

**STRATEGY
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**GUARDING AMERICA'S SKY:
EFFECTIVE USE OF INTERAGENCY**

BY

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GUARDING AMERICAS'S SKY: EFFECTIVE USE OF INTERAGENCY

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ABSTRACT

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Several federal agencies have worked together on and since September 11, 2001 in ways not seen prior to the attacks against the United States on that date. The changes and enhancements to the defense of the airspace over the United States has been a particularly successful case study for interagency cooperation. There are lessons learned in this arena that should be applied to the greater expanse of homeland security. The federal government has taken initial steps to improve the security of the infrastructure and people of the United States since September 11, 2001. Forming the Office of Homeland Security was a great first step. But there is more to be done to efficiently use interagency for protection across the skies and on the land and seas of the U.S. This paper examines some actions for the leaders of the nation with a key recommendation to enable effective interagency cooperation.

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PREFACE

Thanks to Professor Patricia Pond for improving my writing skills, Professor James Hanlon for editing my wandering thoughts, and Ms. Lisa Bsales for supporting my research travels. Special thanks to Colonel Gary Snyder for checking six.

GUARDING AMERICA'S SKY: EFFECTIVE USE OF INTERAGENCY

"It's a new kind of war George. It's a new war for a new century."¹

-Breaker Morant

The sun rose across the eastern shore of the continental United States on 11 September 2001 finding the United States with 14 fighters sitting alert to guard America's skies. Eighteen hours later, 285 airplanes were on alert—many of them airborne.² These numbers are only a token of evidence of U.S. response to an unprecedented attack on U.S. soil. The mobilization of American forces in the continental U.S. (CONUS) and the expanding interactions among various agencies of the U.S. government during that time and since the attack has been astounding.

Working together, many entities of the U.S. government critically contribute to our nation's security. Even prior to the attack, many security experts questioned our ability to achieve adequate interagency cooperation. Years of numerous commissioned reports, Congressional testimonies, and continuous journalistic rhetoric questioned and debated American's ability to protect itself. The security of our nation's sky and terrain has forever been changed as a result of these attacks. The time for debate and discussion is well past. The time for action is upon us.

The primary instrument for guarding Americas skies is First Air Force (1st AF), a subordinate command of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). There is a renewed focus for 1st AF since September 11, 2001. That focus requires an inward looking capability in addition to the traditional outward look from our borders. In a few short months, several agencies who previously moved along seemingly different vectors are now working together to achieve synergy. This following analysis shows how numerous governmental agencies, military services, and the civilian sectors have come together to elevate security of American airspace. It describes challenges facing the interagency process for national security to provide adequate homeland security. It recommends action to enable the nation's homeland security apparatus to utilize effective interagency coordination and implementation.

BACKGROUND

If the planes would not divert, if they wouldn't pay any attention to instructions to move away from the city, as a last resort our pilots were authorized to take them out. Now people say, you know, that's a horrendous decision to make. Well, it is. You've got an airplane full of American citizens, civilians captured

by...terrorists and you are going to, in fact, shoot it down...and kill all those Americans on board.³

—Vice-President Dick Cheney

The mission of 1st AF is to ensure air sovereignty and air defense of the CONUS. As the CONUS geographical component of the bi-national NORAD, the command provides airspace surveillance and control and directs all air sovereignty activities for the continental United States.⁴ Prior to September 11, 2001 U.S. security efforts focused almost exclusively outward. Since the terrorist attacks, the necessity to look inward has become imperative. Likewise, the necessity to utilize the interagency process to mount a viable defense has become crucial.

Theoretically, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approves use of military flights to support the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is a part of the Department of Transportation (DoT). The FAA is authorized military flights by the National Military Command Center (NMCC), which through NORAD seeks SecDef approval to use military aircraft.⁵

But what actually happened on September 11? Boston Center of the FAA notified the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), one of three sectors under 1st AF, of a possible hijacking. NEADS scrambled fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts. NEADS had received permission to do so from the 1st AF commander who was in contact with the operations command element of NORAD.⁶ It is now known those fighters were still on the ground when American Airlines Flight 11 impacted World Trade Center 1. These same fighters were eight minutes away from New York City when United Airlines Flight 175 hit World Trade Center 2.⁷

Though the written guidance was not followed in this line of communication, the working relationship between the Departments of Defense and Transportation effectively launched the interceptors in the sky only 12 minutes after the FAA's first call to NEADS.⁸ Similar interagency transactions were taking place as events quickly unfolded in the next several minutes.

