



**STRATEGY  
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**THEN AND NOW: A STRATEGIC PRIMER FOR POST-CONFLICT  
ACTIVITIES**

**BY**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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## ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has found itself involved in a significant number of conflicts that have ranged from small-scale contingencies to war. Military doctrine has evolved and adapted to this new security environment, to include doctrine for the transition to post-conflict activities. Unfortunately, the strategic focus in the United States usually ends at the point of conflict termination and exit strategy.

This paper uses the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual and operations in Haiti as a basis for developing a set of strategic post-conflict planning factors, principles and phases to frame conflict resolution strategies. It suggests that the full implementation of interagency coordination, as directed by PDD-56, coupled with a thorough understanding of the planning factors, principles and phases associated with post-conflict operations, will facilitate U.S. influence in such international operations to achieve U.S. national security objectives.



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## THEN AND NOW: A STRATEGIC PRIMER FOR POST-CONFLICT ACTIVITIES

The cabinet room was utterly silent. His fury had been directed at all of them, but each knew that they were not directly responsible. As the Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, Transportation and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs searched for something to say, the President reiterated, "Tell me how I am going to explain to the American people that we just spent 200 lives and one billion dollars only to have the situation remain the same!" As he stormed out of the office, he threw the country report across the table, scattering the pages amongst them.

—Fictional cabinet meeting

Although fictional, the scenario depicted above is representative of situations that the United States finds itself in after intervening in other countries. Immense effort and resources applied to the execution of operations cannot overcome a lack of adequate planning and preparation for arguably the most important phase of an operation – the post-conflict phase. The problem lies not in the motivation or effort of those doing the planning, but rather in the complexity of post-conflict operations and the inadequate written guidance on how to approach them. An analysis of Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) and existing military strategic doctrine shows these guidance documents to be useful but not sufficient. This is because they focus almost totally on who should be involved and how interaction should be coordinated. Fortunately, a synthesis of material from the old Marine Corps Small Wars Manual and recent lessons-learned from operations in Haiti provides a set of three planning factors, six principles and four phases which can be used as a basis from which to develop requisite strategic guidance for post-conflict operations.

Any analysis of post-conflict activity requirements must begin with an understanding of the terms and phases associated with such activities. A conflict is defined as the realm of conditions in which adversaries employ the threat or application of military force to achieve a political objective or outcome. Although the term conflict is often used synonymously with war, it is much broader in scope, both in theory and reality.<sup>1</sup> It is important to differentiate between conflict termination, post-conflict activities and conflict resolution. Conflict termination occurs when a belligerent achieves intended political aims and has the requisite leverage to impose his will – through the threat or application of coercion – on his adversary.<sup>2</sup> Military post-conflict activities are those operations other than war that are conducted in the period following conflict and the cessation of active combat; activities focused on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing the host nation infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve overall strategic aims.<sup>3</sup> Conflict resolution is the behavior modification involving the long-term transformation of political, social and economic systems to achieve a permanent solution suitable to all concerned. It is generally voluntary and lasting.<sup>4</sup> The aim of post-conflict activities is to achieve conflict resolution.

## **EXTANT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE**

At the strategic level, a cohesive approach to conducting post-conflict activities does not exist. Indirectly, these activities are addressed in Presidential Decision Directive – 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations. It recognizes that in recent situations such as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, the US response was as part of a coalition response under United Nations (UN) or regional sanction. As a result, it makes the assumption that future complex contingency operations will be as part of a coalition, whenever possible.<sup>5</sup> The PDD identifies that, in the wake of the Cold War, effective conflict response requires multi-dimensional operations composed of political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development and security functions. The intent of the PDD is to ensure that the planning and management of such functions is closely coordinated through an integrated, interagency process.

The White Paper associated with PDD-56 states that in some situations the military can quickly affect the dynamics of the situation and may create the conditions necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving underlying conflict or dispute. It caveats this statement, however, by stating that the level of US interest in most of these situations will not warrant the indefinite deployment of US military forces. Additionally, it recognizes that not all aspects of complex emergencies are best addressed through military measures.<sup>6</sup> This understanding of different elements of national power and their appropriate role is critical to the successful conduct of post-conflict operations.

