

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**STRATEGIC LEADER AS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATOR**

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## ABSTRACT

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In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, no institution or enterprise can achieve its strategic goals without engaging with and shaping the information environment. Advanced portable technologies, the 24-hour global news cycle, 'live' cable broadcasts, web-based media, and now round-the-clock web logging have conspired to create a leadership environment unparalleled in our history defined by worldwide visibility - and opportunity. In this extraordinary climate, more than at any time before, our strategic leaders set the tone for the entire nation, its national character, and its strategic influence around the world. Arguably more so than policies or resources, our success or failure comes down to the individuals who lead us and their ability to communicate. Given this, several fundamental strategic leadership competencies stand out and deserve fresh examination. Among them are defining a strategic vision, creating by personal example an organizational culture based on values, diversity, innovation and integrity, and the commitment to personally represent the organization through aggressive internal and external communication. This paper will review vision and culture as imperative foundations for strategic leadership, and tie those imperatives to what ultimately is the greatest force multiplier - strategic leader communication.



## STRATEGIC LEADER AS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATOR

The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding, go out and meet it.

- Thucydides

Leadership at the strategic level is not for the faint of heart. Given the realities of the world we face, particularly in the national security community, seeking leadership at the strategic level is itself an act of selfless service. Increasingly combative political agendas, advanced portable technologies, and the boom in new media, particularly the nearly unlimited capabilities of the Internet, have conspired to create a leadership environment defined by visibility that is unparalleled in our history. The 24-hour news cycle invites immediate public scrutiny to nearly every decision made, with consequences playing out in Congressional hearings, 'live' cable television broadcasts, nationally-syndicated radio talk shows, media opinion-editorials, and now web logging, or blogging, day and night on the worldwide web.

Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the public's seemingly insatiable appetite for news, talk, analysis, and information continues to accelerate. At the very time media consumers cannot seem to get enough information, they have likewise never been more savvy or sophisticated in using it to watch leaders and evaluate their actions.

In the Information Age, no institution or enterprise can achieve its strategic goals without engaging with and shaping this environment. The Department of Defense itself cannot be fully successful in fulfilling its national security mandate if it does not integrate the information component into all of its actions, plans, leader development requirements, and indeed its very culture.

In this extraordinary climate, more than at any time before, our strategic leaders set the tone for the entire nation, its national character, and its strategic influence around the world. Arguably more so than resources, policies, or organizational structure, our success or failure boils down to the individuals who lead us and their ability to communicate.

### Setting the Stage

Given this, several fundamental strategic leadership attributes stand out and deserve fresh examination. Among them, none are more important than defining a strategic vision, creating and leading by example an organizational culture based on values, diversity, innovation and integrity, and the commitment to personally represent the organization through aggressive internal and external communication. This paper will examine vision and culture as imperative

foundations for strategic leadership and tie those imperatives to what ultimately is the greatest force multiplier - strategic leader communication.

#### Perspectives on Strategic Leader Vision

The most critical competency of every strategic leader is the ability to see the future. Leaders at the strategic level cannot move an organization to a future they cannot envision.

The well-known author of *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* Stephen R. Covey suggests a view of strategic leader vision in his Habit #2. That is, to begin with the end in mind.<sup>1</sup> He suggests that all things are created twice, first in our minds and then we work to bring them into physical existence.<sup>2</sup>

John C. Maxwell in *The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership* puts it another way. His 'Law of Navigation' states that 'anyone can steer the ship, but it takes a leader to chart the course.'<sup>3</sup> Charting one's course evokes a broader view toward a grander destination.

