios, number of interactions. Possible indices include the length of the problem solving process. For example, a team that requires 32 minutes for planning vs. a team that quickly plans and inputs in 17 minutes showcases a strong difference in planning efficiency, assuming their output remains high quality.

*c. Efficiency of Plan Execution*

Efficiency of plan execution describes the quality of the plan (e.g., number of lives saved) divided by the amount of resources used to accomplish this and the amount of time the plan takes to unfold. Measurement methods include functions in the simulation that provide data on number of resources spent per planning phase and the impact on civilian population. Possible indices include all financial costs associated with the plan including labor (that is, time a plan becomes executed until the accomplishment of plan objectives multiplied by resources—man hours, gas, etc.). For example, the quality of a plan utilizing a high amount of unnecessary air travel to consolidate humanitarian aid parcels will likely be much lower than one that uses efficient ground travel to consolidate parcels to a single pick-up point for the expensive air vehicle. The end result of impact on civilians may be the same, but the influence of cost affects its quality.

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## IV. METHOD

### A. CODING PROCESS

This thesis empirically evaluates the model of team collaboration developed by the ONR sponsored CKI Program, using the real-world team collaboration domain of the September 11, 2001, NEADS / FAA MCC Operations channel 3 transcript. For this research, we applied the macrocognitive process definitions to the team communications in the transcript, to determine whether these definitions accurately represent how teams collaborate to make real-world decisions, or if the model is more suitable for analyzing controlled, laboratory situations. Additionally, this chapter provides suggestions for enhancements and additions to the existing list of macrocognitive process definitions.

Using definitions included in the model of team collaboration, each coder independently coded 2,278 utterances from 1,710 speech turns, contained in the transcript. Once the individual coding was complete, the coders met in the presence of the thesis advisor to compare and discuss each other's classification of every speech turn. In cases where the coders agreed on an appropriate code to be applied to a speech turn, no discussion was necessary. When the coders disagreed, each coder would then supply the reason behind their coding decision. Then, the coders would either agree on a final code for that speech turn, marking that code in the "FINAL" category of the transcript table, located in Appendix A of this thesis. Codes that are bolded in any of the columns of the table indicate that one coder was persuaded by the other to change his assessment of a given speech turn.

#### 1. Unnecessary Separation

During the coding process, the coders used two very different approaches to analyze each speech turn. Coder one was inclined to break down each speech turn into separate utterances, each having its own code. Coder two had a different approach, which was equally thorough. However, coder two often felt that that separating each speech turn into several utterances was unnecessary. In the example below, coder one separated the *Miscellaneous* (MISC) utterance and coded the subsequent utterance as

*Team Information Exchange* (TIE). Coder two felt that it was unnecessary to break out the MISC utterance, as it had no bearing on the overall intent of the speaker, and coded the entire speech turn as TIE. In each case, both coders categorized the intent of the speech turn with an identical code. In cases where one coder separated a speech turn into two utterances and the other coder did not, the code *Unnecessary Separation* (US) was placed in that coder’s column in the table. For those utterances, the coder who had not assigned a code tended to agree with the coder who had. In every case, both coders eventually reached agreement on the final code for the speech turn, as a whole.

Table 1. Example of Unnecessary Separation Coding

LINE	SPEAKER	MESSAGE	CODER 1	CODER 2	FINAL
915	<i>Bob Davie:</i>	Copy 4, Alpha, 10, Kilo Charlie, Echo, Foxtrot. 9900, copy.	MISC	US	MISC
		One is going to Bangor - Correct. Gold 99.	TIE	TIE	TIE

## B. MODIFYING COGNITIVE PROCESS CODES AND DEFINITIONS

### 1. Additions to the Model

The model and its macrocognitive processes have been revised by the CKI program (Letsky et al., 2007). In view of that fact, several codes were added for this analysis. As mentioned in Chapter III, we have added the Decision to Take Action (DTA) macrocognitive process coding category, consisting of team members issuing an order for a Course of Action (COA) or making a Request to Take Action (RTA), based on research conducted by Hutchins & Kendall (2008, in press). Since we are analyzing communications from a military organization where issuing and implementing orders is a critical element of task completion, the addition of these codes is both appropriate and necessary (Hutchins et al., 2008).

### 2. Modifications to the Model

Several of the codes used in this thesis were modified by altering their definitions. Several of the definitions did not indicate how or when the macrocognitive process

should be used as a code to categorize speech turns. Instead, the majority of those definitions called for a calculation that would need to have been taken at prescribed intervals during the course of the recorded event. While these calculations are valuable to understanding team performance, they are not valuable as codes intended to categorize individual transactions.

Under the Team Knowledge Building phase of the model, we shortened the definition of *Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis (PRTA)* to read: “patterns communicated among team members,” as opposed to reading: “number of patterns communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and accuracy of the patterns.” The definition was shortened, because we used the code to identify single instances of pattern recognition or trend analysis. Identifying the number of patterns and the time taken to detect those patterns, as well as the accuracy of the patterns as a metric, adds value to cognitive research, but it must be done separately from the coding process.

### **3. Omissions from the Model**

Several definitions were clearly designed for use in controlled, laboratory experimental environments, and were not applicable to this, or any, real-world scenario. This is the case because during an actual event, it is impossible to administer a pre-and-post-event questionnaire. Some of the cognitive processes that appeared more relevant to laboratory settings, on the other hand, could be tailored to real-world scenarios. Principally, the definitions of those codes requiring a calculation were modified, and those that were completely dependent on calculations were eliminated. However, this is not evidence that these definitions should be excluded from the model, but simply that they were not applicable for the type of data produced by this real-world event.

Under the *Individual Knowledge Building Processes* phase, *Knowledge Object Development* was not applicable because we relied on the transcribed communications, alone, as our basis for analysis. We simply had no way of knowing if any team member created cognitive artifacts that represented actionable knowledge for the task (i.e. there was no indication of this process occurring in the transcript). Under the *Team Knowledge Building Processes* phase, *Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives* did not

apply, because no team member verbally simulated the ripple effects of offered alternatives. Our goal was to simply identify, not calculate, the number of clarifications requested and provided; number of supporting information points and/or conflicting information points offered per solution ultimately chosen; or the percentage of teammates who participated in the evaluation of alternatives. *Team Process and Plan Regulation* (TPPR), also under the *Team Knowledge Building Processes* phase, was not applicable to this scenario either. During the time period covered by the transcript, the NEADS / FAA team were not given any feedback on the effectiveness of any of their plans.

Under the *Internalized Team Knowledge* phase, *Team Knowledge Similarity* and its four subcomponents were excluded from our analysis, due to the fact that they all require a measure of degree to which differing roles understand one another, and that was not possible to assess from the transcript. Two subcomponents of *Team Knowledge Resources*, also under the *Internalized Team Knowledge* phase, were not applicable. The first, *Task Knowledge Stock* was excluded from our analysis, because we had no way of measuring transactive memory. The second, *Recognition of Teammate Expertise* was excluded, again because we were unable to measure the total amount of accurate knowledge regarding teammates' expertise and behavioral habits.

All three of the macrocognitive processes in the *Team Problem Solving Outcomes* phase were excluded, for a number of reasons. Primarily, the team did not reach that cognitive stage during the portion of the transcript that was analyzed. Had the team reached that stage, it is still beyond the purpose of this thesis to assess the degree to which the team's solution effectively met the criteria for problem resolution, the efficiency with which the plan did so, and the speed with which the team generated their plan. For many real-world tasks, such as NORAD collaborating with the FAA, performance assessment metrics are not available and their development is outside the scope of this research.

## **C. MEASURING INTER-RATER RELIABILITY**

### **1. Inter-rater Reliability**

Inter-rater reliability, the degree of agreement between raters, is used to refine tools given to human evaluators by determining if a particular system is appropriate for measuring a particular variable (Brennan, 1981). For instance, inter-rater reliability is used, in this case, to determine if the level of subjectivity occurring between raters is too high, indicating a change is needed. Changes could include refinement of the definitions or better training of coders. It provides a score of the degree of concurrence between the ratings given by raters, who in this thesis are referred to as Coder 1 and Coder 2. If raters have a high rate of disagreement, then either they require more training on the scale being used, or the scale is defective. Inter-rater reliability can be determined by a number of statistics, typically a version of measuring kappa. Kappa refers to a chance-adjusted measure of agreement (Brennan, 1981). It is considered a more robust measure than simply calculating inter-rater agreement percentage, because kappa accounts for the agreement occurring by chance.

### **2. Cohen's Kappa Coefficient**

For this analysis, we elected to use Cohen's kappa coefficient, which is the appropriate method for measuring categorical inter-rater reliability between two raters (Cohen, 1960). Fleiss' kappa provides a similar measure of agreement, which would have been appropriate if more than two raters existed (Fleiss, 1981). Cohen's kappa coefficient accounts for the hypothetical probability of chance agreement, using the observed data to calculate the likelihood of each observer arbitrarily deciding on each available category. A potentially advantageous criticism of Cohen's kappa coefficient is that it has a tendency to take the frequencies of the observed categories for granted. Cohen's kappa coefficient is considered an overly conservative measure of agreement, because it often underestimates the inter-rater agreement over commonly used categories (Cohen, 1960). Additionally, the number of categories affects the magnitude of the value. For instance, the fewer the categories, the higher the Cohen's kappa coefficient will be (Cohen's Kappa Coefficient, Wikipedia).

Cohen's kappa coefficient measures the agreement between two raters, each of whom classifies  $N$  items—in this case, speech turns from the 9/11 transcript—into  $C$  mutually exclusive categories—in this case, the macrocognitive process categories included in the model. If the two raters are in complete agreement, kappa is equal to 1. If the two raters are in complete disagreement, other than what would be anticipated by chance, then kappa is equal to 0 (Cohen's Kappa Coefficient, Wikipedia). Landis and Koch presented the following table for interpreting kappa values, supplying only their professional opinions as supporting evidence. Thus, this table is not universally accepted. However, it is a helpful guideline for interpreting the degree of inter-rater agreement indicated by a kappa value arrived at by two given evaluators (Landis & Koch, 1977).

Table 2. Cohen's Kappa Interpretation (From Landis & Koch, 1977)

<b>Kappa</b>	<b>Interpretation</b>
<0	No Agreement
0.0 – 0.20	Slight Agreement
0.21–0.40	Fair Agreement
0.41–0.60	Moderate Agreement
0.61–0.80	Substantial Agreement
0.81–1.00	Almost Perfect Agreement

## V. RESULTS

### A. CODING RESULTS

Of the 1,710 speech turns, each of the 2,278 utterances warranted an individual code. Each individual utterance in a speech turn conveyed a specific message and was coded as such. Accordingly, part of a speech turn may have been a miscellaneous statement which was not a crucial component of the mission. However, another utterance in the speech turn conveyed a very important message. Thus, it was important to separate each utterance. In order to properly analyze the cognitive process used by the NEADS team members, each coder entered a code for each utterance into a spreadsheet. The coders were then able to compare the given code to each other, thereby determining the level of inter-rater reliability and the final code for each utterance for analytical purposes. The number of final codes use was 2,278 which included 707 *Miscellaneous* (MISC) and 73 utterances that were determined to be *Not Codeable* (NC). In the data analysis, the MISC and NC codes were used only to determine the frequency of each code used.

#### 1. Percentage of Code Use

During analysis of the recorded transcript of channel three on September 11, 2001, it was discovered that 12 of the 22 (54.5%) macrocognitive process codes were used. Included in the codes used were: Course of Action (COA) and Request to Take Action (RTA) under the Decision to Take Action category, but not the MISC or NC codes. As previously stated there were 10 codes not utilized for the analysis of the transcript. However, this is not to say they are not valuable or useful codes, but that they simply did not apply to this specific real-world, unplanned event.

#### 2. Coding Trends

Team Information Exchange (TIE) was the code most used as it was applied to 792 of 1498 utterances (52.87%). This figure is significant because it conveys how much information was being shared between team members, often without it being requested. While other times, team members needed to be asked for information as demonstrated

from the second most used code, Individual Information Gathering (IIG) with 463 out of the 1498 utterances (30.91%). These two codes will often relate to each other in the form of a question asked and then answered. The morning of September 11, 2001, was a very chaotic and confusing time. There were a lot of questions being asked by team members to enhance their mental model of the situation. However, the level of expertise of each team member assisted in their ability to disseminate pertinent information to other team members. In other words, their past experience helped them to understand and acknowledge which information being passed was crucial to the events that were occurring and, therefore, needed to be shared with all involved. Table 3 shows the macrocognitive process codes and their respective percentages, excluding the codes MISC, US, and NC.

Table 3. Frequency and Percentage of Macrocognitive Processes Used by NORAD and FAA<sup>1</sup>

Code	Cognitive Process	Number	Percentage
<b>Individual Knowledge Building Process</b>			
IIG	Individual Information Gathering	463	30.91
IIS	Individual Information Synthesis	26	1.74
KOG	Knowledge Object Development	0	0
<b>Team Knowledge Building</b>			
TIE	Team Information Exchange	792	52.87
TKS	Team Knowledge Sharing	56	3.74
TSOG	Team Solution Option Generation	46	3.07
ENA	Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives	0	0
PPR	Team Process and Plan Regulation	0	0
<b>Internalized Team Knowledge</b>			
TKSim	Team Knowledge Similarity	0	0
TKR	Team Knowledge Resources	0	0
TkKS	Task Knowledge Stock	0	0
IPK	Interpositional Knowledge	3	0.2
RTE	Recognition of Teammate Expertise	0	0
ISA	Individual Situation Awareness	25	1.67
<b>Externalized Team Knowledge</b>			
ECA	Externalized Cue-strategy Associations	1	0.07
PRTA	Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis	1	0.07
UR	Uncertainty Resolution	2	0.13
<b>Problem Solving Outcomes</b>			
QoP	Quality of Plan	0	0
EPP	Efficiency of Planning Process	0	0
EPE	Efficiency of Planning Execution	0	0
<b>Decision to Take Action</b>			
RTA	Request to Take Action	64	4.27
COA	Course of Action	19	1.27
<b>TOTAL</b>		1498	100.01

<sup>1</sup>Excludes the Miscellaneous, Unnecessary Separation, and Not Codeable Codes

## B. DEFINITION INTERPRETATIONS

During the coding process, we often discussed the interpretation of definitions for several macrocognitive processes. The outcomes of these discussions helped determine situations where certain codes were appropriate. The nature of the problem was such that

the team was flooded with continuous information. New information required the decision makers to ask multiple questions, in order to clarify new information and update their mental model of the situation. Under the Individual Knowledge Building phase, we used the code Individual Information Gathering (IIG) to classify speech turns in which a team member initially asks for or accesses information. When a team member asked for or provided clarification on previously collected information, we classified that speech turn as Individual Information Synthesis (IIS). IIS was also used to classify utterances where the speaker was making inferences about information. In both cases, the code used for the response to the question was not the same as the code used for the question. The response was typically coded Team Information Exchange (TIE) or Team Knowledge Sharing (TKS), since all team members monitoring channel 3 had access to the answer or explanation.

On a similar note, many definitions require “all team members” to discuss a piece of data, information or knowledge. Since all we had to rely on was an audio transcript, it was impossible to know if “all team members” were included in a particular discussion. We found that most of the macrocognitive process definitions were neither exclusive nor exhaustive. More specifically, a given utterance could potentially meet the requirements to be classified as more than one code. We determined that there was often a great deal of overlap between definitions. For instance, TIE can be used as a “catch-all” code, since generally every utterance contains relevant information being passed between team members

### **C. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS**

Two coders analyzed the transcript, in order to test the relative subjectivity of the coders’ understanding and application of the macrocognitive process definitions included in the model. This inter-rater reliability test, measuring the degree of agreement between the two coders, can be used to refine the model’s cognitive process definitions so that any coders, trained in applying the model, could reach an adequate level of agreement when evaluating a given transcript. A low score could indicate that the model definitions need

to be refined or that the coders need additional training in applying the model. The test further determines that the model is appropriate for evaluating a real-world team collaboration scenario, such as the one observed in this thesis.

Inter-rater reliability was determined by Cohen's Kappa Coefficient, which provided a score referring to the concurrence in the ratings given by the two coders. Analysis of the initial independent coding by each coder yielded a Cohen's Kappa Coefficient of 0.77. As previously mentioned, fewer categories imply a higher Cohen's Kappa Coefficient. In this case, excluding MISC, NC, US, DTA (COA) and DTA(RTA), we categorized the speech turns in the transcript into only 10 of the model's 22 macrocognitive process codes. Since less than 50 percent of the model's macrocognitive process codes were employed, we contend that our analysis consisted of a relatively low number of categories. This assertion contributes to our relatively high Cohen's Kappa Coefficient.

According to Landis and Koch (1977), the coefficient achieved by the two coders can be interpreted to mean that the two coder's agreement is substantial. Along with the high inter-rater reliability kappa score, this indicates that the macrocognitive process definitions used by the coders are both objective and applicable to real-world decision-making domains. However, those definitions that the coders agreed to disregard, because they did not apply when analyzing team communications from a real-world event, should potentially be clarified for future applications. Coder 1 and coder 2 engaged in numerous discussions in order to come to an agreement as to how the individual codes should be used. It was observed that as the coding process progressed, the coders became more familiar with each other's interpretation and application of the macrocognitive process definitions. Thus, the frequency of disagreements, which was initially higher, decreased as the coders continued to apply the model to the transcript. Ultimately, by either initial agreement or through the use of debate, coder 1 and coder 2 were in 100% agreement as to which final code was to be used for each speech turn.

During comparison discussions, it became apparent to each coder that he had occasionally made a mistake when assigning an incorrect macrocognitive process code to a certain speech turn. In these cases, the mistaken coder agreed with the other coder's

categorization of that speech turn and changed his code accordingly. Those 44 instances, which account for less than 2% of the analysis, are marked in bold in the appropriate Coder category on the transcript in Appendix A. Additionally, Table 4 below illustrates the total instances in which the two coders agreed on each macrocognitive process code.

Table 4. Coder Pivot Table

CODE TITLE	TIE	IIS	MISC	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	NC	IIG	TKS	TSOG	ISA	US	IPK	UR	PRTA	ECA	Total Coder 2
TIE	685	0	6	0	0	1	3	5	7	2	61	0	0	0	0	770
IIS	12	13	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	31
MISC	27	0	582	0	0	1	4	0	1	0	97	0	0	0	0	712
DTA(RTA)	4	0	3	40	13	0	7	1	2	0	10	0	0	0	0	80
DTA(COA)	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	14
NC	2	0	1	0	0	67	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	74
IIG	1	0	12	0	0	1	413	1	2	0	33	0	0	0	0	463
TKS	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	38	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	61
TSOG	9	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	26	0	2	0	0	0	0	39
ISA	9	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	11	3	0	0	0	0	26
US	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
IPK	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
UR	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
PRTA	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ECA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total Coder 1	773	13	604	41	24	70	429	50	39	13	221	1	0	0	0	2278

## D. INSIGHTS INTO THE COGNITIVE PROCESS

### 1. Dynamic Decision Making

On September 11, 2001, the FAA/ NEADS team responded to several instances of plane hijackings, occurring over a period of time. As a result, they were forced to make a series of dynamic decisions. The term dynamic decision making refers to a situation in which the decision maker cannot reach the goal by means of a single decision (Brehmer, 1992). In this form of problem solving, a team seeks a viable course of action (Hutchins

& Kendall, 2009). Because current decisions are constrained by earlier decisions, and eventually constrain later decisions, each decision is dependent on another. Additionally, the problem evolves, in real time, on its own and as a result of the decision-maker's actions (Brehmer, 1992). Table 5 displays an example of how information is shared in pieces, leading decision-makers to decide on a major course of action, without solving the overall problem. Specifically, *Team Information Exchange* leads to *Team Knowledge Sharing*, which leads to *Decision to Take Action (Course of Action)*, and then the problem continues.

