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**FAILED STATES AND THE APPLICATION OF
NATIONAL POWER: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The post-World War II collapse of colonization placed many nations on a slippery slope heading for a destiny as a failed state. This relatively new phenomenon is currently under scrutiny from academia and only now being explored by western democracies. As these former powers meander into the foray they will find failed state issues much more complex than only a decade ago. Abandoned somewhere after Yalta, left behind by the technology revolution and unable to comprehend global economics, these failed states are a portrait of human disaster.

Somalia quietly embraced independence in 1960 but soon found itself in the center of a Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. By 1990 both superpowers had meddled in Somali politics and inundated the country with their weapons of war. Somalia was thrust into the international spotlight in 1991 when CNN reported thousands of casualties from widespread famine and a brutal civil war. She fell from the spotlight just as quickly in 1994 following a failed US raid and the subsequent collapse of the UN peacekeeping mission.

Nearly every component of a failed state can be found in Somalia...civil war, crime, clan clashes, diminishing natural resources, drought, famine and overpopulation. Caught in the middle of these failed missions and left behind by the abrupt departure of western aid were millions of desolate Somali citizens. Somalia is once again on the brink of the international limelight. Whether the attention is brought by starving children through the focused lens of a television camera or by highly classified intelligence sources in search of global terrorists, the US is again on the verge of applying the tenants of national power to assist this struggling nation.

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FAILED STATES AND THE APPLICATION OF NATIONAL POWER: A CASE STUDY OF SOMALIA

Sitting on the Horn of Africa, astride the Indian Ocean and the Aden Sea, looking north over the Red Sea and into the Suez Canal, the extended coastline and deep water ports of Somalia have long been viewed by the world's superpowers as being strategically significant. Somalia's prime location along vital shipping lanes brought external influences as early as the mid-1800's with the arrival of the British East India Trading Company.

Colonization, independence, drought and famine, complicated by a deeply ingrained tribal "clan" system, makes Somalia's history a patchwork quilt of repeated failures that provides the backdrop for today's quagmire. With no central government or banking system and lawlessness at every turn, this failed state has become a host for rampant "warlordism" and pockets of radical Islamic fundamentalism.

The following pages examine the failed state phenomenon, take an in-depth look at Somali history and provide possible solutions for America's application of the tenants of national power to extricate the Somali peoples from their downward spiral.

FAILED STATE PHENOMENON

The existence of "failed states" is a relatively new phenomenon on the global landscape. Early in the last century, due mainly to the stability brought by colonization, nation-states were able to maintain an equilibrium that supported their survival. "At the beginning of the twentieth century, the international political system was dominated by a half-dozen European great powers and Japan. Most of what subsequently became known as the Third World was governed from colonial offices in London, Paris, Lisbon, and Amsterdam."¹ Colonial rule provided the state with an established form of government, protection from attack and a steady infusion of currency.

Several authors point to the end of World War II and the large scale disappearance of colonization as a key point for the explosion in the number of failed states. The ability of the respective nations to maintain some sort of long-term viability was not important. As a source of reference to emphasize the point, the United Nations Charter had 50 original signatories at its creation in 1945 and by the mid-1990s, there were 185.² "The U.N. and its member states made the "self-determination of peoples" – a right enshrined in the U.N. Charter – a primary goal."³ Colonization was seen as inhibiting self-determination and the thought that these new nations may somehow fail was foreign. Although the U.N. knew the fledgling nations would need assistance, it was their belief that institutions like the World Bank and United Nations

Development Programme, along with other donors, would be sufficient to maintain viability. The subsequent Cold War period allowed many nations to survive on the backs of the two superpowers – the United States and the USSR. Nations seen as strategically significant to either could expect large infusions of cash and or military support, thus covering their internal challenges like a veil with the “hefty infusions of aid from their former colonial masters as well as from the two superpowers.”⁴

The end of the Cold War brought a new set of challenges. “Simply stated, the international political system has gone from the bipolar order imposed at Yalta by the United States and its European allies and the Soviet Union in 1944 to a potential disorder of nations and peoples in which the definition of “bad guys” has become much more elusive and power more diffuse.”⁵ Following the defeat of Nazism, state sovereignty and self-determination became significant issues in the drafting of the United Nations Charter.⁶

Numerous underlying issues, both natural and manmade, contributed to the failure of these states. Urbanization, civil war, crime, religious and ethnic clashes, diminishing natural resources, drought, famine and overpopulation are but a few.

“Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the world has already witnessed the Allied Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq; ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia; the spread of illicit drug trade to Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa; and attacks against Western tourists by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in Egypt. The international community is now in uncharted waters where it must consider the implications of the breakdown of states, the internationalization of crime, and the rise of neo-Luddites.”⁷

In “The Coming Anarchy” Robert D. Kaplan paints a vivid picture in describing a failed state.

“...demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic” danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of... international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms and international drug cartels...”⁸

A much more simplistic view is provided by Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner in their work “Saving Failed States”. They submit that a failed state is one “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.”⁹

Dr. Robert Dorff states that “the fundamental problem of failed states is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability and international peace.”¹⁰ Dorff’s thesis is that the anarchy associated with failed states is symptomatic to the underlying root cause of

