



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**ARE WE APPROPRIATELY DEVELOPING LEADERS
TO FIGHT AND LEAD IN THE FUTURE FULL SPECTRUM OF
CONFLICT?**

BY

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ARE WE APPROPRIATELY DEVELOPING LEADERS TO FIGHT AND LEAD IN THE FUTURE FULL
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ABSTRACT

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The thesis of this SRP is to examine whether we are appropriately training and developing our junior leaders to serve and lead in the future full spectrum environment and organizations, both Interim and Objective. The intent is to focus directly on officers at the platoon leader through Battalion Commander level, and examine the current Officer Education System (OES), and make recommendations as appropriate to adjust our current OES. Additionally, it is to review other factors which affect leadership and professional experience through the current and proposed assignment policy for officers, and how mentoring and basic leadership techniques must be adjusted to better adapt to the changing social and global environments in which our junior leaders will have to operate.

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ARE WE APPROPRIATELY DEVELOPING LEADERS TO FIGHT AND LEAD IN THE FUTURE FULL SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT?

BACKGROUND

ARMY TRANSFORMING

The United States Army is in the midst of an all out transformation. The intent of our transformation is to create a more strategically responsive Army, which has the capability to conduct operations within the full spectrum of conflict. This new organization will have the capability to quickly deploy, and fight across the full spectrum of conflict from peace operations to a major theater war. This new organization will be flexible, independent and have the ability to transition quickly from peace keeping operations, to peace enforcement to combat operations and back to peace operations based on the region and mission requirements.

The thesis of this SRP is to examine whether we are appropriately training and developing our junior leaders to serve and lead in the future full spectrum environment and organizations, both Interim and Objective. The intent is to focus directly on officers at the platoon leader through Battalion Commander level, and examine the current Officer Education System (OES), and make recommendations as appropriate to adjust our current OES. Additionally, it is to review other factors which affect leadership and professional experience through the current and proposed assignment policy for officers, and how mentoring and basic leadership techniques must be adjusted to better adapt to the changing social and global environments in which our junior leaders will have to operate.

Why are we transforming? We as an Army must look into the future and determine what emerging operational environments and threats we must be prepared to face in support of our National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS). As we are concerned about threats to our security, we as an Army are transitioning to a capabilities based force. To support this we must create an organization trained and resourced to counter and defeat these emerging threats.

The future operational environments are ambiguous, nonlinear, and asymmetric in nature and extremely fluid. They include, disaster relief operations, humanitarian relief operations, counter drug operations, small-scale wars, counter terrorism operations, fighting in multinational partnerships, coalitions and range from Pre-crisis action to Global conventional war. These operations will potentially occur in complex terrain and urban environments with civilian populations and infrastructure complicating the areas of operation. We will conduct these operations in a decentralized manner, using cutting edge

technology for communications, and to provide situational awareness and understanding to allow leaders to quickly make decisions and take appropriate action.¹

As the Army prepares to advance American interests against this range of potential threats, it is mindful of the broad spectrum of potential military operations. The spectrum extends from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance on one end to global war on the other. For the past half-century we have structured the Army for operations on the high end of the spectrum, and traditionally characterized these operations as warfighting. But as the experience of the past decade has shown, lower spectrum operations have become far more prevalent. And yet, our non-negotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win the nations' wars. We must remain organized, trained and equipped for war, even as we execute other operations to further the National Security.²

Our Interim and Objective organizations must have the capability to conduct operations within the parameters described above. But even more important is the ability of the junior and senior leaders to have the tools, education, and experience to successfully lead an organization within these ambiguous and fluid environments.

In numerous situations in the post-Cold War strategic environment from the Balkans to Haiti, from Mogadishu to Los Angeles, American military forces at the lowest tactical levels have and will continue to make potentially strategic level decisions as they carry out increasingly complex missions in a significantly expanded professional jurisdiction. In addition to traditional warfighting, Army leaders from top to bottom must be able to deal with the increased political and cultural complexities of peace operations, stability and support operations, humanitarian interventions, forward presence, engagement, homeland defense and more.³

So the question is, do we need to change the way we currently develop our junior leaders? Are we preparing them to command and operate as staff officers in these truly ambiguous environments? Not only are the environments and threats changing, but so is our army based on our transformation. Our organizational structures are changing along with capabilities within each of these new organizations. Technology will play a key role in the United States Army's future organizations, both Interim and Objective Forces. As new technologies emerge we need to ensure our leaders leverage this technology to their advantage without losing focus on their ability to train, lead, and fight their organizations.

OBJECTIVE FORCE CAPABILITES

"The Objective force is not platform driven, but rather the focus is on achieving capabilities. The Objective force will operate as a suite of Integrated Systems. The key to the Objective Force Transformation is technology."⁴

When we visualize the Interim or Objective Forces the first thing we think about is a platform. The platforms that we visualize are the Lightly Armored Wheeled Vehicle for the Interim Force or the Future Combat Vehicle. But, in reality what the Objective Force brings us is a full range of technologies, which will support a number of systems within the full spectrum of new missions and threats, an increased lethality and rapid deployability. Success in these future technologies is to ensure leaders have the accurate and timely information to allow them to make the best decisions to support the mission at hand.

