

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**SECURE THE VICTORY:
IS IT TIME FOR A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND?**

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War, the chance that an enemy would attack the United States in direct combat has decreased significantly. Recent victories have demonstrated to the world the dominance of the military in direct combat. With the strength of the nation's economy and the speed of advances in technology behind it, the military will continue to outpace its nearest competitors. This gap seems to be expanding making combat against the United States in the future even less likely and too expensive for most countries of the world.

However, does the military excel in situations where its adversaries prefer to fight using asymmetric methods? Operation Restore Hope in Mogadishu and the instability currently witnessed in occupying Iraq would lead one to question how dominant is the United States in military operations other than war. These methods tend to be cheaper for nations and non-state organizations and are often more difficult to detect by United States intelligence sources. Therefore, why would any opponent develop forces that would attack America's strength – direct combat? The United States should expect its future enemies to attack it using asymmetric capabilities.

The current transformation of the United States military into a leaner, lethal and more rapid deployable force is impressive. However, will these improvements in land forces ensure victory against all foes? The military is currently deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and other locations conducting peacekeeping, nation building, and other military operations other than war. Only the future knows if these operations will be successful. What is known today is such missions take time and resources. Both items are not advantages that the military currently has in excess. Has a military been created that the main weapon of choice of any adversary will become one of indirect combat and survival long enough that America loses interest in supporting the effort and goes home? This scenario does not match the ultimate goal of *Joint Vision 2020* that stresses the United States military must achieve full spectrum dominance. This dominance requires a capability to conduct military operations in both combat and noncombat situations.

This paper discusses this issue against a proposal raised to establish a Joint Stability and Reconstruction Command. This command and the force structure assigned to it would cover the missions of peace operations, homeland security requirements, and transition (phase IV) operations leaving the remainder of the military to focus on combat or preparing for future combat. The paper reviews the strategic environment the United States faces, discuss the options the nation has in controlling both peace and combat operations and presents the benefits that a new force structure including the Joint Stability and Reconstruction Command would provide the Army in its search to achieve a ready and relevant force.

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SECURE THE VICTORY: IS IT TIME FOR A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND?

Take up the White man's burden –
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard.

- Kipling

Why is the United States Army so reluctant to change? Have past victories made leaders fearful of disrupting a good thing? History is full of examples of military organizations that were victorious one day but defeated the next. The current transformation of the U. S. Army into a leaner, lethal and more rapid deployable force is impressive. However, is this effort developing the appropriate force to solve the current and future national requirements? According to *Joint Vision 2020*, the ultimate goal of the U. S. military is to achieve “full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.”¹ This dominance requires the ability to conduct military operations in both combat and noncombat situations.²

The military operations that destroyed the Iraqi Army in two Persian Gulf Wars have demonstrated the dominant combat capabilities of the United States. On the other hand, the tragic outcome of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Mogadishu and the current instability in Iraq creates a doubt as to whether the United States dominates military operations other than war (MOOTW). In light of this disparity, why would any adversary develop forces to attack America's strength – direct combat. This is especially true since the U. S. military appears to find it difficult to defeat opponents that prefer to fight with asymmetric responses. To better fight both types of conflict, a proposal has been made to establish a Stability and Reconstruction Joint Command (S&R JCOM).³ Considerable debate has occurred whether the S&R JCOM is the proper solution. The purpose of this paper is to review the strategic environment the United States confronts, discuss the options the nation has in controlling all phases of conflict within this strategic environment, and suggest the benefits that a new force structure including a S&R JCOM would provide the Army in achieving a ready and relevant “full spectrum” force.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

After the overwhelming success of the American-led coalition against Iraq in Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM, the likelihood that an enemy would challenge the United States in direct combat has decreased significantly. Max Boot, a well known historian of military operations other than war, claims that, “The United States is so far ahead of any rival in

all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological or geopolitical that scholars describe the international scene as unipolar.¹⁴ With the strength of the economy and the rapid advances in technology in American society, the gap between the U. S. military and its nearest competitor seems to be increasing. This gap makes direct combat less likely or at least provides the nation with significant warning of an emerging military competitor. However, technological and economic advantages do not guarantee peace nor do they insure that the United States will not confront enemies that will find other means to attack the nation. Two obvious threats to national interests have emerged.

The first threat is the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states or non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations. According to the National Security Strategy, "... the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous."¹⁵ United States nuclear retaliation will not deter such actors because they claim no particular sovereignty and view their cause as a greater concern than the population they supposedly represent. These organizations have also become increasingly more difficult to find and target.

The second threat, terrorist attacks against American and allied citizens, similar to September 11, 2001, provides an example of the use of unconventional means that overcomes an opponent's inability to meet the U.S. military on the battlefield. Boot reminds us, "It is likely that the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are only a taste of what America can expect in the future."¹⁶ Terrorism is an inexpensive but effective weapon to adversaries having minimal training and military capabilities.

Although much of the world disapproves of such methods, terrorist organizations will continue to use these means to attack the citizens of the United States and their economy that depends on stable markets and world trade. Section IV of the *United States National Security Strategy* stresses the importance of free markets and free trade to America's prosperity.⁷ Producing chaos and disrupting international stability hinders American prosperity and therefore provides a potential means to indirectly defeat the United States or at least force America to leave a particular region. To protect the country from these threats within the nation's borders, the current administration created the Department of Homeland Security and expanded its intelligence agencies. What has the military done to meet such threats beyond America's borders?

TRANSFORMATION VERSUS THE EXPECTED THREAT

The military is attempting to transform to meet these threats and develop the forces required for future combat. According to *Joint Vision 2020*, the goal is “the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”⁸ Therefore, to dominate across the full spectrum of conflict, the Army must always be trained, rapidly deployable, and capable of operating in all four phases of joint campaigns – deter (phase I), seize initiative (phase II), decisive operations (phase III), and transition to civil control (phase IV). These phases exist whether the military operation involves combat or MOOTW. The current transformation programs are designed to produce a modular and more rapidly deployable force. This will greatly improve the U. S. military’s ability to tailor appropriate forces and deliver them into a theater faster. However, will military leaders produce a force trained to operate in both combat and noncombat situations?

