

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S "GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM" AND THE
LONG-TERM SECURITY GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S "GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM" AND THE LONG-TERM SECURITY GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES, by MAJ Leif Petter Sommerseth, 58 pages.

This thesis tests the proposition of whether the US is pursuing contradictory short- and long-term objectives in its search for security after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Discussion begins with a review of perspectives on security before and after this watershed event. The physical threat to security appears to dominate US security calculus over the short-term, but the long-term picture is less clear. This thesis examines how President George W. Bush's approach to the Global War on Terrorism has won some victories, but also produced setbacks. While these have not been critical, the approach has done little to attack the root causes of terrorism. Superpower emphasis on the military instrument of power overlooks the importance of nation building and similar tasks that highlight cooperation in an international environment. This might be a viable approach in the short-term, but to assume that the US will continue to enjoy single superpower status in the long-term might be risky. This thesis argues that US short- and long-term security objectives could well be contradictory without a persistent emphasis on full congruence between means and ends and between instruments and objectives.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ACRONYMS	vi
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	9
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	12
4. ANALYSIS	15
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	49
GLOSSARY.....	54
BIBLIOGRAPHY	56
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	59
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.....	60

ACRONYMS

DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
NSS	National Security Strategy
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.¹

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Since the attack on the United States of America (US) on 9 September 2001 (9/11), the US has conducted military operations against Afghanistan and Iraq with less than enthusiastic international support. Initially the US gained massive support as nations throughout the world deeply felt the sorrow of US losses from the terrorist act. Support has, however, diminished over time, and the US quest for an attack on Iraq enjoyed less than complete international enthusiasm. More voices now question the legality and proportionality of the US response to 9/11. The tough actions taken since 9/11 seem to have dealt the terrorists major blows; however, the terrorists still appear to have widespread Muslim sympathy and even support, particularly among fundamentalists. Are the US responses effective in addressing the underlying causes of the terrorist threat, or are the responses only addressing the tip of the iceberg? If so, what impact will this uncertainty have on US long-term security?

The Research Question for this thesis is: Does the Bush Administration's approach to the "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT) support the US long-term security goals?

Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US is the only superpower. Throughout the Cold War, the US example shone throughout the world as a lighthouse of democracy

and freedom. Now, however, less than two decades later, parts of the world view the US as a threat to their own existence and way of life. The attack on September 2001 is one example of how the US now has replaced the Soviet Union as THE evil in some parts of the world.

One surviving remnant of the Cold War is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This alliance has demonstrated support and influence for the US in several major military and diplomatic instances during the last decade. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, operations on the Balkans, and the immediate support NATO showed by invoking Article V in response to the 9/11 attacks are evidence that the US has strong support among democratic countries in Western Europe. US influence is likewise manifested in its leading role in NATO, and in its leadership during operations in Somalia, Kuwait, the Balkans, and lately in Afghanistan.

Despite these and other cooperative endeavors, there seems to have been a shift in US relations with the outside world since 9/11. The coalition building of the past seems to have lost priority to a need for rapid and concrete action. Some allies supported the attack on the Taliban regime, but operations in Afghanistan were more unilateral than the international arena has witnessed in the recent past. One clear sign of this increasing unilateralism is the fact that the military leadership for the GWOT is based solely on the US national command system, and does not use any capabilities offered by the NATO command system. The language of politics has employed tough phrases like--“Either you are with us, or you are against us”--a phrase not heard openly in the pre 9/11 or pre-Bush eras.² This kind of ultimatum is perhaps smart in a sense of showing resolve, but perhaps not so smart if coalition building is important. A country like France would probably

have difficulty in grouping Iran in the same category as Iraq; non-compliance then pits France against the US. Even more inflammatory has been an alternative phrase; “If you’re not with us, you’re irrelevant.” Such tough rhetoric puts strains on relationships and is probably not constructive in longer-term perspective.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations, like the regional Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, appear not to have had much influence on US decision-making.³ This development appears contrary to the norm for relationships that have evolved in an increasingly “globalized” world, with its intricate web of economic, informational, and diplomatic relationships. The world confronts problems on a wide spectrum of topics, ranging from lack of clean water, and lack of human rights to the potential spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). These problems most often involve actors who are not identifiable as states or countries, and the nations that become involved often pursue conflicting agendas. In the face of these and other difficulties, the process normally applied since World War II, though slow and rarely 100 percent effective, has been to rely on international laws and organizations as a foundation from which solutions can be built, solutions with which most of the involved actors can live. Democratic values and norms have frequently been used as a basis from which to form potential lasting solutions to conflicts, as has been done in the Balkans, Haiti, Grenada and Panama. The use of military force has generally been approved only after exhausting a number of attempts to find diplomatic solutions, backed by economic means. Brute force has usually been viewed as less than completely effective in coming to grips with the underlying reasons of the violent conflicts we have seen in the last decade. When military force has been used, it has frequently not produced the desired end state or

achieved lasting solutions, a situation often due to a lack of sustained application or support of effective diplomatic and economic efforts. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is but one example in which military power alone has had little effect in producing lasting solutions.

Nonetheless, The Bush administration seems to focus primarily on military efforts when dealing with the 9/11 attacks. US leaders seem reluctant to widen their responsibility in Afghanistan and encourage other nations to take over the mission when it comes to establishing a military presence over time. Cobbled together with a unilateral approach over how, when and where operations are to be conducted, this contemporary US emphasis creates tension among those allies on whom the US depends for follow up action. How long other nations will go along with a unilateral-oriented US approach is one of the basic research questions of this paper. Will the rest of the world accept the role of policing up the battlefield after the US? Will US allies and partners just have to abide by US edicts, or will various partners and friends recapture their pre 9/11 role in the decision making process?

Given the assumption that military force alone is not enough to shape lasting solutions, how will the Bush administration field other means to support such end states? If brute force lacks the ability to come to grips with the underlying causes of the conflict, is there something more to Bush's approach than has emerged so far? The Islamic fundamentalist uprising in the Muslim world has not abated, even though the Taliban regime has been removed from power in Afghanistan.

One other aspect of the US approach subject to scrutiny is the issue of norms. Some nations question whether US actions are in accordance with international law. Is

the response proportional to the threat, and is the US justified in taking unilateral action without the consent of the UN or other organizations? Recent debates between the US and other permanent members of the UN Security Council are a clear sign that the US wants international approval of its actions. But if traditional strategies are viewed as too late, and with too little substance, the alternative hurry-up approach might set an undesirable precedent for other actors. The result might be that other countries, for instance Russia or China, could strike against legitimate groups fighting for human rights and democratic values, claiming that repression just follows what the US has done, striking against terrorism. Thus, the less measured approaches could backfire on the US, giving opponents more fuel for the argument that the US is not fighting for democratic values, but aiming only for short-term, self-interested goals.

Another important problem relates to media reporting of different events. Winning the information war is more important now than ever. The image of al Qaeda fighters in yellow suits, blindfolded in an American military compound, and exempt from civilian law, is perhaps justified for purely military reasons, but the image scarcely represents a public relations coup. That the only US citizen caught fighting for the Taliban has been treated otherwise has not helped. Such examples are perhaps unfair, but they reflect the nature of the information war. The media will continue to play an important role and will have an impact on the US and other countries' fight against terror and for security.

Is tough action the only way forward to strengthen US security in the future, and does it take into account all aspects of security? This thesis highlights some of the questions and dilemmas regarding the present US approach to the GWOT and seeks

answers that shed light on whether or not the current policy is supporting long-term security goals.

Definitions

Security: Security as related to a state's security goals is most often understood as the physical security of a state's citizens. But security also deals with the state's freedom of action, and has since the end of the Cold War even included security against poverty, natural disasters, and manmade effects on the environment. This paper relies on a definition of security as a physical defense against military or terrorist threats. Where other meanings are implied, they will be explained in context.

Short-term versus Long-term: Policies and actions affecting the span of one president's service are considered short-term. Policies and actions that have farther ranging effects are considered long-term.

Hegemon: A state that has preponderant influence or authority over other states.

Globalization: In this paper Friedman's definition of globalization will be used. He has defined Globalization as: "The integration of markets, finance and technology and telecommunications in a way that is enabling each of us to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than before. And at the same time, is enabling the world to reach into each of us farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than before."⁴

Assumptions

The first assumption is that a theoretical approach has utility in a deciding of contemporary security issues.

The second assumption is that open source coverage of relevant decisions has captured the salient elements of reality concerning security.

Limitations

This paper does not get into detailed arguments and explanations. The broad brush and the large picture are used to illustrate trends and provide possible solutions that become component parts of a larger thesis. The author acknowledges the fact that his Norwegian heritage has probably colored some arguments. He has tried to remain as objective as possible. The fact that he builds on US views of US assumptions should counter much of the non-US bias.

In this paper, answers to the research questions are largely found in world politics as they relate to the North American, European and Southwest Asian regions. This restriction limits the number of scenarios, but the regions enumerated are still sufficient to provide a broad perspective on world politics.