“Some of these new technologies include the following:

- Wireless communications and sensors
- Advanced armament
- Hybrid electric propulsion
- Robotics
- Directed energy weapons
- Networked fires
- Electromagnetic guns
- Improved C4ISR structures which will use airborne base stations to flow information to key leaders
- Extended range beyond line of sight fires for future combat systems
- Wide spread presence of digital information systems
- Unmanned aerial vehicles
- Satellite imagery
- The power of web-based command and control systems provide common situational understanding which compresses the strategic, operational, and tactical echelons
- Organic sensors-to include robotic sensors
- Unmanned aerial vehicles
- Long range surveillance detachments
- Data fusion systems
- Advanced information technologies which enable leader collaborative planning and instantaneous dissemination of decisions
- Knowledge-based Battle Command System. Execution Centric, C2 System (TOC-like capability anywhere on battlefield)
- Training to develop leader/soldier capabilities to manage and employ advanced information systems
- Information dominance”⁵

As one can glean, the Objective Force brings an enormous amount of new technologies to the battlefield, which can provide an overwhelming advantage to our Army. The challenges are two fold, to appropriately train our leaders and soldiers to properly use these new technological advancements, and ensure our leaders have the capability to leverage these new technologies to win on the future battlefields regardless of the environment and type of mission.

Technology will be available to provide our future leaders enormous amounts of instantaneous information. Our future leaders will have the weapons systems and platforms to engage targets at unprecedented ranges with tremendous accuracy. But, are we developing the type of leader that can successfully take full advantage of the technological advancements and tremendous amounts of information? Will our future leaders have the keen ability to quickly analyze large quantities of information and take the initiative to make bold decisions in challenging and confusing circumstances? Does the United States Army need to adjust the way we develop our leaders? Does our leadership doctrine, FM 22-100 remain valid as the threat environments and new technologies continue to evolve?

LEADERSHIP

ARMY LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

"Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving their organization."⁶

"The Army leadership framework is built around the following:

- Values: The attributes that build a leaders character, loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, personal courage.
- Attributes: Mental, physical and emotional strength
- Skills: Interpersonal, conceptual, technical, tactical
- Actions: Ability to influence, through communication, decision making, motivating. Operational ability to plan/prepare, execute, assess. Improving, through developing, building, and learning. "⁷

"In an Army in any time, the purpose of leadership is to get the job done. Competent military leaders develop trust, focus effort, clarify objectives, inspire confidence, build teams, set the example, keep hope alive and rationalize sacrifice "⁸

The Army's leadership doctrine in accordance with FM 22-100 provides a basic framework to successfully develop our leaders and has been appropriate for both junior and senior leaders, officers and noncommissioned officers. Yet the key question to resolve is as the Army transforms and information superiority, digitization, and battlefield environments become more complex, do any of these basic leadership concepts need to change?

I argue that our values and attributes remain valid regardless of how our Army transforms and the threats we encounter. "Army leadership begins with what the leader must BE, the values and attributes that shape a leader's character."⁹ Values and attributes encompass the foundation of developing and building leaders. They provide the foundation for proper thought and action guiding our behaviors, decisions, and moral character. "Character –who you are-

contributes significantly to how you act. Character helps you know what's right and do what's right, all the time and at whatever the cost. Character is made up of two interacting parts: values and attributes."¹⁰ Our values and attributes remain valid regardless of rank and seniority.

As we review current operations that U.S. Forces are involved in around the globe, which stretch the entire spectrum of conflict, and take into account new technologies that are being developed and fielded, our basic leader skill sets and how they take action need to be changed. Specifically, we must adapt our interpersonal skills, conceptual skills, technical skills, and tactical skills. The challenge is to determine what this new skill set encompasses and where this training takes place in an officer's career. Should it occur in the Institutional training base, through operational experiences and or self-development? In addition an officer's ability to influence, through communication both verbal and written and his ability to make decisions, will need to be reviewed. Technology and independent operations will make it critical for officers in general to communicate and make accurate and rapid decisions. An officer's operational ability to plan, prepare, and execute, must be redefined so he or she has the ability to adapt to complex situations and provide quick and accurate guidance to their organizations. To be effective an officer must have the ability to apply what he knows.

"In an interview reported in the 30 June 1997 Army Times, the departing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that future leadership demands would be made by unprecedented stress, isolated battle and dispersion on the battlefield."¹¹ In the overview of Future Land Warfare in the Autumn 1997 issue of Parameters, Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr. note how technology will likely compound the stress on battle decision makers and the leadership far more than technology will determine who wins and who loses."¹² The technological advantage alone will not win our future battles. It always comes down to the soldiers and leaders on the ground having the ability to analyze the situation, determine a feasible course of action, motivating his or her unit and aggressively attacking the situation.

The key to our Army's Leadership framework is values and attributes. But, the "Know" and "Do" skills and actions must be slightly adjusted as we transition our army to the future. We must always remember that technology is a tool, and can never over shadow our basic leadership responsibilities to our soldiers.