“ungovernability.” His work describes ungovernability “as the declining ability of governments worldwide, but particularly in the Third World, to govern, to carry out the many and various responsibilities of managing a modern state in an increasingly complex environment.”¹¹ Dr. Dorff provides three main components of this trend: growth of transnational organized crime; the explosive resurgence and growth of ethnic and religious conflicts; and the developments in economic trends, financial markets and technology. He asserts that the organized criminal elements of today’s society are highly sophisticated and technologically advanced. As such, they can rapidly and effectively cut across national borders and operate either regionally or globally.¹² These activities “will not be limited to the international drug trade, revolutionary criminal groups, and rogue states because clearly an overlapping dynamic is at work within industrialized countries.”¹³ “Ethnic and religious conflicts have fueled the pressures toward further fragmentation within countries. Moreover, the apparent intractability of ethnic and religious differences contributes to the erosion of effective government and of public confidence in government.”¹⁴ Finally, the global economic and financial trends, coupled with the ongoing explosion in information technology, degrades a government’s ability to perform the critical tasks deemed necessary to control its populace.¹⁵

Regardless of whether you describe the issue being that of ungovernability or of a failed state, the continuing trend in that direction poses a significant threat to the United States. Dr. Dorff clearly states our current challenge:

“the inability of a state to control criminal activities such as drug or weapons smuggling, money laundering, and terrorism may eventually transform the country into a kind of “safe haven” from which the criminal can effectively consolidate and expand operations. To the extent that such actors gain strength in these safe havens, the failed state becomes a security concern for other countries, including the United States.”¹⁶

THE HISTORY OF SOMALIA

THE CLAN SYSTEM

Any discussion of Somalia would be incomplete without a basic understanding of the historic clan system. A clan is traced through its lineage and is described as “a large group of people believed to be descendants through males of a common ancestor whose name is also the name of the clan. Several clans constitute a clan-family.”¹⁷ “The Somali social order has been marked by competition and often by armed conflict between clans and lineages, even between units of the same clan-family or clan. Although Somalis share a common religion, a common language and a common set of traditions, they are deeply divided along clan lines.”¹⁸

The beginning of the clan system can be traced to the introduction of the religion of Islam. Muslim saints were said to have come to Somalia and have started two of the modern day clans. The Darood clan is claimed to be the descendant of Sheikh Darood who arrived in southern Somali during the 11th century. Another Muslim saint, Sheikh Isahaaq, arrived in northern Somalia during the 13th century.¹⁹

There are currently six major clan families in Somalia: Darood, Hawiye, Isaaq, Dir, Digil and Rahanwein. The Digil and Rahanwein clans focused primarily on agriculture and occupy the areas surrounding the two main rivers in the south. The social elite or "true Somali" clan-families are the Darood, Isaaq, Hawiye and Dir. They are primarily nomadic and hold a somewhat higher status than Digil and Rahanwein. Throughout Somali history there has been a difference both in the clan-families and the geographic locations of the clans and it wasn't until the late 20th century that southern Somalis gained political equality with their brothers in the north.²⁰ It is important to note that Somalis share little national identity and clearly see themselves first and foremost as being from a clan. Their nomadic lifestyle, historic ties to lineage and relatively short period as a free nation are all contributing factors.

The following sections of Somali history are basically devoid of clan-family markings. Significant Somali issues like colonialism, civil wars, dictatorships and independence can become clouded when mixed with clan-family association. This exclusion was done intentionally but the reader should always remain cognizant of the expedient effects experienced by adding the clan-family influence on Somali history.

ANCIENT TIMES (100AD-1840)

"The paucity of written historical evidence forces the student of early Somalia to depend on the findings of archeology, anthropology, historical linguistics, and related disciplines."²¹ Although the earliest archaeological documentation indicates the area on the Horn of Africa known as Somalia was occupied as early as 100 AD²², the exact history of this nation is frequently a point of discussion amongst scholars. The country has had a long history of being split between two ways of life. Those of nomadic existence living on the interior portions of the country found their livelihood through grazing cattle and agriculture while those along the coastline through mercantilism and ocean-going trade.²³ The same trade routes that brought goods to the coastal cities also carried another heavy influence – Islam. It is believed that in the eighth century, during the time of the Prophet Mohammed, persecuted Muslims sought refuge in Somalia.²⁴ The area known to ancient Egyptians as "Land of Punt" was settled between 700 and 1200 AD.²⁵ "From the eighth to the tenth centuries, Persian and Arab traders were already

engaged in lucrative commerce from enclaves along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean as far south as the coast of present-day Kenya²⁶ By the mid-1500s the main port of Saylac emerged as a center of trade and Muslim culture. Ethiopian expeditions into northern Somalia ravaged the port in order to control the flow of coffee, gold and ostrich feathers. Saylac's importance declined after the repeated attacks and the Somali city of Berbera took its place as the trading center. By the 17th century the Ottoman Turks controlled the entire region.²⁷

COLONIAL ERA (1840-1960)

Somalia's relative obscurity outside the region began to change in the 19th century when European nations began to establish influence in the nation. As early as 1840 the British East India Company sought unrestricted port access, which in turn led to treaties with the Sultan of Tajura.²⁸ "The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw political developments that transformed the Somali Peninsula. During this period, the Somalis became the subjects of state systems under the flags of Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia. The rulers had various motives for colonization, most of which revolved around the lucrative trades routes and sources of en route replenishment.²⁹ In the mid-1880's Britain gained a foothold in northern Somalia after signing treaties with clan chiefs for port security. After the French were evicted from Egypt they sought to establish a foothold in Somalia to break the British sphere of influence in the region and avoid Britain's high import taxes on French goods. They did so in the northwest region of Somaliland in what is current day Djibouti. A reunified Italy also needed ports for the similar reasons, but not at the expense of confrontation with a colonial power. The Italians were relatively unfamiliar with imperialism and chose to move slowly in southern Somalia, signing treaties in 1888 and 1889.³⁰ The Italians remained a vital part of southern region and between 1889 to 1908 secured agreements with Ethiopia and Britain for a Italian Somaliland.³¹ The colonial powers failed to see a rising threat in the form of Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II. Over the last decade of the 18th century Menelik II fought to secure Somali territories that he in turn claimed as Ethiopian territory.³² In 1897 British negotiators signed a treaty to establish a boundary between eastern Ethiopia and what was then known as British Somaliland.³³ The British transferred the area known as Ogaden over to the Ethiopians. This infuriated the Somali nationalist and Islamic leader, Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, who declared a *jihad* against the infidels.³⁴ "Thus, by the turn of the century, one of the most culturally homogeneous regions of Africa, was divided into British Somaliland (northwestern Somalia), French Somaliland (current day Djubiti), Italian Somaliland (southern Somalia), Ehtiopian Somaliland (the Ogaden region in west-central Somalia), and what came to be called the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya."³⁵