MILITARY MISSION AND FORCE STRUCTURE MATCH

If the military is responsible for fighting the nation’s wars, then its force structure should meet the requirements associated with all phases of operations. Phase IV operations require skill sets to handle stability and reconstruction operations. Both are different from the standard tasks of closing with the enemy and securing objectives by force, that are more realistic to phases II & III. If the United States is unable to handle all phases concurrently, should America consider itself a global hegemony? Any future adversary would logically focus its efforts on defeating the United States in the phase that it has the least capabilities.

Comparing the Army force structure against tasks in all campaign phases, the Army has forces that excel during the first three phases while it attempts to jerry-rig forces to meet phase IV requirements. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) forces and forward deployed forces provide the nation with strong capabilities to deter (phase I) potential enemies. By infiltrating into unstable regions and living with the people, SOCOM operations provide intelligence needed prior to conflict. Training in language, regional traditions, and cultures assist Special Forces in carrying out this mission. In fact, special operations teams often stabilize hostile situations before combat occurs and thus saves the United States the expense of armed conflict.⁹ If conflict is unavoidable, the costs of training these operatives and their limited numbers make it impractical to use them in long, direct combat with the enemy. However, these specialists continue to assist in a supporting role as combat forces enter into the theater. Forward deployed combat forces have a stabilizing influence on the world as demonstrated by the years

of peace in Europe after World War II, on the Korean peninsula since 1953, and currently in Afghanistan.

As recent history has shown, the U. S. military handles phase II and III operations quickly and decisively. Military forces now have the capability to deploy and defeat the enemy in a matter of weeks. This is a dramatic improvement over past wars that took several months just to prepare for combat. However, as Frederick Kagan points out, “The Rumsfeld vision of military transformation, therefore, is completely unbalanced. It will provide the U.S. with armed forces that do one thing only, even if they do it superbly well. They will be able to identify, track, and destroy enemy targets from thousands of miles away and at little or no risk to themselves.”¹⁰

However, the Army currently has no designated force to transition (phase IV) from combat into civilian control. It attempts to adapt itself into the peacekeeping role upon completion of combat operations claiming that soldiers are adaptable and have the flexibility to switch mindsets. But soldiers typically have little experience or training for both types of missions. Jeffrey Garten, a Dean at Yale, argues that the United States has experienced trouble in the past by its “...failure to create the capability to address the immediate aftermath of serious conflicts [that] undermine our ability to convert military victory into lasting success.”¹¹ To achieve lasting success, post-conflict operations take time. These operations are key to securing the victory. Military forces that remain in the area after the conflict has terminated visually represent to the indigenous population America’s resolve and stabilizes the new government. The military also provides security to non-governmental agencies that are critical to reestablishing humanitarian services.¹² Therefore, is the transformation effort eliminating an American vulnerability or improving capabilities it already has an overwhelming advantage?

A dilemma occurs when other commitments require the United States to pull its military forces from a region before true change has occurred. The administration continues to place additional tasks on the military, “Today America faces equivalent tasks – battling terrorists, narco-traffickers, and weapon proliferators, and ensuring open access to not only the oceans but also the skies and space.”¹³ Even with multiple missions and the open ended tasks of post-conflict operations, the military still seems to be reluctance to improve capabilities to conduct phase IV operations. High-intensity warfare happens in a matter of days or weeks while reconstruction and stability operations involve decades. This has made it difficult to stabilize one region and reconstitute military forces for future combat missions.

This phenomenon is neither new nor unique. The U. S. military has found itself involved in phase IV operations after the Mexican War in 1847, after the Civil War, in the Philippines after

the Spanish-American War, in Europe after the two World Wars, and the numerous small scale contingencies since the end of the Cold War.¹⁴ Nor can the United States expect a decrease in post-conflict operations anytime soon. Garten warns us that, "Looking ahead, the possibilities for more U.S. intervention of some kind are well known: a chaotic post-Castro Cuba, a collapsing North Korea, and disintegration in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola.... Haiti remains a failed state."¹⁵ Because of the global American economy that depends on stability for future growth, most of these areas will require an American presence to stabilize the political situation.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)

Since the strategic environment predicts that the American military will continue to conduct stability and reconstruction operations after combat and support peace operations when national interests dictate, what options are available? The first option is to continue with the status quo. Generally, this would keep the focus on training combat skills with a short, roughly '90-day' training cycle for MOOTW just prior to a deployable unit entering into theater. A second option would be to adjust the mission essential task lists (METL) for combat units to incorporate a balance of MOOTW and combat tasks to prepare the unit to handle both types of missions. The third option would be to create a new force specifically tailored to handle all MOOTW missions, while leaving the remaining forces to train and execute combat.

Some may argue another option exists where the military would transfer these missions to the United Nations, contractors, or other government agencies. However, the United States can not rely on any of these organizations and therefore this is an infeasible option. The United Nations has shown its inability to develop consensus in policy and execution of peace operations, as in Mogadishu, or its unwillingness to operate in potential unstable environments, such as witnessed in Iraq. Outside sources or other government agencies do not possess security elements sufficient to protect their employees adequately. Therefore, the military appears to be the best means available to handle peace and phase IV operations.¹⁶

FOCUS ON COMBAT WITH 90-DAY TRAINING CYCLES FOR MOOTW

Many believe the current approach most effectively utilizes the forces available. However, this concept relies largely on the ability of the American soldier to adapt to changing mission requirements. Although modern-day soldiers are adaptable, should young Americans confront dangerous situations where they have had limited prior training? If this is true, why train at all? Leaders owe soldiers the maximum amount of time possible to prepare for deployments and the training resources to rehearse effectively their expected missions.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Walsh conducted research in 1998 to determine the impact that MOOTW had on combat readiness. His overall findings were that units preparing for such missions were training less for their combat mission.¹⁷ These findings were typical of all units requiring training on MOOTW tasks not performed during normal training cycles. His results also discovered other weaknesses in the current approach.

