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**SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI.
CHALLENGES FOR THE U.S. AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

BY

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SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY IN HAITI.
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ABSTRACT

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The prospect of sustaining democracy in Haiti is daunting. Although the international community established a stable and secure environment, justice, economics, and politics lag woefully behind the expectations of the Haitian people. The challenge is to dismantle the remnants of 200 years of predatory rule and replace it with a unified national identity, a revived economy, and secure environment with justice for all, and a universal respect for the law. Only intense foreign assistance, synchronized in an international interagency working group under the leadership of the United Nations, and with key participation from international lending agencies, can give this nascent and still very fragile democracy a real chance for survival. This paper proposes what strategy the United States and the international community should adopt to transition this fledgling democracy to a stable and secure, economically growing, multi-party democracy.

As the United States' oldest neighbor and the Western Hemisphere's second oldest republic, Haiti remains on the fringes of a long climb to political and economic vitality. Haiti is still the poorest nation in the region. Having attained early independence in 1804, one would have thought that it would have jump-started its road to development, but nothing could be further from the case.

In 192 years of independence, Haiti has had 21 Constitutions and 42 heads of state. Of these 42, seven served more than ten years, nine declared themselves heads of state for life, 29 were assassinated or overthrown, and in the 19th century, only one president left office alive.¹ For almost two centuries, the Haitian government has preyed on its people without providing any political or economic goods in return, thus creating what many call the classic "predatory state." It was a political culture without accountability, where absolute power corrupted absolutely. The population, oppressed for decades by a small political and economic elite in alliance with the military and para-military groups, became victims of extreme polarization, with class divisions that effectively prevented the formation of any strong sense of national identity.

Yet, in the middle of this predatory culture there emerged a 19 year respite (1915 to 1934) in which the U.S. Marines attempted to stimulate political and economic development. The United States sent troops in response to a perceived threat to the Panama Canal and sea lanes of communication, and out of concern for growing German influence in Haiti, all of which was justified under the Monroe Doctrine. During this period, Haiti attained political stability, judicial reforms, and an infrastructure that provided for its economic livelihood. Yet within four years of the Marines' departure, it once

again reverted to a predatory government that eventually led to socioeconomic disaster. A series of kleptocratic presidents used the authority of their office to raise private income and perpetrate themselves. After 1957, the Duvalier regime further brought Haiti to a state of poverty where we find it today.

Because of the Catholic Church's Liberation Theology movement, a social awareness of the plight of the Haitian masses emerged. Even before Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure in 1986, grassroots organizations involving as many as two million people backed the emergence of bottom-up political reforms with a thrust towards decentralized local government. This movement eventually led to the democratic election of a Catholic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to the presidency in 1990.² But Aristide's reign was short lived. The military and the private sector believed they had more to gain from a dictatorship, because the president's radical appeals for "direct democracy" and class conflict threatened their predatory lifestyles and survival. So only 7 months after his inauguration, Aristide was ousted by a coup d'etat organized by the military.

From Aristide's fall until September 1994, the international community responded to the Haiti crisis with economic sanctions. This reaction was fueled by the arrogance and lack of cooperation of the de facto government and its leader General Raoul Cedras. During this three-year period, Cedras economically mismanaged the country, which resulted in the loss of 125,000 jobs, and an inflation rate of 52 percent. Human rights violations escalated to a point where over 70,000 Haitians fled on the high seas in hope of successfully immigrating into the United States. As the frustration and anger of the international community grew, the United Nations mandated the most

severe sanctions and the toughest embargo ever imposed in the Western Hemisphere. As a final resort, it authorized the necessary use of force to restore the Aristide government. This was accomplished on 19 September 1994, when a multi-national force arrived in Haiti to oversee the peaceful transfer of power.

Aristide immediately found himself in an overwhelming situation. Democratizing Haiti meant swimming against the currents of history. Only four of the 17 countries that adopted democratic institutions between 1915 and 1931 maintained them throughout the 1920's and 1930's, and one-third of the 32 working democracies in the world in 1958 reverted to authoritarianism by the mid-1970's.³

"Attempts to move from authoritarianism to democracies have failed after most upheavals, from the French Revolution in 1789, to the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, from those in most new nations in Latin America in the 19th Century to those in Africa and Asia after World War II."⁴

