



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**THE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC
LEADER FROM 1919 – 1940 — IS THERE RELEVANCE TODAY?**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**The Education and Development of the Strategic Leader from 1919-1940 – Is
There Relevance Today?**

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ABSTRACT

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The inter-war years from 1919 to 1940 were a time for America to catch her breath and re-evaluate her role in world leadership. This was also a time for the next generation of Army leaders to study the lessons learned from World War I and gain the knowledge necessary to transform the Army into a force capable of protecting the nation in case of war. From its earliest days in 1903, the United States Army War College (USAWC) was intended as a finishing school for senior Army leaders. Initially, because of Secretary of War Elihu Root's ongoing reform initiatives, the College served a primary role as the Army's General Staff War Plans Division. When the College reopened in 1919 after WW I, the curriculum was adjusted to reflect the professional and educational needs of the senior officer training to wage war at the strategic level. Specifically the College taught the student of the 1920s and 1930s the preparation for and the conduct of war. By employing wargaming in early joint war fighting educational experiences and stressing individual as well as committee projects the USAWC helped forge many of WW II's senior leaders in the strategic art. As such, the purpose of this Strategy Research Project is to examine the academic development of the senior strategic leader approximately 75 years ago during the inter-war period and derive any lessons learned to better prepare today's senior leaders for the challenges of the next 15 – 25 years. President Eisenhower in 1958 told Congress, "No military task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans which relate our revolutionary new weapons and force development to national security objectives". Regardless of all else, the development of the senior leader in the strategic art must remain paramount in the USAWC curriculum as the Army looks towards tomorrow. A continuing focus on warfighting complemented by study in the other national elements of power is paramount if today's leaders are to be as well prepared as yesterday's inter-war period leaders.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT III

THE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC LEADER FROM 1919-1940 - IS THERE
RELEVANCE TODAY? 1

ENDNOTES 27

BIBLIOGRAPHY 35

THE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC LEADER FROM 1919-1940 – IS THERE RELEVANCE TODAY

Since its inception in 1901, at the direction of Secretary of War Elihu Root, the United States Army War College (USAWC) has served as the Army's capstone course for the education of its next generation of senior leaders. During its existence, the school has relocated twice, witnessed two World Wars and been party to innumerable other conflicts spanning the entire spectrum of human conflict. Throughout this period, there have been numerous changes to the curriculum in an effort to improve the land warfighting skills associated with the strategic leader, strategic practitioner and strategic theorist. Very simply, USAWC students for almost a century have endeavored "not to promote war but to preserve the peace" by studying to become masters of the strategic art. Numerous important senior WW II leaders attended the USAWC during the 1920s and 1930s. Many of the concepts that were successfully used in WW II were most certainly derived and deliberated during studies and from personal experiences of these officers during the 20-year period between these two great conflicts – an era commonly referred to as the inter-war years. Prime Minister Winston Churchill is quoted as stating the formation of a "mighty force of millions of soldiers" from the United State's inter-war Army is a "wonder of history."¹ As equally intriguing to him was the fact the Army had produced such a "high caliber of leaders and staffs to command such huge land forces" and it is reported he said to General Marshall that "if we had the corps and division commanders you have, nothing could stop us either."² In light of Churchill's observations, this paper is intended to briefly examine the formation of the USAWC, the curriculum of the 1920's and 1930's and the USAWC's role during this era in the development of senior strategic leaders.

The nation is once again at a crossroads and it may be instructive to look back in time to determine if there are lessons worth studying from the experiences of our predecessors. Following are passages that reflect events of the inter-war years or are these passages commentaries on today?

"For 5 years, at least, American business has been in the grip of an apocalyptic, high rolling exaltation over the unparalleled prosperity of the "new era" upon which we, or it, or somebody has entered. Discussions of economic conditions in the press, on the platform, and by public officials have carried us into a cloud and fantasy... Clear, critical, realistic and rational recognition of current problems and perplexities is rare"³

"New Isolationism Imperils U.S. Security"⁴

“Curiously, America’s elected leaders . . . continued to express confidence in the survival of an international order that was quickly passing. Technological, economic and political changes were steadily eliminating the circumstances of America’s geographic isolation.”⁵

Not surprisingly, these passages are from both the inter-war period and now. If one views today’s ongoing discussions, there are striking similarities between the writings of 70 years ago and the press that swirls around us today as the nation seek its place in the new world order. The inter-war years are not an exact fit, nor were they in reflection exactly a Golden Age, but there are sufficient similarities that this period is worth review for strategic leader development. This paper will conclude with some ideas for curriculum emphasis as the Army moves to 2015 and beyond.

In retrospection, much was expected of the inter-war year leaders since unbeknownst to them, WW II was less then two decades away and once again they would carry the torch of freedom. General George Marshall was one of the Army’s foremost trainers during the inter-war period and following is a quotation from 1921 on his acknowledgment of the importance of training leaders in a democratic nation:

“ In no other Army is it so important that the officers of the permanent establishment be highly perfected specialists prepared to serve as instructors and leaders for the citizen forces which fight our wars”⁶

Years later, at the onset of WW II he is reported to have said:

“ It became clear to me at the age of 58, I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position, I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in rapping out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.”

General Marshall had continued to mature in his 20 years since WW I and on the eve of WW II he understood that a great leader requires not only a special personality, but one capable of changing as one’s position and corresponding responsibilities increase. Marshall’s views on leadership from the perspective of a WW I front line staff officer to the Army’s senior leader in 20 years are observations that should not go unnoticed.

THE USAWC’S FORMATIVE AND EARLY YEARS:

In 1875, because of the lopsided outcome of the Franco- Prussian Wars and a recognized long standing need for Army reform, Secretary of War Belknap directed General Emory Upton to undertake a world wide tour to investigate and document how other nations educated their senior military officers.

The reform debate had originated in the 1840s and was fueled for the next three decades by an Army intellect named General Halleck, who was pejoratively referred to as "Old Brains".⁷ Unfortunately, Halleck's arguments for change fell on deaf ears and had little effect on an Army where conservatism and seniority prevailed. General Upton's mission required two years and his final report published in 1878 was entitled The Armies of Europe and Asia. The study made many recommendations, including one to establish "A War College to educate officers in the art of war, and to prepare them for the staff and to hold high command."⁸ In spite of the fact that General Upton was a Civil War hero, his writings and the efforts of others did not generate the reform that was required. Instead, the Army's service arms and their respective Bureau Chiefs, who were the Army's real power brokers, retained their prerogatives in educating their branch officers.

