

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (05-04-07) 17-05-2007	2. REPORT TYPE Masters Thesis Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 31-07-2006 to 17-05-2007
--	---	---

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Foreign Policy Effects on Strategic Communications and the Ability to Influence	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) Robert M. Roth, LTC(P), USA	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton, Blvd. Norfolk, VA 23511-1702	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER JFSC 25789
---	---

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT. This paper provides an analytical analysis of how the United States Government conducted strategic communications from post World War II until the end of the Cold War with the former Soviet Union. In the post Cold War environment, the paper continues to analyze how the U.S. Government conducted strategic communications into the 21st Century without an executive agency to lead this very important form of national power. The discussion leads to an understanding of how deeds and words are inseparable when communicating with the global community, and how policymakers must understand the perceptions of the global community in order to develop effective policies that serve the mutual interests of the U.S. and the region for which the policy is intended. Regardless of the message we try to send, our deeds must match our words in order to communicate and ultimately influence the global community through dialogue. However, with the deactivation of the U.S. Information Agency the leaders in the United States have all but lost their ability to communicate with the international public. As a result, the U.S. fails to lead the global community as the champion of human rights in the struggle against militant religious extremism. This has resulted in the loss of a critical vulnerability within the U.S. Government at a time when the U.S. is attempting to fight an enemy whose base of support is primarily ideological. The paper concludes with a discussion and recommendation on how better to organize and use Informational Power within the U.S. Government.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Strategic Communications, Foreign Policy-making, Use of Media to influence, COCOM support

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: Unclassified			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unlimited	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON SPC Rassmussen
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 757-443-6301

**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

Foreign Policy Effects on Strategic Communications and the ability to Influence

By

Robert M. Roth

LTC (P), U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced War-fighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: _____

17 May, 2007

Thesis Adviser: Dr. Varnell E. Nesmith Jr.

Title: Foreign Policy Effects on Strategic Communications and the Ability to Influence

Problem/Issue: When U.S. Foreign Policies are not in line with American values, the ability to conduct effective Strategic Communications is severely hindered. Combatant Commanders are forced to develop campaign plans in a vacuum without a complete understanding of the political objectives for the directed military operation. Security and Stability actions on the ground become extremely tenuous and the likelihood for success is significantly reduced.

Thesis: Our current friendly Center of Gravity in combating militant extremists in the U.S. proclaimed War on Terror is the ability of the US Government to lead the international community in the pursuit of human rights as proclaimed in the American Declaration of Independence written in 1776: “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.”

Wars are lost due to a lack of military capability, national will, or political will from Government leaders. It is highly unlikely that the U.S. will suffer from a lack of military capabilities in any near-term wars. Currently, a critical vulnerability at the Strategic level is the United State’s ability to formulate foreign policies that influence international and regional collaboration for ongoing and future operations. The Department of State’s failure to protect this critical vulnerability has prevented the United States from continuing to lead the global community as the champion of liberty and beacon of peace in the world.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Post World War II U.S. Influence/Propaganda Operations.

- The development of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)
- The United States Information Agency and the U.S. Military
- U.S. Influence Operations in the Middle East
- The return of USIA -- and the “Great Communicator”
- Rise to Globalism and our Ability to Influence after the Cold War
- The deactivation of the United States Information Agency
- Assessment.

Chapter 2. Effects of U.S. Foreign Policies on the Global Community

- Anti-American sentiment in the Muslim World
- The War in Iraq
- American Values
- Assessment.

Chapter 3. U.S. International Relations & Foreign Policy Development

- The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy-Making
- Foreign Policy-Making and the Combatant Commander
- Assessment

Chapter 4. Effects of U.S. Foreign Policy on Strategic Communications

- The Media is only a conduit for Strategic Communications
- “Winning hearts and minds” and the Ability to Influence
- Assessment

Chapter 5. Conclusion

- Recommendation

Bibliography

Vita

CHAPTER 1. Post World War II U.S. Influence Operations.

Information Operations are not a new concept or practice. There are plenty of historical examples that demonstrate a country's use of propaganda in order to advance that country's specific national interest. In the rivalries between Greek and Italian city-states, the religious conflicts of the 16th and 17th centuries, the wars of revolutionary France, and the revolutions of Russia and China, information operations or propaganda have been used in an attempt to influence another country's population. As modern day strategists use diplomatic, military and economic means to solve international conflicts, the growing interest today of information operations and the power of propaganda supports H.G. Wells's contention that human history is in essence a history of ideas.¹

In their book, International and Intercultural Communications published in 1976, Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John Merrill stated:

“Even a casual observer of the media of mass communication cannot fail to notice that men's minds—nationally and internationally—are being subjected to a ceaseless and clever bombardment of messages. These messages are calculated to influence and control. Internationally, these propagandistic messages are either directed against real or potential enemies or at “neutral” message consumers who might be won over.”

While today we do not use the word propaganda, the recognition of this type of operation as a regular, permanent function of government in peace, as well as in war, is indisputable.²

The development of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)

In June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall unveiled what became known as the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. The Soviet Union

¹ Abdul-Rahim, Salim Yousef, *American Messages to the Arabs: A Study of the Arabic Programs of the USICA*, (The American University, London England, 1980); pg 4

² Ibid, pg 5

launched a large-scale psychological warfare offensive against the United States in an attempt to derail the Marshall Plan. At that time, a small United States Information Service was operating in Europe but could not compete with the onslaught brought by the Soviet Union's propaganda machine. As a result, in January 1948 Congress passed and President Harry S. Truman signed the Smith-Mundt Act (also known as the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948—Public Law 402). This law marked the first time in American history that the United States committed to a peacetime program of international information. Its objectives as stated by Congress,

*“to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.”*³

In February 1950, President Truman gave a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. In that speech, President Truman stated:

*“The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world today by the forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the Communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortions and lies are systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy. This propaganda can be overcome by truth—plain, simple, unvarnished truth—presented by newspapers, radio and other sources that people trust...unless we get the real story across to the people in other countries, we will lose the battle for men's minds by default. We must make ourselves known as we really are...we must pool our efforts with those of the other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard around the world in a great campaign of truth.”*⁴

Several years later, following the election of 1952, President Dwight Eisenhower came to understand the importance of an effective information campaign as well. In his State of the Union address in February 1953, the President stated that the security of the United States and the western hemisphere required a vital information program.

³ Ibid, pgs 258-263

⁴ Ibid, pg 267

Immediately following the address, President Eisenhower created the Jackson Committee which was to make recommendations to the President for legislative, administrative, or other actions for the development of the U.S. overseas information programs. It was a result of this committee that on 1 June 1953, a reorganization plan within the U.S. Government created the United States Information Agency (USIA). This was the first independent agency in charge of all overseas information programs, including those of the Department of State.⁵

In January 1963, President John Kennedy provided an even clearer mission for the U.S. Information Agency than had ever been defined previously. President Kennedy stated:

“The mission of the U.S. Information Agency is to help achieve U.S. Foreign Policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various Departments and Agencies on the implications of foreign opinion, for present and contemplated foreign policies, programs and official statements.”

Notice the word President Kennedy selected in his first objective, he chose the word “influence” – which was the first time a President and the Agency publicly acknowledged the mission of the Agency was to sway global public opinion. President Kennedy went on to give additional guidance as to how these objectives should be carried out. The President directed the Country Team’s at the U.S. diplomatic mission (Embassy) in every country to talk to or seek counsel from their USIA counterparts in the country where a targeted message or program was directed.⁶ This guidance was perfectly in line with the current USIA director, Edward R. Murrow who stated:

⁵ Ibid, pgs 269-271

⁶ Ibid, pg 273

“the diffusion of effort and output that characterized USIA during the first years of its existence is ended. No longer is the Agency’s mission to tell America’s story abroad... ‘targeting’ always an ideal, is now a reality... in order to achieve maximum influence leading to political action.”

The United States Information Agency and the U.S. Military

In February 1964, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Carl Rowan as the new Director of USIA. Rowan was a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Ambassador to Finland. In April 1965, Rowan and the Agency were directed by President Johnson to create the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Vietnam in support of ongoing military and Department of State operations.⁷

JUSPAO would consist of Army Psychological Warfare officers, as well as State Department personnel, Defense Department personnel and the CIA. By July 1965, the office was in existence. At full strength, JUSPAO swelled to a size of approximately 250 Americans and over 400 Vietnamese employees. The director of JUSPAO who put this composite of personnel from differing departments and agencies together came from within USIA. His name was Barry Zorthian. Mr. Zorthian was asked to conduct a propaganda experiment. President Johnson wanted JUSPAO to: 1) persuade the North Vietnamese that the war was wrong and impossible to win; 2) to urge the South Vietnamese to support their government and drive out the Viet Cong; 3) to show the rest of the world that the US was helping a nation under attack repel a foreign invader; and 4) to convince the American public via journalists covering the war that involvement in Vietnam was necessary, honorable, and successful. The last goal given by President Johnson in the experiment was not legal, since USIA by law could not propagandize the war inside the United States. The Smith-Mundt Act signed into law by President Truman

⁷ Ibid, pg 275

in 1948 funded global propaganda outreach using the latest communication technologies. The act prohibited domestic distribution of information that was intended for foreign audiences. This ensured that the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government could not distribute propaganda at home, protecting the American public from slanted information by its own government. (Note: the Smith-Mundt Act still serves as the foundation for U.S. overseas information and cultural programs at the Department of State.) However, this was simply ignored by the Johnson Administration at the time.⁸

Mr. Zorthian captured the confidence of three American ambassadors to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, GEN Maxwell Taylor, and Ellsworth Bunker – as well as long time field commander GEN William Westmoreland. Given sufficient logistical and technical support, as well as support in people from USIA posts world wide in order to blanket the Vietnamese countryside with information and propaganda about the ongoing war, in the end the experiment failed. Partly from the effort Mr. Zorthian put forth into JUSPAO itself. A trusted journalist among his peers, Mr. Zorthian was too consumed in the micromanaging of day to day operations of JUSPAO. Yet there were other compounding effects in Vietnam which doomed the experiment. First, the daily brief provided to reporters in Vietnam who were covering combat operations, was always given as second hand information. The briefer had no first hand knowledge of the battle or incident, thus there was no personal contact with the story being briefed (these briefings later became known as the five' clock Follies). It did not take too long for reporters to figure out they had to go to the field in order to get first hand information of what happened. From there, the reporters could draw their own conclusions and did not have to depend upon the daily briefings from JUSPAO. Second, most of the JUSPAO

⁸ Fitzhugh Green, *"American Propaganda Abroad"*, (Hippocrene Books, INC, NY NY, 1988); pg 150

personnel in the field did not speak Vietnamese, thus they could not communicate with the local people – nor did they try. This inability to communicate and build a relationship among the people they were trying to influence prevented the agents from accomplishing their mission. Third, the negative attitude GEN Westmoreland himself had for the media never helped. The media was a necessary evil to him and he was seldom able to gain their support. All of these effects combined had an impact on the experiment, but the most damaging effect of all was the fact that American soldiers were being killed by North Vietnamese soldiers inside South Vietnam; yet American ground forces could not conduct offensive operations inside North Vietnam.⁹ This sole fact reinforced the American public's perception that a civil war was being waged inside South Vietnam, which the United States had no legitimate right for being involved.

