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**BRIDGING THE GAPS: POLITICAL-MILITARY COORDINATION AT
THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

Joint Military Operations Paper

By

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of State.

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BRIDGING THE GAPS: POLITICAL-MILITARY COORDINATION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The political influence that the five geographic combatant commanders, the so-called “proconsuls,” wield in the post Cold War era has become a topical issue highlighting the need for better political-military integration at the operational level. Examination of the current doctrine and organization regarding such coordination reveals several significant gaps that, in war and in military operations other than war, impact on both the planning and execution of the “post-hostilities” phase of operations and thus on successful war termination.

Current joint doctrine does advocate close interagency coordination at the operational level, but unlike the sophisticated structure developed to do this on the national/strategic level, the doctrine provides minimal guidance on just *how* the combatant commander can effect this. The division of combat operations into war and MOOTW, moreover, has seen unnecessary duplications and, worse, differences being introduced, obscuring the central State-Defense Department relationship.

There is also no effective standing structure for coordination. The ambassador, the key point of contact for the combatant commander under current doctrine, is not the appropriate counterpart for regional coordination. The operational level at State, where regional policy coordination is done, is at the level of the Assistant Secretaries of the geographic bureaus.

While the combatant commanders are assigned Senior Foreign Service Officers as political advisors (POLADS), the latter’s status as personal staff officers rather than formal State representatives, together with the lack of doctrine regarding their function, leads to an *ad hoc*, informal process of coordination rather than a proper system. Often POLADs may be equated to the operational civil-affairs function rather than the political-military policy one. Structural problems within the State Department further erode the effectiveness of the POLADs.

This paper proposes that POLADS become formal State representatives, reporting to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, a step that will provide a number of advantages to the combatant commanders as well as driving the establishment of concrete procedures regarding political-military coordination. The conclusion presents the choices facing us: either continuing as we are, with what doctrine itself recognizes, but accepts, is a lack of an overarching doctrine or structure to overcome bureaucratic and personal differences, or we go about establishing a real system to effect comprehensive, coordinated political-military policies and objectives.

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“Will you please tell me what in hell the State Department has to do in an active theater of war?” – U.S. Army Major General, North Africa, 1942

“War is a projection of policy when other means fail. The State Department is responsible to the President for foreign policy...The North African theater played an active role in the period prior to the U.S. entry into the war; its political trends were important to our policy makers. The State Department had direct responsibility in the preparatory stage leading to the invasion. It was directly concerned in the political decisions inevitably to be made during the military operations, and it will have to deal with the postwar political effects of this campaign. Furthermore, General Eisenhower needs someone to deal with the French officials and leaders on the civilian level. And that is why I am here.” - U.S. Minister Robert Murphy, Political Advisor to General Eisenhower and State Department representative in the theater.¹

I. INTRODUCTION: The Proconsuls

This is how operational-level political-military coordination was effected in “the big one” and how, this paper will recommend, we should do it again. Although Murphy never refers to Clausewitz, he gave a summary of the latter’s view of the relationship between war and politics. Now that we have the benefit of reading Clausewitz in our senior service institutions, one might surmise that the doctrine and organization for unity of effort between soldiers and diplomats would be solidly established throughout all relevant levels of our national security system.

We have by and large succeeded in achieving this unity at the strategic level, but at the operational one a number of political-military gaps remain. There is a key conceptual gap in how we get from the military objective to the desired political end state, doctrinal gaps regarding how combatant commanders coordinate with the Department of State and what function the Political Advisor serves, and organizational gaps both between the combatant commanders and the State Department and within the State department itself.

The net result, in the current post-Cold War environment, is a policy vacuum that has tended to be filled by the regional combatant commanders, a subject which came to public

attention in September 2000 when Dana Priest wrote a series of articles in the Washington Post describing them as “proconsuls.”² This issue has since become a fashionable topic of discussion. Ambassador David Abshire of the Center for International and Strategic Studies has held a session on it, the Secretary's “Open Forum” at State is in the midst of presenting a four-part discussion series on it,³ and it is often raised in question periods at the war colleges. On 10 May 2000 the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, David Newsom, told the Army War College that:

To integrate force and diplomacy as a new sort of policy tool, the Defense and State Departments will have to break out of old cultural and institutional barriers to an unprecedented extent and find new, creative ways of doing business altogether.⁴

He saw this as extending to State’s interaction with the Pentagon in the formulation of goals and objectives in defense policy and with the CinCs in developing their Theater Engagement Plans. This paper examines a modest measure in this regard that should serve as a catalyst for further development of political-military doctrine and organization.