To ensure interagency coordination, the PDD calls for the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council to establish appropriate interagency working groups to conduct the policy development, the planning, and the supervision of complex contingency operations. Normally, this will include the establishment of an Executive Committee (ExCom), composed of representatives of all agencies who will participate in the operation.<sup>7</sup> The presence of a comprehensive group of agency representatives is an absolute requirement for the fusion of the diverse elements of national power required in the post-conflict phase of operation. This group is expected to design a comprehensive political-military (Pol-Mil) plan to present to the NSC. Unfortunately, the PDD has two significant weaknesses. Not specifically addressed, but critical to the overall operation, is the planning for post-conflict operations by this group. Glaringly absent is guidance on ties to international organizations to ensure that efforts of the interagency process will be translated and implemented properly in international forums, such as the United Nations (UN).

Indirectly, post-conflict operations are also addressed in the National Security Strategy (NSS). Diplomacy and international assistance are both cited as tools to be used to mitigate conflict and to chart a new course for post-conflict direction in the wake of conflicts such as was done in Europe in World War Two.<sup>8</sup> The planning and implementation of the Marshall Plan served as a very successful example of post-conflict activities leading to conflict resolution. The NSS serves to reinforce PDD-56 in articulating that the use of military force is not the appropriate element of national power to be exercised in all situations.

## **IMPLEMENTATION OF PDD-56**

Drawing from lessons learned in Somalia, where there was no interagency coordination mechanism to contend with the 1993 change of situation, Haiti served as the prototype for the development of the central elements that ultimately became PDD-56.<sup>9</sup> An interagency Executive Committee was formed, which provided oversight for the development of a political-military plan, based upon the direction and initiative of the Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff. This dedicated interagency process enhanced coordination with the UN and Haiti both before and after the UN assumed control and established UNMIH.<sup>10</sup>

Unfortunately, since its inception, PDD-56 has been complied with sporadically at best. In five different case studies (Somalia, Haiti, Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and Hurricane Mitch), the quality of interagency coordination directly correlated to the effectiveness of U.S. efforts on the ground.<sup>11</sup> A lack of authority, leadership by the National Security Council, and an aversion to deliberate planning by non-military agencies for potential events has resulted in ineffective implementation of the PDD.<sup>12</sup>

While the military is not always the element of national power used to resolve conflicts, it is used frequently. This fact, coupled with the importance of Department of Defense (DOD) input to the interagency process, magnifies the importance of the sufficiency of high-level military doctrine for post-conflict operations.

## **EXTANT HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY DOCTRINE**

A review of both Joint and Army doctrine, specifically, JCS Pub 3-0 (Doctrine for Joint Operations) and FM 100-5 (Operations) reveals that the post-conflict phase is identified as an important part of campaign planning, however, the emphasis is on the transition to civilian (U.S., UN or host nation) control as soon as possible. Both state that post-conflict activities should be planned as early as possible and should include interagency coordination. Joint doctrine articulates that military forces need to work competently in the post-conflict phase as a subordinate to the agency in charge, but must be prepared to take the de facto lead in operations, due to their presence and unique capabilities.<sup>13</sup>

Generally, the doctrine expects that military forces will have significant responsibility early in the post-conflict phase, but will transition to civilian dominance as the threat is reduced and the civil infrastructure is increasingly restored. The effectiveness of the transition is contingent upon the ability to incorporate diverse perspectives from other Services, governmental agencies, and alliance/coalition partners. The post-conflict phase focus on restoring order, reestablishing infrastructure, and presence are described as operations other than war.<sup>14</sup> Typical post-conflict military activities may include transition of operations to civil authorities, support to truce negotiations, Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities, public affairs operations and redeployment.<sup>15</sup> The concept woven through this doctrine is that the military sees conflict termination as the end of its primacy and that the post-conflict phase is one in which they are a participant, but are focused on tactical and operational considerations, rather than

strategic issues. As a result, military doctrine does not adequately address the strategic parameters associated with post-conflict operations.