Table 5. Example of Dynamic Decision-Making Process

LINE	SPEAKER	MESSAGE	CODER 1	CODER 2	FINAL
702	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sergeant Damage?	MISC	US	MISC
		We are working a tanker.	TIE	TIE	TIE
703	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	There is a bomb on board Boston -	TKS	TIE	TIE
704	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	*Explative*	MISC	MISC	MISC
705	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	On board what? Boston 93?	IIG	IIG	IIG
706	<i>Huntress:</i>	United.	TIE	TIE	TIE
707	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	United?	IIG	IIG	IIG
708	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Bomb on board United 93.	TKS	TIE	TIE
709	<i>Huntress:</i>	Intercept. Intercept. We want the aircraft away from there.	DTA (COA)	DTA (COA)	DTA (COA)

## 2. The Iterative Nature of Cognitive Processes

Although the model seems to imply that the cognitive phases occur sequentially, the transcript illustrates the iterative nature of the knowledge building between individuals and across teams (Fiore et al., 2008). In light of these observations, and by analyzing the transcript, we infer that the decision-making process is cyclical, involving constant reassessment of facts and judgments. While it is necessary for the team to consider how the current decision will solve the immediate problem, it is even more

important to consider how it will impact future decisions and accomplish the overall task (Brehmer, 1992). Stress is inherent in dynamic decision making, as is also apparent in the FAA/NEADS transcripts, because the decision maker cannot control when critical decisions have to be made (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009; Hutchins & Kendall, in press).

Deciding on a course of action affects the problem as well as the cognitive process involved in making that decision. By implementing a decided course of action, and observing its results, the decision maker actually changes the problem, itself (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009). For example, any action taken against a hijacked aircraft to determine the hijackers' intent will cause a response. That response, or lack thereof, will alter the team's mental model of that task (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009). Individuals initially react to injected data or information by making minor decisions. The outcomes of these decisions change the nature of the problem, for better or for worse. Execution of these minor courses of action leads to the creation of new information and knowledge, which forces the team to decide on more important courses of action, and this process repeats.

### **3. Uncertainty Reduction and Intuition**

Throughout the team communications, we notice a continual growth in team understanding of the problem, as well as a continually increasing level of interpretation. A team finds the majority of its strength in its ability to coordinate, to maintain team situational awareness, to reduce uncertainty and to resolve ambiguity. Teams resolve ambiguity in data by restructuring it into more meaningful information. Restructuring serves to establish easily recognizable patterns, since detection of the abnormal requires recognition of the normal. Thus, when an anomaly occurs it is recognized as such (Fiore et al., in development). By combining, sorting and filtering information, a mental model is created (Warner et al., 2005). A mental model is a psychological representation of

real, hypothetical, or imaginary situations (Johnson-Laird, 1999), from which a person assumes they can explain and even predict a particular state of the world (Fiore et al., 2008).

From a person's mental model stems intuition, which serves to expedite the individual decision-making process. Little effort is used to reach intuitive decisions, which are typically made subconsciously (Hogarth, 2001). In situations involving significant uncertainty, such as the situation faced by the FAA/NEADS team, previous experience plays a large role. In this case, a solid mental model allowed the team to efficiently reach a much-needed consensus in a short amount of time (Damasio, 1996).

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## **VI. CONCLUSION**

### **A. VALIDITY OF THE MODEL**

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the team at NEADS was faced with a one-of-a-kind catastrophe of amazing proportions, and was forced to collaborate under extremely difficult circumstances. Their mental ability was pushed to the limit, as they were required to adapt and update their preexisting mental models, which were geared toward less intense hijacking situations. The communications between NEADS and the FAA during the crisis provided an excellent example of team collaboration, against which to apply and assess the model of team collaboration. Despite the fact that several macrocognitive process codes were not applicable to this analysis, that does not indicate however that those codes are irrelevant to the model. It was simply impossible to determine, by analyzing the transcript alone, if the cognitive processes defined by those codes were actually occurring.

Based on our research, we can say with certainty that the model is applicable to the NEADS and FAA communications transcript. The results confirm that the team moved between the various cognitive phases outlined by the model, as the tragedy developed. Even though the model does not state that a team will progress sequentially from the beginning macrocognitive phases to the later macrocognitive phases, our research indicates that the NEADS team did, in fact, make such a progression during the observed time period. The results of the Cohen's Kappa Coefficient analysis demonstrate that two individuals can use the model to evaluate the same data and reach a substantial rate of agreement. This attests to the fact that the model is undistorted by emotion or personal bias. It is an objective tool that is able to be interpreted and applied by researchers of differing backgrounds.

### **B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

Including the Donaldson & Johnson thesis (2008) and Socias thesis (2008), three of the four audio channels have been transcribed and coded with definitions from the model (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008; Socias, 2008). Since each channel represents a

portion of the entire NEADS/FAA team effort, it would be useful to transcribe and code the remaining channel. Then, further analysis could be conducted to mathematically determine the length of time it took the team to progress through the stages of the model, reach a shared mental understanding of the problem and ultimately agree on a solution. The efficiency and accuracy of shared information could also be evaluated. The author of a future thesis could also incorporate calculations called for by several of the codes.

Definitions of laboratory cognitive processes, requiring calculations or surveys, such as Knowledge Object Development, Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives, Team Process and Plan Negotiations, Team Knowledge Similarity, Task Knowledge Stock, Recognition of Team Expertise, Quality of Plan, Efficiency of Planning Process, and Efficiency of Plan Execution could be revised to make them more applicable to real-world scenarios. Limiting these cognitive processes to definitions intended for laboratory settings impairs the ability to accurately utilize them in the evaluation of team communications from real-world scenarios. Future researchers may also wish to assess actual outcomes of the team collaborative process. The quality of the team's final plan could be evaluated, along with the amount of available resources. Decisions made during the Outcome Appraisal stage of the model could be evaluated to see if they actually resolve the problem the team faced.

**APPENDIX A. NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND FEDERAL AVIATION  
ADMINISTRATION CHANNEL 3 TRANSCRIPTS FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 1231  
THROUGH 1556 (GMT)**

1	TIME	SPEAKER	MESSAGE	CODER 1	CODER 2	FINAL
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 25 seconds. Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 30 seconds. Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 35 seconds. Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 40 seconds. Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 45 seconds. Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 50 seconds. Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 55 seconds. Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 0 seconds. Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 5 seconds. Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 15 seconds.			
2	[00:00]	<i>Computer Voice:</i>	Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 20 seconds.	MISC	MISC	MISC
3		<i>Sergeant Rayorta:</i>	Yes, ma'am. This is Sergeant Rayorta.	MISC	MISC	MISC
4		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
5		<i>Sergeant Rayorta:</i>	I'm just letting you know for information, we're having an exercise - SF exercise - We're having a come out.	MISC	MISC	MISC
6		<i>Huntress:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
7		<i>Sergeant Rayorta:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
8		<i>Huntress:</i>	Copy, thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
9		<i>Sergeant Rayorta:</i>	All right. Thank you. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC

10		<i>MCC:</i>	This is your MCC.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			All flight personnel report to Op's, all flight personnel report to Op's.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
11		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- Didn't come up in primary radar.	TIE	TIE	TIE
12		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. So you have a general location as to where he is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
13		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We're still tracking him right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
14		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	You're tracking him?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Can you - Can you give lat and long where you think he is just for our SA?	IIG	IIG	IIG
15		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, hold on a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
16		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	And where are they going now, do you know?	IIG	IIG	IIG
17		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No idea. He's heading towards Kennedy -	TIE	TIE	TIE
18		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Hey, _____?	NC	NC	NC
			We're looking for assets.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			_____ give me a lat and long because _____ primary only.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			FAA is tracking it. They _____ because they're the only ones seeing it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
19		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	And is there any military assistance requested?	IIG	IIG	IIG
20		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, _____ -	TIE	TIE	TIE

21		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yes, that's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
22		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	F-16s _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
23		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yes, you do want F-16's out?	IIG	IIG	IIG
24		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, F16's out of Otis.	TIE	TIE	TIE
25		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	But you don't have - You don't have any modes or codes on him?	IIG	IIG	IIG
26		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Not right now. Right now it's just -	TIE	TIE	TIE
27		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Is he inbound to JFK?	IIG	IIG	IIG
28		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We have 41,15 north -	TIE	TIE	TIE
29		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	You don't know where he is at all?	IIG	IIG	IIG
30		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	41,15 north -	TIE	TIE	TIE
31		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	07,346 west -	TIE	TIE	TIE
32		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	07,346 west -	TIE	TIE	TIE
33		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- and the approximate heading is 190 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
34		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	190 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
35		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	-3879	TIE	TIE	TIE
36		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	-3879	TIE	TIE	TIE
37		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Last known altitude is flight level is 290 but we -	TIE	TIE	TIE
38		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Please give me a call and let us know -	IIG	IIG	IIG
39		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Can you give me any other information on it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
40		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You want the type and stuff?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			What do you need? What do you want?	IIG	IIG	IIG

41		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yeah, like passengers on board, where it came from -	IIG	IIG	IIG
42		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We'll call you right back as soon we know more info.	MISC	MISC	MISC
43		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
44		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
45		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	767, _____. No idea how many people on board right now. They came from Boston. They're supposed to be going to L.A. and they're headed south. They're going the wrong way, obviously. It's just -	TKS	TKS	TKS
46		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
47		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
48		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	All right. Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
49		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	And so where are they - who are you gonna send? Do you know anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG
50		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	That determination hasn't been made yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Let me - if you could hold on just a moment, I'm gonna get - We have some coordination going on right now.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I think that they said they're gonna put Otis on battle stations. That's who I would anticipate the aircraft to be based on them going to JFK. That would be our closest backup.	IIS	TIE	IIS
51		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Let me give you my commercial number in case we get disconnected here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
52		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

53		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	603 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
54		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	603 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
55		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	879 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
56		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	879 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
57		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	6666	TIE	TIE	TIE
58		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	666 - Oh, That's a scary number. 6666.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			And your number again, Sir? Joe?	IIG	IIG	IIG
59		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Joe Cooper. You can talk to anyone here. Everybody knows what's going on.	TKS	TKS	TKS
60		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
61		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	All right. So yeah. So I'll stay - I'll stay on hold and you can give me call so we can get this going.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
62		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. Stand-by.	MISC	MISC	MISC
63		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. Can you please call - I got miss assigned data up here. Write it all down. I got to get off the -	MISC	MISC	MISC
64		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Boston Center?	MISC	MISC	MISC
65		<i>Huntress:</i>	Huntress calling you back real quick.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Did you guys have a Mode 2 at all on American 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
66		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Last altitude we saw it was descending _____ 290.	TIE	TIE	TIE
67		<i>Huntress:</i>	I'm sorry. Prior Mode 2 for American 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
68		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	- Mode 3 -	IIG	IIG	IIG
69		<i>Huntress:</i>	Did you file anything - any information for Mode 3	IIG	IIG	IIG

			because we can locate them on the scope if so?	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
70		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Well -	MISC	MISC	MISC
71		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Boston to Los Angeles. That was -	TIE	TIE	TIE
72		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Last known altitude for Flight 11 was 290. Before that, he was requesting - Hold on. Looks like he was requesting flight level 350.	TKS	TKS	TKS
73	[00:05]	<i>Huntress:</i>	Okay. All we're asking is your Mode 3.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Your Mode 3? Did you assign any Mode 3 to that aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
74		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	The reason - The reason was -	MISC	MISC	MISC
75		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
76		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
77		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	MCC -	MISC	MISC	MISC
78		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
79		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I just called it totally, utterly impossible to recall 53.	TIE	TIE	TIE
80		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	3064	TIE	TIE	TIE
81		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	We still should be able to get it without 53.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
82		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	52 is working.	TIE	TIE	TIE
83		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We don't have any Mode 3s. No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
84		<i>Huntress:</i>	Nothing you guys -	TIE	TIE	TIE
85		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Primary target only. I don't even know what it - I can try and find his original mode 3.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
86		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yeah, that's all we need.	TIE	TIE	TIE
87		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC

88		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What does 56 look like?	IIG	IIG	IIG
89		<i>Huntress:</i>	We don't know yet. They don't have a mode 3.	TKS	TKS	TKS
90		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- mashed in so much real world stuff happened during an exercise.	MISC	MISC	MISC
91		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	_____ American 11.	NC	NC	NC
92		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Did you get the battle stations, _____?	IIG	IIG	IIG
93		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yeah, he's having a tough time talking because they are making threats and they have to -	TKS	TKS	TKS
94		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Otis 1241 - Real world -	TIE	TIE	TIE
95		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	For what? _____? You're gonna call them?	IIG	US	IIG
			They're not gonna help you out.	TIE	TIE	TIE
96		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You want to read that out?	IIG	IIG	IIG
97		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
98		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It's a - It's a commercial number. 508 - 508-487-4069 or 4616.	TIE	TIE	TIE
99		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Anybody 290 _____.	NC	NC	NC
100		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
101		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yes, go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
102		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	The original code was 1443.	TIE	TIE	TIE
103		<i>Huntress:</i>	1443. Copy that. Thank you, Sir. And one more question.	MISC	MISC	MISC
104		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
105		<i>Huntress:</i>	Any aircraft close by him that - a mode 3?	IIG	IIG	IIG
106			About the time that -	NC	NC	NC
107			Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC

108		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I think we're working on that.	ISA	US	ISA
			I don't have anybody next to him right now but - His speed is slowing down now. He's turning southwest bound.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			So we don't have anybody close to him.	ISA	ISA	ISA
109		<i>Huntress:</i>	Okay. Thank you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
110		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
111		<i>Huntress:</i>	We will eventually find -	NC	NC	NC
112		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	1443	TIE	TIE	TIE
113		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Well - Well, we'll look and sit down - I'll sit one of these guys down and we'll - have to go on a little bit of hold here, that's all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I mean, we don't have a crew in yet. I mean -	ISA	US	ISA
114		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yeah. He said nobody in that - nobody in that -	NC	NC	NC
115		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Z point.	TIE	TIE	TIE
116		<i>Huntress:</i>	SDMC, scramble - Is the data - is that -	NC	NC	NC
117		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Copy. Same mission.	MISC	TIE	TIE
118		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Who's talking in New York giving them a heads up? Anybody called New York?	IIG	IIG	IIG
119		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	The FCC. I don't know what _____ on of these guys, too.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I need a direction, destination -	IIG	IIG	IIG
120		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Is there a reference point?	IIG	IIG	IIG
121		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It's around there, Steve.	TIE	TIE	TIE
122		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Can we give you the Z point?	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
123		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	_____ is Huntress ID.	TIE	TIE	TIE
124		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It's north of New York City.	TIE	TIE	TIE

125		<i>Huntress:</i>	I got this lat, long 41, 15 coming 436.	TIE	TIE	TIE
126		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, Ma'am. Are you aware of the possible hijacking of American 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
127		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	That's gonna be 346?	TIE	TIE	TIE
128		<i>Huntress:</i>	Destination as a real world hijack American 11. He is headed 40 miles north of JFK headed towards JFK.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We're trying to find out any information that we possibly can.	ISA	TIE	ISA
			Apparently, the pilot was having a rough time because there have been threats in the cockpit. It started out of Boston for Los Angeles, now heading -	TKS	TKS	TKS
			I wanted to give you a heads up to let you know that American 11. We're trying to locate any information as far as the location.	ISA	ISA	ISA
			He is currently a Mode 3.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Do you have any information whatsoever?	IIG	IIG	IIG
129		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I do not.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hold on one second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
130		<i>Huntress:</i>	It's KKKK -	TIE	TIE	TIE
131		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	I can't locate that Mode 3.	TIE	IIG	IIG
132		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	MCC - Have you guys gotten any information on this yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
133		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Is that KKKK, is that his position?	IIG	IIG	IIG
134		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
135		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. We're working on a 25 mile box around that and getting everything up.	ISA	ISA	ISA

136		<i>Huntress:</i>	HRD Foster Conar. How are you doing this morning?	MISC	MISC	MISC
137		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Fine.	MISC	MISC	MISC
138		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, any word on - we got word that there was a real world hijack going on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
139		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's right.	TIE	TIE	TIE
140		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Anything on that at all?	IIG	IIG	IIG
141		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're getting fighters airborne now. They're going to be under FAA control and we have not found the aircraft _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			He's not squawking.	TIE	TIE	TIE
142		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Oh, he's not squawking?	IIG	IIG	IIG
143		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	_____ through the FAA.	NC	NC	NC
144		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Are the fighters airborne already?	IIG	IIG	IIG
145		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Not yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
146		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Not yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
147		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I'll let you know when they get airborne.	TIE	TIE	TIE
148		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Thanks _____.	MISC	MISC	MISC
149		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep. Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain, can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
150		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, Collin Scoggins, Boston Center. How are you doing?.	MISC	MISC	MISC
151		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes, Sir, just fine.	MISC	MISC	MISC

152		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Are you all working on trying to get someone up to -	IIG	IIG	IIG
153		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes. Yes, we are.	TIE	TIE	TIE
154		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Can you, by any chance, can you give me an altitude on him? Do you have an altitude -	IIG	IIG	IIG
155		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Last one was 29,000.	TIE	TIE	TIE
156		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Okay. I didn't know if your radar could actually pick up a correct altitude just so we can kind of nail it down maybe.	IIS	IIG	IIS
157		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We haven't even found the track yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
158		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	You haven't found the track yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
159		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Can you tell us where he's at? He-	IIG	IIG	IIG
160		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Hold on one second. Did you arrange _____ off from the nearest navi?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			It's primary only but I'll get you a track and you'll be able to find them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
161		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Is there anyway that you can -	NC	NC	NC
162		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	15 miles east of Kennedy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
163	[00:10]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	15 miles east of Kennedy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
164		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	East of JFK traveling southwest bound.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			It's only going about 300 knots.	TIE	TIE	TIE

165		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	15 miles east of Kennedy doing 300 knots.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Is there anyway - are we in contact with pilot? Are you guys in contact with the pilot?	IIG	IIG	IIG
166		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	No contact with the pilot whatsoever.	TIE	TIE	TIE
167		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No chance in maybe getting some _____?	IIG	IIG	IIG
168		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	We can't, nope.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			The only thing that I understand that we got here was that someone heard in the background someone entering the cockpit. That's it.	IIS	IIS	IIS
			We have not had any contact with the pilot at all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
169		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
170		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Do you have visual on him yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
171		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're picking up a search track roughly -	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Let me give you a better range here. I got it 8 miles east northeast of Kennedy on search only.	TIE	TIE	TIE
172		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	8 miles east northeast of Kennedy? 8 miles northeast east we have a visual, is that about right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			That's about right.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Do you have an altitude on that?	IIG	IIG	IIG