II. ANALYZING THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GAPS:

Starting with Clausewitz... We all know the core precept of Clausewitz, that war is “not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument.”⁵ If we really believe this, it would necessarily follow that our political and military goals, and our diplomatic and military instruments, ought to be closely interlinked. But do we? Judging from the joint doctrine capstone publications - Joint Publication 1 “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” Joint Publication 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces,” and Joint Publication 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations” - we do not. While there are a few references to Clausewitz therein, and acknowledgement that “war is an instrument of policy”⁶ and that “wars are only

successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure,⁷ there is surprisingly little specific reference made to working with the *principal* foreign policy agency, and the full implications of the connection with war and diplomacy are never fully drawn out.

Whatever may be said in general terms about the political-military link, Americans have traditionally taken a position directly opposed to Clausewitz's basic premise, treating war and diplomacy as two separate activities, conducted by two separate institutions. This still appears to be the "default" setting of both American soldiers and diplomats alike, evident not in theory but in practice. The "single objective" of the military according to JP 1, "winning the nation's wars," illustrates this tendency.⁸ The final phase of war termination, by which one reaches the political objective of the war, is implicitly someone else's business.

Until the First World War, there was no coordination between American diplomats and the military, and what little did occur in 1917-18 was basically forgotten in the inter-war years. By the time the U.S. was involved in the Second World War, President Roosevelt was in effect acting as his own Secretary of State and the State Department *per se* consequently played little role in the theaters of operations.⁹ Roosevelt tended to employ his own political representatives (Murphy had direct access to the White House, bypassing the State Department as necessary), but in general the military supreme commanders took on both political and military mantels.¹⁰ Some officers may have been uneasy at doing both jobs, but this arrangement well fit our traditional sequential separation of war and diplomacy.¹¹ General MacArthur, who put a very tight rein on his own political advisor,¹² exemplified this in telling Congress:

A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands the whole area politically, economically, and militarily. You have got to trust at that state of the game *when politics fails*, and the military *takes over*, you must

trust the military, or otherwise you will have the system that the Soviet once employed of the political commissar, who would run the military as well as the politics of the country.¹³ (Italics mine)

Policy Discipline 1947-1991. Roosevelt's system died with him, and the National Security Act of 1947 formalized the lessons learned during World War II regarding the need to coordinate national security policy at the national/strategic level. To a great extent, however, the operational level continued to conduct its affairs much as it did during the war. The forty-odd years of American Cold War security policy could work with this rather *ad hoc* system at the operational level because the Soviet threat, and our broad and readily understandable policy of containment, imposed a great degree of *de facto* policy discipline. No matter what the issue, all the major operational level players were to make decisions in the context of the overarching Cold War confrontation.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this discipline lapsed into history, rendering the *ad hoc* nature of regional political-military coordination increasingly apparent. This is particularly troubling given that, in virtually all foreseeable future operations, the United States will have limited objectives rather than seek the complete overthrow of our opponents. The use of force will thus take on an increasingly "political" cast. This would not bother Clausewitz, who would say that it simply reflects a different part on the continuum of politics, but it plays havoc with the traditional American separation of military activities and diplomacy. The upshot is that the military tends to be concerned about what it deems to be political interference in its operations, while the diplomats see the military as increasingly taking on policy roles, or at least acting independently in areas that inevitably have foreign policy implications.

