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**GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT: TIME FOR REFORM**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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Thirteen years have passed since the passage and implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereby referred to as GNA). Numerous military professionals, politicians and authors congratulate the Department of Defense on the successes of the GNA. Without question, the GNA has met the intent of defining the role and the powers of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands (the CINCs). The GNA has strengthened the role of civilian authority in the Department of the Defense and improved military advice to the Commander-in-Chief, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.

Will the GNA continue to be effective as we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in the execution of Joint Vision 2010, the creation of future joint visions and a world much different than it was when GNA was enacted? Are there changes to the GNA that would assist our senior civilian and military leadership in shaping and employing future military forces and other instruments of national power? Are there changes required outside GNA? This paper explores some noted successes of GNA, suggests potential reform within the current boundaries of GNA, examines issues to readdress in GNA and suggests additional legislation outside the bounds of GNA. These suggestions would assist DOD in meeting the challenges posed in the execution of national strategy.



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## PREFACE

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), focused on the roles, responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of Defense in organizing the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the unified combatant commanders (CINCs). The Goldwater-Nichols Act empowered the secretary of Defense with the authority to force compliance in assigning roles and functions among DOD components. GNA defined the previously ambiguous roles and responsibilities of the services secretaries and chiefs in regard to the unified commanders charging the services with organizing, training and equipping of forces while delegating the planning and execution of operations to the unified commanders. Although the service chiefs remain as members of the JCS, they no longer carry a vote. The CJCS instead serves as the sole representative of the JCS to the SECDEF and President. However, law does provide the service chiefs the right to report separately to the President, as they desire. The act established a clear combatant chain of command that runs from the President through the SECDEF to the CINCs with the CJCS serving as a conduit for communications to and from the NCA. A summary of the intent of GNA is:

1. To reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian control.
2. To improve military advice to the NCA.
3. To place responsibility clearly on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for accomplishment of assigned missions.
4. To ensure CINCs have authority commensurate with their responsibility.
5. To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.
6. To provide for the more efficient use of defense resources.
7. To improve joint officer management policies.
8. Otherwise, to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration.

In the conduct of my research, I found no sources within the last four years that attempted to grade GNA on all eight points noted above; most in depth studies focus on how GNA came to be. Instead, I found multiple sources that addressed specific items of the act. I have not attempted to answer the question of success or failure or provide recommendation for every point noted. I have chosen to focus on the points that have most often come up in professional conversation with my War College classmates and respective faculty. I approach the subject from my own professional experience supplemented by DOD and Congressional directed studies and an abundance of authors who are or claim to be experts in defense matters. I have chosen to address points one through three as I found these are the areas that most need emphasis.



## GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT: TIME FOR REFORM

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereto referred to as GNA) is a continuum of congressional interests, proposals and acts dating as far back as 1921. Proposals to combine or unify military departments under a single executive agency were considered as early as 1921, with some fifty proposals to reorganize occurring between 1921 and 1945.<sup>1</sup> However, due largely to opposition from the War Department and Department of the Navy, legislative initiatives did not occur.

Both departments, supported by Congress, preferred independence instead of unification. The United States' involvement in WWII brought to light the need for unification of the military departments. Even before formally entering the war, the weakness of the decentralized American military system was demonstrated when coordinating with the British in 1941.<sup>2</sup> Military departments (Army and Navy) basically went their own directions without integration and with little guidance and oversight from above. In short, the integration and oversight of the departments did not exist in a manner to efficiently plan for and employ national military assets. As a result, the executive branch established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1941. This body, consisted of the Army Chief of Staff, the Army Chief of Staff for Air, the Commander of Army Air Forces, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and in 1942, it added the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, who chaired the committee and served as liaison to the president. The committee functioned as an ad hoc organization lacking statutory authority and an institutional foundation. The JCS reported directly to the President usurping the role of the Service Secretaries.<sup>3</sup>

The campaigns in WWII included numerous amphibious operations and sea based invasions involving Army and Navy forces. The further evolution of air support to both Army and Navy operations further increased interoperability among the services. The pursuit of strategic, operational and tactical objectives in WWII demanded the establishment and operation of unified commands--components of one service working under the direction of another--to ensure unity of command in winning the war. General George C. Marshall recognized a unified approach to the pursuit of war as early as 1943 and subsequently proposed a unified defense establishment. In 1945 President Harry S. Truman sent to Congress a message outlining his observations during the war, noting the United States military had achieved unity of command but:

"...we never had comparable unified direction in Washington. And even in the field our unity of operations was greatly impaired by the differences in training, in doctrine, in communications systems, and in supply and distribution systems that stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington... it is now time to take stock, to discard obsolete organizational focus... We cannot have the sea, land and air members of our defense team working at what may turn out to be cross-purposes, planning their programs on different assumptions as to the nature of the military establishment we need, and engaging in an open competition for funds."<sup>4</sup>

Following two years of debate, the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted. The Act created a Secretary of Defense, without department, and three military departments consisting of the Army, Navy and Air Force. All departments carried cabinet status, were members of the NSC and were allowed to appeal any matter directly to the President or the Director of the Budget. Additionally, along with this enactment came the National Military Establishment, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. The establishment of the Department of Defense is commonly associated with the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA). However, because the NSA did not create a unified military department with a strong central authority, a decade of further reforms occurred. The NSA did not clearly define the lines of command, authority and responsibility between the uniformed military, the military departments, the Secretary of Defense and the President.<sup>5</sup> Congress's concern in crafting the NSA of 1947 was fear of yielding much of its control over the military establishment to the executive branch—it wanted to keep tight rein on the military and not allow it to become controlled by the President.<sup>6</sup> Colleen Getz notes, "In sum, the composition of the JCS reflected a Navy victory over the Army's desire for a single Chief of Staff. It also demonstrated Congress's will that centralization of military authority remain limited."<sup>7</sup>

