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THREADING THE NEEDLE: HOW THE UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND  
CAN CREATE EFFECTIVE INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the significant operational, political, and organizational risks inherent in the implementation of United States Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, and how the command can mitigate those risks by carefully managing their relationships with the homeland security interagency players. After briefly reviewing homeland security organizational issues, the author proposes three areas of potential problems -- budget authority, unclear lines of authority and responsibility, and a lack of communication, command, and control relationships among interagency players. To address these problems, the author suggests NORTHCOM focus on five characteristics of their interagency relationships -- coordination, cooperation, cohesiveness, clarity, and coherence. To implement these characteristics, the author recommends NORTHCOM pursue the following eight recommendations: participate in the Homeland Security Council/Policy Coordination Committees at the CINC or DCINC level; both fill and establish permanent liaison officer positions with their interagency partners; develop a deep cultural awareness of other agencies; maintain a clear customer focus; establish a strong teamwork ethic; collaborate on mutual Memoranda of Understanding with their partners; develop, exercise, and evaluate scenario-based operational plans; and keep a constant emphasis on the homeland security mission.

There are significant operational, political, and organizational risks inherent in the implementation of United States Northern Command, or NORTHCOM. The thesis of this paper is to demonstrate that the NORTHCOM commander in chief and his staff can mitigate these risks by carefully managing the relationship between the command and the other key interagency players within the federal government. In this paper, the author will contend that relationships based on principles of coordination and cooperation can form a solid foundation for the contribution of Northern Command, and more broadly the Department of Defense, to the homeland security arena. This argument will be supported by reviewing the Department's involvement in homeland security issues and previous organizational models used to address those issues, and analyzing the NORTHCOM proposal announced in the 2002 Unified Command Plan. The analysis will identify three potential problems--budget competition, unclear lines of authority and responsibility, and a lack of clear communication, command, and control relationships among interagency players. Recommendations to avoid those problems follow the analysis, including eight specific actions NORTHCOM should take to create effective relationships with its interagency partners.

## **BACKGROUND**

The terrorist attacks carried out by members of the Al Qaeda organization against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were unprecedented in complexity, scope, and lethality. September 11, 2001 has entered the contemporary American lexicon as a synonym for savagery, much the same as December 7, 1941 did for those who fought and won World War II. The impact of the events of that day still resonates through society—from business to education, and from domestic politics to foreign policy. The attacks have become a

rallying point for all Americans, and brought back to the collective consciousness of the nation the importance of sacrifice and service in a way no government program ever could.

This watershed event has also dramatically affected United States defense planning. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, military professionals and defense analysts alike have expended great effort in defining the proper strategic perspective and force-sizing mechanism for the armed forces of the United States. Planners have wrestled with the notions of “major regional conflicts” versus “major theater wars”; planned for two simultaneous or near-simultaneous conflicts; struggled with understanding the proper force structure and weapons mix to meet the still-undefined “threat”; and wavered between threat-based or capabilities-based schemes to design, organize, train, and equip America’s armed forces for the twenty-first century. Yet always the military’s focus has been outward, looking to enemies overseas—in their homelands, not our own. Since 11 September, however, there has been a dramatic paradigm shift, as those responsible for the defense of America have looked inward. This noticeable change in the concept of homeland security in the early days of Governor George W. Bush's campaign for the Presidency accelerated after 11 September.<sup>1</sup> On 30 September 2001, the Secretary of Defense in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review made homeland security a centerpiece of the administration’s defense policy and expanded the concept beyond theater/ballistic missile defense measures.<sup>2</sup>

## **PREVIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY**

The Department of Defense has historically organized itself to meet differing concepts of homeland security. Several major and combatant commands have had the responsibility for parts of what is known today as homeland defense, including the Army's

Continental Army Command, and the Air Force's Air Defense Command and Continental Air Command.<sup>3</sup> The United States Coast Guard has traditionally played a major role in guarding the nation's maritime borders and waterways, and the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard have also had major tasks in ensuring domestic security, both in their Federal and State roles, from natural disaster response to consequence management.<sup>4</sup>

In recent years, the Department of Defense has made a number of changes to the Unified Command Plan and assigned responsibility for homeland security to a series of unified commands. The first was the United States Atlantic Command, formed shortly after World War II and assigned the geographic responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean and eastern approaches to the continental United States.<sup>5</sup> Later, functional leadership was added to its mission; the command was tasked with “planning for the land defense of the CONUS, domestic support operations to assist government agencies, and the combined Canada—United States land and maritime defense of Canada.”<sup>6</sup>