The Problem of War Termination. If the strategic military objective is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and the occupation of his country, achieving it will enable us to impose whatever political terms we wish. In any other case, the achievement of the military objective would be a *sine qua non* for reaching our desired political end state but will not in itself get us there directly. The "post-hostilities" phase of our strategy – which should be an integral part of our strategy at its inception – is then equally as critical for our ultimate success. Moreover, *how* we achieve the military objective will obviously affect this "post-hostilities" phase. As doctrine cautions, "the outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis."¹⁴ It should also not conflict with our political objectives in other areas of the globe. To avoid "unintended consequences," both regionally and globally, we need close and continuous political-military coordination in both the planning *and* execution of combat operations

A Single Continuum? The way we currently divide doctrine, however, tends to produce unnecessary duplication or, worse, differentiation, allowing the military and policymakers alike to revert to thinking in the traditional compartmented terms. Doctrine does note in passing the "singularly important threshold" of the use, or threat of use, of military force, a threshold that "is the distinction between combat and non-combat operations."¹⁵ The *governing* doctrinal threshold, however, is now placed between "war" and "military operations other than war" (MOOTW), unfortunately and illogically dividing combat operations – "war" in Clausewitzian terms -- into two separate bits. MOOTW doctrine then combines one of these bits with non-combat operations, further adding to the confusion.¹⁶ This would be little more than a semantic curiosity except that an entire body of *separate* doctrine, providing even different principles of

war, has been written for MOOTW.¹⁷ MOOTW doctrine emphasizes in particular the necessity for interagency coordination, but in doing so leaves the implication that such is not equally the case during "war" itself. As another example, doctrine emphasizes that, in MOOTW, "planning for post-conflict operations should begin as early as possible, and preferably before the conflict begins."¹⁸ Why should this be different than "war" is not addressed. One can only surmise that, for a real "war," the military remains in the frame of mind of the anonymous major general quoted at the start of this paper.

When doctrine does speak about coordination, it refers to an all-inclusive "interagency" process covering *all* branches of the government *and* NGOs, thereby obscuring the *key* political-military link between State and Defense. Moreover, the traditional separation of war and diplomacy still occasionally tends to rear its head. Doctrine, for example, states that a military commander may in the post-hostilities phase hand over responsibilities to another US Government agency, but without specific mention of how this is to be planned for, coordinated, and effected. The bias is also evident in the 1995 Joint Publication 1, which says that Operation DESERT STORM was "a triumph of the joint operational art."¹⁹ This is certainly true but, ten years on, as we still struggle with the political problems remaining from how we conducted the post-hostilities phase, a little less hubris might be in order. The war and diplomacy link was never fully made in the Gulf and, with USAF aircraft still flying combat patrols, we have arguably yet to see successful war termination there. Much the same can be said for other post-Cold War operations, be they in Haiti or the Balkans. In the current, perhaps less threatening but certainly more complex international environment, we must do better.

Our Focus on Political-Military Coordination at the Strategic Level... Since 1947 we have steadily developed a sophisticated system of strategic political-military coordination.

The key link between State and Defense was recognized when their respective Secretaries were included in the NSC as the only two statutory Cabinet officials. This link is replicated in the senior sub-Cabinet national security forum, the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor and including inter alia the Deputy Secretary of State, either the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Vice Chief of the JCS. Day-to-day management of these issues is effected by the new Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) and, significantly, the six regional PCCs are chaired by either an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary of State.²⁰ The leading position of State in developing regional national security policy is thus formally recognized, though flesh must be put on this bone.²¹

...Is Not Reflected at the Operational Level. Political objectives are turned into military ones at the operational level: “JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. They translate political aims into strategy and operational design.”²² In the commander’s estimate process, the start of this process, the mission analysis doctrinally includes long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. While stating that military commanders are “rarely concerned with only” military end state conditions and “may be required to support the other instruments of national power,”²³ however, it implies that they do not necessarily have ultimate responsibility for realizing the political aim. Under “termination,” doctrine notes that “during the post-hostilities and

redeployment phase, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces.’²⁴

Though every situation is unique, it is still striking that virtually nothing is said about who these “other authorities” may be, nor when and how the planning for such a transfer of control should take place. We posit here that the “post-hostilities” phase can only be successful if there is effective coordination both in the initial planning and in handling of the day-to-day adjustments caused by the interplay of both sides in the fog and friction of using military force. Examples abound: NATO planners were likely not considering China in developing their operational plans, but a few bombs on the Chinese embassy caused significant problems for all. A junior officer’s quick decision about what to do with his damaged EP-3 drove the national/regional agenda for weeks.

