



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**GAINING IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM
FOR ARMY TRANSFORMATION**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Gaining Irreversible Momentum for Army Transformation

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ABSTRACT

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The Army's Final Draft Transformation Campaign Plan, dated 15 November 2000 defines the conditions of irreversible momentum as "a rate and scope of change that can survive individual decision makers and singular, discrete decisions". The Army's plan continues that such transformation must rest on perceptions and therefore must depend upon strategic communications efforts. Using this definition, transformation can achieve irreversible momentum only when the Total Army (active, reserve, and civilian), the other services, the administration, the Congress, and the American public become convinced of its need, suitability, and feasibility. It is the purpose of this paper to determine the critical elements of irreversible momentum, to propose some recommendations for the Army to achieve it, and to become an intrinsic way of thinking about and solving problems arising from transformation. The paper consists of three sections. The first introduces the reader to current thoughts on managing and succeeding in transformation and offers a template for gaining irreversible momentum. This section concludes by comparing this template to historical examples of military transformation. The second section reviews the current status of the Army's transformation plan to the proposed template. The last section offers recommendations to assist in achieving irreversible momentum.

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PREFACE

Thanks to Kim, Anthony, Nicholas, Alyssa, and John who sacrificed some of the "Best Year" of our life together for me to complete this project. Many were the evenings and weekends that I spent away from you to complete this. Your patience and understanding speak volumes about your love for me. Also, I owe a special thanks to Dr Bob Murphy for his professional and insightful assistance in the development and completion of this project.

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FIGURE 1-1. CHANGE MANAGEMENT MODEL 5

INTRODUCTION

We are on track ... we understood that the first year was about building momentum for transformation and then looking for opportunities to keep building it. General Shinseki, Oct 2000.¹

In October of 2000 General Erik Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army began his second year of transforming the United States Army. His remarks in an interview with *Armed Forces Journal International* suggest that the Army had achieved success in its first year of transformation. Nevertheless, the second part of the Chief's comments imply a sense of uncertainty as to whether the future will also yield similar successes for the Army's transformation plan. General Shinseki has identified the criticality of building momentum. And, given the political dynamics of a new administration and Congress; a less robust U.S. economy; and barely more than two years remaining in his tour as Chief of Staff, gaining irreversible momentum is indeed a daunting challenge.

The difficulties involved in implementing change are not new. As Machiavelli wrote in his book The Prince, "It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things."² Change and the how to manage change has confronted men since the beginning of time. In fact, according to Dr. David Jablonski of the Army War College, the continuity of change is a constant.³ The catalysts for military transformation generally fall into three sources. These are the emergence of new capabilities that can provide the current forces significant improvements or cause them to become obsolete, irrelevant, or at great risk; loss in a war; and political pressures that may require a new mission capabilities.⁴ Unfortunately America's and specifically the Army's track record of managing change has not been all that good. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, edition America's First Battles: 1776-1965, have evocatively described the Army's inability to adapt in response to the changing world environment. That failure had its effect on the Army's preparedness to fight and often resulted in tactical and operational losses.

The Army's current transformation effort aims to break the paradigm of its past failures. The Chief of Staff's intent is to initiate and manage change so that it occurs in the manner in which the Army prescribes instead of being compelled to act in a certain way due to lack of time or money.

The Army's Final Draft Transformation Campaign Plan, dated 15 November 2000 defines the conditions of irreversible momentum as "a rate and scope of change that can survive individual decision makers and singular, discrete decisions". The Army's plan continues that such transformation must rest on perceptions and therefore must depend upon strategic communications efforts. Using this definition, transformation can achieve irreversible momentum only when the Total Army (active, reserve, and civilian), the other services, the administration, the Congress, and the American public become convinced of its need, suitability, and feasibility. It is the purpose of this paper to determine the critical elements of irreversible momentum, to propose some recommendations for the Army to achieve it, and to become an intrinsic way of thinking about and solving problems arising from transformation. The paper consists of three sections. The first introduces the reader to current thoughts on managing and succeeding in transformation and offers a template for gaining irreversible momentum. This section concludes by comparing this template to historical examples of military transformation. The second section reviews the current status of the Army's transformation plan to the proposed template. The last section offers recommendations to assist in achieving irreversible momentum.

THEORIES ON TRANSFORMATION

ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES.

Influenced by the increase in foreign competition and emergence of information technology in the late 1970s and 1980s, the business world began to regain their competitive advantage.⁵ A multitude of theories, strategies, and techniques of management emerged throughout this period. All these theories sought to describe the appropriate steps necessary to renew the basic business organization. These organizational theories are relevant to military institutions because they are based upon the human and institutional dynamics associated with resistance, control, and power present during periods of change or transformation as well as other types of institutions. The following theorists are those most applicable to the military.