The 1st AF launched the alert fighters out of Langley AFB, Virginia, to fly Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the Washington, DC area soon after the airliners crashed into the World Trade Center. At the same time, the Secret Service, a branch of the Department of Treasury, was alerted to protect the Vice President of the United States. The Secret Service was not aware of the fighters on the way to Washington, DC, and thus contacted the District of Columbia Air National Guard, requesting them to fly cover over the Washington, DC area. Once both sets of fighters were airborne, the flights established radio contact and coordinated their efforts, along with supporting air refueling tanker aircraft and airborne electronic warning aircraft.⁹

Significantly, the fighters were quickly airborne, and informal interagency coordination between the Departments of Treasury and Defense was timely and effective.

The Vice-President quickly declared the airspace over the District of Columbia a free-fire zone. All U.S. airspace was closed after Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta directed Monte Begler at the FAA to "bring all the planes down."¹⁰ Mineta was in the White House bunker with Vice President Cheney who agreed with the command. There were 4,546 airplanes in the air at the time.¹¹ Within two hours all airborne traffic over the CONUS was on the ground.¹² The commander of NORAD declared Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigation Aides (SCOATANA).¹³ For the first time in history, U.S. airspace was handed over to military control. NORAD maintained the airspace control for the next three days.¹⁴ All these measures were implemented quickly and smoothly among the many governmental agencies involved.

Even so, the NORAD commander acknowledged shortcomings in NORAD's ability to look inward prior to September 11, 2001. General Ralph Eberhart later observed that, "If somebody had called us and said, we have a hijacking 100 miles out coming from Europe or South America, there are terrorists on board, and they've taken over the airplane, that's a scenario we've practiced. We did not practice--and I wish to God we had--a scenario where this takes off out of Boston and minutes later crashes into New York City. This is a whole new ball game."¹⁵ There was a remarkable interagency response to the stupendous surprise of September 11, even though no one agency was fully prepared for this specific event.

To understand the complexity of interagency coordination, comprehending how Homeland Security (HLS) is defined is a must. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) define HLS as the preparation for, prevention of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggressions directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure. Further, HLS is responsible for crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support. Under the umbrella of HLS lie Homeland Defense (HLD) and Civil Support. HLD provides protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Civil Support (CS) provides DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, as well as to designated law enforcement activities and other actions.¹⁶

INTERAGENCY: A SUCCESS STORY

The interagency process will work best and be most effective for all players if all strategies have been fully designed and planned for and all contingencies considered, evaluated, and exercised. But such total preparation is simply not possible. The ad hoc nature and risks of

some crises will require interagency coordination to be immediately tailored to a given crisis through previously coordinated and practiced procedures.

Even so, on September 11 participating agencies shared a full understanding of the situation and command relationships immediately following the attacks. Joint efforts were taking place parallel to interagency workings. The US Navy knew they were supporting the Commander in Chief (CinC) NORAD. The 2nd Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Dawson and the 3rd Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Buckey both called the 1st AF Commander Major General Arnold to give their support. The George Washington Carrier Battle Group was placed off New York and the JFK Carrier Battle Group was placed off Virginia. The Joint Expeditionary Base Command and Control Center (JEBCCC) capability, which forwards the common battle group operational picture ashore, was established for the first time. The Fleet Admirals received and complied with scramble orders issued from a Colonel in NEADS because they understood and accepted their supporting role.¹⁷

Accurately and immediately identifying possible domestic threats is the key to effective interagency response. To accomplish this task quickly and effectively the Department of Defense (DoD) relied on a known Department of Transportation capability--the FAA radar and Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. The FAA has now linked their radar to NORAD to permit an inward looking capability that it did not possess before. Coincidentally, these very radars were scheduled to be decommissioned in the near future for a savings of billions of dollars.¹⁸ The Multi-Source Correlation Tracker (MSCT) connects internal radar feeds to 1st AF and NORAD for real-time radar tracking of aircraft in the CONUS airspace. NORAD has also added a conference line that links directly to FAA controllers. This data link now gives instant voice communication and real-time radar pictures to NORAD and 1st AF, who can now observe all tracks the FAA radar is displaying across the continental U.S. The 1st AF has Air Battle Managers in each of the 15 ATC Centers across the CONUS. These Air Battle Managers have access to encryption material and can pass orders that the FAA controller cannot legally relay.¹⁹ The efforts of these two governmental agencies working toward a common goal have added this critical resource to strengthen homeland defense.