Muhammad Abdullah continued his pursuit of *jihad* over the first two decades of the 20th century with intermittent skirmishes against both British and Ethiopian outposts. Using guerilla tactics and avoiding direct confrontation, Muhammad Abdullah became known as “Mad Mullah” to his adversaries. He signed a peace and protection treaty with the Italians in southern Somalia and then quickly began to attack their fragile outposts. His successful hit and run tactics against the colonial rulers continued to gain notoriety and attracted both devout Muslims and outlaws alike. Against overwhelming odds from a combined British-Ethiopian force of nearly 16,000, “Mad Mullah” continued to fight until the British brought to bear the latest in war-making technology – the airplane. Fresh from their experience in World War I and dropping 20-pound bombs, the “Z” squadron broke the back of the resistance and forced the Mullah to retreat to Ogaden where he died in 1920. His death notwithstanding, Muhammad Abdullah instilled in the Somali people the will to resist foreign intervention.³⁶

Italian influence in the region continued to grow throughout the same period. “The motivation was threefold: to “relieve population pressure at home,” to offer the “civilizing Roman mission” to the Somalis, and to increase Italian prestige through overseas colonization.”³⁷ In 1935 Mussolini’s army attacked Ethiopia and regained the Ogaden lands, then in 1941 expelled the British from their garrisons in the north. During their two-year occupation, the Italians removed the arbitrary boundaries placed by previous regimes in an attempt to reunite all Somali clans. Thousands of Italians, many of them war veterans, quickly moved into Somalia.³⁸

At the start of World War II Italy quickly lost their new territories when the British attacked the Italian East African Empire³⁹ and regained northern Somalia, followed shortly thereafter with a campaign to secure the entire region. Britain occupied the territories from 1941 to 1950 and returned the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1948. Although Somalia was full of ex-soldiers from the Italian army, they had an even larger concern.

“The greater security challenge for the British during World War II and immediately after was to disarm the Somalis who had taken advantage of the windfall in arms brought about by the war. Also, Ethiopia had organized Somali bandits to infest the British side so as to discourage continued British occupation of the Ogaden. Ethiopia also armed clan militias and encouraged them to cross into the British zone and cause bloodshed.”⁴⁰

In 1947 the Italian government surrendered all claims to Somaliland and the allied powers turned the country’s future over to the United Nations. In 1949 the UN General Assembly recommended placing Italian Somaliland under a ten-year international trust with Italy as the administrator. The decade-long trust would be followed by independence.⁴¹

INDEPENDENCE AND THE BARRE YEARS (1960-1991)

Coinciding with the trusteeship and impending independence for Italian Somaliland was the rapid progression towards self-governance in British Somaliland. Beginning with British occupation during the 1940's the northern Somalis began the transition by establishing a court system, planning committees and initial steps at developing political parties. Free elections were held in 1960 and the newly appointed Legislative Assembly quickly requested independence from Britain to allow reunification with Italian Somaliland and the creation of a greater Somalia. British Somaliland independence was granted on 26 June 1960 and less than a week later, on 1 July 1960, the former colonies of Britain and Italy were joined to become the Somali Republic.

The newfound independence and associated diplomatic process was deeply embraced by the Somali people. "The most desired possession of most nomads was a radio, which was used to keep informed on political news. The level of political participation often surpassed that in many Western democracies."⁴² A democratic state and national constitution were adopted in 1961 during the country's first referendum. Early political positions followed along clan lines and the clan positions were closely tied to their former colonial rulers. The Somali Youth League (SYL), a political party initiated by the British in 1943, was the first to be able to cut across clan lines in an effort to advance greater Somali issues.⁴³ Although the SYL won 74 percent of the municipal seats in 1963, dissatisfaction with the SYL grew in both the north and south and two new parties emerged, the Somali National Congress and Somali Democratic Union. The north/south split, complicated by pro-Arab and pan-Somali sentiment, created insurmountable friction in the political process. This notwithstanding, Somalia was able to make significant improvements in their relations with both Kenya and Ethiopia.⁴⁴

Even though the Somali government looked favorably to the west, especially Britain and Italy, her quest for self-reliance led to increasingly warm ties with China and the Soviet Union. As early as 1962 the Soviet Union began to finance, train and equip Somali armed forces. By the end of the decade over 300 Soviet advisors were in Somalia and 500 Somali soldiers were trained in the Soviet Union. Throughout the decade both China and the Soviet Union provided significant nonmilitary assistance in the form of agriculture and industrial aid, infrastructure projects and educational assistance.⁴⁵

The open elections in March 1969 were problematic and violent. Over 1000 candidates from 70 parties vied for the 123 seats in the national assembly. Ballot stuffing was widely reported and clan allegiance played a key role.⁴⁶ On October 15, 1969 President Ali Shermarke was killed by a bodyguard and as parliament mulled over a successor General Siad Barre

assumed power in a bloodless coup. General Barre deposed the existing government and shortly thereafter a new ruling body called the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) elected General Barre as the President of Somalia. The Barre government quickly looked to the Soviet Union for assistance and began to align many of its internal programs along Soviet lines. Barre's socialist government attempted to reduce the importance of the clan system by encouraging widespread literacy, women's involvement in government and by pushing for social equality between rival clans.