Still another perspective on the importance of strategic vision can be found in *The Transformational Leader*. Authors Noel M. Tichy and Mary Anne Devanna conclude that any transformational process starts with creating a vision for the organization, one that provides people "with an image of what can be and motivates them to move ahead into the future they envision."<sup>4</sup>

Closer to home, Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, puts it this way: a strategic leader's fundamental strength is in envisioning the future, *conveying it to a wide audience* (emphasis added), and personally leading change to achieve it.<sup>5</sup> Further, the Army War College Strategic Leadership Primer defines strategic vision as "a means of focusing effort and progressing toward a desired future – what ought to be."<sup>6</sup> It goes on to clarify: "the term vision suggests a visual image – a mental picture of a future organization ahead of us on the horizon, one which includes an ideal end state."<sup>7</sup>

Two examples of strategic vision in the 20<sup>th</sup> century stand out and demonstrate what can be achieved when strategic leaders 'begin with the end in mind.'

President John F. Kennedy, in his *Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs* given in person on May 25, 1961, makes his world-changing remarks on the national urgency for space exploration: "...I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth."<sup>8</sup>

Although the technologies required were not yet physically possible, President Kennedy looked beyond the then-impossible, saw the future and led America there.

Dr. Martin Luther King's 1963 "I Have a Dream" speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial during the March on Washington is another national example of strategic leader vision. He clearly envisioned a future for America in his mind, as Covey says, which didn't yet exist. He was not deterred. He too looked beyond what seemed impossible on that day to a future he believed was truly possible.

It is difficult to imagine our world today had these two, and many other, strategic leaders not had vision.

For strategic leaders in the national security community, vision of what ought to be, not of what is, is critical. This vision cannot only include the 'hardware' associated with weapons and technologies with which we fight on the battlefield, but also speaks to the 'software' of the people, the attitudes and organizational culture that will sustain our military through both good times and sacrifice for the rest of this century and beyond. All of us who seek to lead at the strategic level in today's environment must first conceive of the future and its ideal end state, both in its organizational 'hardware' and its 'software,' the human dimension.

President George W. Bush includes this human dimension in his strategic vision for national security in the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* in September 2002. He concluded his introductory remarks by summarizing his own view of the world today and his vision for a future not yet real.

Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.<sup>9</sup>

He envisioned a world future as it ought to be, to return to the definition cited above in the Army War College Strategic Leadership Primer, and he challenged America to lead the world in this effort.

So too do Secretary of the Army Dr. Francis J. Harvey and General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, envision the Army of the future. In the 2006 Army Posture Statement they demonstrate their intent not only for today's Army but for the Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: "the Army Vision is to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth – the ultimate instrument of national resolve – that is both ready to meet and relevant to the challenges of the dangerous and complex 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment."<sup>10</sup> The Army Vision provides that crucial way ahead for the organization of today and, more importantly, tomorrow.

Defining the strategic vision is a mandate for every strategic leader and drives nations, organizations and individuals. Across DOD, our strategic leaders today must also be visionaries in their approach to the global information environment. Beginning now to create a future in which leaders at all levels are strategic communicators - educated, trained, equipped and available - will allow vision to meet opportunity. Strategic leadership begins with strategic vision; to become reality, strategic vision requires strategic communication. The success of our strategic goals depends on it.

### Creating a Strategic Culture

Defining and modeling organizational culture is a key component in reaching a vision's destination. It will also be crucial in bringing to life the vision of creating leader strategic communicators. The manner in which strategic leaders demonstrate what is important to them becomes the inherent message they send to those who follow. Strategic culture flows from the strategic leader. Several perspectives follow.

The course directive for the Strategic Leadership course at the U.S. Army War College instructs that strategic leaders must do everything necessary to get and maintain competitive advantage for an organization, shape the organizational culture, and create an ethical, effective command climate.<sup>11</sup>

Edgar H. Schein defines organizational culture in his book *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. He writes that the culture of a group is defined as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."<sup>12</sup>

John P. Kotter in *Leading Change* also describes culture as referring to "norms of behavior and shared values among a group of people."<sup>13</sup>

The Army's view of what those behavior norms and shared values should be begins in Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, subtitled Be, Know Do. "Be, Know, Do" is a manual for all Army leaders but applies to the strategic leader perhaps first and foremost. In it, former Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki outlines in his foreword the very heart of everything that follows in the manual: "...above all, I challenge you to be leaders of character and competence who lead others to excellence. Whether supporting training or fighting, America expects you to BE, KNOW and DO what is right."<sup>14</sup> General Shinseki wanted Army leaders to understand that they above all define the Army's culture, and that they do that by showing the way with personal example.