In October 1999, Atlantic Command was renamed the United States Joint Forces Command. The command retained geographic responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean region, and gained added functional responsibilities as the lead agent for force transformation in the Department of Defense. It was assigned responsibility for military assistance to civil authorities, and gained control of Joint Task Force--Civil Support, the DoD's organization to coordinate support to civilian authorities in the event of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident in the United States.<sup>7</sup> After 11 September, Joint Forces Command stood up a new organization, aptly named Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland Security. This new organization is responsible for coordinating “land and maritime defense of the continental United States, and military assistance to civil authorities.”<sup>8</sup> Despite the renewed emphasis on

homeland security, no unified combatant command was assigned geographic responsibility for the United States, Canada, or Mexico.<sup>9</sup>

### **CURRENT NORTHERN COMMAND PROPOSAL**

On 17 April 2002, in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Myers, CJCS, unveiled the new 2002 Unified Command Plan. Secretary Rumsfeld announced that the Department of Defense had formed a new combatant command, United States Northern Command, calling it the “most significant change to command organization since the end of the Cold War.”<sup>10</sup> The command will assume geographic responsibility for the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico, portions of the Caribbean not assigned to United States Southern Command, and the contiguous waters offshore to a “minimum” distance of 500 miles from both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.<sup>11</sup> The commander in chief of this new command “will be responsible for land, aerospace, and sea defenses of the United States. He will command U.S. forces that operate within the U.S. in support of civil authorities.”<sup>12</sup> This change relieves Joint Forces Command of their geographic responsibility and the portion of their functional responsibility pertaining to homeland security, including Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland Security and Joint Task Force--Civil Support. The commander of this new command will be the single point of contact for Federal, State, and local authorities seeking military support coping with a variety of threats to the security of the homeland of the United States. He will also serve as the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has published the Terms of Reference for the implementation of this new combatant command.<sup>13</sup> In them, he outlines the command’s

preliminary shape as it assumes its new responsibilities. The staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, NORAD, and Joint Forces Command, along with the Joint Staff, are now developing the NORTHCOM implementation plan based on these Terms of Reference.

The plan as presented on 17 April 2002 has many strong points. NORTHCOM represents the latest evolution in the Department of Defense's efforts to come to grips with the issue of homeland security. Led by a four-star general/flag officer, the new unified combatant command will consolidate responsibility for a variety of homeland security missions. This change assigns all of the nations of the world to one of the geographic CINCs, though it remains to be seen what will be done with Joint Forces Command's NATO role in the Atlantic.<sup>13</sup> The new arrangement provides other government agencies with a single DoD homeland security point of contact point, perhaps one of the plan's strongest points. It also highlights the supporting nature of the military's involvement in homeland security. In the briefing announcing the Unified Command Plan changes, senior DoD leaders referred to NORTHCOM's role as one of providing support to civil authorities no fewer than sixteen times.<sup>14</sup> Clearly, these leaders hope such repetition and emphasis results in clarity of purpose and unity of effort.

However, the plan does have its weaknesses, and is not without its detractors. Some observers decry the effort as just another Department of Defense reorganization,<sup>15</sup> contend that little will change from previous command arrangements, and conclude that the change is "...just an organizational reshuffling."<sup>16</sup> The location of the new command headquarters--Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado--might prove to be a source of problems if it places the command at too great a distance from the key federal agencies in the Washington, D.C. area that will be its partners in the homeland security mission.<sup>17</sup> The as-yet-undefined

relationship between the commander in chief of NORTHCOM and the other geographic CINCs regarding force allocation and apportionment will also prove troublesome, if crises provoke a serious allocation issue.

There are numerous issues in the homeland security arena worthy of study and research. One issue is the international relations aspects of the implementation of Northern Command. The United States' relationships with her nearest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, will almost certainly change under the existing proposal, regarding not just defense, but also social and economic matters. Domestically, the commander in chief of Northern Command will face an unprecedented challenge in managing relationships with the 535 United States representatives and senators whose constituents live within CINCNORTH's theater, a feat that will require extraordinary political skill. A third issue is the complex relationship between Northern Command and the multitude of government agencies with homeland security responsibilities or concerns. While all are important, this paper, due to its limited scope, will address only the last—the relationship between NORTHCOM and other government agencies.