While this was indeed a failed attempt at conducting strategic information operations in support of combat operations, the rationale for the experiment was sound. The idea was based on experience from the Dominican Republic revolt in the spring of 1965. With Santo Domingo in the midst of revolt, US soldiers were sent in to establish peace and order. A USIA field-team was sent in to quickly get out the message of why American soldiers were in their country. This team was supplemented with an Army PSYOP team from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Together, the USIA team and the PSYOP team produced leaflets and a newspaper, and worked with Voice of America to tell the people of the tiny island nation – as well as the world – what the US was doing in the republic. TV crews and press cameramen photographed U.S. soldiers handing out rations and clothes to the citizens displaced by the fighting. In the end, the military

⁹ Ibid, pgs 151-156

operation was a tremendous success and world opinion quickly looked favorably upon the decision by the United States to intervene.¹⁰

U.S. Influence Operations in the Middle East

As a result of the war between Israel and several Arab neighbors in the Middle East in 1967, the United States Information Agency faced another challenge in regards to information operations. The Agency monitored public sentiment and official reports of all of the Arab countries involved in the conflict. On several occasions, Arab radio stations were heard broadcasting during and after the war, false and inflammatory charges of American military intervention on behalf of Israel. In Syria and in Egypt, radio stations reported US military forces were on the ground fighting beside Israel Army forces.¹¹ As anyone would expect, the prevailing attitude among political and religious leaders in the region after the 1967 War was that the U.S. was “unalterably” aligned in Israel’s favor. Diplomatic relations were severed or strained between a majority of the Arab countries and the United States as a result, and the entire Middle East appeared to be moving toward embracing an anti-U.S. sentiment. At this point, the Information Agency undertook an extensive program to counteract these prevailing attitudes.

In the early 1970s, the Agency arranged speaking tours in the Middle East with American experts, providing Arab government officials, journalists, and others with printed background material on many subjects. The Agency assumed that by making information fully available about the United States Government, its culture and values, Arab countries in the Middle East would develop a better understanding about U.S.

¹⁰ Ibid, pg 148

¹¹ Abdul-Rahim, Salim Yousef, “*American Messages to the Arabs: A Study of the Arabic Programs of the USICA*”, (The American University, London England, 1980); pg 111

policies. In 1973, another war erupted between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Again, USIA monitored public sentiment and official reports. USIA discovered that during and following the 1973 war, the usual propaganda attacks on U.S. policy did not occur. In fact, most of the comments that came out of the Middle East were neutral or critical but fair positions of U.S. policy.¹²

By 1976, the U.S. Information Agency was conducting overseas operations in 112 countries. These missions ranged from one-man posts in small countries to sophisticated media and cultural programs in major western European countries and Asia. In April 1977, President Jimmy Carter transformed the Information Agency yet again. Suspicious of USIA's efforts to use misleading information, the President reorganized and renamed USIA to become the U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA). The President went on to direct that the new Agency "*undertake no activities which are covert, manipulative or propagandistic*".¹³

The new Agency was a merger between USIA, Voice of America (VOA), and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.¹⁴ The purpose of the reorganized Agency under President Carter can be summarized as an attempt to reduce the degree to which "*misperceptions and misunderstandings*" complicated relations between the United States and other nations. President Carter believed that only by knowing and understanding each other's experiences can the U.S. find common ground with other countries on which to resolve differences. In a memorandum to the Director of the newly formed Agency, John E. Reinhardt, President Carter stated "*it is in our national interest to encourage the sharing of ideas and cultural activities among the people of the United*

¹² Ibid, pg 114

¹³ Ibid, pg 8

¹⁴ Ibid, pg 276

States and the people of other nations.”¹⁵ The President believed conflict resolution was best solved through communication.

The 1978 Camp David Summit Conference and its two peace accords between Israel and Egypt was a major test for USICA under President Carter’s guidance. The Agency relayed to Arab audiences the official policy statements of the U.S concerning the Camp David Summit throughout. Afterwards, USICA conducted an examination of the content, programs and messages that had been sent to the Arab world in support of the successful Camp David peace accords. USICA determined they were successful in making government officials and the public familiar with U.S. policy in regards to the summit. However, USICA also discovered that their ability to influence either the Governments or the people to support the newly signed peace accords had been met with limited results. When USICA officials attempted to determine why they were not able to influence or make government leaders sympathize with the policy, they discovered that USICA was presenting information from a government whose policies were not accepted by the Arab people. Thus the Agency’s ability to influence anyone was limited.

This observation is in line with many perception theorists who argue that it is the audiences’ psychological reality – *and not the physical reality* – of the messages transmitted is what counts in persuasion.¹⁶ Regardless of the good intentions behind an act or how reasonable the message, the receiver’s perception at the time will affect his or her reaction to the message. It became clear, the more a given U.S. policy appears to be in harmony with the interests of a foreign audience, the more likely the people receiving

¹⁵ Ibid, pg 73

¹⁶ Ibid, pg 248

the message are willing to listen – and the Agency becomes the conduit for effectively explaining and advocating that policy.

The return of USIA -- and the “Great Communicator”

“*MR Gorbachov, tear down these walls*”, the famous speech given by President Ronald Reagan at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, 1986, echoed around the world and inspired people behind the Iron Curtain to reach for freedom. Because of President Reagan’s insistence on getting his message – the American message – out to the world, this famous phrase reverberated everywhere. ¹⁷

Soon after assuming office, President Ronald Reagan renamed USICA and returned it back to its original name – the United States Information Agency. In October 1983, days after 200 U.S. Marines were killed in a suicide attack in support of peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, the U.S. used military force and removed an illegitimate and ruthless dictator in Grenada. Yet the U.S. found itself being ridiculed and condemned from around the world for interfering in the internal affairs of another country. President Reagan was convinced the world was not getting the message the United States had been sending.

The President believed the world should have responded with appreciation and sympathy for removing coup leaders who had imprisoned and killed the former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and other government officials in Grenada. The newly installed government, led by Bernard Coard, immediately installed a corrupt and abusive Marxist-Leninist regime that resulted in condemnation from around the world. Even the Cuban

¹⁷ Alan Simpson, “*President Reagan & Global Political Television*”, (COMLINKS MAG, 8 NOV 2006); available from the internet at www.comlinks.com

leader, Fidel Castro, condemned the coup by Bernard Coard and threatened to pull all Cuban humanitarian support out of Grenada.¹⁸ It was at this point President Reagan decided to act and remove the illegitimate government from Grenada.

The President was convinced that instead of lying or spinning the facts of a story to meet the United States needs, he wanted the people of the world to hear his message. Determined to get that message out to the international public, President Reagan appointed Charles Z. Wick as the Director of USIA. Mr. Wick, a long time friend and Hollywood producer, was given the task to create a global media network based on new satellite technology for this exact purpose.¹⁹

The President wanted the network available to every Embassy around the world. The mission of USIA was clear: broadcast U.S. foreign policies to the global public and provide feedback to the State Department and White House on global public opinion in order to better understand and formulate U.S. Foreign Policy (note that this mission was very similar to the guidance given by then President John Kennedy to USIA). Contrary to many in the business sector who did not think it possible, USIA had the information network operational in record time. It was known as WORLDNET (initially it was called EURONET but the name changed soon after operations began). Born on the 10th of April, 1985, WORLDNET transmitted from the US Embassy in London to more than 125 embassies around the world.²⁰ The network was highly successful. From two USIA production studios in Washington DC, programs on America, its values and culture were

¹⁸ Stephen Zunes, *"The US Invasion of Grenada: A Twenty-Year Retrospective"*, (Global Policy Forum, October 2003); available from the internet at www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/2003/10grenada.htm

¹⁹ Alan Simpson, *"President Reagan & Global Political Television"*, (COMLINKS MAG, 8 NOV 2006); available from the internet at www.comlinks.com

²⁰ Alan Simpson, *"Selling the American Dream – President Reagan's Vision"*, (COMLINKS MAG, 2005); available from the internet at www.comlinks.com

beamed around the world. Video teleconferences were held on a weekly basis where leaders from any country could talk to and question the policy makers of the United States. An example of the effectiveness of the network was never clearer than in Bucharest, Romania where over 2000 people lined up for hours to watch uncensored television and get their first glimpses of a free media and freedom of speech.²¹ Now, President Reagan had the ability to talk to people around the world. More important, the President was able to communicate the basic principles which guided his foreign policy: *peace through strength, “trust but verify”, tyranny is evil, and evil must not be allowed to triumph.* These principles proved more effective than the rationalizations and moral equivocation offered by many academics and liberal policymakers.²²

By the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s, communism was being replaced by democracy and the threat to the United States had dissipated. The Cold War with the Soviet Union was ending, as was the Soviet Union itself.

Rise to Globalism and our ability to Influence after the Cold War

As a result of winning the Cold War, the defeat of communism, the re-unification of Germany, and the spread of freedom and liberty around the globe, the United States was the unequivocal leader of the free world. It appeared the United States could do no wrong and it did not take an information agency to get this message out. It was self-evident by the unfolding events of the time. If to add to the credibility of the United States as the champion of freedom and liberty, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam

²¹ Ibid, available from the internet at www.comlinks.com

²² Lee Edwards, “*Ash Heap of History: President Reason’s Westminster Address 20 years later*”, (The Heritage Foundation, 3 June 2002); pg 4

Hussein in 1990 was certainly icing on the cake. As a result of a UN mandate for Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait or be removed by force, in 1991 President George Bush led a coalition of non-Muslim and Muslim countries which attacked into Kuwait to push the Iraqi occupiers out and free the Kuwaiti people. It was truly a global effort in defeating the Iraqi dictator, and at the helm was the United States.

In December 1992, with a UN mandate in hand, the U.S. led another coalition of combat forces to help secure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the starving people in the failed state of Somalia. A feeling soon prevailed throughout intellectual circles within the United States that we were becoming the world's policeman. The intent of the United States under President Bush initially, and then President Bill Clinton, was to help protect UN supplies from feuding warlords in that country. Although the mission in Somalia ended with the failed attempt to capture one of the warlords, it certainly showed the United States was searching for its role in the new world and wanted to play a more active part in helping solve global issues. Without question, we saw ourselves as the leader of the free world, and the undisputed champion of freedom and liberty.

On September 13th, 1993 the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands after signing the *"Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements"* at a Washington ceremony hosted by President Clinton.²³ Clearly a remarkable accomplishment, the United States found itself living in an era where it did not foresee a threat to its national security, and wanted to bring western style democracy and values to those places around the world that were shedding decades of tyranny. At that moment in time, the credentials

²³ *"Bill Clinton and the Historic Handshake"*, (Bob Heart, 13 September 1993) available from the internet at <http://www.bill-clinton-peace.blogspot.com/>

of the United States carried enough political power and clout to influence virtually any world organization, government, or nation on earth to actively pursue this objective.