The success of the Departments of Defense and Transportation and in particular NORAD and the FAA in solving this new problem of tracking aircraft movement within the CONUS came about for two reasons. First, both of these organizations were motivated toward the same goal. Their specific agendas did not conflict with regard to the task at hand. Secondly, the relationships between these two agencies had been well established through concerted effort on both their parts. The DoD has representatives working inside the office of the FAA

headquarters in Washington, DC. This has been the case for many years. These representatives are military officers from the Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy. The highest-ranking officer in this office is an Air Force Colonel.²⁰

The primary responsibility of these officers is to liaise with the FAA. They provide customer service for the FAA and the Pentagon. Their responsibilities range from passing information to directly engaging in projects. After the September 11 attacks, their role and mission became operational in nature. They were directly involved in Operation Noble Eagle. Their duties for this operation fell in the tactical through strategic levels during the crisis; activities performed by these military officers included working airspace issues for the scrambled fighter jets to writing military policy. This team put their personnel in the Crisis Action Teams at both the FAA Headquarters and the DoT Crisis Command Center.²¹

The close working relationships between these agencies is further evident in the person of a Senior Executive Service (SES) member of the DoD staff working for the Air Force Operations Staff (AFXO) in the Pentagon. He serves as the executive director for policy board for the Secretary of Defense. He also serves as the senior liaison officer with the FAA.²² These well established relationships provide the means for successful interactions between separate agencies even in the absence of detailed, practiced procedures.

Other agencies are likewise working together to secure American airspace. It was earlier noted how the Secret Service of the Department of the Treasury has worked with DoD entities. Their quick response was facilitated because a member of the Secret Service was also a member of the DC Air National Guard. He used this dual capabilities to get F-16s launched and flying combat air patrol (CAP) missions over Washington.²³

U.S. Customs assisted the Air Force by offering EP-3 airborne electronic warfare aircraft to fly missions in support of what has now become Operation Noble Eagle. The Air Force E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft were over-extended and could not cover all the requirements of the "Noble Eagle" and "Enduring Freedom" operations. Thus the Customs support was critical.²⁴ The National Air and Space Agency (NASA), an independent governmental agency, was concerned about the security of their space shuttle launches following the September 11 attacks. The Departments of Transportation and Defense responded by imposing a temporary flight restriction around Cape Kennedy and providing CAP and attack helicopter missions respectively.²⁵

The Department of Energy similarly requested increased security for U.S. nuclear facilities from the Departments of Defense and Transportation. These three agencies quickly established settings that supported facility security yet kept the airspace from being too

restrictive for commercial and private aircraft.²⁶ The Federal Emergency and Management Agency (FEMA) came into the picture because they needed permission for mission essential movement to fly FEMA personnel to New York City. Likewise, the Department of Agriculture needed authority to fly helicopters in the northwest part of the U.S. for forest fire support while all the airspace was still closed immediately following the September 11 attacks.²⁷ These examples of cooperation and coordination clearly demonstrate how government agencies can come together and achieve positive results when they share a common focus and have established relationships.

Cooperation can go beyond the military and governmental organizations. It can productively include the private sector. Every other Tuesday a meeting takes place outside of Washington called the "Severe Weather Avoidance" gathering. Formerly known as the "S2K" meeting, its original purpose was to address capacity problems in U.S. airspace. The meetings have now taken on a larger, more complex task because of the number of jets flying CAP missions in the proximity of busy airports. Weather challenges further complicate the de-confliction problem. All of these interagency and private sector efforts proactively anticipate challenges to homeland defense. These meetings include representatives from the military, the airlines, the Air Transportation Association, the Air Line Pilots Association; they are led by the FAA.²⁸ This is an impressive example of cooperation among interagency representatives and the private sector.