173		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No, I don't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
174		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	You don't? When you get an altitude, can you call us here at the center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
175		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I will do my best.	TIE	TIE	TIE
176		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	And we can pass that on to New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Our DSN here is 881-1635.	TIE	TIE	TIE
177		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're losing - We're losing primary on them now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
178		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	You're losing primary on them now? Do you have another sight or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
179		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No. HR2 was the only site. We're got satellite _____ right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Give me your phone number?	IIG	IIG	IIG
180		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Okay. 881-	TIE	TIE	TIE
181		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	- 881 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
182		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	1635	TIE	TIE	TIE
183		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	1635	TIE	TIE	TIE
			And your name again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
184		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	My name is Collin -	TIE	TIE	TIE
185		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Collin.	TIE	TIE	TIE
186		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Scoggins. S-C-O-G-G-I-N-S.	TIE	TIE	TIE
187		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Scoggins. Okay. That's all we're seeing right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
188		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Okay. No altitude pick up?	IIG	IIG	IIG

189		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
190		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Okay. Let me know if there's _____ New York and they have no clue what to move around them. So -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
191		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I roger that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
192		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Yep. Thank you very much. _____ let us know _____?	NC	NC	NC
193		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Sure will.	MISC	MISC	MISC
194		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Thank you. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
195		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain. May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
196		<i>Collin Scoggins:</i>	Yes, southeast -First Air Force Public Affairs, Sergeant Timmons.	TIE	TIE	TIE
197		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
198		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	I was just talking with ID and we had a phone call that came down to us saying that they had a possible hijack out of Boston.	TIE	TIE	TIE
199		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
200		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	And I just flipped around and we were just - we always watch the news and a 737 hit the World Trade Center and I was just curious at the same time if that was the aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG

			Last I knew they had a primary on him and the track was not squawking 7500 but it was -	IIS	TIE	TIE
201		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Send them to New York City.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			Still continue go. Okay. Okay.	MISC	US	MISC
			Who's plugged in up there?	IIG	US	IIG
			Plug in.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			I'm gonna have to have you hold.	TIE	US	TIE
			This is what I've got so far.	TIE	TIE	TIE
202		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
203		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're working to confirm that.	TIE	TIE	TIE
204		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	Okay. That's fine. I understand you guys are pretty busy -	MISC	MISC	MISC
205		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're jumping through hoops right now.	MISC	MISC	MISC
206		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
207		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
208		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	All right, I tell you what. I'll give you guys a call back. I know you're pretty busy up there.	MISC	MISC	MISC
209		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
210		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	All right. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
211		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain. May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
212		<i>Sergeant Timmons:</i>	Sergeant Kelly from Otis. Flew panthers off at 1252 Zulu.	TIE	TIE	TIE

213		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Roger that, thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
214		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	- peculiar -	NC	NC	NC
215		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain. Can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
216		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	Yeah, how are you doing? Lieutenant Tracy at Otis. How's it going?	MISC	MISC	MISC
217		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're kind of busy. How you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
218		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	I know. I'm busy here, too.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We've got the -- I just want to let you know that there's a Maine 85 in the airspace -	TIE	TIE	TIE
219		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What airspace?	IIG	IIG	IIG
220		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	Pardon?	MISC	MISC	MISC
221		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What airspace?	IIG	IIG	IIG
222		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	In Whisky 105.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			It may be useable for the missions that our panthers just took off on.	TSOG	<b>TSOG</b>	TSOG
223		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Stand by. Let me run this up the channel.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We're gonna pass that up and if we need them then we'll get back to you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			How's that?	IIG	US	IIG
224		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	That's great.	TIE	TIE	TIE
225		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's the best we can do right now.	ISA	TIE	ISA
226		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	Yeah, you can - you can probably get them through Giant Killer if they're in the area.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
			They're out of Bangor and confirm that the location was 40, 40 north, west 74	IIG	IIG	IIG

			please?			
227		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I'm sorry? Say that again.	MISC	MISC	MISC
228		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	40, 40 north, west 74.	TIE	TIE	TIE
229		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	74 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			And that is the location of the Maine 85?	IIG	IIG	IIG
230		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	No, that was the location that you guys gave me of the - of the 767.	TIE	TIE	TIE
231		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. I -	NC	NC	NC
232		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	I wanted to double check the 74 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
233		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're hearing - we're hearing reports right now that the civilian aircraft crashed in to the World Trade Center. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
234	[00:15]	<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
235		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	It's not confirmed at this point. We're trying to confirm that. It's all over the news and the whole nine yards. -	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Just confirmed it? Boston Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
236		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	Holy shit.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			There it is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
237		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	All right? So we don't know what's going on.	ISA	TIE	ISA
238		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
239		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	All right?	MISC	MISC	MISC
240		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	Well, I'll get off the phone.	MISC	MISC	MISC
241		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I'll try to keep you informed.	MISC	MISC	MISC
242		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	Okay, thanks. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
243		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC

244		<i>Lieutenant Tracy:</i>	This is Sergeant Akin calling from International Guard Operation Center at Andrews.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I can probably pretty much assume that ya'll are being a little bit busy up there now.	IIS	US	IIS
245		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
246		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	But I have a question. Can you confirm if Otis was scrambled on to those aircraft that are out there toward -	IIG	IIG	IIG
247		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
248		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	That was agreed?	IIG	IIG	IIG
249		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yes, definitely.	TIE	TIE	TIE
250		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
251		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
252		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
253		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
254		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	Yes, this is Sergeant Akin calling again.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I just need to get your name and I spoke with you earlier about the 102nd scramble.	IIG	IIG	IIG
255		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
256		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	Can I get your name again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
257		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Sergeant Bianchi. Bravo, India, November - Alpha, November, Charlie, Hotel, India.	TIE	TIE	TIE
258		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	Okay. Your rank again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
259		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Senior Analyst.	TIE	TIE	TIE
260		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	Senior Analyst? Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC

261		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Second aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
262		<i>Sergeant Akin:</i>	Yeah, yeah.	NC	NC	NC
263		<i>Huntress:</i>	That one looks like it's -	NC	NC	NC
264		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	United?	IIG	IIG	IIG
265		<i>Huntress:</i>	We're calling it a jet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
266		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	The first one -	NC	NC	NC
267		<i>Huntress:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain. May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
268		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Hey, it's Ken Borchon down at Langley.	TIE	TIE	TIE
269		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
270		<i>Ken Borchon:</i>	Do you guys have a few available to let us know what's going on right now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
271		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I'm sorry?	MISC	MISC	MISC
272		<i>Ken Borchon:</i>	Do you guys have a few available or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
273		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah, hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
274		<i>Ken Borchon:</i>	Any word on what's going on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
275		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	None of this is really classified that we know of. It's all over the news if you've seen the news.	TKS	TKS	TKS
276		<i>Ken Borchon:</i>	Yeah. Is that why we're getting the battle stations?	IIG	IIG	IIG
277		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
278		<i>Ken Borchon:</i>	Okay. I'll call you back then.	MISC	MISC	MISC
279		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
280		<i>Ken Borchon:</i>	Giant Killer call.	NC	NC	NC
281		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're actually -	NC	NC	NC
282		<i>Huntress:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
283		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, this is _____ Kelly from Langley.	MISC	MISC	MISC

284		<i>Sergeant McCain</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
285		<i>Lt. Kelly:</i>	Hold for MCC Major Evans.	MISC	MISC	MISC
286		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
287		<i>Lt. Kelly:</i>	Go ahead. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
288		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We are looking for words on - for the battle stations.	IIG	IIG	IIG
289		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	It's Langley Command Post. They want words on why they're on battle stations.	TKS	TKS	TKS
		<i>Major Evans:</i>	We're looking for words.	TIE	TIE	TIE
291		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Have you been watching the news?	IIG	IIG	IIG
292		<i>Major Evans:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
293		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's why.	TIE	TIE	TIE
294		<i>Major Evans:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
295		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	- Langley Command Post.	TIE	TIE	TIE
296		<i>Major Evans:</i>	Okay. That's the reason -	TIE	TIE	TIE
297		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You can pass it to the _____ as well.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
298		<i>Major Evans:</i>	We were looking for the words because we understand we need to get words.	IIG	IIG	IIG
299		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Air sovereignty national -	TIE	TIE	TIE
300		<i>Major Evans:</i>	Go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
301		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hey, this is Major McCarthy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Who am I speaking to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
302		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	This is Major Nasypany.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
303		<i>Major McCarthy:</i>	Hey, Nasypany. Are you guys watching CNN?	IIG	IIG	IIG

304		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Yep. We are in a situation right now. I'm kind of busy so -	MISC	MISC	MISC
305		<i>Major McCarthy:</i>	Okay. I just wanted to -	NC	NC	NC
306		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Yeah. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
307		<i>Major McCarthy:</i>	Attention in the Ops room. All personnel who are not actively involved right now, would they please leave the Ops room? I'll say again: All personnel that are not actively involved please leave the Ops room.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
308		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Yes, I do.	NC	NC	NC
309		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Do you have contact with that aircraft airborne?	IIG	IIG	IIG
310		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No. United 175 is the second aircraft that crashed in to the Trade Center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
311		<i>Huntress:</i>	Okay. That's what I needed, Sir, is confirmation.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Only one other question: The _____ on board were either _____?	NC	NC	NC
312		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You'd have to get Boston Center on that.	TSOG	US	TSOG
			They were both out of Boston going to Los Angeles.	TIE	TIE	TIE
313		<i>Huntress:</i>	_____.	NC	NC	NC
314		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Boston Center would have that information.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We don't have that information yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
315		<i>Huntress:</i>	Thank you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
316		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
317		<i>Huntress:</i>	Sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
318		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

319		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yes. No, we're here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
320		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	November, 612, Uniform, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
321		<i>Huntress:</i>	November, 612, Uniform, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
322		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, we shut all the traffic off at Boston Center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Nobody is departing.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We're routing all incoming arrivals New York Metro Airport.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I have a question for you in case we have any more aircraft that start deviating. We need to -	NC	NC	NC
323		<i>Huntress:</i>	I don't even have one.	TIE	TIE	TIE
324		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm not gonna send that because I don't know what the hell to put on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
325		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	American Airlines is still airborne, still hijacked.	TIE	TIE	TIE
326		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Oh, God. They better call the President.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
327		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Believe me, we know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
328	[00:20]	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	American 11.	TIE	TIE	TIE
329		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	New York, Huntress ID reference American Airlines 11.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm calling American right now - New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
330		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	This is New York. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
331		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yes, Sir. We just had information that American Airlines 11 is still airborne heading towards Washington.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Did you get that information?	IIG	IIG	IIG
332		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Stand by.	MISC	MISC	MISC

333		<i>Huntress:</i>	Sir, I'm on with New York. I'm on with New York, hold on.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Tail number is right here. November, 334, Alpha, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
334		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- Alpha, Alpha - American -	NC	NC	NC
335		<i>Huntress:</i>	Air Defense?	MISC	MISC	MISC
336		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yes, go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
337		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What beacon code are you looking at?	IIG	IIG	IIG
338		<i>Huntress:</i>	Sir, we don't have a beacon code. We only have a tail number.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Last known beacon code was 1443 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
339		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm gonna give you a phone number and you need to call them because -	DTA(RTA)	TIE	DTA(RTA)
340		<i>Huntress:</i>	Is it 631-468-,	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Sir, 5959?	IIG	IIG	IIG
341		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It's 631-468-5959.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			That's the Watts desk and they'll have any information you may need on this flight.	TSOG	US	TSOG
342		<i>Huntress:</i>	Okay. If you can do me a favor and have them call us.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			We cannot call out for some reason.	TIE	TIE	TIE
343		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	All right. Let me have your number.	IIG	IIG	IIG
344		<i>Huntress:</i>	It's - Do you have DSN or no?	IIG	IIG	IIG
345		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm sorry?	MISC	MISC	MISC
346		<i>Huntress:</i>	315 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
347		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
348		<i>Huntress:</i>	- 334 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
349		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
350		<i>Huntress:</i>	-6344	TIE	TIE	TIE

351		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
352		<i>Huntress:</i>	Thank you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
353		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	All right. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
354		<i>Huntress:</i>	Oh, shoot. 6348, 6344.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Who needs what? Major Anderson? Major Anderson, what did you need? American Airlines 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			New York is gonna call me back right now with the information that they have.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm just waiting.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			That's the first one we had that we thought went into the World Trade Center. 767 type aircraft. We got his tail number and everything.	TKS	US	TKS
355		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
356		<i>Huntress:</i>	How you doing? This is Kelly. Can I post?	IIG	IIG	IIG
357		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
358		<i>Lt. Kelly:</i>	Langley.	NC	NC	NC
359		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
360		<i>Lt. Kelly:</i>	We need the heading again. The altitude -	IIG	IIG	IIG
361		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	The altitude? Stand by. Langley needs an altitude.	IIG	IIG	IIG
362		<i>Lt. Kelly:</i>	Okay. 010299. Let me give you another heading. We don't have a -	TIE	TIE	TIE
363		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	We have tankers - We have additional tankers on the wire.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Call sign? I'm not sure on the numbers.	TIE	TIE	TIE
364		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm aware of it, yes. Thank you, Sir.	US	TIE	TIE

365		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We got the tail number, November, 334, Alpha, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			_____ when they hit _____ still airborne, still hijacked.	TIE	TIE	TIE
366		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
367		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. This is Langley again. What's the primary? Is it 234?	IIG	IIG	IIG
368		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
369		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Copy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
370		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
371		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I need a -	NC	NC	NC
372		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
373		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I don't know exactly where -	TIE	TIE	TIE
374		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	All right. Nothing heard.	TIE	TIE	TIE
375		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Ten miles.	TIE	TIE	TIE
376		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Oh, yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
377		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hello? What? I just got here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
378	[00:25]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- World Trade Center. That's the second aircraft that hit.	TKS	TKS	TKS
379		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry. Nothing heard. We're trying to get a hold of them. We're trying to make sure -	TIE	TIE	TIE
380		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
381		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	_____ from CONAR.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Hey, real quick can you guys throw in the chat with squawks for the Otis birds, please?	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
382		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay. We'll send it on to the chat.	TIE	TIE	TIE
383		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Thank you. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC

384		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	You're welcome. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
385		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
386		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Hi, Sergeant Lucas calling from Lotus.	MISC	MISC	MISC
387		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
388		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	We're in the CONAR chat here and see I that CONAR - the region commander has directed all sectors -	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Are we increasing THREATCOM?	IIG	IIG	IIG
389		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	I know we are for New York. That's all I know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
390		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	Okay. So we are not at this time?	IIG	IIG	IIG
391		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	I don't believe you are. I haven't read the chat. I haven't got the chat in front of me so I couldn't tell you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
392		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
393		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	All right?	MISC	MISC	MISC
394		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
395		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
396		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	This is Air Force _____, Sergeant Michael speaking.	MISC	MISC	MISC
397		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			The force protection plan and the force protection mission Bravo, was that just for NEADS or us or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
398		<i>Sergeant Michael:</i>	It's everybody in New York State.	TIE	TIE	TIE
399		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's all of New York?	IIG	IIG	IIG
400		<i>Sergeant Michael:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE

401		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What about for CONAR? Have you heard anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG
402		<i>Sergeant Michael:</i>	No, I haven't heard anything about that. All I heard about was all national guard units inside of New York State - General Barbarren put them in to Bravo.	TKS	TIE	TKS
403		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. In New York. All right. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
404		<i>Sergeant Michael:</i>	All right?	MISC	MISC	MISC
405		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
406		<i>Sergeant Michael:</i>	Indianapolis was the last one to work with it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
407		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	- earlier from Boston?	IIG	IIG	IIG
408		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, Boston to L.A.	TIE	TIE	TIE
409		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Boston to L.A.	TIE	TIE	TIE
410		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We don't know what the hell it's for. All we can do is say we - I don't know -	TIE	TIE	TIE
411		<i>Huntress:</i>	Go ahead. Hold on -	MISC	MISC	MISC
412		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It's over Long Island. _____ over Long Island and _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
413		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
414		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It's _____ here from CONAR. We need a phone number for the air team.	IIG	IIG	IIG
415		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Air team?	IIG	IIG	IIG
416		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
417		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Hold on a second. Oh, hold on a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
418		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
419		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yep. Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC

420		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- 010 - Did you catch that in - 6 miles east of the White House.	TIE	TIE	TIE
421		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	304 extension will get you right to a commander.	TIE	TIE	TIE
422		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Say again now? I couldn't hear that.	IIG	IIG	IIG
423		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	587-6304.	TIE	TIE	TIE
424		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	6304. Thanks very much.	TIE	TIE	TIE
425		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Right here, Sir. Here's your target. Bravo 032.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
426		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, it's Sergeant Benowski at the _____ post at Langley.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Did you do a _____ for our guys?	IIG	IIG	IIG
427	[00:30]	<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	I'm sorry, ma'am. 1335?	IIG	IIG	IIG
428		<i>Sergeant Benowski:</i>	Yes, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
429		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay. That's what I need.	TIE	TIE	TIE
430		<i>Sergeant Benowski:</i>	Okay. Thanks. Bye-bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
431		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Steve, prosecute Bravo 032.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
432		<i>Sergeant Benowski:</i>	Radar only. Bravo 326?	IIG	IIG	IIG
433		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	32	TIE	TIE	TIE
434		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Bravo 032.	TIE	TIE	TIE
435		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Don't have an altitude?	IIG	IIG	IIG
436		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Don't have an altitude. 290 knots.	TIE	TIE	TIE
437		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	_____?	NC	NC	NC
438		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	We don't have an altitude.	TIE	TIE	TIE

439	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	_____ is at 80 now. Bravo 032, that's the aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Get his Z point. Thank you.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
440	<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Where are the fighters?	IIG	IIG	IIG
441	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	2T25. Quit 25 right down there. _____ on bad data now. Zero velocity. 032 back on the Z point.	TIE	TIE	TIE
442	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I got it.	MISC	MISC	MISC
443	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
444	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. From York, he was 080 to 01 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
445	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Where is York?	IIG	IIG	IIG
446	<i>Huntress:</i>	Indianapolis.	TIE	TIE	TIE
447	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Oh, okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
448	<i>Huntress:</i>	80,010	TIE	TIE	TIE
449	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. So 841 -	NC	NC	NC
450	<i>Huntress:</i>	38, 41 north. 082, 52 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
451	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	How long ago?	IIG	IIG	IIG
452	<i>Huntress:</i>	When was that last _____, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
453	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Right before we saw him -	TIE	TIE	TIE
454	<i>Huntress:</i>	That was his last -	TIE	TIE	TIE
455	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	They're doing that now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
456	<i>Huntress:</i>	Heading westbound 270.	TIE	TIE	TIE
457	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Heading west 270.	TIE	TIE	TIE
458	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I don't know his speed at this point. WE got that information off of the - .	TIE	TIE	TIE
459	<i>Huntress:</i>	Bravo 112. That point you gave me, Mo.	TIE	TIE	TIE
460	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Lat and long - 270.	TIE	TIE	TIE
461	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	The point out is Bravo 112.	TIE	TIE	TIE
462	<i>Huntress:</i>	Bravo 112, Bravo 112.	TIE	TIE	TIE

463		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Bravo - American 77 last known position is Bravo 112. That hit point right there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
464		<i>Huntress:</i>	Right here?	IIG	IIG	IIG
465		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
466		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Oh, my God.	MISC	MISC	MISC
467		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What is it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
468		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Delta what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
469		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	89	TIE	TIE	TIE
470		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	89. Boeing 757.	TIE	TIE	TIE
471		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Las Vegas?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I don't even know how the - I need a code.	IIG	IIG	IIG
472		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	089 is the Delta 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
473		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Bravo 089? Bravo 089. Area 1.	TIE	TIE	TIE
474		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yeah, that's another hijack. Delta is _____ Bravo 089 has been trapped.	TKS	TIE	TKS
475		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Do me a favor? Make sure that gets a special 15 just for everybody's information.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
476		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. I'm not sure where all the tankers are right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I got another hijack. Another hijack. It's a Delta - Delta 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
477		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	It's right there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
478		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Boston to Vegas. I know it's _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
479		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	It's right there. Approximately 75 miles.	TIE	TIE	TIE
480		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Bravo 089.	TIE	TIE	TIE
481		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Delta 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
482		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Take a deep breath.	MISC	MISC	MISC