A detailed account of the GWOT is not the focus of this paper. Examples from the Bush Administration's approach are drawn to show different and differing effects of that approach. Explanations are not provided for every political decision, nor is all the information subjected to interpretation. The object is to perceive trends and to use them to answer the research questions. The recent push towards an attack on Iraq and the attack itself are discussed only in the context of how they affect US security goals in the long-term, and not necessarily how events unfolded. Such detail would detract from a holistic view and impede the clarity needed to see long-term trends.

Significance of the Study

Critical voices in both foreign and US media suggest that this topic gives rise to many unanswered questions. Members of the author's committee said that no such topic--at least for the last several years--had been treated as a Master of Military Arts and

Science study. A critical view of major events can both enlighten and elicit arguments that are often lost in the heat of the moment. To bring such arguments forward in a staff college environment is important in itself, given the fact that field grade officers in such a course of studies will have to deal with real world consequences upon return to line-officer assignments.

¹Clausewitz, C.v. *On War, Indexed Edition*, trans. M. Howard and P. Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 579

² President Bush's 1st speech to the UN post 9/11. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/>

³ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is the largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. OSCE homepage: <http://www.osce.org/general/>

⁴ Friedman, T.L. *The Lexus And The Olive Tree--Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Anchor Books of Random House, Inc., 2000).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since the topic under examination is contemporary, not many books have been written on it. On international relations and conflicts in general, however, there is a large body of literature. This body reflects a diversity of views on international politics and international conflicts. *Understanding International Conflicts*¹ by Joseph S. Nye Jr. has grown out of the course on international conflicts in the modern world that he taught as part of the Harvard core curriculum for more than a decade. The book largely divides the theoretical traditions on international conflicts into two groups: realism and liberalism--but with several sub categories and some separate independent theories. This thesis uses Nye's description of Realism and Liberalism as a backdrop for describing motivations and consequences of the Bush administration's approach to GWOT.

A textbook will necessarily consist of only a distillation of pertinent writings. For further insight into realist views of conflicts, this thesis draws on other works including those of Kaplan, Hans J. Morgenthau, Kagan, and Huntington.² The liberalists are well represented by the works of Joseph S. Nye.³ In addition, other works that explain differing views within the realist or liberalist camps, like Friedman's globalization concept, are employed.⁴

The literature mentioned above sifts and sorts some information on trends and changes in the world today. The same literature usually depicts the historical backdrop. The words and actions of the George W. Bush administration, together with a sense of change of precedent, are found in official documentation, including the US National

Security Strategy, speeches, press releases, and other official guidance on the GWOT.⁵ Official documentation from the Bush administration is a source of its views on the subject and how the administration seeks to approach it over the short and long term.

One book that illuminates these approaches is Bob Woodward's *Bush at War*.⁶ It gives a detailed and well-documented picture on how Bush responded to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and which decisions and considerations that were in play until the autumn of 2002. Even though Woodward's book is not an official record of the events, the book does give worthwhile insight into the politics of the contemporary Superpower. The *American National Security* by Jordan, Taylor and Mazarr is a textbook developed from the 1970s until 1999, with the present fifth edition.⁷ Among other things, it describes the different approaches to security policies in American history. This book illuminates which of Bush's approaches are new, and which are but a continuation of previous policies.

In addition, quotes are freely drawn from articles written by commentators in the US media. Especially important are articles compiled for *Foreign Affairs*' "America and The World: Debating the New Shape of International Politics."⁸ The articles from "The End of History" through "The Clash of Civilizations" to "America's Imperial Ambition" are of special interest and importance.⁹ Seen in connection with Kaplan's *Eastward To Tartary*, these articles provide a useful framework within which President Bush's actions can be understood in somewhat different perspective than in day-to-day media coverage.

Since almost all the material this thesis builds on is of US origin, one might claim the study is too focused on US views and the views of its own President. There follows a concern about international opinion. The US coverage of the topic, however, affords

various perspectives on the President's policies and his execution of them. These various perspectives generally give voice to the major viewpoints, whether or not the materials are US generated. In some instances, however, the thesis relies on Norwegian, British, French or German literature to diversify the picture.¹⁰

¹J.S. Nye, Jr. *Understanding International Conflict, Fourth Edition*, (New York: Longman, 2002).

²Books used for this thesis are: Huntington, S.P. *The Clash of Civilization-Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Touchstone, Simon & Shuster Inc, 1996). Kaplan, R.D. *The Ends Of The Earth-A Journey To The Frontiers of Anarchy*, (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, Inc., 1996). Kaplan, R.D. *Eastward to Tartary-Travels In The Balkans, The Middle East, And The Caucasus*, (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, Inc., 2000). Kaplan, R.D. *The Coming Anarchy – Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*, (New York: Vintage House, 2001). Kagan, R.D. *Of Paradise and Power-America and Europe In The New World Order*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). Morgenthau, H.J. *Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and peace, Brief Edition*, (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1993).

³J.S. Nye, Jr. *Understanding International Conflict, Fourth Edition*, (New York: Harvard University: Longman, 2002).

⁴T.L. Friedman, T.L. *The Lexus And The olive Tree – Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Anchor Books of Random House, Inc., 2000).

⁵This information can be found on the web: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/>

⁶B.Woodward, *Bush At War*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).

⁷A.A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., Michael j. Mazarr. *Fifth Edition – American National Security*, (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

⁸Foreign Affairs, *America and The World-Debating the New Shape of International Conflict*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002).

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰A few of these articles are: Sir Howard, M. "Mistake To Declare This A War." *Defence And International Security*, December 2001, p 1., and Melby, S. *The Hegemon's Transition-Bush, September 11, and US Foreign Policy*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The organizational framework disseminated by Director of Graduate Degree Programs, US Army Command and General Staff College, governs the organization of this thesis.¹ The thesis is an exercise in qualitative analysis. It studies a problem that requires collection of information that cannot necessarily be dissected and explained through empirical approaches and methods. The sources of information include a variety of books and articles that must be subjected to interpretation and analysis. The information sought is general, with a wide scope. Detail is not as important as the broad perspective. Specific issues and detail take backseat to a holistic view.

The study has adhered to the steps that the scientific method demands. The steps include: identification and isolation of the problem; development of a hypothesis; collection and classification of information and its sources; discussion and arguments on the information found; development of conclusions; and presentation of the aforementioned steps in an organized form.² Thus, chapter 1 embodies an introduction that states the nature of the problem in the form of primary and secondary research questions. Chapter 1 also defines restrictive research limits, including definitions and assumptions. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of literature relevant to the research topic. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used to resolve the problem. Chapters 4 and 5 comprise the heart of the thesis. These chapters seek to answer both the primary and the secondary questions. The primary question queries whether the US short-term approach to the GWOT supports US long-term security goals. To establish a foundation for

evaluating present day policies, the secondary questions were formulated in combination to facilitate solution to the puzzle. The secondary questions are:

- 1) What solutions are there to security?
- 2) What is the US approach towards security?
- 3) How does the US approach towards security affect its European allies, and how does this approach, in turn, affect US security?
- 4) How does the US approach towards security affect possible threats in Southwest Asia, and how does the impact there, in turn, affect US security?

The nature and sequence of the secondary questions have been chosen to allow for a systematic approach for getting at the primary question. Their order reflects a logical progression in which the answer to one question provides the building block for the next. The examination focuses on the present US administration, not to subject that administration to particular criticism, but to view in critical light contemporary world events. Criticism in this context rests on the Greek root (*kritos*) of the word, meaning “to discern, to separate.” The thesis intent is to explore origins, trends, implications, and possible consequences.

Analysis rests on information found in the literature review and various documentary citations. The paper is based on open-source materials. The materials have been subject to critical evaluation, but the object is not to pursue detail. The governing assumption is that the information found in open sources captures the salient elements of security. The argument is intensely theoretical, with all the advantages and limitations of such an approach.

¹U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. July 2002. *Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis*. Fort Leavenworth: Student Text 20-10

²Bruce W. Menning, "A First Cut on the Method Shell for Qualitative Research," CGSC MMAS Course 221 Handout.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Primary Research Question

Does the Bush Administration's approach to the GWOT support the United States' long-term security goals?

What Solutions are there to Security?

Our goals on the path to progress are clear; political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
The White House Washington, September 2002.

The international relations specialist Joseph S. Nye describes three basic forms of world politics: a world imperial system, a feudal system, and an anarchic system of states. Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the western world has generally and unconsciously accepted the anarchic system of states as the dominant system of world politics. By its domination over the world, the West has imposed this view on the rest of the world. The Portuguese, French, Dutch, and British sought and achieved world dominance for various periods, but they were soon dethroned by other states that joined together to remove the hegemon. The anarchic system persisted into the twentieth century, when it became polarized and was somewhat disciplined by the United Nations (UN), evolving international law and custom, and the unwritten rules of the Cold War. Anarchy has not diminished since the end of the Cold War, but the US has emerged as the only superpower.¹ Although the international arena remains anarchic, the US now operates in many ways as the world hegemon among anarchic states. This realization might not be official US policy; on the contrary, President Bush has rejected it

repeatedly.² Still the effect on the world is clear: the US is currently the only country that puts resources into maintaining military power with a global capability, and the US has even divided the world among regional combatant commanders to pursue US policies throughout the world.