INTERAGENCY: CHALLENGES FOR COOPERATION

The Administration has pursued a clear and committed war strategy against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaida. But our homeland security strategy, which may affect millions more Americans, has been ad hoc, inconsistent and confusing.²⁹

—U.S. Representative Jane Harman, D-Calif.

Importantly, since the scope of homeland security responsibilities span an array of federal, state, and local organizations, it also will require enhanced interagency processes and capabilities to effectively defend the United States against attacks. The recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security will galvanize this vital effort.³⁰

—Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.

Governmental agencies have not been traditionally inclined to work toward a common goal for the good of the nation. Parochial interests tend to take priority over shared missions.

Such parochialism is inefficient and expensive. It is also detrimental to the security of the nation.

In October 2001 President Bush announced the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security. Governor Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania was named director. President Bush directed the office to develop and coordinate a national strategy to secure the U.S. from terrorist threats or attack and to coordinate the executive branch's efforts in this concern.³¹ Governor Ridge has indicated that he has all the resources he needs to accomplish the stated mandate for the new office. This may be due to the strong relationship he and the President enjoy. But this fortunate circumstance does not secure the future of this office, nor does it give it the power to make the changes that may be required to achieve the assigned tasks.

Governor Ridge said he has no intention of testifying before Congress. He stated he is an advisor to the President, not a Cabinet member obliged to appear on Capitol Hill. He argues he has no authority over any federal agency and does not control any monies. Some members of Congress counter he coordinates spending of more than 80 federal agencies.³² The ill will between Congress and the Executive branch over this refusal to testify before Congress is counterproductive to the HLS effort. The Democratic chairman and the ranking Republican of the Senate Appropriations Committee sent a letter to the President expressing their displeasure with this situation. The chair of the House subcommittee that controls the Office of Homeland Security's budget has indicated that funds for the HLS office may be held up because of this refusal.³³ The current advisory role distracts from the authority of the director of the HLS Office and reduces the potential for productive interagency endeavors to counter the threats to the U.S. The full capabilities of this nation must be mustered to shape and respond to the challenges facing the security of our country and the world. Government agencies and the private sector must work cooperatively to protect shared interests and overall security. U.S. capabilities go well beyond the military; they include the agencies of the executive branch, the appropriations power of the Congress, the roles of local agencies, and also private sector assets in certain situations.

One of the greatest strengths derived from the interagency process are the unique perspectives of the various entities involved. General Wesley Clark addressed this positive characteristic when the interagency team built the Dayton Accords at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He stated, "It was an interagency team, bringing together a wide perspective on the issues. Together we would help end one war."³⁴ A significant downside to the interagency process is the tendency for a lethargic response due to the wide disparity of opinion. General Clark spoke of this weakness when the Bosnian enclave in Srebrenica fell in attacks by the Serb

forces in July of 1995. "In Washington, the interagency discussions seemed to go nowhere for a few days, while we held our breath on Srebrenica. Then Srebrenica fell." ³⁵

On the service front, Headquarters U.S. Air Force has formed the Directorate of Homeland Security (AF/XOH) to address the serious matter of protection of our people and facilities on U.S. soil. It is evident that today's adversaries may to a certain extent be "non-deterable." Even so, all services and agencies must work cooperatively to prevent, protect against, and respond to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Key interagency stakeholders have been identified by this newly established office for HLD. They include the Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, FEMA, DoT, and others. ³⁶

The AF/XOH has designed a concept named the HLS Task Force (HLSTF). It is modeled on the Global Strike Task Force developed by General John Jumper, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, when he was Commander of the Air Combat Command. The AF/XOH recognizes the strength of interagency cooperation. One of the objectives of the HLSTF is to effectively prevent, protect against, and respond to threats by integrating Air Force capabilities into joint and interagency efforts. ³⁷

The concept of operations for the HLSTF is capabilities-based. It includes Global Strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), and the survival readiness center at the wing level. It plans to interface with the local first responders. These capabilities are being forwarded to the Major Commands (MAJCOMS) for inclusion in the requirements process. ³⁸

One of the responsibilities of the AF/XOH office is to represent the Air Force in the joint and interagency arenas on HLS policy and planning discussions. Indeed, the appreciation of the requirement for interagency planning is growing. This head-on approach seeks to integrate all efforts of the government on a common vector for homeland security. But to keep all stakeholders focused on a common mission, there needs to be a lead individual or agency to orchestrate these endeavors.

