

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-10-2006		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Interagency Cooperation: It's as Hard as You Think It Is				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lester Moore CAPT/USN Paper Advisor (if Any): N/A				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The Department of State has been charged with leading the interagency process for the U.S., including conducting stability and reconstruction operations harmonized with any planned or ongoing military operations. However, neither the State Department, nor national leadership has implemented the direction from the President leaving it to the military commanders. The regional commanders have accepted this responsibility and are driving the problem through JIACGs and interagency executive committees. As the military has learned to integrate their efforts, so too must the U.S. government learn to integrate the talents and capabilities of each agency. JIACGs are leading the way, but they are not the long term solution. This paper will illustrate the requirements for interagency cooperation, explore some of the ongoing work in this area, point out the gaps which remain, and develop possible solutions for the way ahead.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Interagency, JIACG					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			Chairman, JMO Dept
				22	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

Interagency Cooperation: It's As Hard As You Think It Is

by

Lester Moore

CAPT, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

23 October 2006
(Date of submission of paper)

Abstract

Interagency Cooperation: It's as Hard as You Think It Is

The Department of State has been charged with leading the interagency process for the U.S., including conducting stability and reconstruction operations harmonized with any planned or ongoing military operations. However, neither the State Department, nor national leadership has implemented the direction from the President, leaving it to the military commanders. The regional commanders have accepted this responsibility and are driving the problem through JIACGs and interagency executive committees.

As the military has learned to integrate their efforts, so too must the U.S. government learn to integrate the talents and capabilities of each agency. JIACGs are leading the way, but they are not the long term solution. This paper will illustrate the requirements for interagency cooperation, explore some of the ongoing work in this area, point out the remaining gaps, and develop possible solutions for the way ahead.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The First Tentative Steps in Interagency Cooperation	1
Characteristics of Functional Interagency Cooperation	6
The Impediments to Interagency Cooperation	8
Interagency Cooperation in the Real World: a Way Ahead	13
Conclusion	16
Bibliography	19

Introduction

Clausewitz famously asserted, “War is..., a continuation of political activity by other means.”¹ Some have claimed the opposite view—politics is a continuation of war by other means. Whichever view is adopted, they both have one thing in common: a stove piped separation of state and defense department missions. A former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs said, “Rather than viewing diplomacy and force as opposing ends of the spectrum of national policy—with one used when the other fails—it is important to recognize that each must seamlessly support the other.”² The realization is dawning that stove piping leads to seams and seams can be exploited by the enemy. Even worse, stove pipes between agencies can prevent a smooth transition to a subsequent operational phase leading, perhaps, to a worse situation than was present at the beginning.

The coordination of the Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) is not the extent of the mutual support required. The agencies involved in national or homeland security cannot afford to work in isolation. Each agency provides expertise in limited areas, which combined with the others, achieves the goals of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This paper will illustrate the requirements for interagency cooperation, explore some of the ongoing work in this area, point out the remaining gaps, and develop possible solutions for the way ahead.

The First Tentative Steps in Interagency Cooperation

Interagency cooperation has long been recognized as an idea whose time has come.

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87

² Patrick N. Kelleher, “Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 32 (Autumn 2002): 110.

According to a Joint Staff memorandum, “in the past it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental planning” for two reasons: other agencies of the US government do not understand “systematic planning procedures,” and each agency has its own approach to solving problems. The State Department, for example, values flexibility and its ability to respond to daily changes in a situation more than it values planning, while the CIA is reluctant to coordinate for security reasons and the former US Information Agency held Defense and the CIA at arm’s length for fear that it would be seen as a mere dispenser of propaganda. If we are to have interagency coordination, the memorandum warns, “These inhibitions of other governmental agencies must in some way be overcome.”