483	[00:35]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Oh, yeah. They've been airborne for quite a while. Sorry.	TIE	TIE	TIE
484		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Come here.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
485		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Go to be.	NC	NC	NC
486		<i>Huntress:</i>	Delta 89. Out of Boston heading to _____ 1304.	TIE	TIE	TIE
487		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I got additional fighters coming out of - Got more aircraft coming out from Langley. First Fighter Wing.	TIE	TIE	TIE
488		<i>Huntress:</i>	_____ south of Cleveland.	TIE	TIE	TIE
489		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	ALS, right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
490		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Aircraft _____, right near the _____. Okay. Steve, you've got an aircraft spotted right near the Pentagon.	TIE	TIE	TIE
491		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Mode 3 -	IIG	IIG	IIG
492		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	1304	TIE	TIE	TIE
493		<i>Huntress:</i>	Okay, guys. Another aircraft spotted near the Pentagon.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Also, did you get the word that Delta 89 south of Toledo - Yeah, the track is Bravo 089.	IIG	IIG	IIG
494		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Reclassified as specials, Laia. Somebody made a _____. It's going back to special. I'm gonna forward tell it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			If CONAR calls, its -	NC	NC	NC
495		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Bravo 089?	IIG	IIG	IIG
496		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Bravo 089. That's the special. That's the Delta 89, 767, originally Boston to Las Vegas from what I understand.	TKS	TIE	TKS

497		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	And I'm trying to contact _____ for another possible hijack.	TIE	TIE	TIE
498		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You might want to - you might want to talk to Duluth, too.	TSOG	DTA(RTA)	TSOG
			That's the keyboard. We've been so busy.	MISC	US	MISC
499		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Talking about -	NC	NC	NC
500		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah, they've got guards posted all over - They ought to have some freaking _____. Just grass, Mo.	TIE	TIE	TIE
501		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, _____ sky actually. _____.	NC	NC	NC
502		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No.	MISC	MISC	MISC
503		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It just shows that the - I don't know.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			They ain't gonna do much at the White House.	TIE	TIE	TIE
504		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're talking to -	NC	NC	NC
505		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sergeant Perry?	IIG	US	IIG
			Is this his wife?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We're really busy. Okay? Like -	MISC	MISC	MISC
506		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Right there.	TIE	US	TIE
			Both of them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
507		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What about Duluth?	IIG	US	IIG
			Did you think about them?	IIG	US	IIG
			What about Duluth? Did you -	IIG	IIG	IIG
508		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- Fighters.	TIE	TIE	TIE

509		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	All right. Just throwing out possibilities.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Force protection condition?	IIG	US	IIG
			We're at Bravo. Real world.	TIE	TIE	TIE
510		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Real world?	IIG	IIG	IIG
511		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Call your wife when you get a chance.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Who's this?	MISC	MISC	MISC
512		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	_____ near Lake Eerie.	TIE	TIE	TIE
513		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	This is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
			That is a Delta flight, 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
514		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	They say it possibly may not be a hijack.	TIE	US	TIE
			He - They did get in touch with him.	TIE	US	TIE
			They confirmed that they are _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
515		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	So it's just a possible - Right now it's just a possible hijack, okay?	TIE	US	TIE
			They've started to learn towards it's not _____ . Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
			They are in contact with the FAA. They are in contact with that aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			It's a Delta 89 757 _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
516		<i>Huntress:</i>	Keep them at high priority though, because they're not sure about that.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
517		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hey, _____. How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
518		<i>Huntress:</i>	Not well.	MISC	MISC	MISC
519		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Do you need help on anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG

520		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Nope. We got things as well handled as we can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
521		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. I'm in Rome,	TIE	US	TIE
			so if you need anything I can come right in.	TIE	TIE	TIE
522		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
523		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
524		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
525		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- Possible.	NC	NC	NC
526		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	High priority -	NC	NC	NC
527		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Who was that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
528		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	One of the guys in _____ wanting to know if we needed any help.	TIE	TIE	TIE
529		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	If anything, we need more trackers.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
530		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep.	TIE	TIE	TIE
531	[00:40]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Say that again, please.	MISC	MISC	MISC
532		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Who's that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
533		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	The search track is heading toward New York. That's all I know.	TIE	US	TIE
			He's got a tracker sitting here doing just New York and he's telling us the tracks. That's all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
534		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sergeant McCain.	TIE	TIE	TIE
535		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes, this is _____.	NC	NC	NC
536		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC

537		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	DMNA just called.	TIE	TIE	TIE
538		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Who?	IIG	IIG	IIG
539		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	DMNA.	TIE	TIE	TIE
540		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Who are they?	IIG	IIG	IIG
541		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Division Military and Naval Affairs.	TIE	TIE	TIE
542		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
543		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We've been directed to force protection condition Charlie.	TIE	TIE	TIE
544		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. That's real world?	IIG	IIG	IIG
545		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep. I'm here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
546		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hello? Can you hear me?	MISC	MISC	MISC
547		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, I can now.	MISC	US	MISC
			Did you hear me?	MISC	MISC	MISC
548		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes, I heard you.	TIE	US	TIE
			Force conduct - Force condition Charlie for New York State; is that correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
549		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
550		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Just New York State?	IIG	IIG	IIG
551		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep.	TIE	TIE	TIE
552		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Roger that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
553		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC

554		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
555		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	MCC - MCC -	MISC	MISC	MISC
556		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Go ahead. Did you get word that the Pentagon has now been hit?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			We're at condition Charlie.	TIE	TIE	TIE
557		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
558		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Charlie. Yep. We're at Charlie. No. Okay.	TIE	TIE	TIE
559		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. We need to be more selective on what we drop.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			We have Boston - No, we have New York City and Washington back here.	TIE	US	TIE
			We're watching New York and Washington.	TIE	US	TIE
			Up there, they have Boston - the hijack headed west and the _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
560		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. There's one hijacker now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
561		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Right now they -	NC	NC	NC
562		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	- Shelly, those are out of Langley. Shelly, those are the Langley -	TIE	TIE	TIE
563		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Show that one Z point you just put in.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
			Go.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
			I see that guy going north.	IIS	US	IIS
			Let him run north.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
			I don't want anything headed east.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
			You tell me if you see anything heading towards New York City, okay?	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)

564		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	_____.	NC	NC	NC
565		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Huh?	MISC	US	MISC
			That's not him. That's your search target right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We have fighters on cap over New York City. We have fighters right now headed for Washington to go on cap to be in position.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			They're trying to find someone to get on our western guy. They're having problems -	TIE	TIE	TIE
566		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	_____?	NC	NC	NC
567		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, they're having a problem. That might be. He might be headed towards the Sears Tower. I don't know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			They are trying to get on that guy someone - west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We don't know if they're trying to get someone from Selfridge. - has no aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
568		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Steve, Steve. They're trying to get Toledo airborne.	TIE	TIE	TIE
569		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Toledo?	IIG	IIG	IIG
570		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	They're trying to get Toledo up. We are trying to get a hold of Toledo.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Trying to get them airborne to get that other guy.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
571		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	There's four now reported.	TIE	US	TIE

			They're not where they're supposed to be.	TIE	TIE	TIE
572		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Steve, do you have enough trackers?	IIG	IIG	IIG
573		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Do we need anybody -	IIG	IIG	IIG
574		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Do we need to recall anybody for tracking?	IIG	IIG	IIG
575		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We have everybody in.	TIE	US	TIE
			I can get another crew in here pretty damn quick.	TSOG	TIE	TIE
576		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, we're okay right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
577		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	If I have to I'll call every son of a bitch I can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
578		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We're okay right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
579		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	All right.	MISC	US	MISC
			Let me know.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
580		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hello?	MISC	US	MISC
			Did you catch that?	IIG	US	IIG
			089, hard right-hand turn at level 27,000.	TIE	TIE	TIE
581		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	They got a computer -	NC	NC	NC
582		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What do you need utility for, Sir?	IIG	US	IIG
			You need TT?	IIG	US	IIG
			Okay. Long arm is down?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I need TT out here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
583		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Nobody at Duluth. They don't have any aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Try to get Toledo up.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
584		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I need GTE out here immediately.	TIE	TIE	TIE
585		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Jeff, long arm radios are down.	TIE	TIE	TIE

586		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I got four so far.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			They reported American Airlines 11, American Airlines -	TIE	TIE	TIE
587	[00:45]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	They're still airborne?	IIG	IIG	IIG
588		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No. This is from the beginning of this whole shebang.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Keep an eye on it.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			Where's he at?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Weapons has the listings in their checklist. In the checklist they have a whole ITA listing. I don't know what they're - Boston and New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
589		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Surveillance, Sergeant Richmond. Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
590		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hello, this is Sergeant Barns at the 103 <sup>rd</sup> .	MISC	MISC	MISC
591		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
592		<i>Sergeant Richmond:</i>	I got a call earlier saying you guys might need a _____?	TIE	TIE	TIE
593		<i>Sergeant Barns:</i>	Let me - Let me give you to my MCC -	MISC	MISC	MISC
594		<i>Sergeant Richmond:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
595		<i>Sergeant Barns:</i>	Who is this? The 103 <sup>rd</sup> ?	IIG	IIG	IIG
596		<i>Sergeant Richmond:</i>	103 <sup>rd</sup> .	TIE	TIE	TIE
597		<i>Sergeant Barns:</i>	I'm sending you to 6311.	TIE	TIE	TIE
598		<i>Sergeant Richmond:</i>	Yeah, I did.	NC	NC	NC

			Northeast?	NC	NC	NC
599		<i>Sergeant Barns:</i>	Hello, sir. This is Sergeant Damage at the 103 <sup>rd</sup> ACS.	MISC	TIE	TIE
			I got a call from you guys earlier saying you might need a sub. Do you need us?	IIG	IIG	IIG
600		<i>Sergeant Richmond:</i>	Let me find out for you. Hold on.	TIE	TIE	TIE
601		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
602		<i>Sergeant Damage:</i>	Do you need the 103 <sup>rd</sup> out of Connecticut?	IIG	IIG	IIG
603		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Not yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
604		<i>Sergeant Damage:</i>	Not yet, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
605		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Do you want us to - to get our radar up or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
606		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Stand by and crank it a turn, he says.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
607		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. We have people in route to turn it on right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
608		<i>Sergeant Damage:</i>	Okay. We'll be ready.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Thanks. Gotcha.	MISC	US	MISC
609		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	MCC?	MISC	MISC	MISC
610		<i>Sergeant Damage:</i>	What?	MISC	MISC	MISC
611		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Charlie crew swing surveillance?	IIG	IIG	IIG

612		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You need them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
613		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
614		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
615		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Long arm radios, computer up front is locked up.	TIE	TIE	TIE
616		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
617		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Looks like the Pentagon got hit.	TIE	TIE	TIE
618		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Pentagon did get hit.	TKS	TIE	TIE
			We need to make a command decision. _____ saying he needs some more surveillance people.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We're recommending Charlie crew swing to come in here.	TIE	TIE	TSOG
619		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	He needed _____ and it wasn't working.	TIE	TIE	TIE
620		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			We're all here. Northeast.	TIE	TIE	TIE
621		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah, I'm looking for a Major Deskins.	TIE	US	TIE
			This is Major Mormon from Springfield National Guard Base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
622		<i>Huntress:</i>	Stand by. Stand by. I'll get you Major Deskins -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
623		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Who am I talking to right now? What office?	IIG	IIG	IIG
624		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	This is the Ops floor, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE

625		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Of where?	IIG	IIG	IIG
626		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	Of Northeast Air Defense Sector.	TIE	TIE	TIE
627		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
628		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	Huntress. I just motioned. She's up and behind some glass here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
629		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. I don't need to talk to her.	TIE	US	TIE
			What we're trying to do is she just called here and said we need airplanes in the air.	TIE	US	TIE
			I don't know why she called Springfield National Guard Base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
630		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	We've got a problem out there. That's why she called.	TIE	TIE	TIE
631		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. You know where our airplanes are, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
632		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	Sir, I really - I haven't been working that part of our -	TIE	TIE	TIE
633		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I understand. I understand. I -	MISC	MISC	MISC
634		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	I'm not familiar -	NC	NC	NC
635		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I understand. All I'm doing is following up on a phone call and make sure it wasn't somebody -	TIE	TIE	TIE
636		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	I've got her coming down here right now and she'll be here in just a minute.	TIE	TIE	TIE
637		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

638		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	6311. The Ohio National Guard. You called them. You called them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
639		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Major Deskins.	MISC	MISC	MISC
640		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	Major Deskins? This is Major Tom Mormon from -	TIE	TIE	TIE
641		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Oh, by the way. 68 IC 3, 68 IC 3, be advised we are at 4 <sup>th</sup> option Bravo. Force protection Bravo. Real world.	TIE	TIE	TIE
642		<i>Major Deskins:</i>	Copy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
643		<i>Major Mormon:</i>	Copy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
644		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I hate to bother you with this, okay, but Steve says he needs more people. I suggest we call -	TIE	TIE	TIE
645		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Force protection -	TIE	TIE	TIE
646		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We call Charlie Crew Swings.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I want all the surveillance people in here pronto.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
647		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	- the other one now.	NC	NC	NC
648		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No problem.	MISC	US	MISC
			Kevin? Make sure that this is a no bullshit recall. I want them in here as fast as possible.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
			Quit 301. Try it.	NC	NC	NC
649		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I don't know. Do you need more people?	IIG	IIG	IIG
650		<i>Huntress:</i>	- for 89?	IIG	IIG	IIG

651		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	- I don't know who they're -	NC	NC	NC
652		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Stand by. I may need you as a runner.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
			Do you need more people?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I'm gonna get you two.	TIE	US	TIE
			Go find Kevin Foster and tell him I need two ID techs from Charlie ASAP.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
653		<i>Huntress:</i>	From what I understand, this guy out west is orbiting?	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Is that what I heard?	IIG	IIG	IIG
654		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I got a recall Charlie flight surveillance, and I recalled two ID techs over here so that these guys can get a break.	TIE	US	TIE
			These guys have been sitting here and messing with this stuff.	TIE	US	TIE
			You need some kind of food.	TIE	<b>MISC</b>	MISC
			Sir, I recalled all of Charlie Crew surveillance and two ID techs.	TIE	US	TIE
			We recalled Charlie crew surveillance from swing and two ID techs from Charlie flight.	TIE	TIE	TIE
655	[00:50]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We called Charlie crew surveillance. We already did it. We already did. It's already been done. They've been recalled.	TIE	TIE	TIE
656		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	MCC, _____ 257 has gone to 1,200. _____ target -	TIE	TIE	TIE

657		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hey, Steve. How you doing?	MISC	US	MISC
			Hey, we're not doing so good right now.	MISC	US	MISC
			I need you guys to make sure that -	MISC	MISC	MISC
658		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Attention in the area, attention in the area. Check noise level in the Ops room, please.	MISC	MISC	IIG
			Noise level in the Ops room. Did anyone hear it?	IIG	US	IIG
			Can you please - Chuck, Bravo 089. That's the track number. Okay.	TIE	US	TIE
			Tell them we're still gonna keep it at 15 until we confirm that he's on the ground. All right?	DTA(RTA)	TIE	TIE
			Northeast, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
659		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, this is Sergeant Centra- at Southeast.	MISC	US	MISC
			Could you confirm that B089 is where it's supposed to be _____?	IIG	IIG	IIG
660		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Can I confirm what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
661		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That the track of special in your area -	IIG	IIG	IIG
662		<i>Sergeant Centra</i>	Bravo 089?	IIG	US	IIG
			Okay. Last - These are the last words, okay?	TIE	US	TIE
			They got in touch with the pilot. He is evidently not declaring a hijack and is landing at Cleveland for precautionary measures only. But -	TIE	TIE	TIE

663		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
664		<i>Sergeant Centra:</i>	- But we are going to keep him a special 15 until we confirm him down on the ground and safe.	TIE	TIE	TIE
665		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I understand.	MISC	MISC	MISC
666		<i>Sergeant Centra:</i>	Understand? Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
667		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You to 6854.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
668		<i>Sergeant Centra:</i>	At this point, I ain't doing shit. I'm just passing on information.	MISC	MISC	MISC
669		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
670		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	6854, I got the 103 <sup>rd</sup> coming to you - I'm talking to my operator.	TIE	US	TIE
			I got the 103rd coming your way. I'm sending you to 6854.	TIE	<b>TIE</b>	TIE
			MCC? The 103rd _____ working a link.	TIE	TIE	TIE
671		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You the man.	MISC	MISC	MISC
672		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Connecticut I want to say or Rhode Island. Connecticut.	TIE	TIE	TIE
673		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Connecticut. It's Connecticut. The 103 <sup>rd</sup> is up in birds	TIE	TIE	TIE
674		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I don't know. I know they were looking for _____ number. I don't know what's going on with that.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			MCC, _____?	NC	NC	NC
675		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I don't know. Let me check.	MISC	MISC	MISC
676		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I need to know. All the targets -	IIG	IIG	IIG
677		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Do we have any available?	IIG	IIG	IIG
678		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's what I'm asking.	TIE	TIE	TIE
679		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. That's what you're asking?	IIG	IIG	IIG
680		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
681		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Steve? Steve?	MISC	MISC	MISC
682		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes?	MISC	MISC	MISC
683		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	A request just went in for an E3 over Chicago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
684	[00:55]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Got it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
685		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, he was making a turn down -	TIE	TIE	TIE
686		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I got the recall in.	TIE	TIE	TIE
687		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	_____ calling from _____.	MISC	US	MISC
			I'd like to do 3 or 4 line checks.	TIE	TIE	TIE
688		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Not a good time. Not a good time at all.	TIE	US	TIE
			We've got all kinds of shit hitting the fan down here. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
689		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Forget it.	MISC	MISC	MISC
690		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, do it later.	MISC	MISC	MISC

691		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Washington -	NC	NC	NC
692		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	How long?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			We have to get a hold of Booster. Major Booster.	TIE	US	TIE
			Can we call him? Did you try to call him?	IIG	US	IIG
			Try Major Booster and try Captain Ruby.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			Where's the recall book? The recall roster?	IIG	US	IIG
			Get a hold of Booster.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			If you can't get a hold of him then get a hold of Humberg. Humberg's at home asleep.	TSOG	<b>TSOG</b>	TSOG
			It's all there. All your recall officers are there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Northeast? Okay. Major Cheney, how are you doing? Are you having any problems out there?	MISC	IIG	IIG
			Okay. You got two going up to Fargo -	TIE	US	TIE
			This is Sergeant McCain. How are you doing, Major Cheney? We're kind of busy here.	MISC	US	MISC
			Two at Fargo and two city. I'll pass that on.	TIE	US	TIE
			Under FAA control right now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
693		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	_____ airline.	NC	NC	NC
694		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Right. Got it. That's fine.	MISC	US	MISC
			I'll let them know.	MISC	US	MISC