The author submits that coordination in planning and execution must be effected by both military commanders and diplomats at the operational level as well as the strategic level. There is no real structure for this at present, causing a gap identified by, among others, the Hart-Rudman Commission.²⁵ This structural gap leaves the operational level commander bereft of *authoritative* political advice, the diplomat with little input on how the military actions contribute to the overall political objective, and both without an effective means of achieving all the doctrinal admonitions regarding coordination. Both then gladly revert to their traditional attitudes, do their own work without interference, and proceed to win the war but not the peace.

Is Political-Military Coordination at the Operational Level Really Desired? JP-1

recognizes that “the combatant commands play key roles in cooperation with other Federal and

Defense agencies within their theaters,” asserting that this is why the term “unified operations” is a useful description for their broad, continuing activities.²⁶ It acknowledges, moreover, that “use of American military power directly or indirectly affects other combatant commands and Federal agencies”²⁷ and thus the role of the combatant commanders “requires acute political sensitivity.”²⁸

Despite all the admonitions contained in doctrine, and an entire joint publication being devoted to interagency coordination,²⁹ the virtual silence as to *how* this is to be done in the political-military area, as well as the lack of an adequate structure to do so, largely undercuts the exhortations. The military thus often develops plans independently of other government agencies.³⁰ President Clinton attempted to improve the situation with PDD/NSC 56 of May 1997. This PDD recognizes the need to “facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level,” but contains no concrete measures to do so. Moreover, the measures therein apply *only* to specific “complex contingency operations.” The latter in effect are defined as “peace operations” and are *not* those involving “international armed conflict.”³¹ A 1999 study by the consulting firm A.B. Technologies assessing progress in implementing this PDD, moreover, criticized the slack implementation of this PDD.³² Ambassador David Litt, POLAD to SOCOM, in a Secretary’s Open Forum speech on 15 June 2000, also noted slow progress and expressed other State Department concerns:

PDD 56 provided a mechanism, a framework for the interagency community to manage complex emergencies...but the learning curve is steep, and the results have been less than optimal. In PDD 56, the State Department role especially is troubling. State is on the verge of assuming a merely subordinate role in complex contingency operations. During the last decade or so we have developed into more of a tactical partner than a leader or strategic player in times of crisis. This despite the incontestable fact that State and the Foreign

Service are the prime repositories of foreign affairs experience and institutional expertise for the U.S. government.³³

PDD 56 also poses problems in that it follows the war/MOOTW divide. Why it is limited to one side of this divide is unfathomable, particularly for those who accept Clausewitz's dictum that a limited war only "appears" more political, and has essentially the same nature.³⁴ Why one would need two different sets of doctrine and procedures for the use of force in war and MOOTW is something that would thoroughly confound him.

If So, With Whom does the Combatant Commander Work, and How? JP 3-0

acknowledges the necessity for operational political-military coordination:

In war and operations other than war, combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.³⁵

As a whole, doctrine nevertheless gives little indication of just *how* the military commanders are to "*work*" with the Department of State. Doctrine notes that "at the operational level "there is seldom a counterpart to the geographic combatant commander,"³⁶ This may be the reason that the emphasis is on going up the chain of command: "Mission planning conducted by the geographic combatant commander should be coordinated with the Department of State, *through* the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."³⁷ (Italics mine)

Doctrine also says "implementing military commanders need to understand the overall political aim and military objectives for termination and should request clarification from higher headquarters in the absence of the political authorities."³⁸ One could ask why *should* there be such an absence?