Kotter. In his book Leading Change, John P. Kotter, a Professor of Leadership at the Harvard Business School, has identified eight steps required to transform an organization. The first is establishing a sense of urgency. Kotter contends that failure to instill a sense of urgency is the biggest mistake leaders make when trying to transform an organization. Establishing a sense of urgency and eliminating complacency are crucial to gaining the cooperation needed to drive the transformation process.⁶ The second step is forming a powerful guiding coalition. Transformation requires a powerful force to sustain the process. No individual, regardless of formal or informal power or weak committees, can lead or manage transformation. The magnitude of the task requires a coalition composed of the right people, enjoys a great deal of trust, and shares a common objective.⁷ The third step is creating a vision. A vision performs three tasks: it provides general direction and therefore simplifies the number of decisions a business needs to make; it motivates people; and it coordinates actions.⁸ The fourth step is communicating the vision. Communications are essential to ensuring that people within the organization have a common understanding and shared sense of commitment to the future.⁹ The fifth step is empowering others to act on the vision. Effectively empowering subordinates consists of four actions: 1) remove structural barriers; 2) provide needed training; 3) align organizational systems to the vision; and 4) deal with troublesome supervisors.¹⁰ The sixth step required to transform an organization is planning for and creating short-term successes. Short-term successes provide credibility to the transformation effort and help sustain it over the duration of the process. The seventh step to successful transformation is consolidating improvements and producing still more change. Organizations must use the credibility afforded

by short-term victories to tackle bigger problems within the transformation plan.¹¹ The last step is institutionalizing new approaches. In this step, leaders need to anchor change within the organization's culture to ensure long-term success of the transformation effort.¹²

Kotter concludes that there are two fundamental lessons on change. The first is that as change involves numerous, inter-related phases that take a long time, skipping steps or performing steps out of sequence "creates only an illusion of speed and never produces a satisfying result."¹³ The second lesson is that a critical mistake in any phase can have a devastating impact on transformation by slowing momentum or negating hard won gains.¹⁴

Miles. Robert Miles is an academician and professional consultant on change and transformation. In his 1997 book, Leading Corporate Transformation, he defines the fundamental attributes associated with successful transformation as: 1) the ability to thrive on energy with direction; 2) a total system perspective; 3) a comprehensive implementation plan; 4) a demanding transformational leader. He continues by describing the leadership tasks that support these attributes: The first is generating energy for transformation.¹⁵ The second leadership task is developing a vision of the future. According to Miles, a vision should 1) identify a purpose and mission for the organization; 2) create an emotional view for the future organizational state; 3) and provide direction to get to the vision state.¹⁶ The third task is aligning the organization and culture. The leadership must deliberately orchestrate all of the elements of the organization's total system – strategy, structure, infrastructure, people, culture, and core competencies – to maintain dynamic alignment and facilitate human development and organizational learning that allow forward movement without excessive risk.¹⁷ The last leadership task is creating transformation process architecture. The transformation architecture enables the transformation leader to orchestrate the transformation process.¹⁸ Like Kotter, Miles claims that failure in any one of these transformation leadership tasks will result in a failure to transform the organization.¹⁹

Morris and Raben. Kathleen Morris and Charles Raben, professional change management consultants, offer a model for change management based upon ten years of experience. Their model is broken down into three related areas. The first is the problems encountered within transformation – resistance, control, and power. The next area is the implications of these problems on the transformation effort – need to motivate change, need to

manage the transition, and the need to shape the political dynamics of change. The last area consists of the action steps needed to overcome these problems. The following diagram illustrates this model²⁰:




FIGURE 1-1 -- Change Management Model

While the fundamentals of these theories do apply to the military institution, there are two differences between the military and other institutions that these theories do not address. The first is what Michael Howard defined as the tension between the military's disciplined adherence to authority required for reliable battlefield performance and the questioning attitude of the skeptic that is required for successful adaptation.²¹ Because this tension does not exist to the same degree within other institutions, creativity is more apt to be present in other types of organizations. Williamson Murray contends that the acceptance and the rewarding of imagination and creativity are central to the success of an innovation.²² Murray states, "One of the most important components of successful innovation during the interwar period had to do with the ability of officers to use their imaginations in examining potential innovations."²³ The second difference is the ability to measure the results of the transformation effort. The business world is able to measure the results from their transformation efforts consistently and relatively

rapidly. Their metric can be productivity, quality, sales, profit margin, or the value of the stock. Furthermore, this feedback may appear relatively quickly -- sometimes within days or weeks. Conversely, the military often does not recognize success or failure from its military innovation until war. As Peter Paret noted, in his forward of Harold Winton's book, To Change an Army,

The strategy and operations of any war can be understood only in the light of conditions of the ten or twenty years before its beginning. Technology, organization, doctrine, training, command and staff appointments -- all the essentials of action in war -- are put in place and developed in peacetime. The testing experience of combat will bring about change, but prewar elements continue to affect many events throughout the longest of conflicts.²⁴

Murray further highlights the difficulty that military institutions face in preparing for a war "...that will occur at some indeterminate point in the future against an unidentified opponent, in political conditions that cannot be accurately predicted, and in an arena of brutality and violence which one cannot replicate."²⁵

MILITARY THEORIES ON CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION.

Faced with the peculiar challenges associated with managing change within the military, General Donn A. Starry (1982) and General Gordon Sullivan along with Colonel Michael Harper (1996) developed these thoughts on transformation.

Starry. General Donn A. Starry (USA Retired), former commander of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, faced the challenge of developing a doctrine to enable the U.S. Army to defeat a much larger Soviet land force. In the process he identified seven general requirements for effecting military change.²⁶ First, the military leader or coalition must identify an institution or mechanism to manage change. This newly appointed institution or mechanism must then define the need for change; describe what must be done to effect change; and define how the change is different from past practices. The second requirement is to ensure the principal staff and command personalities responsible for change possess an educational background sufficiently rigorous, demanding, and relevant to bring a common cultural bias to problem solving. The third is to appoint a spokesman or institution to be the champion for change. The fourth requirement is to build consensus for change that will give the new ideas and the need to adopt them a wider audience of converts and believers. Starry's fifth

requirement is the maintenance of continuity of leadership. He contends that continuity is needed among the architects of change so that consistency of effort is brought upon the process. The sixth requirement is to gain support from the top or near the top of the organization. The supporter must be willing to hear out arguments for change, agree to the need, embrace the new concepts and become at least a supporter if not a champion for change. And the last requirement for change is to conduct field trials and experiments. The relevance of the proposed change must be convincingly demonstrated to a wide audience through the use of open, challenging, and realistic experiments. In addition, to sustain the support of the wide audience, the institution must modify the change based upon the results of these experiments.