In such a situation the policy options are crucial. On the one hand, the US might reinforce the emerging organizational tendencies embodied in the League of Nations, the UN and the unwritten laws of the Cold War. On the other hand, the US might find rules a nuisance and act to diminish their future importance. Put in the terminology of international relations, a realist approach would focus on making the US ever stronger compared to the rest of the world, while an idealist approach would focus on the total well being of the world, although allowing for interstate changes in power relationships. The difference between the two approaches is well described as "the prisoner's dilemma" in Nye's *Understanding International Conflicts*.³

History shows that hegemons might be tolerated by other states or power centers as long as the hegemon does not put intolerable pressure on the others.⁴ But if the hegemon is perceived as intolerable, other powers will band together to dethrone the hegemon. Today the US is a superpower, but it does not have the power unilaterally to rule the world. A true imperial system, according to Nye's definition, does not now exist. However, as the world's only hegemon the US might have the ability to transform the world through either overt or covert coercion, or it can try to change the world through international cooperation. If the latter is the case, the US cannot expect always to have its way. If the US tries to bully the rest of the world into obedience, some nations will eventually break out and resist. The possibility of rebellion against coercion might not be

a problem today, because the US is strong across the spectrum of the national instruments of power. The US is possibly the only state in the world that now has global reach in the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) instruments of power.⁵

Coercion could in fact continue to serve US interests, including security interests, as long as no countervailing powers emerge. If, however, such powers should arise, and there are indications that China, Russia, India or Europe are potential candidates, then the US would be better off with some organization within the anarchic system of states. The degree of compromise is the main difference between the realist and the liberalist views of the world.

Yet, there is a third view, a variation of the liberalist strain that might be labeled the “globalizationalists.” Their understanding of the world order stresses global linkages through commerce, cyberspace, health and the environment. These linkages are now so tight that they engender cooperation and international solutions to common problems. Thomas Friedman describes this view in his *Lexus and the Olive tree*, and shows how interdependent the different parts of the world are.⁶ He also shows how non-state actors have come to be ever more important.

Non-state actors have long been present in the world, but the emergence of extra-regional terrorist organizations has given the term a new meaning.⁷ These organizations are spread throughout the world, and they use the modern infrastructure of cyberspace, world commerce, and a perceived struggle between poor and rich to finance and build a power base. This is the threat that President Bush has chosen to wage war against. How he fights is the subject of later discussion, but the characteristics, the threat, and possible solutions to the challenge merit brief treatment.

Terrorism as a concept is not new. It has been around for a long time, and different states and hegemonies have found different ways to use or combat it. Napoleon contended with guerillas or terrorists in Spain. Great Britain has seen and countered terrorism in Palestine, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland. The British have pursued two strategies. In Palestine they let go, and left the problems to the new state of Israel and the Palestinian people, a source of conflict we still have to live with. This ploy has probably contributed much to the emergence of Al Qaeda as a world organization. In Northern Ireland, the British approach has been a combination of military force and negotiations, but most of all the approach has relied on perseverance and patience.

The common denominator in most approaches to countering terrorism is the understanding that terrorism is usually not a cause in itself, but a symptom of other problems. These other problems can seldom be overcome with military force alone, but require application of the other elements of the DIME, with an emphasis on economic and informational campaigns, rather than military ones. Another characteristic is that the underlying problems of terrorism most often affect more than one country. In the case of Al Qaeda, the problems affect a whole bloc of nations and, indeed, the whole world. Multilateral solutions therefore seem rational to meet such multinational challenges.

Africa is another area in which social instability causes major problems. Robert Kaplan describes the effects of history and failing societies in this part of the world in a chilling and depressing way.⁸ His prediction of the breakdown of whole societies, not only in Africa, but also in other Third World regions, is perhaps vividly dramatized, but he highlights one of the apparent trends of contemporary world development.

If we are weak militarily--if we are not able to meet the rising challenge of warriors--our political values may be eclipsed worldwide.

Robert D. Kaplan, *The World of Achilles. Ancient Soldiers, Modern Warriors.*⁹

Democratic countries have a problem, he says, if they cannot fight on the same terms as the new adversaries. These terms might not be within the limitations of international law as it has evolved over the last few centuries. If fighting on the same terms means that the democratic countries have to break these rules, and this tack leads to double standards for a while, so be it. It is interesting to note that President Bush has a high regard for Kaplan and his views. Kaplan is a possible influence on the president's actions.¹⁰

Just as in the realm of inter-state relations, non-state actors may play an important part in some solutions. It can be argued that many problems do not directly affect the security of the US, but globalization certainly brings them closer than previously to the shores of America. If regional problems can be expected from organizations similar to Al Qaeda, or in association with Al Qaeda, such problems could quickly become important to US security. Again, many of these problems may best be solved, or may only be soluble through a coordinated effort of all the major powers/states in the world. And if the conflicts giving rise to these problems are not solved, the problems may have a negative impact of US security in the long run.

Why has terrorism suddenly become important to the US? Events of 9/11 showed how terrorists could strike the citizens of the US at home. The addition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the equation has seemingly changed the nature of the proposition. The magnitude of the effects a terrorist can cause is such that no country can

fail to address the threat. Preemption has become not only acceptable, but perhaps even mandatory in US perspective.¹¹ Preemption has manifested itself not only in attacks against key infrastructure, just as the Israelis destroyed the nuclear facilities of Iraq in the seventies, but more recently in the US attack on Iraq with the purpose of regime change to remove the threat once and for all. Whatever the case, preemption explicitly challenges the commonly held conviction that only defensive wars are just wars.¹²

There are other alternatives to preemption for solving the WMD threat. North Korea is a state that has possessed a limited WMD capability for some time. Consistency would argue that the approach towards Iraq should have been the same as for North Korea. Why has this not been the case? Later, as we shall see, no matter what the answer might be, there is more than the military tool available to address today's threats. Other elements of national power, including the diplomatic, informational and economic, can be used as well, or in conjunction with military means. Their combined effects in the long term might be more acceptable than the consequences of sole reliance on the military. Yet, military applications alone over the short term do not always alleviate all aspects of the threat. As the author William R. Inge (1860-1954) once said: "A man can build himself a throne of bayonets, but he cannot sit on it."¹³

There are a variety of styles to describe the conduct of state and non-state actors in the international system. The US tradition has ranged from Wilsonian to Jacksonian. Important variables include the role of institutions and the conditions under which bayonets as organized violence enter the larger US equation. At issue is whether or not 9/11 marks a paradigm shift. According to Kagan and Kristol, there has been a paradigm shift in Bush's mind if nowhere else. The use of immense military might to counter

international anti-democratic splinter forces and to defend the US way of life seems to have become Bush's paramount mission.¹⁴

Security, in a traditional sense, has been understood to be the physical security of a country's citizens. The state's survival and the protection from foreign military forces were seen as the state's major concern in security matters. The end of the Cold War seemingly removed most of the Western World's perceived threats, but non-traditional threats soon emerged to occupy center stage. National survival in itself, while still significant, was perceived as only one of a number of important national interests. Emerging threats like pollution, global warming, and starvation became important security issues. President Bush in his "State of The Union Address" on 28 January 2003 addressed the US reliance on fossil fuels as one issue of concern, and he stated his interest in finding solutions to this problem within the foreseeable future.¹⁵ Such a development could have far-reaching effects on the whole world, challenging the importance and well being of many oil-producing states. At the same time, new solutions would also probably pose new problems. In this sense, science and resources would become security concerns for the US. To the extent that these new dimensions of national security are relevant to a discussion of GWOT, they will be introduced as appropriate. It is certainly true that some countries perceive their national security as being more dependent upon their economic well-being than is the case in the US today.

This changing understanding of the importance of security to a nation in many ways reflects the perceived level of threat to that nation. In a nation's domestic sphere the security of the citizenry is guaranteed by a system of law and order that ensures some degree of predictability for citizens. In international politics, such guarantees are

basically non-existent. Realists maintain that the main responsibility of a country's leadership is to secure the country's survival. The world order is essentially anarchic, and each state government's foremost responsibility is state survival. The security of its people cannot be left to others to guarantee, if the state wants to maintain freedom and freedom of action. All uses of power and all politics focus on the survivability of that single country. However, Friedman maintains that a citizen's well being is also affected by globalization, and that it is impossible for one country, no matter how powerful, to stand alone and contend unilaterally with the effects of globalization.¹⁶ Globalization connects the different parts of the world so that union strikes in the Venezuelan oil industry restrict the US ability to wage war in the Middle East.¹⁷ Generalized threats also influence the security of the US people, if not in the short-term, then in the long-term. It is not unilaterally possible to contend with global warming, pollution, and uneven wealth. Indeed, the continued prosperity of the American people is not dependent on US actions alone.