Edgar Schein also speaks to the ways in which leaders transmit and embed culture in their organizations. He identifies six primary embedding mechanisms, the first of which is that what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis becomes embedded in culture.<sup>15</sup>

He believes what leaders consistently ask about and pay attention to is one of the most powerful mechanisms for communicating what they believe in.<sup>16</sup> Schein says this can mean anything from what they comment on or notice to what they reward or don't. Schein also concludes that leaders embed culture by deliberate role modeling, teaching and coaching, that their own visible behavior sends a powerful message to the members of a group.<sup>17</sup>

Embedding strategic culture within the Army based on its core values remains a critical competency for strategic leaders. Perhaps never before in our Army's history has the need for its strategic leaders to 'Be, Know, Do' what is right been more important as we transform to face the challenges ahead. Public support is at its most imperative as we continue to wage and sacrifice in the Global War on Terror. Recruiting and retention efforts are significantly affected not only by our performance on the battlefield, but by our reputation as a professional organization representative of the nation we serve.

Our strategic culture, founded on the integrity, dedication and selflessness of our service members, has resulted in great public confidence in the military. According to the latest Harris Poll, the military remains the most admired institution in the nation.<sup>18</sup> Our strategic leaders must shape the future organizational culture that builds on this success by embedding a culture of communication to share the story. Success begets success. Only through deliberate and visible behaviors of their own can strategic leaders make this happen.

#### Strategic Leader Communication

In the words of President Abraham Lincoln, "Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed." Being possessed of a strategic vision and creating organizational culture based on values are merely the preambles to truly great strategic leadership. Strategic leaders must possess the ability and indeed enthusiasm to engage at every opportunity to communicate about his or her organization to all audiences, stakeholders and constituencies. Every strategic leader must take a personal interest in and commit to personal investment in advocating and educating all audiences, including and perhaps especially the internal audience, about his or her organization, its purpose and its meaning.

President Thomas Jefferson seemed to understand this when he said ‘information is the currency of democracy.’ He understood an often undervalued strategic leadership imperative. That is, that information is knowledge, and that it should be, indeed would be, the knowledge of the governed from which our new democracy would derive its power. Moreover, he knew even then that investment in sharing information would universally pay off for the investor. To use a modern day analogy, he knew that one must spend money to make money. Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson may not have declared information as an element of national power or called the deliberate, effective sharing of it strategic communication, but he knew that effective, proactive, and persistent communication – led by the President himself – is itself a fundamental element of American strategic leadership and would clinch success for the burgeoning American experiment in democracy.

Fast forward 230 years. Has Jefferson’s instinctive connection between leadership success and vigorous communication changed? Certainly the information environment has but ultimately the principle of strategic leader communication remains the same.

By nearly every accounting of how organizations successfully implement their strategic vision, successful communication and outreach to that organization’s publics is critical and must begin with its chief executive. In the case of the United States, that means of course the President. The owner of the strategic national security vision is the President. Thus, it is incumbent upon the President to be the voice of the strategy. A 2004 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication put it very effectively: “A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required.....Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials.”<sup>19</sup>

The Army War College educates future strategic leaders as to why they must lead communications efforts personally. “In an era of instant communications and 24-hour news cycles, the strategic leader must be able to manage meaning, be able to ‘tell stories,’ and articulate organizational purpose and action to a world-wide audience.”<sup>20</sup>

As leaders move from the tactical level through the operational to the strategic level, the world in which they find themselves is more complex and uncertain. Accomplishing the strategic mission requires collaboration, consensus, and buy-in from many stakeholders and constituencies not within the leader’s span of control. Communication skills become all the more critical because of this the more senior one becomes.

