

A Logistical Response to Assist in Answering the Call of Defense Support to Civilian Authorities in Disaster Response

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

A Logistical Response to Assist in Answering the Call of Defense Support to Civilian Authorities in Disaster Response by MAJ Jeffrey J Britton, United States Army, 54 pages.

During Hurricane Katrina, the levees in New Orleans failed turning a potential crisis into a catastrophic incident. The public began to question the responsibility and requirements of the United States (US) government in responding to the total devastation of New Orleans as the media continually showed the death and destruction. The public wanted answers on how the Federal government was going to provide quick and timely assistance in evacuation, search and rescue, and distribution of supplies (food and water). To answer these questions for John Q. Public, a logical response could have been the activation of a federal agency that will stop the horrors shown on an hourly basis. The agency with the responsibility to answer these questions is Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the direction of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The FEMA design, as a coordinating agency with the ability to task and synchronize the other federal agencies, was not able to respond to the widespread devastation. The President decides once again to call on the Department of Defense (DOD) to answer the call to assist in disaster response. This study will specifically focus on the logistical responses necessary to react to a catastrophic incident.

An examination of the governmental laws and policies will provide the basis of the legal requirements in supporting the Defense of Civilian Authorities. These laws and policies will lay out the constraints that the President and DOD must work through in order to provide the type of response that the public was looking for in Hurricane Katrina.

This paper conducted an examination of the National Response Plan (NRP) to determine which areas would fall under the purview of DOD. Focus of the investigation into the NRP also concentrated on the abilities of logistic units that can resolve some of the specified and improvised tasks for DOD. The end-result was the creation of an appendix that allows one to examine each of the Emergency Support Functions within the NRP that provides purpose, scope, and specified tasks for DOD elements.

Finally, this paper offers a proposal for instigating a logistics headquarters that could respond to national response in a timely manner and prevent some of the ad hoc command structure that was evident in the responses to Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina. The logistical headquarters is developing within the Army's drive to transformation but will need some refinement to assist in the difficulties facing a response to natural or manmade disasters.

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INTRODUCTION

During Hurricane Katrina, the levees in New Orleans failed turning a potential crisis into a catastrophic incident. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in its National Response Plan (NRP) describes a catastrophic incident as “Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.”¹ The environment in New Orleans and the extensive surrounding areas of Louisiana and Mississippi fit this description exactly after Hurricane Katrina smashed into the Gulf Coast. This event clearly demonstrates the intricacies of coordinating and synchronizing the responses between local, State, and Federal governmental agencies. The designed response plan dictates specific steps that these agencies need to follow in order to receive assistance. The failure to execute the plan, as written, led to all agencies involved in becoming quickly overwhelmed in their response efforts, causing the response to be even more problematical.

The public began to question the responsibility and requirements of the United States (US) government in responding to the total devastation of New Orleans as the media continually showed the death and destruction. The public wanted answers on how the federal government was going to provide quick and timely assistance in evacuation, search and rescue, and distribution of supplies (food and water). To answer to these questions for John Q. Public, a

¹ Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan* (Washington, D.C., 2004), 63 [document on-line] available from <http://www.dhs.gov.interweb/assetlibrary/NRP-Fulltext.pdf>; accessed 20 January 2007, 63. “The description goes on to further clarify the event which could result in sustained national impacts over prolonged period of time. [Which would] almost immediately exceed resources normally available to state, local, tribal and private sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.”

logical response could have been the activation of a federal agency that will stop the horrors televised on an hourly basis. The agency with the responsibility to answer these questions is DHS through the direction of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The FEMA design, as a coordinating agency with the ability to task and synchronize the other federal agencies, was unable to respond to the widespread devastation. The President decided once again to call on the Department of Defense (DOD) to answer the call to assist in disaster response. This study will specifically focus on the logistical responses necessary to react to a catastrophic incident.

The US Code provides the President with the authority to use any federal agency in an incident response.² DOD and its numerous organic capabilities seem to be a logical answer to any rapid response. Historically, the DOD is usually the agency that responds to these types of natural disasters with their capabilities being available in a moment's notice. Most federal agencies do not even possess a percentage of the DOD capabilities and must contract for them.

An examination of the governmental laws and policies will provide the basis of the legal requirements of Defense Support to Civilian Authorities. Specifically, we will examine the Robert T. Stafford Act and its implications for the President in the use of the DOD. In order to gain a better understanding of the Stafford Act, an examination of the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act is necessary to lay the foundation for the Stafford Act and the effects that it has on providing federal assistance to states.

² United States Congress, *US Code: Title 42, Chapter 68, Subchapter II, § 5131*, (Washington, D.C., 1993), [Document on-line] available from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode42/usc_sec_42_00005131----000-.html: accessed 12 February 2007,

The events of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) brought some dramatic changes to how the US responds to disasters within the US. This event brought about the far-reaching organizational changes and the development of several new laws, specifically, the Homeland Security Act with its formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the integration of seven diverse federal agencies under one command structure.³ Another critical piece of legislation that caused changes in how the US responds to events like 9/11 is the President's Homeland Security Directive (HSPD-5), which forces the updating of the National Response Plan (NRP). These laws cause several DOD directives to become important and bear some investigation to determine the overall effect that they have on the DOD and why the military is required to be prepared to respond to natural disasters.

A review of the last two natural disasters (Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina) requiring a military response will show the inadequacies that government agencies faced and some of the shortfalls detected within the NRP. Further evaluation is necessary to determine the requirements that are in the bailiwick of a military response, how the US Army responded at the time, specifically looking at the logistical requirements, and how the US Army allocated capabilities to these requirements. The assessment of both responses illustrates the necessity for the US Army to establish a capability in order to react to this kind of crisis.

Historical analysis and future predictions show that DOD will continue to be required in responding to natural disasters. With that insight, this paper will examine the latest NRP and

³ Department of Homeland Security, DHS Organizational Chart (Washington, D.C., 2006) [document on-line] available from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_OrgChart.pdf, accessed 10 February 2007. DHS consists of the following agencies Transportation Security Agency, Customs and Border Protection, US Secret Service, Citizen and Immigration services, Immigration and Customs enforcement, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the US Coast Guard.

determine the requirements that the plan is going to force on DOD in order to support the overall government response. Comparing the NRP to current military doctrine, both joint and Army reveals that in interpreting the desires of the doctrine, the requirements in the NRP are within the capability of DOD.

Finally, this paper will propose a possible response in providing a logistical headquarters that is capable of providing the immediate and organizational response necessary to support the logistic missions foreseen in the NRP. We will analyze the logistical headquarters to determine if it is capable of preventing the ad hoc organizations that responded to previous natural disasters. Further analysis of the logistical headquarters capabilities shows that changes to its Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) are minimal and even with current deployments supporting the Global War of Terrorism (GWOT) there is no detrimental effect on the overall Army's mission in wartime support.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES THAT AFFECT DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES

Federal Policies

The Constitution of the United States, under the auspices of federalization, states that individual states are responsible and required to provide civil order and protection of their citizens. If the state requests assistance or is unable to maintain law and order then the Constitution endows the Federal government with the responsibility to maintain order and protect

the state's citizens from domestic violence. There are several federal policies, which clarify those responsibilities and grant the Federal Government the legal power to act.

The Posse Comitatus Act

Constructing this law allowed the lawmakers to prevent the use of military soldiers from conducting domestic law enforcement.⁴ Written in 1878, at the end of Reconstruction Era, the law specifically prohibited Federal troops from supervising (influencing) elections in the former Confederate States following the Civil War. A current interpretation of this law shows that it does not prevent the military from being able to conduct domestic operations, which is a common misperception⁵. When the government takes upon the mission to assist local law enforcement then there is a violation of the PCA. The PCA states “when civilian law enforcement officials make “direct active use” of military investigators; or when the use of the military “pervades the activities” of the civilian officials is in violation of the PCA statutes. It even goes on to further point out that when military forces are used to subject citizens to the rule of military powers which are “regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature”⁶ then the directives of the law are in violation. Fortunately, Congress, in the 1860s, had the foresight to leave some exceptions within the law for the use of military forces. There are three stated exceptions to this law. The first exception is the National Guard when not federalized (either activated under Title 32 or state

⁴ Interesting to note that Congress has the ability to waive the limitations imposed by the PCA and has used this power previously.

⁵ Charles Doyle, Library of Congress, and Congressional Research Service, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law.” (Washington, D.C., 2000), 31, [document on-line] available from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/95-964.pdf>, accessed 17 February 2007

⁶ Jennifer K Elsea, Library of Congress, and Congressional Research Service, “The use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues,” (Washington, D.C., 2005), 2 [document on-line] available from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22266.pdf>, accessed 20 October 2006

control). The second provides a military branch or service, the Coast Guard, with the ability to conduct law enforcement activities, focusing on the capabilities to conduct search and seizure and maintain general order. The third exception is a little greyer in clarity but allows the President or another government agency to authorize DOD forces to conduct law enforcement activities through the activation of a different federal Act. The Act that the President usually uses is the Insurrection Act.

The Insurrection Act

Federalized troops are able to conduct limited police operations due to the provisions of the Insurrection Act. Congress provides the President the ability to bypass the constraints of the PCA in order to allow the military to suppress an insurrection or any disturbance that affects the public well-being or rule of law. Interpretation of the unique aspects of this Act is highly debatable by several court rulings in the determination of the meaning of well-being, but it does not limit the ability of the US government in enacting this Act.