This approach affects the non-commissioned officer (NCO). Are future Army NCOs going to be the experts of their military occupational specialty (MOS) or the jack-of-all-trades? They can not become experts if they are doing combat training one day and providing humanitarian support the next. Combat skills are too perishable. When one adds the rapid changes in computer software and advancements in military equipment, every day away from training for combat makes NCOs less proficient in preparing their soldiers and their unit for combat. Often, units must leave their primary weapon systems at home and conduct operations in HMMWVs to carry out peace operations. Being away from their combat equipment hinders their ability to train even basic preventive maintenance and conduct weapons qualification.

Much of the dilemma of conducting peace operations and training is the manpower required to execute MOOTW tasks and the differences between these two missions. There is not sufficient time to complete all the peace operation tasks and train at the same time for combat. Warfighting deals with destruction and killing. Peace operations usually focus more on rebuilding, stability, and diplomacy. When combat forces deploy for combat, the opposite effect occurs as 100 percent of the time is spent on improving combat skills. Therefore, if the two missions are incompatible, why is the Army willing to degrade its combat force accomplishing MOOTW tasks?

More detrimental to warfighting skills is the fact that often the soldier does not realize the importance of the tasks he is required to perform. Walsh's survey concluded that the majority of leaders surveyed were "willing to neglect 20 percent of their METL tasks to train for MOOTW tasks."¹⁸ The latter has become so commonplace that leaders feel these skills are more important than combat tasks. This view probably indicates that these soldiers felt they had a greater opportunity to deploy for MOOTW than combat missions, and thus they should train accordingly. This mindset could lead to an unprepared Army for future wars.

Recovery time is also an issue. The survey concluded that "at least 7.5 weeks to 13 weeks as the reconstitution time necessary to recover the training element of readiness."¹⁹ This is time a unit needs to be fully operational in order to conduct its primary combat mission after returning from a deployment. If the same combat unit conducts multiple MOOTW missions, the reconstitution time would most likely increase as a greater percentage of combat trained leaders

would have departed the unit since solid combat training had occurred. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Cherry, in a strategic research paper published in 2000, determined that total time lost to a combat unit's warfighting training was closer to a year after its return from deployment away from home station. As a result, extended peace operations affected the combat proficiency of three units – the recovering unit, the deployed unit, and the unit preparing for deployment.²⁰

Finally, are the soldiers executing the jobs they were recruited for or even trained on during basic training? Soldiers enter the service expecting to defend their nation in combat. However, the nation is increasingly asking them to conduct peace operations. Lieutenant Colonel Colleen McGuire's strategic research paper in 2001 stresses the difference, "Soldiers admit that operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were not the life they expected when they joined the Army or graduated from their entrance training into the service. They expected to be ready for battle – not escorting children to school. Many were not trained to handle domestic disputes among foreign civilian populations."²¹

BALANCE METL TO COVER COMBAT AND MOOTW TASKS

Since rapid train-ups for peace operations are disruptive to combat readiness, others have suggested that the best solution is to balance unit mission essential task lists (METL) between combat and noncombat tasks. Colonel Lloyd Miles, in his 2002 strategic research paper, claimed that historically constabulary forces, that spent the majority of their time conducting stability operations, could not maintain their warfighting ability. They would prove ineffective if there was an increase in hostilities in the region.²² But does training for combat, then deploying for peace operations do any better in a unit's preparation for combat? Units deployed for MOOTW prior to conducting combat training center rotations were noticeably weaker at combat tasks. "According to a former National Training Center (NTC) observer/controller and opposing force commander, observers at the NTC are noticing an absence of fundamental skills and abilities at every level. Many believe the only solution is to increase the frequency of training."²³ Balancing unit METLs would reduce combat training, not increase it.

In McGuire's paper, a considerable number of former battalion commanders and staff officers believed that training for peace operations negatively impacted combat readiness.²⁴ Several of the Army's field manuals stress the importance of training to maintain the force capable of deploying to fight the nation's wars. Never can the Army afford not to train and maintain the highest levels of readiness. With a focus towards combat preparedness, would peace operation tasks ever receive sufficient priority in training these tasks sufficiently? Walsh

raises the additional point that, “much of the Army doctrine and Joint doctrine indicates that [military] operations other than war are difficult and challenging and that they require skills beyond those developed in our normal training tasks.”²⁵ With a different mindset - killing versus peaceful diplomacy - and the incompatibility of tasks between combat and peace operations, this option becomes less attractive, unless the unit’s tasks were similar to begin with.²⁶ This is not the case with the majority of combat forces.

DEVELOP A NEW FORCE WITH PRIMARY MISSION TO HANDLE MOOTW

Numerous documents discuss the option of creating a separate military force tailored to handle peace and phase IV operations. In 1998, Colonel Don Snider built a case on returning a constabulary force to the U. S. Army. He proposed that the Army “create a constabulary force using roughly 15,000 active duty structure spaces ...and would have roughly the combat equivalent of three MP brigades.”²⁷ This new force would perform most of the noncombat operations allowing the majority of the Army to focus on the combat mission.

Cherry proposed the creation of a United States based, corps sized Engagement Force to handle small-scaled contingencies (SSC). This corps would support peace operations and allow the rest of the Army to focus on warfighting. It would become the nation’s experts in civil-military, multi-national, and information operations. Along with SSC deployments, it would provide a school to train soldiers on peace operations.²⁸ Two authors from the National Defense University recently published a joint planning document, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, that recommended the creation of the Stability and Reconstruction Joint Command (S&R JCOM) as a method to adjust today’s military structure to better handle stability and reconstruction operations.²⁹

Opponents of the formation of such a command often state the concern that the Army has about increased end strength. However, is end strength the critical factor in the Army’s reluctance to form the S&R JCOM? Most of those in favor of this new command claim this structure could come from current forces, thus eliminating concerns about increased end strength. Certainly today’s force restructuring to ‘units of action’ aims at identifying spaces that the Army can potentially eliminate. But even if military leaders proposed an increase in active duty personnel, the present end strength is still 300,000 less than the Army had at the end of the Cold War. Increases of 30-50,000 would more than provide adequate force manning for the S&R JCOM and still maintain the Army at a strength less than the Cold War Army. One could certainly justify increased costs to the country, if this new force structure better served the nation’s vital interests more than what is available now.