The SRC pursued a course of "scientific socialism" that reflected both ideological and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The government instituted a national security service, centralized control over information, and initiated a number of grassroots development projects. Perhaps the most impressive success was a crash program that introduced orthography for the Somali language and brought literacy to a large percentage of the population. The SRC became increasingly radical in foreign affairs and in 1974 Somalia and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation.⁴⁷

This effort notwithstanding, the clan system remained an integral part of the Somali landscape. Although Barre announced in 1971 that the SRC would phase out military rule once policy and decision making bodies were established, by 1974 nearly all government and public institutions were headed by military or police officers.⁴⁸

In the early 1970's Somalia increased the friction along the border with Ethiopia and by the mid-70's had established the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). WSLF conducted guerrilla operations with the focus on regaining the Ogaden region.⁴⁹ Using the WSLF as the infantry, backed by Soviet-provided heavy armor from the Somali National Army (SNA), Barre's forces struck deep into Ethiopian territory in July 1977. "Much of the chaos now reigning in Somalia can be traced back to the doctrinaire Marxism of President Barre and his aberrant decisions to mount an invasion of Ethiopia in 1977."⁵⁰ Although the mission was tactically successful it was a strategic disaster. The Soviets quickly broke ties with Somalia and began a large sea and airlift operation to support Ethiopia. By November thousands of Ethiopian and Cuban troops had defeated the Somali forces and returned the disputed region to Ethiopian control. Facing a Soviet embargo, Barre turned the focus of the SNA to his domestic problems, quelling clan-led uprisings in the countryside. The United States, having lost its ties with Ethiopia due to the Soviet Union's support of their war effort, moved to regain influence in the region. The U.S. stepped into the Somali vacuum created by the Soviet's departure and completed construction of the abandoned air and naval facility at Berbera.⁵¹ Sporadic fighting continued along the Ogaden and in the summer of 1982 Ethiopia attacked in earnest. The U.S. provided emergency airlift in support of SNA forces⁵² and "the United States government

responded by speeding deliveries of light arms already promised. In addition, the initially pledged \$45 million in economic and military aid was increased to \$80 million. The new arms were not used to repel the Ethiopians, however, but to repress Siad Barre's domestic opponents.⁵³ In late 1986 Barre's security forces were cut loose on his frightened populace and numerous career military officers were removed from authority due to their perceived lack of support to the President. His radical views and repressive government forced the U.S. to act. American support to the Barre regime began to dwindle, but by 1987 Somali still received \$8.7 million from the American government.⁵⁴ By 1989 the SRC was in turmoil. Barre unleashed his air forces in the north, attacking both insurgent and civilian targets.

"Faced with saboteurs by day and sniper fire by night, Siad Barre ordered remaining units of the badly demoralized Red Berets to massacre civilians. By 1989 torture and murder became the order of the day in Mogadishu. On July 9, 1989, Somalia's Italian-born Roman Catholic bishop, Salvatore Colombo, was gunned down in his church in Mogadishu by an unknown assassin. The order to murder the bishop, an outspoken critic of the regime, was widely believed to have had come from the presidential palace. On the heels of the bishop's murder came the infamous July 14 massacre, when the Red Berets slaughtered 450 Muslims demonstrating against the arrest of their spiritual leaders. More than 2,000 were seriously injured. On July 15, forty-seven people, mainly from the Isaaq clan, were taken to Jasiira Beach west of the city and summarily executed. The July massacres prompted a shift in United States policy as the United States began to distance itself from Siad Barre."⁵⁵

Lack of external support left Barre to his own fate. Economic crisis loomed and the national treasuries, what remained of them, were looted. A severe drought and widespread famine compounded Barre's economic and political problems.

By 1990 the forces of the United Somali Congress, led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed, had successfully defeated SNA forces and controlled the northwest territory. More importantly, they also controlled the majority of the capital, Mogadishu. The SNA disbanded and many former Barre soldiers returned back to tribal or clan control. Barre himself fled to Nigeria with several of his top deputies and died there in 1991. Shortly thereafter the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland (formerly British Somaliland) declared independence and later introduced law according to the Islamic Shariah.⁵⁶

UNOSOM AND THE AIDEEDS (1992-1998)

General Aideed formed the Somali National Alliance (SNA) in 1992. The SNA consisted of four major factions, controlled the majority of southern Somalia, and attempted to cut across both clan and factional lines. With no central government, the economy in shambles and little hope for outside support, Aideed's forces survived by looting relief shipments arriving in the port

at Mogadishu.⁵⁷ In August 1992 the United Nations passed a resolution establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), a humanitarian relief mission designed to escort food and water past the bandits to the starving natives in the outlying areas. The United States called this mission Operation Provide Relief and supported it with a joint task force to airlift food and water to Somalia and northern Kenya. Because of the grave threat to the relief mission the UN passed a second resolution in December that authorized the military limited use of force in executing its humanitarian relief mission and the U.S. changed the name to Operation Restore Hope. In May 1993 the UN passed another resolution (UNOSOM II) and the mission evolved into a peace enforcement mission authorizing combat action and nation building.⁵⁸ Throughout the UN mission Aideed's forces and local bandits harassed the convoys and looted supplies at every opportunity. Aideed was fearful that the peacekeepers would undermine his power within the country and in June 1993 his forces killed 23 Pakistani soldiers. In response to this incident the American commander ordered the arrest of General Aideed. Additionally, in an effort to solicit internal support for Aideed's removal, the U.S. commander placed a bounty on Aideed's head. These actions forged greater animosity against the U.S. peacekeepers and on October 3, 1993, 18 Americans and over 1000 Somalis lost their lives in a brutal firefight made famous through the book and movie "Blackhawk Down." The UN mission was withdrawn in early 1994 and those he controlled saw General Aideed as a hero. In an attempt to solidify his nation-wide support Aideed called for a united Somalia. His efforts were fruitless and a rival clan subsequently killed him.