The President has the authority to enact the Insurrection Act for one of the following conditions:

- The request of the State Government.
- The President believes that “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States”⁷ and use the military forces is only enforcing the law or suppressing the rebellion.

⁷ U.S. Constitution art I, sec 8, cl. 14

- The President believes that local law enforcement is unable or unwilling to protect individuals due to the insurrection or domestic violence.

There are several precedents for the use of this Act. The most recent use was the response to the Los Angeles Riots in 1992⁸ and suppressing the looting following Hurricane Hugo in 1989. The previous two Acts discuss the use of the military to conduct law enforcement activities within states. We will now examine some additional federal policies that provide for the activation and use of DOD forces.

The Disaster Mitigation Act (Robert T. Stafford Act)

The Robert T. Stafford Act authorizes the President to provide federal assistance to states affected by manmade or natural disasters. This Act also provides the President the right to activate and use DOD forces in order to provide a domestic disaster response if other government agencies are unable to respond. The Act covers all actions done by these agencies such as debris removal, emergency medical services, distribution of essential supplies (water and food), and advice on disaster management and control. The Act is what allows the government to provide the assistance necessary to the states in their recovery, mostly in the response to hurricanes.

The Act provides the President with a lot of leeway in using federal assets for relief efforts. However, it does not provide free reign in tasking those elements until the states follow the specific criteria, specifically the formal request from the state government.⁹ There is one

⁸ The LA riots were the result of the mostly white jury acquitted four police officers accused in the videotaped beating of black motorist Rodney King. The determination of the jury provided the spark that led to a mini-race riot that lasted for six days with 53 people killed. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LA_Riots

⁹ The Act can be enacted in one of four ways (1) federal declaration of a major disaster, (2) federal declaration of an emergency, (3) provide essential assistance for a limited period of time(10 days), and (4) protection of federal property. Requirements 2 and 3 require that a state first activate its state emergency plan and the disaster has overwhelmed the state assets.

major exception to this Act for DOD and that is the immediate response authority, which we will discuss in the DOD policies section. The immediate response authority provides the DOD with flexibility to preposition forces in order to support the good of the nation.¹⁰

The Act does not alleviate the military and the federal government of the requirements of PCA. The PCA auspices prevent DOD forces, supporting the disaster relief efforts, from performing law enforcement activities unless the president is able to activate the Insurrection Act in conjunction with the Stafford Act. A reminder though is that state activated forces are exempt from this ruling, which is why most state governors do not allow for federalization of their National Guard units, one of the issues of conflict during Hurricane Katrina.

Homeland Security Act

The Homeland Security Act was made law in 2002 in response to the misfortune of the 9/11 attacks and problems determined within the federal government in their abilities to coordinate information and a coordinated response. The Act establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which centralizes the response to the mission of protecting the US from terrorist attacks and coordinating domestic response within the US. This mission is of concern to DOD in that it establishes the DHS as lead agency in emergency response planning.

The DHS as lead agency means that federalized military forces and other federal agencies become subordinate to the DHS in crisis planning and execution. In terms for military thinkers, DHS is now the supported commander and all current federal agencies have to change the way

¹⁰ DOD utilizes this capability often, most recently in the forward position of forces in preparation for the impact of Hurricane Katrina

they do business and their support structure in order to be supporting agencies. This provides several interesting aspects for DOD that we will examine later in the paper.

President's Homeland Security Directive #5 (HSPD-5)

The issuing of HSPD-5 in 2003 establishes a “national incident management system”¹¹ for all federal agencies to incorporate in their organizations. The DOD now has the requirement to incorporate the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP) in developing their response plans and in responding to natural disasters. HSPD-5 declares that the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management and is responsible to coordinate the federal agencies when one of the following conditions applies:¹²

- A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority requests assistance.
- Resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and the State or Local authorities have requested assistance.
- More than one federal agency is involved in the response.
- The President directs the Secretary to oversee the response.

Luckily, nothing within the HSPD-5 impairs or alters the authority of the Secretary of Defense over DOD. The military support requirement is only when directed by the President and military forces are available to conduct the response. The directive clarifies that the DHS and

¹¹ Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) were designed to communicate presidential decisions about homeland security policies of the United States

¹² George W Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5, Subject: Management of Domestic Incidents”. (Office of the Press Secretary, February 2003), [document on-line] available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html, accessed 20 October 2006

DOD will establish relationships and mechanisms to facilitate the cooperation and coordination within the two agencies. The directive is a further amplification of the President's promise to the public for a unified approach in responding to natural disasters.

Department of Defense Policies

The requirement for DOD to provide support to civilian authorities forces it to establish several policies that assist in planning and executing this response. The principal policies are the Defense Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and Defense Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities¹³. These two directives define DOD's structure in responding to requests from civilian authorities. The directives grant DOD components the capability to provide an immediate response, without prior approval, "to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage."¹⁴ The directives also provide a clear unity of command from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army in providing emergency support for natural or manmade disasters.¹⁵ Except for the cases of immediate response, the

¹³ DOD Directive 3025.15 is an amplification of specific responsibilities for DOD. It does not supersede 3025.1.

¹⁴Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, (Washington D.C., 1997), 4, [document on-line] available from www.dtic.whs/directives/corres/pdf/302515_021897/302515p.pdf, accessed 13 February 2007 DOD Directive 3025.15 defines "Immediate Response" as an imminently serious condition that does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters. The responses may include: Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment; Emergency restoration of essential public services; Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance; Recovery, identification, registration, and disposal of the dead; Monitoring and decontaminating radiological, chemical, and biological effects; Roadway movement control and planning; Safeguarding, collecting, and distributing essential supplies, Damage assessment, Interim emergency communications; and facilitating the reestablishment of civil governmental functions.

¹⁵ Ibid, 3

directives specify the processes, which allow for support to civil disasters¹⁶ and for DOD to develop plans in order to commit resources to support civil disasters.

DOD RESPONSES TO PAST NATURAL DISASTERS

Due to the vast capabilities of DOD and the requirements derived from the NRP and DOD Directives 3025.1 and 3025.15, DOD is responsible to support the DHS, especially FEMA during federal natural disaster responses. This section reviews two previous hurricanes that have slammed into the continental United States and required activation of DOD forces for a response. The first response is Hurricane Andrew (1992) and the second is Hurricane Katrina (2005). In each of the responses, an attempt to show what the logistical requirements are and how these requirements were to influence the organizational structure of Army logistical units in responding.

Hurricane Andrew (1992)

The passage of the Stafford Act, the formation of FEMA, and the release of the Federal Response Plan¹⁷ (FRP) are just completed and Hurricane Andrew comes ashore in the southern peninsula of Florida on 24 August 1992. In anticipation of its arrival, DOD began preparations to support an anticipated activation of the FRP. These preparations included the prepositioning of supplies and materials¹⁸ within airlift distance of the targeted area.¹⁹ The Defense Coordinating

¹⁶ The Director of Military Support (DOMS) shall review a support request to determine recommended courses of action in order to respond to the request. If the request is capable by DOD components, then the DOMS shall submit the request for assistance to the Secretary of the Army for approval and subsequent tasking of the appropriate DOD components.

¹⁷ The FRP was the base document in developing the NRP, we will examine the NRP and the DOD in later sections

¹⁸ Working from precedents set by earlier storms like Hugo, which did \$5.6 billion damage on the East Coast three years prior, DOD planners compiled lists of items like rations, cots, blankets, tents, water, electric generators, transport planes and dozers to remove debris that they thought would be required in the

Officer (DCO) and the Emergency Response Team – Advance (ERT-A) deployed to the Florida State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and collocated with the Federal Coordinating Officer’s (FCO) location to begin coordination prior to the landfall of Andrew. On 23 August, Florida state officials ordered the evacuation of over 1 million people, causing state highways to be flooded with over 700,000 evacuees allowing for even more congestion to an already overwhelmed infrastructure.²⁰

Hurricane Andrew crossed the southern Florida peninsula with winds up to 145 mph, gusting to 175 mph. In its wake, there were 40 people left dead and 1,000 square miles of South Florida damaged. The property toll was over 28,000 homes destroyed, another 105,000 homes damaged and over 80,000 businesses destroyed or damaged beyond use. More than 1.4 million people lost power.²¹ The roads were blocked and the majority of the water sources were non-potable.

Even though the damage was contained in the southern peninsula and federal government agencies were prepared to respond, there was a delay until the State of Florida activated its portions of the response and then request support from the Federal Government as directed in the FRP. During these days of initial disaster response, the victims in Florida perceived that federal efforts were too little and too late. The Director of Dade County Office of Emergency Management (Kate Hale) during a press conference demonstrated this frustration when she asked,

area. Among other things, the military had 63 million Meals-Ready-to-Eat within airlift distance of Florida. The command team was ready to move a week in advance. As one Pentagon planner put it, "We were leaning so far forward our noses were on the ground."