### **ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE PROBLEMS IN NORTHCOM'S IMPLEMENTATION**

There are numerous possible interagency problems as the implementation of Northern Command moves forward. While there are dangers, there are also ways to avoid those dangers if senior leaders are diligent in carefully defining and clarifying the relationships between NORTHCOM and its homeland security partners. Three primary issues emerge at first glance: budget competition, unclear lines of authority and responsibility, and the need for clear communication, command, and control relationships among interagency players.

## Budget Competition

Demands for funding are sure to be sticking points. Battles will be fought between executive branch departments to secure the needed funding for homeland security issues and initiatives. There will be debates regarding funding shortfalls for such agencies as the FBI, FEMA, and the Department of Defense and State and local governments. In these debates, there are likely to be concerted efforts to use the homeland security threat as a means to expand budget authority. There is a limit to Congress' willingness to fund executive branch priorities in lieu of their own priorities; executive branch budget leaders can expect opposition to a certain percentage of executive branch initiatives and addition of Congressional priorities to the appropriations bills for their respective federal agencies. With regard to funding, there are at least two key points of disagreement.

One area of concern will be people. Endstrength, or the number of people (by component or category) in the agency or organization, is a major issue and is a direct contributor to the organization's ability to achieve its mission. It will likely be fiscally untenable to add large numbers of active duty military personnel, reserve military personnel, customs agents, border patrol guards, federal airport security personnel, and FBI agents to the federal workforce all at the same time.

A second area of concern relates to equipment, training, and operations and maintenance funding. The same restrictions would apply; absent an unprecedented infusion of Federal, State, and local dollars, budget officials will have some hard choices to make. Almost certainly, perceived requirements will exceed the taxpayers' ability to pay for them in a fiscally constrained environment.

President Bush and Congress have made some progress, however. In the proposed FY03 President's Budget, President Bush directs \$37.7 billion to homeland security (compared to \$19.5 billion in FY02) and emphasizes four key areas for added funding: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence.<sup>18</sup> This amount is in addition to the homeland security portion of the FY02 Emergency Budget Supplemental, which totaled \$10.6 billion.<sup>19</sup> However, while this will help meet the needs, these dollars will not fund DoD initiatives for homeland security.

If difficult homeland security funding choices must be made within the executive branch--as they almost certainly will--they are likely to be made when the various executive branch agencies consult with officials of the Office of Management and Budget as the President's annual budget proposal makes its way to Congress for consideration. In these negotiations, OMB officials will expand or curtail budget proposals to meet requirements while staying within the President's desired overall budget figure.

#### Authority and Responsibility

Ultimately, the budgets for agencies and organizations involved in homeland security will be determined by the tasks assigned to them. This raises the second issue related to the interagency process and homeland security: the matter of unclear authority and responsibility. One of the major questions facing the entire homeland security community is the issue of roles and missions. There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding who is responsible for what tasks regarding the different aspects of homeland security. This division of labor will affect funding, manning levels, leadership concerns, training, and other areas. The NORTHCOM commander in chief will surely spend considerable time unraveling the tangled set of relationships among the interagency players and defining the command's

relationships with those players. Just who is responsible for what—not only in the interagency process but also within the Department of Defense—is a question still to be answered, a process that may not be complete by 1 October 2002, the date for the command to achieve initial operational capability.<sup>20</sup>

The example of a homeland security threat clearly illustrates this issue. Depending on the nature of the attack, significant roles could be played by the FBI, FEMA, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, Health and Human Services, or a number of other agencies.<sup>21</sup> Add to that mix the involvement of State and local governmental officials, with differing concepts of what constitutes a threat, differing capabilities, and a variety of chains of command for dealing with an emergency, and confusion and chaos are the almost inevitable outcomes.<sup>22</sup>

Part of the resolution of this issue depends on the eventual role of the Office of Homeland Security, headed by Governor Tom Ridge, and NORTHCOM's relationship to the Office's staff. Today, the director of this relatively small office reports directly to the President. However, the President is considering elevating the position from Assistant to the President (not subject to Senate confirmation) to Cabinet rank, a position that is subject to Senate confirmation and whose responsibilities are subject to Congressional oversight and committee testimony requirements.<sup>23</sup> A key mission of the Office is to develop a national strategy for homeland security, a product that has yet to be delivered, though the Office was established by Executive Order 13228 on 8 October 2001.<sup>24</sup> Even something as seemingly simple as the Homeland Security Advisory System has created consternation at local levels.<sup>25</sup>