Furthermore, the strategic leader must add his or her own genuine passion and enthusiasm for the organization and its people to the 'mission sets' of strategic communication, public information and public outreach to be truly effective. Only through leader passion and enthusiasm can one truly educate, inspire, and build advocacy. This is ultimately why strategic communication must be viewed as more than simply a public information program. Truly strategic communication, by strategic leaders, proactively and deliberately delivered, is a critical competency that will get and maintain the competitive advantage our Army and DOD needs now and into the future.

The role of the strategic leader in shaping the communication of an organization cannot be overstated. Check the shelves of any local bookstore and one will find it filled with leadership 'bibles' all of which emphasize the need for leaders in all industries to make it their personal business to communicate inside and outside of their organizations, and to recognize that it is an imperative for success. Strategic leaders who achieve great results know this and take full advantage of it.

#### Strategic Communication Defined

This means strategic leaders must communicate *strategically*. But what exactly does this mean? Is strategic communication simply "the new public affairs"?

Current joint and Army doctrine are still evolving to include the concept of strategic communication within the military context. There is still some confusion regarding the purpose and meaning of strategic communication as it relates to public affairs. Some in the Army define strategic communication as the function of public affairs. The opening paragraph of the Army's policy on public affairs, Army Regulation 360-1, *The Army Public Affairs Program*, provides a reason to conclude this. It says in part, "public affairs fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American public and Army informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict, and war."<sup>21</sup> For those who have served in the military public affairs functional area, this is and will always be a truly prime directive. Our obligation to keep the public informed is inherent in our institution.

In the joint world, Joint Publication 3-61, Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs, likewise addresses the mission, principles and execution of public affairs for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) but itself does not yet address strategic communication. The mission of joint public affairs as outlined is to support the JFC by communicating truthful and unclassified information about DOD activities to U.S., allied, national, international and internal audiences.<sup>22</sup>

These doctrinal documents promulgate DOD's policy for public affairs as the mission to educate and inform all publics about its mission and activities. This is a vital mission for every public institution and is the foundation for the confidence placed in our military forces by the American people.

While strategic communication does include the function of public affairs, it goes further. Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, defines strategic communication as "focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. interests, policies and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power."<sup>23</sup>

Key concepts in this definition stand out: efforts to *understand and engage* key audiences; create, strengthen or preserve *conditions favorable to our interests*; and *coordinated* programs, plans, themes, messages, and products.

Strategic communication is, by definition, a strategy for communicating. It recognizes that information can transform attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, and is a potent force for achieving strategic ends. Strategic communication is effects-based and begins with the end in mind, as Covey might say.

#### Assessing our Strategic Communication Commitment

Although strategic communication is a key concept for successful U.S. governance, our record so far in using it to our strategic advantage is mixed.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) includes a foundation for the principle that national security strategy is indelibly tied to success in public communication. It affirms that "just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America. The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must excel."<sup>24</sup>

The NSS demonstrates the President's awareness of the need to build public communication, strategic communication, into every action we take as a nation to secure our homeland and defend our interests. We should follow this example by cascading this commitment to the public's understanding throughout our foundational national security documents. We must embed this kind of language and commitment in every statement of

national security strategy and act upon it with resolve. Conversely, however, a review of the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy do not reflect any direct mention of the need to communicate those strategies to the American people.<sup>2526</sup> When these documents are updated, this should change. Every national policy and national security strategy statement should include a resolution that the policy and strategy itself can only succeed with a commitment to broad-based, proactive strategic communication.