¹⁹ Tom Mathews and Peter Katel, "What went wrong?", *Newsweek*, 7 September 1992, 22

²⁰ Janet McDonnell, *Hurricane Andrew: Historical Report*, (Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, VA, Jan 1993), 1

²¹ *Ibid*, 2

“Where the hell is the cavalry in this one? We need food. We need water. For God’s sake, where are they?”²² When this statement hit the press, the President²³ ordered an increase in DOD participation to relieve the suffering. The DOD response was the formation of Joint Task Force Andrew on 28 Aug 1992 (four days after landfall).

JTF Andrew consisted of elements from XVIII Airborne Corps, 10th Mountain Division, a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, the US Air Force, US Army Material Command, and Canadian Forces. The JTF contained almost 24,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, the largest response of a federal agency to date within the US during a disaster response. The JTF’s mission statement was “Provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage / distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local / line-haul transportation operations and other logistical support to the local population.”²⁴ JTF Andrew divided its concept of the operation into three phases:

- Rapid distribution of basic life needs (food, water, shelter, medical services, and general supplies) to the hurricane victims
- Direct support to Federal (FEMA), State, and local authorities as a supporting agency
- Transition of services to non-DOD agencies and management conducted by local, state, and federal agencies

²² Mathews, 23

²³ Interesting to note that this was an election year and currently Pres Bush was leading the polls against Bill Clinton and Florida is a major swing state for the election.

²⁴ Makowski, Forces Command Hurricane Andrew Response: JTF Andrew AAR, (Fort McPherson, GA 1992),6, [document on-line] available from www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/Hurricane_files/FORCOM%20Hurricane%20Andrew%20AAR.pdf, accessed 15 January 2007

Interpreting the mission statement and the phases of the operation, a logical person could determine that this mission would require a large logistic unit presence in order to coordinate and manage the relief efforts. The logistics elements used for the response came from multiple headquarters located throughout the US. The overall headquarters was the Logistics Support Group (LSG) established by HQ Army Material Command (AMC) and staffed by the HQ elements of 80th Ordnance Battalion. The remainder of the Task Organization is below:

- 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM)
 - 507th Corps Support Group (CSG)
 - 44th Medical Brigade
 - 32nd Medical Logistics Battalion
 - 724th Main Support Battalion
 - 227th General Supply Company
 - 226th Supply and Services Company
 - 533rd Transportation Company
 - 365th Transportation Company

The logistic units had the primary mission of operating the Humanitarian Depot System (HDS), which consisted of the centralized Florida Relief Center and Distribution Hub to forward humanitarian depot sites (three) and a truck consolidation point. The forward depot sites were operating at a capacity of about 100 trucks of all types a day.²⁵ There were additional logistic

²⁵ Thomas B. Arwood and Bob Hunt, "Army Aids Disaster Victims", *Army Logistician*, (Fort Lee, VA, Jan/Feb 1993), 20-25, [document on-line] available from http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/PDFDocs/1993jan_feb/artp20_93jf.pdf, accessed 17 February 2007

units supporting the JTF Andrew but their focus was to provide direct support for their respective organic units.

The active Army is going through a major restructuring during this mission. The Army was still in the process of resetting after their successes in Desert Storm and beginning the painful process of the implemented drawdown. At this time there was no doctrine developed for domestic support operations²⁶ as this was a mission the Army decided was not going to be within their bailiwick. The multitude of requirements, the capabilities of the FEMA being quickly overwhelmed, and the visibility that the lack of a response was receiving from the media forced the President via the DOD to send a multitude of troops and enablers to the area to relieve the suffering. Although, there seems to have been no analysis conducted between the requirements necessary and the capabilities of the DOD in determining this response package. It looks like the Army was sending whatever seemed to be a good idea to assist in the response. Unfortunately, this method provides many assets but also wastes assets for other missions within the Army. Now travel forward a few years, 13 to be exact and examine the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Hurricane Katrina (2005)

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in our Nation's history and has caused unimaginable devastation and heartbreak throughout the Gulf Coast Region.
President George W Bush, September 8, 2005²⁷

Hurricane Katrina began its buildup on 23 August 2005 and continued to increase in size and category over the next several days. The hurricane smashed into the US beginning in

²⁶ FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations was still in the development phase.

²⁷ George W. Bush. "President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation," (Office of the Press Secretary, Washington D.C., 2005) [document on-line] available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html>, accessed 12 September 2006

Southern Florida then back into the Gulf of Mexico where it increased in strength again and then finally into the gulf areas of Mississippi and Louisiana. As in Hurricane Andrew, the federal government had just finalized the NRP in December 2004 and is still in the process of restructuring the DHS (response to 9/11 terrorist attacks), in which FEMA is a subordinate entity. During this period, the Army is also in the middle of supporting the ongoing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Katrina caused a catastrophic amount of destruction. However, the issue with the actual hurricane is not just the damage caused by the hurricane but is the result of the failure of the levees in New Orleans²⁸, and the resulting effects from the flooding, which caused approximately 80 percent of the city to flood.²⁹ Hurricane Katrina had a diameter of just over 206 miles as it struck the gulf coast region. It had a significant impact on nearly 93,000 square miles, which crossed 138 parishes and counties.³⁰ Katrina also forced the evacuation of an estimated 770,000 people into several other parts of the US.³¹ The greatest challenge of this hurricane compared to previous ones is the vast distribution of the damage. A second challenge was that the amount of the damage quickly overwhelmed the ability of the first responders. Finally, the destruction of infrastructure greatly impaired any unity of effort or command and control of the response effort.

²⁸ New Orleans is located 1 to 10 feet below sea level and requires the levees to keep the city from being flooded. This was determined to be a critical in previous emergency exercises conducted for New Orleans during 2003.

²⁹ U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Satellite and Information Service and National Climatic Data Center, "Hazards/Climate Extremes," [document on-line] available from <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/aug/hazards.html>, accessed 11 February 2007

³⁰ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #8," August 30, 2005 and American Red Cross, "Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessments," (document on-line] available from <http://www.msema.org/redcrossassessments.htm>, accessed 20 November 2006

³¹ Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 15 February 2006

Table 1 breaks down the damage done by Katrina, which is the largest natural disaster so far within the US.

Housing	\$67 billion
Consumer durable goods	\$7 billion
Business property	\$20 billion
Government property	\$3 billion
Total	\$96 billion

Table 1 Estimated damage from Katrina and New Orleans Flood³²

Katrina alone devastated over 300,000 homes, which in comparison to Hurricane Andrew, which only damaged about 100,000 homes, one can truly understand the extent of overall destruction from Katrina.

The Commander United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM)³³ began establishing staging bases and deploying DCOs and DCEs to the anticipated affected areas in order to assist in the management of DOD responses³⁴. Continuing to remain in this proactive mindset, the NORTHCOM planners via Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) began to notify units for possible deployment to the affected areas. The anticipated mission capability was to include imagery support and damage assessment; inter-coastal waterway search and rescue; aviation medical

³² Frances Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, D.C., 2006), 7, [document on-line] available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/>, accessed 17 February 2007

³³ Statement of Admiral Timothy M Keating, Commander, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) before the House select bipartisan committee to investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, 27 October 2005

³⁴ The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authorized this action in anticipation of activation of the NRP due to an Incident of National Significance and the authorization for DOD to take preliminary actions prior to an activation of the NRP.

evacuation; and infrastructure engineering/repair. Immediately following the impact of Katrina and once again prior to request by federal agencies, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), authorized NORTHCOM to deploy forces deemed necessary for the preservation of life and reduction of the suffering of the people in the area affected. The final step for NORTHCOM at the direction of the SECDEF was to establish and activate Joint Task Force – Katrina (JTF Katrina) to provide command and control of Title 10 assets deployed to save lives, mitigate suffering, and restore critical services in the gulf region. This force grew to over 24,000 personnel from all services, to include over 200 fixed and rotary wing aircraft and 20 ships. The missions that JTF Katrina took over included:

- Conduct search and rescue, both inland and coastal;
- Assist with the evacuations;
- Organize the complex logistical system to deliver food, water, and other essential supplies;
- Provide medical care;
- Provide imagery support;
- Conduct fire fighting and mosquito abatement;
- Clear debris;
- Control crowded airspace; and
- Assist with mortuary affairs.

The formation of JTF Katrina and the tasks that the Army was looking at coordinating led the 13th COSCOM Commander to develop and activate Logistic Task Force (LTF) Lonestar. Initially LTF Lonestar was task organized to support the 82nd Airborne Division but then reorganization occurred for better support and the LTF became attached to the Joint Logistics Command (JLC) JTF-Katrina. This Command consisted of the following forces:

- 13th COSCOM

- Headquarters and Headquarters Company Special Troops Battalion
- 64th Corps Support Group
- 4th Corps Material Management Center
- 29th Movement Control Battalion
- 263rd Maintenance Company
- 1st Medical Brigade

These units conducted numerous missions including water purification, transportation, preventive medicine, distribution management, and debris removal. Overall, the JLC distributed an estimated 1,675,000 gallons of water, 3,587,760 Meals-Ready-to-Eat, and 11,480,000 pounds of ice throughout southern Louisiana³⁵. The Army is once again conducting a transformation during the execution of this response. The Army is supporting the Global War on Terrorism in two different countries with over 170,000 soldiers deployed in Iraq alone. Many of the forces during this time were from the National Guard units in Louisiana.