## **STRATEGIC DEFICIT**

Clearly, while useful, the existing strategic guidance is insufficient for guiding broad interagency planning for future post-conflict operations. In order to look forward, sometimes it is helpful to look back in time. The basis for such guidance can be found in two historical studies. The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, last published in 1940, codifies the lessons learned by the U.S. Marine Corps during expeditionary operations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the military largely was responsible for the full range of post-conflict activities. A review of the 1994 intervention in Haiti is helpful in understanding the more recent actions required to set the conditions for re-establishment of stable governments and achievement of conflict resolution, within a UN controlled environment.

## **SMALL WARS MANUAL**

The Small Wars Manual was published by the United States Marine Corps in 1940 to capture the principles and lessons learned of period of 1800-1934, when the Marine Corps frequently was employed in what is now defined as small-scale contingencies (SSC). The operational tempo at that time appears to have been not too different than that of today. It is often quoted that the U.S. military has been engaged roughly 35 times from 1989 to 2000. In comparison, the introduction of the Small Wars Manual states,

“Small Wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps. During about 85 of the last 100 years, the Marine Corps has been engaged in Small Wars in different parts of the world. The Marine Corps has landed troops 180 times in 37 countries from 1800-1934. Every year during the past 36 years since the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps has been engaged in operations in the field. In 1929, the Marine Corps had two-thirds of its personnel employed on expeditionary or other foreign or sea duty outside of the continental limits of the United States.”<sup>16</sup>

The high operational tempo of the Marine Corps was a result of being actively involved in not only intervention, but also post-conflict activities. While it is not desirable to have the U.S. military as the primary agent for post-conflict activities today, understanding the fundamentals of such operations will assist in issuance of strategic guidance and attainment of U.S. national objectives in the post-conflict environment.

## **SMALL WARS PRINCIPLES OF POST CONFLICT ACTIVITIES**

The Small Wars Manual asserts that although small wars and post-conflict activities are decidedly different than “regular war”, the principles of warfare are enduring. The ingenuity with which they are applied is the key to success in the complex environments of this realm. It is not the intent here to recite the traditional principles of war, but rather to look at some of the peculiar aspects of small wars that are a consideration for the post-conflict phase.

The first element addressed is strategy. The nature of the military strategy in small wars is that it is very closely aligned to the political strategy. Diplomatic overtures have usually not broken down completely as in a "regular war", but are concurrent with military operations. This relationship occurs not only during the conduct of the small wars campaign, but increasingly so in the post-conflict phase. The military commander will find himself constrained by diplomatic initiatives in the conduct of military operations. The close affiliation between the Marine Corps and State Department during this period resulted in the informal reference to Marines as "State Department Troops".<sup>17</sup>

Resourcing the strategy is essential to success. The evaluation of the people who will oppose the operations, combined with the political and military objectives, must be matched with the appropriate resources to accomplish the assigned tasks expeditiously and energetically. Given the requirement to operate from detached posts, the force must be flexible, mobile and highly trained to operate independently. If faced with a levee en masse, the force must be capable of holding all strategic points in the country, protect its lines of communication and react with force, when necessary, to overcome opposition. While curbing the passions of the people, courtesy, friendliness, justice and firmness should be exhibited.<sup>18</sup>

Psychology is a common thread woven through all of the Small Wars Manual concepts. The imperative is the understanding of the psychology of the individual who operates beyond the control of superiors. It is also applicable to friendly forces, where the aim is not to develop a belligerent perspective, but one of caution and steadiness. The blending of these two concepts results in an understanding of the "enemy" and his defeat through diplomacy vice force. "A force commander who gains his objective in a small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success than one who resorted to the use of arms".<sup>19</sup> The "weapons of success" are those which target the social, economic and political development of the people. To maximize their effect, it is important to conduct a serious study of the racial, religious, political, physical and mental characteristics of the people involved in the conflict.

Attitude, bearing and conduct of the force are major factors in establishing the operational environment. As mentioned above, an understanding of the indigenous population is critical. Their customs, language and social character must be understood by all to maximize the effectiveness of the force. The conduct of troops will have a great impact on the attitude of the people towards military operations. If the local populace is treated with tolerance, sympathy and kindness, as well as, firmness and professionalism, the civilian populace will respond positively and potentially assist in post-conflict resolution.