Sullivan and Harper. General Gordon R. Sullivan (USA Retired), Chief of Staff of the United States Army, 1991 – 1995, and Colonel Michael V. Harper (USA Retired), former director of the Army Chief of Staff's Staff Group, list eleven rules for guiding change in their book, Hope is Not a Method. They identified these rules as they led the Army through its post Cold War organizational transformation. First, change is hard work. Leading change requires leaders to do two jobs at once. They must conduct today's operations and lead the organization into tomorrow.²⁷ Second, leadership begins with values. The leader uses values to signal what will not change within an organization and in doing so provides stability and direction during the uncertain times associated with change.²⁸ Third, the intellectual leads physical. The first step in transformation is intellectual. The leader and his team must expend a great deal of mental effort to build a solid intellectual framework for the future.²⁹ Fourth, real change takes real change. The leader must change the critical process within the organization if he wishes to effect true change. Simply working on the margins – incremental change -- will not effect substantive and enduring transformation.³⁰ Fifth, leadership is a team sport. Effective leaders build teams and forge alliances, as teamwork is critical to transformation. Teamwork empowers people with a sense of responsibility for the organization thereby creating momentum for transformation.³¹ Sixth, expect to be surprised. Resiliency and flexibility are critical for the organization to deal with the unexpected and maintain the course throughout transformation.³² Seventh, today competes with tomorrow. The transformation leader must strike a balance between resources – people, funds, time, and energy -- to meet today's requirements and those of tomorrow.³³ Eighth, "better" is better. In transformation "better" cannot be defined using current qualitative values – better quality, reduced cycle times, shared information, [lethal, mobile, survivable]. "Better" may include all these characteristics and more.³⁴ Ninth, focus on the future. The leader

must inculcate the organization with a positive, optimistic, and creative vision of the future.³⁵ Tenth, learn from doing. A learning organization – one that learns from doing and sharing information -- is critical to transformation. These actions will spark a spirit of innovation and growth within the organization.³⁶ And lastly, grow people. Creative people are what enable organizations to successfully transform. Leaders must understand this and grow and reward creativity among all the people within the organization.³⁷ What is perplexing to the military is that this "rule" is hard to support given the tension between adherence to discipline and the questioning attitude required for innovative and creative thought within the military.

A GUIDING TEMPLATE.

As stated earlier, because the human and institutional dynamics associated with resistance, control, and power are found in both the military and in other institutions, similarities exist between their theories/models for change. First, all of the models identify the need to establish a sense of urgency for transformation within the organization. Second, they all also highlight the importance of leadership in successful transformation -- more specifically, a coalition of leaders. Third, all of the models also stress the criticality of a vision and a strategy to achieve it. Fourth, all of the models identify the need for open communications to build consensus and support for change. Fifth, excluding Starry, the models identify the need to empower all people throughout the organization to achieve the vision. And lastly, all of the models stress the need to institutionalize the transformation within the organization's culture. Therefore, it appears that a template for gaining irreversible momentum includes these six tasks: 1) Instill a sense of urgency for change within and external to the organization. 2) Establish a powerful coalition to guide the change. 3) Develop a vision of the future and a strategy to achieve it. 4) Communicate the vision and need for change. 5) Empower people within the organization to include rewarding imagination, and creativity. Empowerment also includes providing people an educational experience sufficiently rigorous, demanding, and relevant to ensure the organization's members possess a common cultural bias toward solving of problems. 6) Institutionalize the change within the organization.

The history of the German and British efforts to innovate during the WW I and WW II interwar years supports this template. The following is an extrapolation of the German and British interwar efforts to innovate using the above template.

German interwar innovation. 1) Establish a sense of urgency. The loss of the war and resulting restrictions of the Versailles Treaty reduced the German Army to less than 120,000 men of which only 4,000 were officers. This loss and the ensuing sense of vulnerability to invasion, due to the drastic reductions in the Army, were the catalysts for German military reform. 2) Establish a powerful coalition to guide the change. Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, commander in chief of the German Army, used the German general staff for effecting doctrinal and organizational changes in the German army.³⁸ 3) Develop a vision of the future and a strategy to achieve it. Von Seeckt developed the vision based upon his experience and his exceptional critical thinking skills.³⁹ He established fifty-seven committees, of general staff officers and subject matter experts, to examine the broad and specific questions that WW I had raised. The general staff corps used the results of these studies to develop the basis of German operational doctrine, "Army Regulation 487, Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms".⁴⁰ 4) Communicate the vision and need for change. Highly respected by his fellow officers, von Seeckt was able to convince Germany's political leaders and officer corps to adopt his vision and this doctrine as their own. He accomplished this by reorienting and re-educating them towards the doctrines of modern maneuver warfare.⁴¹ 5) Empower people within the organization. That the German general staff corps was able to develop such innovative solutions to the problems of modern maneuver warfare was a reflection of the German Army's strong tradition (culture) of studying war in a critical fashion and then encouraging open debate, creativity and imagination among the officer corps.⁴² In addition, the German army exposed these doctrinal concepts to extensive field tests and trials. 6) Institutionalize the change within the organization. Von Seeckt institutionalized the change by first encouraging open discussion and debate within the officer corps and then by ensuring continuity of leadership after his retirement. Generals von Beck, von Fritsch, and Lutz were all proteges of von Seeckt and continued using the centrality of maneuver warfare as the army's doctrine.⁴³