While perhaps a direct threat to the United States was not apparent in the 1990s, several ethnic conflicts grabbed the world's attention in Africa and Europe. In Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Croatia and Bosnia to name a few, war killed hundreds of thousands of people.²⁴ In the former Republic of Yugoslavia, nationalism tore apart that country after the death of Marshall Tito and brought years of civil war to an area of the world that had not seen death of that magnitude since World War II. Of the latter, the United States believed the problem was for our European allies to solve, and it was not in the interests of the United States to intervene. But the problems in the Baltic would not go away, and the call for U.S. intervention would eventually place U.S. combat troops in a peacekeeping role under mandates from the United Nations.

As a result of the Dayton Accords Peace Treaty signed in December, 1995, it was determined that an international media campaign would be used to convince the local populations involved in the conflict that the Peace Accords could lead to a brighter and better future for all parties.²⁵ For the military commanders leading the Peacekeeping force going into Bosnia-Herzegovina, a positive relationship with the media was viewed as essential to making this campaign work. As a result of the successful bombing campaign which brought all warring factions to the peace accords, and supportive of any attempt to bring peace to the Balkans in order to stop the genocide, the media developed

²⁴ "Consolidated State Failure Events, 1955-2005", (Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 2005); available from the internet at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitftabl.htm>

²⁵ Avruch, Narel, & Siegel, "Information Campaigns for Peace Operations"; (C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, Library of Congress, February 2000); pg 31

a very positive view of NATO and the military forces involved in keeping the peace.²⁶

Thus all of the pieces were in place to implement the Information Campaign in support of the Dayton Peace Accords. Military Commanders, part of the Implementation Force known as IFOR, developed and implemented the Information Campaign for NATO. USIA did not play a role.²⁷

Perhaps the elections of 1998 in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide the best example when analyzing the effectiveness of the Information Campaign to that point. Established by the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, elections took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Millions of dollars and institutional resources that the international community devoted to the media campaign (aimed to empower the moderates) did not attain the results the international community had hoped for. The main focus of the information campaign was to convince the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they would be better off under the Dayton Peace Agreement. Since the major political parties still dominated the landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was hoped that by appealing to the people and influencing them to accept the Dayton Agreement, it would put pressure on the political parties to accept and implement the agreement.²⁸

After the elections, the campaign realized that ultimately the information operation could be no stronger than the support of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina really gave or were prepared to give to the goals of the Dayton Peace Accords (a lesson learned by USIA in the Middle East almost 20 years earlier). As third-party interveners in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is absolutely critical to gather sufficient information on the root causes of a conflict before designing an information campaign in order to target the

²⁶ Ibid, pg 42

²⁷ Ibid, pg 164

²⁸ Ibid, pg 46, 164

causes of the conflict. In military terms, a coherent national-level policy or strategy must be developed in order to guide the development of the information campaign that will reinforce the national strategic objectives. Without a strategic plan for information operations, what develops at the operational and tactical level is haphazard and reactive at best. The ideal information campaign is one that connects the operation to wider political goals that the interveners and indigenous actors can articulate.²⁹

The deactivation of the United States Information Agency

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch of the U.S. government. USIA explained and supported American foreign policy and promoted U.S. national interests through a wide range of overseas information programs. The agency promoted mutual understanding between the United States and other nations by conducting educational and cultural activities. USIA maintained 190 posts in 142 countries. Pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Section 1601, Public Law 105-277, Division G, USIA was integrated into the Department of State on October 1, 1999.³⁰

“The public diplomacy function of the United States government has been examined frequently over the last 40 years, and has often been the subject of experimentation. The challenges presented by the Cold War, especially impediments to the free flow of information in communist societies, provided the impetus for USIA’s creation and growth. However, in the post-Cold War era when technological advances in communication allow for instantaneous transmittal of information to many places in the world, it is neither cost-effective nor necessary to the U.S. interest to conduct public diplomacy through an autonomous bureaucracy. The committee firmly emphasizes that the function of public diplomacy is a vital one and should be maintained at a high level in

²⁹ Ibid, pgs 156-163

³⁰ Text of a letter from the President to the Chairmen and ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, International Relations, and Foreign Relations (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 30 DEC 1998); available from the internet at <http://library.whitehouse.gov/PressReleases-plain.cgi>

*the U.S. government. It is the Committee's belief that public diplomacy can be most effectively conducted through the primary foreign affairs agency, the Department of State, and should be regarded as an integral part of the overall U.S. diplomatic effort.... This bill eliminates the U.S. Information Agency and merges its international exchange, broadcasting and public diplomacy under the Department of State's new Under Secretary for Public diplomacy.”*³¹

During the early 1990s, after the collapse of communism and the defeat of the Soviet Union in the cold war, USIA had been given a new direction by the Clinton Administration. In 1993, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake announced the strategy of enlargement, enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies. Thus USIA was directed as its mandate to influence foreign audiences about U.S. style democracy and markets. The Clinton administration used public diplomacy to promote free-market economies, free trade, American competitiveness, and U.S. style democratization. It was a mini-Commerce Department approach to influence foreign audiences. No where is this more clear than USIA's assistance in convincing the Mexican people that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was more than just caring about the economical bottom line.³²

By 1995, USIA was viewed as a Cold War relic no longer necessary, especially with the advent of the internet and mass media. While USIA successfully supported President Clinton's mini-Commerce Department approach to Foreign Policy, where a Commerce Department already existed, this was considered a repetitive and unnecessary function. The purpose of the Agency as was written in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 was to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and the international community. The new mandate for the Agency by President Clinton was

³¹ Senate Report 104-095 – Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995

³² Nancy E. Snow, “*The Progressive Response*”, (Foreign Policy in Focus, Volume 1, #10, JUL 1997); available from the internet at http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume1/v1n10_body.htm

making a mockery of the Smith-Mundt Act, thus the Agency was not performing any legitimate post-cold war function.³³ In 1997, President Clinton announced the deactivation of the Information Agency.

Assessment.

Spanning a period of over five decades and seven U.S. Presidents, the United States Government has seen the value of an Information Agency in order to talk to and listen to the global community. More importantly, USIA acted as the source for developing, coordinating and synchronizing Informational power at the strategic level.

Born out of necessity to combat communism and the Soviet Union's propaganda during the Cold War, USIA provided a conduit for the President of the United States to explain the policies of the United States. The Agency described American culture, lifestyles, and values, and communicated these principles to areas of the world where the media was censored and society was closed. USIA answered directly to the President of the United States. While considered a part of the State Department, the Information Agency performed the intellectual function of collecting, deciphering and recommending to policy-makers within the U.S. Government. Once policies were decided, the Agency was the lead at developing, coordinating and integrating Informational power at the strategic level of Government. In short, the Agency kept its pulse on what the world was thinking, and provided that feedback to the President and other Cabinet members. Once decisions were made, the Agency executed the Informational power of Government and ensured it was well coordinated and synchronized.

³³ Ibid, available from the internet at http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume1/v1n10_body.htm

It became clear, to be effective, policies must meet with the support of the people for whom they are targeted, other wise no information operation will ever influence the international community to support U.S. objectives. Over time, USIA performed these functions very well.

With the defeat of communism and the Soviet Union, came the demise of the Information Agency. Beginning near the end of the Bush Administration and leading into the Clinton Administration, the Agency was seen as a relic with no real purpose. It was perceived to have been an Agency that existed only to fight the cold war. As the United States searched for its role in a world after communism, the Agency was not sought to assist in the development of a new ‘grand’ strategy that could charter a course for future policies. Instead, the Agency found itself relegated to doing what the Commerce Department had been doing for years. And just as the military was downsizing, the U.S. Government began downsizing other Cold War agencies as well. At the request of the Republican controlled Congress, the Information Agency was deactivated and its duties and responsibilities were integrated into the Department of State.

With a lack of foresight and no vision to direct U.S. Foreign Policy, nor any institution to listen and understand the problems of the global environment, there does not exist an informational and intellectual think tank to lead the United States leaders into the 21st Century.

CHAPTER 2. Effects of U.S. Foreign Policies on the Global Community

On the 2nd of November near a park in downtown Washington D.C., a handful of foreign students – all teenagers – were given a tour of the capital. In the park at this time was a woman conducting a peace vigil. The woman, in her 60s, has been in the park for 25 years protesting the development and testing of nuclear weapons. The group of teenagers, many from Islamic countries, could not believe this woman was allowed to protest without interference by the government. When it was explained to the group that the woman was protected by the 1st Amendment guaranteeing freedom of speech in the U.S. Constitution, they were shocked, yet pleased. Later on in the tour, another visitor from Amman Jordan commented that she was fearful to wear a scarf, being Muslim. She was afraid she would be ridiculed and perhaps embarrassed. None of these things happened, and she admitted it was completely different from what she expected.³⁴ It quickly became apparent that none of these students had an understanding of our American values and freedoms.

In an article published by U.S. News and World Reports in May 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told a group of senior military officers. *“If I were grading (America’s effort at getting our message out to the world), I would say we probably deserve a D or D plus as a country as to how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place in the world today.”*³⁵ But is it only a matter of communicating ideas as the Defense Secretary refers?

³⁴ Louise Fenner, *“Young International Students eye U.S. Freedoms in Action”*, (Bureau of International Information Programs, Department of State, NOV 2006); available from the internet at <http://usinfo.state.gov>

³⁵ Linda Robinson, *“The Propaganda War”*, (US News and World Reports, 29 May 2006); available from the internet at <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060529/29propaganda.htm>

Anti-American sentiment in the Muslim World

Opinion polls conducted by Zogby International, Gallup (CNN/USA Today) and the Department of State a year and a half after going to war in Iraq show Arab and Muslim anger has intensified. Data from July 2004 show U.S. policies are viewed unfavorable by 98% in Egypt, 94% in Saudi Arabia, 88% in Morocco and 78% in Jordan. When you review media commentary over the same period, it is also consistent with the polling data. State Department surveys of the print media (editorials and op-ed) in 72 countries discovered 82.5% of the commentaries were negative.³⁶ This data provides a greater insight into the international community and their opinions on U.S. policies. Without question, this kind of anti-U.S. public sentiment towards our Government affects the President's ability to influence foreign governments and turns the global community against whatever good our policies are attempting to bring.

No one is suggesting that U.S. policy be based on global public opinion, but an understanding of a region's perception should influence the development of policy. It could also allow us to shape the environment before and after our policies are put in place in order to explain what we are doing and 'why' we are doing it. When we look back to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War discussed in Chapter 1, we can see that shaping the environment by effective diplomacy can have an effect on people's attitudes and perceptions if our policies match our words.