...The memorandum just quoted was written in 1961.³

After the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the defense establishment did not find itself idle, but busier than ever with operations which would have been unthinkable a few years earlier. Regional commanders found themselves involved in peacekeeping, nation building, and humanitarian operations instead of classic force on force against a state military. These missions, and others, defy traditional definitions for when military force should be brought to bear and have been lumped together as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).⁴

The shift in mission was a result of several factors. These included the fallout from the Soviet Union’s breakup, the time and resources now available to work on problems that were too minor during the cold war, the commanders have the budget and resources, and they have the network of contacts with regional political and military leaders built to support cold war coalitions in their theaters. The regional commanders did not tear these missions “other than war” from other agencies, they reluctantly accepted them to fill the void. Responding to

³ David Tucker, “The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs Ignorance and Sloth?,” *Parameters* 33 no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 66.

⁴ Encompasses concepts from “small wars” (which could be anything from pure military operations on a limited scale to armed clashes), to peacekeeping, nation building, reconstruction, and humanitarian intervention. MOOTW also covers any instance where the military might be called in lieu of or in addition to a more traditional agency—either because the military has related expertise, or the military’s ability to bring significant resources to bear.

these new missions emphasizing nation building and peacekeeping “pushed the commanders into expanded diplomatic and political roles.”⁵

The regional commanders found themselves making decisions and setting policy in areas far removed from their military training.⁶ Their initial efforts were implemented as expected—using DOD personnel as their agents in political reform.

While most operations in the European, Pacific, and Central Commands are closely related to traditional military actions, Southern Command is in a unique situation. There, the regional commander faces hostility from government leaders still resentful of past U.S. policies and the U.S. is not involved in any ongoing military actions. Still, Southern Command was not idle but actively sought ways to use its influence to stabilize democratic governments. “There’s enough backsliding to warrant U.S. military attention,”⁷ in the words of SOUTHCOM.

The Southern Command seized on the counternarcotics program as the wedge with which to crack open the doors of South American countries to U.S. influence. Southern Command took the lead on a U.S. funded program to help Columbia regain territory under control of rebels and drug traffickers. By using U.S. military assistance in counternarcotics as the draw, SOUTHCOM gained influence in South America, sometimes above that wielded

⁵Dana Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy? U.S. Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy,” *Washington Post*, 28 September 2000, final ed; A01.

⁶ “When the Pakistani army staged a coup last October, the Clinton administration sent a stern protest to the new, self-appointed ruler, Army Gen. Pervez Musharraf. A nuclear-capable, unstable nation had plunged into fresh turmoil, and Washington waited anxiously: How would Musharraf respond?”

When the general finally placed his call, it was not to President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen or the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad. Instead, Musharraf telephoned Marine Corps Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who happened to be sitting with Cohen at an airfield in Egypt.

“Tony” Musharraf began, “I want to tell you what I’m doing...” (Priest, A01)

⁷ Priest, A01.

by the State Department.⁸ SOUTHCOM is using a problem traditionally assigned to law enforcement as the basis for U.S. military operations. This is indicative of many missions under the MOOTW umbrella—all of which require expertise and resources for missions far outside the U.S. military’s traditional capabilities.

Regional commanders quickly discovered these gaps between their missions on the one hand and their capabilities and resources on the other. They turned to other U.S. government agencies for advice. As that proved useful but limited, they began building ad hoc interagency teams to support their efforts in solving specific problems. Still, in the words of General Zinni, “The system is badly broken. We use chewing gum and bailing wire to keep it together.”⁹

Because of the hard work and sincere efforts of people involved in all levels of the government, interagency groups do exist in an advisory capacity. The problem is breaking down the barriers to authority. As described by Matthew Bogdanos, “Task forces and working groups designed to facilitate interagency coordination have existed for years, but they were usually ad hoc, limited in authority¹⁰, narrow in scope, and viewed with suspicion by most governmental entities, including the Department of Defense (DOD). As a result, such organizations have had difficulty breaking down barriers and penetrating information stovepipes.”¹¹ However, much to the regional commanders’ credit, when they realized the task was beyond their abilities, or beyond collaboration with any single agency, they

⁸ “Wilhelm scotched a State Department plan to create as many as 15 counterdrug Colombian battalions and argued for three larger, more efficient units. At his insistence, the battalions will fit an American model, with scouts, mortars and forward support, psychological staff and intelligence operations.” Dana Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy? U.S. Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy,” *Washington Post*, 28 September 2000, final ed; pA01.