In other places a counterpart *is* assumed. When the President designates a Special Envoy, there is no doubt as to who the appropriate civilian interlocutor should be. To effect overall coordination, combatant commanders are advised that “establishment of a *temporary* framework for interagency cooperation is appropriate and is an effective precondition to effective coordinated operations.”³⁹ (Italics mine) The implication is that *standing* interagency coordination is not necessary. Elsewhere, an “Executive Steering Group” (ESG) of “principals from the JTF, the embassy, NGO and PVO communities... and other agencies as appropriate” is recommended for policy coordination.⁴⁰

The Limitations of Ambassadors. Apart from Special Representatives/Envoys, all doctrine points to the combatant commanders coordinating with Ambassadors, who function “at both the operational and tactical levels.”⁴¹ This is reflected in JP 3-08’s “Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations – Foreign Operations,”⁴² where the combatant commander/JTF commander is shown as equating to the Ambassador, who in turn reports to the Secretary of State. Relying on the Ambassador as the sole linkage is a flawed concept, however, and contributes to the gap identified in the Hart-Rudman report. While the US maintains embassies in some 150 odd countries, and ambassadors are the definitive source of policy guidance for operations within their host countries, designating ambassadors as the appropriate interlocutors for the military commanders *does not*:

A) *Reflect the State Department Organization.* The operational level of the Department of State, where the *regional* coordination similar to that for which the five combatant commanders are responsible is effected, is that of the seven regional Assistant Secretaries of State in Washington, *not* the ambassadors. While the latter are personal representatives of the

President, they are by the nature of their responsibilities focused on the bilateral relations between the United States and their host countries and on the multilateral relations the host countries maintain with international organizations. Ambassadors *are not* in a position to evaluate and recommend security policies on a regional basis. The regional Assistant Secretaries, under the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P), are the ones who must balance our equities across a particular region while the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, balances these globally.

B) *Provide for situations where there is no mission in place.* Even were ambassadors the appropriate interlocutors, one *cannot* assume that there will always be one about. During Desert Storm, for example, CENTCOM had no US Ambassador in Iraq or in Kuwait. The Ambassador to Saudi Arabia clearly was not competent to speak for US interests in other countries. Was there then anyone to turn to? Clearly, policy guidance on political objectives in the Middle East/Gulf areas would have been a function of the Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, who now chairs the NSC/PCC for that region.

The Structural State-Defense Gap at the Operational Level. There is, however, no formal linkage between combatant commanders and their counterpart regional Assistant Secretaries of State in Washington. Moreover, as Defense divides the world among five combatant commanders plus the JCS, the NSC does so among six geographic PCCs, and State does so among seven geographic bureaus, a one-on-one correlation is not possible.

If doctrine were to dictate coordination between the operational levels at State and Defense, what structure would be needed to do it? In 1942 we had Robert Murphy, the prototype political advisor, or POLAD, and one could posit that the POLAD would be the

appropriate person to effect this. From 1942 to 1952, POLADS were nearly co-equals with their military counterparts and their directives emphasized their political rather than advisory role.⁴³ Substantial changes came about, however, with the establishment of our modern POLAD system in 1952.⁴⁴ Current POLADS are *not* formal representatives of the State Department, but rather personal staff officers of the military commanders. This may reduce the possibility of friction between agencies, but it does so by putting the latter in very ambiguous positions. Doctrine is virtually silent on how POLADS are to be used. In a review of all a combatant commander's personal staff officers, for example, *only* the POLAD has no description of duties.⁴⁵ Doctrine's only reference to the POLAD says:

In order to effectively bring all elements of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, combatant commanders are augmented with representatives from other agencies...Frequently, geographic combatant commands are assigned a Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) or Political Advisor (POLAD) by the Department of State. This person provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkage with embassies in the AOR and with the Department of State. The FPA and/or POLAD supplies information regarding policy goals and objectives of the Department of State that are relevant to the geographic combatant commander's strategy.⁴⁶

Given their lack of official State status, POLADs tend work in very idiosyncratic ways, being very dependent upon the interests of the military commanders, the confidence and cooperative spirit which they can develop with the military,⁴⁷ and the personal contacts and personalities in the State structure to do their job. One former CENTCOM POLAD said that a POLAD "basically carves out his own role," which he can do once his military colleagues accept him as not being the "State Department mole."⁴⁸ This is not to deny the effectiveness of many individual POLADs, but it is hardly a system.