The first Secretary of Defense, former Naval Secretary James Forrestal, was confronted with a fundamental problem. He lacked the power to resolve service rivalries over funds, roles, missions and coordination. Forrestal worked closely with the service Chiefs to resolve these problems but to no avail. Subsequently, Forrestal sought Congressional support. Congress in turn amended the NSA of 1947 in 1949, creating the Department of Defense and increasing the authority of the SECDEF over the military departments. This amendment provided the SECDEF "direct" authority as opposed to the previous "general" authority over the military departments inclusive of administrative and budgetary authority. The Secretary's staff was increased to include a Deputy Secretary and three assistant secretaries. Probably the most important aspect of this amendment was that the SECDEF became the principal assistant to the President for all matters pertaining to the Department of Defense. The military departments' cabinet and NSC status were abolished. The departments also were designated as "military departments" from the previous "executive departments", reducing their power.<sup>8</sup> The JCS benefited from the creation of a non-voting Chairman and doubling the size of the joint staff. Congress rejected any ideas of a single Chief of Staff (with authority over all services) thus sustaining congressional influence over the military establishment through traditional means of decentralization, the ability to hear from each of the service chiefs.<sup>9</sup> Each military department remained separately administered and permitted the department Secretaries and the JCS members to present separate views and recommendations to the Congress after first informing the SECDEF.

Upon assuming the Presidency in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower sought further reforms drawing upon his extensive military experience. During the period between 1953-1958, the Department of Defense underwent further reform. The most notable of these reforms were:

1. An increase in the centralization of authority in the office of the SECDEF by authorizing additional assistant secretary positions.
2. The Chairman, JCS was given authority to select and direct the Joint Staff.
3. The Chairman, JCS was subordinated to the President, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and subject to congressional oversight.
4. Civilian control of the military departments was maintained by replacing as executive agents the individual service Chiefs with service secretaries of the military departments (Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of the Air Force). Thereby the chain of command ran from the President, to the SECDEF through the Joint Chiefs to the commanders of the unified and specified commands.
5. The SECDEF was provided the power to reorganize the DOD.
6. The requirement that the military departments be "separately administered" was changed to "separately organized".<sup>10</sup>

President Eisenhower stated, "Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact."<sup>11</sup>

During the next three decades, although there were multiple studies by blue ribbon panels that assessed military organization, DOD reorganization was ignored even in the face of Vietnam.<sup>12</sup> Several conflicts occurred in the late 1970's and 1980's highlighting what was deemed a need for additional reform in defense organization. Major concerns centered on the command of military forces and the organization, training and employment of these forces.

#### **Conflicts calling for further defense reform.**

The failure of Desert One/Operation Eagle Claw (1979) to rescue the U.S. hostages being held by Iranian militants at the U.S. embassy in Tehran raised questions concerning unified command, unified action and joint training of forces.<sup>13</sup>

The loss of 241 U.S. military personnel and wounding of over 100 others in a suicide bomb attack on the U.S. Marines headquarters building in Beirut, Lebanon (1983) highlighted recurring deficiencies from Desert One, most notably unified action. A subsequent investigation also noted problems with the military reporting system to the civilian chain of command and the failure of the civilian leadership to heed the advice of senior military leaders.<sup>14</sup>

Although Operation Urgent Fury (1983), intended to evacuate approximately 1000 U.S. citizens from the island of Grenada and defeat Grenadian and Cuban forces, was deemed a success, problems once again occurred in unified action and training which further fueled the debate for reform.<sup>15</sup>

U.S. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia confirmed this call for reform. The failed Iranian hostage rescue mission "Desert One", and the flawed victory in Grenada confirmed and reinforced Nunn's view that it was time to pursue further defense reform. According to Senator Nunn, these events along with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) defense reform project convinced him that the time to pursue reform had arrived.<sup>16</sup> Subsequently, in January 1985 following an 18 month study in the form of hearings, interviews and research, Senators Nunn and Goldwater directed a more formal and vigorous study be conducted.<sup>17</sup>

Goldwater-Nichols came to fruition in law as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act on October 1, 1986. GNA came as a final product of debate, compromise and concession driven by two major studies—the Locher Report and the Packard Commission. Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Nichols championed the passage of the law. The scope and grounds for the subsequent legislation can be summarized as follows:

"The scope of the legislation clearly evidenced congressional dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of the United States armed forces. Congress believed the problems derived from dysfunctional relationships among the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and service components and the service chiefs."<sup>18</sup>

A summary of the purposes of GNA in layman's terms is:

1. To reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian control.
2. To improve military advice to the NCA.
3. To place responsibility clearly on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commanders for accomplishment of assigned missions.
4. To ensure CINCs have the authority commensurate with responsibility.
5. To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.
6. To provide for the more efficient use of defense resources.
7. To improve joint officer management policies.
8. Otherwise, to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration.<sup>19</sup>

## **REORGANIZE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND STRENGTHEN CIVILIAN AUTHORITY**

Absent prior to the GNA were specific relationships and authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in regard to the Service Secretaries. Desiring to clarify the authority of the SECDEF, Congress stated, "The Secretary has sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act."<sup>20</sup>

The GNA has strengthened civilian authority and has empowered the SECDEF to efficiently influence, lead and manage DOD. Dick Chaney, former SECDEF, found that the act "significantly improved the way the place functions."<sup>21</sup> In designing GNA, the intent of the Congress was to end claims by defense officials to jurisdictions that were independent of the Secretary's authority. An explanation of

defense organization pointed to the fact that the SECDEF's responsibilities were not matched by commensurate power. The SECDEF carried the burden of challenging the services on policies and programs, both individual and collective, due to lack of independent military advice. The relationship of the service secretaries was not well prescribed dating back to the NSA of 1947. Thus, service secretaries "devoted considerable energy to advocating service positions, often at the expense of the Secretary's broader agenda."<sup>22</sup> GNA provided the conduit for independent military advice with the CJCS providing the advice and prescribed the responsibilities of the service secretaries in relation to the SECDEF. However, there are criticisms that the Chairman's more influential role undermines civilian authority. GNA clearly empowers the SECDEF to control the nation's top officer. "No evidence exists to suggest that civilian control of the military, properly understood, has atrophied. The President and Congress determine policy, from force structure and acquisition to the use of military force."<sup>23</sup>