⁹ Priest, A01.

¹⁰ “Limited in authority” is putting this kindly. These interagency groups were usually limited to an advisory role

¹¹ Bogdanos, 11.

requested permission to set up interagency coordinating cells. The Secretary of Defense granted authority to coordinate directly with the necessary agencies.

An example of how this process worked for a single type of operation: CENTCOM developed an intelligence-gathering fusion center for counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The Joint Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism (JIATF-CT) members were from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Diplomatic Security Service, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Human Intelligence Service, the New York Joint Terrorism Taskforce, and from the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State.¹² JIATF-CT made great progress because of its ability to fuse information from disparate sources and the members' willingness to bring their agencies' assets to the mission. On a visit to Afghanistan to view first hand the workings of this group, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers noted, "this is exactly what the Secretary and I had in mind."¹³ As these types of task forces proved their worth, they began to move from specific tasks to a more general and comprehensive advisory group. The Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) was born.

The JIACG construct is new. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is still wrestling with the doctrine for this group. They are incorporating lessons learned, innovations, and the desires of the regional commanders into a comprehensive document. As a result, each revision to the prototype JIACG doctrine is already somewhat out of date before it can be published. This is a consequence of dealing with a fast moving issue. To its credit, JFCOM is not slowing down JIACG development so the paperwork can catch up. On the contrary, JFCOM is sponsoring and actively engaged in JIACG experiments to improve the process.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

JFCOM staff is feeding back results of their experiments and analysis to the regional commanders.

The regional commanders are not waiting on JFCOM, either. They are all actively shifting their JIACGs to better fit their command responsibilities, incorporating their own lessons, and reaching out to other agencies. The military has found counterinsurgency is an especially difficult mission if fought only through traditional force application. As discussed recently in the Marine Corps Gazette, “In a counterinsurgency, though, military power is often used in a supporting role. The peace is actually won through a combination of economic, political, and cultural instruments of power. Military force is generally used to set the conditions for winning the peace.”¹⁴ Getting those economic, political, and cultural instruments to the fight is now a key motivation for the regional commander.

In its present form as an advisory panel to the regional commander, the JIACG is not necessarily the correct tool for all interagency operations. Who the JIACG works for gives it a decidedly military action bias. That MOOTW is so broadly defined means the JIACG will be involved in operations traditionally in the realm of other U.S. government departments, but that is an accident of definition rather than a well analyzed policy.

Meanwhile, the regional commanders are pushing forward with the JIACGs—gaining experience and knowledge which will stand in good stead if the process is aligned throughout the Executive Branch.

Characteristics of Functional Interagency Cooperation

¹⁴ David E. Cooper, “An Organizational Model for Marines Fighting an Insurgency,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 89 no. 6 (2005): 49

Though the actual makeup and mission of JIACGs are customized by each regional commander to suit his requirements, there are aspects of the better functioning JIACGs which are common. These characteristics are:

- Providing interagency access to other command or agency planning groups. While interagency cooperation is the goal, each agency involved has planning groups which develop their agency's sequences of action for the overall plan. Allowing the interagency group members access to these other agency planning cells ensures the agencies are involved from the first hint of a required action, through plan development, then through execution. Agency members can go back to their headquarters and apprise them of what was under consideration, then report back to the planning group with confirmation or modification for their agency's proposed action. A lot of trust goes into this step and if there is one fundamental characteristic of successful interagency cooperation, it is this one.
- Information sharing. Once the agencies are comfortable with allowing each other to participate in planning, getting their information shared around the group is the next step. Granting other agencies' access to materials runs up against security issues, agency culture, and just plain reluctance to take a chance on information leaving agency control. A related issue, but no less important, is the agencies' inability to share information even when they want to. Incompatible information structures and protocols keeps agency knowledge stove piped.
- Breakdown of agency parochialism: the "Not invented here" syndrome. Agencies learned to champion ideas from other agencies as vigorously as they championed their own. This ensured an objective look at each proposal.

