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# Soldier, Statesman, Scholar: A Study of Strategic Generalship

A Monograph  
by  
Major Maurice L. Todd  
Aviation



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## ABSTRACT

Contrary to Army promotion policies and practices today, all types of generalship are not the same. Instead, there are different types of generalship required for different levels of command and specialized functions. Unfortunately, the Army's focus on promoting officers to general rank based almost exclusively on tactical unit assignments does not address the differences in the requirements for the different types of generalship, particularly at the strategic level. The key characteristics of the strategic level that make it different from lower levels are the importance of joint, combined, and unified command; the constant international scope; and the interaction in the national political system. Examining the lives and careers of three American generals who performed unquestionably well at the strategic level, Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, reveal indicators of their success in terms of organizational characteristics, education, experience, and selection. The organizational characteristics of the US Army were similar for MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower. The Army consisted of a small standing regular force that expanded rapidly in time of war. Unfortunately, the Army was neither large enough, nor had the resources to prepare officers for higher level duties and command through field training, exercises, and actual command assignments. Instead, emphasis was placed on professional education in Army schools where officers could increase their professional knowledge and gain experience in higher level military formations. Furthermore, like today, there was no formal process for preparing officers for strategic generalship, nor was there a military institution that provided officers with the proper preparation in joint and combined operations, international relations, languages, management, or national politics required for strategic generalship. Lacking the availability of such schooling, MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower, undertook the critical challenge to educate and train themselves early in their careers through a combination of the available service schools, mentorship, independent study, and unique assignments. In addition to professional education and training, a key factor in shaping the intellectual growth, professional development and advancement of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower was their serving, as junior officers, in positions that gave them considerable experience at higher levels. Also, the international situation allowed opportunities for foreign experience through assignments and travel. These experiences afforded them ample opportunity to gain diplomatic skills and understanding of other cultures. In addition, their duties with the National Guard, the militia, and the Civilian Conservation Corps gave MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower a knowledge and an appreciation of the American citizen-soldier that would prove critical in winning World Wars I and II. It is also important to note that MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower did not ascend to strategic generalship on their own. Each acquired the sponsorship of influential senior Army leaders early in their careers that had a major impact on their eventual selection for strategic generalship. Finally, even though MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower served as commanders of tactical units, they did not follow traditional paths through those commands. They were initially recognized and ultimately promoted to strategic generalship because of their outstanding staff performance in operations and planning, particularly at high levels. Thus, they advanced in spite of the time spent in tactical units and not because of it. This is a critical difference from the current Army promotion system based on sequential tactical command. Perhaps these indicators of success for MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower could be useful for the Army in developing officers for strategic generalship today. However, before they can be useful, the current Army leadership must reject the underlying theory behind the current method of promotion that assumes successful command at one level is both necessary before and an accurate predictor of successful command at the next higher level and that there is only one path to all types of generalship - through tactical command. In fact, there are other and, perhaps, better paths to generalship at the strategic level as the careers of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower demonstrate.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The changing international security environment brought on by the end of the Cold War and increasing domestic fiscal constraints have propelled the Army into an era of uncertainty and change. The difficulties the Army faces in adjusting to this new era are magnified by the concurrent necessity to move from second wave warfare to third wave warfare as America transitions from an industrial-based to an informational-based society.

As the Army downsizes to meet the fiscal constraints and reorients to meet the current and future challenges to U.S. national security, its ability to develop competent, intelligent, visionary leaders for the future becomes increasingly important. Such leaders must be able to deal with complex and sophisticated political-military issues at increasingly lower levels, as well as with operational and strategic issues at higher levels.

The question of developing leaders for the Army naturally requires an examination of the requirements of generalship. A brief review of the myriad of general officer positions with various types of duties and degrees of specialization indicates that not all generalship requirements are the same. For example, various positions on staffs and in support agencies often require exceptional bureaucratic and administrative skills, while positions in separate brigades and divisions require emphasis on tactical expertise, and positions at the highest levels require strategic vision and considerable intellectual acuity. If, indeed, generalship has a variety of requirements depending upon the particular position, then it is logical to question whether there is one best path to the rank of general officer, or various appropriate paths depending upon the actual requirements of the specific positions.

However, in the Army today, it is virtually impossible to attain the rank of general officer through any career path other

than that of tactical command. This is particularly true of the combat and combat support arms branches from which the vast majority of Army generals are promoted. As a result, while many general officers may be adequately prepared for subsequent commands and key positions in divisions and corps at the tactical and, sometimes, operational levels, their preparation for leadership at the strategic/intellectual level may not be adequate.