			You bet. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
695		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No, we don't know where he is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
696		<i>Huntress:</i>	_____ just called.	TIE	US	TIE
			You got two coming up on status with Fargo and two more in two cities.	TIE	TIE	TIE
697		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Why aren't we calling the other crew?	IIG	IIG	IIG
698		<i>Huntress:</i>	That's from the lodge. That came from the lodge.	TIE	US	TIE
			They're bringing them on status.	TIE	US	TIE
			Yes, it will be about half an hour before they get there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Sergeant McCain. Sergeant McCain, Northeast..	MISC	US	MISC
699		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes, this is _____.	MISC	US	MISC
			Is the exercise knocked off?	IIG	IIG	IIG
700		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	The exercise was cancelled.	TIE	US	TIE
			We're all out of parts here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
701		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. I'll call the battle gap cab. Thanks.	TIE	TIE	TIE
702		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sergeant Damage?	MISC	US	MISC
			We are working a tanker.	TIE	TIE	TIE
703		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	There is a bomb on board Boston -	TKS	TIE	TIE
704		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Fuck.	MISC	MISC	MISC
705		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	On board what? Boston 93?	IIG	IIG	IIG
706		<i>Huntress:</i>	United.	TIE	TIE	TIE

707		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	United?	IIG	IIG	IIG
708		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Bomb on board United 93.	TKS	TIE	TIE
709		<i>Huntress:</i>	Intercept. Intercept. We want the aircraft away from there.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
710		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	United 93, bomb on board. They are recently over Pittsburg.	TKS	TIE	TIE
711	[01:00]	<i>Huntress:</i>	You have a mode 3 code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
712		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
713		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yeah, Lieutenant calling from down Southeast.	MISC	MISC	MISC
714		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
715		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hey, just wanted to confirm that that guy that you're telling us, Bravo 089 is Delta 89?	IIG	IIG	IIG
716		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	That's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
717		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Oh, okay. I'm seeing the stuff in the chat here, too.	IIG	US	IIG
			Can you lat tel that to us?	IIG	IIG	IIG
718		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Can we lat tel what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
719		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I got another thing here from 14:07 from NEADS MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
720		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What do you need?	IIG	IIG	IIG
721		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	About the aircraft from Canada? We'd like to get a position on that.	IIG	IIG	IIG
722		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We don't have a position on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
723		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Good deal. Hey, what's going on with Delta 89? Is he landing or -	IIG	IIG	IIG

724	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	He's landing - Last we heard he's supposed to be landing at Cleveland.	TKS	TIE	TIE
725	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Good deal.	MISC	MISC	MISC
726	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Got to go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
727	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Wait -	MISC	MISC	MISC
728	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Any squawks?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		If this is the next guy's input then this is a good one.	NC	NC	NC
729	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	You couldn't orchestrate this kind of bullshit.	MISC	MISC	MISC
730	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Into Cleveland. Okay.	TIE	TIE	TIE
731	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	1527 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
732	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	1527? Can we locate that, please?	IIG	US	IIG
		1527, right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
733	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
734	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	1527, mode 3, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
735	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	35911. 35911. 078, 46 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
736	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	7846. Going in for a Z point.	TIE	TIE	TIE
737	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Thank you, Sir. This is the plane with the bomb on board.	TKS	TIE	TIE
738	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	351 north 078, 46.	TIE	TIE	TIE
739	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Airborne in 20 minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE

740		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	All I got is a Z point - I got a Z point but to tell you the truth, I don't know what the track number is. I can't find it but it's in there.	TIE	US	TIE
			If you look right on that _____ you gave me. 3978 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
741		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Coming up on 3280 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
742		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Bravo 424, what's the Z point on that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
743		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Why are they calling Charlie Crew in?	IIG	IIG	IIG
744		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Huh?	IIG	IIG	IIG
745		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Why are they calling Charlie Crew in?	IIG	IIG	IIG
746		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
747		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Colonel Lott from the 174 <sup>th</sup> is the SD available?	MISC	MISC	MISC
748		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, Sir. Stand by.	MISC	US	MISC
			Colonel Lott from 174th wants to talk to you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
749		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	_____.	NC	NC	NC
750		<i>Colonel Lott:</i>	I'm doing, well, as good as can be expected.	TIE	US	TIE
			I got guys that will be launching in about 15 minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
751		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I appreciate it.	MISC	US	MISC
			Are they loaded?	IIG	IIG	IIG
752		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We've got hot guns. That's all I -	TIE	TIE	TIE
753		<i>Colonel Lott:</i>	Hot guns?	IIG	US	IIG

			Well, that's good enough for me for the time being. Only words I got are - I got another possible aircraft with a bomb on board. It's in Pennsylvania, York, approximate area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
754		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, that's south.	TIE	TIE	TIE
755		<i>Colonel Lott:</i>	Yeah, south of us. There's also the possibility of - Where is that guy? Where's the other guy? The special? He turned back over the lake?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			No, the other lake. Lake Eerie. Right there.	TIE	US	TIE
			Okay, another one that's possibly at Cleveland area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
756	[01:05]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Do you want sectors on those?	IIG	IIG	IIG
757		<i>Colonel Lott:</i>	Not yet. It looks like one, the one over Cleveland, turned around.	IIS	US	IIS
			It looks like he's heading back to the east. The guy down at York, Pennsylvania -	IIS	TIE	TIE
758		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm gonna try to voice that hard copy _____ at CONAR -	TIE	TIE	TIE
759		<i>Colonel Lott:</i>	Can I have a phone number for you? 6850?	IIG	US	IIG
			What's your name again? What's your name again? Thank you.	IIG	IIG	IIG
760		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	410 -	MISC	TIE	TIE
761		<i>Colonel Lott:</i>	1527 on the mode 3?	IIG	IIG	IIG
762		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, we're not finding them. Open line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
763		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	This is Sergeant Richmond.	MISC	MISC	MISC
764		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What happened?	IIG	IIG	IIG

765		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We're finding out. We're finding out.	TIE	TIE	TIE
766		<i>Sergeant Richmond:</i>	- Northeast of Camp David.	TIE	TIE	TIE
767		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, I don't.	TIE	US	TIE
			Can you get a Z point for me?	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			Give me the lat and long. Open line.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
768		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
769		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	_____ from CONAR.	MISC	US	MISC
			We understand a plane coming out of Canada - We need clarification on if that plane is going to DC or state - Washington State.	IIG	IIG	IIG
770		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	DC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
771		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	It's going towards DC?	IIG	IIG	IIG
772		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We believe so.	TIE	TIE	TIE
773		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	:	NC	NC	NC
774		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Stand by. All right. Hold on.	DTA(RTA)	MISC	MISC
775		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Major <i>Nasypany</i> on line. Go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
776		<i>Male Speaker</i>	_____ from CONAR, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
			I just - I had a request to find out if we have any fighters near the aircraft going towards DC that's coming out of Canada?	IIG	IIG	IIG
777		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	TIE	TIE
778		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	We do? What do we have out there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
779		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Wait a minute.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			Are you requesting that we have Quit 25, 26 in the MCA area? Quebec, India, Uniform, Tango?	IIG	IIG	IIG
780		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	25 and 26? Where are they out of?	IIG	IIG	IIG

781		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	4 quit, 4 quit, 25 and 26. We're falling behind in the _____ stuff.	TIE	TIE	TIE
782		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Quit?	IIG	IIG	IIG
783		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Quit.	TIE	US	TIE
			It's over the NCA area.	TIE	US	TIE
			Quit 25, 26.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			QT?	IIG	<b>IIG</b>	IIG
784		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	QT, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
785		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What base are the fighters out of?	IIG	IIG	IIG
786		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	They're over Cleveland.	TIE	US	TIE
			I've got 3 over there. I got 25, 26 and 27. I got 3 birds there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
787		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. I'm trying to see if that's the same - airline right now?	IIG	TIE	IIG
788		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, they're with the NCA. I got them flying over the NCA. They're doing the best they can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
789	[01:10]	<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	4342. They want somebody to handle them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			What aircraft is this?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			It keeps saying unknown, unidentified. Okay.	IIG	<b>IIG</b>	IIG
790		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
791		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Hi, this is Mr. Arnold at Niagara Falls.	MISC	US	MISC
			How are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
792		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Good.	MISC	MISC	MISC
793		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hey, I need to talk to somebody -	IIG	IIG	IIG
			They called about our availability.	TIE	US	TIE
			They said to ask for the MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE

794		<i>Mr. Arnold:</i>	Yes, Sir. Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			I got MCC from Niagara Falls on the line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
795		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, hi. Who is this?	IIG	US	IIG
			This is the MCC.	TIE	US	TIE
			Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
796		<i>Mr. Arnold:</i>	Hi, it's Mr. Arnold from Niagara Falls.	MISC	MISC	MISC
797		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We can have one chopper ready - We can have it airborne in 2 hours pumped up with some extra offload capability and we're in the process of pumping another two up right now after that.			
798		<i>Male Speaker:</i>		TKS	TIE	TKS
799		<i>Mr. Arnold:</i>	Okay. One and two hours?	IIG	US	IIG
			How long for the second two?	IIG	IIG	IIG
800		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I would give it about an hour and a half to two hours for the other two. I -	TIE	TIE	TIE
801		<i>Mr. Arnold:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
802		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	North of Camp David.	TIE	TIE	TIE
803		<i>Mr. Arnold:</i>	Hello? Who's this?	MISC	MISC	MISC
804		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It's Niagara Falls calling to see if you need _____ Cleveland right behind us.	TIE	<b>TIE</b>	TIE
805		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Was he on hold?	IIG	MISC	IIG
806		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, no.	TIE	<b>TIE</b>	TIE
807		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Have we called the Southeast and see if they have any fighters out of Charleston?	IIG	IIG	IIG
808		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No, not yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
809		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You got an idea?	IIG	<b>IIG</b>	IIG

810		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That one is from New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
811		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast.	MISC	MISC	MISC
812		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah, this is _____.	MISC	NC	NC
			Is there any _____ ?	IIG	NC	NC
813		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Hold on a minute, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
814		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
815		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Do you know who it is?	IIG	MISC	MISC
816		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I have no idea who -	NC	MISC	MISC
817		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Is there any way we can _____ noise level?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I'm sorry, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
818		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Stand by. Stand by.	MISC	US	MISC
			We're real busy here.	TIE	MISC	MISC
819		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	I understand, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
820		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Get a hold of _____ turn around and go _____.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
			Not you but that was an idea.	TIE	US	TIE
			Sir, are you there?	IIG	US	IIG
			Call back.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			I think line 2 is clear.	TIE	US	TIE
821		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Line two? Anybody on line two?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Okay. Yes, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
822		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	That is a coast guard.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			Turn him around and have him go look. Northeast is -	<b>DTA(COA)</b>	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
823		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
824		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, Mike. This is Sergeant Tillhouse.	MISC	MISC	MISC
825		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah, hi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
826		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hey, just to let you know I'm on the freeway heading home. I'm in Syracuse. If they're doing any recall people I'm on my way home.	TIE	TIE	TIE
827		<i>Sergeant Tillhouse:</i>	Miles, Miles. Standby. Miles?	MISC	MISC	MISC
828		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes?	MISC	MISC	MISC
829		<i>Sergeant Tillhouse:</i>	This is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
			We could use you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
830	[01:15]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
831		<i>Sergeant Tillhouse:</i>	We could use you bad.	ISA	TIE	ISA
832		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. I'll try and get in there as soon as I can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
833		<i>Sergeant Tillhouse:</i>	Thanks, bud.	MISC	US	MISC
			What's that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
834		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	The President is airborne.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE

835		<i>Sergeant Tillhouse:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
836		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Got it.	MISC	MISC	MISC
837		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Can you help some of these people at tracking this bird?	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
838		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. We're recalling a bunch of people.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hey, this is Sergeant McCain, Northeast.	MISC	US	MISC
			Can you get Air Force One airborne and get a good position on them and a good check on them?	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			Can you make sure you call us as soon as possible -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
839		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. We're doing it now because he's on his way.	TIE	TIE	TIE
840		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I don't care how far south he is we just want to know where he's at.	TIE	TIE	TIE
841		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're doing it now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
842		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
843		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We got 475. We got the particulars, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
844		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
845		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	He needs to anchor in the next three hours.	TIE	TIE	TIE
846		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Well, where's he going? Where's he heading?	IIG	IIG	IIG

847		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Oh, God. Okay. ____ for ID.	NC	NC	NC
848		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, it's leaving Florida.	TIE	TIE	TIE
849		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Leaving Florida?	IIG	IIG	IIG
850		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah. More fighters are going out. Guns are on them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Two of them when they get there are going to - Washington DC - All right?	TKS	TIE	TKS
			We'll have two fighters.	TIE	TIE	TIE
851		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Where's force - where's he going -	IIG	IIG	IIG
852		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I was told he was going to _____. That's what I was told.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			777?	IIG	<b>IIG</b>	IIG
853		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep, four sevens.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Can you make any sense out of - Okay.	IIG	US	IIG
			He's gonna be in the Chicago area. _____ 50,000 tons will give them. Most of it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
854		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Quiet down a little bit. Use the intercom.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
855		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, it's going to Washington. All right. _____ 19 <sup>th</sup> -	TIE	TIE	TIE
856		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	There's more than one aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
857		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
858	[01:20]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, this is Sergeant Centron.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			_____, please?	NC	US	NC

859		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Line 1 is secure so you'll be secure on line 1.	TIE	TIE	TIE
860		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Can I -	NC	NC	NC
861		<i>Sergeant Centron:</i>	Stand by. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
862		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
863		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You can pick up.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			You got it, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
864		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	It's Colonel Creski with 1 <sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing.	MISC	TIE	TIE
865		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, Sir?	IIG	MISC	MISC
866		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hey, do you have a Senior Control or the Senior Duty Officer or somebody around?	IIG	IIG	IIG
867		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Okay. We got out MCC here. He's on a line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We've got our Senior Director? I can send you to him?	<b>IIG</b>	IIG	IIG
868		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Whoever - Basically whoever is in charge.	TIE	TIE	TIE
869		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Cleveland, can I help you?	MISC	IIG	IIG
870		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Who's this?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			This is Colonel Creski with the 1st Fighter Wing.	TIE	TIE	TIE
871		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	It's Lt. Colonel Cleveland.	TIE	TIE	TIE
872		<i>Lt. Col. Cleveland:</i>	Hey. We got a call from NORAD basically saying get four jets airborne with a hot gun as soon as you can?	TIE	TIE	TIE
873		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC

874	<i>Lt. Cleveland:</i>	<i>Col.</i>	We got word from ACC basically telling us to standby because technically we work for the ACC type of thing and let's make sure we get our story straight kind of stuff.	IIS	TIE	TIE
875		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	We're looking to get a four ship with a gun or whatever you got available to get up to finish escorting Air Force One back in to the Washington area.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
876	<i>Lt. Cleveland:</i>	<i>Col.</i>	Okay. Somebody needs to get a hold of ACC and tell them about this.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
877		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Okay. I'll talk to my commander.	TIE	TIE	TIE
878	<i>Lt. Cleveland:</i>	<i>Col.</i>	I tried to get a hold of NORAD - the number that, you know?	TIE	US	TIE
			Their lines are all busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
879		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Yeah, I can believe it.	MISC	TIE	MISC
880	<i>Lt. Cleveland:</i>	<i>Col.</i>	I thought maybe you might have it.	IIG	IIG	IIG
881		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	No, I don't have the number right now. The circuits are so busy we can even get DSN access.	TIE	TIE	TIE
882	<i>Lt. Cleveland:</i>	<i>Col.</i>	Great.	MISC	MISC	MISC
883		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Hold on a second. Give me your number.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
884	<i>Lt. Cleveland:</i>	<i>Col.</i>	Okay. The number here is - 5411 is command post.	TIE	TIE	TIE
885		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
886	<i>Lt. Cleveland:</i>	<i>Col.</i>	574 is _____.	NC	TIE	TIE
887		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Got it. Okay.	MISC	US	MISC

			We got to shut down line so that we can use it.	ISA	DTA(COA)	ISA
			I'll go talk to my commander and then I'll be right back with you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
888		<i>Lt. Cleveland: Col.</i>	Okay. You understand the issue is that we're being _____ by NORAD and ACC and saying that we don't work for NORAD yet. They're not being dicks about it. They just want to make sure that we don't -	IIS	TIE	IIS
889		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Well, if you can get them hot cocked and ready to go, we'd appreciate it.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
890		<i>Lt. Cleveland: Col.</i>	Okay. We're heading that direction.	TIE	TIE	TIE
891		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	All right. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
892		<i>Lt. Cleveland: Col.</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
893		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
894		<i>Lt. Cleveland: Col.</i>	Let's have the four ships recently take off or that's taking off - or gonna take off out of Langley?	NC	NC	NC
895		<i>Colonel Creski:</i>	How recently?	IIG	IIG	IIG
896		<i>Lt. Cleveland: Col.</i>	Half a quit. There's another flight -	TIE	TIE	TIE
897		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
898		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, this is Colonel Brooks at the Air National Guard Cat.	MISC	MISC	MISC
899		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC

900		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I guess they're getting ready to launch two of our Air National Guard F-16's out of the 113's.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
			These guys don't have a clue who they're talking to and who's their commanding control. I'm assuming it will be you.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
			I need a radio frequency for them to make contact as soon as they get handed off by ATC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
901		<i>Colonel Brooks:</i>	Standby, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
			I'll hand you off to our Senior Director.	TIE	TIE	TIE
902		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
903		<i>Colonel Brooks:</i>	its 6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
904		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	9900_____.	NC	NC	NC
905		<i>Colonel Brooks:</i>	There are five aircraft in our sights. 10, Charlie, 104, Alpha, 10 -	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
906		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, 1, Kilo, Charlie, 104 Alpha is all he said. I don't know if that means anything.	IIS	TIE	TIE
907		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
908		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, Bob Davie, Washington Flight Control.	MISC	US	MISC
			I was told to give you a call about possibly fueling any area?	TIE	IIG	IIG
909		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. Please, hold. Let me put you on with somebody that can help you.	MISC	<b>MISC</b>	MISC
910		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
911		<i>Bob Davie:</i>	6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hold on and I'll patch you up to him.	MISC	US	MISC

912		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
913		<i>Bob Davie:</i>	Call 9900.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
914		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, 4, Alpha, 10 going to Kilo, Charlie, Echo, Foxtrot. Copy	TIE	TIE	TIE
915		<i>Bob Davie:</i>	Copy 4, Alpha, 10, Kilo Charlie, Echo, Foxtrot. 9900, copy.	MISC	US	MISC
			One is going to Bangor - Correct. Gold 99.	TIE	TIE	TIE
916		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Thank you, what was it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
917		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Come up on 28216.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
918	[01:25]	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	I wonder if he said - I got weapons -	IIG	MISC	MISC
919		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Is there somebody monitoring the guard?	IIG	IIG	IIG
920		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
921		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Hi, this is Captain Sortil from _____.	MISC	MISC	MISC
922		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
923		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I need to talk to your SD.	<b>MISC</b>	MISC	MISC
924		<i>Captain Sortil:</i>	I'll take you up to him. If you get disconnected it's 6313.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Standby. 6313.	MISC	US	MISC
925		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Slow it down.	MISC	US	MISC
			Hey listen, we're getting all kinds of planes out of the sky and you folks are having them launched and we don't know anything about it.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			We need you to have somebody call over here and give us some codes when it -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
926		<i>Captain Sortil:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
927		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	_____ here at Andrew's Command Post.	MISC	US	MISC

