

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**BUILDING ON THE VISION**

by

Colonel Charles A. Stafford  
United States Army

Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II  
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>03 MAY 2004</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Building on the Vision</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) <b>Charles Stafford</b>				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>See attached file.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>33</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Charles A. Stafford

TITLE: Building on the Vision

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 5 April 2004 PAGES: 33 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

On 8 October 2003, Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker published fifteen focus areas for all Army senior leaders. He followed this up with the publication of *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready* and *The Army in 2020 White Paper* in November 2003. These three documents define the Army Chief of Staff's Vision for the Army. While the majority of the vision is sound, the pervasive focus on the Global War on Terrorism leads to shortcomings in the Training, Leader Development, and Soldier imperatives. This paper offers modifications in each of these areas in an effort to synchronize the long-term vision for the Army.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
PREFACE.....	vii
BUILDING ON THE VISION .....	1
<b>THE CURRENT ARMY VISION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
TRAINING.....	<b>3</b>
LEADER DEVELOPMENT.....	<b>6</b>
SOLDIERS .....	<b>8</b>
<b>CONCLUSION</b> .....	<b>11</b>
APPENDIX 1: CSA FOCUS AREAS .....	13
APPENDIX 2: THE SOLDIER'S CREED .....	15
APPENDIX 3: THE CODE OF CONDUCT .....	17
ENDNOTES .....	19
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	23



## PREFACE

My Army family, at home and abroad, provided the support, encouragement, and motivation to complete this project.



## BUILDING ON THE VISION

God give me the serenity to accept things which cannot be changed; Give me courage to change things which must be changed; and the wisdom to distinguish one from the other.

—Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr

The Army weathered its share of change over the past year. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) all continued to compete for the Army's focus. Through all the operational deployments, the Army transformation effort continued. In the midst of this turbulent time, the Department of Defense "changed horses in mid-stream" and installed new leadership for the Army.

General Schoomaker arrived amid a swirl of controversy surrounding the Army's current role within the Department of Defense and amid conflicting views on the Army's transformation.<sup>1</sup> Army leaders waited in open anticipation for the new Army Chief of Staff's vision. What would his focus be? What would stay the same, and what would change? Soldiers at all levels debated what his position would be on everything from major acquisition programs to whether or not we would continue wearing the black beret.

This organizational dynamic is not unique to our Army or to our time. The arrival of a new strategic leader, and the vision (or lack there of) that he brings with him always causes stress within an organization, military or otherwise. Vision plays a key role introducing useful change by helping direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of large numbers of people.<sup>2</sup> Without an appropriate vision, a transformation effort can easily dissolve into a list of confusing, incompatible, and time consuming projects that go in the wrong direction or nowhere at all.<sup>3</sup>

General Schoomaker eventually published his vision in three separate, but related documents: "Fifteen Immediate Focus Areas,"<sup>4</sup> "The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready,"<sup>5</sup> and finally "The Army in 2020."<sup>6</sup> The first document describes things the Army needs to do today; the second describes a transitional vision for Army, while the third provides the deeper view of the Army's future.

## THE CURRENT ARMY VISION

Don't tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and let them surprise you with their ingenuity.

—General George S. Patton

The Strategic Leadership Primer defines strategic vision as a collaborative effort, the product of a dynamic, logical, and collective organizational process.<sup>7</sup> Ultimately, it is the senior leader (Army Chief of Staff), who shapes, refines, and articulates his path for the organization. Strategic leaders develop and communicate a compelling, understandable strategic vision for their organization based on intuition developed through frames of reference created over a military career.<sup>8</sup> The key factors influencing the visioning process include an evaluation of the current organizational environment, history, mission, values and trends.<sup>9</sup> Within these factors, the current organizational environment, mission, and trends dominate the Army Chief of Staff's vision for the Army.

Transformation defines our current organizational environment. Transformation calls for dramatic changes across all the Army Imperatives incorporation of new technologies in order to meet the conventional and asymmetric challenges of the future. From the President of the United States to the lowest levels of the Army, transformation is the primary theme defining our world. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, "Transformation requires building new capabilities and expanding our arsenal, it also means reducing stocks of weapons that are no longer necessary for the defense of our country."<sup>10</sup> Transformation is the backbone of our current Army vision, and the Army Chief of Staff continually emphasizes that we are at war, and transforming.