The current Army promotion system rewards service in tactical unit assignments to the near exclusion of service in other types of assignments such as those at the operational and strategic levels as well as those in non-tactical units in general. Other specific non-tactical assignments such as service on the Department of the Army General Staff or on the Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might favorably augment assignments in tactical units, but do not replace such tactical assignments which are required for promotion.

Promotions from one rank to the next in the Army are predicated on meeting specific criteria for "branch qualification" for each of the branches. While branch qualification for officers in some non-combat arms branches may differ to a degree, branch qualification for most officers focuses on serving in command positions at the tactical level or in key positions to prepare them for tactical command. This is true for each level of rank. The underlying theory behind this method of promotion is that successful command at one level is both necessary before, and an accurate predictor of, successful command at the next higher level.

For example, in order to branch-qualify and ultimately attain general officer rank, a lieutenant must serve as a platoon leader/commander; a captain must serve as a company commander; a major must serve as a battalion or brigade operations officer or executive officer; a lieutenant colonel must serve as a battalion

commander; and a colonel must serve as a brigade commander. Even graduates of the Army's Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), which claims to train officers to become operational level planners, are required to serve in tactical assignments at the division and corps level to become fully qualified AMSP graduates.

The time required to serve in all of these tactical positions combined with the time required to attend the many mandatory Army service schools and training courses consumes most of an officer's career prior to consideration for promotion to general officer. Unfortunately, under the current promotion system there is little time for lower ranking officers to serve in positions at higher levels or to attain quality graduate level education which would help them develop the experience and skills necessary for successful performance at higher levels while remaining competitive for promotion to general officer. As a result, general officers may be inadequately prepared to command or hold key positions at higher levels, particularly at the strategic/intellectual level.

In the converse situation, officers who serve in operational and strategic level jobs and receive high quality graduate level education are seldom able to also complete branch qualification in command and key positions at the tactical level. As a result, the officers who probably would be best prepared to command or hold key positions at higher levels do not rise above the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel, and therefore cannot hold those higher positions because they are not general officers. These officers often find themselves in the ironic position of performing substantive work at the operational and strategic levels under the command or direction of a general officer who may be tactically proficient, but who may not be adequately prepared for the higher level job. Such officers have no hope of promotion to the general officer's position because they do not possess the requisite tactical credentials. The overall result is an Army

dominated by a tactical mindset from the lowest tactical level, where it is usually appropriate, to the highest strategic/intellectual level, where it is seldom appropriate.

In order to address this issue, the current Army leadership must examine its promotion system to determine if officers should be able to attain general officer rank through career paths that are not solely focused on tactical command. The mere establishment of this program for training and designating operational planners, that program for training and designating strategists, or the other program for developing political-military experts,<sup>1</sup> as the Army has done, is irrelevant if officers in such programs are not promoted for those specific skills. This is because, as Stephen P. Rosen points out in his book Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, it is the promotion system that defines and rewards success in the Army, and it is those leaders who control the promotion system that control the makeup and mindset of the organization. Because of this, innovation in the makeup and mindset of the Army, in general, and in the criteria for promotion to general officer, in particular, cannot come from below. Instead, such innovation must be implemented from the top by current members of the Army leadership who possess the requisite tactical credentials associated with success and credibility today, as well as the vision to recognize the need for change for the future.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the current Army focus on tactical command up through brigade level as the path to all types of generalship, there are many examples of very successful, indeed, some of the most successful, generals who did not require a career of successive tactical commands to rise to greatness, particularly at the highest levels requiring strategic/intellectual generalship. An examination of the lives and careers of some of these generals reveals key insights which the Army should consider in its search to develop generals to lead the Army at the highest levels.

While more and more articles addressing the future leadership requirements of the Army are being written for professional journals as an increasing number of people become concerned with successfully moving the Army into the 21st Century, few articles question the basic assumptions of the current trends in the Army officer personnel system. Instead, most of the articles seem to take for granted the validity of the current system and, therefore, focus on specific functional issues such as force projection, information management, etc. In addition, even though there is an excellent body of literature dealing with the lives and careers of various generals, there appears to be little emphasis on the actual question of the best path or paths to strategic/intellectual level generalship. As a result, the overall state of research on this particular question is far from adequate, and the need for additional study is considerable.

This study first examines the requirements of the highest level of generalship: the strategic/intellectual level, or simply, the strategic level. It then examines the lives and careers of three American general officers who performed exceptionally well at the strategic level to determine organization, education, experience, and selection characteristics that might be indicators of their success.