The Engineer branch had opened their school at Willet's Point, New York in 1866 and this event was successively followed by the Artillery School, an Infantry and Cavalry school, a Cavalry and Light Artillery school and finally the Medical Branch opened their school in 1893.⁹ During this period, the Bureau Chiefs answered directly to The Secretary of War. The Commanding General was considered at best as an equal and although he was given every courtesy, his orders rarely went unchallenged or were brokered through the Secretary of War's Office prior to their execution.¹⁰ Compounding reform was the smallness of the Army and the fact it was scattered across the continent because of the Indian Wars. Accordingly, the interest in change was limited especially when paired to the comfort and power found in maintaining the status quo. Collectively, these forces were sufficient to stifle reform and negate the impact of General Upton's study and his recommendations for improvement in the Army.¹¹

In an interesting counterpoint, as the Army education reform effort faltered in the 1880s, the Navy made the decision in 1885 to assume the lead agency role for the reform of their officer education and established the Naval War College. The Navy found a visionary in Captain Luce, who later rose to the rank of Rear Admiral, who quickly embarked on creating a Naval War College. "Strangely enough", the only full-time faculty instructor at the Naval War College was an Army lieutenant charged with teaching military history.¹²

With the conclusion of the Spanish American War in 1899 and its documented problems,

President Roosevelt directed newly appointed Secretary of War Elihu Root to initiate Army wide reforms. Secretary of War Root was a corporate lawyer and recognized as a centralizer who was willing to take charge.¹³ Root also strongly believed, the Army could profit from “intellectual exercise”.¹⁴ One area identified for reform was the establishment of a senior officer education system with a curriculum designed to educate senior officers in the conduct of war as a means to avoid the mistakes encountered in the prosecution of the Spanish American War. In 1900, Root ordered the Army to form a committee, which was tasked to prepare the regulations required to establish the USAWC. General Ludlow was selected to chair the committee because he was a professional soldier and a like minded reformer. One of his committee members, LTC Sanger, was familiar with the work of General Upton and made the text, The Armies of Europe and Asia, available to the committee. General Ludlow understood Secretary of War Root’s intent and using Upton’s study as a guide, quickly produced an encompassing reform product for President Roosevelt and Congress.¹⁵ Congress quickly followed through on General Ludlow’s recommendations by making \$20,000¹⁶ available to fund the establishment of the USAWC and another \$400,000 was appropriated to construct the War College Campus at a location that would eventually become Fort McNair.¹⁷ Senior officer development would be two tiered. Namely, there would be a Command and General Staff College for Captains and Majors and a United States Army War College for Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels.¹⁸

For this discussion, Root’s other reforms included reorganization of the Army’s hierarchy and the formation of a de facto General Staff. Congress would not initially support a large General Staff, so an early role of the USAWC was to serve as a planning cell for the War Department under the supervision of the General Staff.¹⁹ In reflection, Secretary Root used the USAWC as his primary reform tool to achieve a full fledged General Staff and a War College and as such, the development of the General Staff and the mission of the USAWC in the early years were inextricably intertwined. The USAWC although “meant to serve as the highest institute where officers could be trained in the conduct of war”, through 1919 actually served the two functions of planning agency and preparatory school for educating officers to serve on the emerging General Staff and as senior commanders.²⁰ To drive the reform point home to the Army’s leadership, one of Secretary Root’s first taskings to the War College was to “draw up a detailed inventory

of America's armed forces, their location, equipment and preparedness for war".²¹ Clearly, there was work to be done.

The Army needed a focused Commandant for the War College, and after a short tenure by General S.B.M. Young, found one in General Tasker Bliss, who like General Upton before him, had also studied the German military system. General Bliss was considered well qualified for the position having served as a translator of classics, and as an instructor at West Point and the Naval War College.²² He took his labors seriously and quickly established the educational foundation for broadening the knowledge of the military art of senior leaders.²³ By 1905, the College was executing its dual purposes of General Staff planning section and as an institution for individual professional development. This pattern continued until 1917 with the temporary closure of the USAWC during WWI. In the early years of the College, students only attended for four months, but gradually over the next two decades the length of school's academic program was extended to a year where it's remained to this day. Because of the Prussian influence, the course of study was loosely based on the *Kriegsakademie* model, a three-year General Staff officer course for promising officers. Specifically, Clausewitz's philosophy and Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke's educational direction strongly influenced the curriculum during the USAWC's early years.²⁴ Finally, after more than 125 years of existence, the Army had a finishing school for senior leaders.²⁵

The formation of the USAWC and senior officer education is a lesson in slow change. Although, the Army had been engaged in a reform dialogue for 60 years since the 1840s, and had seriously analyzed the topic by commissioning General Upton's study in the 1870's. It took outsiders a generation after Upton's study was completed and the tragic lessons of the Spanish American War to initiate major substantive new direction for the Army. It was finally recognized, that the Army bureau chiefs had entirely too much power and their decentralized system usurped the chain of command by answering first to the Secretary of War versus the Army Commanding General. Perhaps this was an effective system when the nation was formed, but as the 20th century dawned the requirement for reform was all to evident. Both President Theodore Roosevelt, who had first hand knowledge of the system's shortcomings and Secretary of War Root deserve credit for imposing change. However, without the scholarly work of Upton and the arguments of Sanger and Ludlow who studied Upton's ideas, this

period of transition in the Army conceivably would have been less smooth and rapid. Instead, Elihu Root had a blueprint for reform and this paired with his forcefulness, and the backing of the President ensured swift new direction. With Root's sure hand directing the way, the Army had a school system for senior leaders. Concurrently, the Army Bureaus quickly began to lose their preeminence and control, while the Army Commanding General and the infant Army Staff began the march towards centralized control. The Army was again looking forward in these opening decades of the 20th century. On a tragic note, Upton committed suicide some believe because of his dissatisfaction with the slow pace of change in the Army.²⁶

THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT:

As 1919 drew to a close, the nation was headlong in demobilizing the Army after the conclusion of "the war to end all wars," in 1918 with the Treaty of Versailles. President Wilson was traveling the country attempting to build consensus for collective security through support of a League of Nations. Meanwhile the while the press, the populace, and the Congress were involved in a continuing dialogue over America's role in the world. It was a time intended as a golden age for business, industry and society. As America continued to industrialize, the population migrated from the farms to the urban areas, and with the coming of the Depression and Midwest dust storms of the 1930s, moved westward to the Pacific as well. With increased industrialization, the march of technology continued. Improvements in the radio and the internal combustion engine led to reliable communications and expanding air travel shortening worldwide distances. Beginning with the rejection of President Wilson's foreign policy initiatives, America withdrew from international affairs and steadily tracked on a course of isolationism.

