

Empowering Interagency Capabilities: A Regional Approach

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Brett G Sylvia
U.S. Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AY 05-06

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMS No. 0704-0188		
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 25-05-2006		2. REPORT TYPE MONOGRAPH		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) SEPT 2005-MAR 2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Empowering Interagency Capabilities: A Regional Approach			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Brett G. Sylvia			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) CGSC, SAMS		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This research proposes developing Regional Interagency Consulates with an Ambassador in charge and a military deputy that is dual-hatted as the Regional Combatant Commander. It contains functional Assistant Secretaries with staffs from most Cabinets and many executive agencies and government corporations. It meets the aforementioned challenges by being robust enough to offer the President options, both military and non-military, to prevent crises from occurring and to respond if they occur. It can operate in a state construct just as easily as in a construct of sub-national and transnational actors. At the same time, it benefits from the competencies already residing in the executive branch of the United States government without having to build the capacity from civilian organizations. Lastly, it can tread more lightly in the world by bringing the capabilities needed to meet the needs of a region in a manner that is more amenable to the concepts of maintaining sovereignty, empowering the local leadership and organizations, and demonstrating compassion.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Interagency, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Regional Combatant Command					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 74	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (913) 758-3300

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Brett G. Sylvia

Title of Monograph: Empowering Interagency Capabilities: A Regional Approach

Approved by:

Timothy D. Parks, COL, IN

Monograph Director

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Abstract

EMPOWERING INTERAGENCY CAPABILITY: A REGIONAL APPROACH

by MAJ Brett G. Sylvia, USA, 65 pages.

In an age predominated by states but rife with non-state actors, failing states, increasingly fluid boundaries, disenfranchised yet interconnected populations, and increasingly self-aware cultures, the United States must develop a foreign policy structure that is adaptive to these circumstances. This foreign policy structure must be able to leverage the unique and varied technical capabilities of the United States and be able to apply them to diverse cultures across the globe. It must be able to win over allies and partners to gain regional influence and appeal. It must be able to leverage relationships with regional partners and entities through prolonged presence built into trust. When action is required, it must be flexible enough to respond across a range of responses from strictly civilian capabilities to military action. Finally, it must be able to act with the full support and confidence of the President and possess the responsibility and accountability to match.

This research demonstrates the current foreign policy architecture does not possess the capacity required to meet this challenge. Likewise, the current reforms both within the military and within the interagency are insufficient to the tasks required. As a result, it is necessary to reform the interagency to be able to adequately match the desired ends of the National Security Strategy with more agile and diverse ways and means.

This research proposes developing Regional Interagency Consulates with an Ambassador in charge and a military deputy that is dual-hatted as the Regional Combatant Commander. It contains functional Assistant Secretaries with staffs from most Cabinets and many executive agencies and government corporations. It meets the aforementioned challenges by being robust enough to offer the President options, both military and non-military, to prevent crises from occurring and to respond if they occur. It can operate in a state construct just as easily as in a construct of sub-national and transnational actors. At the same time, it benefits from the competencies already residing in the executive branch of the United States government without having to build the capacity from civilian organizations. Lastly, it can tread more lightly in the world by bringing the capabilities needed to meet the needs of a region in a manner that is more amenable to the concepts of maintaining sovereignty, empowering the local leadership and organizations, and demonstrating compassion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	v
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Problem Background and Significance	1
Monograph Format.....	3
Scope and Limitations	4
CHAPTER 1 – THE WORLD IS CHANGING.....	6
How the Department of Defense Sees the World.....	6
The Glass is Half Full - Globalization.....	7
The Glass is Half Empty - Kinship and Clash.....	8
“The National Security Issue of the Early 21 st Century”	10
What does it all mean?	12
Responding to These Changes.....	15
CHAPTER 2 – CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY ARCHITECTURE	17
Washington D.C. is “The Base”	17
The Level of Execution	20
A “Militarized” Foreign Policy	23
CHAPTER 3 – IS THIS STRUCTURE ADEQUATE?.....	25
States Are Not Alone.....	25
Fluid Boundaries	27
Failing States Pose a Threat	28
Disenfranchised Populations Pose a Threat.....	29
Culture Really Does Matter.....	31
Assessing the Gaps	33
CHAPTER 4 – ATTEMPTS AT REFORM	36
Reform #1 - The JIACG	36
Reform #2 - S/CRS.....	43
CHAPTER 5 – SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS.....	51
CHAPTER 6 – A NEW STRUCTURE – A REGIONAL APPROACH.....	54
Meeting the Needs?	57
The Downside.....	62
CONCLUSION	66
APPENDIX 1 – Notional JIACG Structure	67
APPENDIX 3 – S/CRS Organization Chart.....	70
BIBLIOGRAPHY	71
BOOKS	71
JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS	72
U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS	73
THESES, STUDIES, SPEECHES and OTHER PAPERS	74

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The Breakdown of the Policy Coordination Committees in the NSC.....	20
Figure 2. Side by Side Comparison of Regional Offices within DoD and DoS.....	27
Figure 3. Proposed Design of the Regional Interagency Consulate.	55

INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant implications is in the area of unified action. The future joint force must gain and maintain the ability to operate effectively with participants of varying capabilities and differing areas of expertise. Greater integration should be a focal point of policy development to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities. This effort may require an overarching national-level concept that presents a method of integration for all U.S. government agencies.¹

This opening statement from the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations provides the best summary for the impetus of this research. All military officers readily admit the need for change in the civil-military structure of our foreign policy. Different offices, agencies, and contemporary thinkers similarly recognize a need and propose different solutions; the question is, however, how to get beyond recognition of the problem and criticism of the current inadequacies and translate that into action.

During a National Defense University-sponsored symposium on Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the integration of the joint force, participants turned to the discussion of the Defense Department interagency coordination. “The participants found these [interagency coordination] abilities wanting...and focused on how the joint force would interact with non-DOD agencies and organizations.”² The positive conclusion to draw from this is that the relative success of integrating the services through legislation naturally directed the discussion to the next challenge of integration – the interagency.

Problem Background and Significance

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.³

¹ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. Version 2.0 August 2005. (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 2005) 1

² Dennis J. Quinn, ed., *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), xii

³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington: The White House, September 2002), 29.

Criticism of American foreign policy abounds today, and perhaps always will. This does not mean that some of these criticisms should not be taken seriously. One such critique is the increasing militarization of the United States foreign policy. As the world has grown more interconnected and the U.S. military has found itself increasingly engaged across the globe for long duration missions, the United States is finding that it needs more options and more solutions for its foreign policy.⁴ A legacy of its Cold War construct, the government finds itself forced to rely on the military to implement its foreign policy. American culture revels not only in its WWII victories, but also the successful occupations of Germany and Japan. The military executing the post-WWII occupations, however, had ranks filled with citizen soldiers with myriad civilian experiences to overcome any shortcomings of military culture. That expertise does not exist in today's less numerous professional armed forces. In fact, today's military services pride themselves on their efficiency as well as their effectiveness in executing combat missions. The current Department of Defense leadership lauded the Afghanistan military campaign as a harbinger of the future, as it pertained to smaller deployed forces who call on better technology and who work in conjunction with proxies to avoid massive troop deployments – a true victory for efficiency, as well as effectiveness. However, “winning the peace” in Afghanistan and Iraq is a much more complicated affair that compels the United States Army and sub-unified commands to call for increased capabilities that reside only in their interagency partners.

As the world “flattens”⁵ and the United States heeds the call for help from nations across the globe or feels the need for “preventive defense”⁶ to root out terrorism, it needs a foreign

⁴ Discussion with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans on 30 September 2005, on the need for increased capacity within the interagency. His position was that as the interagency increased its respective capacities, it provided the President of the United States more options when faced with a crisis.

⁵ Thomas Friedman uses the term “flat” to say that globalization increasingly brings the world closer together. This topic became the basis for the title of his second book on globalization, *The World is Flat*.

policy structure that can successfully wage such campaigns. Congress acknowledged a change in the international environment following WWI and signed into law the National Security Act of 1947. This reorganization of the foreign policy architecture was well suited for the Cold War world. However, the current foreign policy approach is still a Cold War design. It centralizes its decision-making and policy development. It almost wholly focuses on issues in a Post Peace of Westphalia mindset of bilateral relationships. It is reactive by its lack of forward engagement and, because of this, it is overly reliant on its military as the only capable arm to bring policy into action. It is possible to reorganize this structure and there are attempts being made at this. Ultimately, a new foreign policy structure should have cultural understanding, regional influence and appeal, adaptive qualities, and precision crisis prevention or rapid response capabilities across all the instruments of power.

Monograph Format

This study attempts to answer the question, “What is the most effective foreign policy architecture for the contemporary and future national security environment?” In order to answer this large and complex question, several sub-questions will attempt to lead to an answer to this larger question. The first is simply, “What is the current and future national security environment?” Many sources tackle this issue and this study tries to represent the broad schools of thought and then distill them to their points of convergence. These points of convergence are the measure for evaluating the subsequent sections. The second question is, “What is the current foreign policy architecture?” This leads to the third question, “Does this current architecture meet the demands of the environment articulated in the previous section and what are the unintended consequences?” Prior to making a recommendation on what changes should be made

⁶ Official DoD term for what has been commonly referred to as the strategy of “Preemption.” Preventive defense is actually an internationally sanctioned term to permit the use of preemptive force when the threat is real and imminent.

to this structure, this study then evaluates two currently employed reform methods and asks if these are sufficient. The researcher then evaluates whether or not these fill the gaps presented in the previous evaluation section. The monograph's final section recommends a new structure to meet the needs described in the environment to mitigate the shortcomings of the current structure. This new structure, called the Regional Interagency Consulate, addresses these concerns and matches the new environment.

Scope and Limitations

The scope of this research and the recommendations are restricted to the structure of the foreign policy system. While this suggests that a causal linkage exists between a change in structure and the reform of the interagency system, it does not mean that a change in structure is wholly sufficient to *completely* reform the interagency system. The author recognizes that any true reform of the national security architecture of the United States government would require significant changes to education and training policies, cultural changes across the interagency, statutory or executive directive mandates, and an evaluation of the personalities and leadership qualities of the implementers, to name just a few. The merit of changing the structure is for what this change would precipitate. A change in structure can realign accountability with responsibility, can precipitate a series of policies, can force a budgeting of resources and assets, and can lead to a change in culture. Finally, a change in structure is a reform that is not easily undone by capricious opinions of leaders, lawmakers, theorists, or pundits. For the sake of limiting the scope of the research, those second order factors will not be addressed in this monograph.

Additionally, a limitation on this study is the ever-changing, emerging doctrine and understanding of this topic. The current reforms (JIACG and S/CRS) are too new to possess empirical evidence on their successes or failures. However, certain journals and first hand

accounts provide an insight into the theories behind them and some initial forecasts. It is from here the author evaluated the reforms and made assessments.

Finally, this study does not provide a road map to get from the current structure to the proposal. This study identifies an end-state condition. In *Victory on the Potomac* by James Locher, he gives a lengthy explanation of the difficult road traveled to get the Department of Defense to reorganize to increase the effectiveness of military forces to meet the challenges of the Cold War. A similar review on how to reform and reorganize the entire executive branch of the United States government would be beyond the scope of this study and, therefore, was not tackled by the researcher. That is not to say that the intricacies of getting to the proposal were not addressed during the research. The attempt was always to develop a solution that could be implemented through the dedication and bipartisan cooperation of key members within the United States government. In that vein, the researcher believes this proposal can be achieved.

CHAPTER 1 – THE WORLD IS CHANGING

In the Army, it is a well-worn adage that “intelligence drives operations.” This means that a full understanding of the environment and the enemy determines force organization and plan development. In the same vein, before describing how the foreign policy architecture should change, the environment must be fully analyzed and addressed to determine if there is any need for change. Fundamental differences exist in the environment today from that of the Cold War world. The question that must be answered is – *how* is it different?

While military documents focus on the world in terms of threats, which is one-half of the issue, the U.S. government foreign policy should not only be concerned with threats but also with opportunities. This review of the environment, then, begins with the military point of view and moves into contemporary authors and their assessments of the predominant actors or underlying conditions in the environment for today and the future. The chapter ends with a distillation of these various theories and their broad points of convergence.

How the Department of Defense Sees the World

The capstone document for the defense view of the world is the new document from the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) – the Department of Defense’s (DoDs) operational joint doctrine developer – titled, “The Joint Operational Environment – Into the Future.” This document forms the basis for another document called the “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations version 2.0.” This capstone concept’s (CCJO) purpose is to “lead force development and employment primarily by providing a broad description of how the future joint force will operate.”⁷ It is, then, very important that the Joint Operational Environment (JOE)

⁷ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. Version 2.0 August 2005. (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: 2005) 1

accurately define the future environment for the military to be properly sized and apportioned for all future threats. The JOE is:

Expanding webs of social, economic, political, military and information systems will afford the opportunity for some regional powers to compete on a broader scale and emerge on the global landscape with considerable influence. Increased globalization is bringing changes to the international strategic landscape based on a rise of new powers, population shifts, competition for natural resources, impacts on governance, a pervasive sense of global insecurity, and evolving coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new actors (both national and transnational) that will continually appear and disappear from the scene.⁸

It is this environment that authors of the CCJO distilled into three primary threats: (1) transnational security threats, (2) regional, near peer and emerging global competitors, and (3) failing or failed states. This distillation of the threats allows the military planners to determine the capabilities requisite to meet state and non-state actors. The missing component of this analysis is a greater understanding of the underlying conditions that lead to the rise of these three actors. Some contemporary theorists and commentators offer additional insight into these other factors.