Examining the military responses to natural disasters in both Hurricane Andrew and Katrina shows that there are still several unanswered questions for the DOD to include the primary question addressed by this paper. What are the capabilities that may be necessary in responses that DOD executes under the NRP? Specifically to the Army, which of the capabilities identified for DOD in the NRP fall into the realm of Army Logistics capabilities? We will cover these topics in the following two sections.

³⁵ Ryan T. Tierney, “13th COSCOM Support of Task Force Katrina,” *Army Logistician*, September – October 2006, 24.

THE NRP AND DOD

NRP Description and Organization

The NRP is the only nationwide all-inclusive document that incorporates the majority of federal agencies response plans into one document. Unfortunately, the inclusion of all these responses causes the entire document to be well over 400 pages in length. The NRP incorporates the same techniques as any interagency plan would, in that it is vague enough to allow all 32 signatories to agree with the document. The completion of the NRP in December 2004 is the result of an HSPD-5 (2003) tasking to the DHS and the Homeland Security Act³⁶. As stated in the Letter of Agreement³⁷, the signatories agree to support the NRP and “provide the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of federal support to state, local, and tribal incidents.” Examination of the NRP permits the reader to determine that the product provides an insight into how the federal agencies are to assist DHS. There are some shortcomings in the document though most of them are in the ‘how’ category and will continue to be refined between the interagencies. There is a larger discrepancy though and that is the NRP is the result of a plan designed to respond to a terrorist attack within the US. Therefore, the reader must remember that this product will continue to be a living and growing document that is refined after more lessons are learned, some hopefully not as painful as Hurricane Katrina.

As we determined in the last section, the NRP was still a new document when Katrina smashed into the gulf region and as with all good plans did not survive first contact. The document’s primary purpose is to provide the structure that allows for coordination between all response entities (Federal, State, local, tribal, private, and Non-Governmental Organizations)

³⁶ Pub. L. 107-296

³⁷ NRP, iii

involved in domestic incident preparedness, response, and recovery operations.³⁸ The NRP's structure provides for the baseline of both the conceptual procedures in a rapid response to a national event and a detailed supplemental (hazard-specific) planning process. There are five main sections within the NRP and they consist to the following:³⁹


- Base Plan – This “includes planning assumptions, roles, and responsibilities, concepts of operations, incident management actions, and plan maintenance instructions.”
- Appendixes – This provides more in depth information to include the collection of interagency plans, descriptions of Federal involvement under the Stafford Act, and the Federal-to-Federal support in non-Stafford Act situations. This monograph is only going to discuss those that affected by the Stafford Act.
- Emergency Support Functions (ESF) – This is the detailed area of specific responses. Appendix 1 details the ESFs with a particular focus on the purpose of each and what kind of tasks DOD may have to conduct.
- Support Annexes – Covers the administrative functions of the NRP to assist in an efficient and effective activation
- Incident Annexes – Addresses the specific contingencies or hazards that require a specialized response instead of the baseline response designed in the NRP

The writers of the NRP did not design the document for every crisis within the country. The NRP is to address those events that are in the category of an “Incident of National Significance.” An incident of national significance is one of such devastation that the Secretary

³⁸ Ibid, 2

³⁹ Ibid, xi

of DHS declares the disaster beyond the capabilities of state and local response. Once declared, the NRP structure assists in maintaining awareness of the incident, and provides for centralization for response activities. Figure 1 shows how the flow of information begins at the point of disaster and specifies that the Secretary of DHS is the only person who can activate the NRP; the President may only recommend activation, this continues to be a point of contention within the US.⁴⁰



⁴⁰ Michael Greenberger, "False Conflict: Who's in Charge of National Public Health Catastrophes", *Administrative and Regulatory Law News*, (Baltimore, MD., 2006), 2

Figure 1 The National Response Plan (Stafford Act)⁴¹

Emergency Support Functions

The NRP provides one definite advantage and that is a detailed breakdown of the ESFs. These ESFs provide the specific responsibilities for certain federal agencies in the “planning, support, resources, program implementation, and emergency services that are most likely necessary during Incidents of National Significance.”⁴² There are 15 ESFs in the NRP and they cover numerous categories from Transportation to External Affairs (Table 2). There is only one ESF (# 3) designated to DOD as a lead agency but this lead agency responsibility is for the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Key to understanding the implications of the ESFs in the plan though is that DOD is the only federal agency that has the requirement to be a supporting agency to every ESF (Appendix 1), which it accomplished during support of both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina.

	Responsibility	Primary Agency
ESF 1: Transportation	Provide civilian & military transportation support	Department of Transportation
ESF 2: Communications	Provide telecommunications support	DHS, National Communications System
ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering	Restore essential public services & facilities	DOD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
ESF 4: Fire Fighting	Detect & suppress wildland, rural & urban fires	USDA, U.S. Forest Service
ESF 5: Emergency Management	Support overall Federal activities for domestic Incident Management	DHS, FEMA
ESF 6: Mass Care, Housing & Human Services	Manage & coordinate food, shelter & first aid for victims; provide bulk distribution of relief supplies; operate a system to assist family reunification	DHS, FEMA, & American Red Cross
ESF 7: Resources Support	Provide equipment, materials, supplies & personnel to Federal entities during response	General Services Administration

⁴¹ U.S. Army War College, *How the Army Runs*, (Carlisle, PA, 2005), 474 [document on-line] available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/htar2005.pdf>, accessed 15 February 2007

⁴² NRP, 11

ESF 8: Public Health & Medical Services	Provide assistance for public health & medical care needs	Health & Human Services
ESF 9: Urban Search & Rescue	Locate, extricate & provide initial medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures	DHS, FEMA
ESF 10: Oil & Hazardous Materials Response	Support Federal response to actual or potential releases of oil and hazardous materials	DHS, U.S. Coast Guard & EPA
ESF 11: Agriculture & Natural Resources	Provide nutrition assistance, assurance of food safety & food security, control & eradication of devastating animal disease or plant pest infestation	Food & Nutrition Service, Department of Agriculture
ESF 12: Energy	Restore power systems & fuel supplies	Department of Energy
ESF 13: Public Safety & Security	Provide non-investigative/non-criminal law enforcement, safety & security capabilities	DHS & Department of Justice
ESF 14: Long Term Community Recovery & Mitigation	Provide a framework for Federal support to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of Incident of National Significance	DHS, FEMA, HHS, Treasury, Commerce, Small Business Administration
ESF 15: External Affairs	Provide public affairs, community relations, Congressional affairs, state & local coordination	DHS, FEMA

Table 2 - Emergency Support Functions⁴³

Incident Management

The NRP is specific in the methodology of incident management. Its design is to ensure that the initiation and coordination of the incidents occur at the lowest level (local or tribal) and then logically progress through to the state jurisdiction (Figure 2). Each state has designated legislation and internal response plans developed to respond to an incident. Every state has an established organization that assists the state government in conducting incident management. The arrival of an incident from the local level to the state causes an activation of the state’s plan and appoints the state governor responsible for all activities occurring within the incident area. This is especially critical in declaring states of emergency for a state and ensuring that the federal level receives the state’s request for assistance. The development of a generic response from the

⁴³ HTAR, 477

federal government is impossible because no state plan is the same. Once the local activities are overwhelmed then the state will activate its response capabilities, the largest being the National Guard. The state governor can order the National Guard to conduct operations, which are necessary and vital to their state or to assist other states as appropriate to the crisis.⁴⁴ Once the state and local governances exhaust their resources, then the state is able to request assistance from the President, through his declaration of major disaster or emergency. The state governor must request specific resource requirements before the federal government can allocate resources to assist. The request submittal process is to DHS and they normally delegate this coordination response to FEMA. There is one major exception to this methodology, which we discuss previously, as an Incident of National Significance allowing for certain flexibility in response and prepositioning of forces in anticipation of activation. The federal responses to Hurricane Katrina and Andrew ended up being a combination of both these steps and caused some of the problems described in both of the Hurricane Katrina and Andrew responses.

⁴⁴ All states have mutual support agreements with other states in order to assist during a major crisis. These agreements are mostly for natural disasters and manmade incidents, most notably California wildfires, Hurricane Katrina, and 9/11. For more information on state-to-state agreements, see the Emergency Management Assistance Compact Website. (www.emacweb.com)




Figure 2 Tiered Disaster/Emergency Response⁴⁵

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA in most cases is the coordinating agency for all requests for the federal assistance. They will consolidate and prioritize state requests/requirements and then task them out to the individual supporting agencies. The ones that we are examining are the requests specifically for DOD support. As was discussed previously, 90% of the time there is a collocation of the FEMA representative and the DCO in vicinity of the SEOC. There is an assumption here that there is

⁴⁵ HTAR, 471

coordination occurring between the staffs of FEMA and DCO to determine requirements and capabilities for DOD responses but most readers know what happens with assumptions. As shown in Figure 3, the assistance requirements have passed through many levels prior to reaching the DOD, which shows why some of the delays occur in the identification of the requirement and an ability to deliver those requirements in a timely manner. Upon receipt of the request by the DCO/JTF, the military is then able to respond in a normal manner that is conducive with day-to-day operations of military activities.