American generals are examined to ensure the validity of conclusions for the US Army. Three twentieth century generals with unquestioned credentials as successful strategic generals are examined: Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Once identified, the key characteristics from the three individual generals are compared to determine common factors in the preparation for successful generalship at the highest levels.

## II. REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGIC GENERALSHIP

The key to understanding the requirements for strategic generalship is to understand the nature of the environment at the strategic level in which strategic generals must operate. An understanding of the nature of the strategic environment makes it clear that the nature of the lower level tactical and operational environments are different and, therefore, have different requirements for generalship than the strategic level. Indeed, this should not be a controversial concept because the Army itself recognizes the differences in both the nature of the environments and the requirements for generalship between the lower and higher levels and discusses these differences in detail in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of the strategic level environment when compared to lower levels is its extremely high complexity. This complexity is due to a wide range of factors to include the size and diversity of the organizations at that level, the myriad of internal and external influences, and the high degree of uncertainty in dealing with intangible problems, indirect effects, and long term consequences. As a result, requirements at the strategic level differ qualitatively, not just quantitatively, from requirements at lower levels where organizations are smaller and more similar, there are fewer external influences, and there is less uncertainty in dealing with tangible problems, direct effects, and short term consequences.

In examining the specific nature of the strategic level environment, the first, if not the most significant, characteristic is the importance of joint, combined, and unified command. Where lower level generals may deal primarily in a strictly Army environment with single-service issues and organizations, strategic generals must deal with multi-service (joint), national level (unified), and multinational (combined) issues and organizations.

The joint, unified, and combined nature of the strategic level environment significantly increases the complexity of operating at that level. For example, communication is complicated by the need to understand the languages and cultures of the participants, whether they are foreign armies, other U.S. military services, or national level agencies. In addition, interaction with other organizations - subordinate, lateral, and superior - is complicated by unclear and nontraditional command arrangements, unlike typical lower level Army chain of command structures, resulting in a diffusion of command. Even if clear lines of command could be established, however, due to the size and diversity of organizations at the strategic level, strategic generals are rarely able to use direct influence and coercive leadership styles to successfully accomplish their goals as is possible at lower levels.

As a result, the joint, unified, and combined nature of the strategic level requires an understanding of multi-service, national level, and multinational issues, organizations, and operations. It also requires knowledge of the cultures and languages of other countries, services, and national level organizations to ensure effective communication. Strategic level generalship requires the ability to deal with large, diverse organizations and diffused command by indirectly influencing such organizations through intervening subordinate personnel and organizations rather than by direct influence which is the norm at the tactical level. In addition, it requires the ability to deal successfully with complex systems and often vague guidance to accomplish missions rather than with individual organizations or personnel and clear, unambiguous guidance. Furthermore, the strategic level requires collegial, persuasive leadership and negotiation skills, instead of directive/coercive leadership, in order to reduce uncertainty and to build consensus and shared vision with representatives of other organizations, services,

agencies, and/or countries to successfully cooperate in such a complex environment.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the often combined military nature of the strategic level environment, operating at this level is always international in scope. Social, political, economic, technological, and intellectual developments from nearly anywhere in the world could impact on strategic generals and their subordinates. The rapidly growing global economic interdependence and ease of information flow combined with the uncertainty of the post-Cold War era makes such developments increasingly important for current and future operations. Furthermore, unlike lower levels where foreign contact may not be required, the strategic level environment is characterized by considerable personal interaction with high-ranking foreign officials who may have considerable influence on US national interests, goals, strategy, and operations, of both a military and nonmilitary nature.

An international perspective or frame of reference is required to interact effectively with representatives of other nations at the strategic level. Understanding cultural differences and how to deal with them is essential to effectiveness, especially outside of military-only channels. In order to keep abreast of relevant international issues, strategic level generals must remain sufficiently informed by developing ways to sift through the great volume of random data available. This can be accomplished by greater familiarity with such data and developing networks of contacts who can sift through specialized information and with whom relevant information can be exchanged.

Strategic generals must also have the requisite degree of political, economic, and social knowledge, skill, and sophistication to be at ease, socially and professionally, in meetings and discussions with international political figures such as heads of state, ambassadors, international negotiators, etc.