British interwar innovation. 1) Instill a sense of urgency for change. Initially, the British as one of the victors of WW I, did not see a need to change or even conduct a reexamination of their doctrine. As Winton states, "Lord Cavan, chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.) from 1922 to 1926 and other senior military men of the immediate postwar years seem to be content with the status quo."⁴⁴ And while attempts to reform the doctrine and mechanize the force were present from the late 20's to the early 30's under Lord Milne, the British civilian leadership selected a successor, General Montgomery-Massingberd, who was opposed to innovation change.⁴⁵ 2) Establish a powerful coalition to guide the change. Since the senior leadership did

not perceive a need for or, as in the case of General Montgomery-Massingberd want to change due to his bias towards horse cavalry, they did not establish such a coalition. 3) Develop a vision of the future and a strategy to achieve it. The British senior officers did not develop a vision of the future and a strategy to achieve it. According to Winton, "With few notable exception, the senior officers of the army neither possessed nor articulated a reasonably accurate vision of the nature of future war."⁴⁶ 4) Communicate the vision and need for change. Since the British did not develop a new vision of war or a need to change, they did not communicate them. 5) Empower people within the organization to include rewarding imagination, and creativity. British efforts to empower its officers were sporadic. The degree of empowerment – open debate, dialogues, and experimentation -- present within the army was dependent upon who was the C.I.G.S. Lord Milne, fostered these critical ingredients. Conversely General Montgomery-Massingberd, his successor, did not. Rather he imposed rigid centralization within the army; restricted the distribution of a report which recommended fundamental reform; and perpetuated the notion the next war would be an updated version of the last one.⁴⁷ Nor did the British stress the requirement for rigorous and demanding education of its officer corps to instill a common cultural bias towards problem solving. The British saw soldiering as and officer as an agreeable and honorable occupation rather than a profession that required intellectual dedication equivalent to the medical, legal, and engineering professions.⁴⁸ The British regimental system exacerbated this problem. Senior officers dissuaded junior officers from seeking staff college assignments and those that did attend were seldom intellectually challenged by the curriculum.⁴⁹ 6) Institutionalize the change within the organization. There was no institutionalization of change within the British army. Two points support this statement: 1) the lack of continuity of maneuver/mechanized oriented C.I.G.S appointed by the British government during the interwar years; and 2) the absence of a coherent doctrine for armored warfare.⁵⁰

ARMY TRANSFORMATION – ACTIONS TO DATE

In the words of former Secretary of the Army Caldera, "The amount of momentum that we [Army] have been able to generate for transformation in less than a year is remarkable."⁵¹ The question, "are the efforts the Army has expended to gain this momentum consistent with the six tasks needed to gain irreversible momentum?" The following is a brief summary of the Army's actions and a comparison of them to the tasks that an organization should employ to successfully execute a transformation.

Creating a Sense of Urgency. The Army's mantra for transforming is that the strategic conditions are present for the United States to transform and failing to transform now could result in lack of preparedness in the future.⁵² General Shinseki highlights this point in his *Association of the United States Army Green Book* article, "Army Transformation: A Historic Opportunity",

We are attempting to transform ourselves during an unprecedented period – a time of relative peace, of unrivaled economic prosperity and of stampeding technological progress. The conditions are most favorable for our success, **but the window of opportunity may have already begun to close.** [Emphasis added]⁵³

He concludes the article by citing the testimony of General George C. Marshall before Congress in 1940, "Yesterday we had time but no money. Today we have money but no time". Marshall's words came after Great Britain and France had declared war on Germany for having invaded Poland. Today, as in 1940, the Army's challenges to transform are the same. It must convince an administration, a congress, and a nation that the Army is a critical component of national defense; that the Army's current superiority is fleeting; and the nation needs to invest now in Army transformation to ensure it remains able to perform its missions.

Establish a Coalition to Guide the Change. It is difficult to determine the composition of the Army's change coalition. It is clear that General Shinseki, General Keene, Vice Chief of Staff, and General Abrams, the Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command are members within this coalition. And since the new administration seems to support Army transformation, it is reasonable to deduce that the new Secretary of the Army will be a member of the coalition.

Vision and Strategy. On 12 October 1999 General Shinseki articulated the Army Vision entitled, "Soldiers on point for the Nation...Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War" during the annual Association of United States Army convention. The title of the vision conveys three messages. First, "Soldiers on point for the Nation" is sending two messages: the Army is soldiers (people) and, like the "point-man" in an infantry squad, the Army is a critical instrument of national policy. The second and third parts of the vision -- "Persuasive in Peace" and "Invincible in War" -- define the strategic results and environments in which the Army must operate while "on point". The text of the Army Vision defines three areas, maintaining and caring for people, sustaining the readiness to respond strategically throughout the world, and transforming the Army into a force capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations. As General Shinseki stated, the purpose of the vision is to set the direction for the Army to meet the needs of the 21st Century.⁵⁴ The Army's vision provides a general direction, motivates, and coordinates actions of the Army. It does not outline the necessity for land power in the current and future world environments or discuss the Army's role within the Joint arena. Both of these are essential to gaining Congressional support.