Truly, Haiti's future is daunting. Today she remains a country of rampant unemployment, with precariously high inflation, and lays claim to one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world, thus providing a quality of life much worse than the hemispheric average. Among its Latin American neighbors, Haiti's infant mortality rate (104 per 1000) is twice as high, her illiteracy rate is three times the average, and her population growth is the hemisphere's highest.⁵ Coupled with the lowest contraceptive use (10.5%), Haiti's population will double every 30 years.⁶ In addition, Haiti's forests are losing 30 million trees a year, and the environmental degradation will take generations to reverse even if started today. All this creates a vicious cycle of poverty, rapid population growth, and environmental degradation which strangles attempts to break out of underdevelopment.⁷

This paper will assess Haiti's judicial and security policies, economic, agricultural, and environment strategies, and political procedures. It will then determine what strategy the United States and the international community should adopt to transition this fledgling democracy to a stable and secure, economically growing, multi-party democracy. As the United Nations leaves Haiti, one cannot help but wonder how history can be prevented from repeating the experience of the post-1934 era. Only intense foreign assistance, synchronized in an international interagency working group under the leadership of the United Nations, and with key participation from the United States, other "friends of Haiti" (i.e. France, Canada, Venezuela, Argentina), and international lending agencies, can give this nascent and still very fragile democracy a real chance for survival.

Stable and Secure

Providing a stable and secure environment was the single most important end-state objective of the Multi-National Forces (MNF) prior to their transition to the United Nations Peacekeeping operation. Only with a stable and secure environment can democratic systems begin to take root, businessmen gain confidence that their economic investments will not be lost, and people know their human rights will be protected. As long as Haitian citizens across all classes feared reprisal, the bedrock of democracy could not be laid.

But there exists a dilemma. Dismantling the old institutions of repression requires all Haitians to respect the rule of law. A new professional civilian security force that is trusted and that respects human rights is needed, as well as a justice system that works and

applies to all citizens equally. However, the problem is that international forces currently providing Haitian security are temporary, the Haitian judicial system is dysfunctional, distrusted and still corrupt, and President Preval has yet to resolve how he will treat Aristide's prior adversaries, whether by pursuing justice or with reconciliation. Dismantling this predator culture and all the systems and infrastructure that thrived off of and supported it will not happen easily or quickly.⁸

Security

As the U.N. transitions from Haiti, a possibility exists that Haiti will return to the conditions it experienced under the de facto regime. Just as crime plagued El Salvador and Panama after their own militaries were demobilized, urban and rural crime is already on the increase in Haiti. Violent gangs are shaking down businesses and assaulting vehicle occupants with growing frequency. Even in the outlying areas, criminal organizations are increasing in numbers and weaponry. In a recent challenge and show of force, a band of criminals outgunned and outnumbered the Haitian National Police (HNP) in a Port-au-Prince slum, Cite Soleil. Embarrassed and shaken, the HNP were "rescued" by the interim police, or vetted ex-FAd'H, in an inherently negative example of capabilities.⁹

Perceptions of a weak and nascent security force are devastating to U.S. interests and can destroy 18 months of hard work and progress. Should there be any hint that Haiti is returning to anarchy and chaos, potential domestic and international investors will remain aloof, migration will resume, and instances of vigilante justice will increase. The challenge, therefore, is to field, train, equip and

empower the HNP so that, instead of fear reigning in the streets, trust and confidence will prevail.

But this in itself is a daunting proposition. The average age of the Haitian National policeman is 22 years and the average experience is 8 months. Leadership experience is the same, when leadership exists at all. Of a 152 commissairs needed to manage their daily affairs, only 15 were in place in January.¹⁰ Very few of the police have the mobility needed to respond to crimes, conduct mobile patrols, or even visit rural towns and hamlets. Their communication capability consists of only the remnants of the International Police Monitors' radios used during the MNF days -- all without any maintenance contracts. Investigation capabilities and forensic lab resources still do not exist. But perhaps the biggest problem of the HNP is in the unpredictability of their pay. Although they receive a high salary designed to resist temptation toward graft, its tardiness and uncertainty create a breach of faith between the police and the country's leadership.¹¹

However, the greatest danger for the National Police is that U.S. policymakers and other international actors will see their task as done and walk away prematurely.¹² The international community must remain in Haiti over the next few years to monitor, train and mentor this fledgling security force. It will take at least that long to change the culture of policing in Haiti. There is no model of democratic policing within this country; what has been modeled and integrated into their culture is graft, corruption, and brutality. As U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in his remarks at the commencement ceremonies for the first HNP class on 5 June 1995,

"It will be your great honor to protect the communities where you were born from brutality, corruption, and injustice. You know from your own experience how much ordinary Haitians suffered when the security forces were nothing more than thugs in uniform."¹³

One of the key priorities of this international presence must be to train the civilian leadership in the basic skills of managing urban and rural police stations and operations. The U.S. Department of Justice is developing a program for this through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). This program must remain until the last HNP leader is mentored on the job. In addition to training, the international community must insure the openness, transparency, and accountability of the HNP to the people. Mechanisms must be developed to monitor their ethics on the job and their performance in the area of human rights. Other key tasks include the training of a special investigative unit, equipping the police with the mobility (vehicles) and communications necessary for their job, and developing a back-up force specifically designed and equipped to deal with larger, more difficult-to-handle crimes.