The SECDEF has effectively used contingency planning guidance (CPG) to provide guidance to the CJCS of general and specific areas of concern to the civilian leadership. Likewise the Joint Staff has worked effectively with the Office of the SECDEF (OSD) in the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JCSP), the document by which the Chairman tasks the CINCs to develop operations plans. Consequently, the SECDEF has given primacy to the policies of civilian leadership. The SECDEF has empowered CINCs to develop contingency plans and, by providing planning guidance early in the planning process, has maintained effective civilian control over the military.<sup>24</sup>

#### **Room for Improvement--Program Planning and Budgeting System.**

The Program Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) for connecting means to ends and tasks to strategies has served OSD and the services for over 30 years. However, the last ten years have seen: monumental and rapid advances in technology; changes in national security objectives precipitated by a change in global economics; changes in national military strategy due to changes in national security objectives; expansion of mission responsibilities assigned to CINCs; and services charged with the responsibilities to organize, equip and train forces to meet the challenges of a new set of conditions. The PPBS met the need of a "cold war" environment where an adversary was easily defined. Today, the PPBS system is cumbersome, slow and inefficient in meeting the challenge to shape military forces for today and tomorrow. The economic cycles defined by the PPBS do not keep pace with the technological cycles. A budget system coupled with a research, development and experimentation system that requires an inordinate amount of time to field equipment is ineffective in the development of future force structure.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) in 1995 recommended a restructured PPBS system that consists of two phases preceded by a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR is currently published by Office of the SECDEF. The two phases following the QDR are planning and direction (identifying what is needed) and development and review of programs, budgets and out year plans (how to meet the demands).<sup>25</sup> Both phases of this proposal would be aided by the development of a document defining all military requirements as discussed later in this paper. Specific front-end assessments of requirements followed by a strong SECDEF program for budget direction would

assist in identifying investment alternatives. This assessment and program would provide clear direction for the services and other DOD agencies and effectively eliminate cross service and agency duplication in pursuit of program requirements.<sup>26</sup> This is an area that can be addressed by the SECDEF within the boundaries of GNA.

An additional measure of adding stability in budgeting would be the adoption of a biennial budgeting process tied to a five-year plan. DOD currently prepares biennial budgets by law with Congress only appropriating resources for one year. Therefore, DOD prepares an annual budget to meet the needs of the Congress. Congress should implement biennial budget appropriations. Adoption of such provides a level of stability and certainty in defense spending and provides senior leadership flexibility in budget management.<sup>27</sup> The Packard Commission noted in A Quest for Excellence:

“The most important reform, in the [Packard] commission’s view, is the adoption by congress of biennial budgets tied to a five year plan... [this] would promote stability by providing additional time to do a better job—to think through military planning options, to evaluate results of current and prior-year execution of the defense budget, and to ensure that each phase of the cycle has the right attention needed.”<sup>28</sup>

This would be an initiative supplementing the GNA that would assist DOD.

#### **Room for improvement--Service Secretariats.**

An area that has drawn attention for reform in DOD is the service secretariats. GNA and Title V provide for a Secretariat and a service staff reporting to the Service Secretary in each military department. GNA attempted to reduce duplication between the secretariat and service staffs by separating and assigning specific civilian and military functions. Under GNA, the service secretaries are responsible for and have the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of their departments inclusive of the following functions: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, maintaining, constructing, outfitting and repair of military equipment; the construction, maintenance and repair of structures and utilities; and acquisition of real property. Additionally, subject to the SECDEF’s guidance, the secretaries are responsible to the SECDEF for the “functioning and efficiency” of their departments in regard to policies and programs. Assigned “sole responsibilities” include acquisition, auditing, comptroller, information management, inspector general, legislative affairs and public affairs. The service chiefs (CNO in the case of the Navy, Commandant for the Marine Corps) assist their respective service secretaries in the execution of their duties. They do this under the direction and control of the service secretary and are responsible to the service secretary. Additionally, the service chiefs perform prescribed duties as members of the JCS. To perform their prescribed functions, the service secretaries and service chiefs retain their own respective staffs. In the case of the Navy, there are three separate staffs: Navy Secretariat, Chief of Naval Operations Staff and the United States Marine Corps Staff.<sup>29</sup> The service chiefs are not involved in the operational employment of forces. GNA clearly places the task of command and control and operational employment of service component forces in the hands of the combatant CINCs.

The changes in responsibility and authority of the service secretaries and respective military chiefs coupled with major force reductions since 1986 question the current management structure of the services. DOD corporate headquarters employs approximately 30,000 employees. Service staffs within 25 miles of the Pentagon number 150,000 employees.<sup>30</sup> The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces concluded in May 1995: "The advantages of separate headquarters staffs are outweighed by disadvantages."<sup>31</sup> The noted advantages of the current structure include: a secretariat staff that is in direct support to the Secretary in functional areas deemed essential to civilian control or that require service civilian oversight; and a service staff that can provide independent military perspectives in light of the service chief's role as a member of the JCS. In whole, separate staffs provide different sources of administration to the Service Secretary and the Service Chief and serve as independent bases of support for each.<sup>32</sup> Among the noted disadvantages are: the presence of two staffs impedes integration of effort, and forces choices between "civilian business functions and military functions."; "Split responsibilities between secretariat and service staffs cause confusion at higher and lower echelons, resulting in unnecessary friction and cumbersome management processes"; and "efforts to reduce duplication and improve specialization between the two staffs leave the appearance that "sole responsibility" activities assigned to the Service Secretary by Title 10 should be of less concern to the service chief, while predominately military functions are of less concern to the Service Secretary."<sup>33</sup>