To achieve this vision, the Army developed its transformation strategy and campaign plan. The strategy emerged in the spring of 2000 as part of the General Shinseki's testimony to Congress. The strategy consists of actions along three paths: sustain and re-capitalize the Legacy Force (current force), build an Interim Force to meet the needs of small to medium scaled contingencies, and develop an Objective Force to succeed the Legacy and Interim Forces. The Department of Army published the final coordination draft of its campaign plan on 27 October 2000. The plan states that its purpose is to "translate the vision [Army Vision] from concept to reality".⁵⁵ The Transformation Campaign Plan identifies three axis and fourteen subordinate actions that the Army must take to accomplish transformation. It also designates responsibility throughout the Army for accomplishment of these tasks. One of these actions is resourcing. The Army estimates its un-funded requirements for transformation to be \$26 billion.⁵⁶ Critical to the success of transformation is the Army's ability to convince the Congress and the administration of its need to fund these requirements. To accomplish this and other communication's tasks, the transformation campaign plan tasks the Chief's Special Studies Group to develop a strategic communications plan to "Synchronize and coordinate the transformation strategic communications efforts to internal and external audiences to inform, educate and build consensus, to garner support, and to acquire the resources for Army

transformation."⁵⁷ As of 28 February 2001, The Special Studies Group had not published the communication plan. Regardless of the existence of a plan, the Army has been communicating its vision and the need to transform. General Shinseki and, to a limited extent, other senior officers have been communicating the Army's vision and transformation strategy throughout the Army and to the Congress since October 1999. In addition, the Army has published or "sponsored" numerous articles within *Soldier Magazine* and *Army Magazine* and participated in a Public Broadcasting Station *Frontline* episode entitled, "*The Future of War*". Lastly, General Shinseki has testified before Congress to gain Congressional support for Army transformation. His efforts netted 1.6 billion dollars in fiscal year 2001.

Based upon a review of these actions, it appears that the Army has accomplished or is in the process of accomplishing, three of the six tasks critical to irreversible momentum. It is attempting to instill a sense of urgency for change within and outside of the Army. It has established a coalition to guide the change. And finally, it has developed a vision of the future. Left uncovered are the tasks of communicating the vision and need for change; empowering people within the organization; and institutionalizing the change within the Army.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Based upon a comparison between the Army's efforts to date and the template of six tasks, there are three tasks that the Army needs to perform to gain irreversible momentum. These are communicating the vision, empowering people within the organization, and institutionalizing the change within the Army. This section will recommend some actions that the Army might use to achieve these tasks.

COMMUNICATION.

Transformation is impossible unless hundreds of thousands of people are willing to help, often to the point of making short-term sacrifices... Without credible communication, and lots of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are never captured. John Kotter, Leading Change.

As Kotter states, credible communication is critical to successful transformation. In communicating the vision and the need for transformation, the Army must build a persuasive argument tailored for each of its diverse audiences. In essence the Army must build consensus for change -- a consensus that will give the new ideas and the need to adopt them a wider audience of converts and believers.⁵⁸ Again, in the words of the Final Draft of the Army Transformation Campaign Plan, "Develop a communications plan to synchronize and coordinate the transformation strategic communications efforts to internal and external audiences to inform, educate and build consensus, to garner support, and to acquire the resources for Army transformation."⁵⁹ These audiences include the administration; the United States Congress; the American people; the Army -- its active, reserve, and retired soldiers, Non Commissioned Officers, and Officers; and the sister services -- the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Communicating to the Administration and Congress. Convincing these audiences is essential to gaining irreversible momentum. As the House Appropriations Defense Panel commented in its mark-up of the FY 2001 Spending Bill,

The committee believes that if this effort is to avoid the fate of previously well intended Army efforts, it will require a sustained level of commitment from the Army, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress, a demonstrated dedication to change and willingness to make tough choices and concerted effort to make this a top DOD priority. ...The committee also believes that if the defense department and the next administration does not accord Army transformation the budgeting priority it deserves, it will languish and eventually be homogenized in

the traditional Army structure along with many past initiatives, producing only marginal long term effect.⁶⁰

To prevent this homogenization, the Army may use four themes. First, the United States is currently within a window of opportunity to transform under relatively secure terms. This security is the result of two things: the establishment of the interim force and the re-capitalization of the legacy force as envisioned within the Army's transformation plan; and the time it will take for our potential enemies to develop the capabilities to challenge the United States. Unfortunately, as the capability and strength of potential enemies' increases, the utility of the current force will continue to diminish and thereby result in greater risk of operational failure. Second, Army transformation provides the NCA with an Army that is more strategically, operationally, and tactically mobile across the full spectrum of warfare than the current force. Third, land power will remain decisive in future wars. While air, sea, and land power can employ the military, economic, and psychological levers of power to affect an enemy's forces, economy, and political will;⁶¹ land power, as Colin Gray states, "Is the most conclusive, yet also the least exclusive, of the geographically focused branches of conflict."⁶² He continues, "The inherent strength of land power is that it carries the promise of achieving decision. Whereas dominance at sea, in the air, or in space might enable a war to be won, dominance on land should translate as victory in war as a whole."⁶³ Fourth, the Army is inherently linked to the American people through the extensive and essential integration of active and reserve component forces. And as such, it brings with it the critical public support and will needed to prosecute war.

