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Newport, RI**

**PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION FOR
A NEW GLOBAL COMMONS**

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for an Advanced Research Project.

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14. ABSTRACT
 This report begins and ends with the ideas of Sun Tzu about winning without fighting and of Clausewitz about managing the powerful moral forces and interactions that permeate conflict. An omniconnected, omnipresent Global Communication Commons has developed during the past 20 years because of the Internet, interactive global media, and personal communication technology. This new Commons goes beyond the accepted land, sea, air, space, information, and cyber domains; it exists within a ubiquitous "climate" of communication that pervades and influences all human activity, especially nations' efforts to achieve their political objectives. Within the context of national security, this climate offers a four-layer construct that correlates to the four levels of war. At the highest level of national strategy, "strategic communication" is defined as the highest layer within the communication climate through which U.S. Senior leaders can promulgate national themes and messages and use the principles of strategic communication to keep the peace and win at war. The most effective approach to understanding the principles of strategic communication is the dialogic model of communication. Thirteen core principles of strategic communication are synthesized from the tenets of dialogic communication, the principles of war, and the strategy development process. These principles can underpin national strategy and may help achieve U.S. national objectives at the lowest risk and with the highest benefit. Applying the principles of strategic communication to help realize these ends and objectives, however, requires the USG to inculcate these principles into their strategies and plans (ends), resource the needed capabilities (ways), and use the methods (means) that can best achieve the goals. The ways and means of the DOD may not be postured to support the strategic communication construct and apply the SC principles across its range of military operations. The DOD and USG may wish to assess their current SC resources and their alignment with national strategy so they can help thoroughly and effectively integrate all instruments of national power. In international diplomacy and war, a national strategy shaped by strategic communication principles may be an effective way to understand yourself and your enemies and to win, preferably without fighting, as Sun Tzu would urge, or with only the minimum necessary violence, as Clausewitz would agree.

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Abstract

This report begins and ends with the ideas of Sun Tzu about winning without fighting and of Clausewitz about managing the powerful moral forces and interactions that permeate conflict. It asserts that an omniconnected, omnipresent Global Communication Commons has developed during the past 20 years because of the global spread of the Internet, interactive global media, and personal communication technology. This new Commons goes beyond the accepted land, sea, air, space, information, and cyber domains; it exists within a ubiquitous “climate” of communication. This climate pervades and influences all human activity, especially nations’ efforts to achieve their political objectives. Within the context of U.S. national security, this climate offers a four-layer construct that correlates to the four levels of war. Corresponding to the highest level of national strategy, “strategic communication” is defined as the highest layer within the communication climate through which U.S. Senior leaders can promulgate national themes and messages and use the principles of strategic communication to keep the peace and win at war. The most effective approach to understanding the principles of strategic communication is the dialogic model of communication based on mutuality. Thirteen core principles of strategic communication, founded on the concept of legitimacy, are synthesized from the tenets of dialogic communication, the principles of war, and the strategy development process. If these principles are considered the underpinnings of national strategy, they may help achieve U.S. national objectives at the lowest risk and with the highest benefit. Applying the principles of strategic communication to help realize these ends and objectives, however, requires the USG to inculcate these principles into their strategies and plans (ends), adequately resource the needed capabilities (ways), and use their methods (means) that can best achieve the goals. At present, the ways and means of the DOD may not be postured to support the strategic communication construct and apply the SC principles across its range of military operations. To uphold Sun Tzu’s dictums to avoid wasting national treasure and disrupting the social fabric, the DOD and USG may wish to assess their current SC resources and their alignment with national strategy. They should study how to use the principles of strategic communication to thoroughly and effectively integrate all instruments of national power. In the complex exchanges of international diplomacy and war, a national strategy shaped by the principles of strategic communication construct can be an effective way to understand yourself and your enemies and to win, preferably without fighting, as Sun Tzu would urge, or with only the minimum necessary violence, as Clausewitz would agree.

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PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION FOR A NEW GLOBAL COMMONS

“1. Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this...

“3. ...To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill...

“10. Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s entire army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.

“11. Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and your gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy.”¹

“31. Therefore I say: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.

“32. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal.

“33. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are in every battle to be in peril.”²

Introduction

Under Sun Tzu’s dictum, to achieve U.S. national objectives, the U.S. government (USG) and Department of Defense (DOD) must know themselves, their allies, their competitors, and their enemies with a broad and deep understanding in a dynamic climate of interaction both in peacetime and in war. Regardless of whether the U.S. is at peace or war, the DOD must establish strategies, plan for war campaigns or long-term peace-making efforts, and use appropriate tactics to overcome its major challenges and achieve DOD objectives. The DOD now faces critical strategic problems as the DOD seeks to overcome the nine major challenges in the National Security Strategy.³ (See Appendix A).

One of these problems is that the DOD lacks a set of clear principles of strategic communication (SC) with which DOD Senior leaders, including the Office of the Secretary (OSD), the Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), and their subordinates, can orchestrate their overall communication strategy, operations, and tactics. This report seeks to help fill this gap as a first step toward thinking through this essential problem in a coherent way.

Within the overall situation, a second problem is that the DOD as a whole appears to have focused on discussing policy and definitional issues rather than on the truly strategic aspects of a critical vulnerability and potential strength. This vulnerability arises from what Clausewitz called “the moral forces” and the USG’s shortcomings since 2001 in clearly understanding and appropriately responding

to the negative moral forces it faces in its current struggle.⁴ Clausewitz said, "...the right comprehension of moral forces [personal hostile feeling, national hatreds, ambition, love of power, will] which come into play is more difficult...it is *only in the highest branches of Strategy* (emphasis added) that moral complications and a great diversity of quantities and relations are to be looked for" at the point where strategy and political science meet.⁵ Clausewitz devotes an entire chapter to moral forces and calls them "among the most important subjects in War. They form the spirit which permeates the whole being of war. These forces fasten themselves soonest and with the greatest affinity onto the Will which puts in motion and guides the whole mass of powers, uniting with it as it were in one stream, because this is a moral force itself."⁶

At present, these moral forces are a critical vulnerability because the USG has suffered significant damage to its legitimacy and support for its efforts to establish representative government in Iraq and defeat radical extremists in Afghanistan and the world.⁷ These moral forces also can serve as a potential strength, as they did during the Cold War when the USG clearly stood for liberty against tyranny and gained the support—despite many setbacks along the way—of many oppressed peoples.

Report Purpose: Suggest Fresh Principles of Strategic Communication

This report asserts that human communication⁸ creates the climate⁹ through which the flow of human thought and energy create and sustain Clausewitz's stream of moral forces that permeate a unique, rapidly evolving, interactive environment called the Global Communication Commons.¹⁰ The DOD must have the capacity first to comprehend the essence and implications of this dynamic flow of human interaction and then to master how to affect that flow to achieve its objectives in war and in peace. In the spirit of Clausewitz's emphasis on moral force and Sun Tzu's emphasis on deep knowledge of oneself and one's enemy, this report takes a fresh look at the fundamental relationship between strategy and communication within this new climate. This report presents a set of tenets of

human communication, examines a set of modern principles of war, reviews the basic rules for developing strategy, and synthesizes all three into principles of strategic communication that the DOD and the warfighter might find useful. These principles can begin to describe the essential qualities of this new climate and to explore the fundamental conditions in which the DOD can better understand Clausewitz's moral forces, harness their flow, and master its own strategic challenges.

With regard to the increasing importance of communication in strategic affairs, there exists a tension between Clausewitzian and Sun Tzuvian philosophies that derives from their different perspectives. Sun Tzu, focused on winning without fighting, advocated using what we now call all the instruments of national power¹¹ and their communicative interaction—dialog—to achieve his goals without the inevitable damage that war causes. However, Clausewitz focuses primarily on violent interaction between known enemies—the military instrument of national power. The Clausewitzian purpose for communication is using it as another weapon to advance your message and to disrupt and discredit the enemy's message while your enemy seeks to do the same to you. For Clausewitz, just as war is another means to achieve a state's policy goals, communication is another means of conducting violent war.¹²

The philosophical tension between Clausewitz's and Sun Tzu's views has played a significant role in how the DOD has approached the problem of strategic communication since 2001. Its approach has evolved through practicing tactical public relations (embedding reporters with combat troops) to directly support combat operations, conducting Madison Avenue marketing campaigns to win "the hearts and minds" of various publics, and subordinating strategic communication to information operations (IO) to support effects-based operations.¹³ The DOD's disparate services, offices, and think tanks have debated the nature of strategic communication and offered numerous definitions, none of which has been formally approved for DOD-wide use. This internal debate has delayed critical advances for more than

two years: 1) the mandated institutionalization of “strategic communication” across the DOD, 2) publication of a DOD SC policy directive, 3) clear SC roles and responsibilities within the OSD, and 4) communication plans for the war in Afghanistan, among other key operations.

A Typology of the Communication Climate

Most important, all of these approaches focus on strategic communication only as an instrument or utility, but none of them raises strategic communication to the “highest branches of Strategy” that Clausewitz might agree is where it belongs.¹⁴ None of them describe a national security/military typology or hierarchical classification of “communication” that logically arranges types of communication according to their strategic importance within the military “levels of war” construct. The levels of war are defined as national strategic, theater-strategic,¹⁵ operational, and tactical.¹⁶ The national strategic level concerns national policy, the desired end state, and national objectives; the theater-strategic level (Combatant Commands) focuses on specific theater end states, mission objectives, and campaigns; the operational level on major, Joint Task Force (Army, Corps, fleet, air group) missions and objectives; and the tactical level on battles, engagements, and small unit action (brigade, air wing, strike group, battalion, and small units). Although there are no hard-and-fast lines among these levels, they are useful for perspectives that can clarify the roles and responsibilities for the commanders and units at each level and the relationships among the levels so commanders can “visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks.”¹⁷

These organizational and logical distinctions are equally important for “communication” as a critical climate for human interaction (both non-violent and violent). To mix metaphors, if communication forms the pervasive, interactive climate of human affairs, then like the physical climate, its “atmosphere” can be distinguished by layers that correspond to the levels of war. The overarching class is “communication,” the interaction of humans with words, symbols, images, and actions in

transactional exchanges. The highest national layer is where “strategic communication” belongs, that is, the level for Senior leader consideration of Clausewitz’s moral forces. At this level, national and DOD policy makers determine the national Central Organizing Principle, the desired end state, the national objectives, and the national strategic communication themes and messages that all USG Departments and Agencies must support. At the theater-strategic level, DOD Senior leaders span the boundary between the national and Combatant Command level, giving guidance to the CCDRs for their specific theater missions, desired end state, objectives, and communication themes and messages—their communication strategy. With their theater security cooperation plans (TSCP), the CCDRs cross the boundary between the theater and operational levels to guide the Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) who plan their major communication operations, focused on supporting their campaign mission, objectives, desired effects, and tasks. The JFCs cross the boundary between operations and tactics with guidance to their unit commanders who plan their specific battles and engagements. Specific communication tactics, of course, support those specific actions.¹⁸ (See Chart 1).

In sum, this typology distinguishes among the four types of communication within the defense context and delineates the doctrinal boundaries between each type. This typology also eliminates the conflation of the term “strategic communication” across all the layers, especially the operational and tactical ones, that make up the communication climate; this conflation has been a cause of the years-long debate across the DOD, the Services, and the USG about a definition of strategic communication.

Confusing Types, Means, and Ends with Multiple Definitions

To this point, the DOD has not examined “strategic” communication from the typological perspective. Former DOD and current Department of State (DOS) communication planning strategist Emily Goldman has acknowledged that strategic communication has meant many things to many people: “It is a *tool and instrument of power* to support our national goals. It is a *means to influence*

attitudes and behavior. It is *a process of listening, understanding, and engaging* audiences. It is *a process of coordinating messages* across our government and with our allies, and of synchronizing and integrating information with other instruments of national power. Strategic communication is *both words and deeds*” (emphases added).¹⁹

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and Joint Publication 3-0 focused on the “understand and engage” process view.²⁰ In contrast, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Planning (USD[P]) has called SC “*a perception strategy. It is the massing of information, ideas and actions* to align the perceptions of key audiences with our policy objectives. It is achieved through the synchronized promulgation of information, ideas and actions over time with means and content that are tailored for multiple and diverse audiences” (emphases added).²¹ However, the USD(P) definition limits communication to only one stage (perception) of the complex process that involves participants²² in continuous, interactive transactions with other participants.²³ It differs from intention, message transmission, message receipt, and interpretation.²⁴ To define strategic communication as ‘perception management’ limits the concept to only managing how people experience information through their senses and process it through their minds.

Defense Science Board (DSB) experts have taken a broad view to explore all the dimensions of the term. Bruce Gregory, DSB member and Director, Institute for Public Diplomacy, George Washington University, has asserted that ‘strategic communication’ has distinct traits and applications that separate it from other terms. He focused on first its nature as *instrument of power* that can achieve core objectives and added that it serves as a *concept that enriches* “all other elements of strategy and becomes essential to their use and success.”²⁵ However, if one considers strategic communication as primarily an alliance of instruments, it is removed from the national level and becomes conflated as one tool within a group of tools rather than a ‘layer’ of the communication climate.

Distinct Definition with Critical Differences

With these differences of opinion, one can understand how gaining common acceptance of the term “strategic communication” has become so difficult and confused. The contrasting traits from these definitions have the following shortcomings: 1) they conflate terms with distinctly different meanings; 2) they tend to follow the “monologic” model rather than the “dialogic” one;²⁶ 3) they do not integrate the elements of two-way communication into a comprehensive definition; and 4) most do not address any meaning for “strategy” or “strategic.”²⁷ If strategic communication is a tool, means, method, function, mass, process, instrument, collection of instruments, perception strategy, mechanism of influence, and enriching concept, then the term lacks appropriate boundaries that distinguish it from other terms within the context of military strategy and operations. (See Appendix B).

The phrase “communication climate” defines and describes the multi-dimensional interaction throughout the global commons, while ‘strategic communication’ describes the interaction at the national level that leads to all elements of national policy. Crafting strategy at the highest level determines the national themes and messages while the theater, operational, and tactical levels plan and implement the specific methods, tools, and channels of communication that execute the communication strategy through the means of campaigns, operations, engagements, and tactical actions.

Within this typology, bounded traits and a clear definition of strategic communication can be derived. (See Appendix C). As the national strategic layer, strategic communication establishes the foundation for considering the fundamental elements (values, metaphors, narratives, assumptions, and interests) that may shape national objectives and strategy. A bounded definition of “strategic communication” that the DOD might consider would be:

Strategic communication is the highest layer of human interaction through which U.S. Senior leaders promulgate national themes and messages to support the USG mission, achieve national objectives, and realize the national end state. Through the global interactive environment, USG

Senior leaders, Departments and Agencies engage all states, cultures, and peoples to gain understanding, negotiate desirable outcomes, provide mutual benefits, establish effective relationships, and influence positive consequences from conflict.

This definition allows DOD strategists and planners to focus on the normal processes of developing communication strategy (ends), assessing the appropriate capabilities (ways) to achieve DOD goals, and executing specific communication tactics (means). In fact, the JIC states, “This concept posits that there will be no strategic communication process in the future, but that strategic communication will be inherent in the planning and conduct of all operations, as described by the observation-orientation-decision-action model (or OODA loop).”²⁸ Of equal significance, ADML Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in December 2007 expressed a similar view that the basic SC concepts should be inculcated across the DOD as quickly as possible; he added that he did not believe there should be any independent SC offices or entities within the DOD or the Services.²⁹

This report, the JIC, and the Chairman are ‘in violent agreement’ that the principles that support the term and their essential importance for achieving national objectives should become inherent in and pervade all DOD strategic and operational planning. If the Chairman posits that the concept should imbue all DOD strategies and planning, the JIC posits that the term should fade away, and the climate typology provides a clear alternative, then DOD decision makers may wish to consider eliminating the term from their theater, operational, and tactical uses. They may wish to focus on analyzing the four-layer climate model to determine whether it might help them to institutionalize the core principles.

Recent DOD Progress in Communication Strategy and Tactics

Facing the challenges of the war against radical extremism and the multi-dimensional Iraq insurgency, the DOD has made important progress in using communication principles and practices as Sun Tzu’s ways of soft power to know its competitors and enemies and then integrating those ways as necessary with Clausewitz’s hard power. A critical aspect of this improvement has been its efforts to

harness the power of coordinated communicative interaction (what has been called “strategic communication”) as a key determinant of success.

Since 2002, the DOD has moved forward with a growing awareness of the nature, meaning, and power of communicative interaction, including “strategic communication” as one five critical efforts to achieve unity of effort in the 2004 Quadrennial Defense Review.³⁰ The 2006 QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap laid out the game plan through which “strategic communication” concepts and plans would be institutionalized across the DOD.³¹ It established the Strategic Communication Integration Group, overseen by an Executive Committee of deputy undersecretaries and assistant secretaries of defense.³² The SCIG charter expired in March 2008, and the planning duties were assumed by a Communication Integration and Planning Team reporting to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication (DASD[JC]).³³ The DASD(JC)’s charter continues to focus on institutionalizing SC concepts across the DOD and preparing communication plans as directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]).³⁴ The DOD-wide institutionalization process is now taking place primarily through the DASD(JC)’s efforts to inculcate the concepts across DOD educational institutions and training and exercise venues.³⁵ (See Appendix D).

As the DASD(JC) and Pentagon efforts have continued, the Futures Group (J9) of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) reached a significant milestone when it issued the draft Strategic Communication Joint Integration Concept (JIC) in late April 2008.³⁶ This JIC is the most detailed approach to date for the future effective application of SC concepts at the JFC level.

Key JIC Changes

The JIC has emphasized extremely important changes in conceptual bases, models, and tenets of communication strategy for joint force commanders, including:

- The central idea that in the future, one of the most critical challenges a JFC will face is that of consistently integrating and applying his³⁷ complete menu of communication capabilities that can influence the attitudes and behaviors of friends, neutrals, and adversaries to achieve his operational goals.³⁸
- The need to “conceive of every act as a strategic communication, because all actions send signals, whether by design or not.”³⁹ All actions have both intended and unintended consequences that affect operational success or failure.
- The recognition that this constant awareness is driven by the pervasive nature of the global communication network.⁴⁰
- Communication will often play a decisive role in conducting effective operations.⁴¹
- Communication strategy and the need to integrate and synchronize all related capabilities must “be inherent in the planning and conduct of all operations...”⁴²
- A limited definition of strategic communication as “communicating strategically—that is, creating meaning through the use of symbols (communicating) in support of national objectives (strategically).”⁴³
- A list of 10 supporting ideas that help inform higher level principles of strategic communication. (See Appendix E).

In addition, the JIC provides a detailed discussion of the military problem, an operational solution focused on influence through the required communication capabilities, an analysis of the risks of following this concept, and a thorough approach to an essential, but overlooked element of communication operations—measurement, assessment, feedback, and adaptation. (See Appendix F).

From Operational Building Blocks to New Strategic Perspectives

The JIC draft provides excellent building blocks for raising the core issues of strategic communication to a new, broader level of discussion. Discussion of these issues may help clarify existing strategic problems as the DOD fulfills its mission to overcome the nine major challenges delineated in the National Security Strategy.⁴⁴ (See Appendix A).

Four Questions from the JIC

As the JIC stressed for joint force operations, the U.S. military must think and act with more peaceful, fewer violent methods that rely on influence to achieve objectives. The rest of this report will examine four serious questions that the JIC raises and suggest new perspectives in four key areas that affect the principles of communication as beginning approaches to useful answers.