In 2001 the Army Posture Statement said, "The Army exists for one purpose-to serve the Nation."<sup>11</sup> The current Army vision says, "Our Army exists to fight and win our Nation's wars."<sup>12</sup> The difference between these two statements is the Global War on Terrorism. The shift in tone is a direct reflection of the war at hand.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Army has been in a post-Cold War status. We have been through numerous modernization battles and transformation campaigns. Our current Army vision builds upon all of these post-Cold War trends and offers an evolutionary view called, "Current to Future Force". This vision is based on smaller, more modular, expeditionary units built upon the experience of the current fight and focused on the Future Force. As General Eisenhower once said, "What counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight - it's the size of the fight in the dog."

Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono, while serving as the Commander, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), articulated six Army Imperatives for force development. The original six imperatives were Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Leader Development, Materiel, and Soldiers (DTLOMS).<sup>13</sup> The joint community adopted the Army

imperatives and modified them to fit the joint force development process. Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) constitute the seven major domains of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).<sup>14</sup>

However, there are three Army imperatives where the current vision inadequately defines the road ahead: Training, Leader Development, and Soldiers. In each case, the shortcomings are a result of a myopic focus on the close fight in the Global War on Terrorism.

## TRAINING

Training is the Army's top priority; it prepares us to fight. As leaders, our sacred responsibility is to ensure that no soldier ever dies in combat because that soldier was not properly trained.

—General Carl E. Vuono

General Vuono's thoughts are echoed in today's Army vision. The realities of the Global War on Terrorism dominate individual training requirements. In individual training, the vision exclusively focuses on preparing our Soldiers, civilians, and families for wartime requirements.<sup>15</sup> In the process, we ignore the larger issue of individual training accountability across all tasks and environments. The Army needs to look beyond the current wartime requirements for individual training and reapply a Systems Approach to Training (SAT), re-establishing well-defined and measurable standards for all Military Occupational Specialties.<sup>16</sup> We know how to do this, because we have been there before.

Shortly after arriving in Germany in 1982, I deployed to Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels for maneuver and gunnery training. The entire Brigade loaded out by rail and spent approximately six weeks totally immersed in multi-echeloned training. We worked our way from individual skill qualifications through company Combined Arms Live Fire Exercises (CALFEX) and force on force training at the battalion level.

The centerpieces of Army training at that time were the written Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) testing for individual training, and the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for collective training. Both of these methodologies were part of the Systems Approach to Training. The Systems Approach to Training applied five interrelated phases: analysis, design, development, implementation, and evaluation to all aspects of systems, unit, and individual training as well as training support.<sup>17</sup> Each soldier carried a Job Book that contained the key tasks required by the MOS. Squad Leaders and Platoon Sergeants used these books to personalize the individual training focus.

During this same period, the National Training Center (NTC) began to replace large-scale collective training exercises like Return of Forces Germany (REFORGER). The instrumentation offered in the deserts of California, combined with the professional expertise of the Observer Controller (OC) staff, provided an unparalleled training accountability at the collective level. What the National Training Center failed to provide was a similar level of accountability for individual soldier training. Individual training largely remained a home-station training requirement. The Army transitioned away from written MOS testing towards a more performance-oriented hands-on Skill Qualification Test (SQT). While the SQT focused on individual soldier military occupational specialties, it did not retain the rigor of the former written test.

The 1988 publication of Army Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force*, and the subsequent 1990 publication of Army Field Manual 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, solidified this new training paradigm within the Army. The new doctrine called on leaders to, “train as you fight” by integrating realistic conditions such as smoke, noise, simulated NBC, battlefield debris, loss of key leaders, and cold weather.<sup>18</sup> The Army transitioned from the Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to a system of External Evaluations (EXEVALs). This system further enhanced collective training accountability with objective analysis by Observer Controllers (OCs).

Across this same period, individual training assessment continued to evolve. The externally evaluated SQT gave way to the ill-fated Self Development Test (SDT). The SDT emphasized the self-development pillar of Army education. So much so, that AR 350-57 stated, “Preparing for the SDT is an individual responsibility. Units will not use scheduled training time for SDT preparation.”<sup>19</sup> The Army did away with the Self Development Test in 1995, leaving Common Task Testing (CTT) as the only formal means for evaluating individual soldier proficiency. By its very design, CTT was non-MOS specific and only covered general soldier tasks.

The net effect of all these programs was increased collective training readiness accountability and a corresponding decrease in individual training expertise. The Army Chief of Staff recently stood up Task Force Soldier to: “conduct holistic review & analysis of individual Soldier training, equipment, and readiness needs, institutional through small units, in order to support deploying Soldiers fighting the GWOT and to prepare Soldiers for the Future Force.”<sup>20</sup>

As part of its charter, Task Force soldier identifies individual and collective “warrior” tasks required for all soldiers. Examples include react to a grenade attack, evacuate a wounded or injured Soldier, avoid an ambush, and conduct a convoy operation.<sup>21</sup> “This is about shifting the

mindset of Soldiers from identifying what they do as a Soldier -- 'I'm a cook, I'm an infantryman, I'm a postal clerk' -- toward 'I am a Warrior' when people ask what they do for a living."<sup>22</sup> This program will have the desired short-term effect of preparing soldiers to participate in the Global War on Terrorism, but it does not adequately address preparing soldiers for the Future Force.