These realizations and assertions underscore the importance of a central concern. Has security as a concept changed over time, and if so, what would the consequences be for the US? Thucydides described how Athens and the other city-states of ancient Greece either resolved or failed to resolve their conflicts. The difference between the weak and the strong is starkly illustrated in the words of Athenian leaders to the smaller city-state of Melos: "*the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.*"¹⁸ To outsiders, it seems that the US in many ways assumes the same stance when it presses the rest of the world into accepting a US position or policy. When Athens imposed tolls and other restrictions on its fellow city-states, they eventually rose

against the hegemon and formed other power centers. It would be easy to apply the Athenian template to US conduct in selected aspects of the GWOT. However, there are two considerations that lobby against a direct application. One stems from extended vulnerability and interests that other nations do not share. The second stems from the significance of WMD in a possible combination with terrorism.

Has the world really changed with the introduction of WMD as a means of influence now owned by smaller states, and possibly even by non-state actors within a short timeframe? The magnitude and repercussions of a WMD strike might make it impossible to wait for the other side to attack. In such a case, the usual moral stance might have to be cast aside to make sure that no such attack will ever come.

“Preemptiveness” becomes vital. But this accommodation merely seems to resurrect the classical Athenian alliance of expediency with Corcyra. Athens feared the strength of Corinth if it emerged victorious from a war with Corcyra alone.¹⁹ If the resources of a beaten Corcyra were to be joined with Corinth, then the two together would possibly threaten Athens’s hegemonic status. The Athenians decided they had no choice but to assume the initiative, and make sure the two lesser rivals would not join and possibly threaten Athens’s existence. The one thing that might make the situation different today, as President Bush has stated several times, is the magnitude of damage that can be inflicted with WMD by terrorists.

To sum up, there are several approaches to security, and the understanding of security itself is different in different parts of the world. When choosing the right solution, one should keep in mind that today’s world is more interconnected and interdependent than it has ever been, and that most problems concerning security are

multinational in nature and require a multinational solution. Desired end states usually involve more than military victory, and achieving end states almost always involve a larger number of countries or regions.

In addition we have the difference in view whether we can rely on historic examples to find solutions for the future, or if the contemporary world has changed so much that new sets of solutions are required. Friedman labels more traditionally the systemic interpretations as imperialism, feudalism and anarchy, while Fukuyama borrows Hegel's language and claims "the end of History."²⁰ If the fight is now about defending democracy and "the liberal economic order," then the means to fight include not only military, but also all the elements of the DIME. If Fukuyama is correct, non-traditional solutions suggest themselves. Whatever the case, the interconnectivity and interdependency in today's world indicate solutions found within the realm of international cooperation. International cooperation is perhaps not necessary to achieve successes in the short term, but cooperation is certainly necessary over the long-term to solve complex problems of pollution, distribution of wealth, and global warming.

What is the US' Approach Towards Security and GWOT?

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish the Constitution of the United States of America.

The Constitution of the United States of America

This quote describes the long-term security goals of the US. It not only addresses the physical security of the American people, but also the security of their way of life. It

focuses on a wider range of topics than just physical security. Physical security is merely the foundation on which the rest is built and maintained. President Bush's contemporary focus is reflected in the following quote:

So therefore, I think the threat is real. And so do a lot of other people in my government. And since I believe the threat is real, and since my most important job is to protect the security of the American people, that's precisely what we'll do.

President George Bush, *Press Conference 6 March 2003*

Does this tightening of focus on physical security signify that Bush is not considering the long-term effects of his policies, or does it just signify that some issues are more important than others when the immediate threat is unusually high? The national Security Strategies (NSSs) of Presidents Clinton and Bush differ in that Clinton emphasized enhancing America's security in broad terms, including bolstering its economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad.²¹ In contrast Bush, uses different words: defending, preserving, and extending peace.²² The influence of 9/11, together with a change in the administration, has changed the perception of threats from something abstract to something concrete, and something that must be dealt with immediately and decisively. The seeming inadequacy of the traditional US barriers to foreign threats--the Atlantic and the Pacific--has stimulated a new activism in US security and foreign affairs. Bush has realized that he has to change the focus from that of his presidential campaign, from a reduction of US military involvement in the rest of the world, to a policy that actively uses military force, often not in full concert with the other instruments of power.²³ Security is no longer something abstract, but something tangible that can and must be defended palpably. So far, security has been defended primarily by military force.

President Bush has defined the security threat alternatively as Al Qaeda, as the Axis of Evil, as Terrorism, and lastly, as Saddam Hussein, all of which can be dealt with militarily. But are these the real threats, or are they merely symptoms of something else? Who and what are the threats to the US and its allies in both the short- and long- term? The threat from terrorists has been recognized as the most immediate and major threat. To be sure the terrorists constitute a threat, but terrorism is not a cause in itself. It is usually a weapon to further some other cause or objective. The roots of the real threat thus lie somewhere else, and this realization has not been adequately described or dealt with by President Bush. Are poverty and the lack of basic human needs in the Third World the real threats to the American way of life? If so, then the military solution is perhaps neither the sole nor the only feasible one. This logic might be self-evident, but self-evident too is the realization that the immediate threat of WMD cannot be ignored until underlying problems have been solved. The full solution probably highlights both avenues of approach.

The trick is to pursue the one without excluding the other. So far, the present US administration seems to have placed its emphasis on the military approach. In fact, it might be argued that President Bush's mainly military approach has in some ways lent further legitimacy to some terrorist movements. This assertion can be said to be the case in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The US approach appears to have given Israel a "carte blanche" in its approach to the conflict. This "carte blanche" is viewed in large parts of the Middle East as highly unjust. The US approach in this case appears counterproductive with reference to the goal of security in the area as a whole. If this hand-off policy towards Israel is part of the result of President Bush's emphasis on a

military solution for terrorism--attacking the symptoms, instead of attacking the causes— then the policy seems flawed. At the same time, however, a similar case might be argued with respect to Afghanistan before the offensive started there. The US-led military operation has produced a more positive situation, in which the country is under reconstruction, and sentiments towards the US are generally positive. This turn of events was almost unthinkable twenty short months ago.

Because different approaches in different situations can yield different answers, one might think a debate about situations and approaches would capture a large US audience. The absence of such a discussion inside the US might be explained by the present apparent absence of checks and balances normally found in the US political system.²⁴ Since the elections of 2002, the Republicans dominate both the legislative and the executive branches. With a national mandate to fight terrorism, President Bush can choose his policy without having to work overly hard to build consensus. In the absence of serious opposition, he does not have to unite or work for compromise on contentious foreign and security policy issues. This hard-world political reality makes the President strong when executing his policies, but it also disguises weakness. His politics do not necessarily reflect the views of the whole of the US population. He was after all elected by a relatively small percentage of the population, and he garnered a smaller popular vote than his opponent.²⁵

The same lack of checks and balances can be found in today's world order. As president of the only superpower, Bush enjoys a position not seen since the heyday of the British Empire. He can pursue policies in the short-term without having to ask others for assistance or permission. Unilateralism becomes an option, as often advocated by

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.²⁶ Unilateralism can be viewed as negative behavior from the "World Bully," or it can be seen positively as real leadership by the only world power. The perception will likely be highly influenced by policy outcomes. If an outcome were positive for most countries, it would be seen as a good thing. If an outcome sours, then the opposite is true. It is a thin line that the president is walking.

Where does the line go? Are the results only empty caves and palaces in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, or will WMD be discovered? If a leader does the right thing, the rest of the world would eventually get on the bandwagon and support the inevitable. President Bush as a leader has focused the world on one aspect of the problem, but understanding a problem in its full complexity and the application of solution(s) can be very different. This fact can be seen in the US view on preemption in the case of Saddam Hussein. Most of the world agreed that Saddam was a threat to the region, but few agreed with the US that the threat was sufficient to justify a preemptive attack, or even resort to overt military action.²⁷ Observers usually view preemption as harmful to stability in the region. Within the context of 9/11, the US advocated preemption against a Saddam with WMD, while many observers and even state governments felt that preemption would just create a larger recruiting base for Islamic fundamentalists.

To elicit a consensus should be the task of a leader who wants to influence the future of the world. The Bush administration employs different approaches to this problem. The "good cop/bad cop" approach can be seen in the roles of Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Their obvious differences do not seem to stem from a conscious play by the administration, but rather from genuine

differences in opinion over how to attack the problem.²⁸ The president himself has used tough language, but has not always executed tough actions. He has waited and tried to gather international support.²⁹

The openendedness of contemporary wars looms large in any discussion about the GWOT. The same openendedness accords great leeway for altering goals and approaches in the GWOT. The present approach seems to reflect the perception that the short-term threat from terrorists must be addressed before the more underlying causes can be dealt with. This duality might actually affect long-term security goals in a negative way. The attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan has so far proven successful, but if the will to follow through with nation building in Afghanistan is lacking, the net result might well foster terrorist growth in that region.