- What are the most effective approach to and model for strategic communication at the DOD and national levels? The principles of strategic communication support the highest layer of the communication climate which can influence security and defense strategy. Although types and methods of communication serve as tools, functions, and enablers for operational planning and tactical execution, the core principles supersede the instrumental nature of those methods.
- What core tenets of human communication can help provide a new perspective on strategic communication? Communication has a transactional, exchange nature through which people, groups, and organizations seek to establish and pursue relationships to fulfill their mutual and separate interests, negotiate and achieve objectives, and trade benefits at acceptable costs.⁴⁵ The nature of communication is also influenced by the intent of the participants: monologic—to use the methods and media primarily to obtain your own ends—or dialogic—to use the methods and media to seek and fulfill mutual interests, achieve mutual objectives, and provide mutual benefits.⁴⁶ Intent may take shape across a continuum of situations.

- What is an appropriate construct for the dramatically different realm in which all human interaction occurs in the 21st century? A new construct for the “omniconnected”⁴⁷ world in which all human interaction now occurs is called the “Global Communication Commons.”⁴⁸ In the 21st century, everyone will be able have access to everyone else and all information, interact with individuals and groups, and participate in virtually every event. A critical determinant of participation is the scarce resource of attention. A critical competition in the current war against terrorism is for the scarce attention and support of the ‘neutrals.’
- What new principles of strategic communication, which might inform national policy and thinking within the OSD and among the Combatant Commands, can be derived from basic tenets of human communication, sound principles of war, and proven elements of strategy? A baker’s dozen principles of strategic communication synthesize critical elements of government-citizen interaction (legitimacy, will of the people, engagement, clarity) and critical strategic planning concerns (objective, initiative, pervasive awareness, unity of effort, synchronization, sustainment, adaptability, security, and effectiveness).

After this report explores in detail these suggested answers, it ends by suggesting questions for further inquiry concerning how these suggested principles might best serve the DOD mission.

The Strategic Problem

The urgent moves across the USG since 2001 to understand and apply communication as an effective instrument of national power derives from the USG’s continuing struggle to win the “war of ideas” against its declared and avowed adversaries (radical extremists, Iran, and North Korea), key competitors (China and Russia), global public opinion, and its own people (witness the very low opinion polls for both the current Administration and Congress).⁴⁹ Since 2001, the USG has sought to influence

not only the “hearts and minds” of the people in Iraq and Afghanistan, but more importantly, the behavior of USG allies, friends, neutrals, competitors, and adversaries to support U.S. objectives.⁵⁰

However, although the USG has made significant gains recently, the “war of ideas” continues to be waged with no clear advantage to either the radical extremists or the United States.⁵¹ According to the March 2008 Sadat Center-Zogby poll, the vast majority of people polled in six moderate Muslim countries where there is no active conflict strongly oppose both the USG’s policies and the radical extremists. Very few (7 percent) support the al-Qaeda goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate, but nearly one third support al-Qaeda’s opposition to U.S. Middle East policies. Yet, more than eight out of 10 oppose the USG’s policies in the Middle East. “*Attitudes toward the US*: 83% of the public has an unfavorable view of the US and 70% express no confidence in the US. Still, Arabs continue to rank the US among the top countries with freedom and democracy for their own people (bold in original).”⁵² As important, Arab popular opinion continues to focus on the Palestinian-Israel conflict as the center of their concern: “There is an increase in the expressed importance of the Palestinian issue, with 86% of the public identifying it as being at least among the top three issues to them.”⁵³ The current Sadat Center-Zogby study confirms consistent results from earlier Sadat Center-Zogby, Pew World Opinion, Gallup International, and similar polls.⁵⁴

On the other hand, when the USG provided substantial assistance after severe natural disasters, especially the 2004 Southeast Asia tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, Muslim and world opinion shifted favorably toward the USG.⁵⁵ However, the favorable shift still meant that less than one third of those polled in Muslim countries by the Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2007 held overall favorable opinions of the US as previous USG policies and the War in Iraq have continued.⁵⁶

USG Steps Forward

Clearly, this wide opposition to USG policies signifies the gap that the USG needs to address as part of its overall policy and strategy toward these interrelated issues. Numerous studies have offered many useful specific recommendations to help address these challenges.⁵⁷ Most recently, the 2008 Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication recommended creating “a permanent strategic communication structure within the White House, one element of which would be a new Deputy National Advisor for Strategic Communication” to raise these issues to the Presidential level and provide direct authority, focus, and oversight for the broadest SC policies and issues.⁵⁸ The 2007 National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPD&SC) established mission priorities, objectives, key audiences, public diplomacy initiatives, and the need for interagency coordination at the national level.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, the position responsible for leading the way to implement the strategy, the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, has experienced significant turnover since it was established in 2002.⁶⁰ Fortunately, during Karen Hughes’ tenure as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the State Department did launch several key new initiatives that continue: regional media hubs, digital outreach teams (blogging teams), a Rapid Response Unit, an Interagency Counter-Terrorism Communication Center, and a Muslim Citizens Dialogue.⁶¹

The most significant of the DOD’s positive developments include the progress made in Iraq by implementing the lessons learned from such officers as Gen. David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq during the 2006-2008 Iraq Surge, and earlier during 2003-2004, by now-Brig. Gen. Ralph O. Baker. During the Petraeus-led surge at the theater-strategic level and during 2003-2004 at the tactical level when then-Col. Baker led one of the first U.S. battalions stationed in Baghdad, both

applied their deep knowledge of counterinsurgency to communicate with core participants to both influence and be influenced by the Iraqi leadership elites to gain their cooperation.⁶²

Dialogic versus Monologic Model of Communication

The successes of Petraeus and Baker, this report asserts, reflected a new dialogic model of communication (focused on relationship and mutual benefit) at the theatre-strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Although the draft JIC reflects some dialogic traits, its core rests on earlier, less complete communication models: the classic sender-receiver information processing model⁶³ and the interpretive meaning-making model.⁶⁴ The interpretive meaning-making model, derived from the work of Berlo, Peirce, and Schramm, explains communication as a process through which a sender intends to send a combination of message and meaning to a receiver through a channel or medium.⁶⁵ But the receiver perceives and interprets the message and the meaning through his own set of filters. Thus, the meaning and message received may or may not match the sender's intention.⁶⁶

From these two-way communication models, the JIC focuses on the concepts of influence and communication as the “mechanism of influence.”⁶⁷ Citing Berlo, the JIC asserts “*the fundamental purpose of all purposeful communication is to influence* (emphasis in original)—to cause some intended effect, which might be an observable behavior or an unobservable attitude.”⁶⁸ From this point of view, the JIC then focuses on using communication as an instrument to help the joint force meet its basic requirements.⁶⁹ (See Appendix G).

Critical Differences in Intent

However, these influence models and requirements focus primarily on what is called the monologic point of view. With this approach, the initiator focuses almost exclusively on using either one- or two-way communication to achieve his own ends with little or no consideration of the receiver's needs or goals.⁷⁰ Monologic communicators listen and gain feedback through polls, surveys, focus groups, etc. to

gather information about the receivers' point of view so that they can create new messages that will influence the receivers to give them more of what they want.

In contrast, the dialogic model emphasizes communication as a process based on mutuality⁷¹ through which the participants exchange messages and meaning to fill needs, achieve goals, and gain benefits. First discussed by Barnlund in 1970, this model defines communication as a continuous, transactional process through which people exchange messages and meaning to discover mutual interests and exchange mutual benefits at an acceptable cost.⁷² (See Chart 2).

The critical difference between the models is one of intent: What is the communicator's primary purpose for initiating the exchange? If to fulfill only his interests using whatever persuasive or coercive methods are likely to succeed, then he is following the monologic approach; if to engage and understand others, establish relationships, and seek mutual gain, then he is following the dialogic approach.

Intent can be considered as a situational continuum in which the participants choose which approach or combination can best satisfy their purposes and achieve their goals. (See Chart 3). Within the DOD context, its primary mission is use of violent force to defend the homeland and ensure U.S. security, so in the context of violent military operations, achieving the desired effects with monologic communication is appropriate. The DOD must always remain focused on the enemy and keep its destructive means in mind; however, an exclusively monologic approach may not be the best way to influence even enemies and competitors and certainly not allies and friends. They all are active participants in any interaction and they bring their own interests, requirements, beliefs, attitudes, etc. that may not be best understood by or engaged with the monologic approach.

The monologic approach appears to have numerous shortcomings (summarized as people dislike being treated as objects) that can prevent a communication strategy from obtaining the desired results.⁷³ (See Appendix H). Its shortcomings may help to explain some aspects of the USG's difficulties with

influencing the participants whose cooperation it needs to achieve its goals. Perhaps the dialogic model could help encourage the USG to listen more attentively and understand more deeply so that the other participants can believe that they are heard, their views respected, and their interests considered.

Dialog and Mutuality-Based Model

Significant recent success with dialogic communication has been developing from several levels: 1) the tactical and operational lessons learned from the Iraq surge and 2) the new theater security cooperation approaches that the Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) of the U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. Africa Command, and the U.S. Special Operations Command are putting into place.⁷⁴ The four CCDRs are focusing less on direct military preparations and more on their security partnerships and humanitarian roles. They also are becoming far more integrated with the interagency, international governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM are even adopting command structures with interagency executives in key positions.⁷⁵

In addition, the formal SC definition in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (and the similarly worded Joint Publication 3-0) use two key verbs “understand and engage” that encourage the DOD’s shift to a dialog-based approach. Likewise, the JIC is nested in the NSS, the NDS, and the NMS and follows the guidance from the QDR, the QDR SC Execution Roadmap, and the NSPD&SC. The JIC significantly expands the acceptance of the dialogic approach even with its pervasive emphasis on influence activities.⁷⁶

On a grander scale, the major shift in the DOD’s emphases toward more assistance operations rather than violence supports the need to adopt the dialogic model. The military must be prepared to conduct 22 types of military activities across its range of military operations (ROMO).⁷⁷ (See Appendix I). Across the official ROMO only a handful, such as major conventional or nuclear war, are primarily

focused on combat.⁷⁸ The rest involve close relationships with allies, friends, and competitors to shape, prevent, deter, or dissuade—that is, influence—adversaries to avoid conflict or as importantly, to provide foreign humanitarian assistance, freedom of navigation, and the like.⁷⁹ Only the U.S. Central Command has been actively involved in combat operations since 1999, but U.S. forces in all other geographic commands are constantly involved in peacetime security cooperation activities that rely on dialogic communication to achieve their desired results.

Critiques of Dialogic Communication

Despite its usefulness across all levels of national strategy, operational/campaign planning, tactical action, and diplomacy, the dialogic approach is often criticized for four primary reasons:

First, it focuses primarily on discourse rather than action. In response, the model's clear transactional nature means direct action between participants is constantly happening; dialog sets the stage for decision and action and for then assessing and adapting to the results and consequences. Although a dialogic exchange may lead to more discussion, the ultimate purpose of most communication is to influence the other participants and compliance with a request.

Second, it leaves the USG open to manipulation by and weakness in the face of violent enemies. Manipulation by implacable enemies (and friends) is a danger, but using dialog and its numerous means⁸⁰ develops the deep and broad understanding of different peoples and cultures that defeating enemies requires, as Sun Tzu stressed.⁸¹ On the other hand, a significant aspect of dialog is knowing when one needs to stop listening, resolve the issue, make a decision, and take action. Such a point comes between enemies when one enemy perceives it has used dialog to gain the time, material, and strategic advantage to strike first. The USG must use the full range of intelligence, diplomatic, and communication tools to ascertain an enemy's readiness and predilection to go to war. The USG has failed on numerous major occasions to do so: Pearl Harbor attack, Korean War invasion, Chinese entry

into Korean War, Al-Qaeda's numerous attacks between 1993-2001, to name a few.⁸² So it seems that the USG should remain engaged with and listen more closely in peacetime to its competitors and potential adversaries with dialogic processes. In addition, dialog, even if that dialog occurs rarely through intermediaries, is necessary throughout the conduct of war to determine the enemy's readiness to negotiate the terms of conflict termination. Finally, dialog is essential to the actual termination of any conflict; for example, the apparently critical pre-condition for Japanese surrender in 1945 was maintenance of the Emperor. When the USG listened to this absolute and abandoned its war-long position of overthrowing the Emperor, the Japanese moved to surrender.⁸³

Third, dialog is the primary job of the State Department, not the DOD. Right now, the U.S. military is overtly involved in two major combat operations; however, U.S. forces in more than 150 other countries are engaged in peacetime activities, including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in many countries, including one viewed as a competitor (China).⁸⁴ The TSCPs of five of the six geographic CCDRs are focused primarily on peacetime activities.⁸⁵

Finally, dialog is primarily useful during peacetime with allies, friends, and competitors instead of with adversaries and enemies. As the JIC stresses, JFCs—and this report adds, CCDRs and National leaders—must plan to apply the full spectrum of influence to cooperate, compete, and conflict with whoever is interacting with the USG for whatever purpose. At best, during war, the DOD gains the understanding it needs to identify strategic advantages and at the worst, one can maintain minimum contact, as enemies have for centuries, to arrange the exchange of prisoners, wounded warriors, spies, etc. Through these exchanges, the USG gains valuable intelligence about the enemy's moral forces and martial strength. Consider, too, that dialog was essential to the pro-USG resolution to the Cold War as the USG remained engaged, sometimes distantly and sometimes face to face, with the Soviets throughout the conflict to prevent nuclear war, enhance the USG position, and probe Soviet weaknesses.

Dialog during Modern Irregular Warfare Challenges

As important, the DOD must plan how to overcome its likely enduring and emerging challenges and consider whether dialogic communication can serve as an appropriate model for those solutions. The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) document, which predicts the global security environment between 2012 and 2030, identifies six enduring and eight emerging challenges.⁸⁶ (See Appendix J). Of the 14 challenges, 11 involve asymmetric warfare which traditionally has relied on diplomacy and non-kinetic operations; the heart of all of them is dialogic communication. The ROMO's 22 types of military operations and the JOE's 14 challenges strongly support adopting the dialogic model as the foundation for the overarching strategic communication construct that can best support U.S. success in its current and likely future operations. Adversaries, seeking asymmetric advantages, often combine violent and non-violent communicative methods⁸⁷ to weaken USG and allied positions and buy time to strengthen their own.⁸⁸ In these irregular conflicts as well as other asymmetric competition designed to weaken USG strength, such as economic attrition, dialog must become a primary USG and DOD weapon to prevent, deter, and dissuade competitors and adversaries.

The Global Communication Commons

In this highly complex world with multiple asymmetric challenges from multiple directions, a principal driver of the DOD's and USG's serious concerns with its status in the 'war of ideas' is the omniconnected, omnipresent communication realm in which all DOD and USG interaction takes place.⁸⁹ This Global Communication Commons⁹⁰ is the all-encompassing, multi-dimensional (physical, electronic, information, and human psychological [rational and emotional]) realm through which all modern human interaction occurs. It adds a new dimension to the existing domains (land, maritime, air, space, and cyber) through which the DOD must be prepared to conduct the ROMO and needs to establish, if not dominance, at least superiority.⁹¹ Like across the traditional maritime commons, without

appropriate oversight and cooperation among the participants, serious problems can arise in this Commons as it often does in the maritime one. The all-encompassing nature of—and the absolute necessity for unfettered access to—the communication Commons requires USG leadership to help maintain its carefully protected freedom.

The Commons construct extends beyond the current popular terms “cyberspace” and “information environment.”⁹² Neither of these popular terms captures the totality of the communication Commons. This Commons embodies the deep and broad, intensely and continuously transactional, interactive nature of this new realm that surrounds and pervades modern society. The “cyber” and “info” terms also do not adequately address the essence of every communication strategy, as the JIC and many other studies and documents agree: the need to influence—and be influenced by—the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of other people as they are expressed through transactional human interaction. Nor do they account for the breadth and depth of human emotion (Clausewitz’s moral forces) that this new Commons enables any person to express instantly across the world to influence other people and other governments in support of his causes.

Unique Properties of the Global Communication Commons

Dr. Mark Maybury, renowned new media expert, emphasized that the “properties” of this new realm are unique in human history in their scope and impact. They mean the “deaths” of time, space, location, privacy, secrecy, censorship, and distance in ways that fundamentally alter human interaction—and governments’ interaction with their people—with results that cannot yet be predicted.⁹³ These properties include transparency, ubiquitous access, viral message dissemination, global social networks, omnipresence, citizen sensors, increased risk, paradox of security, and media as force multiplier or divider.⁹⁴ (See Appendix K). These unique properties also make the Commons ever more volatile and beyond any government’s control, so the increasing complexity of increasing

omniconnectivity and pervasive omnipresence places a great premium on the DOD's and USG's ability to manage its own communication with the rest of the world.⁹⁵ (See Chart 4).

Of utmost importance, in the war of ideas and ideologies, U.S. enemies, especially al-Qaeda, and rising powers, especially Russia and China, have moved quickly to master these properties and use them to their strategic advantage and to the U.S.'s detriment. The transparency of the Commons, the constant news cycle, the lack of context, and the paradox of secrecy often create a fog that can blur the distinctions among U.S. friends and allies, neutrals, competitors, and enemies. The U.S. should avoid the trap of mirror-imaging its adversaries and competitors and use the principles of SC to gain the understanding that can fulfill Sun Tzu's principle of knowing the enemy as well as one knows oneself.

These principles should help the USG carefully distinguish among all participants and guide the development of strategies that can retain the support of allies and friends, influence the neutrals to support the U.S. or keep them on the sidelines, manage cautious relationships with competitors, and isolate U.S. enemies and adversaries. It should also distinguish that competitors in some areas may be collaborators in others.⁹⁶ The complexities of these evolving relationships and the exploitable nature of the Commons should compel the USG and DOD to consider the impact of these properties and the pervasive climate of communication on their strategies.

Tenets of Communication, Principles of War, and Elements of Strategy

To establish the foundation for the principles of strategic communication that flow through this climate of communication across the Commons, this report next describes of applicable tenets of communication, principles of war, and elements of strategy.⁹⁷ Then, it synthesizes the three into 13 suggested principles of strategic communication. These principles support the overall strategic approach: Ends-Ways-Means. The desired national end state, derived from the National Security Strategy, determines both the goals pursued by all instruments of national power (ways) and the amount of effort

and resources (means) that can be devoted to those instruments. Finally, the pursuit of that end state should harness these ways and means within a strategic concept that upholds the legitimacy of the effort and guides the choice of plans and tactics that can achieve the objectives.

This strategic concept is imbued with the fact that the ubiquitous climate of communication is not a metaphor but the reality through which those strategies, plans, and tactics are executed. The tenets and principles can be considered as guides that can help create effective strategy, plans, and tactics.

Tenets of Human Communication

► Legitimacy

Described by such phrases as “sanctioned by law;” “in accordance with established, accepted rules, practices, and standards,” and “authentic,”⁹⁸ legitimacy signifies that an organization and its actions have been recognized as representing either the generally accepted legal and/or the normative standards. To put it in common military terms, legitimacy is bestowed on a state when it closes its “say-do” gap between what it says and what it does, between its values and its actions. They must be as consistent as they can be; when they are not, a government must explain why in a way that the people can accept.

Unfortunately, in recent modern history, often concepts that are antithetical to the U.S. ideals of freedom and democracy have been recognized as legitimate by their peoples, including fascism, communism, and other totalitarian and authoritarian forms. Once established by either popular vote (Hitler’s regime in 1933) or by revolution (Soviet Union and China), these regimes have maintained their hold on power through a combination of oppression, propaganda, and popular support for their reforms which brought stability to chaos (Germany in Depression) and/or security, stability, and basic improvement to the previously downtrodden (Russian serfs). Even with these regimes, a case can be made that their legitimacy derived from the public support of their ideology. For example, when the

Soviets substantially admitted in 1989 that their system had failed to provide basic prosperity and was no longer valid, it disintegrated quickly.⁹⁹

In the present circumstances, the legitimacy of the USG is judged by a much higher standard than the standard against which its adversaries (Al-Qaeda, Iran, North Korea) are judged. First, we are the only superpower and that power attracts balancing from competitors, and second, the USG sets its own very high standard when its national policy is that our values and our interests are the same.¹⁰⁰

Although the Joint Operations manual rightly stresses that legitimacy is often the decisive element in any military engagement, it doesn't go far enough. For a likely future of waging counter-insurgency operations, conducting preventive security cooperation efforts, preventing the spread of WMD, balancing rising regional powers, and conducting more humanitarian missions, legitimacy will always be the decisive element. This decisive element derives from the acceptance or cooperation of the people and governments affected by how the USG applies its instruments of power to attain its objectives.