At the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) surveyed over 45,000 Army personnel from 2000 through 2002.<sup>23</sup> The requirement for individual military occupational specialty testing came through loud and clear:

Commit to standards-based training. Standards-based training has been the strength of Army preparedness since the end of the Vietnam War. Standards are the basis for developing training, assessing performance, and providing feedback. Yet SAT, designed to document and publish those training standards, has atrophied. Without common standards, soldier, leader, and unit readiness—and battlefield success—are in doubt. These common standards must be documented and accessible in digital and paper formats.<sup>24</sup>

The study further pointed out that the lack of an objective system to measure a Non-commissioned officer's military occupational specialty proficiency, against existing standards, hurts readiness and limits the effectiveness of our leader development programs.<sup>25</sup> A Systems Approach to Training solution based on analysis of key military occupational specialty and leadership skills could evaluate tactical AND technical proficiency providing feedback to the soldier, the unit, and Army readiness.<sup>26</sup> We can accomplish this task.

By building on the foundations of Task Force Soldier, and applying a DOTMLPF approach to re-establishing well-defined and measurable standards for all Military Occupational Specialties, we can prepare soldiers for the current fight as well as the deeper requirements of the Future Force. If we further integrate this development process with the institutional Army, we can leverage the expertise of our Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Courses (BNCOC) and Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Courses (ANCOC) staff and faculty to develop, update, and sustain these products.<sup>27</sup>

We must look beyond today's requirements for the Global War on Terrorism and invest in the Systems Approach to Training methodology that we found so successful in our recent past. We need to accurately measure performance, identify deficiencies, and program resources to correct them. The benefit of this process will be a ready Army, tactically AND technically proficient, prepared to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander and the Nation.

## LEADER DEVELOPMENT

The Nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.

—Thucydides

Our current Army vision seems to make just such a distinction. Over the course of this year at the United States Army War College, we have seen a parade of senior leaders who de-emphasize the importance of this final chapter in the officer's life cycle of institutional learning. We have twice heard the famous Teddy Roosevelt quote, "The Man in the Arena," as the central theme of two lectures.<sup>28</sup> In both cases, the clear message was to devalue our time in an institutional environment as compared to those currently engaged in the operational fight.

The Army has long ascribed to three pillars of the Leader Development Model: operational, institutional, and self-development. Our primary focus as an Army is on winning the Global War on Terrorism. While it is true that, "our individual and organizational approach to our duties and tasks must reflect the seriousness and sense of urgency characteristic of an Army at war,"<sup>29</sup> it is just as true that our resulting operational experience is not enough when developing leaders for the Future Force. In keeping with the Chief of Staff's focus area on "Building the Bench," we need to focus on a deeper objective if we are going to create the leaders for tomorrow.

Like many of my generation, my early views of leadership came from observing leaders on the television. I grew up with two central images rolling across the three channels of the black and white screen in my home, the cowboy and the soldier. I grew up following the exploits of Vic Morrow as SGT Chip Saunders on "Combat," Chuck Connors as Lucas McCain on, "The Rifleman," and real soldiers fighting in Vietnam. These television images always seemed to demonstrate the mental, physical, and emotional attributes that personify a leader.<sup>30</sup> They honed their leadership skills through action, not study.

Years later, the Army taught me another way to develop my leadership abilities. To parody a popular book title, "All I really need to know about Army leadership I learned in Ranger School."<sup>31</sup> The physical and mental challenges provided by this institutional course pushed me to limits only briefly surpassed across my last twenty-three years in the Army. In addition to showing me my limits, Ranger School, through its Ranger Handbook, demonstrated the unwavering requirement to study the profession of arms. This unique blend of operational and institutional experiences shaped my leadership and education for the rest of my career.

Leaders transition from the operational world to the institutional environment, and back again throughout their careers. These transitions provide alternating periods of hands on learning and experience followed by study, reflection and plans for future actions. The Army recognizes this process as the three pillars of the leader development model. The institutional, operational and self-development pillars rest upon a foundation of training and education, expectations and standards, and values and ethics.<sup>32</sup>

The Global War on Terrorism provides a unique opportunity to enhance our leader's operational experience. Distance learning solutions can assist in self-development while soldiers are deployed. What we are missing today is adequate investment in the institutional pillar. The Army Chief of Staff says, "We must develop in our future leaders the right mix of unit, staff and command experience, and training and educational opportunities to meet current and future leadership requirements of the Army and the Joint Force."<sup>33</sup> The operational requirements of the Global War on Terrorism have resulted in neglect of the institutional training pillar within the leader development model.