Command relationships are addressed in the Small Wars Manual in the context of the limited communications capability of the time. The overriding concept associated with these relationships is one of unity of command. Detailed analysis of specific situations involving the differences associated with Navy and Marine command relationships is presented. In terms of civil-military relationships, the commander is expected to liaison with the Chief Executive of the country and the subordinate cabinet

members. If no government is in place, then based on State and Defense Department guidance, the commander may establish a military government.

Police functions are to be left to local police forces. The role of the military in interacting with the police is one of training and response to large bandit or insurgent groups who are beyond the capability of the police. Every attempt will be made to ensure that the judicial system remains intact and legitimate. If the courts are dysfunctional, the police efforts will be useless. Military tribunals rarely are successful in maintaining a perception of impartiality among the populace.

Disarmament of the population is the most vital step in the restoration of tranquility and law and order. It must be accomplished with the assistance of opposing faction leaders, with the greatest tact and diplomacy. Essential to this effort is the ability of the intervention forces to ensure the safety of the population. While such measures will not be 100% effective, the weapons that were unable to be confiscated will gradually attrite through continued searches and environmental degradation while in storage.

The supervision of elections is one of the most effective peaceful means of exerting an impartial influence upon the turbulent affairs of sovereign states.<sup>20</sup> The military role in this mission is to ensure the "free and fair" electoral process. In combination with host government forces, the military ensures that voters are not intimidated, either physically or mentally in the process of voting. Additionally, the ethical conduct of the election is witnessed to ensure that political parties do not attempt to influence voters, particularly the incumbent officials.

#### SMALL WAR PHASES

In describing the phases of small wars, the Small Wars Manual accurately points out that operations, such as modern day SSC's, rarely conform to a stereotypical progression. While phases may be combined or undertaken simultaneously, at other times they may be absent or in a different order. It lays out five phases:

1. Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard
2. The arrival of reinforcements and general military operations in the field.
3. Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies.
4. Routine police functions.
5. Withdrawal from the theater of operations.

Phases one and two correspond to our present day concepts of operation when Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO's) are used or the introduction of military forces to a foreign country is effected. The post-conflict phase of modern operations is most heavily focused on phases three and four. Phase five corresponds to the withdrawal of all non-host nation forces and agencies upon conflict resolution.

To effectively analyze the concepts involved, it is important to understand the details of phases three and four. Phase three is a scalable phase, where a military government or martial law is established and the degree of control ranges from minor control to complete control of all principal agencies of the government. Military forces are used to counter elements that are opposed to law and order. The burden of this phase is placed on the military to conduct all security functions. Host nation forces are used in an increasingly more active role, first with the military forces, then autonomously. The desire is to return responsibility for law and order to the recognized government as soon as possible.

Phase four is envisioned as a period where lawless elements are subdued and military police functions/judicial authority is returned to the native governmental agencies. While the ultimate objective is to reestablish a governmental system with judicial powers, it is important to understand that if the military commander is not given judicial powers, he is somewhat handicapped. Absent a reasonably strong judicial system, the military commander should be empowered to conduct judiciary actions, in order to avoid the embarrassment of illegal assumption by another entity. During this phase, military forces are withdrawn to larger centers and employed as a reserve to buttress local police and militia forces.<sup>21</sup>

The Small Wars Manual was written when unilateral military action could be conducted without significant scrutiny of imperialistic action by the international community. While it is not desirable to conduct unilateral military action, especially in the post-conflict phase today, the principles and phases addressed in the Small Wars Manual remain valid. An analysis of the 1994 intervention in Haiti provides a more modern case study of the fundamentals of post-conflict activities. It is an especially interesting study, as the Small Wars Manual was derived from operations in this same area during the inter-war years, from 1918-1934.