LEADERSHIP SKILL SETS FOR THE FUTURE

The new complex and fluid environments along with new technologies requires the U.S. Army to reassess our leadership skill sets. To remain competent we must determine what new

skills will be required for leaders to function in these new complex and ambiguous environments with an overabundance of data and information. To determine these skill sets we must start with the emerging threats we must counter and fight, developing technologies which will change the way we communicate, fight and possibly make decisions, and future organizations which we will fight, i.e. Interim and Objective units. Determining the skill sets is the first step in developing a concept on how to train our leaders to fight on the future battlefields.

The skill set listed below provides a basic overview of skills, which may be required by our leaders both junior and senior to operate within our new organizations and within the foreseeable operational environments:

“NEW SKILL SET:

- Self-awareness
- Adaptability
- Manage change in a ambiguous, non-contiguous battle space
- Mentally agile
- Synthesize information quickly
- Make rapid accurate decisions
- Deal with cognitive complexity
- Take the initiative
- Innovative
- Deal with pressure
- Comfortable in complex environments
- Understand and operate within the Full Spectrum of operations (Stability, Support, Offense, Defense)”¹³

“Today, the Army's challenge is to produce tomorrow's leaders. The digital age demands quick decisions by leaders at the front who can see into the souls of soldiers and inspire them in the face of danger and uncertainty. Some of these traits can, as the Army believes, be learned through self-study, education, training, and experience. Some can only be revealed.”¹⁴

I believe the center of gravity and start point for developing our leaders for the future is to first determine the correct skill sets required. When we have determined the appropriate skill sets, we must then adjust our Officer Education System (OES), specifically our Institutional training bases to support the new skill sets. In addition to the Institutional training base we will need to review and upgrade how we provide the operational experiences to our officers and both a formal and informal self-development program.

UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDY

In order to get a general impression on how former Battalion Commanders and other officers currently attending the United States Army War College (USAWC), view this topic I

conducted a survey. The survey has sixteen questions, and the dependent variable in this case was: Is the United States Army Officer Education System appropriately training junior leaders to lead and fight in the future full spectrum environment.

The population surveyed were strictly U.S. Army Officers who are students in the current USAWC class (Class of 2002). I surveyed Active, Reserve and National Guard Army officers, both male and female, combat arms, combat support, and combat service support branches.

The questionnaire was issued to two hundred and eleven officers and one hundred and four responded. The surveys were issued in hard copy to the officers in their USAWC mailboxes and their responses were received in hard copy in my USAWC mailbox. I developed the questions in a closed ended format within the survey, which required the respondents to select from a list of appropriate responses, (i.e. strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree, or yes / no). I then entered the data into a data analysis program, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This tool allowed me to critically analyze the data and compare and contrast responses from different populations surveyed (i.e. branches, genders, components).

The specific demographics of response populations are as follows:

- Active Duty: 92
- National Guard: 6
- U.S. Army Reserve: 6
- Combat Arms: 39
- Combat Support: 39
- Combat Service Support: 26
- Male: 99
- Female: 5

A chart of the operational model is depicted in figure 1. The intent of this survey was to develop some baseline data in determining whether the U.S. Army is appropriately developing leaders to serve in the future full spectrum environment. If we are appropriately developing and training our officers, then they will have the correct skills to serve and lead in our transformed organization and within the full spectrum of conflict.

Current Officer Education system, (Basic course, Captain's Course, CGSC) supports training and developing the type of leader needed to face the future full spectrum threat environment.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
disagree	26	25.0	25.0
neutral	23	22.1	22.1
agree	52	50.0	50.0
strongly agree	3	2.9	2.9
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 2

Senior leaders need to change the way they mentor based on the culture of junior officers.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	3	2.9	2.9
disagree	25	24.0	24.0
neutral	14	13.5	13.5
agree	41	39.4	39.4
strongly agree	21	20.2	20.2
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 3

We are satisfactorily mentoring our junior officers

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	11	10.6	10.6
disagree	46	44.2	44.2
neutral	23	22.1	22.1
agree	24	23.1	23.1
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 4

The U.S. Army Institutional training bases adequately adjusted their core curriculums to prepare junior leaders to lead in an ambiguous full spectrum threat environment.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	7	6.7	6.7
disagree	39	37.5	37.5
neutral	41	39.4	39.4
agree	16	15.4	15.4
strongly agree	1	1.0	1.0
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 5

Our junior leaders (Lieutenant – Major) have sufficient time in critical troop leading assignments to provide them the experiences needed to serve at the next higher levels of responsibility.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
no	72	69.2	70.6
yes	30	28.8	29.4
Total	102	98.1	100.0
System	2	1.9	
	104	100.0	

TABLE 6

The proposed U.S. Army Basic Officer Leaders course for all branches and genders, will enhance building a common bond between branches and creating a common warrior ethos.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	7	6.7	6.9
disagree	13	12.5	12.7
neutral	19	18.3	18.6
agree	48	46.2	47.1
strongly agree	15	14.4	14.7
Total	102	98.1	100.0
System	2	1.9	
	104	100.0	

TABLE 7

All newly commissioned lieutenants should attend a common Basic Officer Leaders course prior to attendance to their Branch Officer Basic Course.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
no	28	26.9	27.7
yes	73	70.2	72.3
Total	101	97.1	100.0
System	3	2.9	
	104	100.0	

TABLE 8

The length of current U.S. Army Officer education Courses, (Basic, Captain Career, and Combined Arms and Services Staff courses) are too long, thus detract from hands on field experience.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	10	9.6	9.6
disagree	79	76.0	76.0
neutral	6	5.8	5.8
agree	9	8.7	8.7
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 9