Thus, the true center of gravity (COG) in similar situations is the will of the people. This "will" appears to consist of a "seesaw of approval": at one end are those who always support the USG values, interests, and positions; at the other end are those who will always oppose them. The group with the decisive "will" consists of the undecideds or neutrals who tilt the seesaw either way depending on a number of factors:

- The issue being contested,
- What the USG does do and how it does it, that is, the width and depth of its 'say-do gap,'
- The participants' personal involvement, beliefs, narratives, and interests,
- How the media frame the messages and present them to the seesaw group
- Impact of the influence campaigns each side wages to gain their support,¹⁰¹
- How the seesaw group interprets "the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions,"¹⁰² and
- How all of these factors interact within the communication climate.

► The Question of Delegitimacy in War

Equally important, whether the USG is seeking to win a Sun Tsvian ‘war without fighting’ or Clausewitz’s ‘war as violence to gain national ends,’ the USG must oppose and delegitimize the ideology and actions of the adversaries. This author asserts that rather than focus solely on a public relations or marketing approach, the USG can use the dialogic approach to do so. Genest argues that the current war of ideas must be fought like a political campaign as a zero sum game “with winners and losers” and in which the opposition/enemy’s gain is the USG’s loss and the USG’s gain is their loss.¹⁰³ His view is that “the real function of strategic communication is to win the war of ideas,” a monologic approach rather than a dialogic approach that would build and sustain beneficial relationships.

An election campaign may seem like a win-lose, zero-sum proposition, but the reality is more subtle: Opposing political parties know that after the election, they must find ways to work together to govern; they are not truly interested in the other party’s absolute destruction; they play by generally accepted and relatively transparent set of laws, rules, and norms; and the consequences of an election are not as catastrophic as those of war. The parties know that a campaign is a game that they agree to play so they can compete for the upper hand in the reality of power and governance.

This author agrees with two of Genest’s key points: 1) ‘marketing matters,’ especially the choice of a credible messenger whose message resonates with the intended participants, and 2) ‘spin matters,’ that is, the timing, form, context, and influence of the message and the explanation of its meaning determine the message’s success.¹⁰⁴ However, marketing and spin are only a small part of the elements necessary to win this war of ideas because this war is based on religious beliefs that are far more meaningful to the participants and have a character very different from that of a political game.

The present war against radical extremism has been called 80 percent a war of ideas and a clash of ideologies and 20 percent a war of violence.¹⁰⁵ This author believes that it is more a Huntington-like

fundamental clash of faith-based belief systems. People whose basic belief-forming and world view-driving ideas are being attacked do not appear to consider this war a game; the truly committed on both sides believe that their side has the favor of their God, a far more potent and dangerous belief than a political argument about whether or not to cut taxes.

Consider the current “winner and loser” in the current struggle:¹⁰⁶ Al-Qaeda has sought successfully to delegitimize the USG in the eyes of the Muslim public: 81 percent of Muslims in the March 2008 Sadat Center-Zogby poll disapproved of USG policies in the Middle East.¹⁰⁷ However, Al-Qaeda has failed to establish its own legitimacy as only 7 percent in the same poll agree with Al-Qaeda’s desired end state of a restored Muslim caliphate and less than one third respect AQ for standing up to the USG.¹⁰⁸ So, at present, both the USG and Al-Qaeda are losing the war of ideas if their goal is to gain the support of the global Muslim public.

Thus, this example reveals one of the critical weaknesses of the political campaign/delegitimization approach: even if you can delegitimize your enemy, it does not necessarily follow that you legitimize your own ideology. Apparently, Muslims are seeking alternatives to the diametrically opposed ideologies of the USG and AQ.

Finally, another danger of the political campaign approach is that the electoral, zero-sum game analogy has a serious shortcoming: war is not an election and it is not a zero-sum game because the actual stakes are so much higher and so much longer lasting than those in a political campaign. War always inflicts significant damage on people, economies, social harmony, and cultures. Genest maintains that it is better to wage a war of ideas, backed with violence, to win because you can restore order on your terms after you win.¹⁰⁹

To avoid turning such a serious clash into a war of absolute destruction, it may be better to use a dialogic approach. Since a core USG’s value is freedom of religion, then the USG approach should

uphold that value and be based on mutual respect for Muslims' right to believe as they choose, that is, to grant the basic legitimacy of each religion. To seek to delegitimize their beliefs or insult the believers and their perceived leaders can only deepen the divide and increase the severity of the animosity. It would seem wiser to maximize the dialog to understand and engage the different cultures to better prevent, deter, and dissuade violence. The neutrals and undecideds will decide on whom to confer legitimacy based on their own values, metaphors, cultural and religious lenses, so the USG should develop messages that resonate with them and use credible messengers whom they can believe.¹¹⁰ Ultimately, the tenet of legitimacy is so critical that it must be considered the first principle of strategic communication.

► Interaction

By definition, communication involves the exchange of messages and meaning, so all communication is interactive. In the current context, the DOD might emphasize in its strategic thinking the types and impact of the many kinds of communicative interaction the military already performs, such as foreign internal defense training (FID), military-to-military exchanges, etc. Like AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM with their new TSCPs, the DOD as a whole should plan its strategy with the likely consequences of communicative interaction as a primary consideration of any campaign.

The current war of ideas within the greater war against radical extremism is taking place throughout the global Commons in new ways. Yet, Clausewitz's definition of war and his logic of interaction apply because he claims that war derives from only two motives: hostile feelings and hostile intentions with the latter most important.¹¹¹ In addition, communicative acts will drive and be driven by Clausewitz's theories of interaction in war. He cites three cases of interaction and escalation:

1. There is no logical limit to the application of force as each side reciprocates and increases the force it applies to win.

2. Since “the aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy,” and war is always “the collision of two living forces,” the ultimate aim applies to both sides so “he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.” Thus, neither side truly controls the interaction, so the goal must be to reach the point where you can disarm your enemy or make that position probable.¹¹²
3. Interaction and competition will result in escalation because each side will seek to match the other’s effort against the other’s power of resistance, that is, the enemy’s total resources plus “the strength of his will.”¹¹³ Communication can weaken or strengthen that will.

Although these cases of interaction are theoretical ideals, taken together all three have several important implications in the current war of ideas:

- A. Communication strategies should aim to achieve the maximum negative impact on the enemy while they achieve the maximum positive impact for themselves.
- B. Communication strategies should strive to weaken the enemy’s base of support, either by delegitimizing the enemy so its supporters leave, persuading the undecideds to join your side, or by enticing the supporters away with inducements. These enticements should support to the maximum extent possible the safety, security, and stability of your supporters and the neutrals and undecideds.
- C. To gain the critical advantage that can move the enemy to probable defeat, the ways and means that execute communication strategies must exceed the enemy’s resources.
- D. The maximized resources must aim to break the will of the enemy and his supporters.¹¹⁴

Ultimately, as Clausewitz stressed, in reality, as the three cases of extreme interaction are modified by purpose and circumstance, the strategy in the war of ideas must remain focused on the “*political object*, which was the *original motive* (emphases in original).”¹¹⁵ The extent of the political objective will influence significantly the amount of resources devoted to the effort and the military power brought to bear.¹¹⁶ If the war of ideas makes up 80 percent of the current struggle and the political object of the

war on terror is to defeat transnational radical extremists, then following Clausewitz's views, it would appear logical for the USG to devote far more of its resources to its strategic communication campaign compared to those communication resources it now devotes to this campaign. Those resources should be devoted to establishing and promoting the basic services that demonstrate to the neutrals and undecideds that the USG and pro-USG governments can best provide for their safety, security, and stability—the essence of influencing which side they choose to support, according to counterinsurgency theory.¹¹⁷

The dialogic approach also must be used during these interaction phases as the phases can contribute significantly to the peaceful interactions that first can help identify the undecideds' actual needs (jobs, water, food, etc.), second, gain their confidence, and third, encourage their behavior to change in favor of U.S. efforts.

► **Ubiquity**

Across the pervasive Global Communication Commons, the collapse of distance, time, and location that Maybury described could be viewed instead as the supernova-like explosion of interaction. This explosion is caused by the multiplier effect of the expanding physical infrastructure. From the virtually free cost of data storage to the virtually free cost of telecommunications, these electronic phenomena have compressed traditional concepts of space and time. The paradoxical expansion-compression also created universal access to the Commons, giving it the quality of ubiquity. This ubiquity has energized the forces that shape human interaction in new ways: the viral dissemination effect, the wildfire-like spread of social networking, the virtual life phenomenon, and more are just the initial expressions of what the future holds for the core principle of ubiquity.¹¹⁸

► **The 5 M's— Messenger, Message, Meaning, Medium, Multiplicity**

In any model of communication, the four basic "M's"—messenger, message, meaning, and medium—constitute the critical aspects of how an initiator begins an exchange. In addition, the global

Commons adds the 5th “M”, the “multiplicity” of simultaneous and continuous participants, channels, methods, interactions, and consequences. This factor makes the right choices of the basic 4 M’s ever more complex and far more important than in the past. If the combination of the four gains the attention of the intended participants, those participants clearly understand the intended meaning, and they respond in the desired way, then the communicative act is effective.¹¹⁹ In the future, the “multiplicity” of the Commons and the potential global impact of seemingly minor incidents mean that the USG must constantly anticipate the impact of the basic four elements that it can control.

► Values

Effective communication must take into serious account the participants’ basic values. Noted scholar Shalom H. Schwartz stated that values—beliefs closely tied to emotions—refer to people’s coveted aims, serve as a motivational schema, transcend specific events, serve as standards for action, and guide individuals to create personal priorities.¹²⁰ They act as guides to personal and group behavior, help shape moral judgments, form expectations of others, help construct social norms, influence religious beliefs, and more. Schwartz has identified ten basic human values: self-direction, stimulation (“challenge in life”); hedonism; achievement (personal success through competence); power; security; conformity (restraint to maintain norms and social order); tradition; benevolence (group protection); and universalism (protection of the welfare of all people and the environment).¹²¹ These essential values derive from, create, and are fulfilled by the continuous exchange of messages and meaning among peoples, cultures, and nations. They always exist in dynamic interrelationships, that is, they often complement or compete. For example, good will for your in-group may compete with universal tolerance.¹²² Values—and their competition and cooperation within and among people—have a strong impact on interpersonal and group communication because they form an essential element of a person’s filters that interpret and assign meaning to messages. At the organizational level, Dowling and Pfeffer

stressed that people grant legitimacy to an organization or state based on their values, so organizations “seek to establish congruence between the social values” based on what they do and “the norms of acceptable behavior in the larger social system...,” that is, how their participants expect them to act.¹²³ Thus, the breadth and depth of values in people’s behavior influences and is influenced by all aspects of interpersonal and organizational communication.

► **Metaphor**

Pioneers George Lakoff and Mark Johnson established that the concept of metaphor—“understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”—is not only a trait of language but also the way people “structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people.”¹²⁴ They help shape our basic world view, reflect and are reflected by our values, and “structure how we perceive, how we think, and what we do.”¹²⁵ For example, by conceiving of “argument as war,” we act in ways that the war metaphor influences us to act: win or lose; attack, defend, and counterattack; gain and lose ground; stake out positions; plan and use strategies; seize the high ground; etc.¹²⁶ Lakoff and Johnson show that metaphors are completely engrained in and shape “human *thought* processes (emphasis in original)...”¹²⁷ If metaphors both create and are created by human thought, then they largely shape all aspects of communication and human interaction. Christine McNulty stressed that our metaphors shape our perceptions of other people and other cultures; she asserts that the USG’s inability to achieve its long-term goals have occurred in part because the USG lacks understanding in five basic areas because of the influence of metaphor on its collective perception of its adversaries: systems perspective, cultural context, cognitive dimensions of adversary decision making, cultural-cognitive relationships, and “the nature of and complexity of” adversary systems.¹²⁸ In short, traditional U.S. metaphors that help shape U.S. cultural biases have helped prevent deep and broad understanding of our adversary cultures; in Sun Tzu’s words, we have not known ourselves or known our enemies.

► Narrative

McNulty asserts that every person (and every culture) “lives inside... a story. The story is based on the events and circumstances that have created meaning in our lives—our experiences. We invent the stories to integrate our interpretations of those experiences into a coherent whole.”¹²⁹ These stories resonate within our cultures, nations, organizations, families, and societies and derive from the mixture of values, metaphors, historical experience, and cultural/national/tribal/clan/family heritage. People need narratives to make sense of their world, to make sense of their own lives, and to “explain the behavior of others, whether those be individuals, groups, or nations.”¹³⁰ In a key point, McNulty maintained that narratives, shaped by metaphor, differ from culture to culture and even within cultures.¹³¹ With regard to influence, McNulty stresses the strong role that narratives play in persuasion: “If we hope to influence people, then we have to enable them to see that what we are saying fits into their story;...”¹³² McNulty’s point about narratives correlates to Schwartz’s point about the values of universalism (tolerance for all) and benevolence (protection of your group). Narratives that can evoke shared values, a sense of affinity at some level, and shared emotions can exert more influence than those that do not.

With respect to the Muslim world, the importance of choosing the right messenger is critical. In numerous recent situations, credible Muslim messengers have strongly opposed terrorism as un-Islamic. They appear to be having a significant impact among Muslims to reduce Al-Qaeda’s legitimacy. Most important, Abdel-Qadir Abdel-Aziz, known as Dr. Fadl, a leading Muslim cleric who had been Zawahiri’s mentor and who is now in an Egyptian prison, published a book in November 2007 that strongly opposed Al-Qaeda’s using violence against Muslims and attacking foreigners in Muslim countries.¹³³ His book has had a major impact in damaging AQ’s legitimacy.¹³⁴ Since its publication, bin Laden and Zawahiri have issued several videotapes and published several tracts responding to Dr. Fadl’s

book and attacking him personally. The frequency and stridency of their attacks against him indicate how seriously they take his opposition.¹³⁵

► **Mediated Reality**

Throughout the Commons, most modern human interaction takes place through “new communication technologies [that] increasingly define, at least ‘mediate,’ the human political experience.”¹³⁶ These technologies are used by major media corporations (the media) that act as information brokers. These brokers exert significant influence on, that is, mediate, the creation of reality in people’s minds in several ways: agenda-setting, framing, and priming. The media filter the information they make available through their channels (satellite television, radio, cable television, Internet, traditional publications, etc.) in accord with their own values and interests or driven by customer preferences. Their control of the channels controls who has access to information, how they select the information (“news”) they offer, and how they present it.¹³⁷ The media tend to have the power to “frame” or bound the information and to set the agenda for what the public thinks about, up to a point.¹³⁸ “Agenda-setting is the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media.”¹³⁹ Although recent research shows that the media does not control the agenda as thoroughly as once thought, it does exert significant influence on what the public considers newsworthy and to which the public devotes its attention. This influence is called “the priming of perspectives that subsequently guide the public’s opinions about public figures,” according to McCombs.¹⁴⁰ [and this author asserts, public issues]. Thus, what the media thinks important—or can be convinced by government, corporations, non-profit groups, and individuals to think is important—“strongly influence the priorities of the public.”¹⁴¹

In the war of ideas, the participants, as will be discussed with the tenet of attention in detail below, are always your committed supporters, your committed opposition, and the seesaw sitters (neutrals and undecideds) whose support can tilt either way. The critical strategy is always to retain your committed

base while you appeal to the seesaw participants who can tip the balance in your favor. With limited resources, yet interacting through the ubiquitous climate across the Commons, the DOD has to set its priorities and choose its “4 M’s”—especially the medium and the messenger— carefully so the media can frame the message the DOD wants to send out, set the agenda the DOD wants set, and prime the participants to accept the DOD’s point of view.

In relation to the DOD, Gregory emphasized, “News frames matter in politics and national security issues” because they create and reflect forceful, clear, meaningful narratives that resonate with the public and play a critical role in constructing social reality.¹⁴² When the media chooses to focus on an issue or news item and how it chooses to express that focus, it also exaggerates the importance of that issue or information in the public’s perception in a phenomenon called the **amplification effect**.¹⁴³ However, through its choices to continue listening, watching, or reading the news, the public influences the media’s choices of what to amplify.¹⁴⁴ These complementary processes of framing, agenda-setting, priming, and amplifying are highly meaningful specific processes that reflect the continuous, transactional nature of communication and significantly impact how the USG and DOD interact across the Commons.

► **Attention**

Attention rises to the level of a principle because the attention of the individual and the public has become a scarce resource in the age of information overload. Competition for that attention has become a formidable challenge that the USG and DOD must master to achieve U.S. objectives.¹⁴⁵ Herbert Simon first focused on attention as a scarce economic resource when he noticed that an abundance of information creates a scarcity of attention that can be paid to that information.¹⁴⁶ He stressed that rather than follow models that continue to overload people with information, organizations need to filter and shape the information they provide to meet the people’s needs.¹⁴⁷ Davenport and Beck coined the phrase

“the attention economy” and asserted that the basis for the future success of any organization might be transactions that gain the attention of the public and influence them to support that organization’s goals.¹⁴⁸ (See Chart 5). To gain the participants’ attention, the USG needs to use the classic Aristotelian persuasive appeals (ethos, logos, and pathos) and craft a message that combines “infective” (creates a desire to share the information) and “affective” (appeals to the emotions) meanings.¹⁴⁹ Maybury advised that these appeals should be based on universal values; he cited SOUTHCOM’s theme for its new partnership-based TSCP: security, stability, and prosperity with the United States as a good neighbor who shares these universal interests.¹⁵⁰

The competition for attention relies on all of the principles of communication to be successful: It depends on appeals to values through mediated interaction in the Commons with participants interested in mutual benefit. The interaction is based on shared narratives, nested in common metaphors, delivered by legitimate partners, and impacted by multiple consequences. (See Appendix L).

► **Mutuality**

Mutuality forms the basis for any successful relationship. Social exchange theory holds that relationships continue as long as people (groups, nations) perceive that the rewards they receive exceed the costs they pay.¹⁵¹ In most cases, people communicate because they want to engage in positive exchanges for mutual benefit; negative exchanges occur when people or organizations lack trust, misunderstand each other, and/or have opposing interests. Dialogic communication can create and sustain ongoing exchanges so all participants can comprehend the others’ intent and meaning accurately and develop productive relationships.¹⁵²

In addition, people set standards, that is, create expectations about the profitable behaviors they desire from their partners. Simply, the more their partners fulfill or exceed their expectations, the more likely people are to stay in relationship; the reverse is also true. On a continuum of expectation, there is

a tipping point at which relationships tend to end because people perceive that the costs exceed the rewards, or they believe that faced with other relationship choices, they can obtain greater benefit by shifting relationships.¹⁵³ (See Chart 6). Thus, to establish and maintain successful relationships, people (organizations and states) should seek to understand their partners' wants and needs and do their best to fulfill them. In exchange, they are responsible for communicating their own expectations and make a commitment to negotiate exchanges that each party perceives as mutually satisfying.¹⁵⁴

However, the dominant theme of the rational actor theory of international relations is that states act primarily to protect or enhance their interests. Competing interests, created and driven by historical, cultural, political, and popular interests, inevitably lead to competition and conflict in a zero sum game of winners and losers. Irrational factors, such as religious fervor, hatred of others, megalomania of rulers, the urge to power, etc., accentuate the differences among state actors and increase the likelihood of conflict leading to war. The long history of warfare and conflict, of course, support these views. However, a key theme of this report is that based on Sun Tzu's dictum to 'know the enemy' and the obvious addendum to know your friends, a state must pursue mutuality to best understand friends and enemies. Deep understanding can help identify mutual interests and avoid conflict, or gain the knowledge a state needs to achieve victory at low cost.¹⁵⁵

► Influence

The draft JIC focuses on the use of communication to manage the "challenge of influence—convincing others to think and act in ways compatible with our objectives,..."¹⁵⁶ The JIC describes "two ways to exercise power: compulsion and influence."¹⁵⁷ At the theater and operational levels of war, the JIC strongly implied that influencing participants in every aspect of their operations will be the JFC's overriding concern.¹⁵⁸ The JIC notes that the types of influence can include everything from informing to coercing along a continuum of increasing force. Despite its sometimes negative connotations,

influence, the JIC correctly emphasizes, “*is a pervasive and fundamental form of any social interaction, as essential to cooperation as it is to competition or conflict* (emphasis in original).”¹⁵⁹ Virtually every communicative act has influence as one of its purposes because underlying every communication is a relationship based on a cost/benefit analysis.