#### **POST-CONFLICT PRINCIPLES - UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI**

The 1994 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established under a mandate of the UN Security Council (UNSCR 940). It was charged with "assist[ing] the democratic government of Haiti...in connection with: sustaining the secure and stable environment [established by the multi-national force], the establishment of an environment conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections, protecting international personnel and key installations, and the creation of a Haitian police force."<sup>22</sup>

To frame the planning and execution of the military component of UNMIH, the force commander, Major General Kinser, used the principles of peace operations as prescribed in FM 100-23 (Peace Operations). Those principles are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

**OBJECTIVE:** "Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and obtainable objective." This principle was fulfilled by the clear articulation of UNSCR 940 which gave the commander adequate guidance to focus force effort. As a result, the commander was able to establish priorities for

the force, which ensured that operational activities were supportive of the strategic objective, the UN mandate.<sup>23</sup>

**UNITY OF EFFORT:** "Seek unity of effort in every operation." Although the military component enjoyed a direct chain of command to the SRSG, the wide variety of organizations within UNMIH were not well coordinated and therefore required the use of enormous liaison assets to conduct bilateral coordination between elements. The absence of an effective Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) staff compounded the problem of early dissemination of a political-military plan. Without a vision to coalesce the efforts of all parties, inefficiency, errors and misunderstanding between elements in UNMIH caused additional friction in an operation that was difficult by nature.<sup>24</sup>

**SECURITY:** "Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage." Key to this principle is the establishment of effective Rules of Engagement (ROE). The military force in Haiti routinely used measures to ensure that their high force readiness posture was conveyed to the local populous and that supporting efforts, such as external evaluations, counterintelligence teams, safety programs and situational awareness maintenance, precluded the force from surprise by aggressors.<sup>25</sup>

**RESTRAINT:** "Apply appropriate military capability prudently." The ability to apply appropriate restraint was facilitated by the proper manning and equipping of the force. This applied not only to conventional forces, but also the availability of non-standard assets such as linguists and non-lethal agents. Proper training on ROE and graduated response allowed subordinate unit commanders to diffuse potentially hostile situations diplomatically, without the use of force.<sup>26</sup>

**PERSEVERANCE:** "Prepare for the measured sustained application of military capability in support of strategic aims." The UNMIH force began its mission on 31 March 1995 and per the mandate, was to complete operations no later than 29 February 1996. To meet the mandate in the prescribed time, the force commander kept his unit focused on the mission to be accomplished, while striving to avoid creating dependence on UNMIH, by the government of Haiti.<sup>27</sup> This balancing of efficiency and avoidance of welfare dependence is a difficult one. The UN mandate deadline required an extension due to incomplete UNMIH actions, specifically the establishment of a police force. Denoting deadlines for completed post-conflict activities is a dangerous protocol, which should be avoided.

**LEGITIMACY:** "Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions." The UNMIH drew its initial legitimacy from the UN mandate. This was further enhanced by ensuring the Haitian laws, ROE and other legal constraints were adhered to. This is one key area where discipline of the force is critical. The potential for a tactical action to have strategic consequences is a characteristic of post-conflict operations. Involvement with the government of Haiti was also a precarious legitimacy issue. While desiring to assist the government in quickly establishing infrastructure functions, it was critical to ensure that the people understood that the government, not UNMIH, was responsible for the improvement in the quality of their life. Both the conduct of the force and the actions of the government needed to be promulgated through media to the people for maximum effect.<sup>28</sup>

Taken together the concepts of the Small Wars Manual and recent operations in Haiti provide the threads of continuity between the past and present which can be woven into cohesive set of planning factors, principles and phases to assist in the development of strategic post-conflict guidance.

### **PUTTING TOGETHER THE PIECES**

The problem routinely encountered in current conflict planning is that it consists primarily of military plans, which only carry through to the conflict termination phase. This is generally the result of a phenomenon associated with the employment of military forces and the absence of cohesive, strategic guidance for post-conflict activities and conflict resolution. For planning purposes, the military focuses on the desired military end-state to reached conflict termination. Although strategic end-state is addressed in the definition of strategic objectives, the focus is on conflict termination criteria and exit strategy. Thus, those activities which are required for conflict resolution, but which cannot be accomplished by the military, are poorly addressed.