- Know the other agencies' competencies. Not only does the U.S. government have considerable expertise, but state and local agencies do, too. CENTCOM discovered that New York's Joint Terrorism Task Force brought expertise to the field not held in any federal organization. Additionally, the regional commander is not always aware of which agency may have expertise in an area. For example, the U.S. Customs Service has an unparalleled database for illicit-trafficking and terrorist funding.¹⁵ However, the Customs Service was not among the original agencies solicited for a role on the CENTCOM JIACG during counterterrorist operations.

The Impediments to Interagency Cooperation

From the operational to tactical levels, interagency cooperation has been an exceptional force multiplier whenever it has been tried. And it has been tried because the old paradigm of facing a single opponent in a war with unlimited time afterward to develop and implement nation building is fading fast. There is now active effort to begin winning hearts and minds while battles are raging just to prevent defeated forces in one area simply transferring to another and taking up arms again. The U.S. cannot afford to play “Whack-a-Mole” over and over again on the same ground in hopes of wearing our enemies down. The reverse is more likely to happen. Interagency action has been successful at reducing the level of combat required once a military force has moved through an area, allowing those forces to continue to move toward more operational or strategic objectives. Since the evidence is strong that interagency operations are this vital, what prevents interagency cooperation—perhaps even interagency integration—from becoming the norm?

¹⁵ Bogdanos, 11.

The greatest roadblock to developing interagency procedures has been inside the Beltway. At the very top, the President has issued guidance concerning interagency cooperation. The National Security Strategy (NSS) directs the U.S. government to improve “the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responsibilities covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges.”¹⁶ The President has also issued National Security Presidential Directive One (NSPD-1) which states, “The National Security Council [NSC] system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.”¹⁷ The Deputies Committee of the NSC historically has been the senior sub-Cabinet committee charged with consideration of policy issues affecting national security. NSPD-1 confirms this. The directive further charges the Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) with implementing interagency policies.

The process of integrating the agencies slows, then stops at the National Security Council’s Deputies Committee. The Deputies Committee, though urged to issue authoritative interagency policy, has issued only a non-binding memorandum on JIACGs.¹⁸ There are no strategic level guiding directives to agencies requiring their participation in interagency actions. As a result, the Joint Staff guidance on JIACGs prohibits them from tasking non-DOD personnel or altering coordination channels already in place.¹⁹

The NSS describes the mission of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which draws on all agencies of the U.S. government, integrates its

¹⁶ United States of America. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: GPO, March 2006.

¹⁷ “Organization of the National Security Council System”, National Security Presidential Directive 1, Washington, D.C. February 13, 2001 p.2

¹⁸ Bogdanos, 12.

¹⁹ Ibid., 11.

activities with the military, and coordinates efforts with international governments. Those missions are further described in NSPD-44 which tasks the S/CRS with coordinating, “such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”²⁰ Further guidance to the S/CRS in NSPD-44 directs:

- Coordinating the U.S. government response “for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases.”²¹
- Developing “guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine.”²²
- Recommending when “to establish a limited-time PCC-level group to focus on a country or region facing major reconstruction and stabilization challenges.”²³

Though the NSS, NSPD-1, and NSPD-44 give the Secretary of State and the S/CRS the guidance for implementing the interagency process, there has been no policy established at the NSC level reflecting this authority.

The lack of policy is hampering operational level missions, since regional and joint task force commanders are still unable to task other agencies. When cooperation is obtained, the JIACG is a formidable tool. However, the regional commander cannot be assured of

²⁰ “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” National Security Presidential Directive 44, Washington, D.C. (December 7, 2005): 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

continued support—especially as mission focus shifts through conflict phases. Each phase requires renegotiation and assurance of support from all agencies.