The Glass is Half Full - Globalization

One well-defined underlying trend is the concept of globalization. Perhaps the most famous advocate for globalization is Thomas Friedman in his two books, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* and *The World is Flat*. He focuses on the economic aspects of globalization and the opportunities provided by this environment. He defines globalization as “the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and nation states to reach around the world, farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than before.”⁹ In his 2005 book, *The World is Flat*, he talks of a new era of globalization that began in 2000. This new era he calls “Globalization 3.0,” which is

⁸ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. Version 2.0 August 2005. (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: 2005) 5

distinguished by what is termed “the primary dynamic force” of that globalization era. In Globalization 1.0, countries globalized; in 2.0 it was companies; and in 3.0, the dynamic force “is individuals and small groups globalizing. Individuals must, and can, now ask: where do I fit into the global competition and opportunities of the day, and how can I, on my own, collaborate with others globally?”¹⁰ For Friedman, however, the glass is always half full. He sees this in a context where bad actors feel constrained from pursuing destructive policies because of the equal level of harm they endure in globalization. Globalization,

“with its intensifying integration, digital integration, its ever widening connectivity of individuals and nations, its spreading of capitalist values and networked to the remotest corners of the world and its growing dependence on the Golden Straitjacket and the Electronic Herd – makes for a much stronger web of constraints on the foreign policy of those nations which are plugged into the system.”^{11 12}

That is to say, he feels confident the system has sufficient balancers¹³ to keep the global system going. These balancers are the newest dynamic created through globalization. Friedman believes that states, individuals and capitalist organizations defining the new environment make for a more stable and optimistic environment. Others take a different approach to globalization.

The Glass is Half Empty - Kinship and Clash

Samuel Huntington would agree with Friedman that “globally there has been a trend for state governments to lose power”¹⁴ but his thoughts are that power devolved to substate, regional, provincial, and local political entities. In that regard, he disagrees with Friedman and says

⁹ Thomas L. Friedman. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000) 8

¹⁰ Thomas Friedman, “It’s a Flat World After All,” *New York Times*, 3 April 2005 [periodical online]; available from <http://nytimes.com>; Internet; accessed 29 May 2005

¹¹ Thomas Friedman, *Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 241

¹² Chapter 6 of the *Lexus and the Olive Tree* is termed “the Golden Straitjacket.” It is Thomas Friedman’s attempt to describe the foreign policy constraints a nation finds itself in when its economy globalizes, “your economy grows and your politics shrink.” 103. Similarly, Chapter 7 is titled “The Electronic Herd.” It is a term he uses to describe the millions of individual investors comprising the global markets.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 12. These balancers are the state-to-state actions, the state-to-global markets actions, and the state-to-individual actions.

globalization has caused greater division as opposed to unity. This means that the more integrated the world becomes, the more self-aware cultures become and the greater counterforces of cultural assertion. Huntington says, “Nation-states are and will remain the most important actors in the world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts are increasingly shaped by cultural and civilizational factors.”¹⁵ As a result, Huntington offers a slightly new twist to strict realism, with the prediction that countries will tend to “bandwagon with countries of similar culture and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality.”¹⁶

Huntington asks, “Why should cultural commonality facilitate cooperation and cohesion and differences promote cleavages and conflicts?” He gives five basic reasons paraphrased below:

(1) **Identity Matters Most.** Everyone has multiple identities that may compete with or reinforce each other: kinship. Cultural identification is dramatically increasing in importance compared to other dimensions of societies. Civilizations are the broadest cultural entities; hence conflicts between groups from different civilizations become central to global politics;

(2) **Social-Economic Modernization.** The increased salience of cultural identity is in large part the result of social-economic modernization, where dislocation and alienation create the need for more meaningful identities;

(3) **Know Who You Are Not.** Fundamentally, the concept of identity at any level – personal, tribal, racial, civilizational – can only be defined in relation to an “other”;

(4) **Sources of Conflict Have Not Changed.** Control of people, territory, wealth, and resources, relative power, and, lastly, a difference in ideology, brought on by differences in cultures, remain the sources of conflict.

¹⁴ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 35

¹⁵ Huntington, 36

¹⁶ Huntington, 155

(5) **Ubiquity of Conflict.** Huntington says that it is human to hate and that for self-definition and motivation, people need enemies.¹⁷

It is in these five categories that Huntington is able to recognize the less optimistic aspects of Friedman's globalization and make determinations as to the impacts it is having by fracturing the international community and disenfranchising people, groups, states, or civilizations. Friedman's globalization empowered individuals; Huntington's globalization generates tension and conflict. Both men provide a new context to understand economics, politics, and culture. Robert Kaplan adds another dimension to the context for consideration: environmental stressors.

“The National Security Issue of the Early 21st Century”¹⁸

Robert Kaplan, in developing the theories presented in *The Coming Anarchy*, traveled extensively through Africa and South Asia. He found in West Africa the “symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress.”¹⁹ After calling the environment the “national-security issue of the early twenty-first century” he defines it as the “political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions...”²⁰ Each of these environmental stressors taken in isolation present enormous challenges for the traditional states to handle. If the state has weak democratic or institutional traditions at the outset, Kaplan concludes these stressors can easily lead to the rise of totalitarian or fascist regimes. As the state fails to handle each environmental stressor, it will naturally spill over the border into neighboring countries. Each of these concepts has no regard for nation-state boundaries. In fact, Kaplan

¹⁷ This listing is paraphrased from pgs 128-130 of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*

¹⁸ Robert D. Kaplan. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. (New York: Random House, 2000) 19

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

states, “The state is a purely Western notion, one that until the twentieth century applied to countries covering only three percent of the earth’s land area.”²¹

The JOE concurs with the concept of environmental stressors by stating that 90% of the population growth will occur in the poorest countries and by 2030 60% of the world’s population will be in urban environments. Such a growth and concentration will put a tremendous strain on the resources of a nation. The result is a domino effect through each of these environmental stressors. Urbanization and overpopulation not only result in an overuse of resources but in a hardening of ideas and cultural clash. It is on this point that Kaplan references and agrees with Huntington. As diverging ideas are brought into close proximity, a clash is imminent. This is but one environmental source of conflict.

Countries are also beginning to openly recognize that their natural resources can be used as weapons over their neighbors. Kaplan cites an interview with a Turkish Dam engineer, “It is true, we can stop the flow of water into Syria and Iraq for up to eight months without the same water overflowing our dams, in order to regulate political behavior.”²² This is but one example of many where natural resources must flow across borders for the survival of multiple populations. As resources become scarcer due to the loss of arable lands, improper farming and irrigation techniques and overuse of lands, these cross border issues become more important. “Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated, or in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity. These wars will be subnational...this is how many states will die.”²³

The relative ease of the transmission from state to state of Avian Flu (H5N1), West Nile, SARS, and a host of other diseases all pose another significant challenge to the international community. It is impossible in the current environment for any nation-state to completely shield itself from these diseases. States find themselves in collaboration to defeat these problems before

²¹ Ibid., 39.

²² Kaplan, 37.

they become worldwide pandemics. Regionally isolated or sub-state diseases find less concern or help from the international community forcing the already fragile states to deal with these increased burdens.²⁴ Often this requirement quickly exceeds the capacity of the state resulting in an ensuing crisis. These issues only increase in the future environment described by both Kaplan and the JOE.

What does it all mean?

While each of these views brings a slightly different perspective and each argues over which of these ideas is the central ordering principle, they do have points of convergence. It is the points of convergence that define the attributes of the post-Cold War environment. The following five attributes will form the basis for the evaluation of the current foreign policy architecture.

(1) **States are not alone.** While each theory concurred that the Post-Peace of Westphalia nation-state paradigm still predominates, with the state as the primary actor, many others exist with great influence regionally or even internationally on niche issues. These actors can be helpful or harmful within their areas of influence. Huntington's civilizations provide the basis for regionally oriented groups. He states, "Regions are a basis for cooperation among states only to the extent that geography coincides with culture."²⁵ Some of these institutions include: NATO, CARICOM, ASEAN, the AU, MONUC and OAS²⁶. Each of these actors, with cultural

²³ Ibid., 49.

²⁴ Like the example of River Blindness (Onchocerciasis) in 1980s in Africa. A cure was found by a major pharmaceutical company not because they had been looking for a cure to this disease but as they were looking to cure another problem for a more lucrative community. It was only because of the altruism of the CEO at the time that they were able to bring the cure to the afflicted regions at a profit loss to the company. (Michael Useem. *The Leadership Moment: Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and Their Lessons For Us All* (New York: Random House, 1998)).

²⁵ Huntington, 130.

²⁶ NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization, CARICOM – Caribbean Community and Common Market, ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations, the AU – the African Union, MONUC – the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and OAS – the Organization of American States.

commonality, can play a vital role within their regions. From a functional perspective, other supranational organizations like the International Community of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations (UN), or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are influential and create forums for discussing or resolving issues. On the opposite end of the spectrum, any number of transnational terrorist, criminal, or narcotics organizations wield a considerable amount of power across the globe. These actors exist in weak or failing states or in the interstices of states where the rule of law is loosely applied and they, in turn, become entities with as much, if not more, power as the state.

(2) **Fluid boundaries matter.** In many places, from Africa to the Tri-Border region of South America to Uzbekistan, traditional boundaries found on international maps matter very little to people on the ground. Free flows across these boundaries include migration of people, products, diseases, criminal networks, environmental issues, etc. States can wield little authority in these areas or choose not to because of cultural sensitivities. Africa is rife with examples. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) still has 8,000 to 10,000 fighters in the eastern Congo who seek to threaten their homeland.²⁷ Liberia provides perhaps the best-known example. Before his eventual ouster, Charles Taylor took advantage of a power vacuum created by a non-existent state apparatus to install an avaricious regime and incite a string of conflicts throughout West Africa.²⁸ The violence, epidemics, and refugee crises that plague decayed nations often spill into neighboring countries, destabilizing entire regions.

(3) **Failing and Failed States pose a threat.** Globalization ties people together in ways they often do not even perceive. Friedman continually draws colorful analogies to our

²⁷ International Crisis Group Africa Briefing No25, *The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and For All*, 12 May 2005, prepared by the International Crisis Group [internet] available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/b034_congo_action_plan.pdf; accessed 21 October 2005.

²⁸ Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, & Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84 Issue 1 (Jan/Feb 2005): 134-146.

connectedness like, “Did you know that when you order a burger at the drive-through McDonald's on Interstate 55 near Cape Girardeau, Mo., the person taking your order is at a call center 900 miles away...”²⁹ This type of connectedness creates interdependence. As a result, when states fail, they do not occur in isolation. The characteristics of borderless areas and the concept of globalization make any failing or failed state a threat to United States interests in the world. The Global Conflict Trends developed by the Center for Systemic Peace stated, “Globalization is not simply an economic process, but rather, the term for the technological movement away from dyadic analysis of independent events toward complex, interdependent, systems analysis.”³⁰ As a result, what happens in one state affects the entire international system as part of a complex adaptive system.³¹ The International Crisis Group provides this example:

The coming year will be decisive for the Congo, one of Africa's largest and potentially richest countries. A successful transition is by no means guaranteed. Unfortunately it is quite possible that political leaders will continue to block critical transitional reforms and try to skew the elections in their favour. There are reasonable grounds for fearing electoral manipulation and even a relapse into mass violence that would put at severe risk both the unity of the Congo and the stability of much of the continent.³²

When singular events can have such widespread reactions, it is easy to draw the conclusion that weak, failing or failed states are a threat to the entire globalized system.

(4) **Disenfranchised populations pose a threat.** While globalization empowers individuals, it also has the effect of leaving others out. Those left out or those receiving a disproportionately small distribution of globalization's wealth results in disenfranchisement. In 1951, Eric Hoffer classified various types of disgruntled populations and identified them as a

²⁹ Friedman, “It's a Flat World After All.”

³⁰ Center for Systemic Peace, *Global Conflict Trends*. [internet], available from <http://members.aol.com/cspm/mgm/conflict.htm>, accessed 29 September 2005.

³¹ Robert Axelrod, in his book *Harnessing Complexity: Organization Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York: The Free Press, 1999), adds a new dimension to a strict systemic analysis. In complex adaptive systems, you not only have the system of interacting agents but you have thinking and active agents that seek to adapt. This makes an already difficult to predict system nearly impossible to adequately define.

source for recruiting a dangerous class of people, “true believers.”³³ His disgruntled populations became a hazard when a leader emerged to mobilize this mass discontent. The Internet, for example, offers individuals opportunities to be seen or heard across the globe and to gain followers that they might not have gained prior to globalization. It is this breeding ground, left by environmental scarcity, lack of inclusion in the Electronic Herd, ethnic strife, or any host of conditions, that provides the foot soldiers for narcotics trade, transnational criminal activity, or terrorism. Globalization and interconnectedness bring these disaffected populations and the already diffuse knowledge and technology together into dangerous combinations.

(5) **Similarities (and differences) of culture really do matter.** Increasingly, countries and entities band together along cultural lines to develop regional entities that represent their cultural interests. In some cases, these regional interests can run counter to the interests of their individual state but the states will not oppose them. This condition undermines the value of bilateral relations in this new era. Similarly, this attitude can undo the economic benefits of globalization and force populations or states to make decisions running counter to the interests of the civilization as a whole. Friedman’s globalization only makes Huntington’s civilizations more self-aware. As stated earlier, cultures or civilizations can only be defined in terms of an “other.”³⁴

Responding to These Changes

These five areas represent challenges at four levels: international, regional, national, and individual. A foreign policy structure should be able to address each of these five major areas of

³² International Crisis Group Africa. “A Congo Action Plan.” [internet] available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm>; accessed 19 October 2005.

³³ “...the man of fanatical faith who is ready to sacrifice his life for a holy cause.” Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*, (Harper-Perennial, 1951), xii. “He becomes an anonymous particle quivering with a craving to fuse and coalesce with his like into one flaming mass.” 91

³⁴ “Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without a belief in a devil.” Hoffer, 91

convergence in a holistic manner that brings to bear all of the instruments of power of the United States. Such a structure should be robust enough to be able to prevent crises, be agile enough to respond rapidly should crises occur, be focused regionally to capture transnational concerns, be engaged for prolonged periods to possess cultural understanding, and balanced enough to represent all elements of hard and soft power. It is these attributes of a foreign policy architecture that can account for the context and conditions of the contemporary and future environment.