The nation did not have any peer competitors. Germany was defeated and bankrupt, the French were economically devastated, the British had lost a generation of young men and were war weary as reflected in the poetry of Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves' autobiography Good-Bye to All That. The Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires that existed at the start of the war were defeated, rapidly dissolving, and their influence was fading. In their place as potential enemies, and only on the distant horizon, were the Japanese who had exited World War I unscathed and militarily stronger with a growing Navy and industrial-military complex.²⁷ There were also the communists and

the "menace of Bolshevism", but these were unknowns.²⁸ America was at peace and potential threats from such distant lands could not galvanize national security interest. Economically, the world was preparing for a roller coaster ride and the "Golden Age" of the first decade quickly turned to despair as the world was enveloped in a world depression starting with the Stock Market Crash of 1929. As the country moved forward into the 1930's, there was a rise in nationalism (the Nazis), fascism (Mussolini) and the Japanese embarked on imperialistic expansion in China. Unfortunately, the victors in WWI opted for a policy of appeasement that eventually led to an arms race in the 1930s and another World War barely 20 years after the first one concluded.

As the 1920's dawned, America did not believe another war would arrive anytime soon and "these predictions also reflect a return to American optimism that sprang up after WW I" which in turn began political discussion to set national policy to determine how much land power was enough.²⁹ Once again the Army took a back seat as it rapidly demobilized from over 2M in 1919 to an end strength of 140,000 active duty soldiers, including roughly 14,000 officers by 1921. The defense budget was less than 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)³⁰ with the Army's share per year through 1935 approximately \$425M.³¹ The absence of a clear and focused threat during the inter-war years meant a peace dividend gained through a greatly reduced army. Would the inter-war years be a time for the U.S. Army to learn and reform for the future or a period in which to merely chronicle and forget the lessons of this last Great War? Even though it was a period of peace, lessons could be applied to reform doctrine in response to emerging technologies and experiences of the last war. These lessons were being examined against an international and domestic backdrop of a "New World Order".

THE USAWC AND 1919:

The end of World War I was an obvious restart point to carry on the educational reforms begun by Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1900. As the War College reopened in 1919, so pervasive was the German influence at the USAWC that the statue of Frederick the Great was once again taken out of hiding, unveiled and resumed its place on the USAWC parade field. The statue, in the spirit of

tradition, remains there today having observed one other short absence from 1941 -1945.³² The school's reopening witnessed the conclusion of the USAWC serving as a General Staff planning section although planning remained imbedded in the curriculum. After World War I, Congress legislated sufficient staffing and funding for a full Army Staff eliminating the need for USAWC war planning and as such, the College Commandant was also no longer double hatted as Chief of War Planning Division.³³

Rather than plans, the USAWC's focus was now on education and the professional needs of the career officer with an emphasis on preparing them to serve as senior commanders and as primaries on General Staffs.³⁴ It was now fully recognized and accepted, " that war consisted of more than the practical art of throat cutting – in other words, that it rested on a substantial body of theoretical knowledge that had to be mastered.³⁵ The Army leadership knew change was required because of trench warfare and the horrible losses witnessed on European battlefields. The impact of technology (the machine gun, barbed wire, the radio, armor, aircraft and massed fires) were all too evident and this paired to the writings of J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart as well as other visionaries set the stage for change. To prepare the next generation of Army senior leaders, the curriculum appropriately enough was focused on the preparation for and the conduct of war.

THE STUDENT POPULATION:

As the Army and its leaders returned from the battlefields of Europe, there was a large pool of officers to select from for attendance at the USAWC. As such, almost all the attendees were experienced combat veterans well versed in the realities of WW I. Attendees also knew the Army was in turmoil because of downsizing and an uncertain future. Many knew small isolated posts were in their futures and the potential for rapid advancement was not possible. As a group, they could be characterized as extremely dedicated.³⁶

Like today, there were no formal written examinations for admission into the college even though the USAWC was modeled on the German *Kriegsakademie*, which mandated challenging entrance examinations. Initial selection criteria for attendance at the USAWC was therefore based on one of three

criteria. First, an officer's written record was always reviewed and although not always objective, cumulative reports generally ensured deserving officers were enrolled in the school. The design of the school was for combat arms officers, so most of the early post WW I students had served as commanders of at least brigades or had served as primary staff officers at division level or higher. Second, a mentor's or sponsor's input clearly weighed in the decision and an officer's reputation was often key to the selection process.³⁷ In one interesting example from the late 1930s, four officers were nominated for attendance, but because of a vote of no confidence upon consideration, one of the four was denied entry. It was felt he could do more for the Army for the next few years as a riding companion of Mrs. Roosevelt.³⁸ As a third criteria, success at one level of school generally ensured attendance at the next level. Accordingly, it was difficult for a student to be selected to attend the War College unless he was a graduate of the Command and General Staff College. In the Army education system of the inter-war period, it was possible that some officers had 10 years of military schooling by the time they had graduated from the War College.³⁹

Students at the War College were generally older. The maximum age for acceptance was 52,⁴⁰ but over the course of the 20's and 30's the maximum age was slowly lowered to 44 by judicious student selection.⁴¹ By the end of the inter-war period, the average graduate was 45 years old. Ages by grade were as follows:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Age Range</u>
COL	47 - 55
LTC	45 - 51
MAJ	41 - 46
CPT	41 - 44 *