			Who am I speaking with?	IIG	MISC	MISC
928		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Standby a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
929		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Still there?	MISC	MISC	MISC
930		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I got another call.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Just give me a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
931		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	No problem. No problem.	MISC	MISC	MISC
932		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
933		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
934		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey it's Sergeant Parker from Atlantic City.	MISC	MISC	MISC
935		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
936		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	The authenticators that were faxed over? The Alpha, Bravo?	IIG	US	IIG
			The side was cut off.	TIE	TIE	TIE
937		<i>Sergeant Parker:</i>	You need us to refax the authenticators to Atlantic City?	IIG	IIG	IIG
938		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Right. Alpha, Bravo -	MISC	TIE	TIE
939		<i>Sergeant Parker:</i>	Okay. Do you have a name on the fax of who sent it to you so I could contact them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
940		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	It's Sergeant Perkins or Chief Overman.	TIE	TIE	TIE
941		<i>Sergeant Parker:</i>	Sergeant Perkins or who?	IIG	IIG	IIG
942		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Chief Overman.	TIE	TIE	TIE
943		<i>Sergeant Parker:</i>	I don't know either of those people. All right. I'll work on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE

944		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you said who do you make it attention to. I don't know who we spoke to there as far as getting this stuff faxed.	TIE	TIE	TIE
945		<i>Sergeant Parker:</i>	I'll get it to you as soon as I can.	MISC	TIE	MISC
946		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	This is the MCC talking.	MISC	US	MISC
			May I have your attention, please?	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			Everybody _ slide one. Slide one -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
947		<i>Sergeant Parker:</i>	Utilities, Tom Berry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
948		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hey, this is Sergeant McCain up in the Ops room.	MISC	US	MISC
			I need you guys to send a runner up here, pronto.	DTA(RTA)	MISC	DTA(RTA)
949		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What do you need?	IIG	IIG	IIG
950		<i>Tom Berry:</i>	I need you to send a runner up here pronto. _____ or somebody.	DTA(RTA)	MISC	DTA(RTA)
951		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Well, _____ is out of the building right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
952		<i>Tom Berry:</i>	Is there anyone else in the military or air techs down there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
953		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Ray's around here somewhere. I might have to page him.	TIE	TIE	TIE
954		<i>Tom Berry:</i>	I need him to come to the Ops room, pronto. Have him see Sergeant McCain.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
955		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
956		<i>Tom Berry:</i>	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC

957		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	_____ Weapons on an unsecure line. How may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
958		<i>Tom Berry:</i>	Yeah, hi. Did you _____ 351?	NC	IIG	IIG
959		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Everybody has been told. I will check with each one of the control teams.	TIE	TIE	TIE
960		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I appreciate it. Thanks.	MISC	US	MISC
			Yes, Ma'am. He's checking with everybody right now. He'll be back with me shortly.	TIE	TIE	TIE
961		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I need more coffee. Oh, yeah. It's potent.	MISC	MISC	MISC
962		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	-107	NC	NC	NC
963		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We need to get some Medivac airplanes up in the air.	ISA	<b>ISA</b>	ISA
			Would that be a problem with your guys if we got them -	IIG	IIG	IIG
964		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	From where, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
965	[1:30]	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	You said the national - Washington DC, Baltimore area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
966		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah. Standby. Sir, if you standby I will check with the MCC. Standby.	MISC	TIE	MISC
			Can we get Medivac aircraft airborne and give them a code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
967		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Absolutely.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
968		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	And get all mode 3.	IIG	<b>IIG</b>	IIG
			Sir, can you call across the hotline to Huntress control?	DTA(RTA)	IIG	DTA(RTA)
969		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	What's the - Do you got their number or can you transfer me?	IIG	IIG	IIG

970		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I believe it's the same - Standby. Let me see if they can pick up. Standby.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			You are Washington Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
971		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	That is correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
972		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'll have them call you, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
973		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Thank you. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
974		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, Jeremy? Have them call Washington Center for that.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			He left. Washington Center.	TIE	US	TIE
			Oh, I love you.	MISC	US	MISC
975		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	482, west, over.	TIE	NC	TIE
976		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I know what's going on. Yeah, we just had -	NC	TIE	NC
977		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	We need somebody that has knowledge of what the hell is going on -	ISA	TIE	ISA
978		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Miller is here, Dana is here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			November, 4?	IIG	IIG	IIG
979		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. So far all the aircraft that we've been looking at as possible hijacks are either crashed or down.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
980		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
981		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	We're not sure if there's any more aircraft right now. What we're gonna work right is _____ ship because every center is closing down as you can see.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			If they don't see them, call right away.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
			If you see it and they haven't hit it up, call that center.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)

			We don't have Boston to work with now, we don't have Cleveland now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
982		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	They're closing down every center.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
983		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Open line. Huntress ID how may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
984		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	This is Washington Center. We've got a target we need to find out about. He is -	TIE	TIE	TIE
985		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. Okay. Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			He's got another target.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			BFR?	IIG	IIG	IIG
986		<i>Huntress:</i>	BFR.	TIE	TIE	TIE
987		<i>Washington Center:</i>	BFR.	TIE	TIE	TIE
988		<i>Huntress:</i>	3,100 feet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
989		<i>Washington Center:</i>	3,100 feet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
990		<i>Huntress:</i>	He is 25 miles northeast of Dulles Airport on a southwest heading.	TIE	TIE	TIE
991	[01:35]	<i>Washington Center:</i>	Southwest heading. Okay. Do they have any other mode 3's or anything like that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Find that out.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	IIG
992		<i>Huntress:</i>	It looks like you might have a fighter aircraft in the immediate vicinity at 8,000 feet and descending so you might be taking a look at that guy already.	IIS	TIE	IIS
993		<i>Washington Center:</i>	1200 BFR.	TIE	TIE	TIE

994		<i>Huntress:</i>	The mode 3 on your military looks like 4512. He is directly overhead now of the target.	TIE	TIE	TIE
995		<i>Washington Center:</i>	Okay. We'll pass the information.	MISC	TIE	MISC
996		<i>Huntress:</i>	All right. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
997		<i>Washington Center:</i>	Did you get all of it because I got unplugged?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Twenty five miles northeast of Dulles on a southwest heading, 1200 BFR. Dulles International toward Chicago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm sorry about that.	MISC	US	MISC
998		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I don't -	NC	NC	NC
999		<i>Washington Center:</i>	It's right here. Okay. The latest one - I need all you guys -	MISC	TIE	TIE
1000		<i>Huntress:</i>	Open line. Northeast, this is Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1001		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, this is Major Rodriguez.	TIE	US	TIE
			I need to talk to your SD.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Can you hear me?	MISC	US	MISC
1002		<i>Huntress:</i>	Yeah. 6313. I'll patch you right up to him.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1003		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	- Secure voice?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1004		<i>Major Rodriguez:</i>	Negative.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1005		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I need a secure voice phone with the SD.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
1006		<i>Major Rodriguez:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1007		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	You have reached an unsecure line.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			How may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1008		<i>Major Rodriguez:</i>	Sergeant, this is Tom Clinko with Cleveland Center.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1009		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Tom Clinko.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1010		<i>Huntress:</i>	I have a safer 01 that departed elpine at 14:27.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1011		<i>Tom Clinko:</i>	Northeast. You want secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1012		<i>Huntress:</i>	Hold on a minute.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1013		<i>Tom Clinko:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1014		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We -	NC	NC	NC
1015		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Oops, sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1016		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	The number you have dialed -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1017		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I got a couple of things to do first.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1018		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1019		<i>Computer Voice:</i>	Cleveland Center, Mr. Clinko, wants to know who's safer it was that came out of Elpine?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			So if we can get weapons to tell him? Okay.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1020		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1021		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sergeant Perry, this is Major Bridges from the Air Traffic Services Cell, the command center for the FAA in Virginia.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We've got the attorney general in aircraft November 4 about 40 minutes south of Washington and he's demanding a military escort in to Washington National.	TKS	TIE	TKS
			If you can maybe scramble somebody to go in and intercept the aircraft and escort.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)

1022		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. We'll put the MCC for you and we can check that out.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1023		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1024		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	Go. This is the MCC, Major Nasypany.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1025	[01:40]	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hello, this is Major Bridges with the Air Traffic Services cell in the command center for the FAA in Virginia.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			The attorney general is in November 4, about 40 minutes out of Washington and he's requesting a military escort in to Washington National Airport.	TKS	TIE	TKS
			Is there any way we can do a scramble going?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1026		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	We've got aircraft in the area already.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			What's his code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1027		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Standby. Let me find out.	MISC	TIE	TIE
			Are you still there? Hello?	MISC	IIG	MISC
1028		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	- Frequency?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1029		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	No, right now we got an attorney general -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1030		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	Still there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1031		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, still here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1032		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Okay. Their code is 65127 and the Washington Center frequency is 13365.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1033		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	13365?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1034		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Right.	MISC	TIE	MISC
1035		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	Okay. We don't have any victor - I can possibly get a uniform for us?	TIE	TIE	TIE

1036		<i>Major Nasaypany:</i>	Northeast, this is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1037		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	Hi, this is Sergeant Lucas calling from Otis.	MISC	US	MISC
			Is someone manning the EA booth?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I didn't get an answer in there.	TIE	TIE	IIG
1038		<i>Major Nasaypany:</i>	There should be. Let me send somebody up there.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1039		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. I'm gonna call them on this 23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1040		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	I'm gonna go up to the EA booth and Otis is gonna call you on this 23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1041		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1042		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	No one's up there. They're not getting an answer up there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1043		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's 605, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1044		<i>Sergeant Lucas:</i>	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1045		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	600 _____ off of Atlantic City. They don't know who that one -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1046		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1047		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That is 6579.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1048		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	6579. Do you know what the registrar of this vessel is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1049		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We don't know yet. That's why we're all doing all that and -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1050		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Is it a cruise ship or -	IIG	IIG	IIG

1051		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Is that a cruise ship?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			It's a cruise ship.	UR	US	UR
			Yeah, we're collecting ID and all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
1052		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- where the aircraft is. 6527.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1053		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	6522	TIE	TIE	TIE
1054		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	22?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1055		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Washington Center, can you confirm that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1056		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. His squawk is 6522 not 27. 6522.	UR	TIE	UR
1057		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What position do you have him on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1058		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Also, Sir, do you have a lat and long if possible or give me a -	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Oh, I found it. I got it. We have it monitored on screen now, Sir.	IIS	TIE	IIS
1059		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Oh, you got him?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			He's about 15 miles - Okay.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Do you happen to have a -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1060		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We're working on it right now. We have fighters airborne in the area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1061		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1062		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	And we're gonna see if we can get to him out there to escort him.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1063		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Please give me a call at 725-3330.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1064		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Standby. Can you give me the number again?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1065		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	725 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1066		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	25 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1067		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	-3330	TIE	TIE	TIE
1068		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	-30	TIE	TIE	TIE
1069		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Commercial is 703-904 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1070		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	904 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1071		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	4436	TIE	TIE	TIE
1072		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	4436. And who am I speaking to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1073		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Major Bridges.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1074		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Major Bridges. Got it. Okay, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
			We'll try to get back to you when we can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			You understand that we're really hectic here.	ISA	US	ISA
1075		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I understand.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1076		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	We'll try to get back to you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1077		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1078		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	Okay. On this track, make it special.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
1079		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I'm gonna go ahead and forward intel just so they know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Major Evans?	MISC	US	MISC
			Bravo 545.	TIE	US	TIE

			Tell CONAR that's the attorney general. Airborne special.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			We haven't - I don't know what special yet.	TIE	US	TIE
			Call it special 7. Bravo 545 special 7, the attorney general.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			I've already made it a special. I've already made it a special.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm just letting you know that's who it is. Okay?	MISC	US	MISC
			He's going to Dulles. Washington International, I'm sorry. Washington International.	TKS	US	TKS
			I made it a special 7 just so we can keep an eye on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			He's requesting - Listen to me.	MISC	US	MISC
			He's requesting two armed fighter escorts in to International.	TIE	US	TIE
			We're working that right now, okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
1080		<i>Major Bridges:</i>	Bravo 557, the Delta, 1200, we do not know who it is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1081		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Bravo 557?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1082	[01:45]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Correct. We got it -	MISC	TIE	TIE
1083		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Be advised that we had a swordfish up that was coming back that way so it maybe him. Maybe.	TSOG	TKS	TKS
			You think you could find out for me?	IIG	IIG	IIG

			Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain, how may I help you?	MISC	US	MISC
1084		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah, hi Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
			Lt. Colonel Myers at Fido.	TIE	US	TIE
			Can you give me the number of your - I can get a hold of your fighter there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1085		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Fighter Officer Number?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1086		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1087		<i>Lt. Col. Myers:</i>	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			I'll work it for you.	TIE	MISC	MISC
1088		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	The second ship - the second two ships?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Okay. What would be the delay?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Press them up there and load them up.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
			Whoa, 6601 -	MISC	US	MISC
1089		<i>Lt. Col. Myers:</i>	6601, 02 or 04. Either one of those.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1090		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	6601, 02 or 04?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1091		<i>Lt. Col. Myers:</i>	That's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1092		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	All right. Great, thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1093		<i>Lt. Col. Myers:</i>	You bet. Anyone on line?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1094		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hey, we've been asked to do some airborne command and control. We're just waiting for launch authority with one of our 130's.	ISA	TIE	ISA
			Were wondering what's the COMM plan?	IIG	US	IIG

			Are there frequencies?	IIG	US	IIG
			Are they secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			What's going down?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1095		<i>Lt. Col. Myers:</i>	I got controllers all over up and down the east coast right now.	TIE	US	TIE
			You can contact us if need be on AICC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1096		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	AICC?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1097		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep. We should be listening up on that.	IPK	TIE	IPK
1098		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What frequency is that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1099		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	364.2	TIE	TIE	TIE
1100		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	364.2?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1101		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep. Hey, do you got the - call 64 -	NC	NC	NC
1102		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm sorry?	IIG	US	IIG
			The special 7 is the attorney general of the United States.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I made it a special 7 because that's a dignitary special that 19 use.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			Give you a departure and destination?	IIG	US	IIG
			I know his destination.	TIE	US	TIE
			Do you need departure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1103		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	How are you doing, Joe?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1104		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm all right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1105		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Are you sure?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1106		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep. I'm hanging in there. Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1107		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No, because they won't push over to different frequencies.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1108	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	They should be over here somewhere. I don't know where you're going but what are you gonna do?	IIS	TIE	IIS
		Off the coast of Atlantic City?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1109	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1110	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	That's a cruse ship. That came through the line about 5 minutes ago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Ain't this some shit?	MISC	US	MISC
		Yeah, I'm all right. I'm all right. I'm all right.	MISC	US	MISC
		Send them to Bermuda.	MISC	US	MISC
		Fuck them.	MISC	US	MISC
		I hope that got recorded.	MISC	US	MISC
		I haven't been writing shit in there since _____.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Okay. We have a ship that was right outside of Atlantic City. Turns out it was a cruise ship. Okay?	TKS	TKS	TKS
1111	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Suspicious though?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1112	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah. Well, they've got helicopters above it watching it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We have Bravo 545 is a special 7. It's the attorney general of the United States requesting fighter escort - armed fighter escorts in to Washington National.	TKS	TIE	TKS
		Oh, fuck.	MISC	US	MISC
		Yeah, we're working it.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1113		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We're working it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1114		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Here's the information for the attorney general. He left Milwaukee going to Washington National citation 560, requesting armed fighter escorts. 55 - correction - 6522 and CONAR knows. That was put in to the chat.	TKS	TIE	TKS
1115		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Are we sending the F fighters on them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1116		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	They're working on it through weapons.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1117		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	So 626 has got the attorney general and they're in route to the -	TKS	TIE	TIE
1118		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. That's the fighters that are going to the attorney general?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1119		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1120	[01:50]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Roger that. Thank you. Roger that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1121		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What was their call sign?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1122		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You know what? I don't know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Can you give me a call sign on it? Bravo 545.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain, can I help you?	MISC	US	MISC
1123		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes, this is Lt. Col. Hayes, the fighter officer at the 177 <sup>th</sup> .	TIE	<b>TIE</b>	TIE
			Is the mission director available or could you pass a message to him?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1124		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I can, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1125		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I have two more aircraft loaded with offensive capability. I'm stepping two pilots to run the airplanes.	TKS	TIE	TIE
			Do you know what he would like to do with it?	IIG	US	IIG
			Would he like to launch those or have them go -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1126		<i>Lt. Col. Hayes:</i>	Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			Where are you from, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1127		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Atlantic City.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1128		<i>Lt. Col. Hayes:</i>	Atlantic City. Let me pass this up. I've got to put you on hold.	MISC	TIE	MISC
			Ma'am?	MISC	US	MISC
			Atlantic has got two more aircraft uploaded with offensive capabilities.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Got two pilots standing by and wants to know what you want to do with them.	IIG	<b>IIG</b>	IIG
1129		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Tell them the airplanes are not - they're gonna start and before they shut down do they want to shut down or launch.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1130		<i>Lt. Col. Hayes:</i>	As soon as I get word from the commander I will let you know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1131		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay, thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1132		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Just stay on the line, Sir.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)

1133		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Oh, okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1134		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	This is the MCC.	TIE	US	TIE
			What do you have uploaded on those guys?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1135		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I believe it's only AGI right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1136		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. What's the call signs?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1137		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	I don't have call signs.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I can put a call sign - a local one if you like or if you'd like to give me one -	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1138		<i>Lt. Col. Hayes:</i>	We had snakes originally. We had snake 11 and 12 and we -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1139		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Okay, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1140		<i>Lt. Col. Hayes:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1141		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	The commander wants you to keep them on standby on the ground right now.	DTA(RTA)	TIE	TIE
			Shut them down and stay on alert with them.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1142		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1143		<i>Lt. Col. Hayes:</i>	I'm about to call my wife and tell her to get to the school pronto and get the kids out and go home and lock the doors.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I don't want her to panic, but I tell you what.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1144		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	It's probably safer in the school.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1145		<i>Lt. Col. Hayes:</i>	No, they're hitting public places.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1146		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Let me know if you need anything.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1147		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I know. I'm using you for phone calls and I know you're not qualified but at this point I really don't give a fuck.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1148		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I don't either.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1149		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Not like I don't have the experience.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1150		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Exactly. I know you know how to make phone calls.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Oh, by the way. You're on orders.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1151		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What's up?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1152		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	I'm serious. There's car bombs reported and if they're gonna be hitting public places then I don't want my kids in school.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1153		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What should we do?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1154		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Why did we turn off the - There should be no civilian aircraft airborne.	IIS	TIE	IIS
1155		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's correct. That way if we make a friendly, we know who it is because we've ID it. If it's not friendly -	TKS	TIE	TKS
1156		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Gotcha. Can you give me a call sign on the special 7?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1157		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	November 4.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1158		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	November 4?	IIG	US	IIG
			13365 Victor?	IIG	IIG	IIG

			We can be lax with the criteria because you're supposed to be - There's not supposed to be any aircraft flying.	TKS	US	TKS
			What you're gonna see is possibly a lot of helicopters, all right? A lot of civilian - Yeah.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1159		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Only one guy at the FAA -	NC	NC	NC
1160		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	And they've all shut down. All the FAA centers are shut down. Until you can get it identified - He's being lateral -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1161	[01:55]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We can go with it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1162		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I don't know now. He was being lateral.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			646?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1163		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1164		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I don't know. I can't tell you that for sure.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1165		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	- Air force one is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1166		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Tell them we need to know where Air Force One is.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
1167		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	And we want to know if they're controlling the flight or - out of Langley as an escort.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
1168		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Air Force One.	NC	NC	NC
1169		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Also, are they working a fighter escort?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			We already asked you twice.	ISA	TIE	ISA