Figure 3 Request for DOD Assistance⁴⁶

DOD Activities

All of this has led to this point and how taskings to provide assistance are given to the DOD in support of the NRP, once DOD has determined their taskings, the President via the SECDEF establishes the priorities and resources that will be made available to the response. Unfortunately, prior to acting on the request from FEMA, there is the requirement for DOD to verify that utilization of state and local resources are fully committed in an appropriate manner and that the state and local resources are unable to accomplish the requirements identified, which is the responsibility of the DCO to validate. DOD then considers the requests to determine the operational, legal, and policy considerations that may come into play when responding to these requests. The primary method utilized by planners is to compare the requests from the State via FEMA to DOD Directive 3025.15, which lays out six key criteria that all requests must pass.

These criteria⁴⁷ are:

- Legality – compliance with laws
- Lethality – potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces
- Risk – safety of DOD forces
- Cost – impact on capabilities of DOD to cover expenses and reimbursement of expenditures
- Appropriateness – includes consideration of the impact if the request is denied

⁴⁶ Ibid, 482

⁴⁷ Ibid, 480

- Readiness – impact on forces from being able to conduct primary military mission

Figure 4 shows how the approval process will work for DOD taskings. Once the approval is authorized by the SECDEF the order will go to a designated combatant commander, (NORTHCOM for continental US) and they will designate subordinate unit responsibility for the response. From lessons learned during Katrina, United States Army North (USARNORTH) is going to be the designated command. USARNORTH will take over activities as the DCO and will designate a JTF or become the JTF, if required, in order to coordinate all DOD elements responding to the incident. The DCO will then activate its Defense Coordinating Elements (DCE) and establish operations in vicinity of the disaster. The DCO maintains operational control of all DOD elements, except in the case of JTF activation. NORTHCOM, through USARNORTH establishes a Base Support Installation (BSI) to provide joint administrative and log support to those elements deployed to the area.




Figure 4 Request for Assistance Flow⁴⁸

The BSI is responsible to provide the capabilities in order to be a self-sustaining support base. The BSI is not for the use as a staging base in providing disaster response. In other words, the BSI would consist of the military tail to the DCO/JTF. The following is a list of the basic requirements for a BSI:⁴⁹

- Transportation around the AO

⁴⁸U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 3-26 Homeland Security*, (Washington D.C., 2005) IV-11, [document online] available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf, accessed 20 March 2007 – diagram is adapted from the civil disturbance support command and control. The diagram shows the same structure that is described for requests for DOD assistance

⁴⁹ Ibid, p481

- Supply and distribution of personnel supplies
- Communication infrastructure – C2 operations
- Large area for bivouac sites with the ability of showers, laundry, and mess facilities
- Medical services
- Airfield operations to support organic aircraft
- Contracting/Purchasing elements for subsistence
- Maintenance capabilities

Deriving requirements within the NRP for the DOD requires a reader to analyze several different areas of the document. Appendix 1 is an interpretation and reduction of the 400 pages of the NRP into a stand-alone document that provides the purpose, scope, and potential tasks for the DOD. Incorporated into the table is a menu of potential logistic units that could respond to the specific tasks. Appendix 1 also lays out each ESF with who is the designated lead agency, and what the scope of the ESF covers. The reader needs to remember that these tasks are interpretations from analysis of the NRP as it when written in December 2004. As we identified during Hurricane Katrina, some tasks will occur without any forewarning. There are four primary ESFs that have a direct impact on DOD and they are Transportation (ESF 1); Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (ESF 6); Public Health and Medical Services (ESF 8); and Urban Search and Rescue (ESF 9). These ESFs are critical in the amount of capabilities that are necessary in responding and for coordination between the different agencies in providing a unified response. The next step in the examination is to determine then, is if these are the four primary requirements foreseen for DOD, if there is any developing doctrine that shows a descriptive method utilizing operational principles or establishing a battlefield framework that allows units to accomplish these missions.

Doctrine for Domestic Support / Response

Joint Doctrine

As with all changes in DOD, doctrine still has not caught up with the requirements placed on DOD forces for responding to disasters within the US. There is no current joint doctrine for conducting domestic operations. The closest written doctrine is JP 3-26 *Homeland Defense*, (Aug 2005), which focuses on operations within the US but the primary intent of the document is on Homeland Defense and Civil Support. There is a chapter within JP 3-26 on civil support, which discusses a wide range of events from natural disasters (wildfires), to special events (Olympics), and Manmade disasters (terrorist incidents). According to JP 3-26, there is in development a doctrine manual for just civil support (JP 3-26.2) that will focus on domestic response and integration of the joint force capabilities.

JP 3-26 is beneficial in that it describes the layout critical in comparing requirements to capabilities for major operations in civil support. JP 3-26 additionally illustrates the comparison of the requirements to the federal laws in order to determine the feasibility of the tasks. JP 3-26 also displays the path that a request for assistance (Figure 4) must follow from local through States to the Federal government entities and where the decision points are along the path. The doctrine as currently written provides a starting point in order to provide a joint response from an operational viewpoint. JP 3-26 is still missing the linkage between the operational capabilities of the Joint forces to the individual capabilities of the separate services, which 3-26.2 will resolve hopefully. Now let us look at Army doctrine and see if it incorporates joint doctrine and lessons learned.

Army Doctrine

A review of current US Army doctrine identifies that FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations* (Feb 2003) is the current doctrine that the Army is utilizing when conducting civil support. This manual is probably one of the best descriptive pieces of doctrine that covers

domestic support operations. The manual is several years old now with some of its content no longer relevant due to external incidents and changes in force structures. Chapter 6 of FM 3-07 describes support operations, which covers domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. The chapter's section on domestic support operations details the major federal laws that influence the Army and how they can effect relief operations. Table 3 describes most of the activities that operators and planners may need to consider when developing a response package for a disaster.

Domestic Response Activities			
Reconnaissance	C2 Systems Support	Planning Support	Manpower Support
Supply & Equipment	Transportation	Food Preparation	Water Purification
Mortuary Affairs	Laundry/Shower	Temporary Shelter	Health Support
Power Generation	General Engineering	Security	Restore Law & Order
Search & Rescue	Traffic Control	Fire Fighting	Provide Liaison

Table 3 Anticipated domestic response activities⁵⁰

FM 3-07 goes into greater analysis by spelling out, in detail, the path that a request has to follow prior to it ever arriving at the operational/tactical level for execution. Figure 5 shows all the related agencies that are involved in the process. This is an excellent flowchart for the decision and once the RFA becomes a mission order, there is no doubt about execution as long as the assets are available.

⁵⁰ Department of the Army, *FM 3-07 Stability and Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 2003), 6-3




Figure 5 Domestic Relief Operations⁵¹

In reviewing both joint publications and US Army manuals, there is no discussion or mention of a logistics operational structure. In researching both Hurricane Andrew and Katrina, it quickly was apparent that the logistic response package was an ad-hoc response. The driving forces behind the development of this organizational structure were the taskings determined by FEMA, in conjunction with the DCO/JTF, from state and local requirements. However, as shown during previous response this methodology is reactive, gives an impression of delay, and

⁵¹ FM 3-07, 6-10 The acronym MSCA (Military Support to Civilian Authorities) is now migrated to DSCA but the acronym is still interchangeable in some doctrine manuals

specifically does not allow logisticians to be anticipatory – one of the tenets of a good logistician. The largest problem with this methodology is that it prevents an initial unity of effort that is required for a quick response. So is there a way ahead for logistics and if so how can the different aspects provide a unified response to natural disasters of this magnitude? Is it possible for the Army to respond to these requirements and provide a systematic response to the issues determined in the previous section? A proposal for a way ahead would be using the Sustainment Brigade.

AN UNEXPECTED SOLUTION?

In the Army's drive toward Transformation, they may have produced a solution to this logistic coordination interface. The Sustainment Brigade, due to the transformation of the Army, is now a plug and play modular headquarters that is a subordinate to the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). The Sustainment Brigade structure allows it to be able to conduct full spectrum operations in any environment and with augmentation support a Joint Task Force headquarters. According to emerging doctrine,⁵² all sustainment brigades provide the same general capability, which is to “plan, synchronize, monitor, and control operations within its assigned area of operations.” According to the doctrine, the only organic unit subordinate to the Sustainment Brigade is the Brigade Troops Battalion (BTB) (see Figure 6). All other units will be task organized to the Sustainment Brigade and will vary depending on the structure identified as necessary to support of the area of operations and identified requirements.

⁵² Department of the Army *FMI 4-93.2 (Final Draft) The Sustainment Brigade*, (Washington D.C., 2006), 2-1

The Sustainment Brigade is a versatile unit that is capable of being task organized to fit any environment. The organic structure has an early entry module that provides for a quick deployment of initial forces in order to begin coordination and the activities necessary to provide support to the mission assigned. The sustainment brigade has the capabilities, tactically and operationally, to receive and integrate units within the brigade,⁵³ a network signal company that provides the brigade with the ability to conduct line of sight and beyond line of sight communications. There is also a theater distribution slice within the BTB that assists the brigade by providing manpower and expertise in the management of supply distribution for the area of operations. Additional units that can task organize to the sustainment brigade include:

- Movement control battalion, which controls the movement of personnel, and equipment within an area of responsibility.
- Motor transportation battalion, which provides Command and Control (C2) to motor transportation operations, including cargo transfer and trailer transfer operations.
- Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB), which has subordinate functional companies that provide supplies, fuel, water, transportation, cargo transfer, mortuary affairs, field services, and HR management. These companies provide the backbone of logistical support to either military forces or natural disaster support.