* In 1924 (1) CPT was 34⁴²

Considering the Army's downsizing and a smaller Officer Corps that numbered some 14,000, it is not surprisingly to find the ranks of students in residence ranged from Captain through General. In 1924, the school's official archives show General Pershing was a graduate. Originally, he was a member of the class of 1904-1905, but because of an assignment in the Far East did not qualify for graduation. Three other classes, 1922, 1924 and 1935, had U.S. Brigadier generals in attendance, but by and large USAWC graduates were generally below flag grade in rank and the rolls reflect the bulk of the students were

captains and majors.⁴³

The classes were much smaller then today with the average graduating class numbering about 80. There were 62 graduates in 1923 and 100 in 1940. Additionally, the USAWC was already making inroads in joint education in that there was an exchange of Naval and Marine Corps officers in attendance. This contingent of officers constituted 5% to 9% of a given year's class.⁴⁴ The USAWC also had billets for National Guard and Reserve Officers. Some attended for the full year, while others only attended special courses in their G-Staff area of responsibility or the command blocks as a refresher for a future senior command assignment. Most surprising, in an incredible show of dedication, some of these officers attended "Without Expense to the Government".⁴⁵ There were also deaths in the classes and in at least one case a student (Major Bultman, 1940) died prior to graduation, but his widow received his graduation diploma.⁴⁶

In summary, the inter-war years' student population was generally older, battle tested and based on that day and age extremely dedicated and capable. In the course of the inter-war period, 1660 Army officers graduated and their rolls included another 129 Navy and Marine Corps graduates.⁴⁷ Of these 1660 graduates, 453 made BG, 349 promoted to MG, 41 attained LTG, 12 reached General and two (Eisenhower and Bradley) rose to General of the Army.⁴⁸ Clearly, the USAWC had a role in educating the students who themselves were destined to lead in WW II or instruct and advise other military leaders of the next great and looming conflict.

THE FACULTY

The faculty were military and like the students veterans of WW I. Of significant note, the faculty was junior in the sense that many of the instructors were the same rank or junior to the students in residence. To add diversity to the War College staff, there was an exchange of faculty with the Naval War College. The Commandant had limited control over faculty selection. Unless he could negotiate for faculty members by name, the College was generally at the mercy of the personnel system for instructors although most served as instructors at other locations in the officer education system during the inter-war period.

As an interesting example, one USAWC instructor, Major George Marshall was asked numerous times to instruct at the USAWC before he assumed an instructor's post in the mid 1920's. Marshall's tenure was extremely short at the school because with the death of his first wife, he asked for and received a transfer to Fort Benning. Personal reasons surely played in the decision, but later it is recorded that he felt the Infantry School was where the Army's required innovation and training were occurring.⁴⁹

To lend variety and outside expertise to the curriculum, the War College placed heavy emphasis on the guest lecture program. Some years there were up to 130 lectures per year with up to a quarter of these representing civilian agencies or companies.⁵⁰ The remainder of the guest speakers were U.S. government, U.S. military, U.S. civilian leaders or international guests. As an example, in school year 1927-1928 there were 115 lectures as follows:

<u>Course</u>	<u>No. of Lectures</u>
War Plans	10
G-1	10
G-3	10
G-4	10
ASW*	10
G-2	20
Command I	15
War Plans II	30

*Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement of Supplies.⁵¹

The guest speaker program was intended as a focused effort to round out the formal faculty instruction and lend expertise and credibility to the course of study.⁵² The lectures were "delivered by qualified men"⁵³ and a non-attribution policy or confidentiality code was in effect.⁵⁴ There was a sentiment that some instructors failed to challenge conventional notions and the students were stimulated to learn on their own and this in turn, may have enhanced later initiative and resourcefulness. In counterpoint, the *Kriegakademie* assigned highly successful senior leaders to serve as role models and mentors to the *Akademie's* students.⁵⁵ In addition to the lack of a fully credentialed faculty, the extensive guest lecture program left little time for independent studies. As a result, the college's first attempt to gain accreditation to award an advanced degree failed in the 1936-1937-school year.⁵⁶

This is not to say that the instructors were ineffective, because numerous instructors from captain

through colonel were nominated for duty on the War Department General Staff and other postings as the years progressed.

THE CURRICULUM:

In light of the world and national posture, what was the average year at the USAWC for the senior leader during the two decades of the inter-war years? To enhance student's knowledgeable in the strategic realm, the college structured the curriculum to complement independent studies. Scheduled classes assigned students individual tasks or placed them on committees. Students were expected to follow General Bliss's "learn by doing"⁵⁷ method and ended exercises with briefbacks conducted in conference.⁵⁸ The academic year was roughly divided into four phases that encompassed the preparation for war, the conduct of war, a command block culminating with a Command Post Exercise and a Historical Ride. The ride more often than not lasted up to 10 days and explored the tactical and strategic aspects of Civil War battles and campaigns fought in the vicinity of Washington D.C.

Theory was discussed, but not as a course unto itself.⁵⁹ Rather military theory was broadly incorporated in class assignments and reinforced with a concentration on the principles of war, especially from COL William K. Naylor's Principles of Strategy.⁶⁰ Almost universally, students read and knew the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, and Sun Tzu. They also explored the thoughts of General Giulio Douhet and General Billy Mitchell on air power and read the theories and ideas on mechanization and motorization by British Generals J.F.C. Fuller and Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Germany's Guderian and Rommel and French strategist General Charles de Gaulle.⁶¹

Students incorporated lessons learned from WW I in their solutions, studied history, and spent many hours in professional reading programs. To round out the year, there were guest lectures, extensive readings, special focus classes for detailed officers (Ordnance and Quartermaster), Reservists and National Guard Officers. The program also included sports and leisure time.⁶²

One interesting feature of the College's curriculum during this period was it didn't change much from year to year. Commandants had authority to reorder the sequence, in which courses were taught, shift emphasis in the amount of time spent in an area of concentration, but generally they were not

allowed to make substantive change.⁶³ The reasons for this were twofold. First the War Department approved the course of study and to its and the Army's credit maintained the focus on war.⁶⁴ Second and more importantly, when General McAndrews established the curriculum for school year 1919-1920, he closely linked the course of study to the War College's mission statement. This mission statement did not change during the inter-war years and as a result the curriculum varied only slightly from 1919-1940.⁶⁵ Senior strategic leader, education starting in 1919, followed a seven-course curriculum:

1. THE INTELLIGENCE COURSE.

"The course called for an analysis of the international situation resulting from World War, with special reference to the economic, political, and military change that would be made by the treaties proposed for ending the war.