The increase in technology at the company and battalion level is enhancing the ability of a junior leader to make quick and accurate decisions.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	2	1.9	1.9
disagree	34	32.7	32.7
neutral	26	25.0	25.0
agree	41	39.4	39.4
strongly agree	1	1.0	1.0
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 10

The current pre-commissioning programs (ROTC, OCS, Military Academy) are providing the pre-requisite level of background and experiences for newly commissioned lieutenants to attend their Basic Courses.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	1	1.0	1.0
disagree	10	9.6	9.8
neutral	20	19.2	19.6
agree	67	64.4	65.7
strongly agree	4	3.8	3.9
Total	102	98.1	100.0
System	2	1.9	
	104	100.0	

TABLE 11

The U.S. Army Captain's Career Course should become a combined arms course where each small group has representation from every combat arms, combat support, and combat service support branch.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	7	6.7	6.7
disagree	54	51.9	51.9
neutral	7	6.7	6.7
agree	29	27.9	27.9
strongly agree	7	6.7	6.7
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 12

Distance Learning is a viable alternative to reduce the amount of time in the residence phases of the Basic Course, Captain's Career Course, or Command and General Staff College.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	29	27.9	27.9
disagree	47	45.2	45.2
neutral	4	3.8	3.8
agree	20	19.2	19.2
strongly agree	4	3.8	3.8
Total	104	100.0	100.0

TABLE 13

The motorized / nonmotorized assignment policy for Infantry Officers (i.e., light to heavy / heavy to light), enhances an Infantry officer's ability to master those junior leader leadership and tactical competencies required to command.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	1	1.0	1.0
disagree	12	11.5	12.1
neutral	46	44.2	46.5
agree	31	29.8	31.3
strongly agree	9	8.7	9.1
Total	99	95.2	100.0
System	5	4.8	
	104	100.0	

TABLE 14

The increase of information technology at the company and battalion level has overburdened commanders.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
strongly disagree	1	1.0	1.0
disagree	38	36.5	36.9
neutral	14	13.5	13.6
agree	44	42.3	42.7
strongly agree	6	5.8	5.8
Total	103	99.0	100.0
System	1	1.0	
	104	100.0	

TABLE 15

Overall the United States Army Officer Education System is appropriately training junior leaders to lead and fight in the future full spectrum environment.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
disagree	35	33.7	34.0
neutral	24	23.1	23.3
agree	44	42.3	42.7
Total	103	99.0	100.0
System	1	1.0	
	104	100.0	

TABLE 16

Due to the population within the gender category and response rate from the National Guard / Reserve being extremely small, the majority of the comparisons made within the study are focused on responses from the branches, combat arms, combat support and combat service support. I have included the gender and component categories within the branches. The comparison within the findings becomes extremely interesting as one analyzes the responses based on branch. It is also worthwhile to mention that this surveyed group only represents a small population of the entire U.S. Army, and does not reflect the opinion of our Army as a whole.

This section of the paper will provide descriptive analysis of key variables selected from the entire set which have the greatest impact on our ability to develop junior leaders. I have organized this portion of the paper into three categories. I will provide feedback and analysis on these questions in relation to our leader development model, using Institutional training, operational experience, and self-development to categorize the responses and analysis.

The first category will cover those variables which directly relate to our U.S. Army's Institutional training base, (i.e. OES), the second category will relate to those variables which affect our operational experiences and the final category will examine those variables which impact on our self-development programs. The primary analysis was conducted by running cross tabulation tables to make the appropriate comparisons based on our variables.

INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING CATEGORY

Question: Overall the United States Army Officer Education System is appropriately training junior leaders to lead and fight in the future full spectrum environment. (See table 16)

- This question directly affects the Institutional training base in relation to our OES.
- The response to this question was forty two percent of those surveyed agreed that the current OES, is appropriately training leaders to fight and lead in the future full spectrum of conflict. Thirty four percent disagree that our OES is appropriately developing our junior officers for the future. Twenty three percent of the population were neutral thus had no opinion.
- Further analysis shows that within the combat arms branch, (CA) Fifteen percent of the population vote that we are not appropriately developing leaders for the future while only twelve percent agree that we are. combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS), percentages both leaned in favor of the current OES training is appropriate.

- The interesting finding in this category is the diversity between the CA and the CS / CSS. The CA population in general does not believe that our current OES is appropriately developing our junior officers within the CA branches to serve and lead in the future full spectrum environments. Further research needs to be conducted in this area to determine if the CS/CSS branches have made significant upgrades to their core curriculums within their OES to support the Interim /Objective forces and the asymmetric and ambiguous environments of the future. But more realistically I would argue that the future operational environments place a greater challenge on the CA branches based on roles and responsibilities, thus the CA branches at this point are more concerned with the development of their junior officers in relation to these future threat environments.