⁵³ Ibid, 2-12




Figure 6 Notional Sustainment Brigade⁵⁴

The sustainment brigade has the internal capabilities to integrate and C2 non-logistic units that can provide assistance for the overall mission of logistic support. These additional slice elements can include:

- Military Police units to assist in movement control and force protection.
- Engineer units to conduct road clearance and debris removal, they are also effective at clearing and setting up temporary shelter areas for displaced evacuees.
- Civil Affairs units that conduct personnel interaction with the population to let them know what activities are occurring to assist them and what displaced civilians can do to help themselves.
- Medical units that provide on site emergency care, circulate public areas to identify medical requirements, and provide US military medical supplies in order to assist the local and state hospitals and emergency care centers.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 2-12

These units can be either active duty or state controlled⁵⁵ and allows for a unity of effort that has been lacking in previous logistic responses.

All of these capabilities provide an overall structure to the logistics commander that allows him/her to conduct a multitude of response missions and provides an extremely robust operational framework for the JTF or DCO to utilize for the response. As discussed, during the response to both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, the majority of the missions for logistics units revolved around the ability to get supplies to the ravaged areas and essential services to the evacuees. A proposal for an operational layout could look something like this. The early entry module of the sustainment brigade would activate and deploy with the other advance units to the BSI, identified by the JTF/DCO. The sustainment brigade would then have the necessary liaison capabilities within the JTF headquarters providing the ability to integrate operations in the Joint Field Office (JFO) with FEMA. This will allow the planning staff and the commander to anticipate requirements and make recommendations to the JTF Commander about what units are necessary to respond to the crisis. The developing response package then would be alerted through JFCOM by Forces Command (FORSCOM) and begin preparation to deploy in support of the response. This ability for the logistics' headquarters to get involved in the initial planning would assist in accelerating the response time of the Army and will possibly prevent the backlash that DOD received during Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina in not providing a timely response.

Once notification of the units occurs, the sustainment brigade can then begin preparation for the reception and integration of these units into the command structure that is responsible for

⁵⁵ There is still debate about the control of Title X, Title 32, and State active duty forces but those issues are focusing on operations with restrictions of the PCA. The other issue is the ability of the states to maintain C2 of their National Guard forces.

providing the response. This reception and integration is not only for the logistics units but also for all the other additional military units responding to the incident, particularly search and rescue and the units conducting door-to-door operations. As units process through the reception and integration phase, the sustainment brigade can then provide to the JTF/DCO an actual accountability of soldiers in the area of operations and provide the location of unit. This is another one of the shortcomings identified in both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina lessons learned from the after action reports.

Concurrently, while the sustainment brigade is conducting reception operations, the logistics planners are conducting Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield (LBP) and developing a logistics support plan in order to begin providing a unified response to the disaster area. As identified in both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, the first priority is going to be food and potable water. A CSSB, with a Quartermaster (QM) water production and distribution company along with motor transportation elements would easily fulfill these requirements. The second priority would focus on field services (QM field service company) and medical assets necessary to provide on-site evaluations and liaison with the Red Cross in providing both personnel and medical supplies. Upon completion of providing a response to these critical life saving areas, the sustainment brigade can then begin to focus logistics units to secondary areas for response.

The next focus area would have to be the establishment of storage areas for the reception of not only military supplies, on hand stockage from FEMA storage areas, and new supplies that FEMA has coordinated (i.e. Wal-Mart), but also for donated food and supplies from US public organizations (i.e. churches) and even other foreign nations. The size and distribution of the damage areas will determine the location and number of staging areas necessary. For example, Hurricane Katrina's devastation led planners to identify and develop four staging bases that were necessary in order to coordinate and deliver supplies to the local relief sites. These staging bases will need the capability to receive, inventory, reconfigure, and distribute supplies to the relief sites. Doctrinally, a motor transport battalion, with support from a QM support company, can

accomplish this mission. In conjunction with the Department of Transportation (DOT), a movement control battalion, with assistance from MPs and local law enforcement, can maintain the trafficability and control of the roads into and out of the area. This is one of those grey areas, involving the PCA, that the movement control battalion will be most likely to violate the constraints of this Act, in that they are treading on law enforcement activities. An additional capability of the movement control battalion is in the assistance that they can provide in tracking relief supplies as they are coming from the multitude of interagency support groups to the staging bases and then onto the local relief sites. Intransit visibility is another major weakness identified by FEMA during Hurricane Katrina and DOD was required to take responsibility of on the fourth day of operations. This ability to track supplies is one of those tasks that the developers of the NRP did not anticipate and is not a specified task for the DOD.

With the multitude of assets that the sustainment brigade can C2 and the flexibility that they have in task organization, this is an ideal unit to have on notification for emergency response. However, what is the effect that this might have on the readiness of the Army for their wartime mission. There are currently 25 sustainment brigades on Force Management System Web Site (FMSWeb)⁵⁶, 15 of these are active duty with the remainder in the reserves. The current operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq are currently occupying five sustainment brigades on a continuous basis. With the increase in troop size as requested by the President on 10 January 2007, at least one more sustainment brigade, potentially two will deploy to these areas. This brings, worst case, the total number of sustainment brigades deployed to seven. The other eight active duty units sustainment brigades are in either reset or train up (as per the Army Force

⁵⁶U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency - Force Management System Web Site
<https://webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/usafmsa>

Generation (ARFORGEN) model) for deployment. Therefore, is the Army capable of establishing this proposed on call capability for emergency response? This proposal would have some but limited effect on the DOTMLPF of the sustainment brigade due to the fact that they are continuing to perform their wartime missions and emergency response is for scenarios within the US.

The management method of employment for the sustainment brigade will be very similar to the concept for the Division Ready Brigade (DRB). The personnel will be on a short notice recall and the first activated to respond to a federal incident which was shown to be very effective for getting troops to the area during both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina by elements from the 82nd Airborne Division. The sustainment brigade on alert status would be required to have its early entry capability on short notice recall during the year, particularly during hurricane season. The early entry command post would monitor the crisis through communication with the DCO on site and be able to deploy within 18 to 24 hours to the site depending on location and availability of TRANSCOM assets.

Examining the remaining active duty sustainment brigades and the rotation plan to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Operations, the rotation schedule would have to be on a six-month schedule. The major timing issue though would be that the sustainment brigade would have to have its early entry module available for deployment to the response. This may generate an additional reporting requirements to FORSCOM.

Doctrine

Current doctrine focuses on an overall response to the Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) but is there anything written to assist the Sustainment Brigade? Who is actually responsible for changing this doctrine? In researching this paper, there is currently no unifying element within the Army responsible for developing an overall response doctrine. NORTHCOM is the Combatant Command for North America, and their focus is on the defense of the US. In respect to the providing a response to natural disasters, USARNORTH has this

requirement as we discussed previously. USARNORTH focuses at the operational level of response planning and is responsible for the integration of responses with the different states. Another reason that USARNORTH is not able to develop the doctrine is that they do not have the support structure to develop the necessary doctrine since they are mission executers.

The proponent for logistics doctrine is Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM). Their mission is to “develop logistics leaders, doctrine, organizations, training, and material solutions to sustain a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities in war and peace.”⁵⁷ However, their center of gravity is on sustainment capabilities of army units and CASCOM should not be the integrator of all the other aspects of a DSCA response. The doctrine needs to be a holistic response with integration of all branches. There is also the problem of integration with the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

There is one logical agency capable of responding to this problem of doctrine across the branches. The solution would be to have the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) take on this requirement. This directorate would be the consolidator of information from all the branch schools and centers that fall under the purview of the Combined Arms Center (CAC). This is where CASCOM would have input into the development of the doctrine for logistics units. The doctrine would need to describe a methodology for organizing the sustainment brigade and provide a template case, which assists sustainment planners in their ability to visualize a type of response. There is enough information from AARs on both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina to provide this template or example.

⁵⁷ United States Army Combined Arms Support Command, *Mission Statement*, (Fort Lee, VA, 2007) [document online] available from <http://www.cascom.army.mil>, accessed 16 February 2007

Training and Material is another area that will need modification to allow a DRB type response from the sustainment brigade. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) would have great capacity to assist in influencing these requirements but mainly as an intermediary for the National Guard Bureau and USARNORTH. TRADOC would have to allocate resources in order to allow the sustainment brigades to conduct interagency training and integration exercises between states, USARNORTH, and the National Guard. Currently, USARNORTH is active in executing exercises with states in applying lessons learned and deploying C2 elements to support States' response plans.⁵⁸ These exercises have only been conducted at the DCO/JTF level without utilization of any logistics elements that would benefit from these exercises. Such exercises have proven historically beneficial for most warfighting headquarter exercises in the past.

In the end, it would appear that the NRP writers understood the importance of the DOD in response activities. They decided that it would be too difficult a task to integrate DOD in the response so they left possible responses as vague as possible. DOD knows that they are going to respond again but it struggling to determine the capabilities that are going to be needed in the future response scenarios.