Political-Military versus Civil-Military Affairs. A further pitfall having a CinC define his POLAD's duties lies in the confusion between political-military and civil-military affairs. Civil Affairs (CA) doctrinally "facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives,"⁴⁹ i.e., to assist the commander to do what he is doing more effectively, while one could define political-military affairs as policy advice or guidance telling him whether what he is doing is what he ought to be doing. Murphy fulfilled both functions, being both Eisenhower's POLAD and head of his CA organization.⁵⁰ Current POLADs, however, are often in danger of being equated *purely* with the CA function. General Zinni, for example, endorsed the creation of an ESG with the ambassador but also considered creating a CENTCOM political committee/Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) under the POLAD.⁵¹ Other officers writing about this have made similar suggestions.⁵² This narrowing of responsibilities further undermines a POLAD's status.

The Structural Gap within the State Department. The organizational position of the POLADS also reflects an internal State Department separation of war and diplomacy much akin to State/DoD split. While the lead for political coordination at State is the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (P), POLADS are administered by the Bureau of Political Military Affairs. At its inception in 1961, the Office of Political-Military Affairs was run by a deputy assistant secretary reporting to the equivalent of P,⁵³ but in the bureaucratic expansion of the State Department the office has since become a bureau under the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (T). The Bureau thus has a totally separate management chain, one that first meets that of P at the Deputy Secretary of State level, i.e., that of the NSC/DC. This may work well for coordination within the Beltway, but at present renders

the relatively thin reed of informal links and personality even more important for operational coordination.

III. BRIDGING THE GAPS: POLADs as Formal State Representatives

The military drives changes with doctrine, and so we have to look at developing true interagency doctrine. This indeed is the sort of thing that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs should be well equipped for on State's part but, because of the inevitable give and take, the doctrine would have to be developed under the auspices of the NSC.

The State Department, in contrast, tends to eschew doctrine, but small changes in its organization can have significant effects.⁵⁴ One modest step the author proposes here would be to change the political-military link at the five combatant commands to function similarly to that of the military-political link on arms control negotiating delegations. Because of the obvious interest of the military in the latter, arms control delegations include not only OSD representatives but also personal representatives of the CJCS. State equally has a political interest in military operations, and should have formal representatives – the POLADs --at the five regional combatant commands, with the primary responsibility of coordinating *regional policy*. This will leave ambassadors to coordinate policies *within* their respective host countries.

The military is likely to be wary of this, seeing it as the introduction of a State “mole.” A former POLAD to the commander of NATO IFOR noted some resistance to establishing a POLAD in Bosnia because of the fear that, without the right terms of reference, it could create opportunities for the NAC “to become involved in day-to-day operational decisions, thus undermining the authority of the commander.”⁵⁵ While this may be true, our contention here is

that it at times may be necessary. In stressing the “political nature of peacekeeping operations,” the POLAD asserted that his function has grown in importance “in a political-military environment where tactical decisions influence policy, and where political decisions directly influence operational matters.”⁵⁶ As noted repeatedly, this will hold true for *virtually any* military operations we conduct in the future.

The presence of an *authoritative* source of policy guidance should accordingly have several advantages for military commanders that outweigh any perceived disadvantages of having to cope with an independent agency. The new POLADs, just as the current ones, are likely to be more understanding of the military commanders’ situations and intent and thus be more an advocate than adversary. They would simplify the myriad points of contact with whom the commanders now have to deal and, given the military commander’s chronic problem of vague political objectives, they would provide the military commander with a direct, effective, and at hand means for pressing for clarification and exemplification. The advantages also ought to be clear for State.