At the international strategic level, Gregory views influence as a form of power. Quoting Colin Powell, he noted, “*Diplomacy . . . is persuasion in the shadow of power. It is the orchestration of words against the backdrop of deeds in pursuit of policy objectives.. Diplomacy uses the reputation of power to achieve what power itself cannot achieve, or can achieve only at greater and sometimes excessive cost.*”¹⁶⁰ Similarly, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Richard L. Armitage have urged the USG to balance what they call “soft power”—attractive influence—and traditional hard power to achieve U.S. objectives with smart power.¹⁶¹ At the heart of the five key recommendations in their CSIS Smart Power Commission report is exerting influence in new and innovative ways in critical fields, including public diplomacy, world trade, and energy security. From its theoretical bases to its intensely practical applications, influence constitutes a linchpin principle of communication.

► Consequences

When the USG seeks to influence others, it always initiates messages with intent and desired ends, but it may or may not receive the desired responses. The filters within all participants (leaders, officials, and the public) and the many sources of “noise,” or barriers to accurate perception and interpretation, often interfere. The exchange of messages and meaning may have both intended and unintended consequences; second and third order effects from every communication are virtually inescapable in the complex Commons. Traditional communication models with simple feedback loops rarely consider the impact of multiple feedback streams from multiple sources. Earlier models fail to account for the ubiquity of the modern Commons and the viral dissemination of messages and meaning across the

Commons by citizen reporters and citizen sensors. The JIC acknowledges these multiple layers of complexity, noting that messages will “bleed over to multiple audiences” either through direct channels or through indirect channels across “intermediate nodes” embedded throughout the Commons.¹⁶²

Furthermore, the nature of U.S. society with its free press and open competition in the marketplace of ideas means that global participants often receive conflicting messages from within different USG branches of government and agencies as well as other U.S. participants, including of course, the news media and competing political parties. If it is virtually impossible to control the messages that the United States sends to the world, then the USG and the DOD will always experience—and have to plan for—positive and negative unintended consequences. They are inevitable, have potentially global scope, and make a far broader impact than ever before. (See Appendix M).

Traditional—and Modern—Principles of War

These tenets of communication can be correlated with the principles of war as leaders and commanders must master both and use the tenets to achieve success. During the past decade, an academic debate has considered modifying the nine long-established principles of war first promulgated in 1921 and issued in their most recent form in 1949.¹⁶³ These nine core principles embodied in the Joint Operations 3-0 manual and their basic purposes consist of objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. Reflecting the debate about the difference between principles of war and those of operations, Joint Publication 3-0 adds three principles of operation: restraint, perseverance, and notably, legitimacy. As this author argued above, the principle of legitimacy is an essential, if not the essential, principle of strategic communication.

Those in favor of changing the principles have usually asserted that changes in the modern environment and in warfare (nuclear war, cyber war, irregular warfare, asymmetric tactics, rise of failing states, insurgency, etc.) necessitate a re-thinking of the principles.¹⁶⁴ Several advocates have proposed

changes ranging from modifying the nine core principles and adding several more to revamping the concepts. In 1998, Glenn proposed dropping the term “principles of war” and only calling them “principles of operations.”¹⁶⁵ He presented a unified list of principles of operations that included seven of the original nine, modified two (massed effects and unity of effort) and added two new ones (morale and exploitation).¹⁶⁶ Citing several major situational changes, Morgan, McIvor and their team included several new principles and re-worded others to reflect the modern environment: notably will, precision, simultaneity, and unity of effort.¹⁶⁷ Picking up on Morgan and McIvor’s theme, in 2007 LT CMDR Christopher E. Van Avery called for an even more dramatic overhaul. He retained only objective, security, and surprise from the traditional principles and substantially modified or introduced nine more: speed, concentration of effects, flexibility, economy of effects, pervasive awareness, continuous planning, sustainment, efficiency of command, and integration of actors.¹⁶⁸

In sum, these viewpoints illuminate many of the effects of the dramatic changes in the modern environment and offer several useful ‘old, but new’ principles that can enrich the principles of strategic communication, especially legitimacy, will, pervasive awareness, and sustainment. These four correspond very closely with the core tenets of legitimacy, interaction, ubiquity, attention, mutuality, influence, and consequences. (See Appendix N). This review and their correspondence show how the principles of war can be coordinated with the core tenets of communication. Then, both can be considered carefully through the lens of strategy to derive core principles of strategic communication.

Principles of Strategy Applied To Strategic Communication

Strategy at the national level is “*a plan for applying resources to achieve objectives*. (emphasis in original)...it is inseparable from, indeed it is, the relationship in thought and action between means and ends, resources and objectives, power and purpose, capabilities and intentions in any sphere of human

activity.”¹⁶⁹ These relationships also cross the boundaries of the pairs: the interplay of means and ends affects and is affected by the interplay among all the pairs.

The USG must develop a plan that describes this complex interplay and how the Departments and Agencies are expected to fulfill their roles in that interplay. If the United States is to support the development of secure, well-ordered states, then securing the enduring U.S. interests of security, prosperity, stability, and values must be negotiated, in all senses of the word, across the Commons. Most important, the USG must demonstrate its support for its stated values with a strategic construct that can guide the effective interaction of the USG’s words and actions. It needs a clear set of guiding principles of strategic communication that can inform and frame the development of strategy. (See Chart 7).

To develop an effective strategy, Gregory notes, requires following a sound strategic logic (“analytical construct”) that determines “specific national goals (ends) and choices among instruments of statecraft (means) needed to achieve them. This is not just a simple correlation of ends and means—of objectives and power.”¹⁷⁰ It requires serious analyses that lead to sound assumptions about all critical issues: “interests, values, national and transnational contexts, threats, opportunities, strengths and limitations of instruments, public opinion, priorities, trade-offs between costs and risks, and the application of strategies to situations.”¹⁷¹ The following elements can frame the required analyses:

- Interplay of Values and National Interests
- National Interests and Priorities
- International and National Context(s)
- Foundation for the Instruments of Power
- Identification of National Communication Threats, Opportunities, Weaknesses, and Strengths
- Evaluation of Costs and Risks
- Estimate of National Communication Resources
- Development of Policy
- Allocation of Communication Resources (See Appendix D.)
- Levels of Strategic Thinking and Core SC Premises

These elements of a comprehensive approach to strategy must be applied, Deibel explains, to the overall plan with several levels of strategic thinking: 1) assessment of assumptions about the Commons;

2) analysis of the ends (national interests in light of threats and opportunities) and the means (available sources of power and influence); and 3) a plan that outlines viable objectives, evaluates applicable instruments of power, and identifies the statecraft that can apply the instruments effectively.¹⁷² As the JIC urges for JFCs, and this report encourages all USG departments to follow, every national, theater, operational, and tactical plan should be based on these specific SC premises:

- the communicative/influential purposes behind all campaigns, operations, and maneuvers.
- the communicative context or interactive environment likely to affect the above.
- the synchronized interaction among the instruments of power.
- the communicative TOWS that the specific USG participants bring to the situation.
- an analysis of the required extent of multiple-participant involvement (interagency, Coalition partners, IGOs, NGOs).
- the communicative resources available to support the mission.
- the desired effects and the likely intended and unintended consequences of the results.

Baker's Dozen Principles of Strategic Communication

These elements of strategy synthesized with the tenets of communication and the principles of war shape the principles of strategic communication. Deep understanding of the Global Communications Commons and the highest level commitment to the following 13 principles may offer the USG and the DOD insight into how their planners can develop strategy that can take best advantage of the USG's communicative ways and means. (See Appendix O).

Objective

Traditionally, this principle has concerned, at the highest strategic level, a clear focus on national interests and objectives. (See Appendix A). Unfortunately, the SC objectives from the NSPD&SC, though nested in and supportive of the national security objectives, are not based on the standard ends-

ways-means strategy construct to formulate a comprehensive plan.¹⁷³ Any new strategy first should follow the proven construct and may need to consider objectives that support a multilateral perspective because of the Commons' ubiquitous, participatory nature and the evolving regional powers.¹⁷⁴

Legitimacy

As discussed in detail, receiving a high degree of public acceptance is the ultimate goal of all governments as well as all insurgents. Across the Commons, the primary source of this prize is the will of the people, defined as the tipping point of approval from the neutrals and undecideds.¹⁷⁵ As noted in the communication tenets, cultural metaphors and narratives significantly influence how a people define legitimacy, so strategies to both legitimize and delegitimize opposing sides must focus on those factors when strategists consider the “5 M’s” for key themes and messages.

Will

“Will” refers to the power of conscious decision, determined purposeful action or direction, and one’s disposition toward others.¹⁷⁶ The “will of the people,” long confined to a bounded political entity, has acquired new meaning in the Global Communication Commons. The Commons has two main effects: 1) empowers the truly motivated to create new or join global networks to participate in both the creation and the aftermath of events, and 2) dramatically extends the reach of information and influence to grab the attention of far more people whose interests may have remained dormant without access to the interesting information. As attention is the scarce resource in the Commons, contending groups must spend the resources to attract and sustain the interest of the omniconnected global citizenry. Motivated individuals and empowered groups now have the choice to participate—with their support, opposition, funding, and time in any USG (or any government’s) actions. Dialogic communication dramatically affects this “will” in how people, organizations, and states negotiate costs and benefits. In addition, decision making processes are influenced by two major factors: 1) how the media frames the actions of

governments and their results and 2), most important, the people's *perception and interpretation* (emphasis added) of the messages and meaning that a government intends to send to the people with its actions, words, symbols, and images.¹⁷⁷

Initiative

Given the pervasive nature of the Commons, the ubiquitous 24/7/365 media news cycle, and their influence on the will of the people, the USG should focus on “initiative” rather than the traditional principle of “offensive” and van Avery’s principle of “speed.” Initiative, in the U.S military’s sense of Phase 3 operations, means acting first to take and maintain control of the battlespace.¹⁷⁸ In the Commons, seizing and maintaining control is impossible. However, the USG can take and maintain the initiative in this sense: It can always be prepared to create and advance the message flow and influence whether the flow of discourse, action, and reaction goes in the desired direction as well as act in and react to particular situations as they arise.¹⁷⁹ It should continuously influence the flow by establishing and following a comprehensive, coherent, clear communication strategy and plans that allow the CCDRs and JFCs to attain and sustain the most advantageous timing (prioritized sequence of applying capabilities) and tempo (rate of action that is required to maintain the initiative).¹⁸⁰

Engagement

If legitimacy is the “heart” of strategic communication, engagement is the “exercise” that strengthens that heart. At present, the USG is primarily focused on the multi-level struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan and the overlapping struggle against transnational radical extremism. Yet in its budgeting and programming processes, the DOD continues to focus on acquiring major weapons systems to wage conventional wars, not preparing for irregular conflicts that require an effective understanding of the Commons, the climate, and the principles of strategic communication and then providing adequate supporting capabilities and resources.¹⁸¹ Constant engagement with allies and adversaries is required to

create, enhance, or sustain the type of relationship that—with allies and friends and potential friends—can offer the greatest mutual benefit and that—with competitors, adversaries, and enemies—develop the deepest understanding that can help gain or maintain the greatest advantage. With the latter, engagement can also offer the insight needed to transform a conflictual relationship into a cooperative one.

Unity of Effort

Meeting the asymmetric security and irregular warfare challenges that the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) stresses will require what the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has called “unified action,” more commonly called unity of effort.¹⁸² A growing number of USG departments recognize that the instruments of national powers and their specific capabilities must work together. The IW JOC states, “The complex nature of IW¹⁸³ and its focus on the relevant populations will require the JFC to achieve a level of IA [interagency] teamwork (unified action) beyond that traditionally associated with conventional combat operations...”¹⁸⁴ With dozens of different Departments, Agencies, and USG units directly involved in executing irregular warfare activities, the traditional unity of command is virtually impossible; only unity of effort can align and coordinate their activities toward common goals.

Effectiveness

A traditional principle of war is efficiency, meaning economy of effort to achieve the desired effects. Although economy/efficiency is preferable, it is not necessary for communication “effectiveness,” that is, the actual persuasion of peoples, organizations, and states to act with desired behaviors. Efficiency often is considered in relation to “output,” i.e., producing press releases, the number of pamphlets dropped on towns and villages, and other measures of performance. The concept of effectiveness, instead, focuses on goal achievement and is less concerned about the resources expended to achieve the goal. In the new Commons, with the multiplicity of messengers, messages,

participants, and consequences, efficiency is one of two objectives that are difficult to achieve: the other is what current U.S. military doctrine calls “information dominance” or “information superiority” within the information environment.¹⁸⁵ Simply, the USG may control its messages; it cannot control the results.

Rather than efficiency or dominance, the USG can seek to be effective by synthesizing these core actions as it plans its own communication strategy and tactics:

- understanding the values, beliefs, culture, politics, ruling elites’ decision calculus, etc.;
- planning to engage “simultaneously multiple communication partners;”¹⁸⁶
- mastering the art and science of choosing and crafting the most appropriate messages, messengers, and media with the meanings that best resonate with the most important participants, and
- listening strategically and holistically to the feedback from the multiple participants so the next round of communication in the continuous process can be adapted to the evolving situation.¹⁸⁷

Adaptability

The new Commons is dynamic, complex, and fluid with the possibility of millions of interactions about any given topic that resonates with the needs, interests, and values of potentially millions of participants. Every DOD participant has to understand the constant need to adapt and act flexibly to these rapidly changing circumstances. The constant flow of influence and information means that the USG and DOD must become more flexible learning organizations; our current adversaries, especially the radical extremists and competitors, including the Chinese, have shown that they are highly adaptable and improvise their strategic communication campaigns as needed. As the U.S. military has begun to treat the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan more like counterinsurgency operations, they too have become more adaptive and more successful.

Sustainment

Sustainment seems an obvious strategic principle in any global defense enterprise. As a principle of strategic communication, it means that the DOD must consistently allocate adequate forces and resources that can constantly engage and execute the “influence campaigns” that the multi-decade struggle requires.¹⁸⁸ Sustainment implies the operational principles of perseverance and is a prerequisite to and upholds any long-term effort.¹⁸⁹

Pervasive Awareness

In the global Commons, this principle means that intelligence capabilities, especially human, social, cultural, and political analysis, form the basis for the deep understanding required to plan appropriate communication strategies. Across the Intelligence Community, more resources are being added, but the increases may not be synchronized with the emerging needs nor be devoted to the required capabilities that can acquire, analyze, and interpret the needed information. In addition, the array of Foreign Area Officers, FID teams, MTTs, DOS staff, etc. in individual countries are coordinated through the country teams in each embassy, but this country-centric structure cannot grasp the regional and transnational trends and needs that can help provide the continuous awareness required for strategic decisions. In many troublesome areas, the USG has few resources available to the country teams, much less a comprehensive approach.

Synchronization of Participants

Synchronization of participants implies “simultaneity,” concurrent action, as an operational and tactical means. It also implies that the traditional concept of mass and the modern concept of precision are not strategic principles, but operational and tactical means to achieve desired effects. It acknowledges that “control is dead” across the Commons, especially in open Western societies. Because delivery of the messages cannot be controlled, the best result that the DOD and USG can work toward is

synchronization of themes with and their consistent promotion by the USG, allies, and friends. Such synchronization requires 1) constant repetition by Senior leaders with their peers and to all their target participants; 2) focused and frequent training of all personnel, especially anyone with any external contact that can be reported across the Commons; and 3) clear, continuous communication across the USG and with its allies and friends.¹⁹⁰

Security

Security, never allowing the adversary to gain a competitive advantage, is always a core principle of any organization. It assumes enormous importance when both the DOD GIG and the Commons face a wide range of constant threats from solo hackers to government-sponsored disruption campaigns.

Clarity

Simplicity, as a core principle of war, means that the commander designs the simplest campaign plan that can achieve the objectives and prepares plans and orders that convey the commander's intent and direction in easily understood terms. However, in communicative situations, such as challenging, long-term negotiations or long-term engagement with adversaries, even allies, the exchanges are rarely simple, but the intent, messages, and meaning must be clear to prevent confusion and mistakes.¹⁹¹

Clarity is achieved with words, symbols, actions, and images that the intended receivers can easily comprehend. Difficulty arises when participants must express intangible qualities, such as emotion, skill, degree of probability, etc. These expressions people use to indicate or represent those qualities are called "signals." The deliberate use of actions, words, images, and symbols to indicate a quality is called "signaling."¹⁹² Signals can be honest or deceptive and reliable or unreliable. For example, an honest signal is a statement that the initiator supports with action, e.g. saying "we have nuclear weapons" and then testing one. A deceptive signal, of course, seeks to mislead the other participants, e.g. saying "we don't intend to build nuclear weapons" and then burying undisclosed facilities 100 feet deep. Reliable

and unreliable signals can be either honest or dishonest, just as long as the participant can anticipate what type of signal the initiator sends. If someone always lies, that is a reliable signal. Signaling is especially important in military and diplomatic communication because the degree of honesty and reliability of the messages exchanged has significant impact on the other participants' choice of responses, often with dangerous and destructive results. Clarity makes effective signaling possible.¹⁹³

Baker's Leading Edge Use of Principles of Strategic Communication

To show how these principles can imbue strategic, operational, and tactical planning and action, consider the example that then-Colonel Ralph O. Baker set in Baghdad during 2003-2004: He practiced each of the principles to gain and sustain the cooperation of the five major elites.¹⁹⁴ His objectives were to hold his area of operations, minimize violence, and begin reconstruction activities; to achieve them, he established his legitimacy with the elite groups based on his military authority and force, but he had to receive their cooperation, that is, win the 'will of the people.' He achieved that by taking the initiative to remain constantly engaged with the groups' leaders; Baker said he spent 70 percent of his time on communication and only 30 percent on combat planning. He also had to practice clarity with every group and maintain a clear, consistent message with each to sustain his credibility and trust and avoid confusion that could erode that trust. He also maintained the will of his forces with strict rules of engagement and direct control of all messages that his battalion commanders were authorized to exchange with the people. His control in those early days maintained unity of effort and made their and his efforts more effective. Baker's efforts were effective because during his tenure in his AOO, there was comparatively little violence and substantial rebuilding progress. He was constantly adapting to constantly changing situations, solving problems, and re-negotiating with the local leaders. He said he had adequate combat forces, but always needed more intelligence resources and more qualified public affairs and information operations staff, so sustainment was a key issue. He used his relationships with

the leaders to gather intelligence, used his troops' good relations with the people to gather intelligence tips, used local journalists to work with the local media, and studied the subtle challenges among the five groups. Synchronizing his efforts with the new civilian authorities, the IGOs, and NGOs coming into Baghdad at that time also posed a challenge, but one Baker knew was important to obtain the resources for reconstruction, so he worked at it constantly. Last, and most important, he had to provide as much security for his troops as possible and his mission was to provide security and stability for the people in his AOO. Baker's example—and those of Gen. Petraeus during the surge, the experience of successful COIN operations, and the history of successful diplomacy—clearly demonstrate this critical point: Following the principles of strategic communication will make a significant contribution to success, but NOT practicing them can almost guarantee failure. In sum, the DOD may wish to consider how these principles can contribute to a re-examination of its current strategies in the war of ideas.