These circumstances result in a very ambiguous situation. The military has doctrine to support the transfer of post-conflict responsibility, yet seldom is the transfer of responsibility smooth and the continuation of post-conflict activities effective. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the consequent reduction in military resources, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not want responsibility for post-conflict activities. Such apprehension is logical, as the commitment to orchestrating post-conflict activities is usually a long-term undertaking, which is diametrically opposed to the current DOD initiatives to reduce unit operational/personnel tempo and maintaining warfighting readiness.

The concept of legitimacy exacerbates this dilemma of identifying a lead agent for post-conflict activities. In order for the United States to effectively intervene militarily in other countries, it must do so as part of a United Nations (UN) sanctioned event or as part of a coalition. Any action taken otherwise would be construed as imperialistic and would undermine support from other countries with interest in the area of operations. Consequently, the initial intervention and most probably, the post-conflict phase, will be a multi-nation undertaking. Given this assumption, strategic guidance for interagency post-conflict efforts is even more critical to effectively influence the international effort toward conflict resolution in support of U.S. interests.

The following paragraphs are a synthesis of the lessons learned gleaned from the Small Wars Manual and a study of operations in Haiti and are divided into planning factors, principles and phases for use in development of strategic post-conflict guidance (Table 1). They are intended as a point of departure for further development, not as an all-encompassing solution.

<b>PLANNING FACTORS</b> Hate and Revenge Residual Leadership Destruction of Governmental and Economic Infrastructure
<b>PRINCIPLES</b> Unity of Effort Mission and Objectives Resourcing Local Knowledge Security Perseverance
<b>PHASES</b> Security Phase Transition Phase Consolidation Phase Independence Phase

TABLE 1. FACTORS, PRINCIPLES AND PHASES

### POST-CONFLICT PLANNING FACTORS

Three significant factors must be incorporated into the calculus of every post-conflict operation. The first is the generation of hate and seeking of revenge as the parties in conflict inflict human losses amongst the population. The second is the presence of leaders who participated in the conflict, who now will be positioned to influence actions in its aftermath. They can be a hindrance to effective post-conflict operations, as they are parochial in their view and may cause divisiveness among the factions in conflict. The last factor is the usual destruction of governmental and economic infrastructure as a result of the conflict. The impact of this destruction is disruption of public services, degradation of standards of living and lawlessness. All of these factors combine to create a situation, which is ripe for tension and renewed conflict, and must be mitigated.<sup>29</sup>

### POST-CONFLICT PRINCIPLES

Regardless of the agency conducting the operation, the country involved, or the nature of the preceding conflict, these are enduring concepts that must be addressed for successful post-conflict activities.

#### UNITY OF EFFORT

This is not a difficult concept for the military, as it practices unity of command, which results in unity of effort. Unity of effort is difficult to effect for civilian agencies where consensus is usually the mechanism for coordination. The United Nations has attempted to formulate a structure to facilitate unity

of effort organized under a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). This organization has evolved over the last several conflicts to establish the SRSG as a "viceroy" within the countries involved. An example of the most recent iteration of this structure can be found in that applied to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.<sup>30</sup> (See Figure 1)

## UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN KOSOVO




FIGURE 1

Further development of this structure needs to be accomplished in order to give the SRSG staff oversight for the supervision of the agencies within the country. Additionally, the SRSG must be empowered to decide who will be allowed to participate in the post-conflict efforts, based upon their contribution to

mission accomplishment and cooperation towards unity of effort. To facilitate the transition from military operations to civilian governmental control, an integrated civilian-military implementation staff (CMIS) has been recommended.<sup>31</sup> Such a staff would at different times during the post-conflict phase, be headed by a military or civilian leader and be capable of coordinating the myriad of complex functions in the post-conflict phase.

### MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

The nature of post-conflict operations ties them very closely to strategic political objectives. Assuming that the UN is the authority for involvement in the conflict and as a result, the post-conflict operations, a clear mandate must be issued. Specific objectives must be provided to the SRSG for accomplishment. These objectives cannot be tied to timelines. Although a schedule is important to provide a framework for mission accomplishment, timelines do not allow for flexibility and give parties opposed to the conflict resolution a "line in the sand" to work against. Inherent to the promulgation of clear objectives is the timeliness of the mission statement. As a conflict progresses towards termination, situational factors will change drastically, thus causing the sanctioning authority to review and reissue objectives for the post-conflict phase. This must be done in a timely manner and be an evolutionary process as the conflict matures.

## RESOURCING

Situational factors will dictate the requirements for resources to accomplish post-conflict objectives. Adequate personnel, equipment and supplies are essential to expediting a process, which is inherently long, and to ensure that stability within the country is achieved with minimal use of force. The quality of personnel, particularly military forces, is extremely important to ensure that improper tactical actions do not result in negative strategic consequences. The expertise required in complex post-conflict operations is usually only derived from a high degree of institutional knowledge and familiarity with such operations. This concept is particularly important when assigning the leadership of the post-conflict phase. Weak personalities result in poor coordination and consensus building, and thus, a requirement for a large staff operating on rigid protocols.

## LOCAL KNOWLEDGE

One of the most critical principles, which is most often violated, is an understanding of the cultural, historical, social, economic and political situation within the area of conflict. A thorough knowledge of these parameters is essential to planning for and executing actions in support of post-conflict operations. The psychology of the people will be fundamental in acceptance of initiatives to rebuild and modify conditions within the area of conflict. For true conflict resolution, the society in conflict must accept and be willing to continue the post-conflict initiatives instituted by the international effort. A lack of understanding of the local situation will result in activities at the strategic, operational and tactical level that are contradictory to the ideals of the people. It only takes a few of these events to create a bias towards all efforts and the subsequent failure of the post-conflict phase.

## SECURITY

The essential element of security is a clear definition of the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement during the post-conflict phase will likely be different than when the military forces were engaged in conflict. Force protection, security of non-governmental and international agencies, the conduct of police duties and consistency of force application are all contingent upon this element. Security forces must present a very credible deterrent to all who attempt to undermine the post-conflict phase, yet be disciplined and able to resolve low-level civil conflict diplomatically. This approach not only builds a strong bond with the community, but also serves as a model for the expected conduct of indigenous police forces. The legitimacy of the post-conflict effort will hinge on the effective and acceptable employment of security forces.

## PERSEVERANCE

Post-conflict operations are by their nature, long-term undertakings. It should be expected that the military forces will only be present during the early to middle periods of the phase. A significant shortfall in recent post-conflict operations has been the reliance on the military to complete many tasks, which should have been completed by civilian entities. Particularly in the United States, there is little tolerance for extended deployments of military forces when national interests are not at stake. As a result, the

efforts of the post-conflict phase should be directed towards ensuring the expeditious autonomy of the government and civil structure in the area of conflict. There is a delicate balance to be met of supporting the government, while not allowing it to become dependent on the international effort to rebuild it. National and international groups and agencies overseeing the post-conflict operation must be prepared for multi-year operations. While not necessarily feasible to have the same SRSG and staff in place for the long-term, plans must include a personnel replacement policy that minimizes the turbulence in the changeover of key leaders.

## **PHASES OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS**

Similar to the phases of conducting small wars of the past, modern post-conflict operations must be framed into several phases. These phases account for the different types of activities required and the relationship between the international organization tasked with post-conflict objectives and the indigenous government. Different agencies within the SRSG organization will be conducting transitional activities throughout the phases at different times. The coordination of these activities must be monitored by the SRSG staff to ensure that the transition of one functional area is synchronized and supported by the other functional areas.

### **SECURITY PHASE**

The first phase is the security phase. It is implemented immediately after hostilities end and post-conflict operations begin. It is characterized by heavy military involvement, disarmament of the population and the restoration of law and order. Depending on the severity of destruction, it may impose a military government and martial law, if there is a complete absence of governmental infrastructure. During this phase, assessments of rebuilding requirements are conducted by civilian agencies and the rapid establishment of relief operations for non-combatants is initiated. Military forces will be responsible for police functions in accordance with local or military law, depending on the degree of operability of the local legal system. The SRSG staff will become established in the theater and determine the viability of the local government to supervise civil infrastructure.