Throughout the country at least 30 other factions or clans were struggling for power.⁵⁹ Aideed's son Hussein, educated in America and a prior U.S. Marine, took his father's place.⁶⁰ In the mid-1990's Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed created two major factions and both claimed power in Mogadishu. By the late 1990s lawlessness abounded. Factions that controlled the ports levied tariffs on arriving goods and other factions demanded payment en route. Following failed peace talks in 1998 Aideed's forces clashed with the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), with the fiercest battles being fought over control of the Baidoa area west of Mogadishu. The RRA reportedly received support from Ethiopia, which Ethiopia denied, while other reports indicated that Aideed was receiving arms shipments from Eritrea. Aideed's forces eventually lost but his refusal to relinquish Baidoa initiated another series of attacks by the RRA along both the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders. Nearly concurrent with the battles at Baidoa, Aideed and Ali Mahdi came to an agreement for the joint administration of Mogadishu. Libya quickly provided nearly \$800,000 to establish a citywide police force.

By the end of the year the Aideed - Ali Mahdi agreement broke down and in March 1999 there was an assassination attempt on Aideed. Fighting continued throughout 1999 and Mogadishu became a war zone with three militias, Aideed's, Mahdi's and one paid for by merchants, all fighting for control of the city. Riots broke out after a private businessmen contracted to print money for use in local exchanges, making the Somali shilling nearly worthless. Factional taxation of relief convoys in the outlying areas increased and in response Ethiopian forces crossed the border and arrested several local Somali leaders.⁶¹ Somalis faced the new millennium with anarchy on every front and although governance in Somalia would seem to be unobtainable, Somali scholar Ken Menkhouse noted that:

“...political functions are being carried out at the neighborhood, village or town levels, and clan regional bodies have established ties with neighboring states such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya, Egypt and other international partners. From this perspective, Somalia is a part of the greater instability that has engulfed the Horn of Africa for a decade and is setting precedents in African politics. On the one hand, it represents secessionism feared by central governments in Africa and the international community. On the other hand, it faces the challenge of establishing legitimacy.”⁶²

CURRENT SITUATION AND THE WAY AHEAD

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

“Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, and, to a lesser extent, Italy, have played crucial roles in the ongoing Somalia drama. In 1999, Eritrea and Ethiopia aggravated Somalia's civil war by manipulating and arming Somali groups as part of their own war. Libya supported Aideed along with Eritrea. The northern breakaway regions, as well as some faction in and around Mogadishu, enjoy Ethiopian support.”⁶³

The nation is currently split into three areas with two distinct providences in the north, Somaliland and Puntland, and the larger “Somalia” area to the south. The United Nation's plan for Somalia is to fight against factionalization, sometimes called “Balkanization.” The UN is attempting to forge a greater Somalia by courting the regional powers of Ethiopia, Djibouti and Libya. Ethiopia and Eritrea currently have nearly 4000 UN peacekeepers along their borders in an effort to reduce the tensions between themselves and neighboring Somalia. The UN effort notwithstanding, Ethiopian incursions into Somalia “suggests Addis Ababa has reversed its support for the newly formed UN-backed central government [TNG] in Mogadishu.”⁶⁴ The ongoing efforts by Libya and Djibouti are to create a unitary political system within Somalia supported by clan representation. Western powers, including the U.S., UK and Italy, are pushing for a federal system with Somaliland and Puntland maintaining a degree of autonomy within a greater national framework,⁶⁵ yet neither of the two northern regions see themselves as

part of a future "greater Somalia." "The United States appears to be moving toward acknowledging the reality of a divided Somalia, following the visit of a high level delegation to Somalia's breakaway northern republic of Somaliland."⁶⁶ America sent an ambassador and a team from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to explore the possibilities of using the port and airfields at Berbera.

The northern Republic of Somaliland created and approved a constitution in 1997. The constitution established presidential and cabinet roles, a House of Elders and a 315-member National Communities Conference. This mix of western (British) and traditional forms of government is functional yet cumbersome. The Somaliland constitution revived the traditional value of cooperation and elevated the clan elders to a position of conflict resolution.⁶⁷ Somaliland's President Mohammed Egal (former Prime Minister of Somalia from 1967-69) noted that Somaliland was an independent district until 1960 and refuses to take part in any discussions concerning the unification of the Somali providences.

In the spring of 1998 the northeastern region of Puntland followed the lead of their neighbors in the Republic of Somaliland and established a joint commission for administration of their semi-autonomous region. COL Abdullah Yussuf Ahmed was named president and he established a charter with a governmental structure and a constitutional commission.⁶⁸ The area of Puntland has been the home to several Islamic extremist groups that both Yussuf and the Ethiopian government oppose. Yussuf was ousted from office in mid-2001 but on 23 November over 1000 Ethiopian troops surged into the area to restore him to power.⁶⁹ By early December Yussuf banned public demonstrations and has been forced to remain in his province to maintain control of his people.⁷⁰