CHAPTER 2 – CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY ARCHITECTURE

Today the United States forward deploys some 250 diplomatic missions in the form of embassies, consulates, and specialized organizations. It possesses a unified military command system that covers all regions of the world and even outer space.... American capital, technology, and culture influence the globe. American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional. All the instruments of national power are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into coherent effectiveness, remains. Presidents and their national security staffs strive to achieve coherence with varying levels of success, through the use of the “interagency process.”³⁵

Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College proposes in this quote that “All the instruments of national power are deployed” and it is a matter of achieving coherence in this system that will bring desired end states. This chapter details the current construct of the foreign policy, how the U.S. government translates policy into action, and how the players interact to determine if all the requisite instruments of power are fully deployed or not. The structure at the national strategic level develops the policy and the execution occurs abroad through various operational entities. As a result, this chapter will take a similar top down approach to evaluate the overall foreign policy structure.

Washington D.C. is “The Base”

Washington, D.C. is the seat of power for all three branches of the United States government. Article II of the Constitution gives the majority of the authority for foreign policy to the Executive Branch.³⁶ The Executive Branch wields this authority through the President and

³⁵ Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21st Century,” in *Organizing for National Security* ed. Douglas T Stuart (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.), 164.

³⁶ Article II of the Constitution gives the president certain powers as chief executive, chief of state, commander in chief, treaty negotiator, and the power to recognize foreign regimes. While Article I gives Congress the power for ratification of treaties, this occurs long after the ground work and relationships have been established. Hence, the assertion that most of power resides in the Executive branch finds its basis in the changing conditions of the contemporary environment. Today, the branch of government that manages

the members of his Cabinet. These members of the Executive Branch interact with one another in Washington, D.C. through various methods to develop foreign policy. What is widely regarded as the “top of policy hill”³⁷ is the President’s personal forum called the National Security Council (NSC).³⁸

The National Security Act of 1947 established this forum and gave every President the latitude to tailor it to his or her needs. Its mandate is: “to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”³⁹ Douglas Stuart of the Strategic Studies Institute says of this national security system, “what is most striking about the existing system is not how much it has changed [since 1947], but how little.”⁴⁰ This asserts that all subsequent presidents find the policy development aspect of the national security system to be sufficient.

President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD1) in February 2001 to create his national security policy advisory committee – his National Security Council. This document created a staff and structure to provide the advice he required on a range of issues spanning both functional and geographical subject matters. At the top of the chain is the National Security Council itself. The President chairs the NSC meeting and attendees include the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

the day to day interactions and requirements of the foreign policy retains the preponderance of the influence vice the authority to ratify treaties.

³⁷ Anna Kasten Nelson, “The ‘Top of Policy Hill’: President Eisenhower and the National Security Council,” *Diplomatic History* No. 7, (Fall 1983): 307-26

³⁸ The term ‘NSC’ has two meanings. First, it is a council of advisors composed of specific cabinet heads; second, it is a staff providing research and policy recommendations for that council. Both of these aspects will be discussed to describe the strategic level of interagency interactions.

³⁹ Gabriel Marcella, 166.

Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence are statutory advisors to the NSC.⁴¹ “President [George H.W.] Bush, and later Clinton, held very few formal NSC meetings, preferring to rely on the Principals (PCs), and Deputies committees (DCs)⁴² to formulate and implement long-range strategy.”⁴³ Contrary to this precedent, President George W. Bush has a NSC meeting scheduled every week and will schedule Iraq specific meetings in addition to these weekly meetings. Similarly, the meeting attendance can grow to include members from other cabinet agencies to discuss issues pertinent to their area or expertise. The effect is twofold: a President that is well informed on the most pressing issues discussed and three cabinet agencies well-synchronized in the development of those grand strategy level policies discussed at NSC meetings.

The decisions and policies that result from meetings at the NSC or PCs level are the result of interagency efforts from below, at the Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) in the NSC staff. These are multi-agency arenas where National Security policy is developed and implemented. Each PCC is chaired by an official at the under secretary or assistant secretary level from either the Department of State (DoS) or DoD. The seventeen PCCs are broken into six regions and eleven functions (See Figure 1).

⁴⁰ Douglas T. Stuart, *Organizing for National Security*. (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 2.

⁴¹ Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 10 July 2001

⁴² Principals Committees meetings are attended by all of the same attendees as a National Security Council meeting except the President. Deputies Committee meetings attendees include the Deputy Secretaries from each organization, the Advisor to the Vice President, and the Deputy National Security Advisor.

⁴³ Amos A. Jordan, et al., *American National Security*. 5th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 105.

- **The PCCs are broken into regions and functions.**
- **The six regional NSC/PCCs are as follows:**
 - Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, Africa
- **The eleven functional areas, chaired by an under secretary or assistant secretary from a specific department, are as follows:**
 - Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations
 - International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
 - Global Environment
 - International Finance
 - Transnational Economic issues
 - Counterterrorism and National Preparedness
 - Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning
 - Arms Control
 - Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense
 - Intelligence and Counterintelligence
 - Records Access and Information Security

Figure 1. The Breakdown of the Policy Coordination Committees in the NSC⁴⁴

The NSC is the only functioning statutory foreign policy interagency organization in Washington, D.C. The Homeland Security Council serves a similar function but focuses solely on domestic issues. Any other collaboration among interagency partners is ad-hoc and un-budgeted – since no structure exists to receive a budget. As a result, all other policy flows from the Cabinet heads down through their organizations to those who will implement it.

The Level of Execution

The NSC pushes policy derived in its interagency agreements through National Security Presidential Directives, when the matter is exceedingly important, or the policies are published as a ‘Summary of Conclusions’ for the NSC meetings, when it is a matter of routine policy or adjustment to current policy. Each agency is then on its own to implement that policy. The NSC possesses no monitoring capability to measure progress, compel compliance or even to verify performance. As a result, the NSC cannot be held accountable for any failures in policy implementation. Implementation can affect all executive branch agencies but in almost all cases a bifurcation between domestic and foreign policies exists.

⁴⁴ The information for this chart came from www.whitehouse.gov. Accessed on 15 October 2005.

The traditional levers used to execute U.S. Government foreign policy lie in the three offices represented in the NSC meetings: Defense, State, and Treasury. It is these cabinets that brandish the biggest instruments of power – Military, Diplomatic, and Economic. Similarly, these agencies wield the largest sticks of foreign policy and overshadow any of the possible carrots to be offered by these agencies or by any of the other cabinet level agencies that are not invited to NSC meetings. Even more so, only two of these have any physical or formal forward presence to manage the day-to-day interactions with foreign entities that form the basis of foreign policy – DoD and DoS.⁴⁵

Prior to World War II, the State Department dominated the development and execution of foreign policy. Since World War II, however, its role in the foreign policy-making process diminished for various reasons. First, the restructuring of foreign policy with the National Security Act of 1947 gave the President greater authority in policy-making through the NSC and to give the military an increased peace-time role.⁴⁶ Second, “the rise of security, economic, humanitarian, and environmental issues that have joined State’s traditional preoccupation with diplomacy as central components of foreign policy.”⁴⁷

While these and the advances in communications and travel may have diminished the power and autonomy of ambassadors, they remain important both as symbolic representatives abroad and as the head of the U.S. country team in each embassy. The State Department operates nearly 300 embassies, consulates, and missions abroad.⁴⁸ “Their information-gathering, analysis, and reporting of local trends and thinking are indispensable inputs into Washington’s

⁴⁵ Many embassies possess a representative from the Department of Treasury, however this office wields no authority and is merely an advisor to the Chief of Mission.

⁴⁶ “The biggest loser in all of the struggles surrounding the 1947 National Security Act was the State Department, which discovered over time that the new arrangements institutionalized the marginalization of State in ways that had been understandable during the war but were unprecedented in peacetime.” Douglas Stuart, “Present at the Legislation: 1947 National Security Act,” in *Organizing for National Security* (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 19.

⁴⁷ Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown. *Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 97.

policy-making process.”⁴⁹ The embassies, consulates, and missions also provide the perspective of foreign service officers, generalists steeped in the art of diplomacy, which is much different from any other input in the interagency. Nevertheless, in foreign policy-making “the State Department’s analyses of world affairs are typically less sophisticated and rigorous than those of rival agencies, especially the Pentagon and the CIA”⁵⁰ based on their in-country cultural immersion that provides a myopic view of issues.

The other entity in implementing foreign policy is the DoD. The Defense Department groups the world into Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs – whose commanders were formerly called CINCs) that cover not only all the land of the entire world but also the oceans, space, and cyberworld. These RCCs wield tremendous influence with the leaders in Washington, D.C. and in capitals across the globe.

Ambassadors and CINCs rely on each other to promote policies that will enhance American interest in a country and region. CINCs have large staffs and awesome resources compared to the small staffs and resources of ambassadors. Moreover, their functions are different. The ambassador cultivates ties and is a conduit for bilateral communications through the art of diplomatic discourse.⁵¹

The combatant commanders take a regional approach to issues, in contrast to their State Department counterparts whose structure constrains them to a bilateral approach.⁵² Similarly, they possess capabilities that no other government agency can bring to bear on problems within their areas of operation. These unique capabilities are a tremendous planning staff, a logistics backbone, communications architecture, and the ability to travel throughout their region. This affords them tremendous influence throughout the region.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 96.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 97.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 99.

⁵¹ Marcella, 181.

⁵² The State Department does possess regional offices located in Washington, D.C. but they do not wield anywhere near the same level of engagement or authority of the RCC.

A “Militarized” Foreign Policy

Unfortunately, it is these two departments, State and Defense, which conduct the preponderance of U.S. foreign policy. “Charged respectively with the responsibilities of preventative diplomacy and national defense, they ... augment the president ... in the national security process.”⁵³ At the NSC, these institutional equities foster healthy debate in the formulation of national security policy. The major difference arises in the ability or inability to implement those policies or monitor that execution occurring through the RCCs and embassies. “The CINC represents the coercive capacity of American power through a chain of command that goes to the president. He and his sizable staff command the operational tempo, deployments, [etc.] – resources, language, and culture that are the opposite of the art of diplomacy.”⁵⁴ In a similar vein, the RCCs have a regional perspective, strategies, and programs while ambassadors focus on advancing the interests of the United States in one country.

This approach sounds strikingly similar to the accusations levied toward the DoD prior to the development of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 which compelled the services within DoD toward greater synchronization, interdependence and, eventually, efficiency. That legislation, “contrasts with a separatist approach by which each military department would be a relatively autonomous organization – coordinating, and perhaps synchronizing, its activities with the other departments, but retaining essential decision-making autonomy in most areas.”⁵⁵ The State and Defense Departments suffer from the same malady – deconfliction vice synergism.

From a structural perspective, when these two institutions vie for control of the direction of foreign policy, there is a winner and a loser in each policy debate. Thomas Barnett, a former Pentagon official now military theorist, concludes,

⁵³ Vicki J. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia*. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 100.

⁵⁴ Marcella, 182.

⁵⁵ Stuart, 66.

America now has, for all practical purposes, a Department of War and a Department of Everything Else. Both are housed, quite comfortably in the pentagon....One force felt it did its job in Iraq brilliantly, and thus wanted to go home as soon as possible. The other force felt it was doing its job in Iraq the best it could, and it was desperate for new resources, new skill sets, and new partners.⁵⁶

That being the case, the foreign policy architecture is not having the impact it needs to have in order to affect the contemporary environment described earlier. “[T]he current combatant commanders will continue in their long term evolutions as the main purveyors of system administration.⁵⁷ Not proconsuls so much as precinct captains, they will maintain the continuous presence of U.S air, ground, and naval forces around the world...”⁵⁸ They undoubtedly outstrip their interagency counterparts in terms of influence in their respective regions. The effect, as clearly caught by Barnett, is that they are incapable of the ‘proconsul’ role because their structure allows only knowing, affecting, and employing the elements of security, as would a ‘precinct captain.’ In interviews with the current combatant commanders, Dana Priest observed, “Their leadership skills, honed over years of competitive military service, ensured CinCs dominated.... That their overbearing influence might actually distort U.S. foreign policy was not a problem they thought much about.”⁵⁹ The end result of this foreign policy structure is then a lack of monitoring of implementation by the NSC of policies that are heavily influenced by the RCCs.

⁵⁶ Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 318.

⁵⁷ Barnett's term for forces that deal primarily in stability and reconstruction tasks.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 324.

⁵⁹ Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2003), 33.

CHAPTER 3 – IS THIS STRUCTURE ADEQUATE?

Bureaucracies do not invent new ideas – as one Beyond Goldwater-Nichols team member is fond of saying, ‘candle makers do not invent electricity.’ Bureaucracies elaborate the implementation of old ideas.⁶⁰

The previous section detailed the current structure as organized by Cold War legislation and as implemented by the government. Like water, bureaucracies follow the path of least resistance. In this case that means the U.S. government’s Cold War foreign policy structure executes policy with Cold War bureaucracies in the manner that is most efficient for those bureaucracies. However, what is efficient for the bureaucracy may not be the most effective. This section measures the effectiveness of the current foreign policy structure by determining its suitability to address the five attributes of the current and future environment, identified in the previous chapter.