The 1999 Congressional Budget paper *Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of the U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations* concluded that peace operations affected combat readiness and proposed an increase of 20,000 soldiers to handle MOOTW missions.³⁰ In late January 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used emergency powers to authorize an increase of 30,000 soldiers to temporarily cover shortfalls created by stability and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries.³¹ Although this is only a temporary measure, legislators do not seem to be upset over this increase in Army end strength. Thus, the opportunity may exist to fund an increase in the military personnel in response to the new demands created by the war on terror.³²

Opponents raise that having two forces within the Army is inefficient.³³ Listed above were several reasons why one force attempting to do both missions does not represent the most effective means of conducting peace operations while preparing for future combat. On the other hand, the S&R JCOM would still be a military force, and assigned soldiers would have to maintain the same standards as the rest of the Army, the only difference being its emphasis on training and conducting post-conflict and peace operations. Operations in Kosovo provided examples where soldiers specifically trained in peace operations deployed faster, and performed considerably better than combat forces. Given the political sensitivity of such missions, America must have its best trained soldiers executing these missions.³⁴ If the Army expects infantrymen to maintain skills different from those of a supply clerk, why should it look on forces specifically designated to handle peace operations differently than combat units? In this high OPTEMPO environment the military is experiencing, the United States can not afford, as Graham states, "... a mind-set characterized by one civilian Pentagon official as 'We just do combat, and stability ops is a sideline.'"³⁵

SKILLS REQUIRED FOR STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

'Secure the Victory' is the motto of the Civil-Affairs branch of the U. S. Army and this is exactly what peace operations accomplish for America.³⁶ Throughout history, soldiers have stabilized regions as countries transform their form of government.³⁷ No matter how technologically advanced the military becomes, transition requires a visible deterrent to reduce the violence as the new government develops.³⁸ In today's rapid and decisive combat environment this visible post-conflict presence may be even more important since a large portion of the adversary's population may not have witnessed the defeat of their own conventional military forces or personally experienced the effects of war.³⁹

Public opinion also affects peace operations and therefore requires soldiers who understand the importance of maintaining positive public support. The globalization of the world economy along with America's views towards human rights will continue to keep the United States involved in regional conflicts.⁴⁰ The Army needs soldiers that possess the skills found in Joint Pub 3-07.3 and Army FM 3-07 to execute peace and phase IV operations effectively.⁴¹

Soldiers in stabilization and reconstruction units must have persistence. Nation building takes time and enemies must understand America's resolve.⁴² Soldiers must be comfortable working with the population, even if this produces a greater risk of casualties.⁴³ Force protection measures typically restrict American soldiers from integrating with the local community. Combat forces tend to look at the population as dangerous and fear that locals support the enemy. This philosophy handicaps success in nation building.⁴⁴

Another reason why combat forces can not maintain the expertise required for peace operations is that not all such operations are the same. FM 100-23 lists three types of peace keeping operations: "support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. In simple terms, support to diplomacy seeks to prevent conflict; peacekeeping attempts to maintain the peace; and peace enforcement attempts to establish peace."⁴⁵ Because of the unique requirements of each mission, it is unrealistic to believe that combat forces training for war would gain the experience to handle the complexities of these peace operations.

USING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND

If the military created the S&R JCOM, this new command would receive the mission for all peace operations including phase IV operations in campaigns involving combat. This shift in responsibilities allows combat forces to focus totally on training or executing combat. As Snider states, "The Army's mission for the foreseeable future is as clear as it is daunting: to be prepared simultaneously at both ends of the conflict spectrum – high-intensity power projection operations in regional theater war and constabulary operations of extended duration."⁴⁶ This new command would provide strategic leaders the ability to manage both 'ends of the conflict spectrum' and never lose focus of providing the nation a well trained combat force.

Examples of S&R JCOM responsibilities would include the majority of the military forward presence forces. For example, the S&R JCOM would include all units currently in Korea. These forces would not have the combat power of the 2nd Infantry Division. However, they would have the capability to rapidly receive and sustain combat forces onto the Korean peninsula should war start. The S&R JCOM mission of deterrence and demonstrating America's resolve would continue to force adversaries to decide whether negotiated settlements

peacefully were in their best interests versus facing the combat capabilities of the United States. Should increased violence become the enemy's choice, then combat forces would rapidly enter into the theater, engage the enemy until successful mission completion and depart the theater to refit for future combat. While in theater, the S&R JCOM would support the joint task force commander by securing lines of supplies and communications, and continue to work with the local population in areas no longer requiring combat forces. When combat forces depart, the S&R JCOM would receive command of the units in the area to continue phase IV and other peace operations. Stability and reconstruction units would remain in theater until either the United Nations assumes command of the rebuilding mission or stability returns to the point that the new government assumes responsibility for its own security efforts. Bradley Graham, a *Washington Post* correspondent, notes, "The idea is that the stabilization and reconstruction force would serve as a kind of bridge between the end of major combat operations and the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and running...."⁴⁷

Using the current Operation IRAQI FREEDOM scenario with this new command, the S&R JCOM would have been involved from the beginning of planning to best execute phase IV operations. The S&R JCOM would deploy into theater as a supporting command to the Combined Forces Land Component Commander. Deployment phasing considerations would include sufficient S&R JCOM structure to assume responsibility for occupied territory as coalition forces moved towards and secured Baghdad. Once all combat forces had completed their deployment into theater, remaining S&R JCOM forces would finish their deployment. By May 2003, The S&R JCOM would have received most of the security responsibilities of southern Iraq and Mosel areas, with only a small combat force required to focus on the counter-insurgency mission in the Sunni Triangle.⁴⁸ The military would have redeployed the majority of three combat divisions back to the United States and refit these divisions for future combat operations. The S&R JCOM would publish annual rotation schedules with the majority of these follow on units mobilized from the reserve component.

As Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM required the U. S. military to extend the transition phase, it raises a question to the nation – how long can America afford to keep combat forces tied up in post-combat operations? While executing this mission is America preparing these forces for its next adversary? Adjusting force structure to create a unified command with the direct responsibility of post-combat operations seems a more efficient means to prepare for both operations in the future.

IMPLEMENTING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND

How large should the new S&R JCOM force structure be? The Army should first decide the required size force and the type of units needed for expected future combat scenarios. If Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is the standard, then a combat force of approximately four divisions reinforced with required artillery, logistics, and communications units attached should be the size of the force. The military can afford to maintain such a small combat force due to transformation efforts that continually improves its rapid deployment capabilities and its ability to execute modern warfare quickly and decisively. To plan for unexpected contingencies, another similar corps of two active divisions and two reserve component divisions should more than cover any remote situation where two wars occur near simultaneously. These forces train at the combat training centers and maintain their equipment in a high state of readiness because when called, they execute! The military would direct additional reserve units for combat missions if world events presented an increased need for combat forces. SOCOM force structure would increase to provide each geographical component commander sufficient soldiers to keep a forward presence, collect vital intelligence towards potential adversaries, and support the training of friendly militaries in their area of operations.

The S&R JCOM would command all other forces. This headquarters should recommend the force structure required to meet its missions, but in general, this command would be the largest part of the Army. A key component to this new force structure is the development of the joint headquarters directing noncombat operations. Although the Army will provide the majority of personnel within this unified command, this headquarters must plan and coordinate with all services to best utilize limited resources.⁴⁹ Along with this new headquarters, Chapters 3-5 of *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* provides a very detailed listing of the required forces and how to create this stabilization and reconstruction capability.⁵⁰ This document recommends a force of two division-equivalents with at least one being from the active component. This force would have the ability to grow larger by incorporating additional reserve component units if events required an additional American military presence. The S&R JCOM must have active duty forces capable of immediate deployment as well as a large reserve component when mission requirements increase to provide for the rotation of initial entry forces. These forces would be modular, reducing the need to deploy entire divisions if a smaller force is sufficient. The S&R JCOM should be able to forecast rotation schedules well in advance aiding to predictability for many reservists.

Adjustments will have to be made to ensure the correct mix of civil affairs, military police, psychological operations, and other key post-conflict military operation skills are available in the

active duty component. “Overwhelmingly, civil affairs soldiers are reservists. Their real-world job experience gives them an edge in performing Army tasks,” said Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, Commanding General, Army Reserves. “Hands-on nation builders, they focus on infrastructure improvements: getting utilities up and running, working with contractors and overseeing the bureaucracy that distributes food, clothing and water to civilians.”⁵¹ Active duty units must develop these skill sets to provide immediate support to the civilian population after combat has degraded existing infrastructure. This support aids in securing the victory as much as defeating enemy conventional forces.

Homeland defense requirements would also be the responsibility of the S&R JCOM. Local National Guard units would handle the majority of these operations, however, the S&R JCOM could reinforce them with active component units if the threat expands.

A transformation of this magnitude is not unprecedented. Frederick Kagan, reminds us, “In the mid-1970s the U.S. abandoned the draft and recruited an all-volunteer professional military.”⁵² The nation questioned this sociological transformation but executed it with great success. “The shift should echo President John F. Kennedy’s establishment of the Peace Corps at the height of the Cold War, with the ring of new responsibilities for the U.S. and our determination to fulfill them.”⁵³

DEVELOPING A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FORCE INSTITUTE

When not deployed, stability and reconstruction personnel should be gaining expertise in post-conflict operations through education. The U. S. military should create a Stability and Reconstruction Institute where experts would educate future leaders in the art of phase IV and peace operations and offer lessons learned to American allies. Students would master regional expertise, customs, and language skills, all key capabilities for MOOTW. According to Colonel Miles, “At this school, lessons learned could be taught to large number of trainees and doctrine could be established. It is realistic to believe that the UN would also support such a university with skills obtained by other countries.”⁵⁴ The institute would consolidate expertise from the international community to develop viable solutions to improve noncombat operations.

The institute could also support the development of phase IV military operations plans. Garten claims that over a period of time the institute will, “... create an institutional cadre of highly skilled and motivated experts, adequately trained and financed, whose careers will be devoted to operating in politically chaotic situations. The American people do not desire to remain in these countries any longer than required, but no one should underestimate the time

necessary to establish a transition to stability.”⁵⁵ The institute would provide senior strategic leaders with more realistic time tables and critical event checklists to better plan exit strategies.

CONCLUSION

America is new to the role of global hegemony. However, being new to this role has not reduced the goals of the United States. According to the National Security Strategy, “... the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”⁵⁶ With such an aggressive foreign policy, the military can expect to become involved in numerous regional conflicts as our nation attempts to learn and administer the duties as the global policeman.

History indicates that whatever program America adopts to transform its armed forces, her enemies will react to level the playing field. Kagan states, “The search for an indefinite American ‘asymmetrical advantage,’ requires not merely a revolution in military affairs: it also requires a fundamental revolution in human affairs of a sort never seen before. It requires that America continue to change her armed forces so rapidly and successfully that no other state can ever catch up – indeed, that no other state in the world would try.”⁵⁷ The current transformation program relies on maintaining an overwhelming advantage in a single area of conflict – direct combat. A more beneficial goal of transforming America’s national defense is to achieve full spectrum dominance by creating a force structure capable of achieving superiority in war and peace. The concept of a Joint Stabilization and Reconstruction Command is a feasible option to solve America’s reluctance to engage in the increasing number of MOOTW missions without degrading combat proficiency. If the military ever wanted to change, the time to act has never been better.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020, America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), 6.

² The use of the US military for missions other than direct combat has led to the creation of many terms that are similar but not exactly alike. Listed below are several of the terms and their definition that are used in this paper and the quoted references:

Constabulary Operations: Term used to describe post-conflict nation-building operations in Japan and Germany after World War II. Military forces were assigned the mission to provide security and law enforcement during the reconstruction process of these two nations.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW): "The use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war." Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Publications 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), GL-3.