Justice

Another social requisite of democracy is to treat citizens and institutions equally under the law. The key institutions here are the courts, police and civil service. Both citizens and institutions must be able to predict with reasonable certainty the consequences of their actions.¹⁴ In addition, there must be a general respect for the rule of law, where criminals are prosecuted within a justice system that works and applies to all equally.¹⁵

Unfortunately, this does not exist in Haiti. The Haitian Ministry of Justice is not only trying to repair a dysfunctional and

distrusted judicial system, but its path of correction is disjointed and out of tandem with the security reforms. Already criminals arrested by the new HNP are finding their way back onto the streets, using the same means (bribes) commonly used in the prior predator state. Jail breaks are common, either because of ill-trained guards, or because of guards who compromise their vigilance for debauchery. Due process is almost non-existent. If one were to walk through any prison in Haiti and ask the prisoners if they had seen a judge, one would find that half had not. Prisoners waiting for trial exceed prisoners serving a sentence by 4 to 1. Judges are hesitant to hear trials for fear of retribution, because they do not have any facilities (courthouses) or law books to conduct their trials, or because they are ignorant of the Haitian penal codes (many cannot even read them since they are written in French, and they only understand Creole). Finally, a prisoner will be quick to tell you that the only reason he remains in jail is because he, or his family, have not raised the required funds to pay off the judge.¹⁶

It would be unfair to suggest that the United States and the international community have yet to recognize these problems and implement programs designed to repair them. The U.S. has invested in an \$18 million five-year Administration of Justice program designed to bring the critical components of the justice system -- the courts, police and prisons -- into an integrated and effective whole. Included in this program is the judicial training of 400 Justices of the Peace and prosecutors in the nine departmental capitals, followed by a more intensive course on investigative techniques, roles and responsibilities, case management, and Haitian law. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has also funded a three-week

courtroom security training course designed to field police to protect judges, witnesses, and prosecutors. In conjunction with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), USAID has also provided funding to renovate and reequip the "First Instance" courts. Canada is the major supporter in the IOM program. Finally, USAID is funding a United Nations Development Program which trains prison guards and administrators.¹⁷

What is missing in all of this, however, are two critical components. As mentioned earlier, judicial reform critically lags behind police and security reform. This judicial program must be synchronized with the reforms occurring within the security area and integrated to insure the timely handling of criminal cases. The security system within Haiti is too fragile. When police and citizens fail to realize the fruit of their labor, the temptation to become exasperated and revert to corruption or vigilante justice is too great. Criminals must be caught, prosecuted with due respect for their constitutional and human rights, convicted in a fair and open trial, and allowed to serve their sentences in a secure prison system. Anything less -- especially a lack of visible progress in these areas -- will bring back the ways of the old culture.

Second, the United States and international community must design these programs and integrate them with the needs of the Haitian government. Far too often a frustrated Minister of Justice sat bewildered as to why donor monies were tied to a specific set of conditions, which had little, if any, application to his particular needs. The old adage that "you can't fit a square peg into a round hole" is applicable here. A case in point is how IOM monies were tied to the condition of refurbishing "existing" courts of "First

Instance." Most of these buildings were either destroyed, belonged to private citizens (who agreed to lend the building to the judge), or did not exist. When the Minister requested money either to build new buildings or refurbish other government buildings more suitable to become courts, the donors remained inflexible and the money remained unused. Many similar examples exist in the judicial training and prison refurbishment programs as well.¹⁸

Economy

In order for new democracies to achieve legitimacy, they need more than anything else, efficacy in the economic arena. If they fail to achieve progress in their economic development, they will fail to institutionalize genuine democratic systems.¹⁹ Haiti's economic challenges, particularly her massive poverty, seem so insurmountable that economists who have studied economic reforms in fledgling Latin American countries seriously question whether the country can even make the requisite changes to sustain hope for the masses. The danger, of course, is that if people do not start to find jobs and feed themselves, then their commitment to this "experiment" will wane. With the country's current 75 percent unemployment rate, and foreign investors remaining off shore because of the government's slowness and unpredictability with privatization reforms, the masses' allegiance is being sorely tested. Unless the government institutes sound macroeconomic policies and institutional reforms, socioeconomic development will remain only a pipe dream.