Dimensions of Strategy within Strategic Communication Framework

Applying the principles of strategic communication to shape strategy means first evaluating how the principles can inform and enhance the traditional "Ends-Ways-Means-Risks/Costs" model. This traditional construct ends with development of a strategy; it does not reflect the fact that every strategy process takes place within a fluid environment that constantly influences the execution and modification of that strategy. The strategic communication construct adds to the traditional model the constant, two-way interaction among all participants throughout the process. It acknowledges that strategists and planners both influence and are influenced by the other participants—both internal and external—their interactions, and all the consequences of their interaction. It embeds within the strategy development process the SC principles of legitimacy, engagement, unity of effort, sustainment, clarity, synchronization, and especially, influence.

Ends

The desired national end state should be consonant with and resonate with the principles of strategic communication. Effective support for the policies and actions that can realize this vision requires application of all the SC principles. To review several essential ones, the mutual interests of democratic states and the well-being of their people (objective); USG legitimacy to uphold the ideal of liberty and make it attractive in the face of resurgent tyranny;¹⁹⁵ continuous engagement to sustain the favorable will of the people; unity of effort and synchronization of all the instruments and all of the participants; and clarity of vision, mission, purpose, and values- and principle-based interaction.

Ways

If the USG faces a multi-decade struggle against radical extremists, then conventional warfare may be highly unlikely, and asymmetric and irregular warfare should dominate USG efforts to support the national objectives.¹⁹⁶ The Joint Force IW JOC stresses that such operations require 1) sufficient means across the MIDLIFE instruments, 2) unity of the national effort across the USG, and 3) mutually beneficial partnerships with friends and allies. Thus, the U.S. military should seriously examine how to maintain sufficient conventional forces to deter any rising competitors and focus its programming processes on developing the capabilities that can succeed in the most likely scenarios.

More importantly, the most dangerous threat among the DOD's four "mature and emerging challenges" is the catastrophic use of weapons of mass destruction either by radical extremists or so-called 'rogue states.'¹⁹⁷ Confronting this challenge will require the continued integration of all instruments of national power, especially diplomatic (negotiations), economic (aid), financial (sanctions), legal (law enforcement), and intelligence (preventing, identifying, and tracking). Backed by a credible military deterrence, the interaction of the national and international instruments of power can influence, deter, or dissuade states, primarily Iran and North Korea, from proliferating WMD.¹⁹⁸ The

current negotiations with North Korea and the “kabuki dance” of diplomacy underway with Iran demonstrate the necessity of applying the principles of strategic communication as the starting point of managing those challenging relationships.¹⁹⁹

The current and likely future challenges may require a significant shift in the DOD’s “Ways” construct toward those identified in the SC JIC, the IW JOC, the DOD JOE, and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 2.0.²⁰⁰ It stated, “...the future joint force will require capabilities and processes to *help minimize the use of armed force* and to most efficiently respond when necessary. This includes the need for *engagement before and after* warfighting/crisis response, the need for *integrated involvement with interagency and multinational partners*, and the need for multipurpose capabilities...across the [ROMO]” (emphases added).²⁰¹

Means

At present, within the DOD, the actual capabilities and resource allocations that can support the SC framework are divided among many Services and their resource development and allocation uncoordinated. It is unknown whether these resources are being allocated where they are most needed.²⁰² If the SC JIC, the IW JOC, Joint Publication 3.0, and the Joint Capstone Concept all agree that unity of effort—integration and coordination across the spectrum of the MIDLIFE—is necessary to achieve the national ends, then the DOD may need to assess its current and future needs across the FYDP 2010-2015, incorporate the SC principles into the long-term JOCs and JICs, evaluate how adopting the principles may affect doctrine and concept development, and synchronize all DOD SC programs and capabilities with Senior-level oversight.²⁰³ Equally important, the USG may need to consider sustained efforts to integrate and synchronize the interagency instruments of power and to shift significant resources to the DOS and other Departments with major defense roles: Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Commerce, Energy, Transportation, etc.

Finally, the DOD needs to follow the SC principles to prepare to cope with the enormous changes being created by the Global Communication Commons. For example, of 13.4 million registered users in the Second Life virtual society, more than 1.1 million people participated in “virtual living” during the past 60 days on a virtual “mainland” and 905 individually owned “islands.”²⁰⁴ More than 80 million blogs have been created within the past five years. Access to the Internet continues to grow rapidly across the world, reaching into the less developed areas in the Arc of Instability. Al-Qaeda and many other radical extremist groups have mastered the use of the Internet for internal command and control as well as for external propaganda, recruitment, fund raising, etc. The DOD may wish to consider significantly increasing the resources it devotes to its ability to minimize the threat posed by the Commons and maximize its utility to U.S. forces. At present, the DOD only has the new USAF cyber warfare program to protect the DOD GIG, existing IO CNO capabilities, and some classified activities.

Risks and Costs

The costs of developing and enhancing the SC capabilities that can match the need appear minimal within the overall DOD budget. The DOD should do a comprehensive assessment of its SC resources; the DOS has done a similar assessment, and it estimates that its public diplomacy funding for FY 2008 totaled about \$1.2 billion, almost 75 percent of which paid for the activities of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Liberty, etc.).²⁰⁵ That is approximately 3 percent of the total DOS budget (including DOS pass-throughs for many DOD and other foreign assistance programs) of about \$36 billion. The DOD may wish to consider a similar funding level for its SC programs and capabilities or about \$15 billion.

However, the risks of continuing the current situation are enormous; if the United States fails to exercise the 13 SC principles and provide the required ways and means, it can repeat the mistakes that led to the Iraq War (lack of pervasive awareness, lack of constructive engagement, lack of unity of

effort, lack of synchronization, lack of effective communications) and the negative results (five years of war at a current cost of about \$600 billion, damage to U.S. legitimacy, damage to negotiating leverage with adversaries [Iranian nuclear issue], etc.). Furthermore, the likely risks of taking the corrective actions are minimal. For the DOD, the worst case is that by shifting focus, the U.S. may not anticipate the “next war” and be unprepared for mistakes that could lead to major conventional warfare or catastrophic conflict with WMD. However, by following the key SC principles of pervasive awareness, continuous engagement, initiative, etc., the U.S. military can be forewarned about any negative trends that could lead to these catastrophic consequences as well as use the SC principles to help prevent the conditions that lead to war and deter would-be adversaries. The DOD needs a comprehensive approach that incorporates the impact of the properties of the Commons and the potential effects of applying the SC principles to help guide its efforts to align its ways and means with the national objectives.

Research Questions for Consideration

This in-depth discussion raises a number of significant questions that future analysis could address:

- If the principles of strategic communication should imbue national security strategy and the Global Communication Commons manifests the environment in which all interaction occurs, what are the implications for modifying existing or creating new national policies and legal authorities that can best support the USG mission? An amended National Security Act of 1947? A new Smith-Mundt Act?²⁰⁶
- If relationship building and influential communication are most likely to be the underpinning of the instruments of national power during the most likely future conflicts, how should the USG be organized to seize and sustain the initiative to achieve USG objectives? The 2008 Defense Science Board report, the CSIS Smart Power Commission report, and numerous other studies have made numerous explicit recommendations that need to be evaluated and their most

applicable ideas organized into a coherent plan to restructure the USG national security administration.

- If the efforts of the U.S. military, the interagency, Coalition partners, IGOs, and NGOs must be more tightly integrated to conduct effective peace-building and –sustaining operations, how should the USG and the DOD be organized to increase and maximize the required capabilities?
- If continuous engagement and long-term relationship building are required to develop the deep and broad mutual understanding of all U.S. allies and adversaries that can prevent, deter, and dissuade violent conflict, what capabilities and resources must the USG and the DOD develop and sustain that can result in effective forces that can achieve that end?

Conclusion

This report begins and ends with the ideas of Sun Tzu about winning without fighting and of Clausewitz about managing the powerful moral forces and interactions that permeate conflict. It asserts that an omniconnected, omnipresent Global Communication Commons has developed during the past 20 years because of the global spread of the Internet, interactive global media, and personal communication technology. This new Commons goes beyond the accepted land, sea, air, space, information, and cyber domains; it exists within a ubiquitous “climate” of communication. This climate pervades and influences all human activity, especially nations’ efforts to achieve their political objectives.

Within the context of U.S. national security, this climate offers a four-layer construct that correlates to the four levels of war. Corresponding to the highest level of national strategy, “strategic communication” is defined as the highest layer within the communication climate through which U.S. Senior leaders can promulgate national themes and messages and use the principles of strategic communication to keep the peace and win at war. The most effective approach to understanding the principles of strategic communication is the dialogic model of communication based on mutuality.

Thirteen core principles of strategic communication, founded on the concept of legitimacy, are synthesized from the tenets of dialogic communication, the principles of war, and the strategy development process. If these principles are considered the underpinnings of national strategy, they may help achieve U.S. national objectives at the lowest risk and with the highest benefit.

Applying the principles of strategic communication to help realize these ends and objectives, however, requires the USG to inculcate these principles into their strategies and plans (ends), adequately resource the needed capabilities (ways), and use their methods (means) that can best achieve the goals. At present, the ways and means of the DOD may not be postured to support the strategic communication construct and apply the SC principles across its range of military operations. To uphold Sun Tzu's dictums to avoid wasting national treasure and disrupting the social fabric, the DOD and USG may wish to assess their current SC resources and their alignment with national strategy. They should study how to use the principles of strategic communication to thoroughly and effectively integrate all instruments of national power. In the complex exchanges of international diplomacy and war, a national strategy shaped by the principles of strategic communication construct can be an effective way to understand yourself and your enemies and to win, preferably without fighting, as Sun Tzu would urge, or with only the minimum necessary violence, as Clausewitz would agree.

Appendix A

Nine Major Challenges Facing the U.S.

- **Champion Human Dignity,**
- **Strengthen Anti-Terror Alliances,**
- **Defuse Regional Conflicts With Cooperative Efforts,**
- **Prevent Weapon Of Mass Destruction Attacks,**
- **Support Global Economic Growth,**
- **Expand Global Development,**
- **Cooperate With Other Global Powers Where Possible,**
- **Transform U.S. Security Institutions, And**
- **Take Advantage Of Globalization.**

Source: U.S. President. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006, 1.

Appendix B

Concerns with Different Definitions of Strategic Communication

The contrasting terms have different specific meanings and implications and may more probably refer only to the term “communication” rather than the higher level “strategic communication.”

- Tool. Used to carry out a task, a tool is tactical, not strategic. A type of communication can be used as a tool, i.e., interpersonal communication during negotiations, or an Internet blog can serve as a channel through which the USG can both better understand different points of view and engage in dialog with participants who disagree with its policies.
- Coordinating process of understanding and engaging audiences. A process consists of actions planned to be carried out in an organized fashion, that is, tactics. A process may be developed as a result of a strategy.
- Function. In this sense, it is a tactical enabling task.
- Means to influence. Again, it relates to way, method, or process, and the classic definition of persuasion.
- Processes and efforts. These conflate the methods and the actions taken with the methods, so they are tactical and complementary.
- Perception strategy. Self-referential, that is, the word ‘strategy’ is included in the definition, so it lacks independent reference. Perception is only step in the communication process.
- Massing information, ideas, and action. These refer to operational planning steps and tactical actions, not strategic-level thinking and planning.
- Enriching concept. It refers to a general or abstract notion, idea, or most specifically, an explanatory principle, not a framework or structure.

Sources: All meanings referenced at Dictionary.com. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/> (accessed 5 and 26 May 2008).

Appendix C

Core Traits of Clear Definition of Strategic Communication

- Foundation of central organizing principles
- Comprehensive structure from which to develop strategy that aligns ends (policy objectives), ways (communication processes, methods, and actions), and means (communication resources and their effective use)
- Highest level and broadest scope to communicate with multiple participants to address national security objectives
- Highest level focus on enduring national interests
- Coverage of widest span through time—years or decades, not days or weeks
- Focus on highest level dialog with participants
- Focus on highest level purposes to advance policy objectives

Sources: William C. Martel, “The Search for Strategy,” *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 3, Summer 2007, 123.; Owens, “Strategy and Strategic Way of Thinking,” 111; Goldman, “Strategic Communication.”

APPENDIX D

Summary from Worldwide Strategic Communication Education Summit 20-21 March 2008, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA

DRAFT Principles of Strategic Communication for Joint Force Commanders

Source: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, received 22 May 2008.

Note: More than 70 participants in this Conference brainstormed the following principles of strategic communication to help inform the Joint Force Commanders about the foundations of how best to develop strategy and prepare operational plans for their future joint task force campaigns.

Principle: a fundamental tenet; a determining characteristic; essential quality

1. Pervasiveness.

Everything the Joint Force says, and does, or fails to do and say, has intended and unintended effect. Every action, word, and image sends a message; everybody is a messenger, from the 18-year-old rifleman to the Commander-in-Chief. All communication can have strategic impact, and unintended audiences are unavoidable in the global information environment.

2. Proactive Engagement.

Strategic Communication is a multi-faceted dialogue between parties, not a one-way monologue. Effective application of SC does not simply involve a source transmitting to an audience, but rather active engagement between parties. Its success depends upon building relationships. Consequently, successful SC will seldom happen overnight; relationships take time to grow, and require listening, respect for culture, and trust-building (see *Cultural Relativism*).

3. Unity of Effort.

“Unity of Effort” is a principle that applies to Strategic Communication as it does to all military operations. Strategic Communication must be integrated vertically from the strategic through the tactical levels, and horizontally across all stakeholders. Commanders must coordinate (synchronize) all capabilities and instruments of power within their area of operations, areas of influence and areas of interest to achieve the desired effects.

4. Top-Down Planning.

Thorough application of military planning processes is as critical to success in the information domain as it is to every other domain of warfighting. To ensure integration of Strategic Communication efforts, the commander must not merely participate in planning, he must drive the process. As is true of any operation, successful SC begins with a clear intent and description of the desired end state that can be translated into a concept of operations.

5. Effect Driven.

Strategic Communication activity is executed to achieve specific effects in pursuit of a well-articulated end state. Depending on the level(s) of war at which the responsible command is operating, the SC processes, themes, targets and engagement modes are derived from the policy, strategic vision, campaign plan and operational design (see *Unity of Effort*). SC goes beyond being simply “another tool in the commander’s toolbox” and encompasses all a command says and does. It must therefore fully encompass and be practiced in concert with all other joint functions to achieve the desired effects.

6. Continuous.

Strategic Communication as a process is continuous. It can be expressed in the context of a Joint Targeting Cycle (Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess) or more broadly in terms of the Boyd Cycle or “OODA Loop” (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act.) Success in the SC process requires diligent and continuous analysis feeding back into action, or what Boyd describes as a set of interacting loops that are to be kept in continuous operation during combat: “In order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries--or, better yet, get inside [the] adversary's Observation-Orient-Decision-Action time cycle or loop.” (Boyd, *Patterns of Conflict*)

7. Credibility.

Credibility is the foundation of effective communication; it relies on perceptions of truth and trust between all parties. Actions, words, and images must be synchronized and coordinated both internally and externally (remember Pervasiveness: up & down, laterally, across domains and between adjacent battle space) with no “say-do” gap between words and deeds – or policy and deeds. Good communication is truthful, practical, and consistent.

8. Risk.

Strategic Communication is more art than science. It is impossible to unequivocally quantify and predict human thought, motivation, and behavior. All SC carries inherent risk and requires a thorough risk analysis that includes potential second- and third-order effects, as well as unintended effects and the consequences of catastrophic failure. But while risk must be considered in the form of assumptions in planning, it cannot be allowed to act as a restraint that unduly limits freedom of action.

9. Timeliness.

Strategic Communication must remain flexible enough to address specific issues with specific audiences, and often at specific moments in time to achieve the greatest effect. SC must support the commander’s near-, mid- and far-term objectives, yet it is not crisis communication. When a crisis occurs, the correct question is, “how is this going to affect my objectives?” not, “where is my SC plan for this?” Speed can kill; but this notion is a double-edged sword. Tempo and adaptability count – there is frequently a limited window of opportunity for specific themes and messages to achieve the desired effect. However, acting without understanding your audience (again, *Cultural Relativism*, or “Orientation”) can lead to casualties among friendly forces and noncombatants.

10. Cultural Relativism.

Our own individual view of the world tends to limit our perceptions, creating risk when we make the mistake of judging actions in the context of our culture rather than that of the affected culture. This is one of the most significant challenges we face in Strategic Communication. It is critical we understand that conceptions of truth and moral values are not absolute, but are relative to the persons or groups holding them. Every group of people has its own societal and cultural narrative – who they are, where they’ve come from, what’s important to them, their dreams and aspirations are for the future – all manifest in unique linguistic dialects, idioms, and cultural norms. The audience determines the meaning and interpretation of our communications with them. What we say, do, or show, may not be what they hear or see.

APPENDIX E

Joint Integrating Concept's 10 Supporting Ideas for Strategic Communication

The JIC's "ten supporting ideas" for its central operating concept can serve an even higher purpose as tenets of basic communicative action at every level of war and national strategy:

- Conduct a continuous engagement program within the joint operations area with respect to selected key audiences, as the foundation for all other communication efforts.
- Conceive every act as a strategic communication, because all actions send signals, whether by design or not.
- Actively engage in the debate over joint actions, because all joint actions will be "spun" by competing interests and it is therefore not enough to do good; it is also important to explain our actions.
- Integrate all joint force actions to maximize desired influence on selected audiences.
- Coordinate joint strategic communication efforts with the efforts of other agencies and organizations within guidance provided by higher authority.
- Focus on understanding potential audiences and assessing the results of our communication efforts to the point that courses of action start to become intuitive.
- Formulate and produce tailored, resonant and culturally attuned signals that reach intended audiences through the surrounding noise.
- Focus on the "opinion leaders" and "soft-liners."
- Adapt continuously and iteratively based on feedback about the effects of our signals.
- Decentralize strategic communication at each level within broad parameters established by higher authority."

Source: Strategic Communication Branch, *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*, iii-iv.

Appendix F

Eleven Required Capabilities for Implementing Strategic Communication at the Joint Force Commander Level

“The paper derives 11 capabilities required to implement this concept fully:

- SC-001. The ability to access, produce and maintain intelligence and other knowledge on the perceptions, attitudes and beliefs of potential audiences.
- SC-002. The ability to access, produce and maintain intelligence on complex social communication systems, to include the characteristics of various media channels and the intentions, capabilities and efforts of other influencers within and having an effect on the joint operations area
- SC-003. The ability to detect, monitor, translate and assess the effects of the strategic communication efforts of others—to include friendly governments, non-state groups, neutrals, competitors and adversaries—as the basis for responding to those effects.
- SC-004. The ability to estimate the direct and indirect effects of potential signals on the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and actions of selected audiences, both intended and unintended.
- SC-005. The ability to conceive and formulate timely, resonant (i.e., “sticky”) and culturally attuned messages, both informational and physical, designed to affect the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of selected audiences as desired.
- SC-006. The ability to produce and deliver information products designed to influence selected audiences as desired.
- SC-007. The ability to conceive and coordinate physical actions or maintain physical capabilities designed to influence selected audiences as desired.
- SC-008. The ability to extensively document joint force actions, down to small-unit levels, and to disseminate this information as required.
- SC-009. The ability to monitor, measure and assess the effects of friendly signals on intended and unintended audiences in relation to expected effects.
- SC-010. The ability to integrate all joint force actions to maximize desired effects on selected audiences.
- SC-011. The ability to coordinate joint force actions with the influence efforts of other agencies and partners within the context of a broader national strategy.”

Source: Strategic Communication Team, *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*, iv-v.