Nuts and Bolts. Short of the NSC, State, and Defense agreeing to divide the world along similar lines (desirable but unlikely), the lack of a one-on-one correlation between combatant commanders and their state counterparts can be resolved by having the five regional POLADS come under the policy direction, and report to, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (P). This would accord them considerable status, enabling them to work effectively with State’s various regional bureaus. To avoid an administrative overload on P and use the expertise and contacts already existing in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), the POLADs, reinforced as necessary to support their expanded responsibilities, would remain under PM’s

wing. The military would readily understand this as the relationship between a supported Undersecretary (P) and a supporting Undersecretary (T), though State would likely take some time to adjust to it.⁵⁷

By writing the doctrine to specifically cover the operational political-military linkage between State and Defense and effecting this reordering of relationships, the national security structure would at minimal cost create a catalyst for resolving the political-military issues noted above. The fact that both primary Cabinet Departments will have definite coordination responsibilities on the operational level will create a synergy that will in turn drive the institutionalization of coordinating mechanisms and procedures to ensure effective war termination at the operational level.

IV. CONCLUSION: Muddling Through According to Doctrine, or...

We can go forward in either of two ways: muddling through and accepting that:

...there is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations. Nor is there an overseeing organization to ensure that the myriad agencies, departments, and organizations have the capability and tools to work together...Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations.⁵⁸

or we can develop the requisite overarching interagency doctrine and create adequate structures and procedures covering at least the two *principal* Cabinet agencies involved in national security policy. Unity of effort at the operational, just as at the strategic level, can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency coordination and cooperation intended to overcome bureaucratic and personal limitations, all to win our country's wars politically as well as militarily.

NOTES

1. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday 1964), 156
2. Dana Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy?,” Washington Post, 28 September 2000, A01; “An Engagement in 10 Time Zones,” Washington Post, 29 September 2000, A01; and “Standing Up to State and Congress,” Washington Post, 30 September 2000, A01.
3. Department of State, Department Notice, 13 April 2001, Secretary’s Open Forum of 1 May 2001: “A Conversation on Civil-Military Affairs and U.S. Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of the Regional Commanders-In-Chief,” by Dr. William J. Perry and Ms. Dana Priest; and Department Notice, 12 March 2001, Secretary’s Open Forum of 23 March 2001: “A Conversation on Civil-Military Affairs and U.S. Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of the Regional Commanders-In-Chief,” by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and Ms. Dana Priest.
4. Eric D. Newsom, “Remarks to the Army War College,” 10 May 2000, 2.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989), Book One, Chapter One, Section 24, “War is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means,” 87.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0, Washington, DC: 1 February 1995, Chapter I, Paragraph 7, “The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination,” I-9
7. Ibid, Chapter III, Paragraph 5.n. “Operational Art,” III-23.
8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1, Washington, DC: 10 January 1995, Chapter 1, “Purpose of our Service,” I-1.
9. Jon Lippett Boyes, “The Political Advisor: A New Institutional Concept in American Political-Military Organization,” unpublished MA Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1963, 24-5
10. See Barry K. Simmons, “Executing U.S. Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept,” The Air Force Law Review, Vol 37, 1994, 122-23.
11. Boyes, 26
12. Ibid., 63

13. Allen Guttman, ed, Korea: Cold War and Limited War, 2nd Ed. (D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), 38.
14. JP 3-0, Chapter III, Paragraph 5.i., “Arranging Operations,” III-19
15. Ibid., Chapter I, Paragraph 3.b., “Range of Military Operations,” I-3
16. Ibid., Chapter I, Paragraph III, “Range of Military Operations,” I-2 and I-3, and Chapter V, “Military Operations Other Than War,” V-1 through V-13.
17. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Publication 3-07, Washington, DC: 16 June 1995
18. Ibid., Chapter V, Paragraph 4.f, “Postconflict Operations,” V-5
19. JP 1, Appendix A, “Afterward,” A-3.
20. Naval War College, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” NWC 3089, Newport, RI: March 2001, 1-3.
21. Frank Carlucci, the head of a recent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations/Center for Strategic and International Studies working on State Department reform, has said, “the Secretary of State’s role as the president’s principal advisor and spokesman on foreign affairs, and the leading role of the department in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy, should be reasserted.” See Frank Carlucci, “What State Needs: Resources for Reform,” Foreign Service Journal (May 2001) 19.
22. JP 3-0, Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” Paragraph 5.n, “Termination,” p. III-23.
23. Ibid., Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” Paragraph 3, “Combatant Command Strategic Planning,” III-2.
24. Ibid, Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” Paragraph 5.i., “Arranging Operations,” III-19.
25. The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Strategy: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, 15 February 2001, 62
26. JP 1, Chapter III, “National Level Considerations,” III-12.
27. Ibid., Chapter III, “The Principles of War and Their Application,” III-1.