The southern region, including the capital of Mogadishu, remains in the greatest state of disarray. Warlords and their associated militias operate independently throughout the area and banditry is rampant. In July 2000 at the Arta Peace Conference in Djibouti an agreement was reached on a Somali Transitional Government (TNG). The convening Somali body, the Somali Support Committee, proclaimed that the conference was open to all and that it provided full representation to the concerned parties. In fact, the Republic of Somaliland did not participate and Puntland refused to accept the non-binding agreement. Local and regional warlords, who previously dominated conferences, were not invited to participate. In August 2000 an interim assembly selected a former interior minister of Siad Barre, Abdizasim Salad Hassan, as president. Hassan moved his government to Mogadishu and subsequently named Ali Khalif Galayadh his prime minister. Galayadh then appointed 76 ministers who were selected from the various clans. Subsequent to the Arta Conference 42 Somali warlords, including Aideed,

met in Baidoa and created the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The stated purpose of the SRRC is to create a national representative government that would focus on reconciliation. Another meeting of the SRRC, hosted by Ethiopia, was attended by President Yussuf of Puntland.⁷¹ "Without international support, Hasan will be no more than a figurehead."⁷²

Dealing with the complexities of Somalia may be a difficult proposition for many western cultures. Previous efforts by nations and international organizations to bring a degree of normalcy have been less than successful. Since 1991 "13 conferences and international peacekeeping efforts aimed at reconciling the country's warring factions have failed."⁷³

"It is hard to imagine any drawing of boundaries in Africa, for example, that would not do some violence to an ethnic or religious group. This difficulty is not a heritage of colonialism but instead reflects the complexity of human social forms on the continent and the daunting challenge of trying to make anything coherent out of this diversity."⁷⁴

Outside involvement in Somali politics has met with repeated failures and a current American reentry seems no better postured to succeed than previous attempts. "One of the costs of ignoring Somalia since 1994 is that we are now caught trying to formulate policy about a country we know virtually nothing about. When information is bad, analysis and policy are likely to be flawed as well."⁷⁵ This said, the United States can begin to make a positive impact not only in Somalia but throughout the region by reengaging various African leaders in diplomatic and economic manners, rather than militarily.

The United States is faced with a significant task and should begin its reengagement in Somalia with the Somaliland Republic, since it provides the most stable region. As a first step the U.S. should reach out to President Egal in support of his government. Egal has five years experience governing his republic and national exposure as the former Prime Minister. He has shown an ability to provide a stable government for his people while simultaneously seeking economic growth. Egal has also demonstrated an ability to work regional issues such as port accessibility with neighboring Ethiopia and his policies are western oriented, molded partly from his time under British rule. Somaliland is primed for economic growth and is encouraging entrepreneurial expansion. U.S. recognition of Egal's government must be choreographed within an overarching Somali policy. Support for Egal without a concurrent recognition of the TNG, or some other Somali national-level government, risks opposition from the UN and numerous Africa-based organizations. Since these organizations will eventually orchestrate much of the follow-on relief efforts, their importance cannot be minimized.

U.S. involvement in Puntland must be approached with guarded caution and may be best coordinated by using Ethiopia as an intermediary. Recent Ethiopian support for Puntland's Yussuf indicates some degree of cooperation between the two and may form the basis for establishing a stable long-term relationship. U.S. engagement with Ethiopia and Somaliland will give policy makers a reorientation to regional issues and establish a foundation for approaching Yussuf. A successful start with these regional partners may provide encouragement for Yussuf to actively seek U.S. assistance in his province. Although intelligence reports indicate inhabitation in this region by the radical Islamic group al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), Taliban and al Qaeda, America must be patient in dealing with Yussuf and his fledgling government.

The southern region, with the exception of Mogadishu, may also be best approached through Ethiopia. "The US should support local, regional, and international efforts at conflict resolution and reconstruction. This must include a program to demobilize and disarm the militias."⁷⁶ Political conditions in southern Somalia have little chance of improving until warlordism is brought under control. U.S. support for disarmament can be facilitated by the Organization for African Unity (OAU), a body that has shown recent success in similar disarmament situations in southern Africa. Ethiopian influence in the Ogaden region should not be underestimated as their mutual interest of peace along this disputed border may provide the foundation for political stability.

The city of Mogadishu is in a total state of anarchy. In the late 1980s the population was 500,000 but today it's over 1 million, with nearly three-quarters of the populace having weapons. The TNG stands little chance of any political impact until the capital can be brought under some sort of control. The first step would appear to be disarmament but in a city with virtually no infrastructure and few jobs other than being a member of a militia, this may be far-fetched. This notwithstanding, dealing effectively with the issues in Mogadishu will be paramount to any long-term recovery in the nation as a whole. Several options provide potential solutions to the demilitarization and normalization of Mogadishu as a capital city. Based on current information and from previous attempts, it becomes obvious that military force would be required to accomplish the task. Whether this is an external or internal force is open to discussion.

The first option for a U.S. sponsored military force could be directed at orchestrating another UN peacemaking force in the capital. The force would need to be heavily armed not only with weapons, but also with a robust rules of engagement. This would be a large, high-risk, long-term and costly proposition for the nations involved. Entering a city of nearly one million inhabitants with a spider-web network of dirt streets and back allies, the initial force could well exceed 50,000 soldiers. As seen in Korea, Bosnia and the Sinai, the troops would need to

remain in place long enough for a generation of citizens to live their lifetime in peace. Since Aideed and Ali Mahdi would have nothing to gain and everything to lose, planners would need to expect forced entry operations into every pocket of the city. The fighting will be in close quarters and bloody. Based upon the size of the mission required and UN experiences in Mogadishu during the early 1990s, it may very well be too difficult to persuade a sufficient number of nations to embark on this task.

A second option is to place military and economic support behind one of the three prominent Mogadishu warlords in an attempt to extinguish the other two. The Aideed and Ali Mahdi militias have been the most aggressive and troublesome in their activities. They would appear to be the natural targets in this scenario but could also present the greatest difficulty to a long-term solution. If both Aideed and Ali Mahdi perceived themselves as the targets they could join forces and create a coalition that would approach 20,000 soldiers. If indeed they joined forces the opposition troop requirements to expel them would be too large for the business militia and problematic for any western nation.