U.S. policies communicate a message to the global community. Today we find our policies perceived as selfish and inward looking. That prevailing attitude is exactly the strategic message extremist and militant organizations use to isolate societies, to

³⁶ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, "*Report of the Defense Board Task Force on Strategic Communications*", (Defense Science Board, September 2004); pgs 22-23

recruit fighters, and to defeat whatever message the U.S. attempts to use to influence men's minds. To better illustrate this point, we need to refer to the Zogby poll below:³⁷

	Moroccans view of US FAV/UNFAV	Saudi Arabians view of US FAV/UNFAV	Jordanians view of US FAV/UNFAV	Lebanese view of US FAV/UNFAV
US Science & Technology	90/8	48/51	83/13	52/46
US Freedom & Democracy	53/41	39/60	57/40	41/56
US People	59/29	28/64	52/39	39/58
US Movies/TV	60/37	35/60	56/41	30/66
US Products	73/24	37/59	61/35	39/57
US Education	61/16	12/74	59/29	38/24
US Policy towards Arabs	3/93	3/95	7/89	4/90
US Policy towards Palestinians	3/93	3/95	7/89	4/90
US Policy on Terrorism	13/82	2/96	21/75	10/84
US Policy on Iraq	1/98	1/97	2/78	4/93

An interesting point, the data from the Table above shows these Muslim countries have a big problem with our policies, but do not hate us for our values. This in itself tells us we have a message we can use that can influence the global community. Yet our Government's policies limit the effectiveness of this message.

Four policies in particular seem to be at the cause of this anti-American sentiment. First is the United States led attack into Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein in 2003. Second is the global war on terror to combat Islamic militant extremism. A majority of Muslim

³⁷ Ibid, pg 53

nations do not support the United States fight against Islamic extremism, because they do not perceive it as a problem as most Christian countries do. Third is the perception amongst Muslim countries that the United States acts unilaterally and pays little to no attention to the interests or needs of “their” country, or the global community. Fourth and finally is the Israeli – Palestine conflict, the perception of different standards in resolving this problem. ³⁸

The War in Iraq

When we look at the decision for invading Iraq, we find this decision – more than all others – has painted the United States as an imperialist in many parts of the world. It has provided our adversaries the legitimacy they need in fighting U.S. policies and western influences, and it has significantly suppressed our ability as a nation to communicate and influence men’s minds.

Polls conducted inside of Iraq in January 2006 by WorldPublicOpinion.org show nearly 77% of the Iraqi people polled believe that the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime was the right thing to do, regardless of the personal cost to them or their families. They believe all that had happened up to that point in time was worth it (91% of the Kurdish people and 98% of the Shia people said it was worth it, while 83% of the Sunni people said it was not). But why has most of NATO, and now the American public, not supported the ongoing stability operations and reconstruction mission in Iraq. There are innocent men, women and children who are struggling to move Iraq forward and they are

³⁸ Testimony by Andrew Kohut, “*How the United States is perceived in the Arab or Muslim Worlds*”, (US House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, NOV 2005); pg 2

in great need of the world's support.³⁹ Yet most of the global community does not assist and lets Iraqi on Iraqi violence continue, while the American public has withdrawn their support. What led U.S. Government leaders to believe invading Iraq was the best course of action in the war against religious extremism? To answer this, we need to review International and American perceptions prior to the conflict.

After concluding a very successful military campaign to remove the tyrannical Taliban Regime in Afghanistan (which has been supported internationally from the beginning) the President seemed convinced that Iraq was a partner in terrorist activity and a threat to the United States. Yet global public opinion did not share these opinions. In a January 2003 Gallop International Poll, of 38 countries polled (including 20 European countries) not one showed a majority support of unilateral U.S. military action against Iraq. When asked a follow on question if they would support their country in a coalition with the U.S. taking military action against Iraq, 34 of the 38 countries polled showed a majority opposed having their country support such action.⁴⁰ Thus the President was faced with the challenge of legitimizing our call for action against Iraq. The President increased diplomatic pressure within the UN, and stepped up public diplomacy among the American people in order to win support. Several speeches and events spell this out:

³⁹ Program on International Policy Attitudes, "*Majority of Iraqis Endorse Election and Show Optimism*", (World Public Opinion is a joint program at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and the Center on Policy Attitudes, Washington DC, 31 JAN 2006); available from the internet at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org>

⁴⁰ Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, Evan Lewis, "*Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War*", (Political Science Quarterly, Vol 118, #4, 2003-04); pg 573-574

- In President Bush's January 2002 speech to the nation, he singled out Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil", and accused them of sponsoring terrorism and attempting to build or acquire WMD.
- On 5 February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented photographs and voice intercepts to the UN Security Council as evidence of Saddam Hussein not complying with UN WMD inspectors. Secretary Powell accuses Iraq of harboring Al Qaeda training camps inside Iraq.
- On 18 March 2003, the President stated in a Presidential Letter to Congress, in going to war with Iraq he was taking "*the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.*"⁴¹

In these statements, the Administration attempted to establish that a terrorist organization associated with the attacks on September 11th existed in Iraq, and by Iraq's refusal to fully cooperate with UN WMD inspectors, they were attempting to acquire WMD which could fall into terrorist's hands. This, in the Administration's mind, was a direct threat to the security of the American people and it provided the legitimacy the President used for attacking Iraq.

The effect of the public diplomacy actions by the Administration had a big effect on the American public. In polls taken in August 2002, 55% of the American people believed Iraq currently had WMD and 39% believed Iraq was developing more WMD.

⁴¹ Ibid, pgs 590-592

In September 2002, 75% of the American people believed there was Al Qaeda presence in Iraq and that it presented a clear and present danger to the American people. By February 2003, the percentage believing Al Qaeda was in Iraq dropped to 31%, with 64% of the population believing the U.S. should wait for approval from the UN before taking action, giving weapons inspectors more time inside Iraq. Perhaps sensing a long and bloody conflict in Iraq, the American people became more objective. Nevertheless, when the U.S. led coalition attacked into Iraq in March 2003, a majority of Americans (76%) supported the President's decision. Of the 76% who supported the President's decision to attack into Iraq, 80% stated their number one reason for supporting the President was the tie between Iraq and Al Qaeda.⁴² The President was successful in convincing the American people that war was necessary in order to protect the U.S. and our allies in the Middle East.

Immediately following combat operations and for the next few months, the President and his cabinet continued to support their presumption that Al Qaeda and WMD were found inside Iraq. Note the following comments --

- On 30 May 2003, President Bush stated *“for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them.”*
- On 14 September 2003, Vice President Dick Cheney stated *“If we're successful in Iraq...so that it's not a safe haven for terrorist, now we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorist who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.”*

⁴² Ibid, pgs 570, 576

The effect these statements had on the American people following defeat of the Iraqi Military and the removal of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 continued the presumption that evidence of Al Qaeda and WMD were actually found inside Iraq. Of note are polls taken from June through September 2003 where almost 50% of the American people believed the U.S. found evidence that Saddam Hussein was working closely with Al Qaeda, and slightly over 20% believed the U.S. found evidence of WMD inside Iraq. In both cases, no evidence was found to substantiate either Al Qaeda training camps existed in Iraq, or Iraq was actively pursuing and building Weapons of Mass Destruction or the delivery methods to employ them. (June 2006 - A House of Representatives Committee on Intelligence issued a report in which munitions containing degraded mustard and sarin gas were discovered in Iraq between 2004 and 2006. These were determined to be pre-Gulf War munitions and the effectiveness of the agents was unknown and not documented. They numbered approximately 500 in total. There was no evidence Saddam Hussein attempted to build Weapons of Mass Destruction since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, or that the Regime was selling what little chemical munitions were in Iraq. Most of the evidence suggests these munitions were perhaps unknown by the leaders of the Government.)⁴³

American Values

The values of the American people today are much the same as our founding fathers in regards to international relations. George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin, and others, never envisioned a United States that would be

⁴³ Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *"Iraqi Chemical Munitions"*, (US House of Reps, June 2006)

involved in international affairs where the United States would invade another sovereign nation without having been on the receiving end of aggression first. As Thomas Jefferson stated in his First Inaugural Address on 4 March, 1801,

“it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government...Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none... a well disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them...”.⁴⁴

It is here Jefferson implies wars and conflicts will occur, which requires a professional Army at some point to defend the country. However, to deploy an expeditionary Army to lead pre-emptive offensive operations without having been the recipient of aggression, or the real threat of aggression, was certainly not what our founding fathers intended.

Arguably, our history has shown us to be more of an isolationist country with regards to war and conflicts outside the western hemisphere. Since World War II and our continued evolution as a global power, the United States has had no choice but to take a leading role in world affairs. Considering the military threat from the Soviet Union towards Western Europe immediately following World War II, the ideological attack by communism to destroy capitalism and democracy, and the only power in post-World War II reconstruction that had any capabilities to deal with the Soviet Union, there really was not much of a choice. Yet many Americans were calling for the return of US military forces following the surrender of Japan in 1945, regardless of the military necessity for keeping soldiers, sailors, air men, and marines forward deployed.

This questioning by the American people of our leaders foreign policy decisions has been constantly scrutinized by the American people. It is completely reasonable and

⁴⁴ Alpheus Thomas Mason, *“Free Government in the Making”*, (Oxford University Press, 1965); pg 381

in the line of thinking that Jefferson implies in his first inaugural speech. From our birth as a nation, the American Revolution was an act to free ourselves from the tyranny of British Governance. The essence of what it means to be an American and the values associated are taught to us from the time we enter Kindergarten until the time we are deceased. They have been codified in the American Declaration of Independence.

*“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed... The history of the present King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States...”*⁴⁵

In these few lines from the Declaration of Independence above, our values as a nation are identified. All men are created equal is clearly stated and understood. When the American people perceive U.S. foreign policies violate these God given values, the policies and the leaders of our country are questioned.

Assessment.

With the intense emotional roller coaster inside of the United States as a result of the September 11th attacks and the deaths of 3000 innocent civilians, the Administration created a fire in the international community and in Iraq, all in the name of defeating militant extremists. It is understandable for the President of the United States to want to protect the American people. This is one of his primary responsibilities as the leader of the country, as it is to prevent conflicts from beginning at all. Yet the decision to take military action against another sovereign country which has not conducted any act of aggression against the United States cannot be taken lightly.

⁴⁵ “*The Declaration of Independence*”, (CATO Institute, Washington DC, 1998); pg 9-14

The challenge for foreign policymakers is to understand what it means to be an American, and use our values when developing foreign policy. That has the most long-term effect on shaping American and international public opinion. The United States is the single military super power in the world today, but acting unilaterally or without the consent of a majority of democratic nations sends a message to the international community that the United States is serving its interests only and not the interests of the international community. In a 2005 poll in Lebanon, Pakistan, Morocco and Jordan, the people of these countries reversed trends and developed a more favorable impression of the United States from what was recorded a year earlier. This was a result of foreign policies that showed the United States supporting efforts to bring democracy to their country or region.⁴⁶

Democracy is the right of those who are governed to determine how they will be governed. It is based on the belief that all men are created equal. The Iraq war sent the wrong message to the international community. The decision, along with several other decisions that did not take into consideration the international community, is the cause of anti-American sentiment today and our inability to influence and lead. These trends can be reversed. The best way is to ensure our values as a nation become and remain the cornerstone of foreign policy development.

⁴⁶ Testimony by Andrew Kohut, "*How the United States is perceived in the Arab or Muslim Worlds*", (US House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, NOV 2005); pg 8

Chapter 3. U.S. International Relations & Foreign Policy development

“Human rights are the soul of our foreign policy.”