The goals of long-term security as outlined in the US Constitution would seem to advocate a system of rules within which all states and peoples might exist. A unilateralist approach can easily justify other regional powers' attacks on groups that fight for human rights and democracy, with the allegation that they are terrorists. An approach sanctioned and supported by the UN would limit such approaches by other nations. The US lacks the sustainability to assume the UN's role in Peace Keeping Operations. Even the US is not big enough or strong enough to proceed alone in this field in all countries on all continents.

Motivation is an important corollary issue, and any discussion of motives necessitates a discussion of priorities. Which is more important to the US: Stability or human rights and democracy? Just as important is the issue of identity. The following vignette is illustrative of this point:

In 1945 King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia met President Franklin D. Roosevelt on a ship in the Suez Canal. Before agreeing to meet with Roosevelt, King Abdul Aziz, a Bedouin at heart, asked his advisers two questions about the U.S. president: Tell me, does he believe in God and do they [the Americans] have any colonies?

Thomas L. Friedman, *The New York Times*, 10 March 2003

Friedman's point is that the world questions US motives in its policies towards the rest of the world. Is the US imperialist or is it governed by some sense of higher ethics, religious or moral? Friedman further points out that the meeting between Roosevelt and the Saudi ruler occurred at the end of World War II, when the US did not need to ask anyone's permission to do anything. Still Roosevelt understood that he needed the Saudis not to win the war, but to win the peace.

If the perception is that preservation of American values should be included in the long-term security goals of the US, then President Bush's approach so far seems counterproductive. His policies would appear to undermine the US position as the beacon of freedom and democracy. The imprisonment of Al Qaeda fighters in Guantanamo Bay is viewed by many as a violation of the just treatment of prisoners of war. Many observers do not share the US definition of these fighters' status. The moral stance that the US has defended for so long seems to have less value when the US really gets down to serious business. This view might be unfair, but its unfairness does not lessen its impact on the perception of US policies in the rest of the world. The fact that US Al Qaeda fighters are treated different than the other Al Qaeda fighters does not improve the US position.³⁰ This perception is reinforced by the fact there are allegations that the US is using torture, either directly or indirectly through allies that do not hold human rights in high esteem.³¹ Such a perception of the US has previously found adherents only in a minority of the

world, but continuation of current policy could lead to a change in the perception of the US as something admirable.

As for the civil rights of US citizens themselves, 9/11 has found reflection in the introduction of legislation that gives the federal government new opportunities to control the American public. Seen in context of the traditional, very individual and freedom focused laws of the US, the new laws appear to be a huge shift. When such a shift occurs, the pendulum rarely stops at the middle, but moves all the way over to opposite extreme. So far, this shift has gone almost unchallenged by civil rights groups, and could lead to a less open and more controlling federal authority, quite the opposite of what the US tradition has been perceived to be. This change in law could in the long-term be a bigger threat to the American way of life than the terrorists of today. It might be that President Bush has entered the same trap many before him have entered: a belief that the end justifies the means. As Collin S. Gray has put it:

Typically, Terrorists win when their outrages, induce the state-victim to overreact. The regular belligerent takes action which fatally imperils its own political legitimacy. Similarly, terrorists lose when their outrages delegitimize their political cause.³²

Colin S. Gray, *Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror*

It seems that the Bush administration's approach towards security and GWOT has been focused chiefly on physical security and physical means as response to the threats. This emphasis could indicate that only the symptoms of the problem are being addressed, or it could be a signal that the possible consequences of not addressing the physical threat are so horrendous that failure to address them is not a viable option. If emphasis on physical security is the only way the US approaches security and GWOT, the end state of

a secure world will probably never be reached. Since security in the short-term is closely connected to the threats from terrorism, including that of terrorism coupled with WMD, the short-term responses might be justified even though they do not necessarily support long-term security goals. The threats of terrorism and WMD are, however, only a symptom of the real threats to the US way of life. If the blessing of democracy and a liberal market economy cannot be spread to all the peoples that now serve as a breeding ground for terrorism, then terrorism will live on forever. If democracy really is to be introduced to all the nations of the world, then one nation cannot forever assume the role both as the leader and as the judge of what is right and wrong. Such a system would neither be democratic, nor would it be free market.

President Bush seems to be a very strong, even “Fukuyama-esque” believer in the theory that history has come to an end. If not the end, at least it has come to the final battle between the system that will constitute the end of history, the liberal economic democratic order, and its opponents, the international anti-democratic forces. That he believes strong leadership “a la Kaplan” is necessary seems evident in the way the President executes his policies. And if this approach does not suit the rest of the world at present, so be it, because the US is now in a position where it does not need to ask anyone’s permission. This might be the correct approach in today’s world, with the immediate threat of WMD possibly in terrorist hands. When seen in a longer perspective, this approach must be supported by other means than the military instrument. A truly lasting and satisfactory result can only come through a combination of the instruments of power across the full spectrum of the DIME and with international cooperation as the foundation.

How Does the US Approach Towards Security Affect its European Allies, and How Does

This in Turn Affect US Security?

We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.

President George Bush, *National Security Strategy 2002*

The roots of modern democracy lie in Europe and in the US. Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the rough road to peaceful coexistence between states has finally reached a juncture that would seem to exclude war between the states of North America and Western Europe. At the same time however, war remains a viable policy option, as is evident from the fact that most of these states have recently taken part in military actions. Most of these military actions, like operations in the Balkans and in Somalia, have occurred in response to violence initiated by others. Common to the actions of the US and Western democracies has been an understanding that wars must be just wars.³³ The general understanding is that the moral high ground is vital when conducting military operations against other states. Events since 9/11 seem to question this fundamental proposition.

The US conducted operations in Afghanistan to attack Al Qaeda terrorists harbored by the Taliban regime. These actions accorded with Article 51 of the UN Charter, and most Western European countries agreed.³⁴ The reason for the disagreement

that did occur was not the end itself, but the largely unilateral means employed to attain the end. In the attack on Iraq the opposition has been less focused on the approach, but on the legality of the attack itself. It seemed to many observers that the emergent US strategy now signaled a new departure. Terrorism might threaten the entire globe, but the responses would be US-decided and US-led. The rationale for this departure might be found in the words of Michael Ignatieff:

Multilateral solutions to the world's problems are all very well, but they have no teeth unless America bares its fangs.

Michael Ignatieff, *The Burden*, NY Times, Jan 5 2003.

Western Europe has since World War II steadily spent relatively less money on physical security than the US. Europe developed economic and diplomatic solutions for its internal security requirements through the European Union (EU), while enjoying the military protection of the US-dominated North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO). Europe has moved away from the kind of nationalism that spawned the great conflicts of the last two centuries, towards a union that focuses on peaceful coexistence and commonality. Europeans have dealt with the "Prisoner's dilemma" by means of recurring economic and diplomatic processes rather than by attempts to maximize individual winnings at the expense of others. This development has emphasized processes that are bureaucratic and methodical, but which are rarely effective when dealing with crises that need immediate responses, as in the Balkans. Military capabilities have suffered, since there are no perceived threats to Europe since the Cold War. Europe has become militarily even more reliant on the US than it was during the Cold War. Robert Kagan has described this dependence, or interdependence, in *Of Paradise and Power*.³⁵ He explains that interdependence is something Europe cannot live without, since it is the US that

secures this paradise in which states can interrelate without fear of threats. Today one might be convinced through media that the only need the US identifies in Europe is old cultural ties, and perhaps some minor support when it comes to military efforts in follow-up operations. Hidden behind the harsh official language and media hype concerning the unresolved issues between some countries in Europe and the US, the enormous benefits for both regions coming from trade, investments, and intellectual exchange seem forgotten.

What do European military linkages mean to US security? They mean that Europe can support the US militarily to some extent, especially within the realm of peacekeeping operations.³⁶ Europeans have done so in the Balkans and continue to do so in Afghanistan. This assistance frees up US forces, so that they can be used in more high intensity missions. These are the missions that the US executes to effect relatively rapid and decisive conclusions in situations the President deems appropriate to the GWOT. European assistance directly enhances US security by giving the US freedom to operate. However, it is not without hesitation that European and other nations show up when called by the US and coordinated by the UN. The question is how long these militarily second-rate nations will follow the US, particularly if they continue to lose all voice in the decision making process.

Some nations feel that the US puts too much pressure on them to produce follow-on forces, forces that must stay for a long time, and forces that cost resources without being seen as decisive. If the US is not sensitive to such sentiments, the US might find itself in a situation where there are no follow-on forces to carry on the mission after the US has executed the initial high-intensity and high profile-operations. Would the US by

itself then have the stamina or resources to conduct these follow-on operations, and if not, would the effect remain just short-term?

Operations in Afghanistan appear to be producing a situation in which the international community through the UN will concentrate on nation building, while the US continues to pursue its national goals in the GWOT. The two different types of forces in Afghanistan, however, do not work well in concert, so the outcome is still uncertain. European states that participate in operations in Afghanistan have assumed the less glamorous tasks of peace keeping and nation building. The military capability gap between the US and the rest of the world does favor such a solution. Military realities certainly reveal differences in US and others' military capabilities. If this mission sharing is to be the future norm, then some political influence on the decision making process must be allowed.