Communicating to the American People. As Michael Howard stated in "Military Science in an Age of Peace", "Society is at best indifferent and at worst hostile to its [military's] activities."⁶⁴ While this may define the condition in which the Army must seek public support there are several points the Army can use to stress its case. First, the history of the United States and its Army are inextricably linked. A communications plan that addresses the contributions that the Army has made in the history of the United States and continues to make on a day-to-day basis might contribute to raising the public's awareness of the role of the Army. Simultaneously, the Army should communicate the changes that are occurring within the world and relating the need for Army transformation to these changes. This might assist in gaining public understanding and support for transformation. Gaining public support will go a long way towards gaining Congressional and Administration support as well.

Communicating to the Army. The Army's internal communication plan must perform several tasks. First it must convince the Army of the need for change. Second, it must work to eliminate parochial interests by defining the Army's purpose as institution. Lastly, the Army must maintain open communications across the force.

The Army, like society, consists of many sub-units and cultures. These cultures (armor, infantry, airborne, mechanized, etc) each have a view on how the Army should organize itself to fight. Often these views conflict and political struggles emerge. For transformation to occur senior leaders must fight, through strength of logic and will, to gain a consensus for the future.⁶⁵ Consensus and support are critical for transformation to occur. As General Starry stated in his article, "To Change an Army", "Only when the field Army accepts the benefits of change and believes it has a stake in transformation will the rank and file tear down the bureaucratic barriers impeding the progress of innovation and support the change."⁶⁶ For the Army to succeed it must use all existing communications channels to open dialogue for transformation.⁶⁷ A recent Army Research Institute survey of 177 Army Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels indicates that the Army's efforts to communicate key aspects of transformation were judged as "good", "very good", or "excellent" by fifty two percent of the respondents. Conversely, this same survey indicated that fifty percent of the respondents were uncomfortable or very uncomfortable with the necessary changes as the Army transforms to the objective force.⁶⁸ This indicates a greater need for dialogue to determine the reasons for discomfort.

In addition, the Army must recognize that there are sub-units/cultures whose very reason for being are jeopardized by the new vision, e.g., the Armor community. The Army must address these cultures. Pronouncements that the Legacy Force will continue to remain in existence for the next "X-number" of years does not help young lieutenants and captains who see their chances at commanding "relevant" combat arms forces dissolving with each heavy brigade converted to an IBCT or Objective Brigade. If the Army has already thought through this problem, and determined a solution, then it should communicate it. Failing to address this concern may cause these audiences to resist transformation.

Communicating to the other services. There are several reasons that this is a difficult task. One reason is the services may see the transformed Army as lessening their influence/role in certain mission environments. Another reason is competition for resources.

Competition for strategic airlift between the Air Force and the Army has increased with the introduction of the IBCTs. This competition is because the Air Force uses up to 70% of the nation's strategic airlift capacity to support the buildup and sustainment of air operations.⁶⁹ The Army's development of a viable force that depends upon strategic airlift for strategic mobility competes for that same airlift. Lastly, all the services are operating in a fiscally constrained if not "zero-sum" environment. An environment in which for the past 10 years they have experienced difficulties in sustaining day to day operations, procuring replacement weapons systems, and funding research and development for future weapons systems. Given this context, the other services may perceive the cost of transforming the Army as requiring DoD to increase the Army's funding levels. This would result in a reduction of their funding levels.

To ameliorate this competition the Army must communicate at least three themes to its sister services. First, analysis of current trends indicate potential adversaries will be much more creative and adaptive in countering United States intervention.⁷⁰ This future environment requires an Army, which is versatile and adaptive in the manner in which it can achieve objectives across the full spectrum of warfare and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war -- an Army that can react faster than the enemy. The Army must be a versatile and adaptable force that can achieve the joint forces tactical, operational, and possibly strategic objectives through targeting (fires), maneuver, and/or the securing of terrain in any weather and under any condition -- nuclear, biological, and chemical. Second that the Army is not competing with any of the other services for missions, rather it must transform to enable the Department of Defense to realize future joint concepts embodied within JV 2020.⁷¹ Specifically, as part of the joint team the Army must dominate land warfare within the joint campaign. This requires the Army to have the capabilities to deny sanctuary; dominate all environments; conduct simultaneous or near-simultaneous shaping, decisive, and sustaining operations; and destroy regime-ensuring forces in detail to ensure long lasting decisions.⁷² Finally, the Army must prepare for sustained operations against an adversary whose principal aim is to prolong the conflict and avoid decision.⁷³ As stated in TRADOC final draft document entitled, "The Foundations of Army Transformation and the Objective Force Concept",

...The Objective Force must provide modernized capabilities to dominate land warfare. These capabilities will be employed in the conduct of battles and engagements in shaping and decisive operations nested within the joint campaign. It must possess capabilities to support other components in certain phases of the campaign and to be supported by the interdependent joint force for

decisive land operations. It must be strategically responsive to expand the range of military options available to the NCA and the combatant commander as well as to create the conditions for operational and tactical maneuver from the outset of operations. Finally, it must also be full spectrum capable to not only dominate land warfare but also situations in the military operations other than war.⁷⁴

General Shinseki has set the stage in the past year with the development of a sound vision and concept for transformation. The task now is to build the momentum of internal and external support to sustain the effort. Communications is a critical part of that process. There are numerous themes that the Army can develop and use in its communications plan. Developing the right themes and presenting them in an appropriate and effective manner is an essential step towards achieving irreversible momentum.

EMPOWER PEOPLE -- GET THE ENTIRE ARMY INVOLVED.