It was believed that such a broad study would best illustrate the application to analyze a complicated international situation."⁶⁶

Army strategists of the 20's and 30's were faced with situations similar to today's challenges – how does one design a counter to the enemy of the future when the political environment is encouraging other courses of action? One of the US strengths at the onset of WW II was the solid working knowledge of Army leaders about the non-military instruments of power (economics, diplomacy and politics). Interestingly, this area was not emphasized at other senior military schools around the world and it gave US officers the advantage of recognizing non-military matters in the formation of national objectives, strategy and the conduct of war.⁶⁷ Not unlike today, Clausewitz's writings were firmly rooted in strategic intelligence analysis. It was accepted that "War was nothing but the continuation of policy with other means".⁶⁸ America found that by the end of the 1930s that mobilization and rearmament were once again necessary to balance ends, ways and means skewed by ignoring "the fact that wealth and power or economic and military strength are always relative and changing within the international community".⁶⁹ The study of politics and economics was necessary for the development of professional soldiers such as Eisenhower, MacArthur and Marshall, who transcended the military to become "diplomats, politicians and finally statesmen."⁷⁰ These leaders had attained a supreme quality

Clausewitz called “educated judgment”.⁷¹ To gain additional viewpoints in the classroom, civilians from the Departments of Commerce and State attended the G2 Course as early as 1922.⁷² By placing the Intelligence Course at the beginning of the year, it is clear that the framers of the curriculum understood the importance of strategic intelligence analysis as a basic building block in the formation of national strategy and resultant war plans.⁷³

2. THE WAR PLANS COURSE.

“The G-3 ... War Plan was worked out in three parts from a chronological standpoint with three additional special phases.

The main plan and its phases, totaling six continuous problems, constituted the basis of the Personnel, Supply and Training Courses which followed, the War Game series, and the Field Reconnaissance. There were no assumptions made in the G-3 Course, except the existence of legislation necessary to prosecute unlimited war.⁷⁴

During the war plans course, students used the G2 Course’s strategic intelligence analysis to develop war plans for a theater of operations. This exercise served as a strategic level plan to wage war at the operational level. Because of the German influence, USAWC students developed their war plans using the “Estimate of the Situation”, a structured, logical and systemic military planning process to derive mission, purpose, task, enemy capabilities, and finally courses of action (COA).⁷⁵ As the 1930’s progressed, the focus of war plan development shifted from the Far East to Europe and the emerging Nazi threat. Of particular significance, war plan development included early joint coordination between the Army and Navy to study and concentrate on similar scenarios.⁷⁶ During the Pacific campaign starting in 1942, Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur used concepts i.e., island hopping and amphibious assaults developed in the 1920’s at the Naval War College. It should be noted “this was done in wargaming sessions when Japan was not an enemy of the United States, when overall military budgets were < 1% of the GNP, when the force structure needed to execute the concepts did not exist and the national sentiment was to avoid foreign entanglements”.⁷⁷ Additionally, USAWC students continued to review the War Department Rainbow Plans, but as MacArthur later reflected, no matter what version of Plan Orange (Defense of the Philippines) we were given, the plan always seemed inadequate and there were always insufficient resources to execute the plan.⁷⁸

To gain an appreciation of the effort entailed to mobilize and execute war plans, the students

then studied and exercised in personnel, supply and training courses:

3. THE PERSONNEL COURSE.

"The Personnel Course was ...studied in committees...on the following subjects:

Selective Draft	Military Programs
The Draft Reclassification	Occupational Classification
Psychological Tests	Localization of Units
Commissioned Personnel	Temporary Officer Personnel
Quartering and Police	Welfare
Statistics	Traffic Control
Organization of Operations Division	
Tables of Organization and Equipment	

Students were required to submit a detailed study as to the Personnel requirements for the defense of Hawaii.⁷⁹

Homeland defense and mobilization were clearly the thrust of this course. The professional military officer of the 20's and 30's had a wealth of data from WW I from which to derive lessons learned. Foremost, were the challenges of massive mobilization and demobilization. From 1917 to 1918, the US Army increased in size some 20 times from 133,000⁸⁰ to more than 4 million soldiers in uniform.⁸¹ With the conclusion of WW I, Congress rapidly demobilized the Army to 300,000 soldiers during 1919-1920 and finally to approximately 140,000 by 1921.⁸² After the personnel analysis the course progressed to supply analysis.

4. THE SUPPLY COURSE

"The program of work for the Supply Course was based on the work that the class has already completed during the Operations Course for students to...become impressed with the necessity for the coordination of all the elements and means of supply, both for the Zone of the Interior and the Theater of Operations, and thus insure the preparation of a workable plan of evacuation and supply based on the assumed situation."⁸³

Based on lessons learned from WWI, the Army leadership realized that massive mobilization and large armies concurrently drive up consumption rates. Consequently, logistics would now be a major

planning consideration because the “tail” could prove to be an operational limitation. It was not lost on Marshall that in WW I “the great American industrial machine never did get into full war production.”⁸⁴ Materiel shortfalls at the end of the war included no 75mm or 155mm artillery pieces, limited amounts of artillery ammunition, and less than 1000 aircraft of an estimated requirement of 50,000.⁸⁵

After completing this academic phase, students understood the importance of manning and equipping the force, now they had to consider training.

5, THE TRAINING COURSE:

“In order to give the class instructions and practice in the duties of...training as commanders of large units, both in time of peace and war ...four weeks of the College course (April 16 - May 17) were allotted for this subject...the subject of training was considered divisible into:

(a) What to teach the soldier (or officer)

(b) How to teach him

(c) The management of training for the Red-Orange Plan by the War Department as a big business proposition”⁸⁶

In some cases, it took months after the arrival of the 1st American Expeditionary Force (AEF) soldiers in France to finish their final training prior to their introduction to the trenches.⁸⁷ The rapidity and scale of the WW I mobilization overwhelmed the American training base when paired to the new technologies and lethality of the WW I battlefield. Barbed wire, the machine gun, the increased range and explosive force of artillery, the mud, chemical warfare on a grand scale, aircraft, long range observation combined with radios and mechanization to include armor had dramatically altered the dynamics of the battlefield. Until they received additional training, the American Army was not ready. This lesson was not lost on the Americans after the war concluded. There was an ongoing emphasis to train the militias because it was recognized “a clumsiness in handling troops betrayed a lack in confidence “. ⁸⁸ To the USAWC’s credit, National Guard and Reserve officers were regularly incorporated in the College’s classes until 1934 when there were insufficient funds to pay for their attendance.⁸⁹ To reduce mobilization time, there was a call for universal military training to provide a base force and a

trained pool of manpower to rapidly expand a small Army in case of national emergency.⁹⁰ After understanding how the force was trained, students now had the opportunity to war game:

6. THE WAR GAME COURSE

"The purpose of the War Game Course was to give practice in and see the consequences of important initial decisions and to bring home to all the will and activity of the enemy. Two parties, Blue and Red... were forced to encounter the opponent's will and to realize the hostile moves...will still block plans...No side won. ...studies must be made of the desirability of studying the localization of troops, organization and dates on which war preparations as to numbers and equipment and training must be completed, in order to result most favorable to Blue".⁹¹

Then like now, students pitted two forces (Blue and Red) against one another and wargamed the plan. During the school year exercise described there was no winner, but the faculty allowed the students to study and review the outcome of their plan. At the conclusion of the game, students moved their war plan to the field and integrated terrain into the equation.

7. THE FIELD EXERCISE COURSE

" In a similar manner, the Field Exercise Course conducted from June 1st to 12th brought home the actual terrain and physical objects which must materially effect the progress of events. ...Tracing back by road, rail and water, according to the particular case under consideration, fairly definite conclusions can be reached as to the desirable dispositions to be had at the time of entering the theater of operations...From such studies we can learn what are the most urgent and important improvements that should be striven for in time of peace to improve the situation during the phase that leads to the first crisis"⁹²

By the end of a year, the curriculum had exposed the graduate to all of the steps required for waging the operational level of war in a theater of operations. After a strategic assessment was completed, a plan was written, resourced, developed through a map exercise (war game) and capped with a field problem. The student now had a broader knowledge and understanding of the military art. MG McAndrew closed class year 1919-1920 by writing the War Department:

"The changes in the course next year will be minor, including a reorganization more nearly along the lines of the War Department General Staff, more attention to higher command, and a differentiation of the duties of the higher commander and the General Staff".⁹³

General McAndrew's words were prophetic, because as the decade progressed, the courses detailed above remained fairly constant. By school year 1927-1928 the curriculum was as follows:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Timeframe</u>
War Plans I	September 2 –17
G-1 Course	September 19-October 22
G-3 Course	October 24 – November 12
G- 4 Course	November 14 – December 7
ASW*	December 8 – December 24
G-2	January 3 – February 8
Command I	February 9 – April 4
War Plans II	April 5- May 30
Command II	May 31- June 30

*Assistant Sec of War for Procurement of Supplies⁹⁴

The War Plans I focused on lessons learned, the steps and agencies involved in planning and strategic studies. The G-1 Course emphasized morale, personnel management, selective service and mobilization/demobilization. In addition to the Regular Army Officers in attendance for the full year, National Guard/Reserve Officers also attended this course. The G-3 Course taught organization, equipment and training. The G-4 Course emphasized supply and transportation, plus finance and the role of the Navy in overseas operations. ASW was a course in the procurement and production control of supplies at the national level and a survey of industry. The G-2 Course emphasized intelligence preparation of the battlefield at the national level to include: economics, political and social conditions. Additionally, the course covered matters of international law, censorship, and armament limitations. The Command I Course dealt with organization, strategy, tactics of the Army and the coordination necessary to enable large organizations to perform their assigned roles. In War Plans II, students wrote war plans followed by a map exercise in the Command II course. These courses culminated with a field exercise.⁹⁵

The most noteworthy development of this year’s curriculum was the ASW course because it set the stage for sending Regular Army officers to the Army Industrial College starting in 1930. During WW I mobilization, the Army identified a need for a cooperative national effort to manufacture adequate supplies for the war effort. The Army Industrial College (AIC) was established in 1924 through the efforts of Bernard Baruch,⁹⁶ It was collocated with the AWC with the mission, “to educate officers in the useful knowledge pertaining to the supervision of procurement of all military supplies in time of war and to the

assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organization essential to wartime needs".⁹⁷ The first graduates of this program, Reservists and National Guard officers, through their civilian networks, were key in harnessing America's industrial might. This was demonstrated during WW II, first by the "Lend Lease" program and later in the full wartime production for both the US and Allies WW II effort. The AIC evolved to become today's Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF).

In school year of 1928 – 1929, the College again formally reorganized the curriculum into a Preparation for War Course and Conduct of War Course. Generally this reorganization only changed the sequencing of the courses from the prior year. The curriculum of the school year 1929 – 1930 reflected a course of study that would last the decade. It consisted of:

Preparation for War

G3 Course	September 4 to September 28
G1 Course	September 30 to October 26
G4 Course	October 28 to November 23
G2 Course	November 25 to December 24
War Plans Course	January 2 to February 8

Conduct of War

1 st Period	February 10 to March 22	Map Exercise of Allegheny Mts.
2 nd Period	March 24 to April 19	Map Exercise of War Plan Red*
3 rd Period	May 5 to 21 May	Joint Army and Navy Map Exercise
4 th Period	May 22 to June 7	Map Exercise of Delaware Bay Area
5 th Period	June 9 to June 26	Reconnaissance and Command Post Exercise ⁹⁸

*War Plan for Germany

The major thrusts were command functions and analytical studies of campaigns. Finally, as the decade of the 1930's ended, mobilization and training gained increasing emphasis.