But to Aristide's credit (and with a lot of foreign assistance²⁰), there has been some progress. In the last year of the de facto regime (1994), Haiti's GNP declined -12.2 percent (per capita, -14.0

percent), compared to all of Latin America which grew by 4.6 percent (per capita, 2.7 percent). In Aristide's first year, the GNP rose to a positive 3.5 percent (per capita, 1.4 percent), compared to Latin America's .6 percent (per capita, -1.1 percent). Inflation dropped from 52 to 23 percent. Still, unemployment remains 75 percent.²¹

The United States fully understands the importance of achieving economic progress. When Ambassador James Dobbins, Special Haiti Coordinator for the Department of State, testified to the Latin American Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on 12 October 1995, he stated that a key U.S. objective is to promote economic renewal and sustained growth. USAID's strategic economic goal for Haiti is to facilitate increased private sector employment and income.²² President Aristide's own objectives were to re-establish the basis for sustained economic development, reduce and correct the structural and institutional distortion left behind after decades of autocratic administrations, promote employment, and correct external imbalances.²³ Additionally, he created a Tripartite Commission, consisting of representatives of labor, management, and government, and a Presidential Commission consisting of representatives of the private sector and the government. The purpose of these commissions was to examine key policies and procedures, and establish a common ground across the spectrum of ideas.²⁴

All this sounds good, but it has yet to meet the expectations of the people. Development is not simply a question of financial aid and sound policy, but also of institutional reforms. There are a significant number of such reforms and programs on the table designed to help Haiti. The U.S. government's economic program, for example, is focused at restoring investor confidence and reviving the private

sector. In order to develop employment opportunities for all Haitians, part of the program focuses on revitalizing agribusinesses and widening the scope of commercial bank lending. Specific policy reforms include revising civil, commercial, investment and labor codes to pave the way for predictable and clear settlement of disputes among potential investors; continuing efforts to privatize state-run industries (at least three in 1996); developing dialogue between public and private sectors on business and investment policy matters; reducing import charges by 50 percent; and eliminating non-tariff barriers.²⁵

More than any other commodity or institutional reform, however, Haiti needs capital to jump start its economy. The problem is that the government has yet to meet the requirements established by two major sources of this capital, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank. The IMF requires Haiti to establish a set of measures aimed at promoting private initiative, demilitarizing public and state enterprises, and redirecting domestic credit towards productive activities and liberalized trade. In addition, Haiti must increase its revenues to 6 percent of its GDP.²⁶ Haiti's dilemma is whether to implement these sweeping fiscal policy changes to attract capital and risk the social and political instability that may accompany them,²⁷ or, whether to implement more protracted changes and risk a too-slow economic transformation and the abandonment of international donors. Although Aristide chose the latter,²⁸ Preval seems to be more open to economic reform and privatization. Still, during this potentially volatile period, international donors must work with Haiti's new administration while they balance economic reform at a pace that does not prove unstable.

As an island economy, Haiti must be open if it wants to be vital. Since Haiti lacks the land, labor, capital, technology and entrepreneurial ability necessary for growth, it must engage in export trade to bring in the necessary capital.²⁹ Because of Haiti's cheap and extensive labor pool, the manufacturing industry provides significant opportunities for export growth. Although this is not an end-all solution (because of limited international markets and keen competition from other Third World countries), it has real potential and must be better developed. Tourism is also a potential growth industry. But the most beneficial export sector for Haiti's economy is agriculture because it not only provides products for international markets, but it helps solve many domestic ills as well (e.g. urban migration, unemployment, and the production of food for Haitian consumption).

Because of years of mismanagement and environmental degradation, Haiti's arable land is about one-third the average in Latin America. As a result, there has been a significant shift of the rural population to urban areas. Reversing this trend will take years, but Haiti must start by shifting its land-intensive crops from the slopes and mountains to flat areas. Tree-intensive crops which hold the soil better, like coffee, oranges, and avocados, should be grown in the mountains. Food crops should be confined to the flat lands, and educated agricultural specialists should be consulted to determine the right mix of fertilizers and irrigated water. This is already being done in some areas of the Artibonite Valley where some farmers have tripled their per acre production.³⁰ The consequences of higher yield are more export products, more jobs, higher wages and a rural population that does not migrate in mass to urban areas.