The deeper view of the Army vision, "The Army in 2020" proposes virtual elimination of this leader development pillar:

In 2020, Soldiers participate in minimal formal resident training courses. Beyond Service unique training and entry-level training, Soldiers require formal resident training only for those skills, which cannot be taught in units, such as, pilot qualification.<sup>34</sup>

This vision ignores the lessons we learned coming out of Vietnam. Vietnam provided ample operational experience to our leaders. Year-long combat tours exposed them to the rigors of the insurgent environment, not unlike what we face today in Iraq. Following the Vietnam War, the Army recognized that operational experience was not the only developmental requirement for a more professional NCO Corps. The DuPuy initiatives 1973-1975 produced the Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) we see today.<sup>35</sup>

Another component of leader development in the current Army vision is the use of distance learning. The vision puts forward the idea that unit training, augmented by distance learning can replace formal resident instruction at the individual and officer advanced training level.<sup>36</sup> The primary rationale given for this leader development restructuring is the current and projected pace of operations and deployments.<sup>37</sup> While distance learning can assist our deployed force with self-development, it is not a replacement for the institutional pillar. The Army Training and Leader Development Panel agreed with this conclusion, "The field perceives the Army views distance learning as a replacement for resident education—a resource-driven

requirement versus a means to provide tailored training and education to meet the field's learning needs.<sup>38</sup>

The study goes on to point out that distance learning increases the workload for individual soldiers and decreases what little free time they may have left. Just as importantly, distance learning prevents soldiers, “from coming together as a cohort to, takes away the opportunity to interact with their peers in resident courses, replaces small group instruction, and takes away the respite from the operational pace Army schools provide.”<sup>39</sup> Distance learning is a valuable addition to the self-development pillar of the Army leader development model, but it cannot replace institutional training.

Operational experience is essential for developing leaders, but it only provides one dimension of leadership development. As the Army Training and Leadership Development Panel concluded:

A balance between operational and educational experiences provides the best method to train soldiers and grow leaders. These experiences must be synchronized and mutually supporting. Self-development facilitated by distance learning, technology, standards and feedback fills the knowledge gaps between educational and operational experiences. It is the key to lifelong learning.<sup>40</sup>

Rather than looking at our institutional Army as a bill-payer for modernization programs and operational requirements, the Army vision needs to invest and support this critical piece of Army infrastructure. We owe it to our soldiers to provide the best leaders possible; full-dimensional leaders with a sufficient blend of mental, physical, and emotional attributes.<sup>41</sup>

## SOLDIERS

Out of every 100 men, ten shouldn't even be there, eighty are just targets, nine are the real fighters, and we are lucky to have them, for they make the battle. Ah, but the one, One is a warrior, And he will bring the others back.

—Heraclitus

The focus of all training and leader development programs is the American soldier. The current Army vision recognizes that, “We must never forget that it is the Soldier— fierce, disciplined, well trained, and well equipped—who ultimately represents and enables the capabilities we as an Army provide the Joint Force and the Nation.”<sup>42</sup> The short-term need for the Global War on Terrorism is for the fighters and warriors described by Heraclitus. But what of the longer term needs of the Army and the Future Force? While we will need warriors for tomorrow's battles, we must also have soldiers for tomorrow's world.

The United States Army has always been a values-based organization. In recent years, we have come to define the Army Values as Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage.<sup>43</sup> These values help shape our Army vision. They provide a moral compass for the development of policies and procedures into the future. The current Army vision accounts for these values tangentially through a line in the Soldier's Creed (Appendix 2), "I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values."<sup>44</sup> While we reaffirm that we are a values-based organization, we have put far more emphasis on the components of the Soldier's Creed at the expense of the Army Values definitions.