CONCLUSION

The end-result for all response efforts continues to remain the safety and security of US citizens. Our analysis has led to the conclusion that the overall concept for responding to natural disaster is valid. In order to conduct the most capable response, it must occur at the local level

⁵⁸ United States Army North, *USARNORTH supports exercise Golden Guardian*, (Fort Sam Houston, TX, 2006) [document on-line] available from <http://www.5tharmy.army.mil/news/2006/November/20nov07.htm>, accessed 16 February 2007

because these responders have the best situational awareness. When this local level becomes overwhelmed, the RFA progresses through the state to the Federal level, but with all additional resources coordinating through the local/state responders. When the Federal Government alters this response pattern, as we saw during Hurricane Katrina, the second and third order effects continue to interfere with the execution of the response plan. The investigation into the NRP and the proposal for a possible logistics response is to provide the reader with a possibility to enhance the enablers from the Federal Government and more specifically the DOD.

The catastrophes of both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina have shown the US public that the US Army has the capability to respond more rapidly and with greater forces than any other branch of military service or government agency. Unfortunately, with this knowledge comes the expectation, that if there is another incident of this magnitude, the military will respond and it will come quickly. This expectation has an effect on the military. As we discussed in this article, DSCA is not the primary mission of DOD. The primary mission of the DOD is to focus on being able to win America's wars. However, this mission is debatable between the desires of the public and the requirements of the US to have a military ready to defend the nation. Therefore, the Army is going to have to learn from the responses to both Hurricanes Katrina and Andrew and develop a capability to provide a rapid and ready response package when called upon to do so.

Several issues still face the DOD in their ability to provide DSCA support. The first issue that we examined was a misperception by the public that the current laws must change in order to allow the military to increase its participation in domestic responses. The current Federal laws provide enough flexibility for the President to activate and deploy DOD forces to any area. The legal discussions following Hurricane Katrina display that the largest issue was not that Federal laws were too constrictive but that Congress and the President were unwilling to challenge the current perceptions of these laws.

Second, we looked at two major responses where DOD forces deployed and provided a large support structure. The paper used a filter on the data to determine the logistical footprint

that the Army believed was necessary to support each crisis. This filter allowed us to see that even though the Army structure was more than capable to support the mission, there was a lack of unity of effort and even large areas of conflict between resources and requirements. The glaring insight was that the adhocery of the establishment of a logistical headquarters prevented a unified command structure for the response.

Third, we analyzed the NRP to determine where and how DOD is supposed to support the plan. The NRP was only partially successful during the execution of Hurricane Katrina. The breakdown in the RFA process required the military to be the only agency capable to execute missions. The plan did not anticipate the complete disintegration of the first responder network or an area the extent that Hurricane Katrina devastation covered. The NRP is a very large document and specified missions are not easy to determine.

Finally, a proposal was suggested, which provided for a logistical headquarters be given the mission to be a ready response headquarters. The proposal illuminated the capabilities of the sustainment brigade and their ability to arrive at the response area quickly. The sustainment brigade trains to be a plug and play headquarters that can consolidate and integrate several different units into a responsive unit that can support either a JTF or a DCO as the situation requires. Even though the sustainment brigade is a logistical headquarters, they have the structure that can provide C2 of several non-logistic units, particularly military police units and engineers, in order to support the response.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1: ESF Responsibilities and Supporting Agencies⁵⁹

⁵⁹ NRP, 107 - 233

ESF Coordinator & Purpose of ESF	Scope of ESF (per Fig 2 of 2004 NRP)	DOD Role per NRP excluding USACE	Specified Tasks & Responsibilities Identified in the NRP
ESF # 1 - Transportation Coordinator: Department of Transportation (DOT)	1. Federal and civil transportation support 2. Transportation safety 3. Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure 4. Movement restrictions 5. Damage and impact assessment	Supporting Agency	Provide staffing to the National Response Coordination Cell ESF 1 function and the Regional Response Coordination Cell when requested and upon approval by the SECDEF Provides military transportation capacity from the USTRANSCOM to move essential resources and assist in the contracting of civilian airlift when requested and upon approval of the SECDEF USTRANSCOM provides staff to the headquarters ESF 1 function and the regional ESF 1 when requested and upon approval of the SECDEF
Purpose: Emergency Support Function (ESF) #1 - DOT supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), assisting Federal agencies; State, local and tribal governmental entities; and voluntary organizations requiring transportation for an actual or potential Incident of National Significance. Through the DOT coordination role, ESF 1 integrates the DOT responsibility for Emergency Management of the Transportation System (EMTS) in the prevention/mitigation, preparedness, recovery, infrastructure restoration, safety, and security of the Nation and its transportation system. Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: Movement Battalions with associated Movement Control Teams Military Police			Military Transportation will be provided in accordance with the DSCA section of the NRP an the MOU between DOD and DOT concerning commercial aviation programs
ESF # 2 - Communication Coordinator: DHS/ Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection/ National Communication System	1. Coordination with telecommunication industry 2. Restoration/repair of telecomm infrastructure 3. Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and information technology resources	Supporting Agency	None Identified, however, Government Services Agency (GSA) is identified as responsible for coordinating with DOD on the use of military and National Guard organizational telecommunication assets in support of an Incident of National Significance
Purpose: Emergency Support Function (ESF) # 2 - Communications ensures the provision of Federal communications support to Federal, State, local, tribal, and private-sector response efforts during an Incident of National Significance. This ESF supplements the provisions of the National Plan for Telecommunication Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies. Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: None anticipated but may have to utilize internal communication packages to support response efforts			
ESF # 3 - Public Works and Engineering Coordinator: DOD/ USACE	1. Infrastructure protection and emergency repair 2. Infrastructure restoration 3. Engineering services, construction management 4. Critical infrastructure liaison	Supporting Agency	DOD/ USACE is designated as the coordinator for ESF 3. This responsibility covers the coordination of meetings, plans, exercises, training, and other activities with DHS/ Emergency Preparedness and Response (ERP)/ FEMA, the private sector, and ESF 3 supporting agencies USACE, as the primary ESF 3 agency for response, provides direction and integration of ESF 3 response related activities and resources. DOD/ USACE has developed a Field Guide that provides information on tools/ processes used for ESF 3 mission support available from http://209.225.176/ceerp/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=58&Itemid
Purpose: Emergency Support Function # 3 - Public Works and Engineering assists DHS by coordinating and organizing the capabilities and resources of the Federal Government to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and other support to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from an Incident of National Significance Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: None anticipated but Sustainment Brigade may need to coordinate support and provide administrative oversight			

ESF Coordinator & Purpose of ESF	Scope of ESF (per Fig 2 of 2004 NRP)	DOD Role per NRP excluding USACE	Specified Tasks & Responsibilities Identified in the NRP
ESF#4 - Firefighting	1. Firefighting activities on Federal lands	Supporting Agency	Assumes full responsibility for firefighting activities on DOD installations
Coordinator: Department of Agriculture/ Forest Service	2. Resource support to rural and urban firefighting operations		Supports firefighting operations on nonmilitary lands with personnel, equipment, and supplies under the terms of the existing interagency agreements, providing liaisons as needed.
Purpose			USACE provides contracting services to urban and rural firefighting forces to obtain heavy equipment and or demolition services as needed to suppress incident related fires
Emergency Support Function #4 - Firefighting enables the detection and suppression of wildland, rural, and urban fires resulting from or occurring coincidentally with an Incident of National Significance			
			Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF:
			None Anticipated but Sustainment Brigade will have to coordinate
ESF#5 - Emergency Management	1. Coordination of incident management efforts	Supporting Agency	None listed in ESF coordination matrix
Coordinator: DHS/ Emergency Preparedness and Response/FEMA	2. Issuance of mission assignments		
	3. Resource and human capital		
	4. Incident action planning and financial management		
Purpose:			
			Emergency Support Function #5 - Emergency Management is responsible for supporting overall activities of the Federal Government for domestic incident management. ESF 5 provides the core management and administrative functions supporting the NRCC, RRCC, and JFO operations.
			Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF:
			Sustainment Brigade through the use of Liaisons to the JFO to anticipate requirements
ESF#6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services	1. Mass Care	Supporting Agency	Fulfills mass care requirements for ice and water in coordination with mass care elements of ESF 6
Coordinator: DHS/ Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)/ FEMA	2. Disaster housing		Provides assistance by inspecting mass care shelter sites to ensure suitability of facilities to safely shelter victims.
	3. Human Services		Provides assistance in constructing temporary shelter facilities in the affected areas, as required
Purpose			Provides temporary housing support, such as temporary structures and expedited repair of damaged homes (to include temporary roofing or other repairs that facilitate reoccupation of minimally damaged structures), as necessary
			Emergency Support Function #6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services supports State, regional, local, and tribal government and non-governmental organizations efforts to address the non-medical mass care, housing, and human services needs of individuals and/or families impacted by Incidents of National Significance
			Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF:
			QM Field Service Company, QM Water Production and Distribution; Force Provider??; Medical Company; Veterinary services