The commission recommended that the secretariat and service staffs be combined and noted that "Integrating the staffs would immediately highlight areas of existing duplication, present the opportunity for consolidation of several staff functions, and improve efficiency in headquarters management processes."<sup>34</sup> A merged staff reporting through the Service Chief to the Secretary would broaden the Service Chief's effectiveness, clarify lines of authority and accountability, provide continuity of effort and communication when interacting with OSD, the Joint Staff, the CINCs' staffs and other military departments. An argument could also be made that there could be a reduction in the number of political appointees that currently work in the Secretariat staffs. However, this issue becomes politically sensitive and evokes the question of civilian control. The counter argument is a reduction of turnover in positions that are politically appointed to add stability and continuity to department organization. Additionally, the merger of staffs would reduce what can be perceived as an extreme of "layering" in order to exercise civilian control. Savings in manpower and dollars are estimated at 1,000 billets and an annual pay role of \$125 million (+) in 1995 dollars.<sup>35</sup>

The GNA of 1986 focused primarily on the combatant side of DOD, principally the JCS and the responsibilities of the chairman, with little attention to service organization. "GNA was less concerned with reforming military departments than strengthening jointness. Further reforms envisioned in the original House bill and Senate staffs were lost in the compromises. In attempting to rationalize civilian and military functions in service headquarters, GNA probably raised as many questions as it answered."<sup>36</sup>

The time has come to readdress the compromises of the House and Senate in reforming military departments. Action should be taken to resolve the duplicity of service and secretariat staffs with the aim of unity of effort in one staff. The respective secretariat and service staffs should work together in creating "one staff" consisting of an appropriate mix of senior military and professional civilians. This merger of staffs would reduce duplication of effort and unnecessary layering, consolidate staff functions and, coupled with advanced technologies and management systems, improve overall efficiency. With a view toward the elimination of duplication and layering, military department organization should be addressed in future GNA actions.

#### **Room for Improvement--Office of the Secretary of Defense.**

Unfinished business related to the GNA is redefining the roles and functions of the OSD staff. The FY96 DOD Authorization Act, Section 901, noted the need to review the role of the OSD Staff citing its role is not adequately addressed in statute or DOD directive 5100.1. Assessments were directed in the following areas: advantages and disadvantages of political appointees filling positions of various Under Secretaries of Defense and Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense; the extent of unnecessary duplication of functions between OSD and the Joint Staff; adequacy of present organizational structure to support the secretary in carrying out his responsibilities; and an assessment of the appropriate functions of the OSD staff. A review of the Organization and Functions Guidebook, published by OSD on an annual basis, identifies the general, broad functions of the OSD staff.<sup>37</sup> However, the functional relationships of the OSD staff with the Joint Staff and respective service staffs are not prescribed.

There are differences in the Joint Staff and the OSD staff. The joint staff supports the Chairman in his role as principal military advisor to the President, NSC and the SECDEF. The OSD staff is responsible to the SECDEF for providing policy advice, independent perspectives and analytical support. There are arguments that the OSD staff has taken on functional roles focused on what is being executed in their broad functional areas (acquisition, logistics, personnel management etc.) at the expense of providing objective advice to the SECDEF. " This makes integration of the defense program more difficult and constrains the department's ability to adjust and respond to new missions."<sup>38</sup> An argument can also be made that due to the ambiguity of the roles of the OSD staff, they often become overly involved in the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries, Chiefs, the JCS, and the Joint Staff. Although the SECDEF retains the flexibility to organize and operate as he sees fit, further definition would clarify the responsibilities of civilian and military staffs supporting the SECDEF and provide guidance for support and infrastructure activities. This is a major departure from the SECDEF's empowerment to organize OSD as deemed necessary. If efficiencies in business, resulting in savings in manpower and dollars, are desired a reevaluation under the applicability of GNA may be useful in resolving this situation.<sup>39</sup>

## **IMPROVE MILITARY ADVICE TO THE NCA**

GNA charges the CJCS with the individual responsibility for advising the civilian leadership, directing the Chairman and not the cooperate JCS, to provide planning and advice to the civilian leadership on strategic plans, net assessments, readiness, budgets, joint doctrine, and requirements. The CJCS also advises on roles and missions of all the services. This is an attempt to reduce service parochialism on the part of the CJCS when formulating advice. In essence, the expectation is that the Chairman provide his best advice to the civilian leadership, which may not necessarily represent the individual service chief positions or the cooperate body of the JCS. The GNA provides latitude to the CJCS to structure staff and develop programs aimed at providing this advice. To date GNA has succeeded in accomplishing its aim in this area. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney and Senator Sam Nunn both acknowledged a marked improvement in the quality of military advice provided to the civilian leadership due to the GNA.<sup>40</sup> The role of the CJCS has also provided greater sponsorship of CINCs' concerns and provides greater direction in joint planning, doctrine and support.<sup>41</sup>

Some argue that the service chiefs go unheard and the duties of their office are diminished as a result of the Chairman's powers as detailed in GNA. Personalities aside, the relationship between the Chairman and Chiefs by several accounts have likened the JCS to a "board of directors" who serve as the Chairman's most important advisors.<sup>42</sup> Service parochialism frequently arises as a contentious subject but as Roman and Tarr note, "The dominant norm for the JCS is no longer parochial protection of individual service interests, but a norm of jointness, in which service perspectives, forces and doctrines are genuinely integrated. The JCS is now a force for service integration imposed from the top down."<sup>43</sup> Although GNA has done much in unifying services in the conduct of operations, I contend that force development initiatives remain marked by service parochialism.

### **Room for Improvement—Integrated Force Development.**

GNA by design reduced service influence over operational matters. But, has it reduced service influences over future military force structure? Does GNA empower DOD, namely the SECDEF and CJCS, to make decisions on future force structure and modernization or do the respective services rule in this area? Should the CJCS be the voice in deciding service tradeoffs in military spending to shape the military of the future?