Before leaving this discussion of economic reforms, one must note the interrelationship between the economy, the infrastructure, the education of the people, and the environment. Without investment in education, Haiti will continue to fail to utilize its most precious resource, its human capital. This country suffers from a severe lack of people trained in administration and management, not to mention having three times the highest illiteracy rate in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti is so deforested that its limited arable land has restricted agricultural capabilities to domestic crops only. The effect is massive migration to urban areas, a loss of the agricultural export industry, and a demand for manufacturing jobs that has limited growth potential in a saturated international market. Finally, the country's infrastructure is so poor that Port-au-Prince cannot sustain electrical power for 24 hours a day; products produced in rural areas cannot make it to city markets and port facilities; and the people suffer the health consequences of living in and near open sewers while using a limited, non-potable fresh water supply. Economic reforms made without educational, environmental, and infrastructural reforms will fail in the long run. An enduring free market democracy must have all these things.

There is no shortage of policy recommendations and theories on how Haiti should transform its economy. This paper lists only a few such reforms, some of which have proven successful for other emerging democracies. But what is critically lacking is an understanding between the international community and the Haitian government of the social consequences associated with these measures. When a reform is rendered, it usually involves some degree of social change. Often the consequence of this change results in an element of instability.

Within the highly fragile and volatile political situation that exists, this instability constantly risks unhinging the security on which the fledgling democratic system is based. This, of course, can have devastating consequences. In Haiti, fiscal policy reforms must be applied gradually, so that the effects can be observed and studied. The analysis will then affect additional reforms. Thus, both the international community and the Haitian government must remain flexible throughout this process.

Politics

The creation of accountability and the need for contingent consent are critical building blocks in the foundation of a democracy. They are the keys to filling the void left by the departure of the predatory state. Freedom of speech and press, a respect for political minorities, and mutual reassurance between competing parties are among the benefits of participatory government. Their presence in Haiti is marginal, largely because the country lacks a fully developed national identity. Haitians lack a strong sense of common interests and shared values sufficient to overcome their class and racial differences. The deep roots of social inequality and economic maldistribution have for over two centuries hindered the development of democratic ideals.³¹

Among the three elements addressed in this paper (security and justice, economics, and politics), perhaps the strongest in Haiti today is the political. Aristide's election in 1990, based on grass-roots organizations, produced a new bottom-up leadership, which has been essential to bringing about political reforms. In June 1995, when Haiti conducted its first democratic elections following Aristide's return, over 60 political parties emerged from various

grass-roots organizations.³² This shift of ordinary citizens from being political outsiders to becoming active players and leaders working for change within the system is very encouraging.³³ In addition, the role of the middle class and the reformist bourgeoisie in establishing individual rights, while upholding the sanctity of private property and the pursuit of market gains, is critical to democratic political progress.³⁴ Ambassador Dobbins, in his recent Congressional testimony, called this "a new beginning...a legacy of democracy restored, and hope renewed."³⁵

Still, Haiti is not politically secure. Some observers argue that the old ruling class has not surrendered. On the contrary, they suggest that these elements are regrouping and will try to block any strategy of development that seems antagonistic to their interests. "Haiti hovers on the verge of political catastrophe," they believe.³⁶

There is a degree of truth to this. As one studies the recent (1995) elections, several problems stand out. While international observers felt that the June 25th elections were for the most part fair and free, they were also "fouled-up." ABC News anchor, Peter Jennings reported that they were "too unorganized to be rigged." Although the runoffs and the December 1995 presidential election showed much improvement, the prospects for organized and secure elections in the future are still uncertain.

The other critical political problems challenging Haiti are to develop a legitimate opposition party, and to eliminate the tradition of using political parties solely to elevate candidates to power. The platforms of the parties participating in the recent elections lacked any agenda for rebuilding this devastated country. On the contrary, these organizations were nothing more than vehicles to power. This is

typical of a predator culture, and leads to a lack of public confidence in candidates.³⁷ The result is what we see today: multiple political parties, but few taking root because they lack agendas that meet the needs of the masses.