## Communication, Command, and Control

The third issue is communication, command, and control: who talks to whom, about what, and at which organizational level. Secretary Rumsfeld has voiced a preliminary opinion on the issue of the relationship between CINCNORTH and the Office of Homeland Security, but only states that the civilian connection between DoD and the Office will remain vital, and affirms that CINCNORTH will take orders only from the Secretary of Defense,<sup>26</sup> as provided for in United States Code.<sup>27</sup> However, it is not yet clear just what relationship will exist between the two key organizations, and between them and the other interagency players in the process. Flawed communication, command, and control, particularly during a crisis, could have a devastating effect on the government agencies' responses. Whatever the answer may be, one thing is clear: homeland security is a mission that goes beyond a single service, beyond joint, beyond combined; it enters the shadowy realm of interagency, joint, combined operations. It will put a higher premium on clear communication, command, and control relationships than any other scenario.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO AVOID THE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS**

There are ways to overcome the problems inherent in the NORTHCOM proposal. For this new command to accomplish its mission, the commanders and staff of the United States Northern Command must focus on coordination, cooperation, cohesiveness, clarity, and coherence in their relationships with other interagency players.

### Coordination

NORTHCOM must take coordination with other interagency players to a new level. Given the command's mission--to be the single point of contact for military support to civil

authorities in the context of homeland security-- comprehensive coordination is essential.

Three initiatives will be of particular use in achieving a high level of coordination between NORTHCOM and its homeland security partners.

NORTHCOM and the other federal agencies involved in homeland security must take full advantage of the existing organizational structures created to deal with the homeland security issue. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, dated 29 October 2001, President Bush established the Homeland Security Council, or HSC, based on the National Security Council, or NSC, model. In the Directive, the President states that "securing Americans from terrorist threats or attacks is a critical national security function" and that it demands "extensive coordination across a broad spectrum of Federal, State, and local agencies."<sup>28</sup> As in the NSC, there are three components of the Council. The Principals Committee is composed of cabinet-rank members, with the Secretary of Defense representing the Department of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense represents the Department on the Deputies Committee. The third component is a group of Policy Coordination Committees--the Directive names eleven. It also states that these Committees "shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of homeland security policy." This set of Committees is an appropriate level for CINCNORTH or Deputy CINCNORTH, representing the lead military organization in the Department of Defense, to interact with the key participants in the interagency process.

Secretary Rumsfeld has stated that the civilian relationships between the HSC and the DoD will remain the primary connection between the two,<sup>29</sup> yet it appears there is a proper role for NORTHCOM to play in the coordination process. Secretary Rumsfeld succinctly described CINCNORTH's role:

And in this new organizational arrangement, we will have a four-star military person who will be the Northern commander, who will be responsible for being ready to function in a supporting role and assist all of the other elements of the federal government, as well as the state and local governments, to see that those assets and those capabilities that are distinctive and unique to the Department of Defense are in fact promptly put into play to be of assistance to deal with that crisis in City X, if and when that occurs.<sup>30</sup>

This mission requires NORTHCOM involvement in the policy coordination process to ensure other interagency process participants know and address the operational concerns and capabilities of the lead DoD organization; the HSC/PCC is an appropriate forum to communicate those views.

A second opportunity to ensure effective coordination among the players in the process is the use of permanent Liaison Officer (LNO) positions. NORTHCOM should request LNOs from those agencies to serve on the NORTHCOM staff, and seek to establish permanent LNO positions in the key interagency organizations, including FEMA, the FBI, and others. This exchange of military officers or senior civilians will help to cement the close relationships necessary to coordinate effectively on homeland security issues, particularly in times of crisis. By sharing information and getting to know each other better, both organizations in the arrangement will greatly benefit.

A third initiative is for all the members of the organization to become more aware of the cultural differences between armed services and federal agencies composed of civilian employees. It may be difficult for military members to adapt their viewpoints from one of combat operations to that of supporting and assisting other federal agencies, but that is precisely the task before this new command. To play an effective supporting role for homeland security missions, NORTHCOM must have a deep understanding of the roles and missions of its partners, gained through comprehensive command training programs.

## Cooperation

NORTHCOM must also exhibit a marked degree of cooperation with all the interagency players in the homeland security process. This differs from coordination in much the same way that a plan differs from its execution. While the J-5 staff of U.S. Northern Command must thoroughly coordinate plans with their counterparts in other Federal, State, and local agencies based on anticipated threats, the NORTHCOM J-3 staff must also execute those plans in a spirit of cooperation, only leading when needed, and often following others in the effort.