Noncombat Operations: Term with an identical meaning as MOOTW. Includes "all aspects of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace." Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publications 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September 2001), I-3. The four goals of noncombat operations include deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support US civil authorities. Ibid., I-2.

Peace Operations: "Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace." Ibid., GL-15.

Phase IV Operations: Final phase of a standard joint campaign. This phase "enables the Joint Forces Commander to focus on the synchronizing and integrating joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion, typically characterized by self-sustaining peace and establishment of the rule of law. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat is not able to resurrect itself ... and transfer control to civilian authorities." Ibid., III-21. Often this phase is called the "**Transition Phase.**"

Post-Conflict Operations: Similar term as Posthostilities Operations. Includes all activities required to stabilize the region and transfer control to the national government after major combat has ended. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Joint Publications 3-07.3 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 February 1999), I-7-I-9.

Reconstruction Operations: A subset of tasks performed during post-conflict operations that focus on the rebuilding of a nation-state after the removal of that state's previous form of government. Reconstruction may include the political, economic, judicial, and military means of the country.

Smaller Scale Contingency: "A regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling national interest or threat than those involved in a Major Theater of War. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare" Joint Forces Staff College, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*, JFSC Publication 1 (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, 2000), G-72.

Stabilization Operations: "The promotion and protection of US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis." Goal is to sustain regional and global stability. United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 20 February 2003), 1-2.

³ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 12 November 2003), 1-122.

⁴ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books Publishing, 2002), 349.

⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 13.

⁶ Boot, 348.

⁷ The National Security Strategy makes it clear that, "A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.

We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's shores.... We will use our economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth." Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 17.

⁸ Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, 1. Also the military is looking to become more expeditionary. "No longer do US war plans envision slow buildups and prolonged fighting. Instead, as the invasion of Iraq demonstrated, the Pentagon is counting on rapid preparation and swift victory, with fewer combat troops needed as a result of advances in technology and improved coordination among the military services." Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," *Washington Post*, 24 November 2003, p. 16.

⁹ The introduction of the U.S. Special Operations Command Pub 1 provides an excellent summary of the many missions SOF is prepared to execute. Specially supportive of MOOTW, "SOF can assist a nation in creating the conditions for stable development – thereby reducing the risk of or precluding armed conflict.... SOF works closely with the host nation government, military forces, and population to assist them in solving their own problems...." United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Pub 1: *Special Operations in Peace and War* (MacDill AFB, Florida: HQ, USSOCOM, 25 January 1996), iv-v.

¹⁰ Frederick W. Kagan, "Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War," *New Criterion*, vol. 22 no. 3 (November 2003): 9.

¹¹ Jeffery E. Garten, "Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service." *Foreign Policy*, September-October 2003, 63.

¹² "Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chance for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. As a part of Peace Operations ... the military may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict." Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, I-3.

¹³ Boot, 349.

¹⁴ Colleen L. McGuire, *Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2001), 4-5.

¹⁵ Garten, 64.

¹⁶ “For combat units, the skills required for peace operations are oftentimes not those required for combat. Training and execution of such operations detract from combat training, and consequently from warfighting skills. Nevertheless, these operations constitute a critical, proactive component of national security activities, and the Army is best suited to conduct them.” Louis Caldera and Dennis Reimer, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2000* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1999), xv.

¹⁷ LTC Michael Walsh, US Army War College, conducted a survey of former tactical unit commanders from the 1997 and 1998 U.S. Army War College classes and found that “the trend indicates that units in the field are doing less preparation for their primary warfighting mission.... Also, less time is being allocated to METL skills, while the special [M]OOTW ramp-up training is increasing dramatically.” Michael J. Walsh, *Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Combat Training Readiness*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 20 July 1998), 11.

The same study found most leaders felt preparation for MOOTW missions helped the unit but could not cover all the key tasks they would be required to execute. During the MOOTW deployment, combat training was degraded further. The survey showed “more than 60% of the respondents stated that compared to home station the training opportunities while deployed were less to non-existent. Since METL related training is very perishable and must be maintained and sustained, ... this information indicates a much greater training effort is required to achieve full METL capability” *Ibid.*, 12. More often unit training primarily focused on individual skills like weapons qualification, common skills training, and physical fitness. Collective tasks were minimal at best. Degradation of skills was particularly noticeable above the platoon level of operations. *Ibid.*, 13-15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁰ “Predictably, while unit’s train for and execute small-scale contingencies (SSCs), warfighting skills atrophy and combat proficiency declines. More importantly, while units are caught in the cycle of preparing for, executing, and recovering from SSCs, they are essentially unavailable for major theater wars (MTWs). This recent phenomenon threatens the Army’s ability to successfully accomplish its primary mission – fighting and winning two near simultaneous MTWs.” Timothy D. Cherry, *Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness Dilemma*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 20 June 2000), 2.

LTC Cherry also included a study conducted by the U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned on the effects of peace operations on combat unit readiness. Time requirements for peace operations go well beyond the actual deployment. Units tend to stop training on their warfighting mission when they are designated for peace operations. This is often from two to six months in advance and usually required up to six months upon return to home station to recover equipment, complete personnel changes, and begin to train back on the normal training cycle. Therefore a combat unit loses a majority of the year beyond the designated deployment

period. Deployments affect three units, the deployed unit, the unit returning from deployment, and the unit training as a replacement unit. Also affected are stay-behind units who often must add fillers in personnel and equipment, reducing their combat capabilities. United States Center for Army Lessons Learned, *The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 1996), A7.

²¹ McGuire, 3.

²² COL Lloyd Miles agrees that currently US military forces are not trained to effectively handle peace operations however, establishing constabulary forces (units specifically assigned the mission to provide security and law enforcement during the reconstruction process) is not the solution to the problem. He proposes that current military forces add more peace operations tasks to unit METLs, and to redistribute active component and reserve component force structure because the US Army does not have the end strength to man two specialized organizations. He also claims that constabulary forces can not maintain their warfighting ability, thus creating a situation where they could not handle a rapid increase in hostilities in a unstable region. Lloyd Miles, *Back to the Future: Constabulary Forces Revisited*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 3 July 2002), 14-16.