A number of other mechanisms augmented the formal curriculum. Individual reading programs and advanced study programs were important. All students had reading programs. But the best students and subsequently best known leaders such as George Patton were avid readers who in

many cases owned extensive private libraries. Others in this group included Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, Taylor, and Ridgeway. Generally, they did not record their impressions or thoughts in the margins of their texts, however Patton was an exception and his margin notes provide valuable insights about his analysis of others' writings.⁹⁹ Patton performed two years of advanced studies at the USAWC adding to his extensive knowledge of history and leadership and further developing his ideas on armored and mechanized warfare.¹⁰⁰ During his stay at the War College, he fully immersed himself in strategy and warfighting through the readings of Thucydides, Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great Napoleon, Clausewitz, Sherman and the leading thinkers of the day such as: J.F.C. Fuller, Liddell Hart, Guderian, and Rommel.¹⁰¹

Additionally, he chaired a study group that advocated "small, highly trained, well equipped professional armies" and the future potential of armor and mechanized forces in a combined arms role.¹⁰² This experience gave him a better appreciation for the doctrine of the next war. His 56 page Strategic Research Paper entitled "The Probable Characteristics of the Next War and the Organization, Tactics and Equipment Necessary to Meet Them" neither provided the exact solution for winning WW II, nor were his ideas fully embraced.¹⁰³ But his studies and extensive readings of the 1930's provided the edge he needed to defeat the Germans in WW II.¹⁰⁴ Ironically, Patton's advocacy of armor and mechanization was regarded by many as professional suicide. Patton is rumored to have been professionally threatened by senior horse cavalry leaders' resistance to such ideas.¹⁰⁵

Even the success of Patton's ideas in the Louisiana maneuvers was criticized for violating the game's rules. His response fittingly was that "he was unaware of the existence of any rules in warfare".¹⁰⁶ Regardless of institutional pressures, Patton was considered one of Army's best thinkers during the inter-war years. He is credited for "a kind of warfare that was so fast and destructive that the battle could be won with a minimum of friendly casualties and expenditure of materiel."¹⁰⁷

GRADUATION:

There was no formal program for grading or rank ordering the students on their academic efficiency reports at graduation.¹⁰⁸ Students either failed to complete, met or exceeded course

requirements and were considered as "fit" or "unfit".¹⁰⁹ However, in correspondence to the War Department, especially in the years under General McAndrews, the ratings of "fit" and "unfit" were brutally honest. Ratings made recommendations on the potential of officers to fill positions of higher command and General Staff assignments. Officers were either identified as "Especially recommended for the War Department General Staff, any division", "Recommended for the War Department General Staff, but only in the divisions set opposite their respective names", "Not recommended for high command". Officers not endorsed for the General Staff were regarded as lacking the requisite qualifications for the job, while "the absence of recommendations for high command in the case of senior officers is due to lack of initiative on their part or to temperamental characteristics which it is believe disqualify for command." There were officers who failed to graduate for any number of reasons.¹¹⁰ Even though the Army selected the best suited and presumably most capable officers for attendance at the USAWC, not everyone who attended the College was destined to advance. Conversely, attendance was important, but not absolutely vital or a discriminator for promotion or higher level command.¹¹¹ As the 1930's ended, USAWC students were rooted in problem solving and thinking seriously about matters ahead. Hitler's actions and his rhetoric fanned the winds of war and the world once again was on the brink of conflict.

LESSONS LEARNED.

The College's curriculum provided officers a solid foundation in the strategic art. This period of the USAWC's history provides numerous lessons about the development of senior leaders of WW II. Most notable among these are:

First and foremost, the curriculum focused on war. The G2 Course (Strategic Intelligence Analysis), forced students to incorporate the national instruments of power into the strategic setting, for later use in the war planning and wargaming courses.

Second, the curriculum mixed both individual and committee work. This allowed students to find solutions on their own as well as work in a staff setting. Individual reading and study programs set the best and brightest apart from their peers. Prior to WW I, officers were promoted based on examinations which necessitated outside study. With the National Defense Act of 1920, seniority became the overwhelming mechanism for advancement and thereafter, it was generally only the most serious leaders who had independent study programs.¹¹²

Third, the USAWC provided its students a rudimentary for a “Joint” education through an awareness of war plan scenarios and a basic understanding of naval capabilities and requirements.

Finally, the college’s emphasis on mobilization and its role in the formation of the Army Industrial College forged links between civilians and the military, which in turn created a mechanism for rapidly expanding the Army. The great Captains of WW II used this educational period to think, reflect, and prepare to solve for uncertainty.

ALL THAT GLITTERS ISN'T GOLD.

Despite many successes, the impact of the inter-war period must be kept in the proper perspective. Not all leaders of that generation adapted to the rapid changes in technology or placed a premium on innovation when new solutions were required. As a result not all the senior leaders necessarily commanded nor were they successful strategists. Macgregor writes that Marshall in his reorganization of the Army for WW II retired or relieved in excess of 500 officers.”¹¹³ Some notable misfires include General Short (USAWC 1925) and Admiral Kimmel failing to adequately prepare and act on the available intelligence that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. In February 1943, the II Corps Commander, MG Fredenhall (USAWC 1925) experienced defeat at Kasserine in North Africa at the hands of the Germans. His WW I distant, map board based approach to the battle combined with relatively inexperienced troops resulted in a terrible failure. Later in the war, leadership failures resulted in the tragedies of Anzio, Salerno and the Hurtgen Forest.¹¹⁴ Fortunately, General Marshall minimized these missteps by observing future senior leaders over the two decades preceding WW II and selecting the best and brightest, but once again actual combat ultimately “determined who was suited to lead.”¹¹⁵

There are questions on the substance and intellectual impact of this period and even now historians, soldiers and educators are in disagreement on whether the schooling made a difference.¹¹⁶ The criticisms of the curriculum fall into three broad categories. First, the school produced conservative officers who “showed a decided tendency to stay within the odds... and refrained (on the battlefield) from opting for the imaginative and unexpected.”¹¹⁷ As a counterpoint, Churchill was perplexed by the overall quality of American commanders and their staffs,¹¹⁸ but generally conservatism ruled as witnessed by Mitchell’s courts-martial and mechanization being placed aside for another day by reactionary inter-war

Army leaders. Second, the Army rarely assigned the best officers to serve as instructors and in the inter-war years Army, the workday was often short, discussions were provincial and course work rarely challenged the individual who wasn't self motivated.¹¹⁹ Finally, the Army "rarely rewarded academic excellence by giving it weight in later assignments and judgements about proficiency in the profession" of commanding or serving as senior staff.¹²⁰

Regardless of this criticism, the USAWC focused on the preparation for war and the conduct of war which when linked to fighting and winning the nation's battles has applicability today. The first focus of the College remained the study of the profession of arms and the Army's senior WW II leaders performed well, "considering the limitations of a rapidly formed mobilization Army, and given the unusual tasks assigned them - - tasks with which they had absolutely no experience before 1941."¹²¹ Blumenson writes of America's military leaders from this period "But how our small inter-war Army produced the leadership that got us successfully through the war remains in large part a miracle and, like most miracles, a mystery."¹²² The investment in education during the inter-war years played a significant role in this miracle.