In Iraq the overwhelming international support the US enjoyed in Afghanistan has mostly disappeared. Thus far, the post war environment shows fewer foreign peace keeping forces lining up to relieve US forces. With the limited number of forces possessed by the US, such an environment would deprive the US of its ability to conduct future operations with the same ease as in Afghanistan and Iraq. If the US then cannot solve all its security problems, the US can choose to coerce other states into compliance, or the US could return to working with other states in a true cooperation, with the aim of creating a global understanding about the nature of the problem. With cooperation, knowledge can be drawn from all the participants, and thus "better" solutions can be developed. Such an approach lies in the realm of idealism, a disposition that evidently enjoys little favor within the Bush administration. In short-term perspective, this

approach does not seem realistic, but with the inevitable change of politics in the US, this approach could enjoy a renaissance. Would the Bush approach ultimately have supported US long-term security goals, or would it have made rebuilding international cooperation more difficult? In the end cooperation is a prerequisite for global solutions.

The European nations have a tradition of working with and within international organizations. The first was the League of Nations, which broke down in 1935, after showing the world how an international organization should not be formed. The next was the United Nations, formed in 1945, and guaranteed by all the world powers. The UN might be bureaucratic and might lack effectiveness in some areas, but from a European perspective the UN is the most important instrument available to the world to create some order of the anarchic chaos traditionally afflicting relations between states. And the European heritage indicates that almost any solution is better than devastating wars. The European Union is another example that demonstrates how European nations try to work within international bodies to organize and discipline inter-state relations. Europe (the major differences among European states notwithstanding) tries to reach its security goals through international cooperation. Europe generally feels that some security threats are global, and therefore solvable only through global cooperation. This realization explains why Europe tries to reach larger agreement on such issues and challenges as global warming, pollution, war crimes, and terrorism. This collective approach is at times in diametrical opposition to the US, which has repeatedly refused to accept some international agreements.³⁷ Such US actions reinforce an assessment that some US long-term security goals are sacrificed to expedient short-term approaches. Indeed, at times it seems that the short-term has attained full dominance over US long-term considerations.

Are the UN and similar organizations really so bad that they must be ignored?

Does the ascendancy of the short-term seem so important that it must eclipse other, more institutionalized processes with perhaps the same ultimate objectives? If President Bush believes he is fighting for the existence of the Western World, democracy and free trade, it is understandable that the fight should be tough and pursued with whatever resources are at hand. But how is the world going to be organized at the end of the fight? Will there not be a need for international organizations to facilitate the inter-state discussions and agreements that must be present to organize free trade and help establish multilateral solutions to questions that cannot be solved by the US alone? If cooperation is the case, it might seem rash that so little effort is made to secure the future relevance of international institutions.

The US approach has at least one strong supporter in Europe, British Prime Minister Tony Blair.³⁸ However, Blair's stand might ultimately weaken his hold on power, particularly if he unwittingly subjects the largest and longest standing US ally to reaction from the "Euro" side of the European house. A strong and unilateral US approach could thus prompt a stronger European stand. In the short term this shift would not influence US security, since there are no security threats from a stronger Europe. However, a more independent Europe could shed a different and even contradicting perspective on the solution of major security issues throughout the world. That the two power centers of the world with similar same ideological views should harbor differences is a situation that could lead to an unstable world, and thus present a higher threat in the long term. Active leadership from the US side could be perceived as unilateralism if the message is delivered without finesse.

The lack of finesse is reflected in European perceptions of US views. US presentation of information is perceived differently in both Europe and the rest of the world than in the US. This disconnect finds reflection in varying views over even the most fundamental issues. The US, for example, has changed its view of the threat to its security since the attacks on 9/11. Europe empathized with US losses on 9/11, but it has not agreed with all US threat-related calculations since then. This disagreement has in the US been perceived as lack of support for the US, and the US response has not always been one of good will. Verbal assaults on European nations that have not closed ranks with the US have been unparalleled in modern times.³⁹ When Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld put Germany in the same category as Libya and Cuba, and when he labeled France and Germany as the “Old Europe,” he provoked the European nations and made it difficult for them to close ranks with the US without losing face.

The same proposition obtains in the way European nations critique US approaches to the GWOT. It sometimes seems like more effort is spent on magnifying differences than in trying to reach a common platform from which to build future cooperation. How these differences will influence future cooperation on global security issues is yet to be seen. However, it is not difficult to see that such differences scarcely benefit US security goals in long-term perspective. Is it really necessary to make enemies of your friends before you can make friends again, or before you defeat real enemies? One line of argument might imply that the US has provoked all these tensions, but this line is of course not true. However, it is true that the US is the larger and more powerful of various contenders, and its attributes offer the most leeway for finding solutions that suit all parties. The intense US pressure to initiate hostilities against Iraq seems to have

lacked an information strategy that could have transformed the attack more into a genuine international approach to the GWOT, and less in some eyes a perceived US revenge from Desert Storm of 1991.

The US approach towards security does not affect European allies much in the short term. European stability mainly results from the absence of threats to Europe at the moment. In the long-term a divergence of interests between the US and Europe could destabilize Europe. Europe could resort to a military build-up to compensate for lack of US security support, and this could lead to a traditional anarchistic power game with Europe's neighbors, thus jeopardizing a genuine European experiment in creating peaceful coexistence through non-military means. Such divergence would again affect US security goals in the long-term because the US would have to allocate attention and resources to Europe that the US could otherwise apply to other tasks in a global setting.

Another possible consequence of a split between the US and Europe is that European peace keeping forces now available could diminish, thereby putting even more stress on US armed forces, and thereby limiting US freedom of action around the globe. This potential also holds true applied to the Economic, Diplomatic, and Informational instruments of power.

How Does the US Approach Towards Security Affect Possible US Threats in Southwest

Asia, and How in Turn Does This Affect the US Security?

Southwest Asia seems to be the birthplace of today's terrorist threat against the US and the rest of the world. Both Osama Bin Laden and the terrorists of 9/11 came from Arab countries, and their support among Arab fundamentalists remains strong.⁴⁰ What

then is the real threat, and how does the US try to diminish this threat? The US has labeled its effort GWOT, but is terrorism the real threat, or is terrorism just symptoms of a larger threat? It is incontestable that terrorists are a threat themselves. They have conducted the attacks of 9/11 and others, and they continue to pose a threat around the globe.⁴¹ But is it possible to remove the terrorist threat by attacking them alone, or must the root causes of terrorism be removed as well?

The US response so far can be argued to have focused on the terrorists, and less on the causes of terrorism. The causes of terrorism can be found in the unending Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in the ghettos of the West bank and Gaza, in the bazaars of Islamabad, and in the anti-Western world view of clerics.⁴² Poor Islamic youths have no stake in the future and deem the Western world, especially the US, responsible for their miseries. They are easily recruited into terrorist organizations, and spurred on by religious zealots, they believe their purpose is to fight against the great evils of Christianity, capitalism, globalization, or Zionism. One man's terrorist becomes another man's martyr or freedom fighter. And who are outsiders to say that the indigenous wish to have a greater say about the future is not a valid one? The difficulty is, of course, lies in the methods. Killing innocents and striking non-combatants and combatants without discrimination is never acceptable in Western perspective.

Should the US reduce the recruitment of terrorists, or should the US simply attack already-recruited terrorists? The attack on Afghanistan removed the safe havens for Al Qaeda's training camps. The attack also removed Al Qaeda's support from the Taliban regime, but did anti-terrorist operations remove any of the inherent reasons for becoming a terrorist? The Israel-Palestine conflict has not been solved; the distribution of wealth is

still unjust; only the possibility, not the actuality, for the development of democracy and human rights has been secured in Afghanistan. These factors demonstrate that military means might secure the foundation on which to build a future, but this future is very much dependent on factors other than military presence over time. So far the US has relied on other nations to provide these additional tasks. However, this partnership could change. Whatever the case, a transition to a better future in Afghanistan will take time, and the consequences for terrorist recruitment might not be seen for some years.

The effects of not dealing with the Israeli-Palestine conflict can, however, be seen daily. The terrorists continue to hit Israel, and the Israelis strike back in frustration. Meanwhile, the conflict can be used by fundamentalists throughout the world as an example of how the US pursues its own interests without focused reference to a better whole, and a seemingly just cause. This perception might seem an unjust appraisal, but the US appears at the moment not to be winning the information war. The Bush approach does little to reduce the terrorist threat in this respect.

Southwest Asia consists of countries perceived as friendly to the US. However, some of these countries also wittingly or unwittingly harbor terrorists. It can be argued that an Arab civil war is exported to the West in part because the US supports regimes like those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.⁴³ The Egyptian regime fosters terrorism by advertently or inadvertently sowing the seeds of internal insurrection. A true democracy in states like Egypt might take time to establish, but until stable and peaceful regimes are a reality, Southwest Asia will remain a cradle for terrorism. The present US policy challenges these problems only indirectly and often not at all, by giving shortsighted

support to the very regimes that through lack of democracy and liberalized free markets give rise to terrorism.