President Jimmy Carter, 1977

An idealist, President Jimmy Carter did not regard Communism as the primary enemy or threat to the United States when he assumed office in January, 1977. President Carter was more concerned with the explosive nature of the arms race with the Soviet Union, and with right-wing repressive regimes which the United States supported or sponsored in the fight against communist expansionism. President Carter made a firm commitment to human rights, making it the foundation of our relations with other nations. This was a noble goal, which raised the hopes of oppressed people worldwide. The concept that every human being has certain inalienable rights is essentially a principle from our founding fathers that is represented in our Declaration of Independence. President Carter understood the importance of this fundamental principle and incorporated it into policy-making within the U.S. Government.⁴⁷

While President Carter has often been criticized over his foreign policy ineffectiveness, and is typically never mentioned as one of the great U.S. Presidents in history, his focus on human rights and the constant push to improve the conditions of human beings in countries such as South Africa, Chile, Brazil, the Soviet Union and other places around the world, improved the tarnished reputation of the United States coming out of Vietnam. Prior to his rise to the Presidency, the United States had an image as a patron of tyranny. As a result of President Carter’s efforts, the former reputation of the United States as a supporter of freedom was being restored. Even though the American nuclear arms arsenal increased, and American arms sales abroad increased instead of

⁴⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose, *“Rise to Globalism”*, (Penguin Books, Middlesex England, 1983); pg 390-391

decreasing, the perception of people around the world was that the United States believed in human rights for everyone and was working towards that goal. Thus, the United States was perceived as the champion of freedom and democracy around the world.⁴⁸

In the four years under President Carter's leadership, the United States witnessed:

- pro-U.S. governments in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Iran overthrown by Marxist or Islamic opposition movements
- the failure to reduce the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia even though the President announced he would unilaterally remove nuclear weapons from South Korea as a good will gesture
- the Soviet expansion of military support and arms sales into the Horn of Africa and into southern Africa using Cuban forces as their agents
- Russian military forces (ie. jet-fighter aircraft, ground combat forces and submarines) positioned in Cuba, which the United States viewed as a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement
- the Marxist led government in Vietnam invade Cambodia.
- Finally, the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan

The good will efforts of President Carter were perceived by the Soviets as a sign of weakness. Thus, the Russians decided to take advantage of the situation in order to exploit their communist ideology.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ibid, 391-392

⁴⁹ Ibid, 393

Despite the numerous perceived setbacks in foreign policy, President Carter did enjoy several success stories. In 1979, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Peace Accords marking the first time an Arab country recognized the existence of the state of Israel. Also in 1979, President Carter continued along the path President Nixon began in regards to relations with China. President Carter announced that China and the United States would extend full recognition with each other and exchange Ambassadors. Additionally, President Carter ended its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and withdrew diplomatic recognition to the Nationalist regime, recognizing Taiwan as a part of China.

Remaining true to his word, President Carter suspended military arms sales to countries whose human rights record was abysmal. Countries such as Nicaragua, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and others were denied arms sales regardless of the consequences. President Carter may have been an idealist, but he did his best to ensure that the actions of the United States and the words he used were the same. As a result, a positive perception of the United States developed among the international community.

The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy making

“Throughout our history, we have sought to define and justify our foreign policy in terms of principle. We have never seen ourselves as just another nation-state pursuing selfish aims. We have always stood for something beyond ourselves—a beacon to the oppressed from other lands, from the first settlers to the recent refugees from Indochina. This conviction of our uniqueness contributed to our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained our confidence in ourselves. It has been, and is, a powerful force.”

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 1975.⁵⁰

Ethical decision making in foreign policy development is not a new concept. The ends, means and consequences in strategic policy development are all important. Careful appraisal of facts and weighing of uncertainties along all three dimensions is critical for good moral reasoning. Right versus wrong is less difficult to handle than right versus right and degrees of wrong, and it is even more complicated in international politics where there is less agreement about what is right and where the consequences of actions are often more difficult to estimate. Yet this difficulty in moral reasoning in foreign policy does not justify our avoiding it, rather we must work harder to do better at it.⁵¹ Case in point is President Carter’s decision to base U.S. Foreign Policy decisions on the human rights records of the government in power. As previously stated, the President discontinued the sales of arms to many countries allied to the United States with poor human rights records. Yet arms sales to the countries of South Korea and the Philippines did not end, even though their human rights records were abysmal. When questioned along these lines, the Carter Administration stated that arms sales to these two countries continued based on national security to the United States. Certainly this was not in

⁵⁰ Henry A. Kissinger, *“American Foreign Policy”*, (W.W. Norton & Co. 3rd Edition, 1977); pg 200

⁵¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr, *“Power in the Global Information Age – From Realism to Globalization”*, (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Oxon, 2004); page 122

accordance with the President's stated policy; however there is not always a right or wrong answer as previously discussed.⁵²

Former Secretary of State Kissinger understood American values and the power these principles provided in the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy development. Yet even in 1975, Mr. Kissinger understood the limits to our moralistic power base and knew it would not solely command broad acceptance. Regardless, we have a responsibility as a global power to serve as a sponsor of world order. And as Mr. Kissinger states, "*this nation must be true to its own beliefs, or it will lose its bearings in the world.*"⁵³

Mr. Kissinger sees three basic principles to foreign policy development. First, *Foreign policy must start with security.* The survival of the nation is the first responsibility of any government. This must not be compromised. When the survival of a nation is threatened, many will resort to less than perfect solutions. For example, in World War II, the United States and Great Britain allied with communist Russia to defeat Germany. Even though the United States never officially recognized the communist government in Russia for 16 years after the revolution, by 1941 the survival of the nation was at stake and that took precedent over anything else. Second, *Security is a means and not an end.* The purpose of security is to protect the values of our nation. And since our security is not always at stake, we must seize the morale high-ground at every opportunity. Finally, *American values are the link between the American people and their government.* We live in a democracy, and the execution of foreign policy is made possible only with public support. The American people have a right to understand the purpose of any policy established by the Government. Americans have the right to

⁵² Michael McClintock, "*Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990*", (Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc. 1992); Chapter 13

⁵³ Ibid, pg 204

understand how each policy serves the principles of the American people, which is also the foundation of our partnerships with other western democracies.⁵⁴

For the American people, the question is not whether we use our values to form foreign policy, but whether we have the courage to deal with ambiguity, and whether we have the patience and understanding that sometimes we have to work with communist Russia in order to ensure the world becomes a safer place. Whatever the situation, the ends we seek in any policy must meet within the framework of our values; otherwise our foreign policy is meaningless.⁵⁵

Foreign Policy-making and the Combatant Commander

In 2000, President Bill Clinton decided to cut off all military ties with Indonesia in response over its Army's involvement in a brutal militia rampage against the people of East Timor who wanted Independence from Indonesia. The Clinton Administration wanted to put pressure on the Indonesian Army to adopt reforms demanded by the country's first democratically elected president in 31 years. Senior U.S. military leaders objected to these tactics and instead advocated continued dialogue and engagement in order to induce the changes desired among the Indonesian Army leadership. On April 2nd 2000, Admiral Dennis Blair's jet (the Pacific Theater Commander) touched down in Jakarta Indonesia, at the objection of the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia. The Admiral's position differed with the U.S. Ambassador's position and the U.S. Administration's position on the best course of action to make change occur within the Indonesian Army. Admiral Blair saw that change was taking place within the Indonesian Army, however

⁵⁴ Ibid, pg 205

⁵⁵ Ibid, pg 207-210

slow that it was. The Admiral believed constant dialogue and engagement was necessary in order to continue the changes the U.S. sought.⁵⁶

A report in 2004 on the Indonesian Military stated changes have continued for the better within the Indonesian Army, yet the Army was not subservient to the civilian leadership, and the Army had retained some of their abusive measures.⁵⁷ As implied above, foreign policy development is not easy and there are varying degrees of right. This example highlights this point well. Yet the Administration's first reaction was to take the get tough approach as the best course of action. Somehow by cutting off all communication with the leaders of the country we want to influence, we will achieve the changes we desire.

A similar situation occurred when Army General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan deposed of the civilian leadership and assumed control of the country in 1999. Pakistan is part of the Central Command's Theatre of Operations, and General (R) Anthony Zinni was the Central Command Commander at the time. President Clinton sent a protest letter to the newly self-installed leader. After a period of time, General Musharraf placed a phone call to the United States, but not to anyone in the Clinton Administration. General Musharraf called General (R) Zinni, and explained to General Zinni what his intentions were and what he was doing with the country's nuclear weapons. As a result, General Zinni pushed the Clinton Administration to open the diplomatic door with Musharraf, even though many political advisors were demanding that the communication door be slammed shut. As a result of General Zinni's intervention, Pakistan turned over several suspected terrorists as a goodwill gesture and President Clinton visited General

⁵⁶ Dana Priest, "Standing up to State and Congress", (Washington Post Article, SEP 2000): pg A1

⁵⁷ John F. Bradford, "The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criterion and Ramifications for Reform", (Journal of SE Asian Studies Student Association, Fall 2004) ; Article 2

Musharraf in March that next year. Today, almost 8 years later, Pakistan is a critical partner in our fight against the Taliban and against religious militant extremists in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. As General Zinni stated, *“If Pakistan fails, we have major problems. If Musharraf fails, hardliners could take over, or fundamentalists, or chaos. We can’t let Musharraf fail.”*⁵⁸

Again in 2000, General Zinni found himself on a Central Asian trip. One of the countries the General visited was the country of Kyrgyzstan. Leaders of Kyrgyzstan wanted assistance from the United States in counterterrorism training. Yet human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch were against any kind of assistance or contact with countries in Central Asia. Their position, as stated by executive director Kenneth Roth,

“Rubbing shoulders with people in Turkmenistan, for instance, is an absurd excuse to maintain military contact; we should increase the cost of Turkmenistan’s ruler for not adhering to a basic rule of law. We should not reward them with military contact.”

However, General Zinni believed engagement at any level was the more appropriate course of action. His analogy was, *“Nonproliferation’s or human rights folks”* who want to set conditions for military ties are like people who *“want to deliver health care only to people who are completely healthy.”*⁵⁹

Assessment.

Ethical decision making in the development of U.S. foreign policy must be linked regardless of the circumstances as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger points out. At the foundation of our principles are the values given us by our founding fathers. Yet situations around the world are often unclear and decisions as to the best course of action

⁵⁸ Dana Priest, *“A Four-Star Foreign Policy?”*, (Washington Post, September 28, 2000) Pg A01

⁵⁹ Dana Priest, *“An Engagement in 10 Time Zones”*, (Washington Post, September 29, 2000); pg A01

will remain difficult. And when it comes to the security of the country, the decisions become more centered on the interests of the U.S. and less on others.