The current Army vision focuses almost exclusively on the need for warriors. The new Soldiers Creed is central to the creation of these warriors. "The Soldier's Creed helps Soldiers understand that despite very diverse backgrounds, all Soldiers are warriors and members of a team."<sup>45</sup> Four lines of the Soldier's Creed form the Warrior Ethos: I will always place the mission first; I will never accept defeat; I will never quit; and I will never leave a fallen comrade. The Army Chief of Staff has a strong, personal attachment to this latest Army ethic:

Twenty-three years ago I stood in another place -- in the Iranian desert on a moonlit night at a place called Desert One. I keep a photo of the carnage that night to remind me that we should never confuse enthusiasm with capability. Eight of my comrades lost their lives. Those of us who survived knew grief ... we knew failure...but we committed ourselves to a different future.<sup>46</sup>

The ill-fated Iranian hostage rescue violated all four aspects of the new warrior ethos. They aborted the mission following the loss of critical aircraft. The team had to accept defeat and quit the rescue attempt, leaving the bodies of eight service members in the Iranian desert.<sup>47</sup>

The Soldier's Creed and its corresponding Warrior Ethos are essential components of the different future that the Army Chief of Staff committed to many years ago. While these new words embody the spirit we want in our warriors, they are insufficient in defining our expectations for our soldiers. We need a re-dedication to the Code of Conduct and the Army Values to round out the soldiers of the Future Force. The realities of the modern battlefield call for soldiers to understand how to react in prisoner of war status, the necessity to maintain faith and allegiance in the Nation and in their fellow soldiers, and dedication to higher calling.

The events of Desert One took place on 25 April 1980. On that same day, half a world away, cadets at West Point memorized a document called the Code of Conduct (Appendix 3). President Eisenhower established the Code of Conduct by Executive Order in 1955. It was (and is) intended to serve as a conduct guide to every member of the armed Forces.<sup>48</sup> As recently as 2001, the Department of Defense mandated Code of Conduct training in support of the Regional Combatant commanders.<sup>49</sup>

The non-contiguous battlefield, propensity for independent operations, and the realities of asymmetric warfare all stand as justification to follow through with the training directed by the Department of Defense. The experiences of the 507<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Company stand as proof that Code of Conduct training is required for every soldier on the battlefield.<sup>50</sup> The Code of Conduct requires a deeper, more profound commitment than the Warrior Ethos. With personal responsibility, dedication, and trust underlying the principles of the Code of Conduct, few would argue against imparting these qualities on our soldiers.

All wars end. What does a soldier fall back on when the shooting stops? What governs his/her behavior when personal survival is no longer the motivating factor? The answer is actually very simple. The soldier SHOULD fall back on the Army Values, the same values that carried the soldier through combat. In his farewell remarks General Reimer said,

The foundation of our profession is values. The cornerstone of that foundation has always been the West Point values of duty, honor, country, and over time that foundation has expanded to loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. L-D-R-S-H-I-P. It spells leadership. That is the critical component, leadership.<sup>51</sup>

For over five years, the Army has inculcated the Army Values into every basic trainee. From the day they arrive at the reception battalion, through the ceremony where they receive their Army Values dog tag, we immerse new soldiers in the memorization and application of these values. In the unit, soldiers find a much different approach. Unit leadership often views Army Values another higher headquarters directed training requirement that gets in the way of real training.<sup>52</sup> As one company commander put it, "Something has to go, so [you] pull out your values tag and say, 'Here, live by this and you will be okay,' and then cancel the training. Generally speaking, that stuff goes or gets cut in half."<sup>53</sup>

The current Army vision appears to support this mentality as it only mentions values peripherally. *The Fifteen Focus Areas* and *The Way Ahead* have NO references to the Army Values. The *Army in 2020* refers to Army Values twice, but never defines what they are: "Although Army values do not change, the Soldiers of 2020 apply them within an organization and cultural context unrecognizable to the Soldier of 2004."<sup>54</sup> The Army leadership is even producing a Warrior Ethos dog tag. Unlike the cheap plastic of the Army Values version, this one is stamped out of metal – signifying its importance to our Army.

As with the Code of Conduct, the Soldier's Creed and Warrior Ethos are only a subset of the qualities we expect in our soldiers. We need to combine the Soldier's Creed and Warrior Ethos with the Army Values in order to create soldiers for the Future Force. General Reimer's farewell remarks contained another message for these soldiers of tomorrow:

As President Kennedy reminded us during the West Point commencement address in 1962, “when there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat the answer is not so difficult. Many serve, all applaud and the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long, slow struggle with no immediate visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed.” He was correct.<sup>55</sup>

We need to expect more of our soldiers. We owe it to them to provide a foundation that transcends the current fight and the Global War on Terrorism.

## **CONCLUSION**

Ten months ago General Schoomaker became the Chief of Staff of the Army. Since that time, he has worked to build his vision for the Army into a reality. The *Fifteen Focus Areas*, *The Way Ahead*, and *The Army in 2020* go a long way in providing a unified, compelling, and understandable strategic vision for our Army. Throughout the visioning process, the Army Chief of Staff has remained resolute on one thing, “Our first priority is clear; we are engaged in a war now. This warfighting mindset is essential and must involve the entire Army.”<sup>56</sup>

While the current Army vision provides the right focus for the near-term Global War on Terrorism, it fails to offer a complete solution for the Army imperatives Training, Leader Development, and Soldiers. The solution in each area is readily attainable. All that is required is endorsement, emphasis and support from the senior Army leadership to bring these recommendations to light.