The common term we hear tossed in current forums is "service parochialism." Each service is working diligently to establish its role in the military of tomorrow, between now and 2010, the military after next, and beyond 2010. Each service has its own vision to meet Joint Vision 2010 as evidenced by publications addressing such as: the Army has Force XXI, the Air Force has Global Reach Global Power and the Navy has From the Sea. What these documents fail to do is address the integration of "unique" service capabilities with other services to achieve unity of effort in pursuit of future strategies. It seems that there is a constant open dialogue and competition to see who can provide the best solution to meet the future requirements. This competition blurs the distinctions of service missions and often is conducted

without regard to the combatant CINCs' interests. Competition is good. It brings unique and innovative ideas to the forefront. However, each service's wants and desires come without regard to the costs of other service's programs and budgets. This is service parochialism at its best. The debate of land power (Army) versus air power (Air Force) is a prime example. As Admiral (Ret) William A. Owens points out:

"While a joint perspective is not absent from considerations of requirements for future forces, it remains far subordinate to that of the individual services at a time when each recognizes increasing budget constraints and believes it is involved in a zero-sum funding contest. Service parochialism is still the most important factor in force planning. A joint perspective comes down to cross service trust and the belief that another component can reliably provide a military function."<sup>44</sup>

The current Joint Strategic Planning System provides mechanisms for providing guidance in the shaping of forces. It includes the SECDEF's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), the Chairman's Joint Vision (JV), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Joint Planning Document (JPD). These documents coupled with the National Military Strategy lay the foundation for the combatant CINCs' development of war plans and determine force requirements to meet their assigned missions. The CINCs requirements are submitted in the form of an Integrated Priority List (IPL) to the CJCS and service departments. The CJCS in turn submits his Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) to the SECDEF. Following submission of service and defense agencies Program Objective Memorandums (POM) to the SECDEF, the CJCS submits the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). The Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC), chaired by the Vice CJCS with membership of Vice Service Chiefs make significant contributions to the Chairman's duties in identifying and assessing requirements. However, the CPR and CPA tend to reflect consensus on non-controversial issues vice those that might encourage inter-service conflict. Consensus is commonly achieved by advocating enhanced capabilities vice program reductions.<sup>45</sup> However, when it comes to major service interests in the forms of major programs, the members agree to truces in many cases to avoid challenges to individual service interests.<sup>46</sup> The credibility of the Service Chiefs and their respective Vices' effectiveness is in a precarious position if they are perceived by their services as not fighting effectively for their share of defense missions and resources. The CJCS is less constrained by service constituency in providing his advice but must persuade his colleagues on the JCS to adopt a course of action. If there are disagreements with his recommendation to the SECDEF and President, a report is required by law to the SECDEF. This relationship can bring dissension among the CJCS and JCS and jeopardize the Chairman's effectiveness and that of the cooperate JCS.<sup>47</sup>

What of the unified commanders input to development of future force structure? The common actions of the CINCs, as described by Admiral Owens, go much as follows:

- 1- Planners define the areas of responsibility and activities for separate service components within specific regions.
- 2- Recommendations on the size, structure and character of future forces are compiled from the respective service components and are often drafted by service staffs in Washington.

- 3- Service component commanders reflect their bias before submission to the CINC.
- 4- Recommendations from each service component are submitted to the CINC for approval and submission to Washington for planning, programming and budgeting.<sup>48</sup>

Admiral Owens is not throwing stones at the CINCs, the assigned service components to the CINCs, the JCS or the CJCS as he describes the process above. The simple truth is that the CINCs and service component staffs' major focus is on their day-to-day regional mission—the bugs on the windshield and not the hood ornament. The current system advocates that the service chiefs are more attuned to the future, the hood ornament, than the CINCs and as such have the responsibility to organize forces—entailing the development of force structure and design. However, the question that arises is does the force structure that is being developed by the respective services meet the needs of the war-fighting CINCs?

What of taking the responsibility of organizing, training, equipping and maintaining the force from the service components and placing it at the joint level? The greatest responsibilities of the CJCS and CINCs are joint military advice to the NCA, planning and preparation for warfighting and joint force development integration. To add the responsibilities of organizing, training, equipping and maintaining implies the addition of research, development, experimentation and acquisition and would overwhelm the existing joint system and change its nature.<sup>49</sup> The second challenge in force development is to reduce the duplication created not only by service redundancy, but also by an increasing number of defense agencies, which are additional competitors for resources and which aggravate the problem of duplication.<sup>50</sup>

The current defense and projected defense budgets do not allow for the pursuit of all things to all services. Congress will not stand by idly while each of the services pursues their own independent solution to shaping forces often producing unneeded redundancy. Services insist that this redundancy is required because the vagaries and fog of war demand redundancy. “The realities of budget constraints are that we cannot afford to pursue every investment strategy”.<sup>51</sup> The aim that we seek in shaping forces for the future is integrating service uniqueness with that of other services in terms of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and logistics in an uncertain environment. Each service is a tool in a toolbox that is optimized for its specific mission serving a special purpose—not the only tool in a toolbox. Service parochialism must fall to the side but uniqueness in the services' missions must remain. In order to achieve full spectrum dominance, the integration of land power, sea power and air power is required. No one service can achieve this dominance independent of another service—dominance is achieved by the conduct of integrated joint operations.

There are several alternatives that answer the questions proposed. They range from the extremes of creating a command the sole focus of which is force development, inclusive of experimentation and doctrine, to a shared responsibility between Joint Forces Command and service departments. I propose the development of a document under direction of the SECDEF and CJCS that clearly defines all military

requirements (inclusive of DOD agencies), unique service capabilities and integrated requirements. This document should be specific in establishing which service pursues what initiatives in force development without duplication of effort. Services should not be allowed to pursue their own initiatives without approval of the SECDEF.