Another impediment to interagency action is the lack of a common communication system. A suggestion is to allow agency use of the DOD classified computer network, the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).²⁴ DOD would probably have to fund the installation costs in all agencies, but it would allow agencies to share their information. The difficulty is allowing other agencies access to a DOD system with the attendant problems of restricting access to just the specific classified information applicable to the interagency mission. Other agencies also have concerns about maintaining their information security. These concerns are not insurmountable; they are, however, formidable. There are information technology programs and hardware which can create a trusted information network, but these are expensive and there has been no direction for agencies to move toward incorporating these IT capabilities into their networks.

The advantage to using SIPRNET as the backbone of a trusted interagency communication and collaboration system is the regional commander would not have to install a new communication and internet system in theater. That should be enough to get the regional commanders behind an effort to expand SIPRNET access.

The biggest challenge with using the JIACGs as the interagency integration vehicle is the JIACG is part of the regional commander's staff. That gives DOD the deciding vote over any interagency action—a very uncomfortable concept for any agency worried about the JIACG sponsoring military centric solutions using their agency's resources. This concern leaves the current JIACG operating as an ad hoc team whose participants are there on a voluntary basis and can be withdrawn by their agency whenever things get uncomfortable.

²⁴ Bogdanos, 17.

The JIACG staffs have been successful in persuading agencies to cooperate, but this is personality driven. The JIACGs cannot drive interagency policies, initiate any major interagency proposals, nor prioritize where agencies chose to spend their time and resources.

Even if DOD were to fund collaboration systems; the regional commander give up authority over JIACG decisions; and the NSC were to develop interagency procedures: Congress would have to get involved in passing legislation along the lines of a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency system. This is required because Executive Department agencies operate under different federal codes restricting their actions to certain areas. Congress would have to investigate (or ask the agencies for input) what authorities the agencies would require outside their current scope, then craft and pass that legislation. This is rarely a rapid process. The Secretary of Defense recognizes the need for Congressional action. In a Washington Post story, Bob Woodward quotes a secret memo written by Secretary Rumsfeld:

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation led to greater jointness and interdependence in the Department of Defense among the 4 services, but it has taken 20 years to begin to fully realize its potential. The broader [U.S. government] structure is still in the industrial age and it is not serving us well. It is time to consider a new Hoover Commission to recommend ways to reorganize both the executive and legislative branches, to put us on a more appropriate path for the 21st century. Only a broad, fundamental reorganization is likely to enable federal departments and agencies to function with the speed and agility the times demand.²⁵

Finally, DOD is comfortable operating from the strategic to tactical level. The DOD planning system has been developed over the years to allow planning and execution nearly simultaneously at the operational and tactical levels. Most agencies have neither the requirement nor the ability to match this range. The regional commander might be the most

²⁵ Bob Woodward, "The World According to Rummy" Washington Post Oct 8, 2006: B05.

reluctant one at the interagency table to be a supporting agent for a joint operation where the lead agency has no track record in simultaneous management at all levels.

Interagency Cooperation in the Real World: a Way Ahead

Since DOD is still the U.S. government department with global presence, influence, and the greatest resources, it will continue to be the lead agency for implementing global U.S. policy. Therefore, the responsibility for building interagency coalitions and partnerships will fall to DOD. The work and lessons gleaned from each interagency effort must be preserved. As a symposium on civil-military connections concluded, “There is a history of relearning the requirement for and the modalities of civil-military operations about as often as there is a major change of command or new complex contingency.”²⁶ General Zinni noted at the same conference, “The status quo is [ad hoc] every time.... There needs to be a change.”²⁷

JFCOM is working on that change. Developing a single JIACG Concept of Operations (CONOP) will remove a significant amount of ad hockery²⁸. Still, JFCOM’s current draft CONOP leaves the regional commander the flexibility to mold their JIACGs to suit their theaters.