Even Aristide's Lavalas is a highly personalistic party with few coherent programs. Although Lavalas candidates received over 80 percent of the popular vote, the party was united only in its loyalty to Aristide. Even there, that loyalty did not carry-over into congressional votes.³⁸ This situation underlines the need for strong opposing parties and a legitimate multi-party system. As long as political contenders fear for their security, or believe fraud exists in the electoral process, or lose confidence in the administrative capabilities of the electoral committee, they will boycott elections as they did in the most recent instances. Thus, Haiti's party system will never really be democratic, and will risk becoming illegitimate.³⁹

Besides having safe, secure, and organized campaigns and elections, Haiti must build strong and legitimate opposition parties with agendas that address Haitian problems. These parties should be less class-based and personalistic, and more broadly representative and statesman-like than they have been in the past.⁴⁰ Only with a negotiating process which depolarizes the political arena and builds at least a minimal consensus can multiple parties consolidate into a few viable players.⁴¹

The United States and the international community should focus on this effort. The construction of strong, credible political parties is so essential to the democratic process that policies should be instituted that engage candidates with each other, that find common ground, and that build consensus. In addition, these international

agency policies must assist parties to develop platforms and procedures that address the country's socioeconomic needs. Candidates must align themselves with these platforms both before their election and while in office.

In 1990, Aristide was elected to fight against Duvalierism (predation) and to promote the rights of the masses. Now, five years later, he and his followers find themselves reconciling with Duvalierism and promoting the rights of all classes. But as Father Antoine Adrien, former head of Aristide's Presidential Commission, said to James Ridgeway of the *Village Voice*, "What was good in 1991 is not necessarily good in 1994."⁴² Or 1996, for that matter.

International Inter-Agency Leadership

As the United States conducts its foreign policy, its objectives are not accomplished unilaterally by any single government entity. On the contrary, they are attained through the cooperative efforts of all government departments and agencies. These organizations work together to develop and execute a mutually supportive strategy.⁴³ This same degree of cooperation does not exist within the international community, however. In the case of Haiti, one donor's economic and political programs may have one set of objectives, which may often be either duplicated or in conflict with another donor's programs. Sometimes, indeed, they may be in conflict with Haitian programs themselves. The question is whether the international community can come together in a unified effort with objectives integrated within Haitian needs. A corollary to this is whether Haiti can flexibly integrate international donor objectives into their specific needs. One would have to be an optimist to believe that this is likely, but

the reality of Haiti's future rests on whether the international community can achieve some degree of international inter-agency effectiveness. The danger is that inflexibility on both sides may bring Haiti into a deeper crisis, in which democracy and political stability become the first casualties.⁴⁴

As matters now stand, program flexibility and integration are inadequate in foreign efforts to assist Haiti. Since the Multi-National Forces' invasion in September 1994, the international community has helped the country attempt a dramatic cultural transformation. But the job is not completed, and Haiti's sponsors must formulate a unified and integrated strategy over the next five to ten years. Specifically, the United Nations, under the now-extended UN Mandate 940, should assign a Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) with economic, political and judicial experience, to head the United Nation's efforts through the next decade. This background is critical as Haiti's focus will be primarily on socioeconomic and political problems in this period. The SRSG must coordinate and integrate the efforts of all U.N. organizations -- specifically, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL), the UN and OAS Human Rights Commission (MICIVIH), and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Other key organizations (e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Inter-American Development Bank, and World Bank) that normally work with U.N. associations should seek to integrate their programs as well. Finally, since the "Friends of Haiti" (the United States, France, Canada, Venezuela, and Argentina) have worked admirably with the United Nations and with each other from the beginning of the MNF through the completion of the first phase of

the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), their participation and leadership are critical to the concept's effectiveness. Of course, the SRSG must be diplomatically astute to effectively work with not only all the donor countries, but also with the specific needs and desires of the sovereign Haitian government.

Any international effort must respect the dignity, sovereignty and needs of Haitians. During the author's exit interview in June 1995 with the ex-Prime Minister, Smark Michel, he asked Michel what one lesson he would suggest be taught to War College students in their studies on national strategy and the implementation of foreign policy. His sobering comments were to "...tell the U.S. Army War College students to always respect the customs of the people they are helping. Foreign assistance is very helpful, but it is much more effective when applied to the specific needs of the people."⁴⁵ Professor Abraham F. Lowenthal, in his book Exporting Democracy; The United States and Latin America, states it equally as well.