Question: The length of current U.S. Army Officer education Courses, (Basic, Captain Career, and Combined Arms and Services Staff Courses) are too long, thus detract from hands on field experience. (See table 9)

- This question is also focused on the Institutional training base.
- The overall response to this question was eighty-five percent of the population disagree that our OES courses are too long. Only eight percent agreed that our OES courses are too long in length, and approximately six percent were not sure and responded neutrally.
- There is no significant difference between any of the branches on the response variation to this question. All in general are supportive of the current length of OES courses. They are not all in agreement that the core curriculums have been adjusted appropriately but, are not dissatisfied with the amount of time an officer spends away from the operational base to attend training in the institutional training base.

Question: The increase of Information technology at the company and battalion level has overburdened commanders. (See table 10)

- The overall response rate to this question was that forty-eight percent of those officers surveyed agreed that the increased technology at the company and battalion level has overburdened the leadership. Approximately thirty-eight percent disagreed and believe the amount of Information technology at the Company and Battalion level is manageable. Fourteen percent were neutral.

- The most significant finding in this area is the difference of opinion between the CA and CSS branches. The majority of the CA and CS branches responded that technology is overburdening commanders at the company and battalion levels. But the responses from the CSS branches overall indicated that they as a branch disagreed and believe that information and technology are not overburdening commanders at the company and battalion levels. It is inconclusive on why the CSS branch has this perspective, which is much different than the CA and CS branches. Further study in this area would be required but some factors may include the types of civilian degrees the CSS leaders have vice the other branches, training provided in their branch specific OES schools, self-development programs within their branch, or lack of competing demands within their branch at the company and battalion level which lessens the burden on their leaders.

Question: The U.S. Army Institutional training bases adequately adjusted their core curriculums to prepare junior leaders to lead in an ambiguous full spectrum threat environment. (See table 5)

- Overall forty-four percent of the respondents disagreed and feel that our Institutional training bases have not adequately adjusted their core curriculums to fully develop our junior leaders for the future. Oddly enough thirty-nine percent were neutral and chose not to agree or disagree. The concern with those who responded in the neutral category is these leaders are not familiar enough with their branch specific education system to comment on this issue. Finally approximately sixteen percent agreed that the OES has made adjustments to their curriculum.
- The significant findings here again are the disparity between the CA, CS and CSS. Overall the CA branch and the CS branch did not feel that the Institutional training base has made appropriate changes to their core curriculums. Where the CSS branches were more positive in regards to their OES schooling. But across the board, all branches had a spread from eleven to fourteen percent response rate, which was neutral. Again, many of the leaders may not be familiar as they should be with the current lessons and program being used at their respective institutional training bases.

OPERATIONAL CATEGORY

Question: Current U.S. Army PERSCOM assignment policy allows enough time for junior leaders to serve in critical branch qualifying positions. (See table 1)

- Sixty-one percent of the respondents disagreed, and felt that the current PERSCOM assignment policy does not allow enough time for junior leaders to serve in critical developmental positions. Approximately eleven percent were neutral and twenty eight percent agreed that the current assignment policies were adequate in developing our junior leaders.
- The significant finding in this area is that across the board all branches responded in a manner that they were concerned that the current assignment policy did not adequately allow enough time for junior leaders to serve in critical positions which reduced their operational experiences and reduced their ability to develop appropriately.

Question: We are satisfactorily mentoring our junior officers. (See table 4)

- Fifty-five percent of those surveyed believe we are not mentoring our junior officers in a satisfactory manner. Twenty-two percent had no opinion and responded neutrally, and twenty-three percent agreed that we are appropriately mentoring our junior officers.
- Of significance is that across the board regardless of branch the majority of officers surveyed do not feel we are appropriately mentoring our junior officers. The challenge for our Army is "What exactly is mentoring"? There is not a set definition which is common to all leaders.

Question: Junior leaders have sufficient time in critical troop leading assignments to provide them the experience needed at the next higher levels. (See table 6)

- Seventy percent of the officers surveyed do not believe we allow junior officers enough time in critical troop leading assignments to provide them the experiences needed for higher level positions. Approximately thirty percent of those surveyed believe our junior officers are getting appropriate opportunities in critical troop leading positions.
- The CA branch overall was the most affected by this based on their responses. Of the thirty-seven percent surveyed from the CA branch, thirty-percent felt that junior leaders did not receive enough time in those critical positions.

SELF-DEVELOPMENT CATEGORY

Question: Distance Learning is a viable alternative to reduce the amount of time in the residence phases of the Basic Course, Captain's Career Course, or Command and General Staff College. (See table 13)

- Seventy-three percent of those officers surveyed disagreed with this question, in that they did not believe that distance learning is a viable alternative to reduce the amount of time in the resident phase of selected OES courses. Twenty three percent agreed that it was a viable option, and approximately four percent were neutral and had no stated opinion.
- Of significance in this question is distance learning is not a strongly supported concept to reduce the length of selected OES courses by placing the burden back on the individual officer on his own time.

Question: Senior leaders need to change the way they mentor based on culture of junior officers. (See table 8)

- Fifty-nine percent of those surveyed believe that senior leaders need to change their mentoring and coaching skills. Twenty-seven percent of those surveyed disagree and believe that there is no need for senior leaders to change the way they mentor junior officers.
- Overall there is a strong feeling that senior leaders need to make adjustments to the way they mentor junior officers based on cultural and generational differences.

ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS

It is extremely difficult to measure whether we are appropriately developing junior leaders for the future. There is not a specific test that can easily provide us this information. Our ability to successfully develop junior officers covers a myriad of actions but is specifically related to our OES, our operational experiences, and assignments along with self-development programs.

The USAWC survey data provides some interesting insights, which correlated to the Army Training and Leadership Development panel (ATLD) study findings. Specifically, the USAWC survey feedback related that our OES schools have not made the appropriate adjustments to adequately develop junior leaders for the future. There is much concern with the amount of data and information now available at the battalion and company level and the ability for the leaders to synthesize the data and leverage the information to make more rapid and accurate decisions.

Distance learning is not a popular venue based on the responses from the USAWC survey. Finally, senior leaders need to adjust their techniques to mentor junior officers.

It is impossible to state that based on this study our measurement was adequate, to illustrate that there is conclusive results we are not properly training our junior leaders. But it is a start point in determining some of the possible areas to focus on to better develop our leaders for the future.

I believe internal validity was relatively accurate based on the scope of this research, but there are many areas within this data which do not reflect adequately the independent variables affects on the dependent variable. This shows that we lack internal validity within the study. There are many other factors that affect whether or not we are appropriately developing our junior leaders in addition to the variables provided in this study. The surveyed population was also limited to the number of Army officers in the current USAWC class, and the 50% response rate of those surveyed who responded.

There is a challenge with our external validity. The personnel surveyed are all from one installation, (Carlisle Barracks), and are only senior officers, (LTC or COL). The population is relatively restricted and does not appropriately reflect the responses of the U.S. Army as a whole. In addition, the scope of the research is relatively narrow and there are a number of other variables that can be taken into account to examine this hypothesis. The bottom-line is, the research in this study is unrepresentative across the Army. However, this study combined with the ATLD results reinforces the findings.

As I review the USAWC student responses to the survey, I again ask the question, are we appropriately developing our leaders to serve in the future Army organizations and within the future full spectrum of conflict? Using the current Army leader development framework, Institutional training, Operational experiences, and Self-development as a foundation, I believe the initial response is we are not.

ARMY TRAINING LEADER DEVELOPMENT PANEL RESULTS

The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army, (ATLD), was conducted in support of a tasker by the Chief of Staff of the Army. The panel's charter was to assess Army training and leader development doctrine and practices to determine their applicability and suitability for the future.

More than 13,000 officers, soldiers and family members participated in surveys, focus groups and one-on-one interviews for the study. However, the population in the ATLD study was

much different from the population surveyed at the USAWC. The ATLD survey included officers from the rank of general officer to lieutenant.

Findings in the ATLD study reinforce the findings in the USAWC survey. Five points from the ATLD report directly impact and confirm some of the findings and responses from the USAWC survey conducted. They are:

- “The Army is not meeting the expectations of officer cohorts. Junior officers are not receiving adequate leader development experiences.
- Top-down training directives and strategies combined with brief leader development experiences for junior officers leads to a perception that micromanagement is pervasive.
- There is diminishing contact between seniors and subordinates.
- Personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality developmental experiences.
- Officers are concerned that the OES does not provide them the skill sets for success in full spectrum operations.”¹⁵

The critical thread returns to the quality of the current OES, the lack of operational experiences based on our Army assignment policy, and lack of leader development, i.e. coaching and mentoring.

ARE WE APPROPRIATELY DEVELOPING OUR JUNIOR LEADERS FOR THE FUTURE... WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE

“As our Army Transforms to meet emerging security challenges, and we ponder new weaponry, formations, doctrine, and training, it is imperative we also examine our approach to educating our officers, our profession’s change agents.”¹⁶

My initial assessment is our ability to develop our junior officers remains within the Army leader development model and our leadership doctrine in accordance with Field Manual 22-100. Again, I argue that our Army leadership doctrine remains valid. But, what needs to change are the skill sets required of our leaders based on our transformation azimuth, and the full spectrum of conflict we expect our officers to operate in.

As the ATLD panel stated, “Today’s operational environment is not new. It has evolved since 1989 with the fall of the Iron Curtain and breakup of the Warsaw pact. The Army has recognized for a decade the need to change to remain relevant to the strategic environment. Left to its own devices, the Army has been slow to adapt. Today, it continues to fall behind in adapting training and leader development programs. The operational environment has changed faster than the Army has adapted its training and leader development programs. Consequently these programs must change quickly to become relevant. They reflect neither what it takes to

train and grow today's leaders nor the pervasive impact of Army culture on training and leader development."¹⁷

Where do we start to get our leader development back on azimuth with transformation and the future environment. We must go back to our leadership development model and make adjustments based on our leadership doctrine.

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Within the Institutional training base we must start by ensuring we review and update all mandatory and branch specific training and skill sets and ensure they meet the requirements of our new organizations and environments. This must happen for all our OES schools, from Basic courses to Command and General Staff College. We must first focus on developing the skill sets within their branch or functional areas to ensure they have the requisite warfighting skills and knowledge. They first must be experts at the basic warfighting fundamentals and skill sets and then move on to other stages on the band of conflict from peace operations to war. We must develop their ability to think clearly, be self-aware, adaptive, manage change in an ambiguous, non-contiguous battle space, be mentally agile, synthesize information quickly, make rapid accurate decisions, deal with cognitive complexity, take the initiative, be innovative, deal with pressure, be comfortable in complex environments, and understand and operate within the Full Spectrum of Operations (Stability, Support, Offense, Defense).