When Mr. Kissinger discusses the basic principles he used to develop foreign policy, his first two principles center around the security of the United States. Where it is not threatened, he immediately calls for a moral and ethical approach to solving the problem. That makes perfect sense and explains the actions of President Carter. The result was an almost instant change in world public opinion about the U.S. While President Carter may not have been the best U.S. President when it comes to the execution of foreign policy, the effect his human rights stance had on the international community was overwhelming. Even Mr. Kissinger was amazed at the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. And by continuing to remain engaged with China, the resulting prosperity for both countries has been enormous. That is not to say that the President had to make somewhat gray-area decisions in regards to providing military aid to countries with poor human rights violations. Arguably, those decisions were based on the Soviet Unions decision to pursue pushing its communist revolution around the globe. Thus, the President did what he could to correct poor policy decisions of the past in supporting right-wing tyrannical regimes, but when it came to the security of our allies and the U.S. itself, that policy was set aside.

Mr. Kissinger's third principle in foreign policy-making shows the linkage of our American values between the U.S. Government and the American people. Mr. Kissinger articulates his point that policies developed by the United States Government should meet the expectations of the American people. When the policy is not in line with the public's expectations, the Executive Branch has to explain why. This clearly explains the

dynamic in Iraq today. The American people perceive our reasons for invading Iraq were not legitimate as a result of not finding evidence of Al Qaeda or WMD development there. The interesting dynamic today, Al Qaeda is clearly present in Iraq and threatens that nation's sovereignty. Yet the American people feel deceived and will not allow policy decisions to continue which are not in line with our values. The international community has never agreed with President Bush's presumptions about the former regime and will not support any efforts in Iraq, regardless of their humanitarian nature.

The most interesting dynamic of all comes from the emergence of the Combatant Command in the execution of foreign policy decisions. Combatant Commanders have only been in existence since 1986 with the Goldwaters-Nichols Act which transformed the department of defense into a Joint war-fighting organization. In the evolution of these Commanders over time, they have come to play a major role in International Affairs with the countries in their theater of operations. What becomes even more apparent is the depth of knowledge, experience and political understanding the Combatant Commander brings to the table in regards to international relations. There have been arguments to the contrary, that since the creation of Combatant Commanders and the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the primary advisor to the President, that the Executive branch has been too quick to pull the trigger to use military force to resolve international conflicts. However persuasive that may sound, the fact remains that most military personnel do not like to engage in combat. In 1990 during an attempted coup by the Philippine Army to remove the civilian leadership, a request for U.S. military intervention was sent to the Bush Administration. President Bush was out of the country at the time, Vice President Dan Quayle and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN

Colin Powell had to deal with the developing situation. Immediately the Vice President turned to GEN Powell and asked for U.S. military forces to intervene. GEN Powell argued against military intervention as a first option. His advice was to use American Air power to conduct a show of force in the area where the coup was taking place. Acting on his advice, U.S. jets streamed above the renegade Philippine Army forces and the coup failed. The simple show of force successfully deterred those from continuing with the attempt to dispose of the Philippine leaders and Government.

Prior to 1986, the U.S. Information Agency played a major role in providing input that was used in making policy decisions. Today, with the Information Agency dissolved, perhaps the Chairmen along with the Combatant Commanders are fulfilling the void left by the Information Agency. Unlike years past, these Combatant Commanders are subject matter experts on international relations and they can do more than just provide input to policymakers in Washington DC. These senior U.S. military officials can influence policymaking from the beginning and change policies they believe to be bad. While this is certainly a positive development, it is not the primary role of the military and it should not become a primary role. Yet it should become a part of the process for developing foreign policy.

Chapter 4. Effects of U.S. Foreign Policy on Strategic Communications

On December 26th, 2004 a tsunami and earthquake hit the Asian Pacific theatre. Swift action by the U.S. Government, in cooperation with donors and private organizations, ensured critical needs for water and sanitation were met. This prevented a secondary disaster-related health crisis from beginning. By May 2005, President George Bush signed into law the ‘Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Fund’ which provided \$656 million dollars for a comprehensive reconstruction program for the region which included Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Maldives, Thailand, Malaysia, Somalia and the Seychelles. In addition to funding from the U.S. Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development, the total from the U.S. Government was more than \$841 million dollars. ⁶⁰

In a poll taken by Terror Free Tomorrow, a non-partisan not-for-profit organization in Washington D.C., there has been a dramatic increase in Indonesian support of the United States, and against Osama Bin Laden. Polls showed that humanitarian aid provided by the U.S. caused an overwhelming change of opinion among the people in Indonesia – the world’s largest Muslim country. The polls showed a dramatic shift, as well as a sustained and strengthened shift, by more than 10% from a 2005 survey. Other key findings:

- For the first time in four years, more Indonesians are favorable to the U.S. than unfavorable, while support for Bin Laden and terrorism has dropped to its lowest level since September 2001.

⁶⁰ U.S Agency for International Development, “*Tsunami Assistance, One Year later*”, (U.S. State Department, Washington D.C. December 2005); available on the internet at <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/58392.htm>

- 63% of Indonesians continue to have a favorable opinion of the United States because of the U.S. humanitarian response to the tsunami in 2004
- Indonesians with positive perceptions of the U.S. has nearly tripled from May 2003, while very unfavorable perceptions declined to just 13% today
- Finally, the poll showed that a mere 2% of Indonesians surveyed now believe suicide terrorist attacks are ever justified, down from 27% after September 2001.⁶¹

The implications from this report are clear – the support of humanitarian and disaster relief does more for strategic communications than any words alone could possibly do.

The Media is only a conduit for Strategic Communications

Foreign policies not in line with American values will eventually not stand up to the scrutiny of the American public. The media, being the ultimate conduit to the American public and international community, continually investigates and analyzes foreign policy decisions. Especially when American military men and women will be deployed and their lives are threatened. If the American people perceive the decision by the Government does not conform to our values as a nation, regardless of the positive influence or humanitarian nature of the mission, the media will begin to withdraw their support for the mission. With the loss of the international press, comes the loss of our ability to conduct strategic communications. Case in point is present day Iraq. Electrical

⁶¹ Terror Free Tomorrow, “2006 Poll: Humanitarian Relief Sustains Change in Muslim Public Opinion”, (Washington DC, JAN 2006); available on the internet at <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=82>

output in September of 2006 was 1000 megawatts more than was produced in January 2003. New water projects added potable water to approximately 1 million additional people in 2006, and the U.S. is financing a new national water master plan for Iraq which, once complete, will guide water resource development in Iraq for the next three decades. Internet and cell phone infrastructure, sales and usage has sky-rocketed allowing people to communicate much easier than under the previous regime. Yet none of these wonderful achievements has been able to effect the negative global perception of the United States.⁶²

James L. Tyson, a member of the National Press Club and former journalist for Accuracy in Media and the Council for the Defense of Freedom in Washington D.C., traveled to South Vietnam in 1972 and wrote about that country's progress in agriculture and social welfare reforms. Both, he discovered, were incredible success stories. However, Mr. Tyson was dismayed over the lack of U.S. news coverage in Southeast Asia at the time, and could not understand why the United States had abandoned the South Vietnamese people.⁶³ It was clear well before 1972; the U.S. media and the international press viewed the Vietnam War differently than the U.S. Administration. The decision to involve ourselves in a war between two nation-states where thousands of American and Vietnamese lives were killed or injured was viewed as interference in a civil conflict between the Vietnamese people. The American people saw the war as a civil war which did not threaten U.S. security or the American people. Our involvement was believed to not be legitimate. Even though by 1970, 90% of the South's population was under Saigon's control and coalition soldiers could visit and walk through

⁶² Department of Defense, "*Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*", (DOD report to Congress, November 2006); pgs 15-16

⁶³ Matt Schudel, "*James Tyson; Critic of Cold War Media*", (Washington Post, 9 August 2006); pg B5

many villages which had been under Viet Cong control for years without fear, there was no way to change the perceptions of the American people at that point.

During the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive in March 1972, North Vietnamese Army conventional forces attacked into South Vietnam with 125,000 soldiers and hundreds of Russian supplied tanks and howitzers – the South Vietnamese Army destroyed the invaders. General Abe Abrams was quoted as saying, “*by God, the South Vietnamese can hack it!*”⁶⁴ Yet none of this made any difference, the American people had already made up their minds and there was nothing more that could be done to change their perceptions. The South Vietnamese Government fell to the North in 1975, after most US military aid and all forces had been withdrawn.

In an editorial submitted to the Washington Post on the 2nd of August, 2006 by Major General Bill McCoy, Commanding General for the Gulf Region Division for Reconstruction Operations in Iraq, he writes in his OP ED article “*Why Will they not tell You the Truth?*”. MG McCoy states,

“the United States has invested 20 billion dollars into Iraq’s reconstruction... Today we are focusing on the completion of 3,700 projects... and nearly three-quarters of Iraq gets twice as much electricity today as they did before the war.”

Yet virtually none of this is reported to the American people or the global community.

In both examples, the Administration developed credibility problems with the media as the wars progressed, but not initially. In the beginning of most conflicts, history shows the media tends to report along the lines of what the Administration presents. The media almost sees it as their duty not to challenge the Administration at that point

⁶⁴ Max Boot, “*The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*”, (Basic Books, reprint edition 27 May 2003); pgs 311-312

because they themselves don't have all the facts. For the most part, the media does not have any opinion at that point. When Dan Rather was pressed by Larry King why he took such a pro-war stance at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, he stated:

*“Look, I am an American. I never tried to kid anybody that I'm some internationalist or something. And when my country is at war, I want my country to win... Now, I can't and don't argue that that is coverage without a prejudice. About that I am prejudice.”*⁶⁵

In a survey conducted in September 2003, 71% of the American people believed the Bush Administration implied that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was involved in the September 11th attacks. The evidence to date does not support this presumption. As in Vietnam, the current Administration has a credibility problem. Regardless of whatever good the Armed Forces of the United States is doing in Iraq today – there is no public affairs or public diplomacy campaign that can sway U.S. or international public opinion to turn public perceptions to begin supporting security operations inside Iraq.

“Winning hearts and minds” and the Ability to Influence

In a report to Congress dated November 2006 from the Department of Defense, specific indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq were addressed. The report states: a) Crude oil production is at 2.3 million barrels per day (mbpd), a 7.5% increase from six months prior but slightly under the target level of 2.5 mbpd. Oil revenues improved and exceeded annual targets by \$1.7

⁶⁵ Steven Jull, Clay Ramsay, Even Lewis, “*Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War*”, (Political Science Quarterly, Volume 118, No 4, 2003-04); pgs 592-593

billion through the end of October;⁶⁶ b) Power generation in Iraq is producing on average 12.2 hours of electricity per day nationwide. This represents a 2% increase over the past six months. However the estimated demand for electricity has almost doubled since January of 2003 which continues to put a strain on the power industry;⁶⁷ c) New water projects have increased the supply of potable water by 35% since May 2006.⁶⁸ This represents an increase of 1 million additional people receiving water. The agriculture sector uses approximately 90% of the water consumed, but there is tremendous potential to improve the efficiency of water use. To maximize water use, the U.S. Government has funded a new national water master plan for Iraq. Once completed, it will guide water resource development for the next three decades;⁶⁹ d) Unemployment in Iraq is estimated between 13% and 18%, but the Department of Defense is engaged in efforts to increase employment opportunities. The Transformation Agency is engaged in putting more U.S. contracts in the hands of capable Iraqi contractors as well as identifying factories that could reopen quickly in order to employ, potentially, thousands of Iraqi people. The Agency also has engaged executives of major U.S. corporations to encourage them to do business with Iraqi companies. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also been active within Iraq and has been well received. USAID's efforts to create jobs continue to progress, specifically with their Community Stabilization Program, Community Action Program, and Agribusiness programs. Yet more efforts in these areas must be done.