1170		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You need to go back and change that.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
			You got exclamation point instead of 1.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Where? Where?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1171		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Right there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1172		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	In area 2, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1173		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	There are two of them out there. They've turned the auto IDs off, too.	IIS	TIE	TIE
1174		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah. You want me to tell this one also?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			As far as I know on the Ops floor everybody's been reported that were okay.	ISA	TIE	ISA
1175		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I need to find out about -	NC	NC	NC
1176		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What do you need to know?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1177		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	They should be getting back to us on that.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1178		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No shit. Fucking moron.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Drop it. Go ahead and drop it. Go ahead and drop it.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			Bravo 607 and the unknown are bad.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			E3 is not paying - We still have another one out there, 633, it's just southwest - just southeast of J50.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1179		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1180		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	All the sectors have reported in but the units haven't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1181		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You have call in a status to the EA group.	DTA(RTA)	TKS	DTA(RTA)

1182		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Admiral Perry should be up there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1183		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	_____ calling looking for Huntress.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1184		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You got Huntress.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1185		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You're working with some of the flyers in the Washington DC airspace and everybody is kind of wondering if we can hand them off to you and let you take over control or do you want control?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1186		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Who are you talking about?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			What's - You got a call sign on the aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1187		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	We have - You know the call signs that we work over there.	IPK	TIE	IPK
1188		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Are you talking about the attorney general?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1189		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I'm talking about your fighters in the Washington DC area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1190		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm gonna put you on the line with my MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1191		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1192		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	He's looking for control of the fighters in the DC area, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1193		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay, who's -	NC	NC	NC
1194		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	This is Washington Center.	MISC	US	MISC

			Gary? What do you got? I'm sorry?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1195		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	6,500 feet? Where is he?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1196		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	In the airspace that -	NC	NC	NC
1197		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Give me an arrow, bud.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			Scope 2, scope 1. There.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Is that the Z track?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1198		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	They Z'ed him because he disappeared	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
1199	[02:00]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1200		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1201		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Can you work that?	DTA(RTA)	IIG	DTA(RTA)
			They want to intercept on that guy. I got a cruiser that wants an intercept.	TKS	TIE	TKS
			What?	IIG	US	IIG
			You do know, Gary, you do know that we got an E3 station 100 miles south of Washington - 100 miles south of Chicago and we also have another one over Washington DC.	TKS	US	TKS
			You know that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1202		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1203		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Well, I'm telling you. I'm trying to keep you up - We've been at this since 8:00 this morning.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			So - If you can find a runner, I could use a bottle of water.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We're working it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Thank you guys for coming in. I appreciate it very much. I just want to let you guys know that - Thank you very much. It's appreciated. All you guys that showed up. Thanks, Sam.	MISC	US	MISC
			I've got to get - I've got to call my wife or have somebody call her for me.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1204		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1205		<i>Gary:</i>	Hi, this is Colonel Piscano.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Is this NEADS?	IIG	US	IIG
1206		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1207		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Is Colonel Marr there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1208		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Standby, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			He's up in _____.	TIE	US	TIE
1209		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Listen, let me ask you a - Go ahead. I need to talk to him.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1210		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Okay. Thank you. 706.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1211		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	You're about the only one I can get through to. Everyone else is busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1212		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	706 if you get disconnected.	TIE	US	TIE
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			Her line is busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1213		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Listen, here's what I need. I need to know - I need to know if the FAA - We want to launch an airplane from -	NC	NC	NC
1214		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Let me put you on with the MCC. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1215		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1216		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	MCC on - go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1217		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	This is Colonel Piscano, Headquarters.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1218		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Yes, how are you doing, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1219		<i>MCC:</i>	Good. Let me put you on speaker here, okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1220		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1221		<i>MCC:</i>	Can you hear us?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1222		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Yes, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1223		<i>MCC:</i>	We're kind of worried about flying an airplane.	TIE	US	TIE
			Can we fly an airplane from Syracuse connected to Stewart?	IIG	TSOG	TSOG
1224		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Okay. Syracuse connected to Stewart?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Okay. That should be no prob -	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Do you need an escort or do you need - What are you looking for, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1225		<i>MCC:</i>	We just don't know if we'll be able to fly.	<b>ISA</b>	<b>ISA</b>	ISA
1226		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Who is it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1227		<i>MCC:</i>	This is a military aircraft, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1228		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	We want 30 to support this disaster.	DTA(RTA)	TSOG	TSOG
1229		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. I don't see any problem with you flying, Sir.	ECA	TKS	ECA
1230		<i>MCC:</i>	Okay. So we just do a flight plan?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1231		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Do a normal flight plan saying it's for this and you can head out - Let's see -	DTA(RTA)	TIE	TIE
1232		<i>MCC:</i>	Do you have any specific call signs that you are giving airplanes priority or whatever?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1233		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	No, we're not.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Let's see. It's a C130 connecting, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			We'll get you a call sign. Sir, we're trying to get you a good call sign so we'll know who it is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I would say file a normal flight plan in coordination with FAA.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
			Sir, be advised that Boston is gone. They have evacuated. We have Cleveland evacuating at this time as well.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1234		<i>MCC:</i>	FAA centers?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1235		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Yes, the FAA centers.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1236	[02:05]	<i>MCC:</i>	We just wanted to be sure that when we get an airplane that launches here -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1237		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	That's no problem.	MISC	US	MISC
			Just make sure its squawking.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
			Do you have mode 4 capabilities on the jet and mode 2?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			On your mode 2, make sure that's standard and also make sure you're mode 4 is all loaded up as well.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
1238		<i>MCC:</i>	And you're gonna give us a call sign?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1239		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			We're looking that up right now, Sir. We can't get it right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm gonna give you a call sign.	TIE	US	TIE
			Geez - What's a good call sign for you guys? How about -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1240		<i>MCC:</i>	Skier is our normal call sign.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
1241		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Skier?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			That sounds good to me. Skier.	MISC	US	MISC
			I got a lot of people talking at me right now, Sir. Skier 01.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1242		<i>MCC:</i>	Steel 72. This is - Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			We need a code on steel 72.	IIS	IIS	IIS
			364.2. Hello? 364.2	TIE	TIE	TIE
1243		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1244		<i>MCC:</i>	Yeah, Sergeant Kelly at Otis.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1245		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Good.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1246		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hey, we got two jets on status.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1247		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1248		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Are you guys gonna need us or anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			If you want the loads we can pass the loads.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1249		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			Yes, we are very concerned about that.	ISA	TKS	TKS
1250		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Can you come up on the in of us or -	NC	NC	NC
1251		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	Our battle station is manned so maybe I can transfer you up there -	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG

1252		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	If we come up on the NEADS MCC in the private, we'll patch the loads that way.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
			How does that sound?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1253		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1254		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1255		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	Sure.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1256		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1257		<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1258		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hi, this is Colonel Piscano from Headquarters again.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1259	[02:10]	<i>Sergeant Kelly:</i>	Yes, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1260		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, I don't know who I talked to but I was talking to someone about launching some planes from -	IIS	TIE	IIS
1261		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Yeah, you started with me and then I patched you to Major Nasypany.	ISA	<b>ISA</b>	ISA
			He's standing right here but he's on the other phone.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			What can I help you with, Sir?	IIG	US	IIG
1262		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	He told us that he is using skier 01 as a call sign?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1263		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	He's on the line now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1264		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Go ahead, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1265		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Our call sign will be skier but probably a different number.	TIE	US	TIE
			They're used to using the first and the last number of the plane. They're maybe up to 3 airplanes.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1266		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yeah, maybe. We'll know better later.	MISC	TIE	TIE

			Do you have any codes or are you gonna be squawking 1200?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1267		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Do you want the number from the command post on the 109? I'll give it to you.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1268		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Sir, can you have them call me here with the codes.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	DTA(RTA)
			Call over to my ID section.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			I'll get you a number.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
1269		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	You guys are hard to get to by the way.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1270		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	BSN 5876368 or 69?	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Just give them the command post codes.	DTA(RTA)	<b>DTA(RTA)</b>	DTA(RTA)
			The tower there will have codes to give my ID section so we can track you guys. Mode 3 codes.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1271		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Okay. Will do.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1272		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Your pilots should be loading	IPK	IPK	IPK
			and just make sure your pilots load up their mode 2 and mode 4.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
1273		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Okay. They'll call you with the mode 3 numbers. Okay. Bye.	MISC	TSOG	TIE
1274		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Okay. Yes, Sir. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1275		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Yes, this is Lake AFC.	MISC	US	MISC
			We have pending southwest of J55 - or southwest of J55 data.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1276		<i>Colonel Piscano:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1277		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	You got your radial switch on for some reason.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE

			You want to see the radial spec?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1278		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1279		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	Boston Center? Boston Center?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1280		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	It doesn't fit the profile. It doesn't fit the profile. Whiskey 105 -	PRTA	TIE	PRTA
1281		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1282		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Is it that one right now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1283	[02:15]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1284		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, this is Samantha Thompson with the 138 <sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing and I'm calling to let you know that the take off time of our alert set out of Michigan. He just wanted you to know that.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1285		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	I'm sorry, ma'am. I can't hear you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1286		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I said that the take off time is 10:23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1287		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	10:23?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1288		<i>Samantha Thompson:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1289		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Is that Zulu time?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1290		<i>Samantha Thompson:</i>	I'm not sure. 14:23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1291		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	14:23? What type of aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1292		<i>Samantha Thompson:</i>	A 16.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1293		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Where are they heading?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1294		<i>Samantha Thompson:</i>	It's circling over Detroit and Chicago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1295		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yep. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1296		<i>Samantha Thompson:</i>	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1297		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1298		<i>Samantha Thompson:</i>	You got a mode 3?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1299		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Weapons, Sergeant Powell.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1300		<i>Samantha Thompson:</i>	Alpena just called. They have 311 airborne at 14:23. It's an F-16 and it's gonna be operating in the Detroit and Chicago area.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1301		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Saber what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1302		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Saber 111. I don't know how many aircraft. Airborne at 14:23 Z.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
1303		<i>Sergeant Powell:</i>	14:23?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1304		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	That's what she said, yeah.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1305		<i>Sergeant Powell:</i>	Okay. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1306		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1307		<i>Sergeant Powell:</i>	Hi, this is Lt. Col. Christian at CONAR.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Is there a phone that I can talk securely to security forces people on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1308		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I can patch you out to -	NC	US	NC
			Hold on, let me see if -	NC	TSOG	NC
1309		<i>Sergeant Powell:</i>	Can you just give me their phone number and I'll call that then?	DTA(RTA)	TSOG	TSOG
1310		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. 6830.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1311		<i>Lt. Col. Christian:</i>	6830. Thank you.	MISC	TIE	MISC
1312		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1313		<i>Lt. Christian:</i>	<i>Col.</i> Not right now. 011 is out there right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I know who this one is but I don't know who the second military is.	ISA	TKS	ISA
			What's his track number like?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1314		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	How long?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1315		<i>Lt. Christian:</i>	<i>Col.</i> Do we have any information as to where that 57 and the hot metal -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1316		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	The New York guys are surveying helicopters and -	TIE	TKS	TKS
1317		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1318		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, this is Sergeant Bernowski here at Langley.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1319		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1320		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Can you tell us what frequency you need us to be on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1321		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, ma'am. I'll patch you through to the weapons guys.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
1322		<i>Sergeant Bernowski:</i>	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1323		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry. Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1324		<i>Sergeant Bernowski:</i>	Mike?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1325		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1326		<i>Sergeant Bernowski:</i>	Yeah, we're trying to get a hold of the weapons shop.	<b>ISA</b>	ISA	ISA
1327	[02:20]	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Who's this?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1328		<i>Operator:</i>	This is the operator.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			We got a call that somebody called weapons and they put them on hold and then they got forwarded over here.	IIS	TKS	IIS
1329		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I tried to patch them to 631.	TIE	US	TIE
			Let me try it again.	TIE	TSOG	TIE
1330		<i>Operator:</i>	Okay. Ma'am, are you still here? Hello, ma'am?	MISC	<b>MISC</b>	MISC
1331		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Is it Langley?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1332		<i>Operator:</i>	Ma'am? Ma'am?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1333		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I'll patch them back up. I'm trying to patch you up there again, okay?	TIE	TSOG	TIE
			Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	US	MISC
1334		<i>Operator:</i>	Hey this is Sergeant Bernowski here again.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1335		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1336		<i>Operator:</i>	Can you patch me to your weapons unit?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1337		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I'm attempting to.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1338		<i>Sergeant Bernowski:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1339		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1340		<i>Sergeant Bernowski:</i>	We got Atlantic City on the line wanting to know - dispatch -	TIE	TKS	TIE
1341		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Open line. Northeast, can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1342		<i>Sergeant Bernowski:</i>	Yes, this is Sergeant Bernowski here at Langley. We were trying to find out -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1343		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	They need a frequency for the aircraft and I can't get them up for it. I tried to patch them up.	TIE	TKS	TIE
1344		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1345		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is Sergeant McCain, can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1346		<i>Sergeant Bernowski:</i>	Hi, this is Captain Ainsly.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			How are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1347		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I'm busy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1348		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm looking for a good number to talk to Huntress on.	TIE	IIG	IIG
			We tried 4.2 and couldn't get through.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1349		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You can call 6313.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Let me forward you to 6313 and they should be able to give you a frequency.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1350		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1351		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1352		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	Yes, I'm still here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1353		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			Okay, ma'am. That line is busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1354		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	We're about to launch some aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I need a good frequency.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
1355		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Right. Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1356		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	It's gonna be a first call sign. Two are airborne and we're gonna launch two more.	TKS	TKS	TKS

1357		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Our weapons section is asking for a call sign on those -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1358		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	First 01.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1359		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	First 01?	MISC	US	MISC
			Okay. First 01 and I apologize.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1360		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	How do we know that they went and did that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1361		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	What are we talking about?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1362		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	Continental or whatever?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1363		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Oh. Where did they take off from?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1364	[02:25]	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	We don't know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1365		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1366		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1367		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Ma'am, we're still working that.	TIE	ISA	ISA
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			372.9, 372.9.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1368		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	372.9?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1369		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1370		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	Okay. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1371		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You bet.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1372		<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1373	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	This is Sergeant McCain, Northeast Air Defense Sector. I was listening in on the other line.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Thanks for showing up. Sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I show you secret also. Brian Daniels, okay?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1374	<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		How can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1375	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I need to talk to a weapons director or somebody like that regarding tasking.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1376	<i>Captain Ainsly:</i>	Okay. Let me see what I can do for you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1377	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1378	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hold on,	MISC	US	MISC
		6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Sir? Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		The line is busy right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1379	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Do you want me to hold on?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1380	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Call back at 6313 in a couple of minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1381	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I've been trying that. I can't get through.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Is that the only one your on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1382	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	That's the only one they've got.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1383	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	You want me to keep calling back then?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1384	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yeah. Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1385	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1386	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1387	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Go ahead, sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1388	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yeah, this is Lt. Col. Craig.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			I was unable to get through on 6403 for the last hour.	TIE	TKS	TIE
			Do you have another number or a number for the DO?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			This is about - I need to talk about what you need us to do so that we can figure out if we need other people.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
			We're normally not manned here.	TIE	<b>TIE</b>	TIE
1389		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sir, can you standby a just a moment?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We had battle staff in here anyway and I want to talk to them and see if they have a point for you.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
1390		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hey, you got a flight out of Richmond at 22 out of Richmond, Virginia so when they pop up they're friendly. Just letting you know.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1391		<i>MCC:</i>	Out of Richmond?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1392		<i>Lt. Col. Craig:</i>	Out of Richmond, Virginia. You should see them airborne now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1393		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Do they have a code yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1394		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I haven't got a code on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Continental. How long have you been in here?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1395		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Half hour or 45 minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1396		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You probably need to - No one needs to spend more than 45 minutes to an hour at a time in here anymore.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			Everybody needs to blow off steam and relax a little bit so if you want to take a break then go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I'll get Sam up here and work you guys in teams of two.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I am just trying to keep everybody alert and nerves frazzled so that we can do the job.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Lyle?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Let's work out a plan of hour on hour off. Me and you go and then Harry and Bianchi will be the other pair. Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We can do it right now at 12:30. Do it right now at 12:30 because I just sat down so if you want to take it then we'll have those other two come in and take it at 1:30.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Let Bianchi know.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Come back in about 1:30.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			That way we keep everybody fresh. That's what I'm worried about more than anything.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			We're not doing anything for night shift. As far as I know we're here all the time until - We actually need 3 more other than him. Okay. We need two more besides that. We still got Nora, Juanita Sheppard. He's here. He's working with surveillance. He's working with surveillance.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			If you get Nora and Juanita to come in along with Mike Mateland and John Detro, they'll make up for it and everyone can work.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I can't hear you. I can't hear you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1397		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Did you hear that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1398		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	No, I didn't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			Northeast Air Defense sector, this is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1399		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, this is Lt. Col. Craig calling again looking for the MCC or the DO.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1400	[02:30]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Where the hell is Josie Bon?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Give me a track number on that bomb - that guy going by Cleveland.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
			He was just made friendly. He was just made friendly.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1401		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, he was made friendly before. We're gonna make him -	TIE	TKS	TIE

1402		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Is that the one that's supposed to be going in to Cleveland?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Okay. Okay, so they don't know if that's - Do we know who that aircraft is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I'm just trying to keep us sane with everything that's going on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			What I really want to know is where the intel community was during all of this?	IIG	MISC	MISC
			I realize it's a tough job and you got to -	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Gary, update me on the two aircraft from Canada.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			One of them is down? Is that right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1403		<i>Lt. Col. Craig:</i>	I'm sorry?	MISC	IIG	MISC
1404		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Update me with the two aircraft out of Canada.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			One of them is down?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1405		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	One was turned back to Paris. This one here is -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1406		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	All right. That's what I need to know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Just you and - I'm sorry. I think Cruz pretty much called in.	TIE	MISC	MISC
			Who told you that? Who told you that? Major Evans?	IIG	MISC	IIG
			Have you had a chance to get out of here for a while?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1407		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, not yet.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1408	[02:35]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Why don't you go ahead?	MISC	MISC	MISC