States Are Not Alone

As stated earlier, the state is the predominant actor but it is far from alone. “We now contend with a world that has roughly 200 states.... What is more, there are approximately 800 international governmental organizations... nearly 8,000 nongovernmental organizations.”⁶¹ The State Department’s primary capability is to interact bilaterally through its embassies and consulates across the globe. The only formal and structural interaction that it has with a non-state actor is the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Additionally, the policy-making apparatus of the State Department in Washington D.C organizes itself along both regional geographical lines and functional areas. They break this down into six offices focused on geographical concerns around the globe, one focused on international organizations, and seven

⁶⁰ Clark A. Murdock and Michele Fluornoy, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 2 Report” (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July, 2005), 18.

offices with broad functional categories.⁶² While this gives it the ability to develop policy that looks at global functions or geographical regional concerns, its embassy structure does not equip it to actually engage or implement the plans they develop – a legacy of their Cold War structure.

The Department of Defense uses a similar construct to the State Department, though not an exact match-up (see Figure 2). It structures its offices in the Pentagon (both Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)) around regional offices and functional components. In the same way as the State Department, this structure allows a robust staff to research issues and to develop policy or national level strategy that is comprehensive. In contrast to the State Department, however, it possesses the Regional Combatant Commands to implement this strategy. This regional engagement structure affords the DoD the flexibility to address state leaders, ambassadors, regional organizations, and transnational actors or threats, in addition to the DoD members of the embassies who engage in discussion on bilateral security arrangements.

⁶¹ Grant T. Hammond. “Time for a Revolution: The Transition from National Defense to International Security,” in *Organizing for National Security*. Ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 135.

⁶² Snow, 106.




Figure 2. Side by side comparison of the regional offices within Defense and State Departments⁶³

Fluid Boundaries

While the policy-making construct described earlier gives the U.S. government the flexibility to identify transnational issues in the borderless areas, and possibly even develop policy for them, it cannot act decisively or holistically in many of them. Similarly, the construct described gives the DoD the capability to deploy to regions to address transnational issues but it does not give them the capacity to resolve them. “[M]ost transnational problems involve regions that are smaller than states but involve many of them, or larger than states and thus not susceptible to national solutions. Increasingly, other issues – the availability of fresh water, global warming, pollution – are global in their consequences and hence, their solution.”⁶⁴

⁶³ The information for this chart came from the Defense and State Department web sites (www.defenselink.mil and www.state.gov, respectively). It is of note, that within the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff also has regional offices that assist in policy development with the corresponding organizations listed in this figure.

⁶⁴ Hammond, 153.

The migrations across borders of these environmental issues, diseases, or refugees are things that a RCC may identify and spot as it is occurring. It may also have the capability to report this to an appropriate agency in Washington, D.C. and recommend a military plan to assist. It does not possess the structure to address it in a holistic or meaningful manner. The military does not institutionally possess the requisite expertise to deal with issues of this sort. Similarly, the NGOs in the region that may be dealing with these issues in conjunction with the State Department “Country Teams” do not have the capacity to sustain their efforts to stem these dangerous flows for any period of time.

Failing States Pose a Threat

The domino effects emanating from a failed or failing state can have a serious impact both at the regional and global levels. The causes of failing states are multifaceted problems. These include any combination of security, economic, environmental, social, or cultural factors to deal with them or to isolate the negative effects and shield surrounding states. In some cases, these compounding problems occur quickly and require a rapid response. In other cases, they occur over long periods that require steady and prolonged engagement. Both of these cases will be addressed.

In the current structure, only the military possesses the capabilities and capacities to respond quickly to a rapidly developing crisis with any assets or resources that can shape it. Only the military possesses the capacity to project its unique security apparatus into an austere environment and operate for extended periods. Unfortunately, this can only cure a limited number of a failed state’s problems and does not deal with problem(s) in a holistic manner. This approach does not bring to bear the appropriate assets to rebuild the state’s capacity to govern or function and allow an eventual redeployment of the military assets.

Those cases requiring a continued presence to resolve long-standing issues both between states and within states normally stem from ethnic tensions, economic disparity, or environmental

scarcity. These are not issues the military can or will resolve. In fact, some of these cases can only be exacerbated by the presence of a foreign military. It is in these instances, that only a culturally aware civilian organization, with the staying power of the U.S. military, can have the long-term impact needed to resolve the issue and prevent a crisis. The current construct possesses no regional civilian capability with long standing ties to a region, cultural sensitivity to the non-security issues of the region, or the staying power of the logistical and communications capability of the U.S. military. In most cases, the U.S. government feels compelled to act since “Americans...suffer from a feeling of perpetual guilt...[over] sensibilities that abhor famine, the slaughter of innocent civilians, genocide, etc...”⁶⁵ but they do not have the long term patience to see the issue to conclusion. Often, the outcome is that “other[s] may see such efforts as part of ‘Pox Americana,’ rather than ‘Pax Americana.’.... The fact that this is not our intention is essentially irrelevant.”⁶⁶

Disenfranchised Populations Pose a Threat

His Royal Highness Prince El-Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, in explaining the mindset of suicide bombers, said, “Security comes from the population being given a stake in their country.”⁶⁷ This may appear to be a trite answer to a complex and nuanced problem. Hernando de Soto, of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, illuminates this idea through the establishment of property rights by the state for the individuals. His premise is that through the introduction of the fundamental requirements of capitalism, states can not only create the conditions for ownership but undermine the root causes for disenfranchised populations. These fundamental requirements are: the introduction and management of property rights, the rise of

⁶⁵ Hammond, 145.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 145.

⁶⁷ Prince El-Hassan Bin Tallal address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference, Washington D.C., 27 September 2005. (webcast available from www.eisenhowerseries.com)

business organizations (“the B-52s of globalization”), and the establishment of identity systems.⁶⁸

These fundamental requirements may not be the only method for preventing the growth of disenfranchised populations but it is one that has a wealth of statistical data provided by his Institute.⁶⁹

The foreign policy architecture must then have the capability to not only identify these conditions when they deteriorate across the globe but also to counteract them before they reach crisis levels. When these occur within the governed areas of states, embassy officials are normally very good at identifying them and searching out the root causes for these problems. The country team construct within the embassies provides a valuable method for being able to work with the host country to develop a plan of action for them to wield their authority in an already governed area. These situations pose little problem for the country team in identifying them and recommending actionable plans to combat the threat.

Unfortunately, in many cases, these populations crop up in places that lack the rule of law or that lacks any state entity that can exercise authority in any cogent or recognizable manner. These populations pose a threat and the current structure does not possess the long standing engagement at the individual level to truly provide accurate early warning. Similarly, the current structure can do little to prevent it from connecting with sources of funding, with sources of weapons, or with more dangerous populations who have regional or global reach. Ironically, these dangerous populations adapted by embracing the technology of globalization while the U.S. foreign policy has been less successful in adaptation by not developing the implementing arsenals to help nations build the requisite rule of law or property rights institutions identified by de Soto.

⁶⁸ Hernando de Soto describes these fundamental requirements in detail in his book, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

⁶⁹ In addition to the examples given in Hernando de Soto’s book, the web site for the ILD (www.ild.org.pe) provides links to their studies providing the analytical underpinnings of these concepts.

Culture Really Does Matter

Joseph Nye, the originator of the concept of ‘soft power,’ recognizes a broad diffusion of hard power occurring in the world and the major nations “are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past.” Nye continues with the concept that if a state’s “culture and ideology are attractive, others will be more willing to follow” its leadership, and hence soft power is “just as important as hard command power.”⁷⁰

The U.S. government possesses some cultural experts in the State Department and in the military. The challenge is getting them into the right places in these bureaucracies to have the long-term impact required. The current foreign policy structure places Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) as members of a country team inside a foreign country. It is in this foreign country that the FSO can build a tremendous level of cultural awareness and even understanding. Similarly, the military possesses foreign area officers (FAOs) that it places in these same country teams in most countries of the world.

Unfortunately, most FSOs and FAOs do not stay in these countries for longer than three years – especially if they are effective. True cultural understanding takes much longer than three years – especially in non-Western, Judeo-Christian cultures. Similarly, relationships take many years to cultivate and many more years before they are truly helpful in resolving problems. Lastly, they serve inside of one country and affect the decisions of one ambassador. This cultural understanding does not cross country boundaries; it takes the perspective of one country at the expense of neighboring views and it does not make it outside of the country team to other decision makers within the State Department. A loose affiliation exists between the defense attaches in the country team to the Regional Combatant Commander, though no formal link

⁷⁰ Joseph Nye, “The Changing Nature of World Power,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 105 (Summer 1990), 181-182.

exists.⁷¹ The end result is twofold. First, the current personnel policies allow for the development of personnel with the requisite cultural understanding and sensitivity to have real value added to the development of foreign policy but the structure does not allow the understanding to reach true depth into the regional issues. Second, the reporting structure does not allow the only organization with a regional perspective to leverage the in-country cultural experts.

Another aspect of cultural understanding is the ability to grasp the system of systems that comprise the country or region. Under the current construct, the only functional experts in every embassy or within the regional combatant commands are those pertaining to security and diplomacy. For example, no Department of Labor representative with expertise on labor issues exists in the embassy in Venezuela to measure a set of pre-determined indicators about the rise of labor movements contributing to the popularity of the Chavez regime.⁷² This type of expert brings not only a functional expertise to the country team but adds cultural context to this person's functional knowledge. Should intervention ever be required in this region, a host of functional experts could more accurately depict the importance of issues, personalities, or previously unknown entities and how they interact with one another to provide a comprehensive picture of the situation, the crisis or a possible non-military solution.

The converse of this argument is the top-down policy formulation process existing in today's foreign policy construct. The dearth of officials with cultural context for regional problems, as described previously, results in policy formulation at the national level that is uninformed by the cultural realities of the regional system. Combatant commands provide a military perspective and embassies provide a single state diplomatic perspective but no

⁷¹ Some embassies will have a Security Assistance Officer that does work for the Combatant Commander though not every embassy will have one and this office does not have school trained foreign area officers.

⁷² The Department of Labor has a Bureau of International Labor Affairs in Washington D.C. whose mission includes monitoring the international labor activities and coordinating interagency and

comprehensive body of information on the overall make-up of the regional issues exists. A policy, regardless of its altruism, that is ill-suited for the situation does not further the national strategic goals.

Assessing the Gaps

By the late 1930s, the U.S. Navy had a cadre of very experienced and capable cryptanalysts. But the key ingredient in the ultimately successful breaking of the most important Japanese codes ... was the recognition that solutions could not be found by military personnel alone: that it would take the talents of a host of specialists, civilian and military, mathematicians and linguists, to solve a problem that was, after all, hydra-headed.... By then national destinies were measured by the strength or weakness of sinews of national power beyond those purely military: diplomacy, political leadership, trade, economic structure, industrial base, scientific and technological competence, civilian morale, the ability to manipulate public opinion, and the rest of the elements that came to comprise total war.⁷³

This example demonstrates the ability of the United States government to leverage all of the countries capabilities to solve a complex problem. The preceding analysis illuminates four primary gaps in the current foreign policy structure to address the complex conditions of the current national security environment.

First, the Department of Defense is the only regionally focused entity engaging non-state actors at the regional level. While the State Department does have an Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs in Washington D.C., this does not constitute a regional engagement strategy for the thousands of non-state actors and cannot significantly assist the implementation of strategic policy goals. Similarly, having the military as the sole agent of regional engagement prevents many NGOs from participating for fear of losing their perceived

intergovernmental activities. Unfortunately, this office has no representative on the National Security Council and no systemic relationships with Embassies.

⁷³ David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997)

impartiality, as seen in the relationship between NGOs and Provincial Reconstruction Teams of Afghanistan.⁷⁴

Second, the Defense Department and Embassy apparatus is wholly unsuited for the complex non-military issues facing states. In order to address the root causes for failing states and disenfranchised populations sufficiently, a more robust marshalling of the ‘soft’ instruments of power throughout the U.S. government is required. These instruments are much better suited to build state institutions for property rights or rule of law to ensure the survival of the state system and prevent mass disenfranchisement. Similarly, those agencies of the executive branch traditionally thought of as domestic would have tremendous benefits in developing or supporting the domestic systems of other regions – such as agriculture, labor, or transportation. The development of a sustainable governing system is the only guarantee that the U.S. will not need to intervene in states’ affairs in perpetuity. These state capabilities represent those minimum baseline requirements.

Third, the U.S. possesses no non-military rapid response capability. “Until the U.S. government develops sufficient rapid civilian reaction capacity, the military will continue to be called on to accomplish ‘civilian’ tasks, greatly limiting the strategic choices of the U.S. government at home and abroad.”⁷⁵ The military is then the first, and only, choice for decision-makers facing a crisis far from the U.S. borders. This method will always carry the perception of an occupying force or a heavy-handed response. While it is effective for demonstrating U.S. resolve, it does not endear the U.S. to the local populations or regional heads of state. The fourth gap follows this. The U.S. possesses no low-level non-military apparatus for prolonged

⁷⁴ In 2001, the Taliban faxed a message to the Associate Press that said that all NGOs that worked with coalition reconstruction efforts were to be targeted as enemy (Scott Baldauf. “Aid Groups in Afghanistan Weigh Good Deeds vs. Safety.” *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 October 2003, 7).

⁷⁵ Johanna Medelson Forman and Michael Pan. “Filling the Gap: Civilian Rapid response Capacity for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 116.

engagement across a range of non-security, non-diplomacy related issues. The military is the fastest to arrive and is the only institution with the logistical and communications architecture for prolonged intervention in austere environments.

Lastly, no structure exists to build or leverage cultural expertise or to build functional expertise that is steeped in regional culture. The current systems move personnel through the regional positions for long enough to gain minimum proficiency before they are moved again because no structure exists for upward mobility within that region. Similarly, no political will exists across the interagency to take traditionally domestic-oriented functions and realign them to evaluate the regional problems plaguing foreign policy. While most Cabinet departments have offices that evaluate international issues and trends, these offices are traditionally small and possess no regional focus, regional engagement strategies, or cultural knowledge.

As a result of this analysis, the foreign policy structure does not meet the requirements of the current environment and does not account for these four gaps. As described, it is marked by centralized control of policy-making, it focuses on bilateral relationships, it relies on the traditional instruments of power, and it is overly reliant on the military for rapid response and regional engagement.