"Promoting democracy is not an unworthy, unimportant, or impossible objective, but it is an extremely difficult task. It should be pursued consistently over many decades, not exuberantly chased in small bursts. Because democracy inherently involves self-determination and autonomy, outside efforts to nurture it must be restrained, respectful, sensitive and patient. These are not qualities for which US foreign policy is generally noted, but they are needed to promote democracy abroad."⁴⁶

Conclusion

As Haiti strengthens its democratic roots, it still stands on the brink of failure. Its transformation is far from complete. Societal uncertainty, economic anxiety, and troubling outbursts of violence linger. The challenge is to dismantle the remnants of 200 years of predatory rule and replace it with a humane, democratic government

that responds to the needs of the people. Critical tasks that remain are to create a unified national identity, revive the economy, create a secure environment with justice for all, nurture a democratic culture, and develop universal respect for the law.⁴⁷ When viewed in its entirety, this is a herculean task. However, as U.S. Ambassador William Swing would often remind his country-team, "Look where Haiti was in September 1994, and look where she is now." In that respect, Haiti's transformation is nothing short of remarkable.

It is no secret that the United Nations and the international community have played a critical role in assisting Haiti through its marathon transition. Without their influence none of this could have happened. Still, this fledgling democracy coexists with a political culture of predation and violence that will take generations to erase. The international community must be committed to the task of ensuring that these fragile democratic roots grow deep and can survive. Haiti's democratic foundation still rests on loose gravel; only when it becomes a foundation built on rock will the international community's job be complete. Senator Sam Nunn observed, "We have a one year plan for a 10 year challenge."⁴⁸ The worst thing that could happen would be for the international community to prematurely walk away.

Not only must the international community stay the course, but they must do so smartly. The United Nations must provide leadership that draws international agencies and donor countries together to develop an integrated and synchronized plan that best applies their aid. The many great programs already in existence lack only the leadership and cooperation necessary to effectively integrate them into the needs of the Haitian people and their government. This paper

has reviewed many of the judicial, security, economic, and political programs that are already in effect. It has also identified key areas where the implementation of a particular policy would assist Haiti in its democratic transformation. But none is as critical as the need for the international community to analyze the totality of Haitian needs, and integrate donor programs into an effective synchronized assistance package.

The U.N.'s role in "Restoring Democracy" has shown the world that the international community can contribute to the development of strong national and regional ties, and can do so within the interests of the United States and other regional countries. Its work has also demonstrated that societal change is never easy and almost always takes longer than expected. The United Nations has a lot to be proud of for its contributions in the Caribbean, and that is good. We must encourage it to stay the course, but with a little more teamwork in an integrated and synchronized manner. Haiti's international sponsors do not need to work harder, and they do not need to find more resources. They only need to be smarter in how they do business.

ENDNOTES*

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1. MG George Fisher, Information from this paragraph was taken from MG Fisher's command briefing while he served as commander of JTF190, the Multi-National Command in Haiti from January 1995 until 1 April 1995.

2. Robert E. Maguire, "From Outsiders to Insiders: Emerging Leadership and Political Change in Haiti (Draft)," paper presented at the "Dialogue for Development" conference organized by the World Peace Foundation for the Haitian Studies Association, at Mayaguez Puerto Rico, 20-24 September 1995, 6-8.

3. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, February 1994, 1-22.

4. Ibid., 3.

5. Ambassador William Swing, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, "Haiti: In Physical Contact with History", Remarks at Yale Divinity School, 8 February 1995.

6. The current density of Haitians is 850 persons per arable square kilo and is near the record for the developing world. Almost 40 percent of the population is urban, and Port-au-Prince is growing at a rate of 7 percent annually. From Jennifer L. McCoy, Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction, A Report of an International Meeting Organized by the World Peace Foundation, the Haitian Studies Association, and the University of Puerto Rico, Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1995, 16.

7. Swing, 8 February 1995.

8. McCoy, 19-22.

9. Haiti USEMB DOS Cable; Subj: "Analysis of Post UNMIH Instability - Part 1 of 5 -- Can the HNP Control a Crime Wave?", 23 January 95.

10. Haiti USEMB Cable, 23 January 1995.

11. This information is from the author's personal experiences working with the HNP in both a bilateral and trilateral basis from February 1995 until July 1995 with both the MNF and UNMIH. The author

served as the Executive to the MNF commander for Haitian Security, and in the same capacity with the UN Forces commander.

12. Rachel Neild, Policing Haiti -- Preliminary Assessment of the New Civilian Security Force, Washington, DC: The Washington Office on Latin America, September 1995, 41.

13. Robert Maguire, Demilitarizing Public Order in a Predatory State: The Case of Haiti, Coral Gables FL: University of Miami, North-South Center, December 1995, 1.

14. Lipset, 15.

15. McCoy, 19.

16. Personal experiences of the author in his work in judicial reforms. This work included weekly contacts with the Haitian Minister of Justice, Minister Exume, and his Penal Administrator.

17. Norma Parker, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean Agency for International Development. Testimony before the Sub-Committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House International Affairs Committee, 12 October 1995, 8-10.