Another critical step in gaining irreversible momentum is getting the entire Army involved in the process. The Secretary of the Army and the CSA took the first steps towards involving the entire Army with the development and communication of the Army vision and transformation plan. The next step is putting into place those mechanisms that foster teamwork and lead to a sense of ownership/contribution throughout the Army.

Teamwork. As General Sullivan and Colonel Harper point out, teamwork empowers people with a sense of responsibility for the organization thereby creating momentum for transformation.⁷⁵ Directly linked to teamwork is inspiring and rewarding creativity. Business and military historical examples support the thesis that creative people enable organizations to successfully transform.⁷⁶ Sustaining the creative juices within its people and gaining the most from their efforts requires the Army to approach transformation as a learning organization – one that learns from doing and sharing information. This is not a difficult task as the Army is a learning organization. After Action Reviews are a normal occurrence at all levels within the Army. From combat crews to divisions and corps the Army aggressively seeks to learn from its successes and failures to improve future performances. Transformation is not any different. To make it work though will require the Army to foster a dialogue throughout the organization about lessons learned. These actions will further spark a spirit of innovation and growth within the Army.⁷⁷

Remove barriers to participation. Give people power to act by removing obstacles to their contributing to achieving the vision. Transformation requires enormous amounts of energy. One of the catalysts to generate this energy is the leader who must model required new behaviors.⁷⁸ In the case of Army transformation, this entails ensuring the senior field grade officers (lieutenant colonel and colonel) and general officers within the Army have joined the coalition for transformation and are actively demonstrating support for it to their subordinates. As Kotter states, "Nothing disempowers people the way a bad boss [supervisor who undercuts change] can."⁷⁹ Again citing the survey conducted by the Army Research Institute, 50 percent of the surveyed population of lieutenant colonels and colonels were not comfortable with the forthcoming changes as the Army moves to the objective force.⁸⁰ Aside from communications, there are several other means to gain the support of this critical group. These are ensuring the concept is receiving the widest possible examination and scrutiny by using a red team concept and conducting thorough field tests and experiments.

Encourage Open Discussion and Debate -- Establish a Red Team. Major General (RET) Atkeson in a recent article in *Army Magazine* argues the Army needs to put in place a mechanism to provide early, timely, and pertinent commentary on transformation – a designated devils advocate to examine the concept for flaws before it becomes a done deal.⁸¹ He continues by stating,

The Army needs a designated Red Team. It needs a **loyal, supportive** yet independent agency capable of challenging new concepts of organization, operation, and support. Ideally it would not be limited to nay saying but chartered to propose alternatives directly, when necessary to the highest authority of the Army.⁸² [Emphasis added]

In addition to strengthening the product, a red team might assist in making the senior field grade officers more comfortable with transformation through the use of field trial and experiments.

Conduct field trials and experiments. General Sullivan and Colonel Harper believe the leader should design and use specific activities and events to illustrate and test the new paradigm and thereby encourage all people within the organization.⁸³ General Starry takes this a bit further by specifying to test the validity of the proposed change the tests need to be open to rigorous examination and scrutiny.⁸⁴ General Atkeson uses the Army's High Technology Light Division concept as an example of what happens when an organization does not perform

open, objective, and reliable field trials. In this case because the 9th Infantry Division designed and tested this concept on itself, the Army did not view the results as reliable.⁸⁵ General Atkeson concluded that although the Army Chief of Staff sponsored this concept, the Army at large regarded the results as suspect and the concept collapsed when the CSA retired.⁸⁶ While TRADOC is designing and testing the Interim and Objective Forces, the more open, objective, and reliable the field trials and experiments, the greater the likelihood of gaining consensus from within and outside the Army to support transformation.⁸⁷

FINAL THOUGHTS

Institutionalizing the transformation of the Army by gaining irreversible momentum is a challenging task. It requires strong and consistent leadership emphasis, communication, and teamwork. It also takes time – possibly 5-10 years.⁸⁸ As defined by the Army transformation campaign plan, the momentum for transformation will be irreversible when the rate and scope of change can survive individual decision makers and singular, discrete decisions. The metric of irreversible momentum is the level of support the new administration, the Congress, the American public, and the Army give to Army transformation.

General Shinseki has set the stage in the past year with the development of a sound vision and concept for transformation. The task now is to build the internal and external support the Army needs to sustain the effort. Communications is a critical part of that process. There are numerous themes that the Army can develop and use in its communications plan. Developing the right themes and presenting them in an appropriate and effective manner are essential steps towards achieving irreversible momentum.

Obtaining support from within the Army also requires putting into place those mechanisms that foster teamwork and lead to a sense of ownership/contribution throughout the Army. To accomplish these tasks the Army must continue to leverage its commitments to creativity and being a learning organization. The mortar that binds these critical traits is the trust and credibility between the institution of the Army and its people. To sustain this bond and ensure the validity of its transformation concepts, the Army needs what General Atkeson describes as a loyal, supportive yet independent agency – a red team – to challenge the new concepts of organization, operation, and support. The Army must continue to ensure all of its tests and experiments remain open, objective, and rigorous. The Army must also modify its doctrine and concepts based upon the lessons learned from these test. Testing, experimentation, and modification will act as a hardener within the mortar of trust and credibility. To prevent this foundation from cracking, the Army must maintain open lines of communication and dialogue within the Army. Lastly, to keep the momentum going, the Army must institutionalize transformation through its DTLOMS process and through continuity of leadership.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Jason Sherman, "Momentum, Mo' Money", Armed Forces Journal International (Oct 2000): 46.

² Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W.K. Marriot, vol. 23, The Great Books of the Western World, (Chicago, IL, 1952), 17.

³ David Jablonski, The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight: Doctrinal Change and Continuity and the Revolution in Military Affairs, (Carlisle, Barracks, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 2.

⁴ Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, (Ithica, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984), 57.

⁵ Robert H. Miles, Leading Corporate Transformation: A Blueprint for Business Renewal, (San Francisco, CA, Jossey Bass, 1997), 28.

⁶ John P. Kotter, Leading Change, (Boston, MA, Harvard Business School Press, 1996) 4.

⁷ Ibid, 52.

⁸ Ibid, 68.

⁹ Ibid, 85 &90.

¹⁰ Ibid, 115.

¹¹ Ibid, 140.

¹² Ibid, 157.

¹³ John P. Kotter, "Leading Change – Why Transformation Efforts Fail", Harvard Business Review on Change, (Boston, MA, Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 2.

¹⁴ Ibid, 3.

¹⁵ Miles, 16. Miles identifies four catalysts to generate this energy: 1) confront all level of the organization with reality; 2) create or reallocate resource; 3) raise the standards of performance; 4) and encourage leaders at all levels to model required new behaviors.

¹⁶ Ibid, 29.

¹⁷ Ibid, 48.

¹⁸ Ibid, 57.

¹⁹ Ibid, 57.

²⁰ Kathleen F. Morris & Charles S. Raben, "The Fundamentals of Change Management", Discontinuous Change: Leading Organization Transformation, (San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bassey Publishers, 1995), and 63-64.

²¹ Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace", Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defense Studies, (March 1974): 5.

²² Williamson Murray, "Innovation Past and Present", Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, eds, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 317.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Foreword by Peter Paret, in Harold Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine, 1927-1938, (Lawrence, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 1988), vii.

²⁵ Murray, "Innovation Past and Present", 301.

²⁶ General Donn A. Starry, "To Change an Army", remarks to the United States Army War College Committee on a Theory of Combat, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 10 June 1982.

²⁷ GEN (Ret) Gordon R. Sullivan and COL (Ret) Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not a Method, (New York, NY, Broadway Books, 1996), 236.

²⁸ Ibid, 237

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid, 238.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid, 239.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ James S. Corum, "A Comprehensive Approach to Change", The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941, Harold R. Winton, and David R. Mets, Eds, (Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 40.

³⁹ Ibid, 38-39.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 41

⁴¹ Ibid, 38-39.

⁴² Ibid, 64.

⁴³ Ibid, 64.

⁴⁴ Winton, 225.

⁴⁵ Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare", Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, eds, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22.

⁴⁶ Winton, 232.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 225

⁴⁸ Michael Howard, "The Liddell Hart Memoirs, " Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (Feb 1966): 61.

⁴⁹ Murray, "Armored Warfare", 23-24.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 27-29.

⁵¹ Jason Sherman, "Momentum, Mo' Money", Armed Forces Journal International (Oct 2000): 52.

⁵² Eric K. Shinseki, "The Army Transformation: A Historic Opportunity", (Association of the United States Army Green Book, October 2000) 21

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Louis Caldera and Eric K. Shinseki, United States Army Transformation Campaign Plan – Pre-Decisional Final Coordination Draft, (Washington, D.C., HQ Department of the Army, 2000), 1.

⁵⁵ Caldera and Shinseki, 1.

⁵⁶ Edward Francis, "Transformation Brief to USAWC, 25 October 2000. This is broken down into the following categories: Modernization and re-capitalization of Legacy Force \$21.5 billion, Fielding of 5-8 interim brigades \$3 billion, and Science and technology test and evaluation in support of the objective force \$2.1 billion.

⁵⁷ Caldera and Shinseki, 17.

⁵⁸ Starry, 23.

⁵⁹ Caldera and Shinseki, 17.

⁶⁰ Sherman, 52.

⁶¹ Philip S. Melinger Power Point presentation, "Air Power and the Future of War", slides 27, 32, and 34.

⁶² Collin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (New York, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999), 212.

⁶³ Ibid, 214.

⁶⁴ Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace", 4

⁶⁵ Bryon E. Greenwald, "The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation", (Arlington, VA., The Institute of Land Warfare, Sept 2000), 10.

⁶⁶ Starry, 23.

⁶⁷ Kotter, 12.

⁶⁸ Dr Morris Peterson and Ms Sharon Johnson, "Chief of Staff, Army Transformation Survey", (U.S. Army Research Institute, 5 Dec 2000.) slide 23.

⁶⁹ John Kreul, "Son of QDR: Prospects for the Army", (Washington, D.C., Institute of Land Warfare, July 2000).

⁷⁰ US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), "The Foundations of Army Transformation and The Objective Force Concept – Final Draft", (Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC, Jan 2001), 15

⁷¹ TRADOC, 15

⁷² Ibid, 10.

⁷³ Ibid, 10.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 22.

⁷⁵ Sullivan and Harper, 237.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 239.

⁷⁷ Sullivan and Harper, 239.

⁷⁸ Miles, 16.

⁷⁹ Kotter, 115.

⁸⁰ Dr Morris Peterson and Ms Sharon Johnson, slide 7.

⁸¹ Edward B. Atkeson, "The Army Needs a Red Team", *Army*, January 2001, 12-13.

⁸² *Ibid*, 13.

⁸³ Sullivan and Harper, 238.

⁸⁴ Starry, 23

⁸⁵ Atkeson, 12.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*.

⁸⁷ Greenwald, 11.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*.

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