CHAPTER 4 – ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

Major structural changes must be made in the interagency system in order to harness intelligently human talent and resources. It is time to move away from a system designed for the problems of 1947 toward one that is appropriate to the challenges of the next century.⁷⁶

Many agree with Gabriel Marcella's point and have attempted to reform the system. The following section evaluates the current and on-going attempts to reform this foreign policy structure to determine if they fill the five gaps identified in the previous chapter.

Members of the government recognize the inadequacy of this current structure and have developed reforms. One reform occurs within the DoD, as they recognize their primacy in foreign affairs but their inadequacy in critical skills and expertise to make them more effective. The second reform is within the strategic interagency. It is an attempt to bring together the requisite skills in Washington, D.C. under one head official, and to develop exportable packages to assist in crisis prevention and mitigation, or in a post-conflict environment. These two attempts at reform will be evaluated to determine if they sufficiently fill the gaps identified in the previous analysis. Since they are still largely theoretical, some historical analogies to similar theories provide the necessary extrapolation for analysis.

Reform #1 - The JIACG

The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an outgrowth of validated interagency coordination requirements from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan (see Appendix 1 for Notional Concept). Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, USMC, was a member of the first JIACG⁷⁷ used for a post conflict environment. He recounts the formation of this new coordination body in his article for *Joint Forces Quarterly*. His JIACG began as a need

⁷⁶ Marcella, 189.

⁷⁷ PACOM had actually formed a JIACG prior to this that had been focused on Counterterrorism in the PACOM (JIACG/CT) shortly after 9/11. This group was organized around representatives from Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency.

to de-conflict the various interagency actions in the fast paced and high stakes environment of combat in Afghanistan. Once the agencies came together to discuss their on-going plans and operations, all members began to realize the synergy that could be created through coordinating and synchronizing their efforts, vice just deconflicting. He writes, “Task forces and working groups designed to facilitate interagency coordination have existed for years, but they were usually ad hoc, limited in authority, narrow in scope, and viewed with suspicion by most governmental entities.”⁷⁸ Through the leadership of that ad-hoc organization, they sought to institutionalize the organization and incorporate it into on-going operations. It migrated from being a Joint Interagency Task Force – since in military language ‘Task Force’ implies something temporary and limited – to being a JIACG. The composition of this JIACG was FBI, CIA, Diplomatic Security Service, Customs Service, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Human Intelligence Service, New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Justice, Treasury, and State Departments.⁷⁹

The current joint doctrine on interagency operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (dated 9 October 1996), has no mention of JIACGs. The new Joint Publication 3-08, which is not published but available in draft form, defines the JIACG as “an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.”⁸⁰ The new Joint Publication goes on to give a more detailed definition as well as begins to define some capabilities:

Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place

⁷⁸ Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 37 (2d Quarter, 2005) 11.

⁷⁹ Bogdanos, 11.

⁸⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I (DRAFT)*, Joint PUB 3-08. Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, XX MONTH 2005. II-14.

at the strategic level through the NSC. Members participate in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint task force (JTF) operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.⁸¹

The main source for reviews of this new organization come from the military commands that employed them or who seek to institutionalize them. As a result, almost all commentary is exceedingly positive and the articles written seek to find ways to convince decision-makers in the National Security arena to ratify the concepts. The reason for the positive reviews is the realization by the military planning staffs and headquarters of the tremendous unrealized lacuna of knowledge and expertise that can be filled by interagency partners. At the same time, the interagency partners in this endeavor benefit from the vast planning capability and resource base of the military. All participants have found the venture mutually beneficial and have found the relationships they formed during these endeavors to benefit subsequent assignments or missions.

Perhaps the greatest benefits from the JIACG efforts to date are the results of the interagency planning at the operational level. JIACG members bring the institutional expertise of their agency. While they are not, in many cases, able to speak for or commit their agency to any controversial issues, they do provide the insight of their experience and they do provide valuable, functional input to the military planners. Based on their physical location within the regional staff, which is immersed in the regional issues, they present well-informed responses that not only have technical expertise but cultural sensitivity and regional context as it pertains to their area of expertise. The longer they have spent in the region or on the JIACG results in truly insightful input or feedback. Likewise, the planning insights are useful both in peacetime and in conflict. “Should diplomacy fail, the JIACG also provides a mechanism, through habitual relationships with civilian planners, to expeditiously integrate multi-agency operation planning that

⁸¹ Ibid.

implements political-military missions and tasks.”⁸² Despite these remarkable reviews, this concept has not found vast political backing throughout the interagency or academia.

Most JIACGs to-date were formed around counterterrorism tasks or military operations. The agencies involved in this effort come from the military, paramilitary, intelligence, and financial-tracking agencies. These are all agencies that wield hard power instruments and have somewhat similar cultures to the military and yet it still has not taken hold. The new Joint Publication on the Interagency (JP3-08) specifies that the JIACG will be “tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander.”⁸³ Truly gaining access to the interagency skills required for all contingencies is difficult among agencies where cultures somewhat coincide and nearly impossible for those less inclined to the military. Nothing statutorily compels them to serve in the JIACG. The closest thing is “on January 29, 2002, that the Deputies’ Committee issued ... a nonbinding memorandum on JIACGs” But this was wholly insufficient in motivating Cabinets to participate.⁸⁴ Similarly, no budgetary incentive exists for contribution of personnel or assets. As a result, it is only viewed as a net loss to the organization. December 2003, DoD requested, and for the first time agreed to pay for, individuals experienced in staff work from the State Department, the FBI’s Counter-Terrorism Division, and the Treasury’s Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to augment the JIACGs of all nine combatant commands. “Unfortunately, this decision overlooked the possible effect on the non-reimbursed agencies, each of which predictably became less inclined to continue providing representatives for JIACGs after they learned they did not make the final cut.”⁸⁵ Without statutory or budgetary authority, it is nearly impossible to convince others of the necessity of this endeavor. The result is participation

⁸² JWFC Pamphlet 6, Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), United States Joint Forces Command, 27 June 2004, 8

⁸³ JP3-08, II-14

⁸⁴ Bogdanos, 11.

⁸⁵ Bogdanos, 14.

of just a small slice of the interagency team. As the emerging joint doctrine stands now, the JIACG is a staff directorate of only 12 personnel.⁸⁶

Perhaps one of the greatest downfalls of this approach is the overbearing presence of the military, “Specifically, achieving greater unity of effort in complex interagency operations requires moving beyond the current process of ‘interagency-izing’ military campaign plans.”⁸⁷ Based on capability and a sense of urgency to engage any topic within its area of operations, the military retains the primacy role. While this promotes efficiency, it inhibits effectiveness for two reasons. The first is what Robert Komer refers to as ‘overmilitarization.’ He says, “military men are naturally going to give primary emphasis to the military aspects of any conflict.”⁸⁸ He also goes on to quote James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, by definition argue for military solutions ... that is their business and no one should be surprised that generals behave like generals.”⁸⁹ Secondly, with the military as the spearhead for the policy and the combatant command as the public face of the organization, the command as a whole loses the potential to engage a host of regional or international non-governmental organizations. Many NGOs will not engage with the military despite their desperate security, communications or logistical needs in a war-torn region, for fear of a loss of neutrality. In a recent panel of NGOs, Geoff Lane of the International Community of the Red Cross made this point very strongly, stating the need for “independence, impartiality and neutrality” that cannot be maintained if working with the military.⁹⁰ In the worst case they become targets themselves. The NGOs that routinely work with the Provincial Reconstruction

⁸⁶ JWFC Pamphlet 6, 8.

⁸⁷ Murdock, 21.

⁸⁸ Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam* (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1973), ARPA Order No.: 189-1, 38.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Geoff Loane, the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Head of Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada in an address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference Panel

Teams in Afghanistan have become such a target. In 2003, the Taliban faxed a message to the Associated Press,

Our government has always respected the people who are working in NGOs that really want to build Afghanistan. But there is another kind of NGO, which only uses the name NGO but is actually working and spying for the U.S. We advise Taliban all over the country to attack them and extradite [sic] them from Afghanistan.⁹¹

Col Bogdanos identifies another significant challenge for the JIACG in its current form: “the lack of a single, national-level organization issuing guidance, managing competing agency policies, directing agency policies, and directing agency participation in JIACGs. In short, NSC expects unity of effort without unity of command.”⁹² Robert Komer, who led the interagency teams in Vietnam called CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), said,

If and when an exceptional U.S. supporting effort which cuts sharply across normal agency responsibilities is decided upon, it seems advisable to set up special ad hoc machinery at the Washington level to manage it. Several options are available, [but] whichever is decided upon, it will need a clear grant of presidential authority and solid presidential backing to overcome the natural bureaucratic infighting which it will almost invariably generate (emphasis original).⁹³

Like the CORDS of Vietnam, the JIACG lacks any tie into the Washington, D.C. decision makers to compel effectiveness or integration. Komer has written extensively on how the CORDS were an effective model and gives some reason why they were effective; however, the bureaucracies disregarded these gains and disbanded them just as they were picking up steam. He recommends that any CORDS-like organization have a direct link into Washington D.C. to protect the equities of the organization. The JIACG possesses no such interagency body in Washington, D.C. – each agency protects its own equities, in its own stovepipes.

discussion on Non-Governmental Organizations and their role in National Security, Washington D.C., 27 September 2005. (webcast available from www.eisenhowerseries.com).

⁹¹ Scott Baldauf. “Aid Groups in Afghanistan Weigh Good Deeds vs. Safety.” *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 October 2003, 7.

⁹² Bogdanos, 15.

⁹³ Robert W Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in Vietnam* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), 169.

Similarly, it is extremely difficult to get quality interagency members to volunteer for this JIACG duty since it is not perceived to be career enhancing. A JIACG Training and Education Survey commissioned by the National Defense University found that State Department Foreign Service Officers view service in a JIACG as a “hindrance.”⁹⁴ Specifically, “Blood would be in the halls” if State’s Director-General of Personnel required a JIACG tour for promotion from O-1 to OC level.”⁹⁵ The JIACG, as a military-led organization without any statutory backing or executive directive, cannot muster the appeal to pull in the interagency expertise required for the complex tasks it currently faces – particularly in the face of organizational cultures and personnel and promotion policies that run counter to integration.

A final criticism of this approach is the inability to maintain a continued engagement with the local entities. Many of the officers in the regional combatant command and the members of the JIACG are not there beyond a two or three year tour. This contributes to a “shocking lack of institutional memory, largely because of short tours for U.S. personnel.”⁹⁶ One of the touted strengths of the JIACG is “its habitual relationships with civilian organizations, its in-depth understanding of the AOR [area of operations]...”.⁹⁷ This is hardly possible as military officers rotate in and out between assignments and civilians rotate in and out of the headquarters since their role, as a member of the JIACG, is merely an additional duty to those they must complete back in Washington D.C. Andrew Krepinevich called this, “the pernicious practice of rotating senior military and civilian leaders in and out of Iraq as though they are interchangeable.

⁹⁴ Marcy Stahl. Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Education Survey Results. (Vienna, VA: ThoughtLink Inc., 2004).

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Komer. *Bureaucracy at War*, 162.

⁹⁷ JWFC Pamphlet 6, 8.

Generals who have demonstrated competence ... have been recalled to stateside duty. Such officers should be promoted and retained in Iraq for an extended period.”⁹⁸

The JIACG reform focuses at the operational level and seeks to integrate skills and expertise to impact specific combatant commander initiatives. Ultimately, it performs staff functions to coordinate efforts that each separate agency intends to execute in that combatant commander’s area of operation. It is a solution that does not address the strategic interagency integration in Washington D.C. to develop policy that is tailored to the unique circumstances of a particular region or issue. A second reform, discussed below, seeks to fill this gap by starting at the strategic level and developing capabilities to push to the operational and tactical levels.

Reform #2 - S/CRS

In July 2004, Congress authorized the reprogramming of funds to create the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The Secretary of State named Ambassador Carlos Pascual as the Coordinator. The Coordinator reports directly to the Secretary of State. While it does reside in the State Department, it is billed as an interagency organization, in both character and function, which gives the State Department the role as the lead integrator and coordinator. This lead role for the State Department stems from their role as the president’s principal advisor on foreign operations.⁹⁹

The stated mission of the S/CRS is to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward

⁹⁸ Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. “How to Win in Iraq.” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84 Issue 5; (Sep/Oct2005), 93.

⁹⁹ “In order to carry out U.S. foreign policy...the Department of State...exercises policy leadership, broad interagency coordination, and management of resource allocation for the conduct of foreign relations...” U.S. State Department Strategic Plan (2000), Office of Management Policy and Planning, 25 October 2000, 3

peace, democracy and a market economy.”¹⁰⁰ Amb. Pascual often remarks that prior to now, the international community has approached the stabilization and reconstruction missions in an ad-hoc fashion.¹⁰¹ Within our own government, development missions are handled case-by-case. No established system exists to ‘routinize’ the process for developing and implementing solutions for the nearly fifty failed or failing states across the globe. In many cases, urgency drives policy more than importance as the expectations on the NSC outstrip its abilities. Amb. Pascual says to this condition, “Hence we are given that mandate to create and institutionalize the capability to be able to prevent and prepare for conflict – prevent when we can, and be able to respond rapidly on stabilization and reconstruction when we have to.”¹⁰²

To accomplish this mission and mandate he plans to build certain capabilities within the organization. These boil down to five core functions. These five core functions fall under his primary role in providing the interagency leadership. He correctly assesses the interagency tasks as lacking unity of effort. His interagency leadership is only as it pertains to failing or failed states and, in that regard, his office seeks to have the primary role for developing policy and recommending solutions to be executed across the interagency. The five core functions are (see Appendix 2 for complete explanation for each function):

1. Monitor and Plan.
2. Prepare Skills and Resources.
3. Mobilize and Deploy.
4. Leverage International Resources.

¹⁰⁰ State/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability [internet] available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>; accessed 21 October 2005.