Other lessons learned from interagency ventures which DOD should incorporate into interagency policies:

- Fund all agency participation on the JIACG. DOD has funded some of the agencies participating in JIACGs which resulted in resentment from those agencies which received

²⁶ Kelleher, 108.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Reliance on temporary solutions rather than on consistent, long-term plans. Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.0.1)*, Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2006. <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=ad+hockery&x=0&y=0> (accessed: October 20, 2006).

no funding.²⁹ Since JIACGs are a DOD initiative and agencies are working within constrained budgets, JIACG funding is a lower priority than the projects for which the agencies are responsible. If DOD believes JIACGs are the interagency tool for the foreseeable future, then DOD needs to fund the participation for all—at least until agency participation is seen as more valuable than other projects and budgets are adjusted to accommodate them; or when participation in interagency groups is mandatory. JFCOM Draft guidance recommends a core interagency team made up of one representative from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Justice, with an additional member from DOS specifically from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).³⁰ DOD must be ready to fund additional members as the JIACG mission dictates. In CENTCOM, the JIACG grew to fifty-four civilian members during operations in Iraq.³¹

- Develop and fund internet and IT protocols to build a trusted network for JIACG use. Work with all agencies in the JIACG to connect their databases with this collaborative information system. As more agencies are brought in for various operations, the connectivity will spread throughout the U.S. government agencies. The agencies will find there is an advantage to remaining connected to gain knowledge and information from others—encouraging them to share as well.
- Create and fund full time positions for military personnel on the JIACG. Currently, the regional commanders are manning their JIACGs from within their own staffs. This is adding a considerable workload to already fully tasked staffs. The JIACG needs its own military staff members. JFCOM’s current prototype Concept of Operations for JIACGs

²⁹ Bogdanos, 14.

³⁰ Prototype Concept of Operations for Full Spectrum Joint Interagency Coordination Group, United States Joint Forces Command, July 2006

³¹ Bogdanos, 14.

recommends six military personnel. Experience in CENTCOM indicates that this number will swell (it reached twenty-eight military members at one point³²) as JIACG operations increase. Bogdanos recommends CENTCOM's JIACG have a minimum of thirty active-duty and eight Reserve positions. Still, he can point to periods of intense interagency activity in which the total number of JIACG members grew to over 100.³³ The empirical evidence indicates the JIACG will become a resource drain on the regional commander's staff if not deliberately manned.

- Regional commander contingency plans must include interagency planning at each phase. The JIACG should be responsible for analyzing each phase of a CONPLAN to determine which agencies should be included, generate MOA's for each of them, and get their commitment for support. This will ensure the transition between phases will have continuity.
- Likewise, DOD must be prompt at examining and agreeing to missions requested by other agencies as they fit DOD resources and constraints. DOD must set the standard for supporting agencies.
- The regional commander must walk a fine line between his mission accomplishment and the goals the country ambassador is pursuing. The JIACG, as a working part of the regional commander's staff may not be the entity with which the ambassador and his country team will want to deal. Some regional commanders have developed an executive team consisting of the deputy commander, the chief of staff, and the Foreign Political Advisor (POLAD) which meets with the ambassador's country team on a regular basis to build trust and a mutual understanding of each other's mission. While adding another

³² Ibid.

³³ Bogdanos, 17.

layer of bureaucracy may seem counterintuitive to progress, that construct has worked as far back as the intervention in Haiti. In a discussion of the Revolution in Military Affairs, David Tucker noted, “Perhaps the major reason this process worked, however, was not that the interagency was allowed to operate as a network but that its hierarchy was reinforced. Another layer, an Executive Committee, was inserted into the interagency bureaucracy.”³⁴ Those executive committees have been successful at coordinating country team and JIACG activities—another force multiplier.