We need to return to standards-based, Military Operational Specialty testing following the Systems Approach to Training. This will build upon the tactical proficiency we are currently emphasizing and create the technical proficiency required for the future force.

We need to continue to invest in the institutional training pillar of the Army Leader Development Model. We must never forget that soldiering is more than just a job. We are members of the Profession of Arms, and as professionals, we must make time for institutional learning.

Finally, we need to hold our soldiers to a higher standard than simply the Soldier's Creed and Warrior Ethos. Build upon the foundation of Army Values and ensure that every soldier knows and lives the Code of Conduct.

The Army Core Competencies are to “(1) train and equip soldiers and grow leaders; and (2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commanders as part of the Joint Team.”<sup>57</sup> By building on the vision we can accomplish the first competency and enable the second.

WORD COUNT= 4624



## APPENDIX 1: CSA FOCUS AREAS

- The Soldier – The Army has to invest in the Soldier.
- The Bench – The Army must build a bench of leaders who think strategically and innovatively at all levels of war.
  - Army Aviation – This investment needs to get close attention to make sure that the future doctrine goes hand-in-hand with joint air-ground operation.
  - Leader Development and Education – Training and education is not the same. Soldiers train for a controlled environment, but they are educated so they can operate in ambiguous situations.
    - Combat Training Centers/Battle Command Training Program – They must be more relevant and exploit opportunities to improve abilities to incorporate joint partners to a greater extent.
    - Current to Future Force – The current force has to be able to fight today. The future force can't be fought, it doesn't exist. The Army has to be ready to go to war with what it has.
    - The Network – The network that is needed is one where communication can be done from anywhere among different organizations on the battlefield.
      - Modularity – A degree of flexibility that would give smaller units more power.
      - Joint Expeditionary Mindset – The Army does not fight alone.
      - Active Component/Reserve Component Balance – There are capabilities that the Army needs immediately but only the reserve components can provide. So there is a lot of cross-training going on now. Also the reserve components are being structured so that they are more useful to the states and governors in terms of Homeland security.
      - Unit Manning – They're looking for concepts that will provide greater stability.
      - Installations as Flagships – Installations must be resourced to project power, support tough realistic training and provide for Soldiers, families and civilians.
      - Resource Processes – The Army has processes from how it feeds people to how it equips people. Many of those processes need to be upgraded and brought into more modern standards.
      - Strategic Communications – More communication can take place with the media, each other and improve the lines of communication.
      - Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountability – Sometimes people are given the responsibility for something, but they haven't been given the resources to be successful. So how can they be held accountable?



## APPENDIX 2: THE SOLDIER'S CREED

I am an American Soldier.  
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States  
and live the Army Values.

**I will always place the mission first.**  
**I will never accept defeat.**  
**I will never quit.**  
**I will never leave a fallen comrade.**

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my  
warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.  
I am an expert and I am a professional.  
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of  
America in close combat.  
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.<sup>58</sup>



### APPENDIX 3: THE CODE OF CONDUCT

I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life.  
I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while  
they still have the means to resist.

III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape.  
I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with all my fellow prisoners. I will give no  
information or take part in any actions which might be harmful to my  
comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those  
appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service  
number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I  
will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their  
cause.

VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions and dedicated  
to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of  
America.<sup>59</sup>



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Bill Gertz, "Army chief pick shows Rumsfeld's new focus," *The Washington Times*, 11 June 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030611-120116-9113r.htm>>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2003.

<sup>2</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Peter J. Schoomaker, "CSA Remarks, AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon Speech," Washington, D.C., 7 October 2003; available from <<http://www.army.mil/leaders/CSA/speeches/20031007.html>>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2004.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2003), 1-14.

<sup>6</sup> John M. Riggs, comp., *The Army in 2020 White Paper*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 November 2003), 1-19.

<sup>7</sup> Roderick R. Magee II, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 1998), 22.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>10</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, *21<sup>st</sup> Century Transformation: Remarks to the National Defense University*, 31 January 2002; available from, <<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html>>; Internet; accessed 22 March 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Les Brownlee and Peter J. Schoomaker, *The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2004), available from, <<http://www.army.mil/aps/04/index.html>>; Internet; accessed 23 March 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas E. White, and Eric K. Shinseki, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2001* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, August 2001), available from, <<http://www.army.mil/aps/01/page2.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 March 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Military History Office, *Transforming the Army: TRADOC's First Thirty Years, 1973-2003*, TRADOC Historical Study Series (Fort Monroe, Virginia: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 2003), 16.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.0C (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 June 2003), 2.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*, 7-8.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Report*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2002) available from <<http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2004, OS-7.