An effective place to begin the cooperation process would be to consider well the command's supporting role in the homeland security arena. Unless the implementation plan now being developed dramatically changes, Northern Command will support other agencies in protecting America from a wide variety of threats--the military will not lead or command the effort. This may prove to be a difficult transition for some uniformed members to make. That transition process could begin with viewing the NORTHCOM role from the perspective of the other agencies in the process, the "supported commanders." The command faces the challenge of interacting and communicating with other agencies to determine how best to identify their needs and support them through effective use of the resources available from the Department of Defense.

Leaders must also give special attention to achieving the mission under adverse circumstances. Cooperation in times of crisis is even more difficult than in relatively peaceful situations, and officials must be careful to maintain a cooperative presence in the most extraordinary of events. The terrorist attacks of 11 September are a poignant case study

in interagency cooperation under trying conditions, and one that can serve as an excellent example for those likely to be engaged in similar operations in the future.

### Cohesiveness

NORTHCOM must also form a relationship with other players in the homeland security interagency process that is characterized by cohesiveness. Together, interagency players must foster a deeply held sense of teamwork. Developing an awareness of camaraderie and shared mission among the disparate organizations that participate in the homeland security issue will take more than just the efforts of Northern Command, but the work could and should begin with the uniformed services. Based on long experience with security missions and assignments between commands, military personnel are well equipped to lead the way in forming cross-functional, networked, operationally effective teams with members of the other federal agencies.

### Clarity

NORTHCOM must also communicate with their homeland security partners with a high degree of clarity. Communication within an agency or command can be a difficult and frustrating experience; communicating across agency lines can be even more so. The clearer the partners in the process can communicate, the more effectively the team will perform.

A proven way to clarify communications between organizations is to jointly write a Memorandum of Understanding or Agreement defining the relationship between the two parties. Officials could successfully use this method to establish the relationship between Northern Command and its homeland security partners. A Memorandum stating the command's organizational structures, patterns of interaction, institutional prerogatives, and

responsibilities will help prevent the confusion and misunderstanding that can reduce the effectiveness of teams as they work together.

Leaders should use the same tactic to develop operations plans defining each agency's responsibility in the event military assistance is needed, and describing the support required for a number of scenarios. These plans should then be exercised and evaluated, with needed revisions agreed upon and implemented by Northern Command and the supported agency.

No matter what methods are employed, commanders and supported agency officials must ensure communications between the organizations are as clear as possible. Without that clarity, effectiveness is sure to be compromised. Clear and concise communication is essential to providing the support and assistance needed by other agencies in a crisis.

### Coherence

NORTHCOM must also exhibit coherence and consistency in its relationship with the other key players in the homeland security community. This is not to say that the command must, or even should, be rigid or inflexible in its interactions with other agencies, only that officials must constantly regard the human dynamic as plans are formulated, responses are developed, and crises are managed. NORTHCOM commanders and officials at all levels must diligently ensure the personnel assigned to the command for an event or response fully understand not only the mission, but also the relationships and context within which that mission must be accomplished. For many military personnel, an assignment to assist with a homeland security mission may be his or her first experience interacting with civilian employees from other federal agencies. Ensuring personnel understand the appropriate respect, customs, and courtesies for Federal, State, and local officials would be a simple yet important step in developing close and meaningful ties between organization members.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

There are eight key recommendations to create effective interagency relationships.

- CINCNORTH or Deputy CINCNORTH should participate in the Homeland Security Council/Policy Coordination Committees to ensure effective communication and understanding at this key policymaking level.
- NORTHCOM should seek to fill permanent Liaison Officer positions on the command staff with selected senior civilians from interagency partners, and seek to assign military officers and senior civilians to permanent Liaison Officer positions on their agency counterpart staffs.
- NORTHCOM must develop a deep awareness of cultural differences between the command and its counterparts, and inculcate that awareness through complete command training programs.
- NORTHCOM must develop and maintain a sharp focus on understanding and meeting the needs of the interagency partners they are tasked to support.
- NORTHCOM must seek to establish a strong teamwork ethic and sense of shared purpose with their homeland security partners.
- NORTHCOM must collaborate on writing, refining, and maintaining Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement with key interagency partners, expressing the operational essentials of their shared relationship.
- NORTHCOM must develop sound, comprehensive, scenario-based plans, then thoroughly and routinely exercise and evaluate them, capture lessons learned, and improve the plans accordingly.