Conclusion

The Department of State has been charged with leading the interagency process for the U.S., integrating international government efforts, as well as specifically tasked with conducting stability and reconstruction operations harmonized with any planned or ongoing military operations. However, neither the State Department, nor national leadership has implemented the direction from the President—leaving it to the military commanders. The regional commanders have accepted this responsibility and are driving the problem through JIACGs and interagency executive committees.

The long-term solution requires several actions. The Congress must analyze the requirement and structure for interagency integration—amending laws to allow each agency to support other departments. The interagency act should also require the agencies to place interagency integration high in priority. As Secretary Rumsfeld said, it has taken the military over twenty years to work through integration. I would imagine integrating agencies which don’t have as common a purpose and tradition as DOD has would be much harder.

³⁴ Tucker, 69.

The State Department needs to develop an interagency integration policy. The groundwork laid by JFCOM and the regional commanders should simplify this task. The key here is to design a process much like the military has already developed with supported and supporting agencies. Which agency is supported would depend on the operation or phase of operation. The State Department may be the lead during early phases of an operation, then Defense, then followed by State or Justice in later phases. Or, the operation may be led by Treasury if the entire nature of the mission is economic stability. Humanitarian efforts may be led by USAID from start to finish. The nature of the mission and the phase determines who is the supported commander and who is supporting. The interagency policy must require all agencies to participate, as well as giving guidelines and funding to allow state and some local agencies to integrate into the effort.

Communication and knowledge sharing will be a major requirement for the interagency structure. The SIPRNET and commercially available collaboration software can jumpstart that effort.

Meanwhile, the regional commanders and JFCOM have developed a viable and useful system for interagency cooperation. That the JIACGs have accomplished as much as they have while being a voluntary organization speaks volumes about the professionalism and dedication of these agencies and their people. To maintain this effort until the long term policy and structure can be put into place will require DOD to shift resources to other agencies. The gain from the improved operational performance will more than outweigh the loss of the funding to DOD.

Finally, I began examining this topic because I did not see any indication of interagency cooperation, nor had conversations with fellow students indicated there was a

viable framework in existence. As I researched this topic, I became acquainted with the JIACG concept. That led me to correspondence with J9 staff at JFCOM who were invaluable for their insight into the interagency process. Their willingness to interrupt their work, as well as the enthusiasm they have for the JIACG concept shows how important they believe this development is for interagency cooperation.

I found that necessity really is the mother of invention. The JIACG concept went from an idea to a viable system in a few short months. The improvement cycle for JIACGs has been so short that JFCOM has not been able to get a JIACG concept of operations issued before it is superseded by new experience. The cycle seems to have slowed enough that JFCOM's latest attempt should be approved before it needs to be changed significantly.

Meanwhile, JFCOM is working to expand the joint interagency concept by building a model for multinational interagency cooperation—but that's a topic for another day.

Bibliography

- Bogdanos, Matthew. "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 37 (Second Quarter 2005)
- Bush, George. "National Security Presidential Directive 1." Organization of the National Security Council System." 13 FEB 2001. U.S. Government. 10 October 2006 <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/nspd-1.htm>>.
- Bush, George. "National Security Presidential Directive 44." "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization." 7 December 2005. Washington, DC: White House 2005
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War.* trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)
- Cooper David E. "An Organizational Model for Marines Fighting an Insurgency." *Marine Corps Gazette* 89 no. 6 (2005)
- Dictionary.com. *Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.0.1)*, Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2006. <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=adhockery&x=0&y=0> (accessed: October 20, 2006).
- Kelleher, Patrick N. "Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military." *Joint Force Quarterly* 32 (Autumn 2002)
- Priest, Dana. A Four-Star Foreign Policy? U.S. Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy." *Washington Post* 28 September 2000, final ed: A01
- Tucker, David. "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs Ignorance and Sloth?." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2000)
- United States of America. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: GPO, 2006.
- Woodward, Bob. "The World According to Rummy." *Washington Post* October 8, 2006.