The third, and preferred option, is to use a tactic similar to that executed in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance. This approach could use the RRA as the military force backed by the Ethiopian Army and supported by the U.S. through both overt (FMS, logistics and supplies) and covert (SOF and intelligence) means. This force has the potential of fracturing the Mogadishu militias since many of their fighters have migrated from the outlying areas into the city to find employment. An intense pre-conflict information campaign should take a two-pronged approach. First, it should target the Aideed and Ali Mahdi militias with scenes from the war in Afghanistan depicting the horror of battle, the success of the Northern Alliance and the relative freedoms in the post-Taliban era. Secondly it should target the businessmen and their militias with the theme of a capital reunited with its country and post-Taliban economic activity in Kabul. Based on previous actions, the militia supporting the businessmen would most likely remain neutral if the information campaign was successful and they did not perceive themselves as the target. A successful IO campaign could reduce the militia forces to more manageable numbers and facilitate a rapid transfer of power in Mogadishu.

THE PEOPLE

Nearly 95 percent of the estimated 11 million Somalis are Sunni Muslims. Much of Somalia remains unsettled and nearly half of the population is nomadic (76 percent living in rural areas). Over two million Somalis have left their country to avoid the ongoing conflicts and live in neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Minority groups in Somalia include Pakistanis,

Italians, Indians and Arabs.⁷⁷ Tuberculosis and leprosy are the two most common diseases but maternal and infant mortality is the major health care problem. Professional care is at a premium with doctors few and far between. Medical supplies, nurses and laboratory services are virtually nonexistent.⁷⁸ While conditions continue to improve in Somaliland, many people in southern Somalia face starvation or severe food shortages due to a poor rainy season in east Africa. Although the UN has appealed to donor nations for support to the Somali farmers the constant instability has kept them at arms reach.⁷⁹ Regional watchdog allAfrica.com reports that as many as 500,000 people face starvation due to a combination of economic turmoil and food shortages caused by drought.⁸⁰ The UN World Food Programme's Kevin Farrell noted "the current drought, the very low level of humanitarian assistance, the prevailing climate of insecurity and the fears of further disruption could push an already very precarious situation over the edge."⁸¹

U.S. efforts in this area should focus on Ethiopia. Their support to local clans in the disputed Ogaden region seem best poised to bring short-term relief to the vast numbers of Somalis who face starvation. U.S. assistance in choreographing international relief in the form of food and medical treatment through African-based organizations provides a potential recipe for relief. Long-term improvement to the political situation may well revolve around the improvement in living conditions in rural areas. These improvements must be focused on a plan to provide community-based life support, such as water systems, schools and health clinics.⁸² Flowing relief supplies through the ports at Berbera and Chisimayu (south of Mogadishu) provides second order economic benefits for the peoples in those areas and avoid the chaos in Mogadishu.

Having the vast majority of the population belonging to a single religious group is a bright spot in this discussion. With 95 percent of Somalis being Sunni Muslims, religious foundations may well provide a basis for improvement. A significant portion of the population lives in rural areas and the nomadic people find great joy in listening to their radios to stay in tune with ongoing developments. Resurfacing the Islamic fundamentals of kindness, honesty, hard work and honor will be a key portion of any information campaign. These core values must be stressed throughout the nation in an effort to curtail the ongoing violence from warlords and their associated militias.

THE ECONOMY

Prior to the 1990 civil war nearly 40% of the GNP and 65 percent of the nation's exports were directly related to cattle raising but since the mid-90s these numbers have increased. Due

to a cattle virus in Kenya and not being a "recognized" nation, the Gulf States imposed an import ban on Somali beef. This ban will have a devastating effect on the Somali farmers.⁸³

Seeking to lure outside investors and develop a renewed interest in Somali gas and oil reserves, the TNG recently signed an exploration agreement with French oil group TotalFinaElf. This 12-month lease is for the fertile southern portion of the country where lawlessness prevails and the government can do little to secure the oil workers from clan militias. Oil and gas may be a double-edged sword for the TNG. Leasing and exploration rights may significantly increase the government's cash flow or it may bring about another civil war as clan-families and warlords fight for territorial rights and the natural resources that accompany them.⁸⁴

The Puntland and Somaliland regions have seen a renewed interest from wealthy outside investors. The lack of national regulations and the current cease-fire make conditions ripe for small businesses and other entrepreneurs. The relative security and key strategic location of the two northern providences make them prime territory for market-oriented businesses. America's use of Somaliland ports and airfields may also stimulate economic growth.⁸⁵

Nationwide per capita income (\$979) and GDP (\$6.8B) have remained relatively constant over the past five years. These figures place Somalia at 134 of 191 countries for GDP and 167 of 191 in per capita income.⁸⁶ The poor economic situation is compounded by the fact that the America's global war on terrorism has shut down the main money transfer companies in the nation. Although Somalia receives an undetermined amount of foreign investment they have yet to rebuild their central banking system.⁸⁷ U.S. economic assistance to Somalia should be balanced in supporting the semi-autonomous regions, the TNG, and third-party sources such as the OAU. This approach will have the dual benefits of strengthening the new governments and emphasizing African focused organizations.