Appendix G

The JIC's Four Basic Requirements for Exerting Influence

The “four basic requirements to exert influence” include:

- *“Improve overall relations and thereby increase general influence with selected audiences, whether general population segments or specific decision-making entities.*
- *“Weaken a competitor’s or adversary’s influence on others by undermining its credibility and legitimacy.*
- *“Convince selected audiences to take specific action in support of U.S. or international objectives.*
- *“Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) specific actions”*
(emphasis in original).

Source: Strategic Communication Team, *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*, 8-9.

Appendix H

Seven Shortcomings of Monologic Communication

- **People’s dislike of being “shaped” or targeted.¹**
- **Lack of respect for other people’s points of view.**
- **An “effects-based” goal limited to a narrow “targeting” perspective to achieve a specific goal rather than to establish long-term relationships.**
- **The “audience” concept that treats people as spectators rather than equal participants.**
- **“Mechanistic” rather than “humanistic” world view.¹**
- **People treated as “consumers” of advertising messages to persuade them to “buy a product,” e.g., U.S. policies, with an implied sense of Madison Avenue manipulation.**
- **Communication as only an instrument or tool of national power to achieve only U.S. goals rather than achieving U.S. goals through a mutually beneficial, transactional process.**

Sources: The author’s conversations with numerous international students at the Naval War College between August 2007 and May 2008 showed that they strongly objected to the use of the words “shape” and “target” when the DOD refers to its interactions with them; Thomlinson, “Monologic and Dialogic Communication.”

Appendix I

Twenty-Two Types of Military Operations

Within this list, dialogic communication would be the primary method of communication with other participants in 16 of the operations (see asterisks) and a necessary method to conduct and terminate all of the other types.

- Major Operations (major conventional war, nuclear war)
- Strikes
- Raids
- Show of Force
- Enforcement of Sanctions*
- Protection of Shipping*
- Freedom of Navigation*
- Peace Operations*
- Support to Insurgency*
- Counterinsurgency Operations*
- Combating Terrorism*
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*
- Recovery Operations*
- Consequence Management*
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*
- Nation Assistance*
- Arms Control and Disarmament*
- Routine, Recurring Military Activities*
- Homeland Defense*
- Civil Support*

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 September 2006), I-12.

Appendix J

The 14 Enduring and Emerging Challenges Facing the U.S. Military 2012-2030

Six Enduring Challenges:

1. Defending attacks on the homeland
2. Fighting major powers
3. Using military force to deter and prevent conflict
4. Defeating terrorist networks
5. Destroying international/transnational criminal organizations
6. Preventing or managing the collapse of functioning states

Eight Emerging Challenges:

7. Anti-access strategies and capabilities (that protect an adversary's physical territory and space assets, or conversely, deny U.S. access to its bases or destroy its space assets)
8. Emergence of new terrorist ideologies (perhaps nationalistic or anarchic, anti-globalization movements)
9. Massive disruption of global trade and finance by groups or states
10. Persistent cyber-conflict and the potential disruption of global information networks
11. Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effect (WMD/E) proliferation
12. Failing nuclear states, possibly Pakistan or North Korea in the short term
13. Collapse of mega-cities and massive urban chaos, with resulting humanitarian crises during protracted urban guerilla warfare
14. Growth of a global anti-U.S. coalition of transnational terrorist groups, criminal organizations, super-national organizations, or a combination of all three. The United States appears to be engaged in this type of global conflict in the "war on terror."

Source: Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Environment: Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force through 2030*. (Norfolk, VA: December 2007). [http://www.freewebs.com/usmsa/JOE_v1%209\(14Dec07\).pdf](http://www.freewebs.com/usmsa/JOE_v1%209(14Dec07).pdf) (accessed 29 January 2008).

Appendix K

Properties of the Global Communication Commons*

- **Transparency.** Governments will have a far more difficult time keeping secrets and censoring information as the “strategic peasant” and “citizen reporter” with video cell phones can document and transmit their actions around the world in seconds. “With the virtual death of censorship and secrecy, governments will not be able to control their networks much less their messages. Strategically, it will mean a loss of the principle of “surprise,” and the transparency of this environment will force governments to minimize their say-do gaps.”
- **Ubiquitous access.** A project called the “Information Commons” is seeking to make all information and knowledge in the world available to everyone. (1)
- **Viral dissemination.** Information can be disseminated around the world very quickly as individuals “broadcast” to other individuals and groups. In one grisly example, in 2004, al-Qaeda in Iraq posted the video of Sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi beheading an American contractor on the Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami web site (Forum of the Islamic Supporters). In less than 24 hours, the video had been downloaded more than half a million times.(2) Author Nadya Labi in *The Atlantic Monthly* called this video “the most successful online terrorist online PR campaign ever.” (3)
- **Global Social Networks.** The “deaths” of time, space, location, and distance drive the rise of “social networking” across the Commons. Cyber networks for every conceivable interest and activity continue to arise daily to connect people with similar interests.
- **Omnipresence.** Everyone can communicate with anyone at any time and from virtually any location through the omniconnected infrastructure.
- **Citizen sensor.** Maybury noted that although JFCs may lose surprise, they can gain far greater battlespace awareness through the “soldiers as sensors” concept.
- **Increased risk.** All these properties create new risks as the U.S.’s enemies (radical extremists) and its competitors (Russia and China) seek to master the new Commons to gain strategic advantage and influence their own people, their neighbors, and their enemies and competitors as well.
- **Paradox of security.** As governments lose secrecy, individuals and groups gain asymmetric advantage with secure, global communication networks.
- **Media as multiplier or divider.** The global media can act as a positive multiplier or harmful divider because its choices of what news to show strongly affects the perceptions of distant populations in unique and powerful ways.

* All details result from information gathered during Maybury interview, unless otherwise noted.

(1) The mission statement of Maya Design: “The Information Commons unites all the facts and figures of the world into a resource available to everyone. Through a massive peer-to-peer network, the Commons enables individuals, non-profits and government agencies to fuse their data together into one database, distributed across many different computers. Sharing data in the Commons is seamless between individuals and organizations, offering easy, flexible data integration and reuse.”

MAYA Design, “Introducing the Information Commons,” <http://www.maya.com/infocommons/> (accessed 20 May 2008).

(2) Volvaka J. Neurological, neuropsychological, and electrophysiological correlates of violent behavior. *Neurobiology of violence*. Washington, DC: American Psychiatry Press, 1995:77–122.

(3) Ibid.

Appendix L

Eight Properties for Gaining and Holding Attention

New media expert Kevin Kelly identified eight intangible properties that can help the USG gain and hold the participants' attention:

- 1) Immediacy—prompt attention to needs
- 2) Personalization—messages and tailored for individual requirements
- 3) Interpretation—personal guidance
- 4) Authenticity—guarantees of performance and genuine behavior
- 5) Accessibility—continuous access
- 6) Embodiment—connection to real events
- 7) Patronage—emotional affinity, sense of belonging
- 8) Findability—easy access to needed information, product, or service

Source: Kevin Kelly, "Better Than Free," *Edge—The Third Culture*, 5 February 2008.
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/kelly08/kelly08_index.html (accessed 21 May 2008).

Appendix M

Summary of the Basic Tenets of Communication

- **Legitimacy**
- **Interaction**
- **Ubiquity**
- **The 5 Ms: Message, Medium, Meaning, Messenger—and Multiplicity**
- **Values**
- **Metaphor**
- **Narrative**
- **Mediated Reality**
- **Attention**
- **Mutuality**
- **Influence**
- **Consequences**

Appendix N

Modified Principles of War Coordinated with Tenets of Communication*

Modified Principles of War

- Objective:
- Legitimacy:
- Offensive— Restraint—Exploitation:
- Mass—Massed Effects—Concentration of Effects—Precision:

- Economy of Force—Economy of Effects:

- Maneuver—Perseverance—Simultaneity—Sustainment:

- Unity of Command—Unity of Effort— Efficiency of Command—
 - Integration of Actors:

- Security:
- Surprise—Flexibility—Speed:

- Simplicity:
- Morale—Will:

- Pervasive Awareness:

Tenets of Communication

Meaning/Intention
Legitimacy
Interaction, Attention
Ubiquity, Influence,
Mediated Reality,
Consequences, 5 Ms
Interaction, Attention,
Mutuality, Influence,
Consequences
Interaction, Influence,
5 Ms, Consequences,
Ubiquity, Attention

5 Ms, Values, Narrative,
Mutuality, Influence,
Consequences
(Must have)
Interaction, Attention,
Mediated Reality,
Influence,
Consequences
5 Ms
Values, Metaphor,
Narrative, Mediated
Reality, Legitimacy,
Influence
Ubiquity, Attention

* Sources: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Operations," Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 September 2006), A-1-A-3; Russell W. Glenn, "No More Principles of War?" *Parameters*, Spring 1998. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/no_more_principles.htm (accessed 3 May 2008); John G. Morgan, et al, "Rethinking the Principles of War," *Proceedings* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, October 2003), 35; Christopher E. Van Avery, "12 New Principles of War," *Armed Forces Journal*, July 2007, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/07/2807407> (accessed 3 May 2008).

APPENDIX O

SUMMARY: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION*

Objective: Clear focus on penultimate purposes; new USG objectives may shift focus from national interests to emphasize mutual stakeholder interests with allies, friends, and neutrals.

Legitimacy: Earned or granted recognition that the USG instantiates and supports critical national and international norms, has moral authority, and exerts positive influence

Will: The conscious decisions of a people and the global citizenry that are the ultimate source of a nation's legitimacy.

Initiative: The capability and activities to plan, prepare, and execute communicative actions that continuously influence the global publics and stakeholders to support USG efforts to established and maintain positive relationships with other peoples and nations.

Engagement: Implies cooperation and mutuality and takes advantage of the continuous transactional, exchange nature of the Commons.

Unity of effort: Implies alignment, synchronization across the USG with the Central Organizing Principle and key themes.

Effectiveness: Economy/efficiency preferable, but not necessary for effectiveness. Long-term success with communication, i.e. years or decades of negotiations, may not be economical, but preventing war or gaining long-term advantage is both efficient and effective because it preserves the national treasure.

Adaptability: Encompassing flexibility, it extends acknowledges constant need to adapt within dynamic, fluid COMMONS. Implies need for thorough, accurate measurement and assessment of effects, results, and intended and unintended consequences to revise strategy, plans, and tactics as situation warrants.

Sustainment: adequate forces, resources of operational capabilities for long-term effectiveness

Pervasive Awareness: It infers the need for deep understanding of all aspects through expanded intelligence gathering resources, continuous engagement with all participants, and deep cultural study/analysis/understanding of ever-changing situations

Synchronization of Participants: Implies simultaneity as operational and tactical means. Implies that concepts of mass versus precision are operational and tactical means to achieve synchronization that leads to desired effects. Since delivery of the messages cannot be controlled within the COMMONS, synchronization of themes and their consistent promotion across the USG, allies, and friends will require constant repetition by Senior leaders, focused and frequent training of personnel, and clear, continuous communication across the USG and with its allies and friends.

Security: A constant principle at all levels of war and government, it means operational security to protect the COMMONS infrastructure and prevent threats to political and personal security.

Clarity: Rather than the traditional principle of simplicity, clarity is preferred because although communication and interaction can be complex, the intention of the messenger and the clarity of the message and its meaning can reduce confusion and enhance understanding.

* The author acknowledges that as Sun Tzu aptly states, war is at heart the art of deception. Likewise, "hard" information operations, such as electronic warfare, computer network operations, and military deception all have their place in preparing for and conducting active warfare to gain the advantages required to win victory. However, in the new transparent Commons, these hard "info ops" risk alienating critical groups of participants in all six phases of war: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and restore/enable civil authority, when they are discovered.

Chart 1. Example: How Climate Layers Relate to Interaction




Chart 2. Dialogic Model of Communication




Chart 3. Continuum of Intent: Monologic to Dialogic




Chart 4. Global Communication Commons and National Security Planning Process




Chart 5. Attention-Action Cycle




Chart 6. Continuum of Expectation





Chart 7. Firm Foundation for Strategy Development



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Note: The author also interviewed six Muslim students attending the Naval War College, and under the War College's non-attribution policy, they are not quoted by name. Where their comments were in consensus, this report used their information.

ENDNOTES

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 76, 77, 79.

² Ibid, 84.

³ To summarize: champion human dignity, strengthen anti-terror alliances, defuse regional conflicts with cooperative efforts, prevent weapon of mass destruction attacks, support global economic growth, expand global development, cooperate with other global powers where possible, transform U.S. security institutions, and take advantage of globalization. Source: U.S. President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), 1.

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Anatol Rapaport (London: Penguin Classics, 1968), 185, 242-243.

⁵ Ibid, 243.

⁶ Ibid, 251.

⁷ Numerous Pew Global Opinion, Gallup International, Sadat Center-Zogby International, and other polls have confirmed the struggles with both Muslim and world public opinion that the USG has faced since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. These and recent shifts will be discussed in detail in the body of the report.

⁸ Human communication defined briefly as transactional interactions with words, symbols, images, and actions. See detailed discussion later in the report.

⁹ Defined as both 1) “the prevailing attitudes, standards, or environmental conditions of a group, period, or place,” and 2) “the prevailing psychological state”. Sources: climate. Dictionary.com. *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/climate> (accessed 31 May 2008); and climate. Dictionary.com. *WordNet® 3.0*. Princeton University. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/climate> (accessed 31 May 2008), respectively.

¹⁰ The U.S. military has described the physical dimensions of war as the land, sea, air, space, information, and cyberspace domains. It has long understood that the evolution of technology and military art and science has helped create new domains for human interaction in peace and in war. These domains consist of and reflect the types of and relationships among physical dimensions, cognitive dimensions, and natural environments. First, of course, was the land domain, then the sea domain, or “maritime commons” as it came to be called in the 19th century. In the early 1900’s, the air domain evolved as the military advantages and threats of air power became appreciated. In the 1950s and 1960s, the space domain evolved as space exploration quickly became a military area of operations. In the 1960s and 70s, the ‘cyberspace’ domain and the concept of the ‘information environment’ evolved as information processing and computer networking became the dominant modes of military communication. This report asserts that the rapidly growing and enormous scale of human interaction through the cyberspace infrastructure, the exponential increase in human knowledge, and the radically new scope and scale of human interaction and social participation across and through all dimensions and domains has created a new “Communication Commons.”

¹¹ Rather than the traditional D-I-M-E (diplomatic-information-military-economic) instrument model, this author prefers the broader and richer M-I-D-L-I-F-E (military-information-diplomatic-legal-intelligence-financial-economic) model because following the Sun Tzu way to defeat terrorist networks and more conventional modern enemies, such as North Korea and Iran over nuclear weapons, requires the broadest use of the MIDLIFE approach: military deterrence, information/communication campaigns, diplomatic negotiations, legal (binding agreements and counter-narcotics), actionable intelligence, financial security (anti-counterfeiting), and economic sanctions and incentives.

¹² Karl Walling (Professor, Naval War College, Newport, RI) in discussion with the author, 30 May 2008.

¹³ “Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp human adversarial and automated decision making while protecting our own.” Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington: CJCS, 13 February 2006), ix.

¹⁴ Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 243.

¹⁵ The author would prefer the less confusing, more precise “theater” without the “strategic,” but accepted DOD use is “theater-strategic.”

¹⁶ “The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational and tactical. Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three helps commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Actions within the three levels are not associated with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component type. Instead, actions are defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.” Sources: CJCS, “Joint Operations” Jt. Pub. 3-

0, IV-32; and “Levels of War,” GlobalSecurity.org <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch2.htm#par1> (accessed 31 May 2008). The web site quotes Army Operations Manual FM 3-0.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ For example, the National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPD&SC) has as its end state: “all people deserve to live in just societies that protect individual and common rights, fight corruption and are governed by the rule of law.” Nested in the National Security Strategy, the NSPD&SC has three objectives, one of which is “With our partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith.”¹⁸ This goal also lays out five specific national tasks, one of which is “isolating and discrediting terrorist leaders, facilitators, and organizations.” From this national strategy, the DOD could set as a theater-level communication strategy for the Central Command (CENTCOM) during the war in Iraq the following: disrupt and delegitimize violent extremist organizations in the eyes of the Muslim people within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. At the operational level, the CDR could charge the Coalition commander in Iraq (JFC level) with this communication operations guidance as part of his war effort: disrupt the popular support for Al-Qaeda, isolate it from the Sunni tribes, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to the Iraqi people. At the tactical level, the Coalition commander could charge the JFC with developing a combination of types of communication tactics, in conjunction with combat activities, to isolate local Al-Qaeda cells and encourage Iraqi support for local Iraqi Army and Coalition actions against Al-Qaeda cells. Some tactics could include negotiations and agreements with Sunni tribal sheiks and financial support for pro-Coalition, pro-Iraqi government media. Source: Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2006), 2.

¹⁹ Emily Goldman, “Strategic Communication: A Tool for Asymmetric Warfare,” *Small Wars Journal*, October 6, 2007, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/10/print/strategic-communication-a-tool/> (accessed April 9, 2008).

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 91-2.

²¹ Goldman, “Strategic Communication” and Emily Goldman (Department of State Counter-Terrorism Center) interview with the author, 11 April 2008. Goldman asserted that the USD(P) perception management definition “is a more succinct definition that allows us to begin developing a framework and doctrine for effective strategic communication.” She stressed that communication becomes strategic only when it is focused on and aimed at multiple audiences, has a very broad scope, takes place over time through multiple messages and media, and it is intended to achieve U.S. policy goals.

²² This author has struggled with the most accurate, most meaningful, and best delineated term to describe both the initiator of communication and the person or organization who responds to a message and who chooses to establish and continue an exchange relationship with communicative methods. The traditional term “**audience**” implies passive people waiting to be entertained. “**Receiver**” implies passive receipt of a one-way message with no ability to respond. “**Partner**” implies a positive relationship when we all know communicative relationships can be hostile. “**Associate**” is commonly understood as a co-worker or employee. “**Transceiver**” is too technological and impersonal. “**Collaborator**” has both positive and negative connotations: positive in the sense of teamwork, but negative in the sense of the member of a conspiracy. “**Co-creator**” has some usefulness but the phrase “communication co-creator” sounds awkward. b implies a positive, working relationship. “**Companion**” is equally positive, but commonly refers to friends. “**Correspondent**” is too closely linked in the public mind to its journalistic usage. “**Communicator**” does not reflect the active role the dialogic model implies. The author created “**co-respondent**” because its roots met the two-way model and implied jointness and mutuality, but it is a new and awkward term. The best word that captures the interactive, exchange nature of communication is “**participant**.” “Participate is defined as “to be one of a group of people actively doing something,” and “participant” is defined as “someone who takes part in an activity.” The word shares traits with our definition of communication: based on relationship, is based on regular or continuous occurrence, involves at least two or more people or organizations, and requires exchanges using messages that convey meaning through symbols, words, images, and action. Sources, respectively: participate. Dictionary.com. *Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary*. K Dictionaries Ltd. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/participate> (accessed 19 May 2008); and participant. Dictionary.com. *WordNet® 3.0*. Princeton University.

<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/participant> (accessed 5 May 2008). Discussing core concepts of communication and influence from a cyberspace perspective, Franklin D. Kramer and Larry Wentz also preferred the term ‘participant.’ “...instead of a target or an audience, the other party should be considered an active participant.” Source: Franklin D. Kramer and Larry Wentz, “Cyber Influence and International Security,” *Defense Horizons*, no. 61 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, January 2008), 3.

²³ Perception refers most accurately to the receipt, recognition, and processing of information and stimuli through one’s physical senses and cognitive filters. Source: perception. Dictionary.com. *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perception> (accessed 9 May 2008).

²⁴ Interpretation is a cognitive process involved in creating meaning from what one perceives. It derives the meaning of the perceived information or stimuli. Source: interpretation. Dictionary.com. *WordNet® 3.0*. Princeton University. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/interpretation> (accessed: May 09, 2008).