- NORTHCOM must faithfully emphasize the homeland security mission throughout all levels of the command, particularly in the interagency context.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

These five imperatives and eight recommendations are only starting points for NORTHCOM leaders to consider as they work toward initial operational capability in October 2002 and develop the essential relationships with their interagency partners. The organizational and cultural differences among the military, law enforcement, human services, and emergency response communities could become barriers to those relationships; however, any effort expended by the military to reach out to those agencies they are tasked to support will be worthwhile in the event of a homeland security crisis. The better Northern Command understands the needs of its interagency partners, the better the Department of Defense can support those partners and the American people. A relationship characterized by effective coordination, cohesive teamwork, deep levels of cooperation in executing the homeland security mission, clarity in communication and command and control relationships, and a coherent approach to the execution of the homeland security mission, will form a solid foundation for valuable assistance to civil authorities at all levels of government.

Ultimately, the success or failure of Northern Command, as is true of any organization, depends largely on the actions and attitudes of the leaders and people of the command. Without strong leadership and commitment to the homeland security mission, NORTHCOM might soon be replaced by another organizational attempt to address the multitude of threats against the United States. However, with clear vision and a commitment to meaningful coordination and cooperation with their interagency partners, Northern Command can be an effective and important contributor to United States national security.

## NOTES

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- <sup>12</sup> The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, presenter, transcript of a *Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan*, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002\\_t0417sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002_t0417sd.html)>, 1. [22 April 2002].
- <sup>13</sup> General Richard B. Myers, Memorandum entitled Terms of Reference (TOR) for Establishing US Northern Command (Washington, DC: undated).
- <sup>14</sup> The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Richard B. Myers, presenters, transcript of a *Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan*, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002\\_t0417sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002_t0417sd.html)>, 1-27. [22 April 2002].
- <sup>15</sup> William M. Arkin, "New Command, Old Tricks," <<http://www.washingtonpost.com>>, 1-3. [22 April 2002].
- <sup>16</sup> The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Richard B. Myers, presenters, transcript of a *Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan*, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002\\_t0417sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002_t0417sd.html)>, 9. [22 April 2002]. The quote is taken from an unidentified member of the Pentagon press corps during the question and answer period following the briefing.

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- <sup>17</sup> The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, presenter, transcript of a *Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan*, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002\\_t0417sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002_t0417sd.html)>, 1. [22 April 2002].
- <sup>18</sup> Office of Homeland Security, Homeland Security and the President's Budget Priorities, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland>>, 1-2. [1 May 2002].
- <sup>19</sup> Office of Homeland Security, Strengthening Homeland Security Since 9/11, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland>>, 1. [1 May 2002].
- <sup>20</sup> General Richard B. Myers, Memorandum entitled Terms of Reference (TOR) for Establishing US Northern Command (Washington, DC: undated), 2.
- <sup>21</sup> Kevin Johnson, "U.S. Is All Over The Map On Homeland Defense," 1-5, USA Today, 23 April 2002.
- <sup>22</sup> USA Today, "Homeland Security, State by State," 1-5, 23 April 2002.
- <sup>23</sup> Homeland Security: Update, "Capitol Roundup: Call for Change Mounts," DFI International, <<http://updates.dfi-intl.com>>, 1-2. [18 April 2002].
- <sup>24</sup> President, Executive Order, "Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council," <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13228.htm>>, 1-9. [1 May 02].
- <sup>25</sup> Kevin Johnson, "U.S. Is All Over The Map On Homeland Defense," 1-5, USA Today, 23 April 2002.
- <sup>26</sup> The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, presenter, transcript of a *Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan*, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002\\_t0417sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002_t0417sd.html)>, 12 and 17. [22 April 2002].
- <sup>27</sup> Chapter 6, "Combatant Commands," U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 162, paragraph (b), subparagraphs (1) and (2), <<http://uscode.house.gov/download/10C6.doc>> [1 May 2002]. The Secretary is accurate in his understanding of the statute; however, the exact text reads, "Chain of Command. - Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command runs - (1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command." The wording would appear to leave open the possibility of the President temporarily reassigning a combatant commander to someone other than the Secretary of Defense.
- <sup>28</sup> President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, "Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council," 29 October 2001, <<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-1.htm>>, 1-3. [22 April 2002].
- <sup>29</sup> The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, presenter, transcript of a *Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan*, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002\\_t0417sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002_t0417sd.html)>, 12. [22 April 2002].
- <sup>30</sup> The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, presenter, transcript of a *Special Briefing on the Unified Command Plan*, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, 17 April 2002, <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002\\_t0417sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04172002_t0417sd.html)>, 10. [22 April 2002].

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