#### STEPS TO REFORM

- 1- The CJCS proposes for the SECDEF's approval a future Joint War Fighting Vision that assists in guiding service force development events. The CJCS currently does this on an as required basis.
- 2- Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) researches and develops a consolidated all-military-requirements (inclusive of all DOD agencies) list to meet the Joint Vision for distribution to CINCs and service departments.
- 3- JFCOM coordinates and facilitates the inputs of the CINCs' requirements into this military requirement document and coordinates respective service reviews.
- 4- JFCOM recommends to a joint resource committee chaired by the SECDEF, CJCS as deputy Chair, Service Chiefs and a select number of senior civilian service members from OSD a recommendation on total military force structure inclusive of all services and DOD agencies.
- 5- JFCOM validates and develops a consolidated integrated priority list for recommendation to the SECDEF through the CJCS identifying service responsibility for research, development, and testing of unique and integrated systems.
- 6- JFCOM develops a warfighting interoperability demonstration plan to test and validate the interoperability of service systems. Services develop and submit a unique requirement experimentation plan to JFCOM.

The primary responsibility of the JFCOM is: to serve as the linkage between CINCs, the services and all other DOD agencies in the consolidation of all-military-requirements; to validate the requirements; to fulfill identified missions across the spectrum of operations that the CINCs perform in their regional responsibilities; and to leverage defense spending. The respective services would in effect lose the requirements identification function for force development and equipping. As such, the analytical resources of the services would be stripped out and placed under JFCOM. This staff, under JFCOM would be the only DOD staff dedicated to identifying military requirements. The services would implement the decisions made by the SECDEF for the specific development of the unique requirements and integrated requirements thus managing R&D, experimentation and fielding in these areas. The services would retain responsibility for management of infrastructure, training, personnel management, and doctrine development—65% of the current expenditure of the defense budget.<sup>52</sup> The services would no longer be the initiators of procurement. This approach does not unify the services or abolish traditions that come with uniqueness. Instead, it abolishes arguments and controversy over missions and budget shares.

GNA provides the SECDEF the authority to establish such a program. However, I recommend GNA be amended to direct such a program to provide continuity to force development. Additionally, GNA should be amended to empower the SECDEF with executive authority in deciding service tradeoffs when involved in total force structure.

### **MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE CINCS**

The major concern which GNA act addressed in regard to the CINCs stemmed from the operational chain of command being confused and cumbersome. The roles and responsibilities of the SECDEF, CJCS, JCS and CINCs required further refinement in facilitating the responsibilities placed on a CINC. As a result of GNA, the chain of command from the CINCs to the NCA and specific responsibilities in relation to command and control and training of component forces was established. Clarifying the chain of command reduced the influence of service parochialism on operations by diminishing service influence over operational matters and provided the CINCs, who were charged with operational responsibilities, a greater voice in Washington.<sup>53</sup>

As a result of GNA, the collective personalities of the service chiefs have been taken out of the operational planning and employment of forces. The delineation of an operational chain of command that runs from the President to the SECDEF to the CINCs clearly places the responsibility for operational planning and employment of assigned service forces on the CINC. The CINCs generally communicate through the CJCS to the SECDEF and President and thus the President and SECDEF communicate through the CJCS to the CINCs. Gen. (retired) Schwarzkoff noted great success in this area in pursuing Desert Storm noting that a clear, short operational chain of command facilitated the execution of operations. "Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force."<sup>54</sup> Former SECDEF William Perry noted, "All commentaries and after action reports on [Desert Shield/Desert Storm] attribute the success of the operation to the fundamental structural changes in the chain of command brought about by Goldwater-Nichols."<sup>55</sup>

### **Room for improvement. Integration of inter-agency actions.**

While GNA clearly placed mission accomplishment responsibility on the CINCs and provided authority commensurate with responsibility, a major challenge still exists for the CINCs to adequately fulfill their responsibilities. An examination of the post-Cold War period demonstrates the array of missions which have confronted CINCs of yesterday and today i.e., foreign contingencies in Panama, Iraq, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo; domestic contingencies such as the Florida hurricane, mid-western flooding, western wildfires, and the Los Angeles riots; the maintenance of a presence in the Sinai, Europe, Saudi Arabia and Korea; and international exercises including Partnership

for Peace. These are all missions that comprise what we commonly call today "the full spectrum of operations." The successful execution of these missions demands the integration of all elements of national power.

The major challenge that confronts the CINCs is the inability to integrate elements of national power with military operations in a timely and coherent manner in fulfilling his mission as a regional CINC. After all, does not our senior civilian leadership expect the regional CINCs to develop Theater strategies to meet the national strategy? The development of a theater strategy involves the integration of elements of national power whether in deliberate planning or crisis action planning. Currently, an effective system does not exist to aid the CINCs in this area. Former Senator Sam Nunn said it best, "Externally, organizational shortcomings in the interagency system undermine DOD in carrying out its mission."<sup>56</sup> He contends that our organizational concept for national security is too narrow and does not actively integrate the activities of many departments and agencies of the government in actively pursuing national security objectives. He contends that the Joint Staff has held other agencies at arms length because of concern for security leaks, interference and expenditure of defense resources. "The old days of the Pentagon doing the entire mission are gone for good."<sup>57</sup> He further emphasizes that contingency planning, peacetime exercises and overseas crisis augmentation that are common in DOD are alien in some departments and agencies.<sup>58</sup> The apparent problem is there is no formal responsibility for the coordination and integration of other departments and agencies with DOD and its assets in the pursuit of national and regional security objectives. An approach offered by General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret) is the, "decentralization of national security apparatus, placing more responsibility in the hands of "commanders" in the field such as ambassadors and department representatives. This would improve coordination across all segments of government in a given region because the people who best understand local problems could work together in proposing solutions."<sup>59</sup> The NCA has at its disposal elements of national power to achieve policy if properly integrated with the resources of the regional CINCs. I offer a solution formed around Presidential Decision Directive 56(PDD-56).<sup>60</sup>