#### Renewing Strategic Communications Efforts

Other examples of awareness of the advantages of strategic communication come from elsewhere in government. One starting point came from the White House announcement creating the Office of Global Communication: “The President understands the importance of conveying America's message to the world. Better coordination of our international communications will help convey the truth about America and the goals we share with people everywhere. He knows we need to communicate our policies and values to the world – with greater clarity and through dialogue with emerging voices around the globe.”<sup>27</sup> This might seem to some a restatement of the obvious. However, every communicator knows that repetition is the engine of understanding.

A review of the State Department Strategic Plan FY 2004-2009 outlines a multi-point plan for public diplomacy and public affairs, themselves elements of strategic communication.<sup>28</sup> The plan discusses three dimensions for the department's efforts: a regional dimension for public diplomacy that emphasizes regional and transnational programs to address cultural and media influences that reach across borders; maintaining a dialogue and building support at home; and enhancing outreach to both younger and wider audiences making broader use of people-to-people contacts.<sup>29</sup> The plan further elaborates on how it will accomplish these objectives including by communicating with younger audiences through content and means tailored to their context; quickly countering propaganda and disinformation by alerting senior officials and Embassies to hostile propaganda and disinformation and offering counterstrategies; listening to foreign audiences; taking advantage of advances in communication technology; and promoting international educational exchanges and professional exchanges.<sup>30</sup>

These efforts, while embedded in the State Department Strategic Plan, are clearly the realm of strategic communication. Strategic goals and audiences are identified, and actions are outlined toward a desired end state. The State Department has embedded a Strategic Communication Plan within its department Strategic Plan.

Committing to these efforts in the State Department's five-year strategic plan is laudable. Carrying out the hard work of implementation will take time and resources. The appointment last September of Karen Hughes as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will add new life to these programs. In a keynote address to the 2005 Forum on the Future of Public Diplomacy, Ambassador Hughes offered her plan for enhanced public diplomacy efforts.<sup>31</sup> She introduces her 4-E's of engage, exchange, educate and empower. Ambassador Hughes is the President's most trusted strategic communicator. He put her where he believes she can make the most difference – a demonstration of his awareness of the criticality of this mission. Her strategic communication efforts will enhance public diplomacy success. Moreover, while addressing specifically the public diplomacy aspect of strategic communication, these efforts have applicability to the functions of public affairs and public information as well.

#### Following State's Lead in Strategic Communication Planning

The Department of Defense has needed for a long time to put this same emphasis on its strategic communication planning. It is doing so now. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report provides this long overdue beginning. In it, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recognizes and articulates the need for effective strategic communication planning and commits the department to “work to integrate communications horizontally across the enterprise to link information and communication issues with broader policies, plans and actions.”<sup>32</sup> Secretary Rumsfeld bolstered this QDR commitment during his comments February 17, 2006, to the Council on Foreign Relations by reinforcing his plans to enhance DOD's strategic communications architecture, resourcing, and expertise.<sup>33</sup>

#### Bonding Strategic Leadership to Strategic Communication

A strong central document charting a strategic communication ‘way ahead’ is important. But individual strategic leaders with the vision to translate that roadmap into reality will drive the changes that will ultimately make the real difference.

Secretary Rumsfeld is demonstrating personal strategic leadership by creating opportunities to speak to a variety of audiences about his goals for the department on topics including the war in Iraq, Defense transformation, and implementation of the National Security Personnel System. Over the past several months, he has spoken to youth audiences, the National Press Club, and at Town Hall meetings in Iraq, Korea and in the Pentagon.