### **TRANSITION PHASE**

During the transition phase, the military will assume a lesser role as the civilian element of the SRSG takes on more supervisory roles. Local police forces will be identified and training will commence to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the forces. As forces are trained, they will be fielded to take over from the military forces. The military forces will pull back into garrisoned response forces with the mission to assist police forces in civil control beyond their means, or to combat paramilitary groups still operating in the area of operations. Late in this phase, elections can be considered, but only after the situation has stabilized and the previous leaders of the conflict are no longer the de facto candidates for the election. As the government is re-established, it increasingly takes on roles in passing laws and enforcing justice. It also begins to work closely with the SRSG organization to supervise the rebuilding of

civil infrastructure and the distribution of aid. Efforts are undertaken to move refugees back to their homes and to lay the groundwork for schools and medical services.

#### CONSOLIDATION PHASE

This third phase coincides with the successful progression of the government to provide for the civil populace. The government has successfully established the infrastructure required to monitor and manage programs throughout the country in providing basic services to the people. Local police and security forces are capable of handling all internal threats. Local companies have been established to work with the aid material provided to rebuild housing, utilities and transportation networks. The government has the capability to interact with international business interests to manage investment opportunities. UN military forces are withdrawn, but the SRSG staff and civilian organizations still provide a dearth of technical knowledge and support as well as distribution of aid. The relationship between the SRSG and the head of government has now changed to one of an advisor to the head of government, rather than the "viceroy", with sweeping decision-making power.

#### INDEPENDENCE PHASE

In this final phase, the government has assumed all functions of self-governance. Aid organizations remaining in country deal directly with the government. The SRSG staff and civilian organizations conduct their withdrawal. Nation-building activities are conducted through normal embassy channels and monetary assistance is derived through direct interaction between the government and international organizations. The completion of the phase is marked by the UN declaration of mandate satisfaction.

#### CONCLUSION

The future environment is one likely to be fraught with conflicts ranging from war to small-scale contingencies. The national interests of the United States will probably result in the investment of significant personnel and material resources in these conflicts. A lack of understanding of post-conflict operations and the subsequent failure to adequately develop strategic guidance to support these operations will result in inefficient operations that ultimately may not protect U.S. national interests.

In order to establish adequate strategic guidance for post-conflict activities, interagency action must incorporate sound strategic planning factors, principles and phases of post-conflict operations. While PDD-56 establishes an interagency process for defining and coordinating U.S. efforts, the appointed Executive Committee must understand certain essential fundamental concepts, and incorporate them in the initial planning for contingency operations. The factors, principles and phases outlined in this paper are intended to provide a starting point for the development of a comprehensive doctrine for post-conflict operations. Such a doctrine, when combined with appropriate situational analysis and mechanisms to communicate strategic guidance to the organization(s) overseeing the post-conflict activities, will allow for

the proper planning and shaping of efforts to achieve conflict resolution and a sound return on national resource investment.

Word Count = 6319



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," Military Review 10 (October 1992): 43.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1993), Glossary-7.

<sup>4</sup> Rampy, 44.

<sup>5</sup> The White House, White Paper: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: PDD-56 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997), 2-3.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>8</sup> William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington D.C.: The White House, October 1998), 8-9.

<sup>9</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision directive 56 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 31 March 1999), 5-7.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>13</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), V-5.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Army, Operations, 6-23.

<sup>15</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, V-6.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 edition), NAVMC 2890 ( Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1 April 1987),1-2.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 1-7.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 1-9.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 1-10.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 14-1.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 5-7.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Peacekeeping Institute, Success in Peacekeeping UNMIH: The Military Perspective, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1996), 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>29</sup> Joulwan, George A. and Christopher C. Shoemaker, Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1998), 10-11.

<sup>30</sup> Jarat Chopra, "Peace Maintenance," lecture, in The Security Lifecycle in Peace Operations: Issues of Transition and How Do We Get There from Here: Fifth Annual Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Seminar, ed. U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, August 1, 1999) 25-36a.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

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