President Clinton attempted to provide the coordination to bring all elements of national power to bear on contingency operations with Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) in 1997. PDD-56 was the result of extensive studies conducted on operations in Somalia (Dec'92-Mar'94), Haiti (Sep'94), Eastern Slovenia (May'96) and Bosnia (Dec'95). In each operation, problems were noted in the planning, coordination, integration, synchronization and execution between the military and other agencies, namely DOS, USAID, the U.S. Mission to the UN, and DOJ. Additionally, there has been a lack of coordination for the integration of international organizations. Studies on the effectiveness of PDD-56 conclude that its intent and directives are not being followed. This is most recently reflected in such contingencies as Hurricane Mitch (Oct 98) and Kosovo (98-99).<sup>61</sup>

Hurricane Mitch occurred in October 1998, devastating Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala and produced a humanitarian crisis for the Southern Command. General Charles Wilhelm, CINC, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) noted that the DOD provided clear and timely guidance and

commensurate authority to expend resources to respond to this contingency crisis. However, coordination and integration with other U.S. agencies was inadequate causing delays in relief activities, wasted resources and poor execution of the initial humanitarian response. The major problem noted in this effort was the over commitment of the NSC director responsible for political-military planning. This individual could add this crisis to his workload because of political-military planning for Kosovo and Iraq. In the absence of the NSC political-military director, a Central American Task Force was organized under the direct supervision of the White House Chief of Staff and co-chaired by the Office of Management and Budget. Their efforts were futile as many members were not aware of PDD-56 or the contents of a political-military plan and therefore did not provide comprehensive interagency coordination for multi-agency relief efforts. Therefore, SOUTHCOM remained in the lead for coordination of interagency activities using ad-hoc field coordination mechanisms. The Central American Task Force failed to develop a comprehensive, strategic-level, interagency plan to achieve unity of effort by national assets at the scene or in Washington.<sup>62</sup>

In the case of Kosovo, NSC initiated political-military planning processes during the evolution of the crisis. The results of these processes were "pre-settlement plans" and "post settlement plans". These plans were developed pending the unknown outcome of on-going negotiations involving DOS and were conducted without the oversight of an executive committee as detailed in PDD-56. "Political-military planning was not directly linked to agency decision makers and special representatives assigned by the President to negotiate key elements of the complex contingency operation."<sup>63</sup> Many agencies cite the planning process for the development of highly detailed, lengthy political-military plans as unnecessarily burdensome. This case demonstrates that an Executive Committee is necessary to make the political-military planning process relevant.<sup>64</sup>

Several solutions have been proposed to enforce implementation of PDD-56. They include infusing PDD-56 with authority and leadership, promotion of the versatility and acceptability of PDD-56, the development of resources and interagency training inclusive of budgeting. Another solution proposes that the Chairman, JCS personally promote PDD-56 utilization with the National Security Advisor and other principals and introduce initiatives to resource and target training thus promoting a broad outreach of PDD-56. Endorsement by the members of the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee and the National Security Advisor is required for PDD-56 to be successful.

I contend that PDD-56's intent to, "integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level..."<sup>65</sup> can assist the regional CINCs in fulfilling their assigned missions if responsibility is fixed for coordination and integration. The steps to reform include:

1. The alignment of the current State Department regions with the CINC regions. The State Department is divided into six regional areas whereas the "CINCdoms" are divided into five regions. This would provide continuity of effort across military and political channels.

2. The appointment of a "Regional Ambassador" for each of the five regions. This senior ambassador would serve as the regional coordinator and integrator for elements of national power and work closely with the respective regional CINC.

3. Appoint the Vice-President as the Chairman of the Executive Committee with the responsibility for coordination of elements of national power. Membership of the Executive Committee would consist of the major presidential cabinet appointees.

However, the major challenge to such a proposal may be the infringement of the legislative branch (the Congress) in directing the executive branch (the President) in how to organize and do business.

There is a need to address such action under GNA. Assistance to the CINCs in the integration of elements of national power requires the same emphasis the Senate and Congress put forth in the establishment of GNA. Reconstruction of this executive legislation should address specific accountability for planning, coordination and integration of national assets, provide required funding and staffing to perform this function and identify the relationships between the regional CINCs and regional Ambassadors (if established). The enactment should also place a strong emphasis on military-political education and training in conjunction with CINC exercises.

Failure to establish and resource a functional and efficient system to achieve interagency unity of effort, places our servicemen and servicewomen unnecessarily at risk, wastes resources and places unanticipated and inappropriate demands on DOD and the respective regional CINCs.

## CONCLUSION

"One of the landmark laws of American History. This law is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775." *Les Aspin, 1986, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee*<sup>66</sup>

"Because he was known for colorful, dramatic assertions, many saw this claim as political overstatement."<sup>67</sup> When Les Aspin made this statement in 1986, the year GNA was enacted, no one could speculate on the future success or failure of GNA. Aspin certainly made a bold and colorful statement in light of senior service leaders and the SECDEF, Caspar Weinberger, who did not favor the legislation. Aspin was simply declaring victory over what had been a hard fought five-year battle between DOD and Congress in passing defense reform legislation—the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.

There is a strong consensus thirteen years later that GNA has achieved its intent scoring high marks in some areas and marginal marks in others. However, as history demonstrates, defense reform will continue to be an evolution. As I have discussed, there is room for improvement within the current boundaries of GNA and there are reforms that should be redressed in GNA. I have also ventured

outside the bounds of GNA to address reform to Congressional budgeting—an adjunct to the PPBS cycle of DOD. In summary my recommendations are:

1. Within GNA, improve the Programming, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) through the adoption of a system that identifies needs and how to meet demands. Link this system with an all military requirements system as noted in number five below.
2. Outside of GNA, Congress should adopt a biennial budgeting system.
3. Readdress in GNA Service Secretariat reform.
4. Readdress in GNA OSD reform specifically defining the roles and functions of the OSD staff.
5. Readdress in GNA the construct of an integrated force development program that defines all military requirements (inclusive of DOD agencies), unique service requirements and integrated requirements.
6. Readdress in GNA by empowering the SECDEF the delegated executive authority in deciding service tradeoffs for force development.
7. Within GNA, fix responsibility for the coordination and integration of interagencies with regional CINCs along the lines of PDD-56.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization and the Need for Change, Staff Report, 99<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985, 49.