Accomplishing this requires considerable national strategic and political expertise, as well.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to the international arena, the strategic level environment naturally encompasses considerable interaction within the US national political system not required at lower levels. Strategic level generals must interact with the whole range of national political interests to represent organizational concerns and to integrate military operations with national interests and objectives. Such national political work entails testifying before Congress, negotiating with executives of federal agencies and industries, and influencing political leaders and the media who, in turn, influence national attitudes toward the military.

National political work includes providing military advice to political leaders, formulating and implementing national military strategy in concert with political direction, and planning and executing military operations in concert with the national strategy despite often vague and frequently contradictory guidance. Strategic level generals must also provide direction for extremely large and complex organizations and establish organizational culture and values in concert with national culture and values. In addition, they must plan and develop long term programs to ensure US national security interests are met in the present and in the distant future.

Working within the national political system requires a profound national perspective and deep understanding of American society in order to both serve and influence that society. Strategic level generals must have considerable national strategic and political expertise and sophistication to participate at the national level. This is particularly important in developing national military strategy and integrating military operations into that strategy. Furthermore, sophisticated understanding of military strategy in relation to national objectives and of military operations in relation to national strategy may require

an in-depth understanding and appreciation of both general and military history.

Strategic generals must also be able to understand the web of complex interactions at the national level in order to evaluate current capabilities, envision future requirements, and develop ways to meet those requirements in concert with current and future national interests and objectives. This requires strategic generals to formulate a strategic vision or philosophy which encompasses a whole range of variables, requirements, and possibilities. To accomplish this today, strategic generalship requires a level of cognitive complexity equivalent with a time horizon of up to 20-plus years, equivalent to topmost leaders in industry and other fields.<sup>6</sup>

Meeting current and future national interests and objectives entails planning and securing major resourcing for weapons, equipment, organizations, and operations, to include the necessary logistical support. As a result, strategic generals require considerable political sophistication and understanding of how resourcing, procurement, and budget processes work. They also require an in-depth understanding of logistics and resourcing in order to successfully support worldwide deployments and commitments and to adequately manage the increasing complexity of logistics systems and force modernization requirements.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, it is clear that the nature of the strategic level environment is considerably different than the nature of the lower level environments. It is also evident that the requirements for strategic level generalship are qualitatively different than the requirements for lower levels of generalship. However, the main question remains as to the how to develop strategic level generals in an Army that focuses on the tactical level.

### III. CASE STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC GENERALSHIP

In considering how to best develop strategic level generals, it is perhaps useful to examine the lives and careers of officers who have performed exceptionally well at that level. Three American generals who have performed unquestionably well at the strategic level are Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. An examination of organizational characteristics, education, experience, and selection reveals indicators of their success that may be useful in developing such officers today.

The US Army of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, until World War II, consisted of a small standing regular force that expanded rapidly in time of war. Because of the small size of the force and a slow, seniority-based promotion system, Regular Army officers retained low permanent ranks for extended periods of peacetime service. However, these same officers found themselves briskly promoted and given challenging, high levels of responsibility at relatively short notice during times of war.

Unfortunately, the Army was neither large enough, nor had the resources to prepare officers for higher level duties and command through field training, exercises, and actual command assignments. Instead, considerable emphasis was placed on professional education in Army service schools where officers could increase their professional knowledge and gain experience in higher level military formations. As a result, selection for and participation in Army service schools, especially the Army Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College at Camp McNair were extremely competitive.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, graduation from the Staff School was thought to be a passport to better assignments in the Army and graduation high in the class was said to mark an officer for future advancement and guarantee early attendance at the War

College. Attendance at the War College was an ambition of nearly every officer in the Army.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to professional schooling, selected lower-ranking officers were afforded the opportunity to serve in positions that allowed them to gain considerable experience at higher levels. Such jobs as working as a staff officer or aide in the War Department in Washington, DC were important for developing such experience.

The world situation during this time also allowed opportunities for foreign experience. However, unlike the Cold War era where most Army officers served overseas in Europe as part of a huge military presence with little, if any, interaction with high-level foreign officials, before World War II officers served as part of small forces and often had considerable interaction with high-ranking foreign officials. This experience afforded some officers the opportunity to gain diplomatic skills and understanding of other cultures early in their careers.

#### DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

Douglas MacArthur was born in Little Rock, Arkansas on 26 January 1880 and graduated from West Point in 1903. During his lifetime, MacArthur rose to the highest levels of strategic generalship. He served as Chief of Staff of the Army from 1930-1935 and military advisor to the Philippines from 1935-1937. He retired from the Army in 1937 to continue his duties establishing viable Philippine defenses as the country's Field Marshall until 1941. MacArthur was recalled to active duty in July 1941 as commander of US Army Forces in the Far East to prepare for hostilities with Japan.