28. Ibid., Chapter III, “Multinational Endeavors,” III-13.
29. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-08, Vols I and II, Washington, DC: 9 October 1996.
30. Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, “Complex Emergencies: Under New Management,” Parameters (Winter 1998), 39. This was clearly the case in Panama, as seen in Richard H. Schultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press 1993), 15-24.
31. Naval War College, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive- 56, NWC 3072, Newport, RI: May 1997. The division between “simple” and “complex” operations is given in The White House, Press Release “President Clinton Signs PDD Establishing “U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” 6 May 1994.
32. Rowan Scarborough, “Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions,” The Washington Times, 6 December 1999, Final Edition, Part A, 1
33. Ambassador David Litt, POLAD, SOCOM, Secretary’s Open Forum 15 June 2000, “Preparing for the Crisis After Next: Future Visioning in the State Department, the Interagency Process, and the Military,” 3.
34. Clausewitz, Book One, Chapter One, Section 25, “The Diverse Nature of War,” 87-88.
35. JP 3-0, Chapter I, Para 3.c. “Range of Military Operations,” I-4.
36. JP 3-08, Chapter I, Paragraph 5, “Interagency Operations at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels,” I-5.
37. Ibid., Chapter 2, Paragraph 7d, “Interagency Cooperation: Foreign Operations,” II-14.
38. JP 3-0, Chapter I, Paragraph 7.b., “The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination,” I-10.
39. JP 3-08, Chapter III, “Organizing for Successful Interagency Operations,” Paragraph 4, “Interagency Crisis Response at the Operational Level: Foreign Operations,” III-6.
40. Ibid, Chapter III, Paragraph 8.a., “Organizational Tools for the JTF,” III-15.
41. JP-08, Chapter II, Paragraph 8a, “Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries,” II-15.

42. Ibid., Chapter III, Figure III-2, “Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Foreign Operations,” III-7.
43. Boyes, 86 and 88.
44. Robinson, 31 and 35.
45. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Publication 5-00.2, Washington, DC: 13 January 1999, Chapter 2, Paragraph 7, “Personal Staff of the Commander,” II-13 through II-21.
46. JP-08, Chapter 2, Paragraph 8.g., “Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries,” II-17.
47. Boyes, 71.
48. Author’s conversation with former CENTCOM POLAD at the Naval War College, 25 April 2001.
49. JP-08, “Part II – Terms and Definitions,” GL-4.
50. Murphy, 144.
51. GEN A.C. Zinni, as quoted in Edward A. Swindle, “The U.S. Military, NGOs and CMOC: Staying Connected and Achieving Unity of Effort During MOOTW,” (Unpublished Research Paper, US Naval War College, Newport, RI: 5 Feb 1999), 1, and Author’s conversation with General Zinni at the Naval War College, 31 January 2001.
52. K.E. Bruno, “The Regional Civil-Military Operations Center: A Force Multiplier in Military Operations Other Than War,” (Unpublished Research Paper, US Naval War College, Newport, RI: 5 Feb 1999), 14.
53. William B. Robinson, Programs for Improved Politico-Military Capabilities in the Department of State, (Unpublished Manuscript, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, May 1965), 20 and Boyes, 31.
54. John T. Fischel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 31 August 1992, 9.
55. David A. Lange, “The Role of the Political Advisor in Peacekeeping Operations,” Parameters (Spring 1999), 93.

56. Ibid., 94.
57. At least one Senior Foreign Service Officer writing on this issue has indeed posited the Undersecretary for Political Affairs having all coordination responsibility with DoD. See David D. Newsom, “Why State Doesn’t Need These Reforms,” Foreign Service Journal (May 2001), 28.
58. JP 3-08, Chapter 1, Paragraph 4, “Systematic Integration of Procedures for Effective Cooperation,” I-5.

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