²⁵ Bruce Gregory, "Strategic Logic: Language and Concepts in International Political Communication" (working paper for Information, Media, and National Security course [SMPA 162], George Washington University, January 2008), 9-10.

²⁶ "Monologic" refers to communication in which the communicator focuses solely on his own ends; "dialogic" refers to communication in which participants seek mutual understanding and mutual benefit. Details of each type are described later in this report.

²⁷ strategy. Dictionary.com; Strategic, Dictionary.com. *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/strategic> (accessed: April 17, 2008).

²⁸ Strategic Communication Branch, *Strategic Communication JIC*, iii.

²⁹ ADML Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, CM-0087-07, 14 December 2007.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 91-2.

³¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap* (Washington, DC: DOD, 2006).

³² Its Secretariat was managed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of Joint Communication (DASD[JC]).

³³ CAPT Hal Pittman (Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joint Communication), interview by the author, 15 February 2008.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Since 2007, the DASD(JC) has sponsored a series of SC workshops for general and flag officers, a Worldwide SC Summit in July 2007, and most recently, a Worldwide SC Education Summit in March 2008. Significant strides have been made at these summits. The March education summit focused on SC education at the Joint Force Commander (JFC) level of operations. The 70-plus attendees drafted SC learning objectives that the DOD service schools might consider; established the foundation for a military, interagency, corporate, and academic Strategic Communication Education Consortium; and drafted SC principles for Joint Force Commanders.

³⁶ Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, i.

³⁷ For the sake of simplicity and because the majority of military officers are men, this Report uses "he, him, and his" as the singular pronoun used after a position or title is mentioned.

³⁸ Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, ii.

³⁹ Ibid, iii.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid, ii.

⁴⁴ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, 1.

⁴⁵ T. Dean Thomlinson, "Monologic and Dialogic Communication,"

<http://umdrive.memphis.edu/ggholson/public/Dialogue.html> (Accessed December 14, 2007)

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ The term "omniconnectivity" is used by Dan Kuehl (Professor, National Defense University) to describe the pervasive infrastructure and total degree of connectedness now possible in the Internet Age. Source: Dan Kuehl, interview by author, 9 April, 2008.

⁴⁸ "Commons" is used in two senses: 1) the same sense that the Navy uses the "maritime commons" and 2) the general sense of shared space, in this case, both physical and electronic, with public access and freedom of interaction across that shared space. According to Ronald Ratliff, "the 'maritime commons' comprise seas and waterways either beyond sovereign control of any nation or under the shared sovereignty of two or more [nations]." Although beyond the scope of this article, the "global communication commons" shares many of the attributes of the maritime commons—freedom of navigation, freedom of commerce, freedom of access, etc.—among peoples and states. Those accessing this Commons also shares with the maritime Commons the multitude of legal, security, military, commercial, property rights and concerns that Ratliff addresses in his article: Ronald E. Ratliff, "Building Partners' Capacity: The Thousand-Ship Navy," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn, 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_4_60/ai_n21118683/pg_4 (accessed 19 May 2008). For a discussion of the historical development of the term "Commons," see <http://www.reference.com/search?q=commons> (accessed 19 May 2008).

⁴⁹ Ernie Piacopolos, "Fox News-Opinion Dynamics Poll: Bush And Congressional Job Ratings Hit Historic Lows," http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/032008_release_web.pdf (accessed 15 May 2008). In this poll, 30% of those polled

agreed President Bush was doing a good job while only 20% agreed that Congress was doing a good job. These numbers have drifted downward during the past year from historically low levels.

⁵⁰ The National Security Strategy states that the best way to attain the ultimate goal—“protect the security of the American people” is “to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states” that will fulfill their citizens’ needs and act responsibly in their international affairs.” Source, U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, cover letter and page 1.

⁵¹ CIA Director Michael V. Hayden (General, USAF) reported that “Osama bin Laden is losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Islamic world and has largely forfeited his ability to exploit the Iraq war to recruit adherents.” He explained that U.S. and Coalition attacks have weakened AQ’s ranks and Al-Qaeda created a major “say-do gap” by promoting Islamic unity but killing those Muslims who opposed them. Although Hayden warned AQ “remains a serious threat,” other terrorism experts, such as Bruce Hoffman, were less optimistic than Hayden’s estimate of “near strategic defeat” for AQ in both Iraq and Saudi Arabia and serious ideological reverses around the world. Source: Joby Warrick, “U.S. Cites Big Gains against Al-Qaeda,” *washingtonpost.com*, 30 May 2008, A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/29/AR2008052904116_pf.html (accessed 30 May 2008).

⁵² Shibley Telhami and Zogby International, *2008 Arab Public Opinion Poll*, Powerpoint, March 2008, slide 3; and Shibley Telhami (Professor and Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, University of Maryland, College Park, MD), interview by the author, 21 April 2008.

⁵³ Arab opinion is also much less concerned about the prospect of Iran developing nuclear weapons than USG policymakers; 44 percent believing “the outcome would be more positive for the region than negative.” Source: Telhami and Zogby, *2008 Arab Public Opinion Poll*, slide 2.

⁵⁴ Peter Kiernan, “Middle East Opinion: Iran Fears Aren’t Hitting the Arab Street,” (New York: Zogby International, March 2, 2007), <http://www.zogby.com/SoundBites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=14570> (accessed December 14, 2007); Pew Research Center, “Global Unease With Major World Powers,” (Washington, DC: Pew, June 27, 2007), <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256> (accessed March 7, 2008).

⁵⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America’s Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project.” <http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019> (accessed 1 June 2008).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Col Dwayne Carman, Jr. “Improving US Strategic Communication” (research paper, Newport, RI: Naval War College, National Security Decision Making Department, 5 February 2008), 5. Examples of the reports cited in Carman’s study include Defense Science Board (DSB). *2001 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf> (accessed 30 May 2008); DSB. *2004 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf (accessed 30 May 2008); and DSB *2008 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2008; Government Accountability Office. *Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by a Lack of National Communication Strategy*. (GAO Report 05-323): (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2005).; GAO. *U.S. State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communications Elements and Face Persistent Challenges*. (GAO Report 06-707T). (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 3 May 2006); GAO, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts Have Improved, but Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges*. (GAO Report 07-795T). (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 26, 2007); Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics – Support for Terror Wanes among Muslim Publics.” <http://www.pew.global.org> (accessed 30 May 2008).

⁵⁸ Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Strategic Communication*. January 2008, xv-xvi.

⁵⁹ Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, *National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*. 2007.

⁶⁰ Five people have held the office in six years, and the nomination of the sixth person, James K. Glassman, to fill the position through the end of the current Administration had been delayed in the Senate for more than three months as of 19 May 2008.

⁶¹ Karen P. Hughes, “A Farewell Letter from Under Secretary Hughes,” *Public Diplomacy II*, no. IV, 1-2. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98454.pdf> (accessed 19 May 2008). A DOS Interagency (IA) Strategic Communication FUSION Team has continued to meet at the staff level and coordinate execution of aspects of the NSPD&SC strategy with IA partners, especially from the DOD public affairs staff.

⁶² BG Ralph O. Baker (Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Middle East, Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff [J-5]), interview by the author, 21 April 2008; U.S. Army Headquarters and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Army and Marine Corps HQ, 15 December 2006).

⁶³ Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, 5-6 and 98-99.

⁶⁴ The information processing model is based on the 1948 Shannon-Weaver sender-receiver model and the 1960 David Berlo encoder-decoder model. These early models conceive of communication as a sender encoding a message, sending it through a channel to a decoder who then responds through a feedback loop. Berlo added the concept of “filters,” that is, the amalgamation of stereotypes, attitudes, beliefs, experiences, memories, biases, etc. within a person’s mind, that influence how a receiver/decoder interprets a message and responds to the sender/encoder. Sources: T. Dean Thomlinson, “Monologic and Dialogic Communication,” <http://umdrive.memphis.edu/ggholson/public/Dialogue.html> (Accessed December 14, 2007); David K. Berlo, *The Process of Communication: An Introduction to Theory and Practice* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

⁶⁵ The “message” is the information conveyed by the words, symbols, images, and actions; the “meaning” is the purpose, intention, or significance conveyed with the information. Source: message and meaning. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/meaning> (accessed 1 June 2008).

⁶⁶ Berlo, *Process of Communication*; Wilbur Schramm, “How Communication Works,” in *The Process and Effects of Communication*, ed. Wilbur Schramm (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1954), p 3-26; “Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,” *The Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, ed. by Justus Buchler (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1955).

⁶⁷ Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*. 5-6.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ *SC JIC*, 8-9.

⁷⁰ Thomlinson, “Monologic and Dialogic Communication”

⁷¹ Defined in two senses first as “a reciprocal relationship between two or more people or things” and second as sharing “something in common.” Source: Usage Note, mutuality, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mutuality> (accessed 19 May 2008).

⁷² D.C. Barnlund, “A Transactional Model of Communication” in K.K. Sereno and C.D. Mortensen (eds.), *Foundations of Communication Theory*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). Dialogic communication assumes that all human and organizational relationships are based on the human ability to communicate in complex ways. This model weaves a transactional model of communication, relationship theory, and social exchange theory.

⁷³ Thomlinson, “Monologic and Dialogic Communication.”

⁷⁴ COL Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” *Military Review*, May-June 2006, 13; Major General John Kelly, Interview on National Public Radio, 11 January 2008; ADML James G. Stavridis, *Command Strategy 2016: Partnership for the Americas*, (Miami, FL: United States Southern Command, March 2007); GEN William E. Ward, *U.S. Africa Command*, <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp> (accessed 6 March 2008). To quote: “**A Different Kind of Command.**

Designers of U.S. Africa Command clearly understand the relationships between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa. As a result, U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, reflects a much more integrated staff structure, one that includes significant management and staff representation by Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government agencies involved in Africa. The command will also seek to incorporate partner nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the U.S. staff on common approaches to shared interests.”

⁷⁵ Stavridis, *Command Strategy 2016*; Ward, *U.S. Africa Command*.

⁷⁶ The JIC offers an “influence spectrum” ranging from subtle/gentle—inform/educate—to obvious/forceful—induce/coerce—with urging and advocating a somewhat forceful approach. The JIC states the JFC will have a pervasive requirement to use influence adversaries, friends, neutrals, the general public, governments, and various non-state actors in cooperative, competitive, and conflict situations. He will need to choose from among a variety of influencing methods and tools that can be as simple as providing unbiased information to as complex as a combination of negotiated incentives and implied or direct threats. Yet, all in all, *influence* always means the participants retain their right to choose their responses—and their consequences. Source: Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, 4.

⁷⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-0, I-11-14.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Some common means include military, diplomatic, cultural, and educational exchanges; military training; international military education opportunities; participation in multilateral institutions, working partnerships on common issues, etc.

⁸¹ U.S. Army Headquarters and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*.

⁸² Osama bin Laden has said that he ordered the hotel attacks in Kenya, the Khobar Towers bombing, the Cole attack, and the 2001 September 11 attacks because the USG had not responded to either his declarations of war in 1996 and 1998 or to his series of writings about USG hostilities toward Muslims. He considered that he had given the USG fair warning many times and had been ignored. Source: Osama bin Laden, "Why We Are Fighting You," in *The Al Qaeda Reader*, ed. and trans. by Raymond Ibrahim (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 197-208.

⁸³ Professor Marc Genest, "Strategic Communication in the Cold War." (lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 8 May 2008).

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, "U.S. Delivers Relief Supplies to China," <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49920> (accessed 19 May 2008); DOD, "More Relief Flights Arrive in Burma," <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49919> (accessed 19 May 2008).

⁸⁵ From review of the COCOM web sites.

⁸⁶ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Environment: Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force through 2030*. (Norfolk, VA: December 2007). [http://www.freewebs.com/usmsa/JOE_v1%209\(14Dec07\).pdf](http://www.freewebs.com/usmsa/JOE_v1%209(14Dec07).pdf) (accessed 29 January 2008).

⁸⁷ In one grisly example that gained wide publicity, in 2004, al-Qaeda in Iraq posted a short video of Sheikh Abu Musab al-Zarqawi beheading an American contractor on the Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami web site (Forum of the Islamic Supporters). In less than 24 hours, the video had been downloaded more than half a million times. Author Nadya Labi in *The Atlantic Monthly* called this video "the most successful online terrorist online PR campaign ever" after the video became a global media event that reached hundreds of millions of people and significantly influenced how the U.S. people, among many others, viewed the strength of the al-Qaeda terrorist insurgency movement in Iraq. Source: Nadya Labi, "Jihad 2.0," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2006. <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200607/online-jihad> (accessed April 20, 2008).

⁸⁸ Iran, an adversary with whom we are technically at peace, has log rolled and foot-dragged the three-party negotiations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to delay access to and disclosure of its most secret facilities, following tactics used by USG adversaries and competitors, since World War II, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and of course, North Korea. Source: "Iran Warns It May Limit Cooperation with U.N. Nuclear Watchdog IAEA," FoxNews.com. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,361249,00.html> (accessed 1 June 2008).

⁸⁹ Dan Kuehl uses the term "omniconnectivity" to describe the physical infrastructure and networked condition of what this paper calls the Global Communication Commons. Source: Dan Kuehl (professor, National Defense University, Washington, DC), interview by the author, 9 April 2008.

⁹⁰ "Commons" as used here refers to the "space"—both physical and electronic—and the resources accessible to all under general agreement, treaty, law, or practice. It is "any sets of resources that a community recognizes as being accessible to any member of that community. The nature of commons is different in different communities, but they often include cultural resources and natural resources. While commons are generally seen as a system opposed to private property, they have been combined in the idea of common property, which are resources owned equally by every member of the community, even though the community recognizes that only a limited number of members may use the resource at any given time... The Commons is most often a finite but replenishable resource, which requires responsible use in order to remain available... In order to ensure responsibility of the users, there must be a system of management." Three models include a central authority that monitors the users and can punish abusers, 2) contingent cooperators—once responsible behavior has been established, it will most likely continue without management, and 3) reputation management in which participants monitor and report on the actions of the others to use peer reputation to prompt corrective action and prevent abuses. Source: "Wider Usage of the Term," reference.com, <http://www.reference.com/search?q=commons> (accessed 26 May 2008).

⁹¹ The difference between dominance and superiority is that true dominance would mean the enemy would be unable to act; superiority is a degree of dominance that permits U.S. forces to act at will while they disrupt, degrade, or destroy the enemy's ability to interfere with U.S. actions. Comparison paraphrased from CJCS, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, GL-6, GL-16, and GI-18.

⁹² Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, describes the information environment as transcending four physical domains (air, land, space, sea) and consisting of three information dimensions: physical (interconnected network infrastructures); information "where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected" and the cognitive—processes within the brains of decision makers and audiences. The U.S. Army Information Operations Primer adds a vital fourth social dimension "which links the individual to others forming a greater social network." Cyberspace is generally limited to the electronic infrastructure consisting not only of wires and cables but also the satellite and microwave infrastructure that powers global wireless networks. Sources: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, II-20-II-21. Also described in detail in Joint Publication 3-12, *Information Operations*; U.S. Army War College Department of

Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Information Operations Primer: Fundamentals of Information Operations* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, November 2006), 1.

⁹³ Mark Maybury (Executive Director, Information Technology Division, MITRE Corp.), interview by the author in Washington, DC, 21 April 2008.

⁹⁴ The paradox of secrecy is that as governments lose secrecy, individuals and groups gain asymmetric advantage with secure, global communication networks with encryption software, hidden layers of the Internet, etc. and can threaten the governments' networks with sophisticated hacker attacks. Source: Maybury interview.

⁹⁵ Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, 7-8.

⁹⁶ China's and the U.S.'s different policies on support for authoritarian regimes versus their cooperation on economic issues. Libya's early support for U.S. efforts against al-Qaeda in 2001 versus its continued development of WMD until 2003.

⁹⁷ The term "principle" has these related definitions applicable to the pursuit of national objectives with the instruments of power: "a commonly accepted philosophy concerning the myriad of activities that collectively compose the conduct of war"; "a self-evident or primary rule or tenet from which people derive other rules to guide their actions"; and "a basic doctrine or canon (generally accepted rules) that both motivates action and guides that action." Sources: John Irvin Alger, "The Origins and Adaptation of the Principles of War" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1975), 2-3; Rather than a rigid truth, as some view the concept, a principle is a guide to action that applies to a broad and diverse range of similar situations that involve human organizations and their competitive or cooperative interactions. principle. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/principle> (accessed 6 May, 2008).

⁹⁸ legitimate. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/legitimate> (accessed 10 May 2008).

⁹⁹ Professor Marc Genest, "Strategic Communication in the Long War" (lecture, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2 June 2008).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid; Karl Walling (Professor, Strategy and Policy Department, Naval War College, Newport, RI), in discussion with the author, 30 May 2008.

¹⁰² Legitimate, *dictionary.com*.

¹⁰³ Genest, lectures, 8 May and 2 June 2008.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Sadat Center-Zogby poll; Genest lecture; Strategic Communication Branch; Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

¹⁰⁶ Genest stressed that in the current "war against terrorists" (his preferred phrase), Al-Qaeda's strategy has been to attack five seams or weaknesses in the USG and its Coalition: 1) the moral justification of Muslim self-defense for using terrorism as a tactic of the weak and oppressed against the powerful invader; 2) a protracted war strategy to wear down U.S. and Coalition support; 3) a strategy to split the Coalition/alliance by attacking the weak links in the Coalition (Spain); 4) an economic attrition strategy of draining USG resources; and 5) attacking the will of the U.S. public and those of its Coalition partners. Source: Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Sadat Center-Zogby, *Arab Public Opinion*.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Genest, discussion with the author, 2 June 2008.

¹¹⁰ This war of ideas also reinforces the criticality of the concepts of the omnipresent climate of communication that pervades the Global Communication Commons. All of its properties, especially speed, transparency, citizen reporter/sensor, etc. come into constant play in this war of ideas in unique ways. On June 2, the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan was bombed apparently because a cartoon disrespectful of the Prophet Muhammad was republished in Denmark. On 4 June, a Norwegian newspaper published an additional satirical cartoon that could be interpreted as implying Muhammad is a suicide bomber, although the newspaper's editor claims that the character does not represent the prophet and that it is not the cartoon's intent to imply it. The editor stated that the newspaper is exercising its free speech right to protest the bombing in Pakistan. This situation represents a prime example of how and why the passions aroused by a religion-based war of ideas differ so markedly from a political campaign approach. Sources: Open Source Center, "Pakistan 'Suicide' Car Bombing Outside Danish Embassy Kills 8," FEA20080602707192, 2 June 2008.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_3411_219_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/9240455 (accessed 4 June 2008); "Pakistan: Terrorist Used Embassy Car To Bomb Danish Mission in Islamabad," *Karachi Islam*, reprinted by Open Source Center, SAP20080603100007, 3 June 2008.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_3411_219_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/9247135 (accessed 4 June 2008); "Norwegian Newspaper Prints New 'Muhammad'

Cartoon,” *Adresseavisen*, reprinted by Open Source Center, FEA20080603707515, 3 June 2008.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_1073_209_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/9244479?action=advancedSearch (accessed 4 June 2008).

¹¹¹ Clausewitz defines war as “*an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will*.” (emphasis in original). Source: von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Howard and Paret, 75-77.

¹¹² *Ibid*, 77.

¹¹³ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁴ This tenet helps explain why Al-Qaeda has used a deliberate strategy of excessive violence, especially suicide bombing, against non-combatants to gain maximum media coverage. Since its communication resources are so much smaller than those of the USG, it must use its most efficient and most effective means to gain the global media’s attention so they will frame the violent communication and have the maximum influence on the will of the U.S. and global publics across the Commons.

Source: *Ibid*.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, 81.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24.

¹¹⁸ Maybury interview.