If we take for example, the captains career course. Once the basic branch specific skill sets are developed, we must then expand on more complex ambiguous scenarios, which place our officers in situations where they must determine how to think and take action across the full spectrum of conflict. We can begin to develop many of these skills through vignettes, classroom simulations, and terrain walks. We need to focus on ensuring students are learning from each other but, we must also ensure we have the appropriate instructors who have the credibility and knowledge to lead them down the correct path. In addition, the vignettes and simulations must be focused on current and future operations that our units will be involved in. These exercises must be time constrained, and involve after action reviews, conducted by both students and instructors. These training events should also utilize all new organizations and equipment types we will find in our Interim and Objective units. The capabilities of these new units are much different and students must understand how to fully employ them throughout the full spectrum of conflict. Within these vignettes and simulations, we must also replicate the informational advantage and challenges this additional asset brings with it. The bottomline is we need to

develop our next generation of officers through actual execution of the task. They need to execute what we expect them to do in the field, in our officer education system.

In addition, we must provide the appropriate resourcing to the Institutional training base in relation to budget and quality personnel to train our future leaders. There are many competing requirements for our best officers, but none more important than to train our leaders for the future. We have done a tremendous job in the past to ensure the best small group instructors are selected to instruct and facilitate our Captains Career Course training, where we have peers training peers for all intensive purposes. But, this concept has been successful based on the quality of small group instructors we have been able to select to support our Captains courses. We must ensure the same quality of officers are instructing at the remainder of our OES courses, especially our Command and General Staff College (CGSC). There is a tremendous demand on former battalion commanders to fill positions in both the Army staff and other joint billets, but there is no better way to improve our quality of education than to infuse these former commanders into our school houses to train our future commanders.

We must also ensure we are introducing our officers to technology at the earliest stages beginning with pre-commissioning programs. First they must understand how to actually operate our future technology but more importantly how to leverage the technology to our advantage, while at the same time not losing control of the close fight at hand and leading and taking care of their soldiers. Along with technology comes the over abundance of information. Our officers must learn how to synthesize information, determine what is important, and make rapid and accurate decisions, again using technology to their advantage.

Adaptive leaders develop through increasingly challenging scenarios (training support packages with a menu of complex vignettes), that the leader presents for analysis and resolution. The Army's commissioning institutions must initiate an adaptive-learning continuum that instills an open-minded approach to a leader's duties. Officers' basic and advanced courses together with Combined Arms Service and Staff School, US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College must provide the necessary follow-on steps to ensure successive approximations of the desired end state, adaptive leaders.¹⁸

Overall we must place an emphasis on resourcing our OES schools with dollars and quality people. We must ensure they have the technology available to give them the first class instruction and development required, along with focusing on how to think and develop their abilities to react to out of the box scenarios which encompass the changing threat environments and new organizations. Our OES system is not the sole answer in appropriately developing our officer corps, but it provides the basic foundation.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES

"Today's young officer is much more likely to be confronted by decisions that may have operational or even strategic consequences than were his Cold War predecessors. Today's missions in places such as Bosnia or Kosovo are more politically and culturally complex than were most Cold War missions."¹⁹

Again Institutional training is the foundation but, there is no substitute for operational experience. It has been confirmed in both the findings within the ATLD study and based on the USAWC survey feedback that our current PERSCOM assignment policy does not provide adequate time for our junior leaders to gain sufficient experience in critical positions. Obviously there are numerous second and third order affects to adjusting our assignment policy, based on DOPMA and current congressional mandates, but for the sake of developing a confident leader who has the experiences and tools, we must revisit our assignment policies in regards to all branches within our Army. Our current assignment policy is a personnel management tool, vice a leader development system.

"Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management focuses on career gates rather than the quality of developmental experiences. Assignment officers make assignments based on quotas to fill spaces rather than leader development."²⁰

We must ensure that lieutenants, captains, and majors, have sufficient time in operational units to ensure they have the required tools and experiences to move on to the next level of responsibility. Our inability to ensure our junior officers receive this development may cost lives of our soldiers at a later date.

For example, our lieutenants should serve not less than four years in their initial assignment. An officer's foundation is built around the experiences and development gained in his initial assignment. Allowing a lieutenant to serve four years in his initial assignment will give him the opportunity to serve in a number of critical developmental positions which will give him the additional confidence, experience and credibility later in his career. Obviously there are a number of second and third order affects to allow lieutenants to serve four years at their initial assignments, i.e. training battalion company executive officer positions, and assignments to Korea. However, the overall advantage of providing officers with this experience is invaluable.

We must also ensure that the culture of our Army remains positive. We must allow young officers the flexibility to make mistakes and grow from these learning experiences. Our failure to allow this type of culture or climate will adversely affect our ability to grow the self-aware, adaptive leader we need to serve in the future organizations and environments. We must stamp out anything that sounds like zero defects and micromanagement. We must develop a culture

where there is trust, loyalty and opportunities to grow professionally for our junior officers. If we fail to do this, we will continue to frustrate and lose faith with our junior officer corps.