HLS efforts are currently led by the Office of Homeland Security under the direction of Governor Tom Ridge. On the military side the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has established a Homeland Security Office, with the Army Service Secretary designated as executive agent. On the joint staff the J-5 has a HLS division, and the SecDef approved standup of a HLS CinC on 1 October 2001. ³⁹

Streamlining the number of agencies involved in homeland security since the September 11 attacks has become a popular refrain for lawmakers and administration officials. Pulling National Guard units from overseas deployments is an idea gaining popularity in some circles. ⁴⁰

This controversial proposal was voiced in the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century Phase III Report. This report recommended using the National Guard only for homeland defense missions.⁴¹ But Secretary Rumsfeld recently stated he has not made a decision on the National Guard's role in homeland security strategy.⁴²

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addresses the roles and responsibilities of the Active and Reserve forces to provide for the effective defense of the US.⁴³ This QDR cites the Coast Guard in this discussion, which indicates that HLS planning includes specific roles for given agencies and services. It goes on to say the "DoD will review the establishment of a new unified combatant commander to help address complex interagency issues and provide a single military commander to focus military support."⁴⁴

The QDR envisioned the future of the military on a capabilities-based model. This model "focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur."⁴⁵ Successful use of the interagency process can effectively increase the capabilities of the military. The current QDR addresses this by emphasizing communication among the services and also with government agencies. But successful HLD operations will require forces with combined interoperability.⁴⁶ Such required interoperability must go beyond the federal level to the national level. This entails active involvement of state and local agencies. The National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST), which integrates state and local assets into the federal support structure, provides an example of effective crisis control and consequence management on a national basis. In this model, local, state, and federal authorities coordinate their respective resources by utilizing the three-tiered response.⁴⁷

The FBI will automatically respond to any terrorist or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack. The first responders though will almost always be at the local (city or county) level, including local fire departments, law enforcement agencies, and emergency medical services. As the local incident commander has exhausted his resources, he will call for state support. In the state of Idaho the Bureau of Disaster Services, the Bureau of Hazardous Materials, and the 101st CST all fall under command of the state Adjutant General.⁴⁸ This centralized authority provides easy access and coordination to a large amount of state assets. Through a "bridge call" that the CST's are equipped to establish with their assets, all representatives at each of the three levels (local, state, federal) of the involved organizations are on a common communications link. This system is exercised by the 101st CST and other teams across the country.⁴⁹ This is a national network.

Merely working in a joint environment and attaining interoperability within the DoD and across the spectrum of federal agencies will not wholly ensure security of the nation's citizens. Businesses and associations in the private sector should be added to the mix to assure safety and security in many areas of HLS. For example, the US Department of Transportation formed a Rapid Response Team on Aircraft Security on September 16, 2001. The team was composed of Captain Duane Woerth, president of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA); Robert W. Baker, vice chairman of American Airlines; Robert A. Davis, former vice president of engineering and technology for the Boeing Company.⁵⁰ The Rapid Response Team gave its recommendations to Secretary Mineta in the short time allotted before October 1, 2001. They recommended ways to meet new requirements for strengthened cockpit doors, position-tracking transponders that cannot be switched off in an emergency, a cabin-to-cockpit crew awareness system, and video surveillance of the cockpit entrance.⁵¹ These new measures offer greater security to U.S. citizens as they travel on U.S. airliners.

Such measures also reduce costs of security. Better airline security alleviates the burden on the high sortie rate of CAP missions flying in support of Operation Noble Eagle. Thus the service life of the existing fighter fleet would be prolonged and consuming flying hours with unproductive sorties would be avoided. Consider the flying rate of the F-16 fighters on CAP missions as part of Operation Noble Eagle. One year of service life is lost on each airframe for every five months of flying at the current pace. This is three times the normal rate.⁵² Finally, the cooperative accomplishments of this Rapid Reaction Team demonstrate how the private sector can work to assist in HLS. It shows how the private sector contributes to interagency initiatives.