⁶⁶ Department of Defense report to Congress, "*Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*", (IAW DOD Appropriations Act 2007, Section 9010, Public Law 109-289); pgs 13-14

⁶⁷ Ibid, pg 15

⁶⁸ Ibid, pg 2

⁶⁹ Ibid, pg 16

In regards to the security environment within Iraq, as of November 2006, 104 Iraqi Army Combat Battalions, 2 Special Operations Battalions, and 6 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions are conducting operations at varying levels. Take into consideration both police and army units, there are 322,600 trained and equipped Iraqi security forces conducting operations within Iraq. And by the end of 2006, Iraq will have taken control of security operations in three provinces – the Dahuk, Irbil and Sulamaniya provinces.⁷⁰

When you take into consideration the accomplishments outlined above, and the support from a wide variety of U.S. combat units in regards to conducting humanitarian operations, medical training and assistance to the poor and sick, veterinary assistance to the livestock of farmers, as well as working with local governments to provide for the needs of the people in reconstruction operations, the reaction of the Iraqi people has been discouraging.

Over the past three months, attacks increased by 22% with coalition forces receiving 68% of all attacks.⁷¹ In polls conducted for World Public Opinion by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland in January 2007, a substantial portion of Iraqis support attacks on U.S. led forces, but not attacks on Iraqi Government security forces or Iraqi civilians. Overall, 47% of those polled say they approved of attacks on U.S. led forces (*broken down by ethnic groups: 16% Kurdish approve with only 8% approving strongly; 41% Shia approve but only 9% approve strongly; and 88% Sunni approve and 77% approve strongly*).⁷² Of note amongst the

⁷⁰ Ibid, pg 3

⁷¹ Ibid, pg 3

⁷² Program on International Policy Attitudes, “*Iraqi Public wants timetable for US Withdrawal, but thinks US plans permanent bases in Iraq*”, (World Public Opinion is a joint program at the Center for

Shia who approve of attacks against U.S. forces, a majority do not favor an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. However, this same majority believe the U.S. plans to establish permanent bases within Iraq. Perhaps the attacks are meant to maintain pressure on U.S. military forces that all must withdraw when the Iraqi Government is capable of providing security. Either way, American forces are being attacked and over three thousand servicemen and women have been killed while military forces are attempting to protect the same people who are attempting to kill them. One final interesting note from the poll, of the 35% (overall) of the Iraqi people who favor a U.S. withdrawal in the next six months, only 2% of these people responded “*I do not like the way U.S. forces have treated Iraqi civilians*”.⁷³ Clearly, this indicates that U.S. military forces treat the Iraqi people with respect and dignity. Yet it appears that the extraordinary efforts put forth in reconstruction and humanitarian operations have not won the support of the people. In comparison, when the Program on International Policy and Attitudes for World Public Opinion conducted surveys in Afghanistan in December 2005, an overwhelming (66%) percent of the Afghanistan people supported NATO expanding their military operations beyond Kabul. In fact, in every poll conducted in Afghanistan since the U.S. invaded and removed the Taliban Regime in 2001, the response by the people and overall feeling about the direction of the government has been positive. Clearly the decision to invade Afghanistan, and the ongoing stability and security operations, has met with the approval of the Afghan people and the international community. That is not the case with the United States decision to invade Iraq and our current stability and security operations in that country.

International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and the Center on Policy Attitudes, Washington DC, 31 JAN 2006); available from the internet at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org>

⁷³ Ibid, available from the internet at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org>

Assessment

Joint counter-insurgency doctrine discusses the necessity to win the trust of the local people by providing security and a means for them to support their families. Once established, this trust will lead to support for U.S. and local government forces on the ground, allowing friendly forces to capture or kill insurgent forces. Once the people perceive the insurgents are counter to their needs and livelihood and that the government is capable of providing for them, they will work with the coalition forces to eliminate the insurgency.

Yet, it appears this strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the people is not the panacea problem solver. There is a national strategic element at play, as well, that will affect a Combatant Commander's ability to influence the population in a conflict area of operations. If the strategic level decision is wrong, the ability to use effective Strategic Communications to influence the international community to support that decision won't work.

Strategic Communications (SC) is defined by the Department of Defense as,

“the focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other instruments of national power”.

Combatant Commanders include Strategic Communication (SC) components in their contingency plans and operations.⁷⁴ Strategic Communications must be executed in coordination with the State Department, the Embassy's within the region for which the affected message is targeted, and our friends and allies in the international community. However, our words won't matter much if our actions do not match.

⁷⁴ The United States Joint Staff, *“Joint Operation Planning”*, (Joint Publication 5-0, “X” Month 2006), page xii

The U.S. leadership presented evidence of Al Qaeda terrorist training camps operating inside of Iraq, and that Iraq was attempting to build weapons of mass destruction. Neither of these two allegations has proven to be true, and the American people and international community have become skeptical of our involvement in Iraq to begin with. Many in Iraq today believe the U.S. want to remain forever, and that we want to build bases there, and that we want to control their oil.⁷⁵ Thus the credibility of U.S. forces is always questioned, and our actions are always viewed as suspicious. With the lack of a moral reasoning for conducting combat operations into Iraq to remove the government, our ability to conduct influence operations to convince people of the goodness of our efforts is limited.

Positive actions on the ground can gain local support to an extent, but the negative actions of the soldier in the same area of operations will only amplify our illegitimate reason for being there in the first place. As a result, the American soldier on the ground in the occupied country becomes the recipient of anger against a U.S. foreign policy that is perceived as illegitimate or dishonest. The cost of a bad policy decision comes in the loss of lives of American servicemen and women. Perhaps it is best that input from senior military leaders is available and sought prior to deciding on the use of military force to solve an international problem.

⁷⁵ Ambassador William Rugh, “*Building U.S. – Muslim Understanding and Dialog: Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds*”, (Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington DC, 16 March 2005); available on the internet at (<http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/43544.htm>)

Chapter 5. Conclusion

“Having been a field officer in the Foreign Service for 30 years, is that most of the real work, the day-to-day work of public diplomacy, is done in embassies abroad by public affairs officers, cultural affairs officers, information officers and the Foreign National staff who work with them, and of course Ambassadors and DCMs and Political Officers. Every day they must answer questions from people like yourselves about American policy, about American society, about American culture. And in answering those questions and trying to present a fair and balanced picture of America, which is the task of public diplomacy, they are doing public diplomacy every single day. Public Diplomacy is not just speeches by the President or press conferences... important as they are, but tailored discussions and exchanges and dialogue between Americans on the one hand and foreign audiences on the other” “A good public diplomacy explains to the world that we are interested in listening as well as talking. A public diplomacy program, to be effective, has to be a two-way street and a dialogue.”⁷⁶

Ambassador William Rugh (retired), Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C. March 16th, 2005

From a historical perspective of the United States Information Agency, the agency was established to influence both the American people (indirectly) and the international community (directly). As it evolved over time, it also provided another necessary function. It listened to the foreign audiences it was trying to influence and in doing so, the Agency developed a feedback mechanism that went directly to the President of the United States. We have cited many examples in previous chapters already of how USIA executed this function. Today, leaders in our Government receive input from Department of State officials but that analytical and intellectual analysis has been diluted.

The beauty of a separate Information Agency from our histories past was it provided a tight link that had been established between Public Affairs in the field and in the headquarters in Washington D.C. that focused solely on assessing public perceptions and opinions. Today, the Public Affairs Officer anywhere reports only to the ambassador, serving only one master. Under the old construct of USIA, Public Affairs

⁷⁶ Ambassador William Rugh, *“Building U.S. – Muslim Understanding and Dialog: Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds”*, (Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington DC, 16 March 2005); available on the internet at (<http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/43544.htm>)

Officers served two masters, which were the ambassador and the director of USIA back in Washington, D.C. The Agency provided the funding, guidance, staffing, and if necessary, clear command and control support from Washington D.C. Today there is no link between Public Affairs Officers in the field and Washington D.C.⁷⁷ Transmitted today to the Secretary of State is whatever the ambassador wants to go forward. In effect, he becomes a chokepoint for information sharing and analytical assessment. Unknowing to any branch of office at the time, the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 would show the loss of this critical Agency very well.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created a unique situation that many did not see happening, the involvement of Combatant Commanders in the arena of international relations. With a chain of command that links the Combatant Commander to the Secretary of Defense and the President, and with a corresponding geographic area of responsibility for security and assistance, Combatant Commanders developed relationships with civilian and military leaders in their theater of operations. Removed from the politics of Washington D.C. and each Commander with over 35 years of service to the nation with operations in countries around the world, Combatant Commanders have evolved into experts in the area of international relations. Certainly no one looks to the military – nor should they – for the development of foreign policy; however the Combatant Commander and his staff are the link that provides what USIA provided prior to its demise. The primary difference, Combatant Commanders have resources to work around bad policy decisions by the Executive Branch and much more authority and clout to effect policy changes. U.S. Ambassadors deal one on one with the country they are assigned. Combatant Commanders deal with that country and every other country in

⁷⁷ Ibid, available on the internet at (<http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/43544.htm>)

their theater of operations, and potentially outside influences as well. Combatant Commanders have become a valuable source of input when creating policy, but often their input is not sought or heeded.

Any policy has to have the support of the people for whom it was intended, and the coordinating strategic message that will accompany that policy will not even receive a second look, much less a second thought, if the message we are attempting to communicate does not meet the perceptions of the people it is meant to communicate with. To understand what people, other than American people, believe is happening or not happening in their part of the world is absolutely essential to the effectiveness of policy making. Yet we do not know because we have lost the mechanism to listen.

USIA provided a separate, analytical analysis that was separate from the Department of State and reported to the leadership of the U.S. Government, covering a wide range of thoughts and topics. The Agency received its guidance and direction from the President, and provided intellectual insights that could not be altered by an ambassador or any other Cabinet member. It was an unbiased assessment that the President himself could use as a tool for formulating guidance to his Cabinet and Staff. It was in essence, the Information Power of Government as a stand alone entity.

The incredible genius of this organization and in the assessments it provided can be seen as the sole reason for its call to existence in the first place. It was put in place to counter a communist propaganda threat to our nation. The Agency's sole purpose from the beginning was based on communicating American values and principles to the international community. In so using these values, the Agency provided the analytical basis for determining what was happening in conflict areas around the world, and assisted

in formulating policy and messages to the region. It was a way for policy makers to develop coherent policies that were in line with U.S. interests, and the interests of the people in the affected area. The Agency was the President's personal think tank on Information Operations. It worked to ensure that our deeds and our words were consistent, and that is what the American people expected from their government. The U.S. has been the light and beacon for the world to emulate. The Agency did everything possible to ensure it stayed that way. The ability to influence men's minds was working in our favor.