MILITARY FORCES AND MILITIAS

Throughout the political process militias continued to ravage the streets of Mogadishu. Aideed claims to have a force of nearly 10,000 soldiers spread over the southern region but the once powerful warlord of Mogadishu reportedly no longer pays his militia and may be falling from power.⁸⁸ Warlord Ali Mahdi controls much of northern Mogadishu and also has a comparable force. "With the exception of battling Aideed's forces in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi seems to be content with largely defensive operations."⁸⁹ Two other major forces control much of the southern area outside Mogadishu proper. General Omar Mohammed Hersi (known as "Morgan"), a former Barre associate, and General Omar Haji Mohammed, both control between 2000-3000 men.⁹⁰ The men of these militias are "erratic primitives of shifting allegiance,

habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order.”⁹¹ The effectiveness of the TNG may come at the price of developing a national military force to bring Mogadishu under control. This task is monumental, but if it is attempted there will be a need for an initial contingent of combat troops, as well as a strong civil police force. No amount of force will be sufficient if the various warlords decide that peace is not a viable alternative to the status quo.

The U.S. must take an approach to this issue that addresses each semi-autonomous region independently. In Puntland Colonel Yussuf’s Somali Salvation Democratic Front has about 3,000 men and enjoys the current support of his neighbors in Ethiopia. Yussuf finds himself in a precarious political position and may fall from power without outside assistance. The U.S. can strengthen Yussuf’s position through intelligence support, maritime interdiction and a joint training program. Establishing a robust maritime interdiction line along the Puntland coast will deter inbound arms shipments and reduce the migration of fleeing forces from Yemen and Afghanistan. These actions will improve his army while simultaneously rooting out suspected AIAI and al Qaeda operatives. U.S. support to the Ethiopian Army can also bolster both the RRA and Yussuf’s forces in Puntland.

Somaliland’s Egal commands an army of 15,000 men and some heavy equipment. Egal has good relations with Ethiopia due in part because of the shared use of the port at Berbera and appears to be forging closer relations with the U.S.⁹² The facilities at Berbera appear ideal as an intermediate staging base for coalition operations in the region. If the U.S. can balance the use of these facilities with the need for Somaliland independence it will greatly enhance Egal’s power. The increased naval and air traffic along the Horn of Africa provides an improved ability to monitor the flow of al Qaeda and Taliban operatives fleeing the Middle East and the economic benefits of a U.S. presence, similar to those in Bosnia, are well known.

TERRORIST ACTIVITY

Although TNG president Hassan stated that “the Somali al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) organisation has been dissolved and has no actual presence.”⁹³ intelligence reports state otherwise. Initial reports date back to 1993 when Osama bin Laden sent several operatives to assist Mohamed Aideed’s battle with U.S. peacekeepers. Over the past eight years AIAI and al Qaeda have repeatedly been linked. During the 1990s AIAI expanded their operations within Somalia, controlling several cities and supporting radical Islamic uprisings in both Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1997 Ethiopian forces attacked and destroyed the AIAI headquarters in southern Somalia at Baidoa, killing hundreds. Intelligence reports then linked AIAI and al Qaeda to the 1998 U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. Following the “9-11” attacks on the World

Trade Center the U.S. placed AIAI on the list of terrorist organizations.⁹⁴ Current reports indicate AIAI remains active in southern Somalia and, to a lesser extent, in Puntland. Puntland was also a suspected site for relocation of displaced al Qaeda and Taliban fighters fleeing coalition operations in Afghanistan.

The global war on terrorism will most likely bring U.S. forces to Somalia. Using large-scale U.S. military operations in Somalia, like those seen in Afghanistan, could well prove detrimental to any long-term U.S. prospects in the region. Although pockets of AIAI operatives or suspected al Qaeda terrorists undoubtedly occupy the country, it is nothing on the scale of Afghanistan.

Ethiopia's open opposition of AIAI, coupled with their support for the RRA, provides the U.S. a source of power to indirectly attack this problem. With some further U.S. and Ethiopian assistance in Puntland, Yussuf appears capable of eliminating the remnants of AIAI and any al Qaeda forces.

CONCLUSION

The post-World War II collapse of colonization placed many nations on a slippery slope heading for a destiny as a failed state. This relatively new phenomenon is under scrutiny from academia and only now being explored by western democracies. As these former powers meander into the foray they will find failed state issues much more complex than only a decade ago. Abandoned somewhere after Yalta, left behind by the technology revolution and unable to comprehend global economics, these failed states are a portrait of human disaster – “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.”⁹⁵

Somalia quietly embraced independence in 1960 but soon found itself in the center of a Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. By 1990 both superpowers had meddled in Somali politics and inundated the country with their weapons of war. Somalia was thrust into the international spotlight in 1991 when CNN reported thousands of casualties from widespread famine and a brutal civil war. She fell from the spotlight just as quickly in 1994 following a failed U.S. raid and the subsequent collapse of the UN peacekeeping mission. Caught in the middle and then left behind were millions of desolate Somali citizens. “By ignoring or underplaying that the roots of the conflict – a battle for scarce resources and a power vacuum following superpower abandonment – the U.S. not only distorts Somali history but also absolves itself of any responsibility of the crisis.”⁹⁶ Nearly every component of a failed state can be found in Somalia...civil war, crime, clan clashes, diminishing natural resources, drought, famine and overpopulation.

Somalia is once again on the brink of the international limelight. Drought and famine ravage her countryside and another below normal rainy season will be catastrophic. Whether the attention is brought by starving children through the focused lens of a television camera or by highly classified intelligence sources in search of global terrorists, the U.S. is on the verge of applying the elements of national power to assist this struggling nation. "Perhaps, the whole history of Somalia is yet to be written. But Somalia has changed in many ways."⁹⁷

The United States must take a guarded and holistic approach in preparing for reengagement in Somalia. Many of the deeply ingrained issues are foreign to our thinking and our way of life. But rather than shy away from what appears to be a complex and difficult challenge the United States must lead a coalition of nations to pull Somalia from her death spiral. "The fundamental problem of failed states is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability and international peace."⁹⁸

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