Another strong example of the bond between strategic leadership and strategic communication was offered by Gen. Peter Pace, new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

his initial instructions to the Joint Staff in October 2005. The framework he spoke of serves as a model for the entire DOD community, placing due emphasis on outreach as a fundamental component of strategic communication strategy. He wrote, "We can both learn from and help others through a proactive outreach program to nontraditional partners. Academia, industry, think tanks and a host of other organizations possess a wide-range of expertise and insights invaluable to finding solutions to our most pressing problems....Outreach also extends to our duty to assist others in the execution of their responsibilities and to ensure the American public has the opportunity to interact with their military. We should regularly interact with our fellow citizens, through speaking opportunities, participation in civic events, interaction with elected representatives and their staffs, and through the media. Americans need to see their military and to have the opportunity to dialogue with us. A direct link with the citizens we defend is a core element of the American construct."<sup>34</sup>

Gen. Pace's commitment to outreach should serve as a role model to leaders and commanders in every unit at every level. With his charter as a roadmap, we must strategically plan those engagements.

#### Recommendations

- Strategic Leader Outreach to the Public. We should redouble our efforts in strategic outreach beginning at the strategic leader level. The Secretary of the Defense should direct all general officers, Senior Executive Service civilians, and colonel-level commanders to proactively seek out not less than four public outreach events per year. These engagements should include the full spectrum of audiences from the strategic to the grass roots. They must also include candid question and answer opportunities to allow us to directly listen to those who must support us. Face-to-face speaking and listening 'tours' should be a significant area of emphasis and indeed a 'green tab' requirement of our strategic leadership community. The education community should be of particular interest, including direct engagement with student groups from middle school through graduate school. Remarks should spread the key message of service to a nation at war, and relay stories of the service members who have answered the Call to Duty. Few things send a message as well as stories of individual selfless service.
- Strategic Leader Outreach to the Media. While direct strategic outreach to the public should be our first emphasis, we cannot retreat from media engagement. Strategic leaders understand the obligation to respond to the media. Despite perceptions that the media focuses on the negative, leaders must continue to engage to convey the story of

the men and women serving the nation at home and abroad, and to advance understanding of decisions and actions taken to support our national interests. We have made recent positive strides in media engagement with our initiatives in Iraq – many of our senior commanders are making themselves available to the media in theater and by satellite to the Pentagon press corps on a regular basis. Strategic leaders must continue to be visible and create a department-wide strategic culture of engagement. Many officers at all levels view media engagements as having career-ending potential. Secretary Rumsfeld himself acknowledged this in his remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations in February.<sup>35</sup> However, with Secretary Rumsfeld's clear top-down driven buy-in that not all efforts will be immediately or obviously successful, strategic leaders can engage with more confidence and persistence. There certainly are areas where leaders must be risk-averse. Media engagement should not be one of them. Moreover, we must drive the conversation not respond to it. We must be eager story-tellers and 'glad you asked' oriented. All strategic leaders must understand their responsibilities for and the value of telling our story to the media and why, despite perceptions, it must be viewed and engaged as a mission multiplier in today's environment.

- **Grow Strategic Communicators in All Leaders.** To prepare strategic leaders for their responsibilities to communicate at that level, we should start by adding professional development in the art of communication, and the broader role of strategic communications to the officer and noncommissioned officer education systems, and to all civilian career intern programs. While public affairs modules do exist throughout, we should go beyond the traditional view of public affairs, to develop a full core course into every level to educate all leaders about the purpose and advantage of strategic communication, the nature of and market for information in the global information environment, and the cause and effect relationship between messages, audiences, methods and mediums. We must also insist from the top that young leaders gain deliberate experience in strategic communication through their own involvement in public outreach events, media engagements, and communications planning during exercises and operations. This combination of education and experience early and throughout the career will grow leaders who arrive to each level of leadership with the relevant strategic framework they need to be successful. Given the environment, we must develop strategic communicators simultaneously with development of strategic leaders.

- Build a Strategic Culture of Engagement. A primary goal for current strategic leaders should be to apply strategic vision and culture to the strategic communication enterprise of the entire DOD. By role modeling now the behaviors and actions of a truly inculcated culture of engagement, strategic leaders can chart the future success of DOD strategic communication for the next generation. But it will take more than strategic leader actions themselves to create this culture of engagement. As with any policy or initiative, it will outlive the implementing leader only through institutionalized systems for accountability, evaluation, measurement and reward accompanied by personal leader involvement, prioritized resourcing, dedicated education and relevant training.