18. Author's personal testimony based on participation in both the UN-US-GOH trilateral working groups on Judicial Reform and on Prison Reform, April - July 1995.

19. Lipset, 17.

20. The recovery was based on the availability of \$45 million in aid in rapid disbursement funds which funded 50 percent of the GOH's budget.

21. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1995, New York, NY: United Nations, 1996, 6, 9, 11, 13.

22. USAID, "An Historic Opportunity: Haiti," USAID Action Plan 1996 -- 1997, Washington, DC: n.p., 1995, 1-3, 19.

23. ECLAC, Preliminary Overview, 2.

24. Parker, testimony, 14.

25. Ambassador James Dobbins, Under Secretary of State for Haitian Matters, in testimony to Latin American Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, 12 October 1995, 3; and USAID Action Plan, "An Historic Opportunity: Haiti 1996 -- 1997." 19-26.

26. ECLAC, Preliminary Overview, 28-29.

27. Instability here might be caused by the privatization of industry. Removing government protection of the elite's vested interest may lead to violent reactions.

28. Aristide's hands-off approach to economic reform and privatization allowed him to leave office without being tarred by the brush of neoliberalism. This was what his grass-roots followers wanted and what his ideology (Liberation Theology) inclined him to do. Therefore, if Preval's privatization policies fail, they will not be attributed to Aristide. And if they succeed, Aristide can take credit since Preval is his disciple.

29. Paul R. Latortue, "Toward a Viable Economic Structure in Haiti," paper presented at the "Dialogue for Development" conference organized by the World Peace Foundation for the Haitian Studies Association, at Mayaguez Puerto Rico, 20-24 September 1995, 5.

30. Ibid., 15.

31. McCoy, "Haiti", 5, 23.

32. Bernard Diederich, "Haiti, Stabilization and Political Parties," paper presented at the "Dialogue for Development" conference organized by the World Peace Foundation for the Haitian Studies Association, at Mayaguez Puerto Rico, 20-24 September 1995, 3.

33. See Robert E. Maguire, "From Outsiders to Insiders: Emerging Leadership and Political Change in Haiti," paper presented at the "Dialogue for Development" conference organized by the World Peace Foundation for the Haitian Studies Association, at Mayaguez Puerto Rico, 20-24 September 1995.

34. Robert Fatton, Jr., "From Predatory Rule to Accountable Governance; Dialogue for Development: The Political and Economic Reconstruction of Haiti," paper presented at the "Dialogue for Development" conference organized by the World Peace Foundation for the Haitian Studies Association, at Mayaguez Puerto Rico, 20-24 September 1995, 1, 8, 26.

35. Dobbins, testimony, 10.

36. Robert Fatton, Jr., "Haiti's Road to Democracy, Ambiguities and Paradoxes", The Hopkins Georgetown Haiti Report, No. 1, December 1995, 1-4.

37. Diederich, "Haiti: Stabilization and Political Parties," 2-4.

38. Donald E. Schulz, interview by author, 26 March 1995, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

39. Robert Pastor, "A Popular Democratic Revolution in a Pre-Democratic Society: The Case of Haiti," paper presented at the "Dialogue for Development" conference organized by the World Peace

Foundation for the Haitian Studies Association, at Mayaguez Puerto Rico, 20-24 September 1995, 2-3, 8.

40. Diederich, "Haiti: Stabilization and Political Parties," 20.
41. Harry F. Carey; "Regime Change, Elite Change, Pragmatism, and Consensus: Political Reconciliation and Rule of Law in Occupied Haiti," paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC, 30 September 1995, 20.
42. Kim Ives, "Haiti's Second US Occupation," Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads, edited by Deidre McFadyen and Pierre LaRamee', Boston MA: South End Press, 1995, 118.
43. GEN Barry McCafferey, comment cited in Interagency Cooperation; A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, by William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute For National Strategic Studies, 1995, 41-42.
44. Donald E. Schulz, "Haiti Past, Haiti Future? On Political Culture, Political Change and the Etiology of Violence," paper presented at the "Dialogue for Development" conference organized by the World Peace Foundation for the Haitian Studies Association, at Mayaguez Puerto Rico, 20-24 September 1995, 35.
45. Prime Minister Smark Michel of Haiti, Interview by author, 26 June 1995.
46. Quoted in Diederich, "Haiti, Stabilization and Political Parties," 20.
47. McCoy, "Haiti," i-iv.
48. Quoted in Pastor, "A Popular Democratic Revolution," 8.

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