The apparent US primary approach to security in Southwest Asia has basically been to ensure continued stability through supporting pro-US governments, often authoritarian. The US has supported both the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein, and is presently supporting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, among others. Democracy and human rights do not have any tradition in this region. To wish away this history and to attempt a new regional order built on democracy and free market seems utopian, or at least a bit optimistic. Yet, to disregard the consequences of past policies demonstrates an equal lack of understanding for the region's problems. Until an approach is chosen and advocated that makes sense of contradictory relationships, no lasting solution is foreseeable. Complexity usually means that short-term courses of action rule the day. Perhaps there is an underlying plan that can lead to long-term stability through fostering Western ideas as ideals, but thus far the public record appears largely opaque.

WMD and the possible consequences of a terrorist use of these weapons have provided US justification for preemptive war against Iraq. The emphasis on preemption outside a nuclear war scenario is an apparent change in US policy that contradicts what much of the world has been aiming at since the end of World War II. The terror of 9/11 and the possible effects of WMD make it easy to understand why the present US administration advocates such a view. However, a corresponding shift in information strategy did not occur to elucidate changing correlations between self-defense and preemption. Although many countries have not subscribed to the US view on preemption, the US has continued to pursue its security goals in the short-term. However, the new

approach could make it more difficult for the US to achieve results in the long-term. Trust is a vital ingredient for any solution to the “prisoner’s dilemma,” and trust is a difficult commodity to regain once it has once been lost.

Possible threats to the US in Southwest Asia have not been dealt a decisive blow. The threat consists of a smaller number of individuals who are fundamentally opposed to what the US stands for. To attack these individuals with military means alone will not remove the problem, if it ever can be totally removed. The environment and paradigms driving the terrorists must be addressed. What the US now does, in cooperation with others in Afghanistan and Iraq, is nation building. If this effort succeeds, it is likely that present animosity against the US will diminish. But the risks of nation building and re-education are high. There will be setbacks, and there will be disagreements between nation builders and the inhabitants of the “nation to be built.” When the US does the job with little international support, and when the US accepts the whole responsibility of leadership on its shoulders, the US is accepting a seemingly high and unnecessary degree of risk. Risk should be shared with others by casting the net of cooperation more widely. It is difficult to say what the implications are for US long-term security. If President Bush succeeds with what appears to be a unilateral forceful policy, he will be called the savior of the Muslim world--the one that removed the terrorist threat from the globe--and if he fails he could see a rising number of terrorists, all with the US as the prime target.

¹Some of the authors describing this fact are: R.D. Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power-America and Europe In The New World Order*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). Jordan, A.A., William J. Taylor Jr., Michael j. Mazarr. *Fifth Edition-American National Security*. Baltimore, (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). Foreign Affairs. *America and The World-Debating the New Shape of International Conflict*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002).

²For more on this, see: Foreign Policy A Grand Strategy, J.L. Gaddis, Nov-Dec, 2002; The New York Times, The Burden, M. Ignatieff, January 3, 2003.

³The prisoner's dilemma is used by Nye to explain the relationships in an anarchic world. The dilemma is described as this: "Imagine that somewhere the police arrest two men who have small amounts of drugs in their possession, which would probably result in 1-year jail sentences. The police have good reason to believe that these two are really drug dealers, but they do not have enough evidence for a conviction. As dealers, the two could easily get 25-year jail sentences. The police know that the testimony of one against the other would be sufficient to convict the other to a full sentence. The police offer to let each of them off if he will testify that the other is a drug dealer. They tell them that if they both testify, both will receive 10-year sentences." The dilemma is then whether to take the chance that the other prisoner will stay quiet, or to take the next best and risk a 10-year sentence instead of a 25-year one. Nye gives credit to trust for the cooperation there is around the world, and trust is a valuable and easily squandered commodity.

⁴One example is how Athens's neighboring City-states joined forces during the Peloponnesian War. See: Strassler, R.B. *The Landmark of Thucydides – A Comprehensive Guide To The Peloponnesian War*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).

⁵This is how Directorate of Joint and Multilateral Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College has defined instruments of power for use in classes for Command and General Staff Officer Course Class of 2003.

⁶T.L. Friedman, *The Lexus And The olive Tree-Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Anchor Books of Random House, Inc., 2000).

⁷The different trade companies of the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can be examples of this. See Howard, M. *War In European History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

⁸R.D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy-Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*, (New York: Vintage House, 2001).

⁹Referred to in Svein Melby's "The Hegemon's transformation" Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, report nr 270/2002 (only available in Norwegian), 19.

The article was originally written before 9/11, 2001, but was published in *‘The National Interests, Winter 2001/2002.’* <http://www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Rapport/270.pdf> NUPI

¹⁰Referred to in Svein Melby’s *‘The Hegemon’s transformation’* Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, report nr 270/2002 (only available in Norwegian), 19. His information is based on an article by Steven Mufson, “The Way Bush Sees the World”, *The Washington Post*, February 17, 2002.
<http://www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Rapport/270.pdf>

¹¹Svein Melby *‘The Hegemon’s transformation’* Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, report nr 270/2002 (only available in Norwegian)
<http://www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Rapport/270.pdf>

¹²For a thorough analysis see: Walzer M. 2000. *Just And Unjust Wars, Third Edition.* New York: Basic Books.

¹³R. D. Heinl, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, Annapolis, Maryland: US Naval Institute, 1966.

¹⁴“The Bush Doctrine Unfold”, editorial by Robert Kagan and William Kristol in *The Weekly Standard*, March 4, 2002. and David Sanger, “Another Bush’s Vision Thing,” *The New York Times*, January 20, 2002.

¹⁵This information can be found on the web: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/>

¹⁶T.L. Friedman, *The Lexus And The olive Tree-Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Anchor Books of Random House, Inc., 2000).

¹⁷During the press briefing at the White House on April 12, 2003 this was an issue that was brought up several times. See the web:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020412-1.html>

¹⁸Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: an introduction to theory and history*, 4th ed. (New York: Harvard University), 21

¹⁹Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: an introduction to theory and history*, 4th ed. (New York: Harvard University), 14

²⁰Foreign Affairs, *America and The World*, (New York: 2002), 1-28

²¹The US National Security Strategy as of December 1999, president Clinton.

²²The US National Security Strategy as of September 2002 can be found on the web: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

²³The New York Times, *The Burden*, Ignatieff, 5 January 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/magazine/05empire.html>

²⁴Searching for Checks and Balances at Google.com on May 21, 2003 gave me no articles on the dangers of lacking checks and balances with the president, and the two chambers on the Capitol coming from the same party. This would suggest that the discussion is not very lively, to say the least.

²⁵The 2000 elections gave the candidate Al Gore around 500 000 more popular votes than the elected George W. Bush. See Washington Post, 21 December 2000 for statistics. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/2000/results/whitehouse/>

²⁶See, Donald Rumsfeld, "A New Kind of War," *The New York Times*, 27 September 2001.

²⁷The fact that the UN Security Council could not agree on a resolution legitimizing the attack on Iraq is one such symptom that quite a few nations disagreed with the US concerning how to address the threat of Saddam Hussein.

²⁸See B. Woodward, *Bush At War*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).

²⁹On the White House homepage a number of the administration's efforts are listed. President Bush held numerous press briefings and talks that showed that even though the language was tough, there was some willingness to try to find multinational solutions. But these solutions had to be according to US goals and policies. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/>

³⁰The US position is that US Al Qaeda fighters are US citizens; therefore, they have certain constitutional rights not necessarily applicable to foreign nationals.

³¹Colin S Gray, Parameters. "Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror" US Army War College Quarterly-Spring 2002

³²Colin S Gray, Parameters. "Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror" US Army War College Quarterly-Spring 2002

³³For a thorough analysis see: Walzer M. 2000. *Just And Unjust Wars*, Third Edition, (NewYork: Basic Books, 2000).

³⁴UN Charter article 51 has the following wording: *Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the*

Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. For the full text, see UN homepage at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

³⁵Robert Kagan, *of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003)

³⁶Selected states, including the UK, can do more, as was evident in the recent operations in Iraq.

³⁷The following article lists some of the international treaties that the US has not ratified or agreed on. Monbiot, G. "The Logic of Empire," *The Guardian*, 6 August 2002.

³⁸Italy, Denmark, and Chekia have also supported the US in its approach towards Iraq, but these countries do not have the same importance and weight in European relations.

³⁹The disagreements when France left the military part of NATO, and the split in caused by the introduction of Cruise missiles in the 80s did bring about harsh words, but those incidents caused splits more along political fault-lines, while this time the split seems to be between nations.

⁴⁰Lemann, N. "What Terrorists Want," *The New Yorker*, 29 January 2001.

⁴¹Lemann, N. "The Next World Order," *The New Yorker*, 1 April 2002.

⁴²Kaplan, R.D. *Eastward to Tartary-Travels In The Balkans, The Middle East, And The Caucasus*, (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, Inc., 2000).