			He's not had a chance to get out of here yet so -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1409		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, sure. Yeah, go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1410		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I have a speaking code also if you want it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1411		<i>Major Evans:</i>	Yes.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1412		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	When is he airborne?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1413		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Well, he's not airborne yet. He will be.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1414		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	For what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1415		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	To return to base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1416		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I understand but everything's been grounded for the most part.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1417		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Unless you're on a mission.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
1418		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	He's got approval - He's got approval.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1419		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Through who?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1420		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Through the CO of this base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1421		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. Can the CO of your base call the CO of our base?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1422		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	She's breaking up.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1423		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Unless he is in a misunderstanding of what's going on, we need to stay grounded.	<b>TKS</b>	TKS	TKS
			What you guys should do is have your CO call our CO.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1424		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	6300 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1425		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Are you copying that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1426		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	That would be 6300.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1427		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1428		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1429		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Unless they are in a search and rescue mode they need to remain grounded unless otherwise approved.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1430		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. This is Andrews?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1431		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1432		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay. Don't hang up. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1433		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1434		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. I told them that they can't take off.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I have a question for you. We have a possibility of having a couple of F-18s to be used as an asset for CAP.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1435		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1436		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Basically, for your protection.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1437		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1438	[02:40]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	How do you want to go about coordinating them if you guys need them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1439		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. This is what you have to do. You have to call that number, 6300.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1440		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1441		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	He's approving all assets. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
1442		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1443		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	He will let you know who can be airborne and who can't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1444		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1445		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1446		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1447		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1448		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1449		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Way to go, Mo.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1450		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	6301 could do it. 6301 going to 72.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1451		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			He can't hear you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1452		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Can you have him call me at -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1453		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			He's right here. I'll get him on the line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1454		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hello, this is Commander Gates.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1455		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hello, this is the CCO of CONAR.	MISC	US	MISC
			Are you the fighter officer?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1456		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'm one of them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1457		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Can we go secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1458		<i>Commander Gates:</i>	We don't have secure on this yet do we?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Yeah, we got 3303. I don't know how we got on this line.	<b>TIE</b>	TIE	TIE
			Stand by.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1459		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1460		<i>Commander Gates:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain,	MISC	MISC	MISC
			how can I help you?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1461		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Colonel Goldstein.	MISC	US	MISC
			I was just wondering if I could go secure with someone from fighter duty?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1462		<i>Commander Gates:</i>	6305, Sir. Have you tried that number?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1463		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	No, I have not.	TIE	ISA	TIE
1464		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	That's the number for a fighter officer.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1465		<i>Colonel Goldstein:</i>	Okay. Got it. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1466		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	You bet.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1467		<i>Colonel Goldstein:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1468		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hi, this is Bob Deluce at Chicago Center.	MISC	US	MISC
			Are you the sector that's going to be taking over the airspace over Chicago Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1469		<i>Colonel Goldstein:</i>	Chicago Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Hold on. Let me check.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1470		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1471		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	We haven't been notified here yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1472		<i>Bob Deluce:</i>	Okay. Somebody's gonna be taking it over and I'm just trying to find out who.	IIG	TKS	IIG
1473		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	We've got an E3 heading up your way.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1474		<i>Bob Deluce:</i>	Well, we got some aircraft that want to reposition and there's a medivac unit that needs to test some of their airplanes this afternoon if they need to use them.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			I need to know who we need to get approval from for them.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1475		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	I tell you what. I can put you up to our fighter officer?	TSOG	TIE	TIE
1476		<i>Bob Deluce:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1477		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay? Hold on and I will try to transfer you to the number there -	MISC	US	MISC
			The same as this number but the last four digits are 6800. I'll try to transfer you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1478		<i>Bob Deluce:</i>	Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1479		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1480		<i>Bob Deluce:</i>	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1481		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yes?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1482		<i>Bob Deluce:</i>	Hello, this is Lt. Colonel Bear calling from the 1 <sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			How are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1483		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Not too bad, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1484		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	Can I talk to your duty officer or someone like that, please?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1485		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Our fighter officer is at extension 6300 or 6305, either one.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1486	[02:45]	<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	6300 or 6305?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1487		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yes, Sir.	MISC	TIE	MISC
1488		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	And there is no one on this line right now that I can talk to like that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1489		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Not for a fighter officer. We have our Mission Crew Commander, that's all.	ISA	TIE	TIE
			Do you want to talk to them?	IIG	TSOG	TSOG
1490		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	Yeah, that would be fine.	MISC	TIE	MISC
1491		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Ma'am, you need to pick up on line one.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1492		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	Major Deskins.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1493		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Hi, this is Lt. Colonel Bear calling from the - We're just trying to get an idea -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1494		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	We heard conversation on both lines.	TIE	US	TIE
			You'll have to call back.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Fuck, Sam, I don't remember.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I've taken so many phone calls today.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			He'll call back if it's important.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			There he is.	TIE	US	TIE
1495		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	There he is.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1496		<i>Major Deskins:</i>	He wants to go secure but we can't. I can't go secure. I don't have it available right now to go secure.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1497		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1498		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yeah, this is Sergeant Gaber from the 178 <sup>th</sup> Op. I'd like to go secure.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1499		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hold on a second.	MISC	US	MISC
			Are you still on the line?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1500		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I'm still on the line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1501		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1502		<i>Sergeant Gaber:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is Sergeant McCain,	MISC	MISC	MISC
			may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1503		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Hey listen, I got an aircraft that's flying from San Angelo in to Boston. - FCI Counter Terrorist Team.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			We need to get a BPR so the plane can land in Boston.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1504		<i>Sergeant Gaber:</i>	Counter terrorist team? And you need a what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1505		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	A BBR so that the airplane can land in Boston.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1506		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. I need you to stay on the line for just a minute. Okay, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I need you to stay on the line just a few more minutes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We're up channeling all that information you just asked me and hopeful we'll get you the permission or at least point you in the right direction of who you need to contact.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1507		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Outstanding.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1508		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I need you to hold this line just a few more minutes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1509		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Go for it. Go for it.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1510		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay, Sir? I'm gonna forward you to 6305, just in case you get cut off.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1511		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	6305? What's that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1512		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	6305. You're gonna be speaking to Lt. Colonel Daniels. He's our fighter officer.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1513		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1514		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay?	MISC	US	MISC
1515		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Thank you.	MISC	US	MISC
1516		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
1517		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Probably that guy.	MISC	US	MISC
1518		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Americans are stupid.	MISC	US	MISC
1519		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hi, this is Reggie Davis at CONAR.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Are you guys up on the CONAR CO jet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1520		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Say again?	IIG	US	IIG
			We're in a regular CONAR chat window.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1521		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Who's your FIDO right now? Iceman?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1522	[02:50]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1523		<i>Reggie Davis:</i>	Can you forward me up to him or give me his number?	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
1524		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			6300 or 6305. I'll patch up to one of them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1525		<i>Reggie Davis:</i>	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1526		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Busy. His line is busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			6300?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			It's in my - That one rings up in the washroom. Nope, no such luck.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1527		<i>Reggie Davis:</i>	We're gonna launch two 860s in the next 15 minutes.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			We were advised to provide you with mode 2, mode 4, squawk and call signs.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1528		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay. Do you need to go secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1529		<i>Reggie Davis:</i>	No, because the mode 4 is just gonna be today.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1530		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay. Your call sign, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1531		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Air Force Rescue 67 Flight.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			It's a flight of two 860 helicopters. 02 squawks will be 60. Mode 4 is Day 11 A and B. That will do it.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			You will probably hear from them in about 30 minutes I guess.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1532		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1533		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	What was your name again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1534	[02:55]	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Sergeant Perry.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1535		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1536		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Thank you, sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1537		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	We're gonna shut down everything and make sure we know who is what out here.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1538		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1539		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hey, this is Major Solinas from 1 <sup>st</sup> Air Force.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1540		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1541		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I am trying to get in touch with Lt. Colonel. Daniels.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1542		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah, you're still looking for that BBR?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1543		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Yeah, I called 6305 and nobody answers the phone.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1544		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Try - We were told to have you call Hampton direct and they'll deal with you.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1545		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Give me the number.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1546		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1547		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1548		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	All right. I got someone checking to see if we even have one.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We don't deal with them on a day to day basis.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1549		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	I appreciate that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1550		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay. We don't have a phone number for them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1551		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Do you have an area code that's roughly in the same area?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I can call the 555 information.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1552		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Area code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I don't think anyone's working in there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Boy, let me see.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1553		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Don't worry. I'll find another way.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1554		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah. We were told to have you call them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Maybe you have a DSN phone listing there anywhere?	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
			Do you have a world wide directory type thing?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1555		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	No, I don't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1556		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Oh, shit.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I was looking for them here. I can't - I can't find anything.	IIS	IIS	IIS
			Let me see. Langley, Andrews - That's the only place I don't have.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1557		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Is it an Air Force Base?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1558		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	It's the one just north of Boston. That's all I know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1559		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1560		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1561		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	I'll give them a call.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1562		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Sorry about that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1563		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	No problem.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1564		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1565		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Yes, Sir. This is Sergeant Baker calling from Langley Air Force Base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1566		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1567		<i>Major Solinas:</i>	Just letting you know that quit 25 downtime is 17:19.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1568		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	17:19. Single ship?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1569		<i>Sergeant Baker:</i>	Ship of two waiting on one more.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1570		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	You're waiting on 26?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1571		<i>Sergeant Baker:</i>	Right.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1572		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1573		<i>Sergeant Baker:</i>	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1574		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yep. No problem.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1575		<i>Sergeant Baker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1576		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Sergeant Perry, this is Lt. Colonel Bear calling from the fighter wing.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I talked to your duty officer about 30 minutes ago.	ISA	ISA	ISA
			Do you have an idea of the schedule of events as far as cap measurement and those things are gonna happen?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1577		<i>Sergeant Baker:</i>	No idea, Sir, but I could put you through to someone who may know.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1578		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1579		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Let me get you through to the person that has the knowledge. Hold on. Let me put you up to 6300, Sir. Standby.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1580		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1581		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, this is Lt. Colonel Hayes from Atlantic City.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1582		<i>Lt. Colonel Bear:</i>	Yes, sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1583	[03:00]	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	We've got two airborne for almost 4 hours.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We're wondering if we could try to work a swap out with the -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1584		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Let me put you through to the weapons guys. Standby.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1585		<i>Lt. Colonel Hayes:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1586		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	TIE	MISC	MISC
1587		<i>Lt. Colonel Hayes:</i>	This is Sergeant Christopher with the Indiana National Guard.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Can you please standby for Colonel Peters to go secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1588		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Colonel Peters.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1589		<i>Lt. Colonel Hayes:</i>	Yes, Sir. Standby. WE need to switch to secure frequency. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Here we go. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1590		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hi, Lt. Tracy here from the Maryland State Police Aviation.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm trying to work through a problem so I can get the Medivac back in service down here.	IIS	IIS	IIS
			We generally operate in the Baltimore airspace and the Washington airspace.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			I got approval for operations in the Baltimore airspace. Washington is working on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			When I get up to Western Maryland and Frederick, Maryland, my guys are like -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1591		<i>Sergeant Christopher:</i>	Let me give you to our MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1592		<i>Colonel Peters:</i>	Sure.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1593		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	MCC here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1594		<i>Lt. Tracy:</i>	Hi, Lt. Tracy here from Maryland State Police.	TIE	US	TIE
			We're calling about medivac service up in our state.	TIE	US	TIE
			We generally deal with Baltimore airspace and Washington airspace.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			At this point, I can't operate in Washington.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1595		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	When your aircraft take off -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1596		<i>Lt. Tracy:</i>	6313	IIG	IIG	IIG
1597		<i>MCC:</i>	6313, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1598		<i>Lt. Tracy:</i>	What are you looking for?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1599		<i>MCC:</i>	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1600		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Ramp one, ramp two. Airborne at 18:43. Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1601		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	18:43. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1602		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Two birds airborne, Grant one and two.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1603	[03:05]	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Two?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1604		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	That's what he said.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1605		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	For the duration of the - This exercise has been cancelled.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			What can I say?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			This exercise has been cancelled for the duration of the crisis. Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1606		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Does ID know that anybody from outside should be calling this place at this point?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1607		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	I'll give you the number.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1608		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Are they up?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1609		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Got it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1610		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1611		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			This is Chief Cooper from _____.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Who am I speaking with?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1612		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sergeant Perry.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1613		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Sergeant Perry, how are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1614		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Very good, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1615		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	We have some birds that need to get out to a carrier so that that asset can start moving strategically the way it's supposed to start moving in the grand scheme of things.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			What's the hold up on - Someone said that those guys weren't allowed to launch out of Louisiana.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1616		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Let me find out about that for you, Keith.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1617		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	Okay. I'm talking to NORAD.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1618		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Okay. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			Okay. Do they have their flight plans filed and everything like they're supposed to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			We've got some instructions for you here, Chief.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Give me a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1619	[03:10]	<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	Okay. I'm talking to NORAD on the phone right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1620		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay. Your instruction is to call the initial command center at are code 703-904-4423.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1621		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	Do you know who Colonel Marr is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1622		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, he's our commander.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1623		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	All right. We have permission from Colonel Marr -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1624		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Right. I found that out that its -	NC	NC	NC
1625		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	- these five planes. There's gonna be two per hour.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1626		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	How many aircraft and can you give me codes?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1627		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	They're gonna be on codes 2010 through 2030.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1628		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1629		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	That's the blocks of codes. They're getting to launch from Louisiana now. Colonel Marr knows about it	TKS	TKS	TKS
			and just tell whoever you need to tell that this is happening.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1630		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Thank you for the call.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1631		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1632		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Hey, ID?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1633		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	Yeah?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1634		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I have a series of Navy aircraft on block 2010 through 2030 coming out of Louisiana.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			Permission from Colonel Marr? Was it given?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			They're going.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1635		<i>Chief Cooper:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1636		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	What kind of Navy aircraft? Carriers.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1637		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	FAA - 250?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1638		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1639		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Who are you guys checking out?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1640		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	I'm sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1641		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Right here. I don't know.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1642		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Are they friendly?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1643	[03:15]	<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1644		<i>Female Speaker:</i>	Any alert on those two airliners?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Two airliners out of Chicago are missing?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1645		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	- two hours ago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1646		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1647		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yeah, this is Lt. Col. Anderson with Langley.	TIE	MISC	MISC
			Do you copy?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1648		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hello, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1649		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Hold on, Sir. I'll patch you up to someone that can take care of that.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1650		<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1651	<i>Lt. Colonel Anderson:</i>	Okay. I believe it's 6300 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1652	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1653	<i>Lt. Colonel Anderson:</i>	Sergeant Perry, Lt. Colonel Anderson at Langley.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I'm wondering if there's any kind of game plan yet on whether or not you're gonna need more jets on status or in the air from Langley.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1654	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Yes, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1655	<i>Lt. Colonel Anderson:</i>	No one is answering there at 6300.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Is there anyone in that mission plan that I can be able to talk to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1656	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Standby, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1657	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1658	<i>Lt. Colonel Anderson:</i>	I'm sorry. I was trying to call Fort Worth. Thanks.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1659	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1660	<i>Lt. Colonel Anderson:</i>	Hey it's Boston Center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1661	<i>Sergeant Perry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1662	<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Yeah I got a guy from Rhode Island.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Can you tell me who I need to call?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		What line?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1663	<i>Female Speaker:</i>	What code?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1664		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Do you know what BPA is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Actually that's a location on Long Island. This guy is on a 51, 40, 47 miles north of BPA at 1,500 feet.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1665		<i>Boston Center:</i>	Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Are all military aircraft with Black Hawk Air Force?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1666		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	We're just going off the line real quick. I'll be right back.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1667		<i>Boston Center:</i>	Yeah, we ID it and it's a low wing 107.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1668		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Actually, no. This is north at Boston. Landed near Boston and they said it was -	TKS	TKS	TKS
1669		<i>Boston Center:</i>	Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is Sergeant McCain, may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1670		<i>Sergeant Bianchi:</i>	Hi, this is Major Cherry at the SOA Command Center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I need to coordinate some life support flights and whatnot to - I'm told that we need to do it through each individual air defense sector.	IIS	US	IIS
			Is that correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1671		<i>Boston Center:</i>	Are you doing it - Is this military or civilian?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1672		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Civilian.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1673		<i>Boston Center:</i>	Okay. I'm gonna give you a number to call and they will help you out. It's commercial number area code 703-904-4423.	TKS	TKS	TKS

1674		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. That's us.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			We need to get these released and we want to make sure the military knows about it so that they can be released.	IIS	IIS	IIS
			We were told by NORAD that the individual defense sectors need to get the information on the aircraft released.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1675		<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Can I give you some call signs?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1676		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Sure. Tell me when you're ready to copy or what I can do is I can fax them to you -	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1677		<i>Major Cherry:</i>	I would rather you tell me over the phone and then fax them later.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1678		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1679	[03:20]	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Go ahead, ma'am.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1680		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Call sign is November 127 Kilo Charlie departing out of Alpha Foxtrot Whisky. Destination is Capa Delta Kilo.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1681		<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1682		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	And the agency is CDC and it's doctors.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1683		<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1684	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. The next call sign is November 1218 Charlie departing out of Kennison going to same destination and its CDC and its doctors. The next call sign is November 802 Alpha Bravo departing out of Kennison, destination is Capa Delta Kilo and same thing CDC and doctors. The next one is November 325, departure Delta Foxtrot and its pharmaceuticals but we don't have the destination.	TKS	TKS	TKS
		Do you need that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1685	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	It would help. Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1686	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. We'll standby on that one.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Do you want the rest of these?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1687	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	How many do you have total, ma'am?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1688	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I have about 20 in front of me.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1689	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Go ahead and fax it to me.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		The area code is 315 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1690	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	This is a commercial fax?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1691	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1692	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	315 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1693	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	334-6772.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1694	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	6772?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1695	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	That's correct. That's our fax and you need permission to fly these guys;	IIS	IIS	IIS
		is that correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1696	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Yes	TIE	TIE	TIE
		and how do we know when they're approved to go?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1697	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Hold this line and I will get you permission here in just a few minutes..	TIE	TIE	TIE
1698	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. I'll hold the line and I'll go ahead and put these on the fax machine.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Who should I address it to it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1699	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Sergeant McCain. Major Nasypany?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I got this lady from the - they're calling us back now with a bunch of these aircraft that want to take off that have doctors and pharmaceuticals on it. They need permission to take off.	IIS	IIS	IIS
		Who do we get that through?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1700	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Sergeant Dooley.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1701	<i>Major Cherry:</i>	That phone number is calling me.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		These guys have filed flight plans, okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Now they want permission to take off.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Yes, they did.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			Now this organization is calling back to us wanting permission for these guys to take off. They're all doctors and pharmaceuticals and medical teams and stuff. This lady here is out of NORAD calling from that commercial number that we were given for commercial flight for them to file flight plans for because we couldn't handle that, right?	IIS	IIS	IIS
			Now these guys have called her, they've files, she's calling us now with permission to call back them and say that they're clear to go.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1702		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Ma'am, are you there? Hello? Hello? Ma'am, are you there? Ma'am, are you there? Hello? Ma'am, are you there?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1703		<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Attention in the area. Attention in the area. This is the MCC tech with a public service announcement.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			If you are having a child care problem due the emergencies in the city limits of Rome, I have a phone number available for you to call. We have some people that are willing to go by and get your kids and take care of them for you until this is over.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			If you have child care problems within the city limits of Rome, please come to the MCC tech and I'll give you a phone number you can call to have your kids taken care of.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1704		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Ma'am, are you still there? Ma'am? Are you on the line? 366-2497. Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			You got Debbie Spiker is the one that's coordinating this all. They'll take care of it all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			You need to pick one of them.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1705		<i>Major Nasypany:</i>	I've got a whole bunch of civilian flights right here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1706	[03:25]	<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Okay. Great. Here she is right now. I just saw the phone off the hook and picked it up.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1707		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	I need to talk to her.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1708		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	He wants to talk to you. He wants to talk to you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1709		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Sergeant McCain?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1710		<i>Male Speaker:</i>	Yes, ma'am. I got your fax. I got four pages here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1711		<i>Major Cherry:</i>	Let me see. I faxed you one, two, three, four, five, six.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1712		<i>Sergeant McCain:</i>	Hold on. I got more coming.	MISC	MISC	MISC

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