ESF Coordinator & Purpose of ESF	Scope of ESF (per Fig 2 of 2004 NRP)	DOD Role per NRP excluding USACE	Specified Tasks & Responsibilities Identified in the NRP
ESF # 7 - Resource Support Coordinator: General Services Administration	1.. Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc)	Supporting Agency	None listed in ESF coordination matrix
Purpose: Emergency Support Function # 7 - Resource Support assists the DHS, supporting Federal agencies and State, local, and tribal entities requiring resource support prior to, during, and/or after an Incident of National Significance			
Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: None identified			
ESF # 8 - Public Health and Medical Services Coordinator: Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	1. Public Health 2. Medical 3. Mental health services 4. Mortuary services	Supporting Agency	Alerts DOD NDMS Federal Coordinating Centers (FCCs)(Army, Navy, Air Force) and provides specific reporting/regulating instructions to support relief efforts. Alerts DOD NDMS FCCs to activate NDMS patient reception plans in a phased, regional approach, and when appropriate, in a national approach At the request of HHS, DOD coordinates with ESF 1 to provide support for the evacuation of seriously ill or injured patients to locations where hospital care or services are available. Using available DOD transport resources, in coordination with the NDMS Medical Interagency Coordination Group (MIACG), evacuates and manages victims/patients from the patient collection point in or near the incident site to NDMS patient reception areas. Provides available logistical support to health/medical response operations Provides available medical personnel for casualty clearing/staging and other missions as needed including aero-medical evacuation and medical treatment. Provides available blood products in coordination with HHS
Purpose Emergency Support Function # 8 - Public Health and Medical Services provides the mechanism for coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State, local, and tribal government resources in response to public health and medical care needs (to include veterinary and/or animal health issues when appropriate) for potential health or actual Incidents of National Significance and/or during a developing potential health and medical situation.			
Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: Medical Company; Veterinarian Services; Transportation Truck Companies; QM support companies; QM Collection Company			Provides evaluation and risk management support through use of DCOs, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, and Joint Regional Medical Planners
Coordinates patient reception, tracking, and management to nearby non-Federal hospitals, VA hospitals, and DOD military treatment facilities that are available and can provide appropriate medical care. Provides available medical personnel to assist HHS in the protection of public health (such as food, water, wastewater, solid waste disposal, vectors, hygiene, and other conditions) Provides available DOD medical supplies for distribution to mass care centers and medical care locations being operated for incident victims with reimbursement Provides available emergency medical support to assist State, local, and tribal governments within the disaster area and the surrounding vicinity, to include triage, medical treatment, mental health support, and use of surviving DOD medical facilities near the incident area. Provides assistance in managing human remains, including victim ID and mortuary affairs. Provides DOD confirmatory laboratory testing support in coordination with HHS			
ESF # 9 - Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Coordinator: DHS/EPR/ FEMA	1. Life-saving assistance 2. Urban search and rescue	Supporting Agency	Serves as primary source for providing fixed-wing and/or rotary-wing transportation for US&R Joint Management Teams Serves as secondary source for the following assistance: 1. Ground transportation of US&R task forces and JMTs within the affected area; 2. Mobile feeding units for US&R task forces and JMT personnel; and 3. Portable Shelter (e.g., tents) for use by US&R task force and JMT personnel for eating, sleeping, and working.
Purpose: Emergency Support Function # 9 - Urban Search and Rescue rapidly deploys components of the National US&R Response System to provide specialized life-saving assistance to State, local, and tribal entities during Incident of National Significance. US&R activities include locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures. These task forces are staffed primarily by local fire departments and emergency services personnel who are trained and experienced in collapsed structures search and rescue operations and possess specialized equipment			
Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: QM field service company; QM equipment & maintenance platoons; medical companies; truck companies; aviation support companies			

ESF Coordinator & Purpose of ESF	Scope of ESF (per Fig 2 of 2004 NRP)	DOD Role per NRP excluding USACE	Specified Tasks & Responsibilities Identified in the NRP
ESF # 10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Coordinator: Environmental Protection Agency	1. Oil and hazardous materials (chem, biological, radiological, etc.) response 2. Environmental safety and short- and long-term cleanup	Supporting Agency	Provides OSC and directs response actions for releases of hazardous materials from its vessels, facilities, vehicles, munitions, and weapons Note: DOD/USACE provides response and recovery assistance to incidents involving radiological dispersal devices and improvised nuclear devices, pursuant to development of a MOU between EPA and DOD/USACE Note: In addition, ESF 10 may be utilized to respond to actual or threatened releases of materials not typically responded to under the NCP but that, as a result of Incident of National Significance, pose a threat to public health, welfare, or to the environment.
Purpose: Emergency Support Function # 10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response provides Federal support in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or uncontrolled release of oil or hazardous materials during Incidents of National Significance. The Federal government may also respond to oil and hazardous materials Incidents of National Significance using mechanisms of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) with activating ESF 10 which are described in the Hazardous Materials Incident Annex of the NRP.			
Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF:			
Water production and distribution company; QM supply company			
ESF # 11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources Coordinator: Department of Agriculture (USDA)	1. Nutrition assistance 2. Animal/plant disease & pest response 3. Food safety/security 4. Natural/ cultural resources & historic properties protection & restoration	Supporting Agency	Assess the availability of DOD food supplies and storage facilities capable of storing dry, chilled, and frozen food Assess the availability of DOD transportation equipment, material handling equipment, and personnel for support. This responsibility is confined to the posts, camps, and stations within or adjacent to the affected areas Assess the availability of laboratory and diagnostic support, subject matter expertise, and technical assistance that may be provided
Purpose Emergency Support Function # 11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources supports State, local, and tribal authorities and other Federal agency efforts to address: (1) Provision of nutrition assistance (2) control and eradication of an outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/ zoonotic disease, highly infective exotic plant disease, or economically devastating plant pest infestation (3) assurance of food safety and food security (under USDA jurisdiction and authorities) and (4) protection of natural and cultural resources and historic properties resources prior to, during, and/or after an Incident of National Significance.			Assists animal emergency response organizations, or others as requested and appropriate. Provides resources including senior Army Veterinary Corps officers to function as Defense Veterinary Liaison Officers and Defense Veterinary Support Officers (who serve as the on-site POC for DOD veterinary functions) and other military specialists trained in foreign animal disease diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health. Provide laboratory support to assist and augment the capabilities of the Agriculture/Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Assists in the development of response plans
Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF:			
QM Supply Company; Veterinary Services; QM field service companies			
ESF # 12 - Energy Coordinator: Department of Energy (DOE)	1. Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration 2. Energy industry utilities coordination 3. Energy forecast	Supporting Agency	DOD/USACE coordinates emergency power team missions with power-system restoration activities to establish priorities and efficiently provide support to a facility having power restored
Purpose Emergency Support Function # 12 - Energy is intended to restore damaged energy systems and components during a potential or actual Incident of National Significance. Under DOE leadership, ESF 12 is an integral part of the larger DOE responsibility of maintaining continuous and reliable energy supplies for the US through preventive measures as well as restorative actions			
Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF:			
Maintenance company			

ESF Coordinator & Purpose of ESF	Scope of ESF (per Fig 2 of 2004 NRP)	DOD Role per NRP excluding USACE	Specified Tasks & Responsibilities Identified in the NRP
ESF # 13 - Public Safety and Security Coordinator: DHS; Department of Justice	1. Facility and resource security 2. Security planning and technical and resource assistance 3. Public safety/ security support 4. Support to access, traffic, and crowd control	Supporting Agency	None listed in ESF coordination matrix However, In the event that State and local police forces (including National Guard operating under State control) are unable to adequately respond to a civil disturbance or other serious law enforcement emergency, the State legislature (or the Governor if the legislature cannot be convened) may request, through the Attorney General, Federal military assistance under 10 U.S.C chapter 15. The President may also use the military in a state to enforce Military law or to protect constitutional rights. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 331-334, the President will ultimately determine whether to use the Armed Forces to respond to a law enforcement emergency. Under Title 10 authority, the President may federalize and deploy all or part of any State's National Guard. Procedures for coordinating DOD and DOJ responses to law enforcement emergencies arising under 10 U.S.C. 331-334 are set forth in the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan, February 1991.
Purpose Emergency Support Function # 13 - Public Safety and Security integrates Federal public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities associated with potential or actual Incidents of National Significance. Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: None identified but Military Police companies and individual soldiers may be utilized to support mission			
ESF - 14 Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation Coordinator: DHS/ EPR/ FEMA	1. Social and economic community impact assessment 2. Long-term community recovery assistance to States, local governments, and the private sector 3. Mitigation analysis and program implementation	Supporting Agency	None listed in ESF coordination matrix
Purpose: Emergency Support Function #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation provides a framework for Federal government support to State, regional, local, and tribal governments, non-governmental agencies, and the private sector designed to enable community recovery format he long-term consequences of an Incident of National Significance. This support consists of available programs and resources of Federal departments and agencies to enable community recovery, especially long-term community recovery, and to reduce or eliminate risk from future incidents, where feasible. Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: None identified			
ESF # 15 - External Affairs Coordinator: DHS	1. Emergency public information and protective action guidance 2. Media and community relations 3. Congressional and international affairs 4. Tribal and insular affairs	Supporting Agency	Depending on the nature and scope of the incident, all Federal departments and agencies support the NRP and are responsible for providing appropriate support for ESF 15
Purpose: Emergency Support Function # 15 - External Affairs ensures that sufficient Federal assets are deployed to the field during a potential or actual Incident of National Significance to provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affected audiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and local populace. ESF 15 provides the resource support and mechanisms to implement the NRP - Incident Communications Emergency Policy and Procedures described in the NPR Public Affairs Support Annex. Army Logistic Units capable of supporting this ESF: None identified but Headquarters will be required to provide LNOs as necessary			

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