⁴³The New York Times, *The Burden*, Ignatieff, 5 January 2003
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/magazine/05empire.html>

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several approaches to security, and security itself is understood differently in different parts of the world. Security as it has been understood in the US since 9/11 is closely associated both with the citizen's physical and immediate safety and with the state's freedom of action. Choice of the right solution to security dilemmas over the long-term should reflect an understanding that the contemporary world is more interconnected and interdependent than it has ever been. Choice should also reflect an understanding that most problems concerning security benefit from or require multinational solutions. Even solutions to the short-term problems of today require the involvement of several states or regions. Multinational and multifaceted solutions appear even more important if security is to be secured forever

What we do not know with great surety is whether the future promises imperialism, feudalism, anarchy, or even "the end of history." The world will probably encounter elements or variants of each, and even more probably an amalgam. Is the fight henceforth really about defending democracy and market liberalism as the never-ending way of organizing world business, not only economic, but throughout the DIME? If Fukuyama is correct that Hegel's prediction for the "End of History" finally has arrived, then other solutions suggest themselves.¹ Whatever the perceived threats or adversaries, without international cooperation, the world will not be able to solve the long-term security problems of pollution, uneven distribution of wealth, and global warming.

Thus far, the Bush administration's approach towards security and the GWOT has focused chiefly on the physical understanding of both security and the response to

immediate security challenges. Under Bush, the US is in a near unprecedented situation of having sufficient military power nearly to wage this war alone. The current threat is of such proximity and magnitude that not to address it is not a viable option. The President strongly believes he is fighting the Western Democracies' fight against anti-democratic alien forces throughout the world. Thanks to the nature of US power, the short-term answer to the threat has been one relying on coercive force. Bush obviously believes that strong leadership of the Kaplan mold is needed. The long-term answer must, however, include all the instruments of power for success over the long haul, and integration of instruments goes hand-in-hand with international cooperation.

For Europe this assertion actually means little in security terms over the short term. At the moment, Europe confronts no large security threats. In the long-term a divergence of interests could destabilize Europe by undermining American influence in parts of Europe, thus jeopardizing a genuine European experiment in creating peaceful coexistence through non-military means. Such divergence would affect US security goals in the long-term because the US would have to allocate attention and resources to Europe that might otherwise be applied to other tasks in a global setting. Divided attention would affect the availability of US forces for other high-intensity missions elsewhere, since the European countries now discharge many of the less glamorous tasks. If European countries were to disengage from these tasks, the US military would have to assume these missions as well, and even the US has limited forces available. Over the long-term, diminishing European support would mean a diminishing European contribution to the larger pool constituted from elements of the DIME.

Meanwhile, possible threats to the US emanating from Southwest Asia have not yet been dealt a decisive blow. To attack these threats with military force alone will not remove the underlying problems that create terrorists. What the US now is doing in cooperation with others, in Afghanistan and Iraq, is nation building. If this succeeds, it is likely that present animosity against the US will diminish. An old adage says, "Nothing succeeds like success." But the risks of nation building are high. There will be setbacks, there will be disagreements, and there will probably be diminished international support. However, the risks of failure are higher without international cooperation and without an eye to long-term solutions.

Foreign and security policies are evolutionary. President Bush has moved from disengagement to intervention in a way that perhaps unintentionally brings him close to the legacy of Woodrow Wilson. Yet, in 2004 he must face the American electorate for mandate renewal. Success in war notwithstanding, much of that mandate will depend upon the success of the American economy. Like his father, he could well prove to be a president who forgot that "it's the economy, stupid!" This realization remains the largest "joker factor" in American politics. The present harsh words about punishing the French for disagreeing with US politics in Iraq will neither enhance free trade nor advance democracy in the world arena. Responses in the heat of the moment promise even less if they represent the true sentiments of the present world leader, and such responses rarely produce lasting security results.

At the same time, President Bush's emphasis on the military instrument holds two promises for the future. One is that the military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq have left in their wake important instances in which countries are now subject to post-war

reconstruction. By the time of a re-election campaign, reconstruction failures in either or both of these countries will likely influence the course of the American presidential campaign. Secondly, the absence of a genuine reconstruction effort will diminish still further the other instruments of national power. If the rest of the DIME is to come in to play, the US needs to enhance international cooperation, for not even the US is powerful enough to fly solo when the fate of whole nations rests on enhanced international cooperation. And the success or failure of nation building efforts will likely have lasting effects on the surrounding states.

In many ways, the future of the Palestinian question mirrors the dilemmas of war and reconstruction. The military victories in Iraq did nothing to better the Palestinians' situation. On the contrary, one might argue that the Israelis have enjoyed a "carte blanche" in their operations as long as the US was preoccupied in Afghanistan and Iraq. This situation only furthers the frustrations and cause of Palestinian fundamentalists. If these and related problems are to be solved, the full spectrum of the national instruments of power must come to bear, and international cooperation is a fundamental requirement. Military force and US in isolation cannot directly address the Arab street. At present, US military presence in the region can create stability in Afghanistan and Iraq. If nation building fails, these forces will be the first targets of attack, and the opportunities to create new Muslim martyrs will multiply. The issues that give rise to escalated terrorism are economic, informational, and diplomatic in scope, and over the long-term they are better solved in a cooperative international environment than in a hegemon dominated world.

The emphasis on mixture of instruments also extends to similarities and differences among US allies. Great Britain and Australia have clearly aligned themselves with the US. Others do so quietly on various occasions for various motives. Still others resist being dragged into US-led crusades, if only because of preference for non-military means of pressure. In April 2003, the European Union quietly extended invitations to ten new members. EU expansion is an expression of faith and confidence that something other than US-dominated solutions remain in the political picture. These solutions build on the same foundation of democracy and free markets, but Europeans have largely renounced military power (under a US security umbrella, to be sure) as an instrument of power in their own internal dealings. For the US to ignore such areas of the world in the quest for long-term security goals cannot be viewed as positive.

To sum up, the US has emerged to a position of power unprecedented in world history. For now, the US approach to the GWOT has been one of unilaterally oriented decision-making and action focused on the military instrument of power. In the short-term this approach might be justified, but to reach lasting security goals, the US needs to involve all the instruments of power, and do so in cooperation with its friends, not in spite of them. Over the long-term, course corrections must account for mending relations to revalidate the role of international organizations as means of settling interstate strife peacefully, with reference neither to traditional anarchy nor to novel hegemony. An over reliance on the traditional, anarchic unilateral application of military forces is anachronistic and bodes ill for the long-term security of the US, and for the whole world.

¹Foreign Affairs, *America and The World*, (New York: 2002), 1-28.

GLOSSARY

DIME: Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. The acronym represents the national instruments of power as taught at the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Globalization: In this paper Friedman's definition of globalization will be used. He has defined Globalization as: *"The integration of markets, finance and technology and telecommunications in a way that is enabling each of us to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than before. And at the same time, is enabling the world to reach into each of us farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than before."*¹

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). A concept and activity planned and executed by the US President since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

Hegemon: A state that has preponderant influence or authority over other states.

Idealism. Is considered descriptive and normative. It believes in multiple actors. Welfare and security are considered the key interests of the state. International relations are shaped by mutual cooperation, which equals a positive sum. Economic strength and manipulation is considered a significant instrument of power. Institutions shape behavior. The world is what it is, and can be better (A514).

Multilateralism. Views on international relations that favor a foreign policy where means and ends are found in cooperation with other states. The whole spectrum of collective arrangements is used to find solutions to security and other problems. Solutions that are binding for a long time, far reaching in scope and inclusive are normally sought. International structures that seek to eliminate a single state's dominance over others are the goal. To label multilateralism with idealism is not correct. There can be both idealists and realists within the multinational direction.

National Security Strategy (NSS). A strategy document issued at regular intervals by the US President. The present NSS was issued in September 2002.

Realism is considered descriptive. It only contains state actors. Focus on power and security as key interests for the state. Considers international relations as a zero sum game. Force is only significant instrument of national power. Human nature is fixed and unchanging. The world is what it is, and will always be so (A514).

Security: Security, as related to states security goals, is most often understood as the physical security of a state's citizens. But it also deals with the state's freedom of action, and has since the end of the Cold War even included security against poverty, natural disasters or manmade effects on the environment. In this paper it

¹ Thomas L. Friedman, *"The Lexus and the Olive Tree"*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2000),

is the meaning of security as a physical defense against military or terrorist threats that will be the prevailing understanding. Where other meanings are discussed, this will be explained in the argument

Short-term vs Long-term: Policies and actions effecting one president's service, as president is considered short-term. Policies and actions that have effects ranging further than this are considered long-term.

Unilateralism. Views that advocates an ambitious and globally directed approach on foreign policy, and the ends are most often sought by the state's own instruments of power. If alliances are established, the unilateralist will favor short-term arrangements, based on ad hoc coalitions of the willing. If long-term relations are chosen, these will be exclusive in interest, and not include collective inclusive arrangements.

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