¹¹⁹ Choosing the most appropriate messenger depends on three factors: 1) a keen understanding of the intended participants (while considering the likely unintended participants), 2) the meaning that one intends to attach to the message, and 3) the likelihood that the messenger will have credibility with the participants. Credibility is defined as a personal or organizational trait with which one’s statements or actions are likely to be judged as trustworthy or believable by the other participants. In interpersonal communication, credibility is considered the most critical quality that determines effective communication. Choosing the message content and method depends on why you’re communicating, the primary participants receiving the message, what the message content must say, and what meaning you intend to send. Choosing the meaning depends on both what you want the participant to understand and what rational and emotional responses you want to evoke. Choosing the medium (channel) depends on the intended participants (a ruling group, the domestic public, an individual, or the Commons or some combination), the primary purpose(s) of the message (inform, influence, coerce, warn), and the desired response (act in desired ways). “Different means of delivering messages will achieve different results.” Sources: credibility.

Dictionary.com. *WordNet*® 3.0. Princeton University. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/credibility> (accessed: May 23, 2008); Kramer and Wentz, “Cyber Influence,” 4.

¹²⁰ Shalom H. Schwartz, “Basic Human Values: An Overview,” <http://www.fmag.unict.it/Allegati/convegno%207-8-10-05/Schwartzpaper.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2008), 1.

¹²¹ Schwartz stated that these values are “derived from three universal requirements of the human condition: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups.” Source: Schwartz, “Basic Human Values,” 2.

¹²² Schwartz says that an “integrated structure of values” cuts across two dimensions: “Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence.”¹²² The former is reflected by self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement and power; the latter by security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. Source: *Ibid*, 3-4.

¹²³ John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior,” *Pacific Sociological Review* 18, no. 1, January 1975, 122.

¹²⁴ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 3-4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 4-5.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 6.

¹²⁸ Christine R.A. McNulty, *Truth, Perception, and Consequences* (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 6 September 2007), 3.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 8.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 9.

¹³¹ For example, al-Qaeda has successfully influenced Muslims by creating a shared story based on the highly emotional, strongly negative narrative of colonial imperialism and Western domination of Muslim lands that resonates with Muslims in general, and Arabs in particular. Source: *Ibid*, 10.

¹³² *Ibid*, 10-11.

¹³³ Center for International Issues Research, “Abdel-Qadir Abdel-Aziz: A Chief Militant Radical Islamic Ideologue Moderates His Teachings,” *Global Issues Report*, 3 December 2007.

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/8199891/GMP20071211398003001.pdf (accessed 4 June 2008).

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- ¹³⁴ Lawrence Wright, "The Rebellion Within," *The New Yorker*, 2 June 2008. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?printable=true (accessed 30 May 2008); Genest, lecture, 2 June 2008.
- ¹³⁵ Ibid.
- ¹³⁶ W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman, eds., *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), v.
- ¹³⁷ Bennett and Entman note length of feature, images and graphics presented with the information, reporter's tone and body language, etc. Source: Ibid.
- ¹³⁸ Bruce Gregory defined framing as "Selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution." Source: Bruce Gregory, "Framing, Shaping, and Soft Power" (lecture, Naval War College, Strategic Communication Elective, Newport, RI, 12 December 2007).
- ¹³⁹ "Agenda Setting Theory," University of Twente, The Netherlands http://www.tcw.utwente.nl/theorieenoverzicht/Theory%20clusters/Mass%20Media/Agenda-Setting_Theory.doc (accessed 27 March 2008).
- ¹⁴⁰ Citing Walter Lippman's classic work *Public Opinion*, McCombs says, "What we know about the world is largely based on what the media decide to tell us." Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of Public Opinion," <http://www.sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/extra/McCombs.pdf> (accessed 27 March 2008), 1-2; Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, 1972, 176-187.
- ¹⁴¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁴² Gregory maintained that issue framing is a symbiotic process among governing elites, the media, and the public through their constant mediated interaction through media news reports; public opinion polls; direct public action (demonstrations, voting, etc.); governmental statements, policies, and actions; and the studies, commentaries, conferences, and personal influence of the political elites (think tank scholars, academics, consultants, out-of-power groups, lobbyists, etc.) Source: Gregory, "Framing, Shaping, and Soft Power," Lecture notes.
- ¹⁴³ This author maintains that the media also amplifies the impact on the public mind with sheer repetition. The media chooses to repeat items for several reasons: 1) its value- and interest-driven judgment of the information's importance to its audience, 2) its response to the public's known interest, 3) the technical need to fill time in its 24.7 news cycle, or 4) some combination of the other three.
- ¹⁴⁴ This author maintains that the public's choices focus on news and information generally of three types: of immediate interest (weather reports, sports scores, gas prices, taxes); of entertainment or stimulation value (celebrity gossip, scandal, crime stories); or of long-term importance (public policy issues, social and economic trends).
- ¹⁴⁵ On a continuum that ranges from perception to action, Maybury explained, people first perceive a message and grant their attention. Then, they interpret the message, form an attitude toward it based on their beliefs and values, decide whether it's important to them—appeals to their needs, interests, or emotions—and ultimately act on their decision. Source: Maybury interview.
- ¹⁴⁶ Herbert A. Simon, "Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World," in *Computers, Communication, and the Public Interest*, ed. Martin Greenberger. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
- ¹⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁸ T. H. Davenport and J. C. Beck, *The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001).
- ¹⁴⁹ Maybury interview.
- ¹⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁵¹ M.L. Knapp, *Interpersonal Communication and Human Relationships*, (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1984).
- ¹⁵² Six traits signify this type of relationship: honesty and directness; willingness to cooperate; respect and recognition of individuality; tolerance of differences among people and cultures; willingness to engage and build relationships; and clear inclination to listen and think carefully about another point of view. Source: Richard L. Thomlinson, "The Emerging Concept of Communication as Dialogue," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, LVII: 373-82, cited by T. Dean Thomlinson, "Monologic and Dialogic Communication," <https://umdrive.memphis.edu/ggholson/public/Dialogue.html> (accessed December 14, 2007).
- ¹⁵³ Stephen W. Littlejohn, *Theories of Human Communication*, 5th Ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishers, 1996)
- ¹⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁵ For example, a confluence of circumstances, especially many years of serious negotiations over difficult issues, helped convince Muammar Kaddafi of Libya to abandon his nuclear weapons development program. At least a significant part of that decision came from Libya's interests in improving its declining oil industry with U.S. technology, building its economy to relieve internal economic pressures, and avoiding U.S. military action while one of the U.S. and Great Britain's interests

lay in eliminating a growing WMD threat from the Mediterranean theater and Israel's rear. Sanctions and credible force did support diplomacy, but only the mutuality all parties developed over time brought the situation to a satisfactory solution. Source: Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *International Security* 30, no. 3, Winter 2005-2006, 47-86.

¹⁵⁶ Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, ii.

¹⁵⁷ The JIC distinguishes the two as compulsion is "the act of imposing a desired effect upon another, regardless of the other's interests or efforts. Influence is...causing the other to *choose* (emphasis in original) to do what it would otherwise would not." Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, 3.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 4.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁰ Bruce Gregory, "Framing, Shaping, and Soft Power," Powerpoint, slide 4, Naval War College: Newport, RI, 12 December, 2007.

¹⁶¹ Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Stop Getting Mad, America. Get Smart," *The Washington Post*, 9 December 2007, B03. All five major recommendations in their CSIS Smart Power Commission report rely primarily on exerting U.S. influence to a greater extent than at present: 1) reinvigorating alliances, friendships, and partnerships; 2) creating a Cabinet-level position to advocate for global economic development; 3) investing far more resources into public diplomacy and establishing a new non-profit institution for it; 4) engaging the global economy by negotiating free trade agreements with a core of nations; and 5) taking the lead in technological innovation to create energy security and address climate change. Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007), 1.

¹⁶² Strategic Communication Branch, *SC JIC*, 6-7.

¹⁶³ Glenn, "No More Principles of War?"

¹⁶⁴ In 2003, RADML John G. Morgan, Dr. Anthony McIvor, and a Secretary of the Navy's Action Team cited three modern factors to support a re-assessment: 1) an expanded and more diffused battlespace with irregular, asymmetric warfare in urban areas, towns, and villages; 2) deliberate targeting of "civilians" and elimination of the distinctions between combatants and non-combatants; and 3) possession of weapons of mass destruction by U.S. adversaries, including non-state actors. Source: John G. Morgan, et al, "Rethinking the Principles of War," *Proceedings* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, October 2003), 35.

¹⁶⁵ Russell W. Glenn, "No More Principles of War?" *Parameters*, Spring 1998.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/no_more_principles.htm (accessed 3 May 2008).

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁷ Morgan, et al, "Rethinking the Principles of War," 35.

¹⁶⁸ Van Avery cited the revolution in military affairs (RMA), the giant leap in interconnectivity with the DOD's Global Information Grid, the unprecedented threats from transnational non-state actors, the blurring lines among the levels of war across the ROMO, and the ever broadening categories of conflict as evidence that modern times require these new principles. Source: Christopher E. Van Avery, "12 New Principles of War," *Armed Forces Journal*, July 2007, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/07/2807407> (accessed 3 May 2008).

¹⁶⁹ Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3, using in part David Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), viii.

¹⁷⁰ Gregory, "Strategic Logic," 1.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*

¹⁷² Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy*, 27.

¹⁷³ The current National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPD&SC) established three strategic objectives: 1) "offer a positive American vision for hope and opportunity rooted in our most basic values;"¹⁷³ 2) "seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists..." and 3) "Work to nurture common interests and values" between Americans and other peoples. Source: Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, *National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, 3.

¹⁷⁴ The enduring U.S. national interests are 1) Defense of the Homeland, 2) Secure Economic Well-Being, 3) A Favorable World Order, and 4) Promotion of U.S. Values. Source: LTC Robert Jones, "Security and National Interests" (Security, Strategy and Forces lecture, Naval War College, December 2008), slide 14.

¹⁷⁵ The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution: "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America," to show the one most commonly emulated. Note that the clearly stated purposes remain the enduring and vital U.S. national interests.

¹⁷⁶ will. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/will> (accessed: May 10, 2008).

¹⁷⁷ Those interpretations and the meanings the people assign to the messages result from complex cognitive filters that include a person's values, beliefs, metaphors, narratives, attitudes, knowledge, memory, experiences, physical and mental condition, world views, stereotypes, biases, etc. People respond to communication largely through stereotypes, metaphors, and narratives, tempered by their filters. First, people choose to pay attention to messages based on their interest in the topic, and second, depending on their level of motivation, that is, interest, respond either reflexively or rationally. Messages that reflect core metaphors and narratives and resonate with core values, basic stereotypes, and deeply held beliefs stir the emotions quickly and effectively so that people respond with far more motivation and willingness to act than they do in response to rational messages. Thus, the will of the new global participant can be volatile and easily stirred by emotion-evoking messages and can become very influential quickly and broadly. Thus, this will demands constant attention as the critical determinant in bestowing legitimacy to USG policies.

¹⁷⁸ CJCS, *Joint Operations*, Jt. Pub 3-0, IV-15-16

¹⁷⁹ initiative. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/will> (accessed 11 May 2008).

¹⁸⁰ CJCS, *Joint Operations*, Jt. Pub 3-0, IV-15-16

¹⁸¹ In a preview of the new 2008 National Defense Strategy and companion National Military Strategy, SecDef Gates recently has again urged the DOD and Services to place "greater emphasis on irregular operations."¹⁸¹ and reinforced "his recent public admonitions that the military services must shift their focus away from preparing for conventional fights against superpowers in favor of plans for" dealing with "an increasingly complex, and dangerous, security environment."¹⁸¹ Gates specifically called for "a wider array of skills to assist foreign nations as they enhance the capacity of their defense and security forces," noting in a speech at the U.S. Military Academy that the cadets' most essential efforts may be "advising and mentoring the troops of other nations as they battle the forces of terror and instability within their own borders." Sherman, "New National Security Strategy," 2.

¹⁸² U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Marine Corps, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 11 September 2007), 21.

¹⁸³ The IW JOC's definition of irregular warfare includes 14 different operations and activities, ranging from insurgency and counter-insurgency to law enforcement, civil military operations, and stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO). Source: SOCOM, "IW JOC," 10.

¹⁸⁴ The IW JOC stressed a key supporting idea is the requirement for alternative command and control (C2) methods, including Regional Subordinate Combatant Commands and Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) to coordinate all cross-USG efforts in a subordinate COCOM; IA Advisory Assistance Teams located at the provincial or local level; and expanded U.S. Military Groups (MILGRPs) working under the U.S. chief of mission. Source: Ibid, 21.

¹⁸⁵ As Kramer and Wentz aptly noted, the USG cannot achieve either dominance or superiority "in the sense of overwhelming the other players" in the Commons. Source: Kramer and Wentz, "Cyber Influence," 3.

¹⁸⁶ Achieving effectiveness also is based on implementing all of the core communication principles: legitimacy (USG and its messengers), continuous interaction, shared values, coherent narrative, meaningful metaphors, and mutual interests with a clear grasp of the impact of mediated reality. Then, tacticians can design and implement attention-getting messages and transmit them through well-chosen media as they seek to minimize unintended consequences and maximize the desired influence across the Commons. Source: Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Andrew Wolvin (Professor and former Chair, Department of Communication, University of Maryland). interview by the author, 16 April 2008.

¹⁸⁸ Dan Kuehl has proposed an "influence campaigning" model based on five questions: 1) What is the desired effect, 2) Who is the audience, 3) What is the message, 4) How can the message be delivered most effectively, and 5) Was it successful? The model has four steps in its process: A) sensing-receiving, B) perceiving-internalizing, C) believing, and D) behaving. Source: Kuehl interview.

¹⁸⁹ At present, every capability within the DOD and across the USG, especially the DOS, required to support the MIDLIFE instruments appears to be under-resourced. For example, even after the planned increases, the U.S. Army will have only 16 PSYOP companies in two Groups, most of them in the reserves, and less than 20 Military Information Support Teams (MIST) assisting in U.S. embassies. For the vital defense of the DOD GIG as well as offensive IO, the U.S. Army has two IO battalion-level Commands and the U.S. Air Force has only recently stood up its global network computer security effort with about \$1 billion. There is a significant need for more capabilities across the board.

¹⁹⁰ At present, at the theater, operational and tactical levels, the Combatant Commanders are establishing synchronizing staffs for their communication operations. The Combatant Commands also have Information Operation cells (J-39) that work with the overt capabilities, such as Public Affairs, and covert capabilities (J-2) to coordinate operational efforts. Source: Robert L.

Perry, "The Organization is Flat: An Integrated Model for Strategic Communication for the Combatant Commander" (research paper, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 5 December 2007).

¹⁹¹ Clarity is defined as the quality of a message that allows a participant to easily understand the intent, content, and meaning of the message. Source: clarity. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1)*. Random House, Inc. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/clarity> (accessed 5 June 2008).

¹⁹² Judith Donath (instructor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), "Identity Signals," <http://smg.media.mit.edu/classes/Identitysignals05/> (accessed 23 May 2008).

¹⁹³ For example, after the Korean War began and Allied forces were defeating the North Koreans, every major U.S. leader (Truman, MacArthur, Dulles, etc.) thought China was bluffing when it issued a series of specific warnings that it would fight if the Allied forces crossed its redlines. They misunderstood the Chinese because China had repeatedly bluffed about attacking Taiwan just before and during the early months of the conflict. They assumed that China was far more interested in Taiwan than North Korea, and they apparently accepted their own logic rather than listen closely to the Chinese statements and observe their actions equally closely. Sartori concluded that states are less likely to deter war and less likely to achieve their goals if they develop a reputation for bluffing, and they are more likely to succeed when they have a reputation for honesty. In light of the multi-layered complexities of diplomatic exchanges within the transparent Commons, a state that is honest and reliable in its signaling should be more likely to achieve its goals at less cost and with a greater gain in reputation. Clarity makes effective signaling possible. Source: Anne E. Sartori, "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes," *International Organization* 56, no. 1, Winter 2002, 140.

¹⁹⁴ This discussion is based on the author's interview with now-BG Baker cited above and Baker, "The Decisive Weapon."

¹⁹⁵ Symptoms of these growing threats: Resurging Russian oligarchy; the growing influence on dictatorial states, especially in Africa, of China's totalitarian-free enterprise model; the troubling Socialist movement in South America; the number of fragile democracies in Africa, Central Asia, even Europe; Iran's surging Shia awakening in Middle East; and the transnational radical Salafist movement. The possible multi-decade struggle against radical Salafism is a critical symptom of the far greater and more dangerous phenomenon: the death of the ideal of liberty. For more than 50 years, the United States was the "beacon on the hill," but severe damage to the legitimacy of the ideal of liberty has been done since 2003 and the USG should restore its legitimacy with the dialogic approach that is the most effective way to realize President George W. Bush's famous statement from his 2002 State of the Union speech: "Our values and our interests are now one." When the US errs by not matching its interests and its values, those shortcomings allow the foes of liberty to attack from many sides.

¹⁹⁶ Sherman, "New National Defense Strategy," p 1-2.

¹⁹⁷ U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2004), 4.

¹⁹⁸ For example, in written responses to Congress for his hearings for his confirmation of Commander, U.S. Central Command, GEN David H. Petraeus stated that he "supports continued U.S. engagement with international and regional partners to find the right mix of diplomatic, economic, and military leverage to address the [Iranian] challenges." Petraeus also listed his views of the USG's significant mistakes made in Iraq; all of them reflect shortcomings in applying the SC framework and following the SC principles: "erroneous prewar assumptions" [pervasive awareness, initiative, engagement, unity of effort, adaptability, sustainment, clarity]; "misplaced emphasis on early elections" [legitimacy, will, awareness, engagement, unity of effort, effectiveness, sustainment, clarity, synchronization, and security]; "failure to recognize negative impact of...slow political reconciliation" [awareness, initiative, engagement, unity of effort, adaptability, clarity, synchronization, security]; and "U.S. misconduct at Abu Ghraib...that 'inflamed the insurgency and damaged the credibility of Coalition Forces in Iraq, in the region, and around the world'" [objective, legitimacy, will, engagement, effectiveness, clarity, synchronization, and security]. Source: Karen de Young, "Petraeus: Diplomacy, Not Force, with Iran," *Washington Post*, 22 May 2008, 9.

¹⁹⁹ The costs and risks associated with military action against either North Korea or Iran appear to be very high: invasion of South Korea. Iranian disruption of global oil supplies, and Iranian proxy (Hezbollah) violence against Israel, Iraq, the Middle East, and potentially the United States.

²⁰⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: DOD, August 2005), 5-8. The Capstone summarized this shift after it added "nonadversarial crisis response operations" to three major new categories of threats (transnational, emerging competitors, and failed/failing states to the four NMS challenges (traditional, disruptive, catastrophic, and irregular).

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, 8.

²⁰² The general strategic communication capabilities available within the U.S. military include public affairs (PA), military diplomacy (MD), support to public diplomacy (DSPD), the overt PSYOP aspects of Information Operations, and visual information/combat camera (VI). Supporting capabilities include civil affairs/civil-military operations and the "hard" IO capabilities: computer network operations, military deception, electronic warfare, operations security, and the covert aspects

of PSYOP. Specific efforts include foreign internal defense (mostly by Special Forces and Marines, but increasingly by regular USA units), IMET, foreign area officers in embassies, SSTRO teams, integrated Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance (e.g., USNS Comfort and Mercy), even the military bands.

²⁰³ Robert L. Perry, "The Sheathed Sword: Implications of 'Pragmatic Idealism' For Future Forces and Resources," (research paper, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, National Security Decision Making Department) March 2008.

²⁰⁴ Terra Questi (Second Life name of Susan Gaidos), "Scientists Get a 2nd Life," *Science News* 173, no. 17, 24 May 2008, 21-24.

²⁰⁵ Defense Science Board, *DSB SC Report*, January 2008.

²⁰⁶ The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 prohibits the U.S. government from deliberately seeking to influence the U.S. public because of fear of the power of government propaganda as proven by the Nazis during World War II and the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War. Source: Bruce Gregory, interview by the author, 17 January 2008.