²³ LTC Timothy Cherry discusses in his Strategic research paper how the standard training cycle for combat units has declined since the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Units that trained for combat are now disrupted by expanding peacekeeping operations, and the long deployments away from training areas such as the combat training centers are reducing the expertise soldiers and units have in fighting as members of a combined arms team. Cherry, 4-5.

²⁴ McGuire, 11.

²⁵ Walsh, 2.

²⁶ LTC Cherry provides details on the difficulties experienced with the warrior mindset conducting peace operations. He does a great job listing the differences in warfighting tasks versus tasks covered in smaller-scaled contingencies. Cherry, 7-8.

²⁷ Don M. Snider, "Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force," *Army Magazine*, June 1998, 14.

²⁸ Cherry, 11.

²⁹ Their overall conclusions recommended "creating two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to the S&R mission (S&R JCOMs)" and source them with two division-equivalents of joint assets to execute these missions. Binnendijk, 121. "The first division-equivalent should be mostly active personnel; the second division-equivalent can include a large component of reserve personnel." Ibid. Each division would "...be flexible, modular, scalable, and rapidly deployable with four brigade sized S&R Groups that include military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical, and PSYOPS supported by a tactical combat capability." Ibid. These forces would be America's experts in coordinating with multi-agency civilian response teams, international organizations, and UN Peacekeeping Forces. Ibid, 122.

³⁰ United States Congress Congressional Budget Office, *Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of the U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1999), 9.

³¹ Pauline Jelinek. "Surprise: Rumsfeld Authorizes 30,000 more Soldiers." *The Sentinel*, Carlisle, PA, 30 January 2004, A4.

³² Many legislators believed "... on the ruins of the U.S.S.R., American defense officials and civilian experts were already talking of the 'strategic pause' and the 'peace dividend' that were supposed to follow that epochal event. Defense budgets dwindled and efficiency became the watchword in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill." Kagan, 7. The military's transformation effort was based on "efforts to reduce the defense budget in the 1990s in order to expand the 'peace dividend.'" "...The goal was to make the Pentagon more efficient and to use the funds recouped by the efficiency to support transformation." Ibid. Adding to force structure does not reduce costs and therefore the military had a reluctance to ask for additional troops to handle peace operations.

³³ Such a proposal, "comes in the face of traditional US Army opposition to the idea of establishing forces focused on peacekeeping. Army officials have argued that combat troops can be used for peacekeeping when necessary and that traditional units with recovery-related skills can be cobbled onto combat divisions to meet postwar demands.... In the past, Army authorities have argued that they do not have enough troops to maintain separate combat and peacekeeping forces. They also have worried that units focused on postwar policing would be viewed as stepchildren of the main Army, leading to morale and performance problems." Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16.

³⁴ LTC McGuire provides an example of how a military police battalion was effectively able to deploy to Kosovo with twelve days of notice. Their training was similar to the situation they faced in Kosovo. Therefore, soldier's morale remained high as they were performing the mission they were trained for. On the other hand, an infantry battalion deploying to the same region was extremely ill prepared and performed poorly in Kosovo. Soldiers were demoralized, confused about their mission, and potentially damaged the political environment they were sent to improve. McGuire, 7-8.

³⁵ Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16.

³⁶ "Without their work, a battlefield triumph may amount to little. Hence the civil affairs motto: 'Secure the Victory.'" Boot, 333. No administration would send service members into combat if they knew the same force would have to return to fight again in the future. Post-conflict operations ensure that the political goals achieved by combat remain in place and new methods of government and law enforcement have the opportunity to develop.

³⁷ "In fact occupation duty is generally necessary after a big war in order to impose the victor's will on the vanquished.... Only boots on the ground can guarantee a lasting peace." Boot, 338. Boot also reminds us, by historical example, that claiming victory and departing the area prior to effective change taking place only means you will be required to face the problem again. "Successful state building starts by imposing the rule of law ... as a precondition for economic development and the eventual emergence of democracy. Merely holding an election and leaving is likely to achieve little, as the U.S. discovered in Haiti after 1994." Boot, 346.

³⁸ Kagan makes a good point why the ground soldier must be present before a nation can successfully end the conflict. "If the enemy knows that all he will face is a barrage of precision-guided munitions, he will find counter-measures – digging too deeply for the weapons to penetrate, jamming or blinding U.S. reconnaissance assets, etc. ... This type of warfare was ineffective in the German strategic bombing of Great Britain in World War I and II and the strategic bombing campaigns of North Vietnam." Kagan, 15-16. Ground forces restore the peace over a country that has seen its government and military overthrown. "Even in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, ground forces or the threat of their use played the decisive role in bringing the enemy to surrender." Ibid., 16. This has worked in the past and little seems to have changed in human conditioning to think this phenomenon will change anytime soon. "... [O]nly ground forces can execute the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and reconstruction activities that have been essential to success in most of the wars America has fought in the past hundred years." Ibid., 16.

³⁹ "But today's rapid decisive operations use relatively small forces in quick campaigns, as shown in this year's march to Baghdad. Yet the very haste of that battlefield victory has led to uncertainty as US troops struggle to restore stability in the vacuum left by the toppling of dictator Saddam Hussein." Vince Crawley, "DoD Advised to Form Two Multiservice Postwar Units," *Army Times*, 15 December 2003, 10.

⁴⁰ Many Americans feel we have an obligation as the world's most prosperous nation to aid others in need. "The American public ... understands that the United States can and must share with allies the burden of policing selected conflicts in regions of mutual interests." Snider, 15. It is this public moral position that plays into many of the decisions to get involved in conflicts like Somalia, Kosovo, and Haiti. "It is usually the moral component – in this case, Iraqi atrocities against Kuwaitis – that convinces Americans to take up arms." Boot, 340.

⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, and U.S. Department of the Army. *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. There are other manuals that provide information on these topics, however, these two specifically focus on the differences in peace operations (peacekeeping vs. peace enforcement), stability requirements (such as dealing with insurgencies, handling displaced civilians, terrorism, and establishing humanitarian operations), and reconstruction (reestablishing law, creating judicial means to support law enforcement, military-civil affairs, coordinating with international actors, establishing legitimacy to new local governments, and transfer of power to that government).

Winning the Peace Act, a bill developed by the House of Representatives provides key skill sets that the nation's strategic leaders believe are important to stability and reconstruction operations. "Any person involved in reconstruction efforts of such a state must have extensive cross-cultural training and the ability to communicate effectively in the language of that state.... Reconstruction Services include security and public safety, establishing justice systems, establishing governance and participation, and economic and social well-being." United States Congress, House of Representatives Bill, *Winning the Peace Act of 2003*, 108th Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 2003, 3-4.

⁴² Boot stresses the importance of American resolve if the nation ever expects to influence change in small-scale contingencies. "Short-term occupations ... are unlikely to fundamentally alter the nature of a society." Boot, 345. He claims if the country's support is strong enough to get involved in the conflict, then support should remain even if casualties occur. This resolve tends to make Americans less of a target. "If foreign enemies know that killing a few Americans

will drive the U.S. out of their country, they are far more likely to target American soldiers or civilians." Ibid., 328.

⁴³ Peace operations deal with getting the population to establish trust in the military presence. Max Boot provides a great example where United States forces missed the point. "In the aftermath of the bombing campaign, a multinational peacekeeping force was sent to occupy Kosovo, including a U.S. contingent [the] U.S. Army risk-adverse mentality impeded attempts to establish a durable peace. American troopers seldom ventured outside their fortified compound, Camp Bondsteel, with wearing their forbidding "battle rattle" – body armor, Kevlar helmets, the works. This impeded their ability to interact with local civilians, gather intelligence, and spread goodwill – prerequisites for a successful occupation. British soldiers, by contrast, looked more confident and approachable in their berets and rolled-up sleeves." Boot, 327. Boot raises another point when considering risk and casualty avoidance. "No one expects a big city police department to win the 'war on crime.' The police are considered successful if they reduce disorder, keep the criminal element at bay, and allow decent people a chance to live their lives in peace. In the process a few cops are likely to die, and while this is a tragedy to be mourned, no one suggests that as a result the police should go home and leave gangsters to run the streets." Ibid., 346. It is therefore imperative that police forces are formed, trained, and supervised to control local crime. However, until this force is created, crime reduction and citizen security is a critical mission of the stability and reconstruction force.

⁴⁴ "One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the local people. Unfortunately, the American doctrine of "force protection" works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here's a quote from the minutes of the seminar: 'There are two ways to deal with the issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate them with our firepower. A more viable alternative might be to take the opposite approach and integrate with the community. That way you find out more of what is going on and the population protects you. The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may actually be saving lives. What 'wins' at the tactical and physical levels may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where Fourth Generation Warfare is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British Army has taken more casualties than it has inflicted. This is something the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, because it defines success in terms of comparative attrition rates.'" William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare," 15 January 2004; available from <<http://www.antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702>>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2004.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of the Army. *Peace Operations*. Field Manual 100-23 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 2.

⁴⁶ Snider, 15.

⁴⁷ Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16.

⁴⁸ "More than 75 percent of the violent incidents and sabotage have taken place in only four of the 18 provinces," General John Abizaid said. "His plan is to disengage our forces from stabilized areas and turn security in those areas over to U.S.-trained Iraqi forces." Vince Crawley, "US Troops Go on Offensive in Troubled Iraqi Provinces," *Army Times*, 6 October 2003, 20.

⁴⁹ This "... new force would have its own headquarters to help ensure postwar operations are not overlooked in prewar planning." Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16. Just as stability and reconstruction force structure covers the current inefficient post-conflict operations, so will the S&R JCOM headquarters ensuring all plans have adequate details during phase IV of the operation.

⁵⁰ Binnendijk, 39-84. Binnendijk and Johnson propose the transformation of the military to create units with the specific focus on S&R missions. These forces would have two joint commands (S&R JCOMs) with one primarily in the active component directing current S&R operations while a second (primarily reserve component) organizing and coordinating future and follow-on S&R operations. The military could deploy S&R forces to provide a forward presence and allow the enemy the opportunity to negotiate a settlement prior to United States sending combat units into the region. Along with being a visible deterrent, S&R forces would establish logistics bases that may provide combat forces an early advantage should they be forced to deploy into the theater.

Their proposal used historical and Rand Corporation studies to determine the number of peace operations the United States could expect in the future and therefore design a force capable of executing all these missions without requesting support from combat forces. Their research determined the two active duty divisions force (roughly 18,000 soldiers each) was the best sized force to handle expected contingencies with little or no increase to end strength. "... a brigade-sized force is a bare minimum but will be too small if tomorrow's world is as turbulent as today's. A corps-sized force is close to ideal, but may be more than the traffic would bear. A two division-equivalent force would provide a solid range of capabilities and a relatively high level of insurance, including a capacity for medium S&R missions in two major theaters of war." Ibid., 51.

⁵¹ Jane McHugh, "Reserve Chief: Civil Affairs Not Suited for Regular Army," *Army Times*, 20 October 2003, 31.

⁵² Kagan, 5.

⁵³ Garten, 65. Once the decision is made to implement, the Army should aggressively determine the required changes and execute. Along with the mentioned Kennedy's initiative, Garten adds, "The magnitude of the change in national direction should be equivalent to when President Harry S. Truman launched ... large-scale foreign aid and technical assistance programs to Greece and Turkey in the face of new communist threats. Ibid., 65.

⁵⁴ Miles, 3. Goal would be to improve coalition peace operations and this institute would be a meeting ground for international expertise to discuss issues. Students would be primarily Americans, however, allies would attend, as they do most United States universities. Rumsfeld said, "I think it would be a good thing if our country was to provide some leadership for training of other countries' citizens who would like to participate in peacekeeping." Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16.

⁵⁵ Garten, 65.

⁵⁶ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Introduction.

⁵⁷ Kagan, 12.

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