Most resources and capabilities necessary for HLS are already resident in the military and interagency. What is missing is a focal point for horizontal integration.

RECOMMENDATION

An Act to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the

effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.⁵³

—Public Law 99-433 opening comments

In 1986 the U.S. Congress enacted legislation mandating more effectiveness among U.S. military services.⁵⁴ The successful outcome of this legislation has been demonstrated in subsequent U.S. military engagements. In these operations joint efforts by the branches of the U.S. military contributed significantly to meeting stated objectives. Today a similar legislative mandate must energize the interagency process for homeland security. This is critical to protect U.S. citizens and infrastructure. The authority for such coordination should come from establishment of a new Cabinet post of Secretary of Homeland Security. However, the true power of this office would come from appropriations funded from current and year-to-year agency budgets to support interagency cooperation in the interest of homeland security.

A similar recommendation was made by the Gilmore Commission in December 2000, which recommended that the president should establish a National Office for Combating Terrorism. It would have the "authority to direct the creation, modification, or cessation of programs within the Federal Interagency. It must have strict authority to direct modifications to agency budgets and the application of resources."⁵⁵ Such authority must be written into the legislation for the cabinet level Office of Homeland Security.

CONCLUSION

President Bush has established the idea that a standing federal office designed for homeland security is critically important to coordinate and facilitate the many resources at the nation's disposal. As a federal institution that will serve the nation throughout the 21st century, the office will need to evolve from its origin as a small coordination staff with responsibility for terrorism-focused facilitation and coordination of all federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and private industry into a true federal bureaucracy that spans the homeland security spectrum.⁵⁶

—Dr. Michael Hillyard

The recommendation for Congress to empower the Office of Homeland Security is directed at the federal level. This is step two in a long process of establishing a viable HLS department. The first step was taken in October 2001 when President Bush founded this office. Subsequent steps will require this endeavor to become a national undertaking, as Hillyard

recommended. The Gilmore Commission found that, "We need a national approach, one that recognizes the unique individual skills that communities, states, and the federal government possess that, collectively, will give us the 'total package' need to address all aspects of terrorism."⁵⁷ In short, this nation has adequate resources to mount an effective, sustainable program of homeland security. What it needs is a centralized authority to plan for and, when necessary, execute the appropriate use of these resources.

Until such time that Congress takes action to strengthen interagency cooperation, the evidence of this case study of protection of American airspace on and since September 11 offers a good example of how interagency cooperation can proceed. Such success is possible when each of the participants are motivated by national concerns rather than organizational concerns. An Ad hoc implementation of efforts may be the only avenue for interagency relations based on the actual circumstances of a crisis. Coordinated and integrated efforts in interagency operations are critical.⁵⁸ But the time line for obtaining that effort may only allow an ad hoc response. That response can still be successful if the informal relations of the interagency personnel have been established. Coordination and cooperation in the interagency process is a means, not an end.⁵⁹ Formal and informal relations among agencies are critical.

Leadership and organization of the interagency process in homeland security does not need to be complex. Admiral Paul David Miller provided a manageable and effective model in a 1993 proposal.⁶⁰ His model for an Interagency Action Group (IAG) is based on the structure of a Joint Task Force.

National leaders give policy guidance to the IAF. At the top of the IAG is the interagency director, who is the lead agency representative. Below the director is the steering committee formed from key agency representatives. These representatives provide coordination and adjudication. Finally the core competencies come from the working level representatives, who provide the action and implementation.

The new Unified Command Plan (UCP) will soon be released. It is expected to give some guidance and direction to the matter of interagency and homeland security. In particular, it should provide a unified command for HLS, supported by a CONUS-CinC for homeland defense. No matter what specific plan is adopted, the time has come for Congress to mandate roles and missions for the Office of Homeland Security. Congress must also provide real power and appropriated sufficient funds to carry out this new and critical mission of homeland security, which itself depends largely on interagency response capabilities. U.S. citizens deserve nothing less.