<sup>2</sup> Colleen Marie Getz, Congressional Policy Making: The Goldwater-Nichols Defense reorganization Act of 9186(Defense Department), (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1999) 81-82.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 82

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 83. President Harry Truman, Message to Congress, December 19, 1945.

<sup>5</sup> Christopher A. Yuknis, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Interim Assessment, (Carlisle, PA, United States Army War College, 1992) 4.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Getz, 90.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 85-92. Congress favored a traditional decentralized defense structure, which afforded it the opportunity to exert its influence over military matters. Congress also favored decentralization, which broadened its range of options by which to exercise influence. "A military structure with separate or relatively autonomous military departments, each with its own set of spokesman appearing before congress, could provide the legislators with more than a single point of view on military matters and thus give them some freedom of action in formulating policy."

<sup>9</sup> Defense Organization and the Need for Change, 52. Congressional intent, stated in section 2, specifically stated: "...but not to establish a single chief of staff over the armed forces (all armed forces) nor an armed forces general staff." This should not be interpreted to apply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or the Joint Staff.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 52-53.

<sup>11</sup> Getz., 95.

<sup>12</sup> Getz., 99-127. Collen Getz notes the period between 1959-1981 as the "era of congressional inaction on military reform." Getz discusses in detail the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson during the Vietnam era. She provides perspectives on the civil-military-political issues that marked this era.

<sup>13</sup> Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian rescue Mission, Why it Failed, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985, 6.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Commission on Beirut Airport Terrorist Attack Attack, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport terrorist Act, Washington, DC, October 23, 1983, 1-34.

<sup>15</sup> William S. Lind, Report to the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, Subject: The Grenada Operation, Washington, DC: Military Reform Institute, 1984, 2-5.

<sup>16</sup> Getz., 134. James Locher served as the chief architect and author of the staff study that addressed defense reform. He was the primary drafter of the bill and lead staffer throughout the

legislative process. Precluding his work, CSIS drafted its conclusions and solutions for defense reorganization. However, the solutions discussed were without a full understanding of the problems and their causes. Noting the committee's [CSIS] lack of expertise in defense organization, Locher made the "problems" and "causes" the themes of his staff study.

<sup>17</sup> Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act., (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, 1996), 9.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>19</sup> James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, 10. The Honorable James R. Locher III was a professional staffer with the Senate Committee on Armed Services and served as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Thomas Owen MacKubin. "Civilian Control: A National Crisis?" Joint Forces Quarterly, No.6 (Aut/Win 1994-1995) 83.

<sup>24</sup> Lovelace., 20.

<sup>25</sup> United States. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM). Directions for Defense: Report of the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces., (Arlington, VA: The Commission 1995, 4-23-24.

<sup>26</sup> James M. Dubik, "Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Structure". Association of the United States Army Landpower Essay Series, no. 97-1. (Arlington, VA) Feb 1997. James Dubik addresses the need to rethink how DOD structures U.S. Armed Forces beginning with the QDR and Bottom-Up Review (BUR) processes. He compares the strategy of the Cold War, containment and deterrence, with that of today--prevent, deter and win in the international environment and support in the domestic arena. His contention is the Cold War mentality resulted in a force structure built on sizing vice capability.

<sup>27</sup> CORM., 4-15-16.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 4-15.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986., Conference Report 99-824, 99<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2d Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986, 100 stat. 1034-1064.

<sup>30</sup> Sam Nunn, "Future Trends in Defense Reorganization". Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996. 64.

<sup>31</sup> CORM., 4-23-24.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 4-23-34.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> David A. Smith, "Who Needs the Secretariats", Proceedings, December 1995, 44.

<sup>36</sup> Michael Donley, "Prospects for Military Departments," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, 14.

<sup>37</sup> United States. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization and Functions Guide Book, (Washington, DC, US Department of Defense), July 1995.

<sup>38</sup> CORM., 4-3.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 4-23-24.

<sup>40</sup> Locher., 10-16.

<sup>41</sup> John P. White, "Defense Organization Today," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, 18-22.

<sup>42</sup> Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness," Political Science Quarterly, Vol 113, no.1 1998, 104.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>44</sup> William A. Owens, "Making the joint Journey," Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1999, 92. Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Retired) served as the 3d Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. As VCJCS, he chaired the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the forum for senior military leaders (VCJC and the service vice chiefs) to address requirements from a joint perspective. He has published several articles in Joint Forces Quarterly that address the acquisition programs of DOD.

<sup>45</sup> M. Thomas Davis, "Managing Defense After the Cold War," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, June 1997, Washington, DC. Taken from: Course 3 Joint Processes and Land Power Development. US Army War College, Carlisle, PA., Oct 1999, 154-198.

<sup>46</sup> David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, 26. General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.) served as both Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1978-82) and Chief of Staff, USAF (1974-78). His article speaks of problems in defense organization that are marked by service parochialism.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>48</sup> Owens., 93.

<sup>49</sup> Donley., 15.

<sup>50</sup> Owens., 93.

<sup>51</sup> Dan Coats. "Joint Experimentation--Unlocking the Promise of the Future," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/winter 1997-1998, 15.

<sup>52</sup> Owens., 92.

<sup>53</sup> Rowan and Tarr., 101.

<sup>54</sup> Locher., 12.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 12-13.

<sup>56</sup> Nunn., 63.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 63-65.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>60</sup> United States. White Paper. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive-56. Washington, DC, 1997

<sup>61</sup> National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56: A Plan of Action for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington, DC, 1999, 1-14 & 9-15.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 9-15.

<sup>66</sup> Locher., 10.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

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