<sup>17</sup> Military History Office, *Transforming the Army: TRADOC's First Thirty Years, 1973-2003*, 40.

<sup>18</sup> Department of the Army, *Training the Force*, Army Field Manual 25-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 November 1988), available from, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/25-100/chap1.htm#s5>>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2004.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Self Development Test*, Army Regulation 350-57 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 17 June 1994), 1.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Task Force Soldier Mission Statement*, (Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 March 2004), available from, <<http://www.infantry.army.mil/taskforcesoldier/content/mission.htm>>; Internet, accessed 24 March 2004.

<sup>21</sup> Joe Burlas, "TF Soldier focuses on warrior readiness," *ARNEWS Army News Service* 13 January 2004 [journal on line]; available from <[http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story\\_id\\_key=5584](http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5584)>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004.

<sup>22</sup> Comments by Brig. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley in, Joe Burlas, "TF Soldier focuses on warrior readiness," *ARNEWS Army News Service* 13 January 2004 [journal on line]; available from <[http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story\\_id\\_key=5584](http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5584)>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004.

<sup>23</sup> The NCO Study surveyed over 30,000 personnel, the officer study over 13,500, and the Warrant Officer Study surveyed over 1500 personnel.

<sup>24</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report (NCO)*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2 April 2002) available from <[http://www.army.mil/features/ATLDPNCO/NCO\\_STUDY\\_REPORT.pdf](http://www.army.mil/features/ATLDPNCO/NCO_STUDY_REPORT.pdf)>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2004, 40.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>28</sup> "It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly,

so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.” from Theodore Roosevelt, *Citizen in a Republic*, (Paris, France, the Sorbonne, 23 April 1910) available from <<http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trsorbonnespeech.html>>; Internet, accessed 24 March 2004.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Read*, Foreward.

<sup>30</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Army Field Manual 22-100:, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 2-10.

<sup>31</sup> Robert Fulgham, *All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten*, (New York, New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), title page.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Army Field Manual 22-100, 5-14.

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*, 8.

<sup>34</sup> Riggs, 11.

<sup>35</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report (NCO)*, 2.

<sup>36</sup> Riggs, 11.

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*, 8.

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Report*, OS-1.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., OS-18.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., OS-20.

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Army Field Manual 22-100, 2-10.

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*, 7.

<sup>43</sup> The Army Values are: Loyalty: Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers; Duty: Fulfill your obligations; Respect: Treat people as they should be treated; Selfless-Service: Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own; Honor: Live up to all the Army values; Integrity: Do what's right, legally and morally; and Personal Courage: Face fear, danger, or adversity (Physical or Moral).

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*, 13.

<sup>45</sup> Burlas.

<sup>46</sup> Peter J. Schoemaker, *Arrival Message*.

<sup>47</sup> Rudy Wright, "Calamity at Desert One," *VFW Magazine*, (November 2002) available from <[http://www.findarticles.com/cf\\_dls/m0LIY/3\\_90/102341832/p1/article.jhtml](http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m0LIY/3_90/102341832/p1/article.jhtml)>; Internet; accessed 30 March 2004.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Training*, Army Regulation 350-30, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 10 December 1985), 11.

<sup>49</sup> Department of Defense, *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*, Department of Defense Instruction 1300.21. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 8 January 2001, 4.

<sup>50</sup> "The element of the 507th Maintenance Company that bravely fought through An Nasiriyah found itself in a desperate situation due to a navigational error caused by the combined effects of the operational pace, acute fatigue, isolation and the harsh environmental conditions. The tragic results of this error placed the Soldiers of the 507th Maintenance Company in a torrent of fire from an adaptive enemy employing asymmetrical tactics." From: U. S. Department of the Army, *Attack on the 507<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Company*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army) available from <<http://www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/>>; Internet, Accessed 30 March 2004.

<sup>51</sup> Dennis J. Reimer, *Soldiers are Our Credentials*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 2000), 278.

<sup>52</sup> Leonard Wong, *Stifling Innovation*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 7-9.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>54</sup> Riggs, 7.

<sup>55</sup> Reimer, 278.

<sup>56</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*, 14.