¹⁰¹ Ambassador Pascual has mentioned this in one form or another in all of his public statements available on the S/CRS web-site. These include addresses to the Eisenhower National Security Series conference, his speech to AUSA, his congressional testimony before Congress and his article for *Foreign Affairs Magazine*.

¹⁰² Amb. Carlos Pascual (speech to the AUSA Convention on 4 October 2005) [internet] available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>; accessed 21 October 2005.

5. Learn from Experience.¹⁰³

The structure to accomplish this is an office (see appendix 3) located in Washington D.C. that is organized along functional lines. This organization possesses the responsibility to coordinate the management in Washington D.C. and create a capacity for export to the field. This capacity, now termed the Active Response Corps, is comprised solely of State Department officials, with a mix of “political and economic and diplomatic security and administrative skills.”¹⁰⁴ Their mission, as described in S/CRS Fact Sheet, is to “deploy as first responders to staff planning teams, augment Embassy staffing, and if necessary deploy with military or multilateral peacekeepers to create the U.S. diplomatic base on the ground.”¹⁰⁵

As this program is still in its inception, and the capacities for which they are striving are still in their infancy, the commentary on this organization is sparse. The theory and the initial responses, though, do merit consideration and evaluation. Several positive and negative conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.

The first positive aspect is the attempt to draw a large pool of interagency candidates together to have greater impact on the interagency culture in Washington D.C. Ambassador Pascual gives a realistic assessment in saying that he believes S/CRS can reach a full capacity in five years, with Senate support, but that it will take an additional 15-20 years to sufficiently change the culture to achieve any true effective capability across the entire interagency.¹⁰⁶ This is the initial step for creating a unified capacity across the instruments of power. He rightly assesses

¹⁰³ Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Functions of S/CRS*. [internet] available from (<http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>; accessed 21 October 2005).

¹⁰⁴ Amb Carlos Pascual (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June of 2005) “New 'Civilian Response Corps' Would Relieve Military of Non-Combat Stability Missions,” available from www.OutsideDefense.com, accessed 24 August 2005.

¹⁰⁵ S/CRS Fact Sheet “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), 3 August 2005, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Carlos Pascual, (Address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference); Washington D.C., 28 September 2005. (webcast available from www.eisenhowerseries.com).

the need, “We have to come together to recognize that if we do not unify to create this capacity we are putting our national security at risk and that is unacceptable.”¹⁰⁷

The second positive outcome of this initiative is the institutionalizing of the foreign policy tools needed in assisting failing or failed states. In this regard, this office seeks to marshal the resources across the interagency to meet the needs of these states to either prevent or respond to crises. This is the first time accountability can be fixed onto one agency for the success or failure for interagency foreign policy initiatives of this sort. Additionally, the mere identification of those skills necessary to transition from conflict or civil strife to a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy¹⁰⁸ and then to find who within the government, or even outside the government, possesses those abilities is a tremendous step forward. To date, civilian endeavors in building the capacity of weak states were marked by ad-hoc organizations composed primarily of volunteers. The ability to earmark certain individuals for certain specialties and know they will come when called forward is an altogether new and innovative concept.

The third, and perhaps most important, positive aspect of this program is the presence of an office in Washington D.C. that represents the equities of an organization deployed into an area in crisis. The ability for these deployed members to reach back to a central office to inform policy, gain additional guidance, request resources, or provide feedback greatly increases their effectiveness. Similarly, the ability for decision-makers in the national security community to have balanced, ground truth will result in better strategic guidance or policy. Komer’s lessons learned from Vietnam, described previously, apply equally well here – especially when a special

¹⁰⁷ Amb. Carlos Pascual (speech to the AUSA Convention on 4 October 2005) [internet] available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>; accessed 21 October 2005.

¹⁰⁸ Taken from the S/CRS mission statement. S/CRS Fact Sheet.

PCC is formed to focus the attention and efforts for a specific crisis, as is described in NSPD 44.¹⁰⁹

The positive aspects addressed above result only if the organization performs as prescribed in the theory that drives it currently. Some political realities that exist must also be considered. First, the organization is currently established within one agency and has not even been raised to the Undersecretary-level of importance. The position of ‘Coordinator’ is not one that even requires a nominee to be questioned or confirmed by the Senate. In this regard, the Coordinator of S/CRS holds no clout within the interagency of our government, with other governments or non-governmental organizations. Two of the key components identified earlier require interagency leadership and international community engagement. This will clearly not occur from this office as currently structured.

The second issue stems from the first. Since Congress and the President have not given the S/CRS any real authority, it asks for volunteers from the interagency to participate. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, working on a volunteer basis, is a recent historical example of how this can go awry,. In early 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense sent a memorandum to all deputy secretaries and equivalents across the entire executive branch, not just those represented in the NSC, with an entreaty to participate in post-conflict operations in Iraq. Similarly, the president made several public statements about Iraq being the central front in the War on Terror. With clear guidance from the head of the executive branch and a clear request from the DoD, all Cabinets should have found an office within the CPA to contribute. These agencies possessed the requisite knowledge and expertise to make a difference in this environment. The CPA, however, was unable organize and run in an efficient or effective

¹⁰⁹ NSPD 44, signed by the President on 7 December 2005, in addition to giving the Secretary of State specific powers for stabilization and reconstruction, details the process by which a special Policy Coordinating Committee is established for a specific crisis. This addresses, in many ways, the concerns Robert Komer had.

manner as they were hampered by the interagency's reluctance to provide the requisite support to have immediate impact. No institutional incentives existed to promote this behavior and no structure supported this, save the military. When it came to execution, the results were military officers, ill suited for the tasks required, who held positions of great responsibility for the long-term development of the country.¹¹⁰ This only served to widen the chasm between the military and civilian authorities. It is this same problem of structure, authorities and resources that is apparent in S/CRS.

A third criticism is the concept of being able to export expertise. S/CRS is a Washington D.C. entity with functional expertise but very little cultural context. Great danger exists in this approach. William Appleman Williams, in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, argues that the United States is a truly altruistic country who desires to make the world a better place. This is even truer today as Americans view through their ever-dwelling news channels the calamities unfolding across the globe and then open their checkbooks to give generously to tsunamis in Southeast Asia or earthquakes in Pakistan. He goes on to argue that the United States has also championed self-determination in the areas in which it becomes involved. However, the "tragedy" is in the form of hubris. Williams points out an American tradition where Americans with their proud thoughts of the greater American moral values and systems of democratic governance then, ironically, proceed to impose "self-determination" in the model of their homeland. The only method to combat that natural inclination is through regional sensitivity that augments or underpins any policy recommendations or plans of execution. This current S/CRS organization lacks a cultural awareness born through presence in the region and engagement on issues only pertaining to that region. It is then, likewise, unable to prevent crises through intimate

¹¹⁰ Interview with the Special Advisor to the Chief Operating Officer. October 1, 2005. "For example, the person overall in charge of establishing the Ministry of Agriculture and providing the long-term strategic plan or guidance was an Army Lieutenant Colonel – and a lawyer at that! That was indicative of most of the ministries prior to and immediately following the transition to sovereignty."

knowledge of the people, organizations, and countries of a given area of operations. Secretary of State Rice states, “What we found with rapid response is it does have to be 24-hour and at least a lot of it has to be in the field, not back in Washington, just because of the nature of the time cycle.”¹¹¹ Even more so than that, “Every country is different, and each country’s needs after war will be different. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not appropriate for the broad array of cases that the United States will face in the coming decades.”¹¹² It is only through a continued presence and engagement that this interagency organization could be effective when it came time to implement or execute policy.

A natural extension of this inability to gain true regional expertise is the inability to grasp the more difficult non-state or trans-national issues. S/CRS identifies the failed or failing state as the premier threat of today and the future. The natural extension of this logic is that the preservation of the state results in the security of the United States. While the state is the predominant actor and the ability to maintain that paradigm does increase stability in the overall world order, it is not an all-encompassing articulation of the problem set. The ability for S/CRS to address the issues that do not fall into the Westphalian paradigm is a significant weakness. Similarly, the plan to augment country teams, as a method to bolster state capacity, does not allow it to engage these transnational issues.¹¹³

Lastly, Ambassador Pascual forecasts achievement of full operational capability within ten to fifteen years. Building a civilian response corps would take this long. It is an unfortunately long timeline when the requisite skills and knowledge exist within the government today. His relative ineffective power base does not allow him to leverage those other executive

¹¹¹ Steven R. Weisman, “Bush Confidante Begins Task of Repairing America's Image Abroad,” *New York Times*, 21 August 2005, *New York Times On-Line* [internet] accessed 21 August 2005.

¹¹² Ed. Robert C. Orr. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. The CSIS Press. Washington D.C. 2004, xii.

agency capabilities forcing this extended timeline. In the interim, the military continues to develop ad-hoc solutions with moderate levels of success that continually undermine the achievement of the S/CRS ultimate objective.

¹¹³ “A trained Active Response Corps would deploy as first responders to staff planning teams, augment Embassy staffing, and, if necessary deploy with the military...” S/CRS Fact Sheet. Available from www.state.gov/s/crs; accessed 15 October, 2005.

CHAPTER 5 – SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS

We have reconfigured our institutions to better address ‘the spaces in-between’: but we have been far more reluctant to tamper with the basic institutions themselves. We have not fundamentally changed our habits of thought.¹¹⁴

While recognizing the inadequacy of the current structure is an important step in the right direction, the current reform efforts still fall short of meeting the challenges of the current and future international environment. A complete restructuring of the entire United States government is both impractical and unwarranted; however, a redesign of the implementation portion of the foreign policy structure is both feasible and attainable.

Upon evaluating the five characteristics of the current and future environment, the four gaps in the current structure and the insufficiency of the current reforms, the conclusion is that any effective foreign policy structure should have the following five characteristics:

1 – The institution’s most important attribute is a broad set of functional competencies steeped in regional and cultural understanding. The structure should have the flexibility to focus solely on one region and must possess professionals representing all functional areas. The functionally oriented officials spend enough time in the region to become experts not just in their technical field but also in how that technical expertise applies in that culture. Similarly, it has the capability to reach-back into its parent organization in the interagency and pull forward any data or specialty needed for the missions at hand.

2 – The institution must have regional influence and appeal through legitimacy. International and non-governmental organizations do not seek to align themselves with military organizations. The key to success and the method to achieve a lasting effect in any region hinges on the ability to gain regional ownership of the missions, ideas or principles – involvement in

¹¹⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, “Redefining the Enemy: the World has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not,” *RAND Review*, 28 (Spring 2004), 23

solving their own problems. The proposed institution must be robust enough so that regional entities know they can get solutions to their problems from it and, yet, designed in such a way that it is not intimidating.

3 – The institution must have a prolonged presence in the region. Issues like environmental scarcity cannot be resolved in two or three years. Programs of this sort require long-term commitments, relationships and experience. Trust is a commodity built only through relationships over time. The institution must have the capability to advance personnel and yet keep them engaged in the region over the long term. Prolonged presence is the only manner in which to build the technical expertise with cultural context.

4 – The institution must have a non-military rapid response capability. The institution must have the logistical and communications capability to project both soft and hard power into the remote corners of the region. Eliot Cohen states that the military alone is not capable of solving all problems, “and in the best scenarios would be left out altogether.”¹¹⁵ Ideally, the power projected is a civilian capability with the capacity and staying power of the military to produce the desired effects.

5 – The organization implementing foreign policy in the regions must have credibility and ownership within Washington D.C. Three components of the organization are most critical to achieving this credibility – a short reporting chain to the President, budgetary authority, and personnel authority. Robert Komer’s lessons learned found Presidential credibility as a key factor in the success of the organization. This credibility occurs when the head of the organization can get his ideas, at times unfiltered, to the person who has a constitutional mandate to integrate the interagency efforts – the President. To do this, the implementation organization needs to have a leader that is, at a minimum, an Under Secretary-level status and that reports to a Cabinet level

¹¹⁵ Eliot Cohen, address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference, Washington D.C., 27 September 2005. (webcast available from www.eisenhowerseries.com).

official or directly to the President. This ensures that the equities of the organization are heard and carried to the President. Secondly, budgetary authority, as granted specifically in legislation gives tremendous clout, stability, and sustainability to the future of the organization. Lastly, rating, promotion, or assignment control over the personnel within the organization is a remarkable lever to maintain a minimum level of staffing and to compel prolonged interactions.

These are the baseline requirements for any proposal based on an evaluation of the environment and an analysis of the current structures and reforms. This would retain the concept of centralized foreign policy-making in Washington, D.C., which is critical for staying accountable to the Constitutional principles of our country. Similarly, centralization of policy-making ensures that regional issues do not trump domestic realities or global concerns. It is then possible to reconfigure the structure of the implementation of foreign policy in order to make an institution that possesses cultural understanding of the region and its issues, possesses regional influence and the appeal of the populations and institutions of the region, has a prolonged engagement strategy to prevent crises or can respond quickly in the event a crisis occurs.

CHAPTER 6 – A NEW STRUCTURE – A REGIONAL APPROACH

The benefits of collocating the Military Services at regional command headquarters where they could plan and train together were demonstrated in 1991 in the Persian Gulf. Over time, this model should be emulated at the interagency level.¹¹⁶

This recommendation by Clark Murdock, one of the principal authors of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study speaks to this author's recommendation. The preceding chapter clearly identifies the qualities of any foreign policy architecture to be successful in the current and future environments. As a result, a regional approach, as described in this chapter, meets these criteria.