THOUGHTS FOR EDUCATING TOMORROW'S STRATEGIST:.

"If unpreparedness for war is one pattern in 20th century politics, another is the swift return to an isolationist military posture immediately after conflict" and because of this in 1921 the Army had shrunk to a shadow of its former self.¹²³ Now that the Cold War is solidly behind us and the Army drawn down by "right sizing" does the USAWC curriculum require review for developing the Army's strategic leaders for the next 10-20 years? The student of the 1920s was faced with adapting strategy all the while adjusting to the new lethality of emerging battlefield technology. While today's environment today has parallels with the inter-war years, the only constant between these periods is the environment will continue to be complex and dangerous.

The future strategist must balance Clausewitz's "fog of war"¹²⁴ with the ancient view of Sun Tzu that "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill".¹²⁵ Yet, "Strategic thinking by the American military appears to have gone into hiding. Planning on the tactical and operational levels flourishes, but the strategic is largely discussed in historical terms rather than as current art."¹²⁶ The Army

today can take lessons from the Army of the 1930s when the strategic art strongly influenced future leaders plans for the future.

Some adjustments to the curriculum could better prepare the next generation of strategic leaders for the surprises of the future. Most importantly, the War College must continue the focus on war fighting. Just as academic institutions instruct other instruments of national power, the USAWC must remain foremost in strategic military thought. To emphasize warfighting, the USAWC must continue war gaming. This is a tried true and tested method of studying competitors, evaluating their capabilities and weaknesses, and discerning their potential courses of action. The gaming must emphasize a joint perspective to foster an appreciation for synergy of interservice coordination and cooperation. The school must enforce a rigorous individual reading program through oral and written book reports, possibly at the expense of class time. This reading program should balance history, the strategic art, current events, the present and future threats and technology. Rather than individual Strategic Research Projects, perhaps 50% of the student body should be engaged in special committee studies commissioned by the Army's leadership or student generated future's topics. Finally, the College should establish a 2-year advanced studies curriculum for 5% to 7% of the class. The first year would serve to identify the advance studies students and provide them with the foundation for an in depth education in the strategic art. In the second year, students would be immersed in the strategic art under the tutelage of a recently retired senior officer teamed with a fast track active duty Colonel or General on a 6 month or 1 year fellowship to the College. These mentors would initially guide the students through a series of group and individual exercises. One major course requirements would entail a two to three month internship at either the Departments of State or Commerce or a stint as an intern/special assistant to a CINC. The course would conclude with a Monograph on strategy to defeat a current or future threat. The current Advanced Studies Program has great promise, but in an eight- (8) month course, it will only achieve limited objectives.

In summary, it is a professional obligation for USAWC students to make good on the school motto "not to promote war, but to preserve the peace ...", but if peace does fail then it is imperative to quickly and decisively defeat our enemies. Sun Tzu understood this truth when he acknowledged that when the state's armed forces are committed they must defeat the enemy " in the shortest possible

time, at the least possible cost in lives and effort, and with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties".¹²⁷ Sun Tzu, long before Clausewitz, was aware that war is a political act and "no country has ever benefited from a protracted war."¹²⁸

To best sum America's place as the nation enters a new millennium General Salet, a former Commandant of the USAWC wrote in 1967,

"The back seat of isolationism, protected and guaranteed by the ocean barriers, has been replaced by the position of a leader of the free world. Willing or not, the United States today must face the realities, the problems and the responsibilities inherent in world leadership."¹²⁹

Today's Army leaders must embrace required changes and prepare for challenge of the future.

They can look back to the example of the leaders and citizens of Tom Brokaw's book, The Greatest Generation. Leaders trained during the inter-war period and came of age in WW II. Leaders that demonstrated vision, mobilized and controlled large organizations, and forged winning strategies. Their influence helped guide the nation for the next 50 years. They reached their level of excellence by studying war, being well read and gaining the requisite knowledge base to act in the face of uncertainty. Mistakes were made, but when all is said and done, the leaders were key players in WW II and postured the US to continue its leader role to this day. The USAWC must continue to innovatively train and educate because as Arthur Schlesinger states, "I am a short term pessimist, but a long-term optimist, I think some future crisis will rally the country and bring out new leaders. These are the cycles of history."¹³⁰ and the Army must always be ready to perform its role.

Even with our knowledge of history, the education of senior leaders is still up for question when, "The view that war is the best teacher of war still holds great truth."¹³¹ But in a period of peace, General (Ret) Meyer, believes "that having the chance to put your feet up on the desk and read and think, absent deadlines, instilled a contemplativeness that's important in senior military leaders in today's world" and develop Clausewitz's "educated judgment" has great merit.¹³² Like the graduates of roughly 75 years ago, now is the time to develop the broadly educated senior strategic leader with the analytical and intellectual tools required to forge the right path towards 2015.

Word Count 9,679

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¹⁰⁵ Carlo D'Este, Patton: A Genius For War, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995) 347-348..

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 396.

¹⁰⁷ Nye, The Patton Mind, 162.

¹⁰⁸ Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901-1967, 113.

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- ¹¹⁰ US Army War College, Reports of Operations 1920-1940, Total Number of Graduates, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard and Reserve. 1921
- ¹¹¹ Van Crevald, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, 66.
- ¹¹² Kirkpatrick, Filling the Gaps: Reevaluating Officer Professional Education in the Inter-War Army, 1920 – 1940, 33.
- ¹¹³ MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, 160-161.
- ¹¹⁴ Blumenson, "Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts," 6.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ¹¹⁶ Blumenson, "Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts," 8.
- ¹¹⁷ Blumenson, "Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts," 3.
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- ¹¹⁹ Blumenson, "Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts," 9.
- ¹²⁰ Blumenson, "Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts," 13.
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- ¹²³ MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, note 14 check.
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- ¹²⁵ Samuel B.Griffith, Sun Tzu The Art Of War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 77.
- ¹²⁶ Carl H. Builder, "Keeping the Strategic Flame," Joint Force Quarterly, (Winter 1996-97).
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- ¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.
- ¹²⁹ Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901-1967, xv.
- ¹³⁰ Tom Brokaw, The Greatest Generation, (New York: Random House, 1998) 375.

¹³¹ Van Crevald, The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance, 99.

¹³² Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell and Jane Mahaffey, Who Will Lead: Senior Leadership in the United States Army, 149.

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