### Conclusion

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth; and second, the courage to follow that light wherever it may lead.

- Carl Von Clausewitz<sup>36</sup>

Public support of our nation's strategic goals is at its most imperative as we continue to fight and sacrifice in the Global War on Terror. Our international friends must be confident we are committed to our goals and to our shared national interests. Our enemies must be equally confident we will not lose our will to deter and defeat them. Military performance on the battlefield in the Global War on Terror is but one element of success.

Clearly critical also is success in maintaining international support of U.S. strategic policies, and the highest prize - American support for the men and women of America's Armed Forces who represent those policies at home and around the world.

Strategic leader success cannot be achieved without strategic communication success. We must do better to consistently measure that success, evolve programs and renew our commitment to the process, create a strategic culture of engagement, take the best of practices from any proven endeavor, and reach out to connect to the public like never before from all levels.

When President Thomas Jefferson said 'information is the currency of democracy', he 'got it'. All of us must demonstrate to the world and to the American people that we "get it" today as Jefferson did 230 years ago. Only then can democracy have credibility.

If information is indeed the currency of democracy, we must not let it burn a hole in our national pocket.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Stephen R. Covey, *The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People* (New York, NY: Simon and Shuster, 1989), 95.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>3</sup> John C. Maxwell, *The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership Workbook* (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2002), 39.

<sup>4</sup> Noel M. Tichy and Mary Anne Devanna, *The Transformational Leader* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), 122.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Leadership*, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 7-1.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Strategic Leadership Primer 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Department of the Army, 2004), 21.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>8</sup> President John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs," Joint Session of Congress, 25 May 1961; available from <http://www.jfklibrary.org/j052561.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

<sup>9</sup> George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Francis J. Harvey and Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, "2006 Army Posture Statement: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities," 10 February 2006; available from [http://www.army.mil/aps/06/05\\_ArmyVision.html](http://www.army.mil/aps/06/05_ArmyVision.html); Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Strategic Leadership Course* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Department of the Army, 2005), 6.

<sup>12</sup> Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 12.

<sup>13</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 148.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Field Manual 22-100, inside front cover.

<sup>15</sup> Schein, 231.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 240.

<sup>18</sup> Jim Garamone, "Harris Poll Finds Military Still Most-Admired U.S. Institution," 7 March 2006, the American Forces Press Service Home Page at "Press Service," available from

[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/20060307\\_4420.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/20060307_4420.html); Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 2004), 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 17.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Public Affairs Program*, Army Regulation 360-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2000), 1-6.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Public Affairs*, Joint Publication 3-61 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2005) I-3.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2006), GL-12.

<sup>24</sup> Bush, 31.

<sup>25</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *National Defense Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, March 2005).

<sup>26</sup> Gen. Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 2004).

<sup>27</sup> Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "New White House Office Coordinates Global Communications," 21 January 2003, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030121-4.htm>; Internet; accessed on 3 December 2005.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State and US. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, August 2003), 30-32.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 30-31.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-32.

<sup>31</sup> Ambassador Karen Hughes, "Remarks to the 2005 Forum on the Future of Public Diplomacy", available from <http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/55165.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2005.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 92.

<sup>33</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations," 17 February 2006, available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp20060217-12574.html>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Gen. Peter Pace, *The 16<sup>th</sup> Chairman's Guidance to the Joint Staff: Shaping the Future*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1 October 2005), 10.

<sup>35</sup> Secretary Rumsfeld, in remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, makes these comments: 'Anyone who looks at those careers and recognizes the near-instantaneously public penalty that is imposed on someone in the military who is involved in anything that the media judges instantaneously to be imperfect or improper and that then requires a long time to figure out what actually took place, people are -- you know, military people are intelligent, they'll move away from those careers.'

<sup>36</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1984), 102.