It took a direct attack on America to motivate the government to take action to create the Office of Homeland Security. It must not take another attack to make this office viable and effective. The cost monetarily and in American lives is simply too high.

Word Count = 5,097

ENDNOTES

¹ Jonathan Hardy and Bruce Beresford: Breaker Morant, prod. Matt Carroll, dir. Bruce Beresford, 107 min., Lexicon, 1980, videocassette. The leading character, Harry Harbord "Breaker" Morant, found fame as a folk hero and martyr after his infamous trial during the Boer War at the turn of the 20th century.

² Major General Larry K. Arnold, 1st Air Force Commander, Air National Guard, interview by author, 13 December 2001, tape recording, 1st Air Force Headquarters, Tyndall AFB, FL.

³ NBC's *Meet the Press*, 16 September 2001, quote by Vice President Richard Cheney.

⁴ 1st Air Force Web Page, available from <http://www.1staf.tyndall.af.mil/mission.html>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2001.

⁵ Arnold.

⁶ Arnold.

⁷ NORAD Web Page, available from <http://www.spacecom.af.mil/norad/presrelNORADTimelines.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2001.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Arnold.

¹⁰ Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "American's Chaotic Road to War," The Washington Post, 26 January, 2001; available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/nation/nationalsecurity/A42754-2002Jan26.html>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2002.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Jeff Griffith, FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic, interview by author, 29 January 2002, tape recording, FAA Headquarters, Washington, DC.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Griffith.

¹⁵ General Ralph Eberhart, Commander in Chief, NORAD, USAF, "Quote of the Day," New York Times, 27 September 2001, sec. A, p. 1.

¹⁶ Colonel Terry Scherling, Deputy Director Headquarters U.S. Air Force Directorate of Homeland Security, Air National Guard, interview by author, 29 January 2002, tape recording, Pentagon, Washington, DC.

¹⁷ Arnold.

¹⁸ Griffith.

¹⁹ Colonel Mike Corbett, 1st Air Force Vice-Commander, Air National Guard, interview by author, 13 December 2001, tape recording, 1st AF Headquarters, Tyndall AFB, FL.

²⁰ Colonel Sheryl Atkins, Air Force FAA Liaison Detachment Commander, USAF, interview by author, 29 January 2002, tape recording, FAA Headquarters, Washington, DC.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Arnold.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Atkins.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Mark Cato, Staff Engineer, Air Line Pilots Association, interview by author, 29 January 2002, Air Line Pilots Association Headquarters, Herndon, VA.

²⁹ Jane Harman, "Quote of the Day," Harrisburg (Pennsylvania) Patriot-News, 25 January 2002, p. 2.

³⁰ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), v.

³¹ The White House, "President Establishes Office of Homeland Security," Press Release, 8 October 2001.

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³³ James Carney and Douglas Waller, "Split Decision," Time, 1 April 2002, 42.

³⁴ Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2001), 54.

³⁵ Ibid., 50.

³⁶ Scherling.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Colonel Terry Scherling, Deputy Director, Headquarters U.S. Air Force Directorate of Homeland Security, Air National Guard <Terry.Scherling@pentagon.af.mil>, "RE: HLSTF," electronic mail message to author <Larry.Kauffman@carlisle.army.mil>, 18 March 2002.

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⁴⁰ Kristin Patterson, "Rumsfeld Unsure Where Guard Fits in Homeland Security," available from <<http://www.ngaus.org/newsroom/rumsfeldguard20602.asp>>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2002.

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⁴² Patterson.

⁴³ Rumsfeld, 19.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 33

⁴⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Gary P. Leeder, 101st Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Commander, Idaho ANG, telephone interview by author, 1 April 2002.

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⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ "US Transportation Secretary Mineta Announces Rapid Response Teams on Airport, Aircraft Security," Press Release, 16 September 2001, available from <<http://www.bts.gov/PressReleases/2001/dot9801.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2002.

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⁵³ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1987), Vol. 1, 992.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 992-1075b.

⁵⁵ "For Ray Downey: Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction," 15 December 2001; available from <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2002.

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⁶⁰ Paul David Miller, The Interagency Process: Engaging America's Full National Security Capabilities. National Security Paper No. 11 (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), 16.

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