<sup>57</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*, Foreword.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Training*, Army Regulation 350-30, 11.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brownlee, Les and Schoomaker, Peter J. *The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army. February 2004. Available from <<http://www.army.mil/aps/04/index.html>>. Internet. Accessed 23 March 2004.
- Burlas, Joe. "TF Soldier focuses on warrior readiness," *ARNEWS Army News Service* 13 January 2004. Journal on-line. Available from <[http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story\\_id\\_key=5584](http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5584)>. Internet. Accessed 16 March 2004.
- Davis, Raymond. "Lessons Learned in Vietnam." July 1995. Available from <<http://www.mvcc.com/user/amgrunt/Davis.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2004.
- Department of Defense. *Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and Education*. Department of Defense Instruction 1300.21. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. 8 January 2001.
- Fastabend, David A. and Robert H. Simpson, *Adapt or Die – The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2003.
- Fulgham, Robert. *All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten*. New York, New York: Ballantine Books, 1993.
- Gertz, Bill. "Army chief pick shows Rumsfeld's new focus." *The Washington Times*, 11 June 2003. Journal on-line. Available from <<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030611-120116-9113r.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2003.
- Kotter, John P. *Leading Change*. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.
- Magee, Roderick R. II, ed. *Strategic Leadership Primer*. Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 1998.
- Military History Office. *Transforming the Army: TRADOC's First Thirty Years, 1973-2003*. TRADOC Historical Study Series Fort Monroe, Virginia: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 2003.
- Peters, Ralph. "The New Warrior Class." *Parameters*, Summer (1994): 16-26.
- Reimer, Dennis J. *Soldiers are Our Credentials*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History. 2000.
- Richardson, William R. "FM100-5: The Air Land Battle in 1986." *Military Review* January-February 1997. Journal on-line. Available from <<http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/JanFeb97/RichardB.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2004.
- Riggs, John M. comp. *The Army in 2020 White Paper*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 November 2003.

- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Citizen in a Republic*. Paris, France: the Sorbonne. 23 April 1910. Available from <<http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trsorbonnespeech.html>>. Internet Accessed 24 March 2004.
- Rumsfeld, Donald. *21st Century Transformation: Remarks to the National Defense University*, 31 January 2002, Available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html>>. Internet. Accessed 22 March 2004.
- Schoomaker, Peter J. "CSA Remarks, AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon Speech." 7 October 2003. Available from <<http://www.army.mil/leaders/CSA/speeches/20031007.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2004.
- Schoomaker, Peter J. "Task Force Modularity Brief." Briefing slides with scripted commentary. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 4 February 2004.
- Schoomaker, Peter J. *Arrival Message*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2003, Available from <<http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/messages/1aug03.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2004.
- U. S. Department of the Army. *Attack on the 507<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Company*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army. Available from <<http://www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/>>. Internet. Accessed 30 March 2004.
- U. S. Department of the Army. *The Way Ahead, Our Army at War, Relevant and Ready*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2003. Available from, <<http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/foreword.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2004.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Leadership*. Army Field Manual 22-100. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Training*, Army Regulation 350-30. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 10 December 1985.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Operations*. Army Field Manual 3-0. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001. Available from <<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/pref.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2004.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Self Development Test*, Army Regulation 350-57. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 17 June 1994.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Task Force Soldier Mission Statement*. Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Department of the Army. 1 March 2004. Available from, <<http://www.infantry.army.mil/taskforcesoldier/content/mission.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 24 March 2004.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report (NCO)*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2 April 2002. Available from <[http://www.army.mil/features/ATLDPNCO/NCO\\_STUDY\\_REPORT.pdf](http://www.army.mil/features/ATLDPNCO/NCO_STUDY_REPORT.pdf)>. Internet. Accessed 7 March 2004.

- U.S. Department of the Army. *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Report*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army. 2002. Available from <<http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf>>. Internet. Accessed 24 March 2004.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Training the Force*. Army Field Manual 25-100 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 November 1988. Available from <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/25-100/chap1.htm#s5>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2004.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Training the Force*. Army Field Manual 7-0 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2002.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3170.0C. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 June 2003.
- Webnox Corporation. *Hyperdictionary*. Available from <<http://www.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary/expert+system>>. Internet. Accessed 28 February 2003.
- White, Thomas E. and Shinseki, Eric K. *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2001*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army. August 2001. Available from <<http://www.army.mil/aps/01/page2.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 23 March 2004.
- Wong, Leonard. *Stifling Innovation*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. 2002.
- Wright, Rudy. "Calamity at Desert One," *VFW Magazine*. November 2002. Available from <[http://www.findarticles.com/cf\\_dls/m0LIY/3\\_90/102341832/p1/article.jhtml](http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m0LIY/3_90/102341832/p1/article.jhtml)>. Internet. Accessed 30 March 2004.