A regional ambassador, with a combatant commander deputy and a robust staff representing a broad array of cabinet-level and other agencies, will not only understand the regional and cultural implications of U.S. foreign policy but will also more effectively shape and impact the international implications of regional events with both soft and hard power. Figure 3 provides a rough sketch of the structure for such an agency. This proposal depicts a regional ambassador with the normal authorities and reporting chain of a typical country ambassador – to both the Secretary of State and the President. The deputy is dual-hatted as the Regional Combatant Commander who reports to the ambassador and through his traditional chain through the Secretary of Defense to the President.

Subordinate to the State and Defense Department leaders are functionally oriented offices. The offices represented in this diagram are a baseline for what each region might require. Flexibility should be retained in the design of the consulate so that it can be tailored to the specific requirements of the region. Similarly, these functional offices have an Assistant Secretary designated as the lead to coordinate the activities of the myriad cabinets or other government agencies that comprise that policy coordinating staff within that functional element. Figure three also provides a sampling of the types of agencies represented from the pool of 16

¹¹⁶ Murdock, 21.

Cabinet-level agencies and the more than fifty independent agencies and government corporations in the executive branch of the United States government today. The agencies represented in the diagram are those that represent the types of capabilities useful for that




Figure 3. Proposed Design of the Regional Interagency Consulate. The figure also gives an example of the some of the representative Cabinets or government agencies that could be included in a particular functional office within the consulate.

functional area and the list is not intended to be the exhaustive or authoritative listing of possible contributors. In the end, the number of contributing agencies to a functional area could decrease as agencies realize the redundancy of functions already existing between the organizations. For example, the existence of offices within the State Department focused on environmental issues or diseases. The Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Interior or Center for Disease Control could more appropriately address these issues, thereby, negating the need for the State Department to have offices devoted to these functions.

An organization with such robust functional specialties and the backbone of the military forces within the RCC could easily be overwhelmed in its ability to translate these capabilities into policies and implementation strategies. For this reason, the structure of the organization possesses a hybrid of the attributes of hierarchical and matrix structures. The organization chart makes it clear who is overall in charge and accountable while the subordinate functional offices below the leaders look more like policy coordinating committees than subordinate military organizations. This mixture allows the free flow of information and ideas while still providing a framework for decisions to be made and operations (both civilian and military) to be executed. Similarly, while the Ambassador is ultimately responsible for the entire organization, serious issues with great disagreement within the leadership of the Consulate can be pushed up to the National Security Council for final arbitration. This organization provides the Consulate a tremendous capability for policy formulation, task implementation, and mission monitoring.

From an administrative perspective, these leaders have personnel authority that can compel the organization to effectiveness. Each of the positions within the consulate staff will be declared through a manning document similar to what is established for the National Security Council or what the military is familiar with as a Joint Manning Document. The organization is able to staff the individual offices with the personnel and specialties it requires from this document. Similarly, these documents specify the reporting and rating chains of the organization. The evaluations are written within the consulate and promotion opportunities also exist within the consulate. Each of the organizations represented within the specific functional areas could be promoted to the Assistant Secretary position. Likewise, as the members of the country teams within the countries of that region attain promotions, they also provide a future resource pool for members of the Regional Interagency Consulate. It is a means to keep personnel engaged in the region longer by providing additional promotion opportunities within the same region.

Additionally, the Ambassador possesses the authority to reorganize the staff to account for issues that run across multiple functional areas. The establishment of coordination boards,

centers or cells could include: Security Sector Reform Coordination Cell, Development Initiatives Cell, Intelligence Coordination Cell, or mission-specific planning groups. Based on the requirements for a particular region of the world, these cells can be temporary or permanently fixed into the routine meeting agendas of the organization. In this manner, it continues to leverage the most positive attributes of hierarchical and matrix organizations.

While building the synergistic capabilities of many agencies, each agency representative can “reach-back” into the parent organizations for increased technical or intelligence information. It is unrealistic to assume the representative can have both the cultural expertise and the technical expertise for all possible crises that could arise. For this reason, it is important to leverage the information age opportunities. The intent of the structure proposed is not to create new regional stove-pipes or hierarchies but to provide expert pools of functional information organized in networked cells with cultural context to better plan, coordinate, and engage the challenges presented in each region. As a result, the members of the consulate do not permanently leave the parent organization from which they came.

Meeting the Needs?

This proposal has the potential to fill the gaps left by the current structure and reforms while retaining the best principles that have produced results in the current system.

First, this system retains the centralization of policy-making in Washington, D.C. and decentralizes implementation to the regional level. The National Security Council retains primacy in the development of national security policy. The change this structure brings to the national policy-making is in the quality of information provided back to the decision-makers. While greater synergy could result from a wider cabinet inclusion in the National Security Council at all levels, it is also impractical. The National Security Council helps the President make decisions and, as an advisory body, must remain small. The more personnel involved in the

process needlessly slows that process. Hence, the current size of the Deputies and Principals' Committees and the National Security Council itself should remain unchanged. However, the advice and recommendations that feed both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State in their National Security Council meetings with the President will come from regional leaders with staffs that can accurately gauge the totality of the complex problems facing their respective regions and can be more comprehensive in the actions proposed. More specifically, the range of options to address the concerns or crises will grow exponentially from all the new levers of 'soft' power positioned forward in the region. The resulting policy decisions by the President will then represent a greater awareness of the problem within its regional context while still fulfilling his duties in being receptive to the will of the American people. Additionally, the NSC will continue its role as the final arbiter of interagency disputes whether arising in Washington D.C. or in regional consulates.

Second, this new structure provides increased technical competence steeped in cultural understanding. "The intersection of domestic and foreign issues has expanded to affect every American and involve virtually the entire U.S. Government."¹¹⁷ The United States government possesses a depth of knowledge and expertise on a range of technical topics that never make it into the foreign policy realm. As described earlier, the complex environment existing across the world presents both challenges and opportunities. The military and Foreign Service officials deployed around the globe can only understand and capitalize on a small portion of them. Marshalling this increased technical or functional awareness and coupling that with an in-depth understanding of how to interact with the complex adaptive systems in each region to further U.S. interests abroad is a significant leap forward in foreign policy capacity. This proposal allows the U.S. to "develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in these civilizations see

their interests.”¹¹⁸ Huntington points out that “Successful political, security, and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations”¹¹⁹ And this structure better accounts for this cultural dynamic.

Third, a civilian led organization, while still American, is much more attractive to regional partners who are largely intimidated by military forces or presence. Eliot Cohen accurately levels charges against the military, through its regional combatant commanders, of dictating foreign policy abroad; “they have had the regional outlook, the sophisticated staffs and the resources to make things happen. It is small wonder that much of U.S. policy abroad has been effectively militarized, at the expense of the State Department....”¹²⁰ This militarization turns away valuable partners in solving the regional problems of which they possess expertise. The proposed structure reverses this dynamic and the growing animus from a perceived militancy of the U.S. foreign policy abroad resulting from the current structure. The new ambassador possesses all the same resources available to the RCC. At the same time, it entices the international and non-governmental organizations to work in partnership with the non-military technocrats within the consulate. Establishing these ties will be the first step toward empowering or working alongside these organizations in times of crisis. Those organizations of a regional or cultural nature will be able to voice their needs and concerns for more than just security assistance or American dollars. The increased capability of the regional consulate allows these organizations to request specific niche capabilities for specific problems of their region. These organizations, then, increase in their capacity and stature in the region which, in turn, can empower various parts of the concerned governments or lend credibility to regional organizations

¹¹⁷ U.S. State Department Strategic Plan (2000), 7.

¹¹⁸ Huntington, 168.

¹¹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, (Summer 1993) 165.

¹²⁰ Eliot A. Cohen. “History and Hyperpower.” *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 83, No. 4 (July/August 2004). 52.

to arbitrate between states over transnational concerns. All of this is achieved without a perceived heavy-handedness of military involvement – the existence of other government agencies, like USAID, MCA, or other secure and stable regional partners creates greater opportunities and makes these options more attractive to a wider NGO or philanthropic population. The United States can become more of a regional facilitator than economic and military authority.

Fourth, the military deputy provides a rapid military response capability in the event a crisis occurs requiring military intervention. Should the President determine a military led operation is required for the crisis, the Regional Combatant Commander can become the lead agency for the combat operations taking place. His role as Combatant Commander retains the reporting chain through the Secretary of Defense to the President. At the same time, his role as the principal military advisor to the Regional Interagency Consulate facilitates a transition to the post-conflict operations to take place when hostilities cease. The current struggle facing the interagency is the ability to smoothly make the transition from a military led effort to a civilian led effort. This structure, through established working relationships, makes this transition appear seamless. The President can then pronounce the end of hostilities or major combat operations and smoothly transition to a State Department lead.

Fifth is the ability to provide a prolonged presence in the region. Currently, the only prolonged regional presence is the military but even this is not for a sufficient length of time beyond a three year tour. The first effect of this new structure would be to provide upward mobility within the regional structure or the country teams of that region. This prospect can entice agency personnel for continued service within the region. Just as many Foreign Service officers aspire to one day become an ambassador, each of these officials can strive for an assistant secretary status or eventual ambassadorship of this regional consulate. This view will encourage officials to gain increased knowledge of the region and form the long-lasting relationships for true effectiveness.

Sixth is the crisis prevention and rapid response. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the S/CRS reform is the ability to rapidly respond to crises with a civilian cadre. As stated earlier, this cadre has no regional expertise, no established logistical or communications support, and no relationships to actors within the region. In contrast, the Regional Interagency Consulate possesses the requisite skills, cultural context, and the logistical and communications backbone of the Regional Combatant Command. The ability to prevent crises is markedly increased with a non-military solution. In the event a crisis occurs, the rapid response capabilities provide the President with a greater degree of flexibility to scale a response or maintain a low profile for sensitive regions or operations. It also allows for a greater economy of force since the Regional Ambassador can apply the right tool appropriate to the situation.

In line with this increased regional capability is the seventh function – creating synergy through the ability to leverage the expertise of the cabinets and agencies in Washington, D.C. The personnel on assignment to the Regional Interagency Consulate still belong to a parent cabinet or agency. This has three benefits. First, each Cabinet agency will own a piece of the regional solution through its contribution to that regional interagency staff. Gone are the days where only the Departments of Commerce, State and Defense immerse themselves in foreign policy. The plans and policies will be interagency from the outset as opposed to one agency's plan that tries to incorporate others later. Second, this structural change will force the executive agencies out of the bureaucratic hierarchy of information needs to more of what Newt Gingrich calls a "21st Century Entrepreneurial Public Administration Model."¹²¹ Members of the Regional Consulate will require information from the cabinet agency in Washington, D.C. that can and will be made available by leveraging information technology instead by a system where authority and

¹²¹ Newt Gingrich, "21st Century Entrepreneurial Public Management as a Replacement for Bureaucratic Public Administration: Getting Government to Move at the Speed and Effectiveness of the Information Age" 12 December 2005; [internet] accessed 13 January 2006. Part of his proposal in this

decisions are defined by who was in a room. The third benefit is a realignment of offices within the contributing cabinets along the same lines as the regional consulates to provide the “reach-back” support required – a long overdue synchronization that has, as of yet, been elusive.¹²² In the end, this proposal seeks to overcome the Cabinet centric method currently in place.¹²³

Lastly, the new structure provides the organization credibility within Washington D.C. The policy recommendations of the Regional Combatant Commanders have tremendous influence within the Department of Defense, with the President, and with Congress. This is more so than any ambassador and greater than any Assistant Secretary of any organization. This credibility transfers to this new Ambassador. He not only becomes the expert and focal point for issues pertaining to his region but becomes the point of accountability for all interagency successes and failures for that region of the world. Accountability for interagency efforts is an effect not created by the current reforms and that is nonexistent in the current NSC construct. The current construct places that burden on the President alone.

The Downside

Critics may levy six possible arguments against this regional approach. First, accusations of imperialism are common today. The appearance of ‘proconsuls,’ and the anti-Americanism it engenders, cannot be missed with the appointment of regional ambassadors. In response, the U.S. already possesses such ‘ambassadors’ who exist today in Washington D.C. under the titles of Assistant Secretaries. The difference in this plan is to push the purveyors of this knowledge and

paper is the ability for the information age technologies to get the right information to the right person regardless of where they are in the decision hierarchy or where they exist physically.

¹²² Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report by CSIS similarly recommends a “common USG-wide framework for defining the regions of the world.” Clark A. Murdock and Michele Fluornoy, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 2 Report” (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July, 2005) 38.

¹²³ The *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II Report* says on this, “Cabinet agencies continue to be the principal organizational element of national security policy, and each agency has its own strategies, capabilities, budget, culture, and institutional prerogatives to emphasize and protect.” 26.

status outside of the 'beltway' and give them presidential imprimaturs to meet with regional heads of state, testify before Congress as regional experts, and feel unencumbered from competing with other Assistant Secretaries of the interagency for primacy of thought.

The second issue is Eliot Cohen's imperial conundrum, "leaders face an unattractive set of options: mastering the challenges of one segment of their political universe scanting others; dealing with all problems superficially; or devolving large areas of policy to proconsuls and viceroys."¹²⁴ This criticism unfairly assesses the constitutional construct of our government. The current system of the United States government possesses the requisite checks and balances to avoid this conundrum. Each of these Ambassadors receives an appointment from the President, under the advice and consent of the Senate. Each of these entities can recall that ambassador at any time. Similarly, the proconsuls of antiquity lacked the ever dwelling media to document each misstep – the self-proclaimed watchdogs of the governmental system. This has happened in the past and there is no reason to assume that it would change under this new system.

The construct of having the Regional Combatant Commander working for a State Department ambassador is certain to draw criticism. An argument can be made that the system is currently out of balance. Samuel Huntington introduced the concept forty five years ago in *The Soldier and The State*. That is, how to balance the military imperative of a strong, effectively coercive military institution and for it to remain legitimate before the society it serves and subordinate to its elected and appointed civilian officials. As argued by Eliot Cohen, among others, the current Regional Combatant Commander exceeds that mandate by being involved in the policy development and decisions for topics that stray far from strictly security concerns. Similarly, the current reforms of the JIACG and the emerging "interagency" doctrine developed by Joint Forces Command all assume the DoD is the first among equals. The unwillingness of other agencies to participate in these efforts is recognition that these agencies do not agree with

this and the belief that the military's only real comparative advantage is in the development of kinetic solutions to far more complex problems.