Again success in the operational experiences field comes down to developing an assignment policy that truly focuses on developing our officer corps, by providing the opportunities to gain professional experiences through serving in critical troop leading and staff positions, which will professionally broaden our officers. In addition, we must ensure our Army culture remains positive and we are focusing on coaching our young officers. Our assignment policy needs adjustment but our senior leaders must develop a positive command climate for our junior officers. A units command climate can enhance or decrement an officer's ability to develop in our service.

SELF-DEVELOPMENT

Self-development programs remain a challenge based on the current deployment tempo of our Army. However, if we can continue to develop training that is appropriate to be placed on the World Wide Web, or CD based training programs that are self-paced, we can continue to improve our current self-development opportunities for our officers. This type of training can reduce the temporary duty requirements to attend some developmental courses and further stabilize families, which increases quality of life for family members. But, we must be very careful how and which courses we do select to provide instruction in these virtual environments. In my opinion, the quality of training in these virtual environments is far less beneficial to our officers.

Self-development enables officers to gain knowledge not learned from educational and operational experiences. Most officers understand the importance and role of self-development in lifelong learning. However, Army training and leadership doctrine does not adequately address it, the Army leaders do not emphasize its value, and the army does not provide the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of lifelong learning.²¹

Self-development must be more than the old box of books correspondence courses. It has to be appropriate for the topic, self-paced and provide a link to a human being for questions and guidance. But, I argue we must be careful on making these types of courses mandatory. The current operational tempo in units is extremely challenging. The last thing we need to do is place another rock in a junior officers rucksack, which equates to him going home after work and spending hours on the computer working on electronic correspondence courses which are now mandatory, and being called self-development. There are great advantages to placing some training online, CD, or web based, and we must leverage the opportunity and the

technology to better develop our leaders. Nevertheless, we must be cognizant of the other requirements on our junior officers and the benefits of attending resident courses.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Above all else, to develop this type of leader requires commitment on the part of the Army and its leaders. The Army must commit to being a learning organization that institutionalizes the organization's learning philosophy and provides the resources necessary to foster continuous education, training and leader development for soldiers and their leaders. Army leaders must commit themselves to lifelong learning and take personal responsibility for their own self-development. Leaders must continually assess their own knowledge and capabilities and aggressively pursue improvement in areas that are not up to standard. They must also be quick to recognize a change, or an opportunity to create change, in the environment and have the initiative and personal courage to adapt rapidly to it.²²

Our Army is all about people. We have a responsibility to ensure we appropriately develop our officer corps to the most professional extent possible. In doing so we are truly taking care of our soldiers by providing them the best leadership in the world. There is a cost to undertake this development process. Our Army had a tremendous leadership development program which took us through the cold war period. We developed training centers, new state of the art equipment, and took stock in our OES schools. We as an Army now have to transition our development programs from a cold war focus to the new capabilities based force for the future full spectrum environment. It will take personnel resources and in many cases state of the art simulations and equipment to prepare our officers for the future battlefields they will serve on.

In addition, it will require senior leaders within our army to get directly involved in providing the type of positive leadership required to make this transition. There is no substitute for leadership by example. Our junior officers need to see positive role models getting out front and setting the example, in counseling, mentoring and developing a positive command climate for their organization.

Finally we must never lose sight of the basics of leadership. We can have all the technology in the world, but it will take a leader motivating his unit to secure and hold the terrain in every conflict. Fathers and mothers entrust to us their sons and daughters, and our challenge is to bring as many of them back home alive from every conflict. We owe it to every one of them to ensure we appropriately develop our leaders to fight and lead in the future full spectrum environments.

WORD COUNT = 9,121

ENDNOTES

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- ² Army Transformation Brief (Short Version), Soldiers on Point for the Nation, 17 October 2000.
- ³ McCausland, 18
- ⁴ General Shinseki, "Army Transformation" Brief (Short Version), Soldiers on Point for the Nation, 17 October 2000.
- ⁵ General Shinseki, "Future Combat Systems" Army Transformation Brief, 17 October, 2000.
- ⁶ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, FM 22-100 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 1-4.
- ⁷ Ibid., 2-2.
- ⁸ Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge to Far?" Parameters 28 (Spring 1998):3.
- ⁹ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, FM 22-100 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 1-3.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 2-2.
- ¹¹ Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge to Far?" Parameters 28 (Spring 1998):3
- ¹² Ibid., 3.
- ¹³ Humayun S. Khan, "The Armor School is Transforming how we Train our Combat Leaders." Armor, Mar/Apr 2001, 38.
- ¹⁴ James K. Morningstar, "Leadership in the XXI Century—Digital Age." Armor, Sep/Oct 2000, 2.
- ¹⁵ Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study, PG OS-2-3
- ¹⁶ Col Jeffrey D. McCausland, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army", Parameters3 (Autumn 2001):19.
- ¹⁷ Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study PG, 6.
- ¹⁸ COL Kent E. Ervin, "24 Adaptive Leaders and the Interim Brigade Combat Team." Military Review, Sep/Oct 2000, 4.

¹⁹ Col Jeffrey D. McCausland, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army", Parameters 3 (Autumn 2001):23.

²⁰ Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study PG,9.

²¹ Ibid., 18.

²² LTG William M. Steele, LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., "21st Century Leadership," Army, August,2001, 29.

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