Recommendation

Foreign Policy-making must start with security. The survival of the nation is the first responsibility of the government. This must not be compromised. When the survival of a nation is threatened, many will resort to less than perfect solutions. Second, Security is a means and not an end. The purpose of security is to protect the values of our nation. And since our security is not always at stake, we must seize the morale high-ground at every opportunity. Finally, American values are the link between the American people and their government. We live in a democracy, and the execution of foreign policy is made possible only with public support, which is also the foundation of our partnerships with other democracies and freedom seeking people everywhere.

Elements of a national power are Diplomatic Power, Informational Power, Military Power, and Economic Power. This is often referred to as the DIME. In the current organizational structure of the United States Government, one Executive Department is responsible for two constructs of U.S. National Power, the Department of

State. The State Department is responsible for developing and executing policies that support Diplomatic and Informational Power.

Diplomatic Power, as defined by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), is the ability to influence the international community through Bi-Lateral and Multi-Lateral agreements, negotiations, and engagement. The Diplomatic element is conducted with foreign nations, the United Nations, and also Non-Governmental and International Organizations. The United States Department of State is the lead executive department in diplomatic policy making.⁷⁸ Not having a clear definition of Informational Power at the strategic level, this paper defines it as the United States Government processes and efforts to engage with and understand global audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to the advancement of human rights through the use of informational, educational, and cultural themes, programs, and actions based on our founding fathers principle that ‘all men are created equal’.

As a result of a lack of U.S. Governmental agency to listen, engage, analyze and provided feedback to the Executive Branch of Government on international relation issues, the following administrative and governmental structural changes are recommended.

Establish the **U.S. Department of Information and Culture** as a primary U.S. Cabinet position which consists of the following subordinate agencies:

- Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This office takes on the primary responsibility of hosting national and

⁷⁸ Naval Postgraduate School, “*Strategic Insights – All Elements of National Power: Re-organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for the Long War*”, (Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)), available on internet <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Jul/millsJul06.asp>

international forums on solutions to modern day problems with regard to race, religion, culture, economics, and geography, and how American values assist or detract in the problem. This is the Executive Branch's 'think tank', the results of which are used in policy development within the Department of State.

- Office of International Information Programs. The Office of International Information Programs is the principal international strategic communications entity for the foreign affairs community. It informs and engages international audiences about U.S. policy and society. It is a leader in developing and implementing public diplomacy strategies through quality programs and cutting-edge technologies.
- Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. This office sponsors international students attending Universities inside the United States. It also works with the international community to host cultural events in both countries in order to foster continued communication and engagement activities.
- The Broadcasting Board of Governors. All news print, radio and television is under the direction of the Board of Governors. Using western and non-western correspondents, reporters, editors, and writers to perform these functions and reduce dependency on American or western reporters only.⁷⁹
- Public Diplomacy Country Teams. These officers are posted in U.S. Embassies and are both American citizens and natives of the country where they are employed. They serve as press spoke-persons to the indigenous country, and assist the U.S. Ambassador in providing information analysis among public

⁷⁹ John Alterman, "*The Effect of the U.S. Media Messages on the World*", (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2002) Summary of Session Two available on the internet at <http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/>

perceptions and opinions as necessary. They also provide the link from Washington D.C. to the Department of Information and Culture on valuable insights and understanding necessary to the National Command Authority for policy development⁸⁰

- U.S. Military Attaches. These senior military officers act as liaison officers who report to the regional Combatant Commanders in that theater of operations. Their purpose is to share information between the Combatant Commander and the U.S. Ambassador in order to provide policy development and strategic communication recommendations to the Director.

Currently, a critical vulnerability at the Strategic level of the United States Government is the inability to formulate foreign policies that garner international and regional collaboration for ongoing and future operations in the fight against militant extremists, and the promotion of American values. The Department of State's failure to protect this critical vulnerability has prevented the United States from continuing to lead the global community as the champion of liberty and beacon of peace. It is time Congress acts and creates a separate structure for the development and execution of Informational power.

⁸⁰ *Department of State Organization*, (U.S. Department of State); available on the internet at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm>

Bibliography:

Ambrose, Stephen E., *“Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938”*, Third Edition, Pelican Books, Middlesex England, 1983

Kissinger, Henry A., *American Foreign Policy*”, Third Edition, WW Norton & Company, New York & London, 1977

Abdul-Rahim, Salim Yousef, *“American Messages to the Arabs: A Study of the Arabic Programs of the USICA”*, The American University, London England, 1980

Green, Fitzhugh, *“American Propaganda Abroad”*, Hippocrene Books, INC, NY, 1988

Alan Simpson, *“President Reagan & Global Political Television”*, COMLINKS MAG, 8 NOV 2006; available from the internet at www.comlinks.com

Lee Edwards, *“Ash Heap of History: President Reason’s Westminster Address 20 years later”*, The Heritage Foundation, 3 June 2002

Bob Heart Blog, *“Bill Clinton and the Historic Handshake”*, Bob Heart, 13 September 1993; available from the internet at <http://www.bill-clinton-peace.blogspot.com/>

“Consolidated State Failure Events, 1955-2005”, Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 2005; available from the internet at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitftabl.htm>

Avruch, Narel, & Siegel, *“Information Campaigns for Peace Operations”*; C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, Library of Congress, February 2000

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CHAIRMEN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND FOREIGN RELATIONS; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 30 DEC 1998; available from the internet at <http://library.whitehouse.gov/PressReleases-plain.cgi>

Senate Report 104-095 – Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995

Fenner, Louise, *“Young International Students eye U.S. Freedoms in Action”*, Bureau of International Information Programs, Department of State, NOV 2006; available from the internet at <http://usinfo.state.gov>

Linda Robinson, *“The Propaganda War”*, US News and World Reports, 29 May 2006; available from the internet at <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060529/29propaganda.htm>

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *“Report of the Defense Board Task Force on Strategic Communications”*, Defense Science Board, September 2004

Mason, Alpheus Thomas, *“Free Government in the Making”*, Oxford University Press, 1965

Darely, William M., *“War, Policy, Public Support, and the Media”*, Parameters, Summer 2005

Program on International Policy Attitudes, *“Majority of Iraqis Endorse Election and Show Optimism”*, World Public Opinion is a joint program at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and the Center on Policy Attitudes, Washington DC, 31 JAN 2006; available from the internet at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org>

Kull, Steven, and Ramsay, Clay, and Lewis, Even, *“Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War”*, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 118, Number 4, 2003-04

Snow, Nancy E., *“United States Information Agency”*, The Progressive Response, Volume 1, #10, July 29th, 1997. The Foreign Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Inter-hemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies.

Zunes, Stephen, *“The US Invasion of Grenada: A Twenty-Year Retrospective – Empire?”*, Global Policy Forum, New York, New York, USA, October 2003

Bradford, John F., *“The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform”*, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies Student Organization, Volume 5, #2, Fall 2004

McClintock, Michael, *“Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990”*, Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc., 1992.

Priest, Dana, *“A Four-Star Foreign Policy?”*, Washington Post, 28 September 2000 (9 pages)

Priest, Dana, *“An Engagement in 10 Time Zones”*, Washington Post, 29 September 2000 (7 pages)

Priest, Dana, *“Standing Up to Congress and State”*, Washington Post, 30 September 2000 (7 pages)

Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “*Power in the Global Information Age – From Realism to Globalization*”, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Oxon, 2004

Moseley, Alexander, “*Just War Theory*”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006; available on the internet at <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/j/justwar.htm>

Hehir, Rev J. Bryan, “*A Just War? Asking the Age Old Question about the Pursuit of Terrorism*”, NPR, January 25th 2002; available on the internet at <http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/jan/justwar/020125.justwar.html>

Cialdini, Dr. Robert, “*Influence – How and why people agree to things*”, William Morrow & Co. Inc, NY 1984

U.S Agency for International Development, “*Tsunami Assistance, One Year later*”, U.S. State Department, Washington D.C. December 2005; available on the internet at <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/58392.htm>

Terror Free Tomorrow, “*2006 Poll: Humanitarian Relief Sustains Change in Muslim Public Opinion*”, Washington DC, JAN 2006; available on the internet at <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=82>

Schudel, Matt, “*James Tyson; Critic of Cold War Media*”, Washington Post, 9 August 2006

Boot, Max, “*The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*”, Basic Books, reprint edition 27 May 2003

Program on International Policy Attitudes, “*Iraqi Public wants timetable for US Withdrawal, but thinks US plans permanent bases in Iraq*”, World Public Opinion is a joint program at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and the Center on Policy Attitudes, Washington DC, 31 JAN 2006; available from the internet at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org>

Program on International Policy Attitudes, “*Iraqi Public wants timetable for US Withdrawal, but thinks US plans permanent bases in Iraq*”, World Public Opinion is a joint program at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and the Center on Policy Attitudes, Washington DC, 26 JAN 2006; available from the internet at <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org>

Righ, Ambassador William, “*Building U.S. – Muslim Understanding and Dialog: Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds*”, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington DC, 16 March 2005; available on the internet at <http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/43544.htm>

Naval Postgraduate School, “*Strategic Insights – All Elements of National Power: Re-organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for the Long War*”, Center for

Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), available on the internet at <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Jul/millsJul06.asp>

Zwiebel, Michael J., “*Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA*”, Military Review MAG, NOV-DEC Issue 2006

Alterman, John, “*The Effect of the U.S. Media Messages on the World*”, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2002; Summary of Session Two available on the internet at <http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/>

Department of State Organization, U.S. Department of State; available on the internet at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm>

Vita:

LTC Bob Roth graduated from Northern Kentucky University with a degree in International Relations, and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Armor in May, 1985. LTC Roth's first assignment was with the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from 1985 until 1988, where he served as a Tank Platoon leader, Cavalry Troop Executive Officer, Squadron Border Officer, and S1 along the East-West German Inter-zonal Border. After completing the Armor Captain's Career Course, LTC Roth was assigned to the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment stationed at Fort Stewart, GA. There, he performed duties as an Assistant Battalion S3, Tank Company Commander, and Headquarters Company Commander. In August, 1990, as a Tank Company Commander, LTC Roth deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Immediately following company command, LTC Roth was reassigned to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. There he performed duties as a Scout Platoon, Cavalry Troop and Battalion TOC Observer Controller. Following graduation from the Command and General Staff College in June 1998, LTC Roth was assigned duties in Germany as an Armor Battalion S3 with the 2nd Battalion, 63rd Armor Regiment, as an Infantry Battalion Executive Officer with the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, and as the Brigade S3 with the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. In June of 2003, LTC Roth deployed to Iraq and assumed command of the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment outside of Fallujah. LTC Roth redeployed the Battalion back to Fort Stewart and spent the next 18 months training and reorganizing the Armor Battalion into a Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) consisting of seven companies and 932 soldiers. In January 2005, LTC Roth and 4-64 AR returned to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06, where LTC Roth conducted stability and support operations in Baghdad. LTC Roth is attending the Joint Advanced War Fighter School in Norfolk, Virginia and will graduate in June 2007.

Awards include: the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star (third award), the Meritorious Service Medal (5th Award), the Combat Action Badge Award, the Parachute Badge, and is a recipient of the MacArthur Leadership Award.