James Dobbins, who oversaw some U.S. nation-building efforts during the 1990s from the State Department, and who is now at the Rand Corporation, summarizes a fourth criticism against such a comprehensive overhaul. "But there is also a whole range of criticism that says, 'If we get better at this, we might start doing it more often.'"¹²⁵ This criticism is akin to an ostrich hiding his head in the sand. As Fareed Zakaria points out, "The ultimate challenge for America...is whether we are prepared for this flat world, economic and political...are we conducting ourselves in a way that will succeed in this atmosphere? Or will it turn out that, having globalized the world, the United States has forgotten to globalize itself."¹²⁶ The U.S. leadership position in the world is undisputed and the globalization trend described earlier is irreversible. To think the U.S. will become less engaged in world affairs is to deny these conditions exist. The U.S. must get better in these engagements and the current reforms do not go far enough to promote the type of results needed to maintain the current U.S. position in the world.

Fifth, in an age of transnational threats, some of the threats will transcend regional boundaries. The question then stands as to whether this organization will increase the efficiency of the government to handle these supra-regional issues. It is instructive to note that while coordination inside an organization can be cumbersome, coordination with outside organizations pose even greater challenges. Joseph S. Nye states, "The best response to transnational terrorist

¹²⁴ Cohen, 186.

¹²⁵ Neil King Jr. and Greg Jaffe, "U.S. Sets New mission for Keeping the Peace: Pentagon Seeks Better Ways to Foster Postwar Stability and Reconstruction," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 January 2006, A4.

¹²⁶ Fareed Zakaria, review of *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, by Thomas Friedman, *New York Times*, 1 May 2005, available from <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/nyt/nytreview050105.html>; accessed 5 May 2005.

networks is networks of cooperating government agencies.”¹²⁷ This proposed paradigm begins to break down the walls between Cabinets by necessity. Being forced to work together will begin to integrate the various cultures – as it has with the armed services in their efforts at “jointness” in the post-*Goldwater-Nichols* era.

This point speaks to the last argument against this approach: the dysfunctional nature of interagency efforts to date. Criticisms against counterdrug efforts, pre-9/11 intelligence sharing efforts, and the recent Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq are but a few of oft cited failures in interagency efforts. Michele Fluornoy, a co-author of the *Beyond Goldwaters-Nichols Studies*, reinforced this criticism by writing, “Past attempts to put senior officials from the State Department or the Defense Department in charge have proved unsuccessful, either because the officials in charge lacked the authority to hold their counterparts in other agencies accountable for their elements of a plan or because they failed to adequately integrate the perspectives and capabilities of other agencies.”¹²⁸ The difference is each of these previous efforts at interagency coordination began in ad-hoc fashions and never received the full support of the contributing hierarchies. For this reason, ad-hoc approaches, while successful in some business ventures, will prove unsuccessful in the government forum over time. The establishment of a functional and enduring structure can and will combat this ineffectiveness. These proposed regional organizations will undoubtedly have difficulty in their inception, as did the inception of the Combatant Command concept. Over time, the quick successes and comparative low cost alternatives to complex problems in regional areas not addressed under the current structure will gain advocates and build momentum.

¹²⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr. “U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 No.4, (July/August 2003) 286.

¹²⁸ Michele Fluornoy, “Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004), 108.

CONCLUSION

We will not defeat terrorists solely through the use of force. We must assist others to create good governance and the rule of law – shaping an environment that precludes the flourishing of terrorism, much as a healthy body rejects the onslaught of disease.¹²⁹

This paper proposes that in an age dominated by states but rife with non-state actors, failing states, increasingly fluid boundaries, disenfranchised yet interconnected populations, and increasingly self-aware cultures, the United States must develop a foreign policy structure that is appropriate for these circumstances. This foreign policy structure must be able to make use of the unique and varied functional capabilities of the United States and be able to immerse them in the diverse cultures across the globe. It must be able to win over allies and partners to gain regional influence and appeal. It must have and be able to apply the relationships with regional partners and entities built through a prolonged presence and trust. When action is required, it must be flexible enough to respond across a range of responses from strictly civilian capabilities to military action. Finally, it must be able to act with the full support and confidence of the President and the responsibility and accountability to match.

This research concludes the current foreign policy architecture does not possess the capacity required to meet this challenge. Likewise, the current reforms both within the military and within the interagency are insufficient to the tasks required. As a result, it is necessary to reform the interagency to be able to adequately match the desired ends of the National Security Strategy with more agile and diverse ways and means.

This proposal meets that challenge by developing a structure robust enough to offer the President options, both military and non-military, to prevent crises from occurring and to respond if they do. It can operate in a state construct just as easily as in a construct of sub-national and

¹²⁹ General Peter Pace, “The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff,” (paper distributed electronically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 2005), available from <http://jcs.mil/PaceGuidance02Oct05.pdf>.

transnational actors. At the same time, it benefits from the competencies already residing in the executive branch of the United States government without having to build the capacity from civilian organizations. It develops a culture of interagency cooperation with professionals who break out of their stove-piped functional organizations to assess and analyze problems within the complex adaptive systems in which they exist. Lastly, it can tread more lightly in the world by bringing the capabilities needed to meet the needs of a region in the manner that is more amenable to the concepts of maintaining sovereignty, empowering the local leadership and organizations, and demonstrating compassion. The soft power levers are enabled and supported by the backbone of the hard power instruments that can respond, if necessary.

In the end, Eizenstat is correct in saying about transformation of this sort that “none of this will happen without fundamental commitments from the highest level of U.S. leadership.”¹³⁰ Moving from proposal to implementation is no small task. It requires Presidential involvement, cooperation from Congress not seen since the *Goldwaters-Nichols* legislation of 1986, and tremendous teamwork among the executive departments and agencies. However, the security and prosperity of the United States depend on their ability to do just that.

APPENDIX 1 – Notional JIACG Structure

¹³⁰ Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, & Jeremy M. Weinstein. “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84 Issue 1 (Jan/Feb 2005): 146.




Figure II-3. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure

This figure, from Joint Publication 3-08 volume I (draft, 2005), describes what the JIACG should look like when composed within the regional combatant commands.

APPENDIX 2 – S/CRS Functions

1. Monitor and Plan: Identify states and regions of greatest risk and importance, and lead U.S. planning focused on these priorities to avert crises, when possible, to prepare for them as necessary. Integrate planning and exercises with the military.

2. Prepare Skills and Resources: Establish and manage an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response and the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support mechanisms can operate effectively. Civilian response corps and standby civilian capabilities will be developed.

3. Mobilize and Deploy: Coordinate the deployment of U.S. resources and implementation of programs in cooperation with international and local partners to accelerate transitions from conflict to peace.


4. Leverage International Resources: Work with international organizations, international financial institutions, individual states and NGOs to harmonize approaches, coordinate planning, accelerate deployment of assets, and increase the interoperability of personnel and equipment in multilateral operations.

5. Learn from Experience: Incorporate best practices and lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning, exercises, and operational capabilities that support improved performance.¹³¹

¹³¹ Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Functions of S/CRS*. [internet] available from (<http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>; accessed 21 October 2005).

APPENDIX 3 – S/CRS Organization Chart

Organizational Chart



Source: <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12937.htm>; accessed 13 January 2006

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Barnett, Thomas P.M. *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004.
- Bletz, Donald F. *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger Publishing, 1973.
- de Soto, Hernando. *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Dobbins, James et al., *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.
- Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000.
- Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer*. Harper-Perennial, 1951.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone, 1996.
- Jordan, Amos A. et al., *American National Security. 5th ed.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. New York: Random House, 2000.
- Komer, Robert W. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1973.
- _____. *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in Vietnam*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.
- Lennon, Alexander T.J., Ed. *What Does the World Want from America?* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002.
- Marshall, Andrew W. and J.J. Martin, Eds. *On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
- Orr, Robert C. Ed. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004.
- Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.
- Quinn, Dennis J. ed., *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999.
- Senge, Peter M. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. New York: Currency, 1994.

- Snow, Donald M. and Eugene Brown. *Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Stuart, Douglas T. Ed. *Organizing for National Security*. Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.
- Useem, Michael. *The Leadership Moment: Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and Their Lessons For Us All*. New York: Random House, 1998.
- Williams, William A. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: World Publishing, 1959.

JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS

- Adolf, Robert B. Jr, Charles W. Stiles, and Franklin D. Hitt Jr. "Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1995): 48-53
- Baldauf, Scott. "Aid Groups in Afghanistan Weigh Good Deeds vs. Safety." *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 October 2003.
- Binnendijk, Hans, Richard I. Kugler, Charles Shotwell, and Kori Schake Editors. *Strategic Assessment 1999, Priorities for a Turbulent World*. Fort McNair, Washington DC, National Defense University, 99.
- Matthew F. Bogdanos, "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 37 (2d Quarter, 2005) : 11-18.
- Center for Systemic Peace, *Global Conflict Trends*. [internet], available from <http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/conflict.htm>, accessed 29 September 2005.
- Cohen, Eliot A. "Supreme Command in the 21st Century." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 2000): 48-54.
- _____. "History and Hyperpower." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 83, No. 4 (July/August 2004) 49-63.
- Eizenstat, Stuart E. John Edward Porter, & Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84 Issue 1 (Jan/Feb 2005).
- Friedman, Thomas. "It's a Flat World After All," *New York Times*, 3 April 2005 [periodical online]; available from <http://nytimes.com>; Internet; accessed 29 May 2005.
- International Crisis Group Africa. "A Congo Action Plan." [internet] available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3758>; accessed 19 October 2005.
- International Crisis Group Africa Briefing No25, *The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and For All*, 12 May 2005, prepared by the International Crisis Group [internet] available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/b034_congo_action_plan.pdf; accessed 21 October 2005.
- Jenkins, Brian Michael. "Redefining the Enemy: the World has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not," *RAND Review*, 28 (Spring 2004).
- King, Neil Jr. and Greg Jaffe, "U.S. Sets New mission for Keeping the Peace: Pentagon Seeks Better Ways to Foster Postwar Stability and Reconstruction," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 January 2006, A4.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. "How to Win in Iraq." *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84 Issue 5; (Sep/Oct2005): 87-104.

- Moore, Scott W. "Today It's Gold, Not Purple." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 98/99): 100-105.
- Nelson, Anna Kasten. "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," *Diplomatic History* No. 7, (Fall 1983): 307-26.
- Nye, Joseph S. "The Changing Nature of World Power," *Political Science Quarterly*, 105 (Summer 1990): 177-192.
- _____. "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 No.4, (July/August 2003): 60-72.
- U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Joint Vision 2020." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 25 (Summer 2000): 58-76.
- Weisman, Steven R. "Bush Confidante Begins Task of Repairing America's Image Abroad," *New York Times*, 21 August 2005, *New York Times On-Line* [internet].
- Fareed Zakaria, review of *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, by Thomas Friedman, *New York Times*, 1 May 2005, available from <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/nyt/nytreview050105.html>.

U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002.
- National Defense University. "Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook." Washington D.C.: National Defense University, Jan 2003.
- National Security Council. *Managing Complex Contingency Operations, Presidential Decision Directive 56*. Washington D.C.: U.S. NSC, May 1997.
- _____. *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National Security Presidential Directive 44*. Washington D.C.: U.S. NSC, December 2005.
- U.S. Department of State. *U.S. State Department Strategic Plan (2000)*, Office of Management Policy and Planning, 25 October 2000.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*, Joint PUB 3-08. Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, 9 October 1996.
- _____, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II*, Joint PUB 3-08. Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, 9 October 1996.
- _____. *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I (DRAFT)*, Joint PUB 3-08. Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, XX MONTH 2005. II-14
- _____, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, Joint PUB 5-0 (draft 2). Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, 8 October 2004.
- _____. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. Version 2.0*. Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, August 2004
- _____. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, Joint Publication 0-2. Washington D.C.: U.S. JCS, 10 July 2001

U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA)*. Pamphlet 4. Norfolk, VA: USJWFC, 24 February 2004.

_____, *The Joint Operational Environment – Into the Future*. Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, January 2005.

U.S. Joint Warfighting Center. *JWFC Pamphlet 6, Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*. United States Joint Forces Command, 27 June 2004.

THESES, STUDIES, SPEECHES and OTHER PAPERS

Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart Johnson, eds. “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.” Washington D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2003.

Eliot Cohen, address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference, Washington D.C., 27 September 2005. (webcast available from www.eisenhowerseries.com).

Gingrich, Newt. “21st Century Entrepreneurial Public Management as a Replacement for Bureaucratic Public Administration: Getting Government to Move at the Speed and Effectiveness of the Information Age” 12 December 2005; [internet].

Loane, Geoff. Address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference Panel Discussion on Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Role in National Security, Washington D.C., 27 September 2005. (webcast available from www.eisenhowerseries.com)

Murdock, Clark A. and Michele Fluornoy, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 2 Report.” Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July, 2005.

Pace, Peter. “The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff,” (paper distributed electronically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 2005), available from <http://jcs.mil/PaceGuidance02Oct05.pdf>.

Pascual, Carlos. Speech to the AUSA Convention on 4 October 2005. [internet] available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>.

Rast, Vicki J. “Interagency Conflict and United States Intervention Policy: Toward a Bureaucratic Model of Conflict Termination.” Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University, 1999.

Stahl, Marcy. *Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Education Survey Results*. Vienna, VA: ThoughtLink Inc., 2004.

Tallal Prince El-Hassan Bin. Address to the Eisenhower National Security Series Conference, Washington D.C., 27 September 2005. (webcast available from www.eisenhowerseries.com)