During World War II, MacArthur was appointed supreme commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area in 1942 and led the Allied offensive through the southwest Pacific from 1942-1945. He was named commander of all US ground forces in the Pacific in preparation for the invasion of Japan in 1945.

After World War II, MacArthur served as supreme commander of Allied occupation forces in Japan from 1945-1950 where he oversaw the reconstruction and democratization of the defeated country. He was then made supreme commander of UN forces in Korea following the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950 where he successfully threw back North Korean forces and invaded the North. MacArthur subsequently established a stabilized front near Seoul after his army was thrown back by Chinese forces. MacArthur was relieved of his command following a disagreement with President Truman in 1951, whereupon he retired from public service.

In examining MacArthur's path to successful strategic generalship, it is clear that his personal experiences as well as his experiences in a variety of diverse assignments were the primary factors in his preparation for the strategic level rather than formal professional education. Indeed, after graduating first in his class at West Point, MacArthur's professional schooling consisted only of several engineering service schools. MacArthur attended neither the Army Staff College, nor the War College.

MacArthur was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers in 1903 and served his first tour as a junior engineering officer in the Philippines where he undoubtedly began developing an increased awareness of international affairs and understanding of foreign cultures. From 1905-1906, MacArthur was assigned as aide to his father, Major General Arthur MacArthur, who had been tasked to tour Asia to observe the last stages of the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria and military organizations and operations in Asia in general. The primary reason for observing the Russo-Japanese war was to gauge the strength of the Japanese Army and its methods of conducting war due to a growing uneasiness in Washington over Japan's increasing expansionism.

MacArthur's tour of Asia with his father may have been the most significant influence on his intellectual and professional

development toward strategic generalship. In fact, MacArthur believed the tour was the most important factor of preparation in his entire life.<sup>10</sup>

On the tour, MacArthur met the great Japanese military commanders of the era such as Oyama, Kuroki, Nogi, and Togo. It was his first glimpse of the boldness and courage of Japanese soldiers and their fanatical belief in their Emperor. However, MacArthur was also impressed by the thrift, friendliness, and courtesy of the ordinary Japanese citizen. MacArthur's father's reports to Washington went far beyond battle tactics and strategy and, as a result, he was asked to extend his observations and evaluations to the colonial lands of the Orient, Southeast Asia, and India.<sup>11</sup>

During the remainder of the trip, MacArthur joined his father in strategic discussions and debates with leaders throughout Asia. He traveled extensively throughout colonial Asia and was able to observe and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the colonial system. How it brought law and order, but often failed to adequately develop the masses along the essential lines of education and political economy. MacArthur was also able to listen to both sides of the famous Curzon-Kitchener debate between statesmen and soldiers over the proper demarcation between civilian control and military duties. He also encountered millions of underprivileged people throughout the region concerned only with acquiring the necessities of life.

This early experience in the Pacific broadened MacArthur's knowledge of diplomacy, negotiations, and international affairs. The contact with high-level matters and personalities gave him an excellent view of the interplay of politics and politicians with military affairs across a wide spectrum of issues. He also acquired a sense of the historic significance of the Pacific and the future importance the region would have for the US. In addition, the opportunity to personally observe and interact with

the Japanese would prove extremely valuable in his later years. By the time he returned to the US in 1906, MacArthur had laid the foundation for an informed, sophisticated world view and an ability to deal with high-level representatives from many cultures which he would continue to develop, and use, throughout his career.<sup>12</sup>

After his tour of Asia with his father, MacArthur served with the 2nd Engineer Battalion, attended an Army Engineer service school, and then became military aide to President Theodore Roosevelt from 1906-1908. While at the White House, MacArthur had frequent discussions with the President on a variety of issues, particularly his experiences in the Pacific. He saw first hand the intricacies of the American political system and frequently interacted with ambassadors, heads of state, congressional leaders, etc., both professionally and socially.

While in Washington, MacArthur developed a close understanding of the American political system at the highest levels. Such a close degree of involvement with the national political system on a daily basis probably reduced any initial idealistic reverence of high level government MacArthur may have had, allowing him to understand and work within the system. However, it may also have given him a view that the system, because of its highly partisan and politicized nature, could and should be manipulated.<sup>13</sup>

After his first tour in Washington, MacArthur moved to Fort Leavenworth where he served as a company commander and adjutant in the 3rd Engineers from 1908-1909, and an instructor at the General Service and Cavalry schools from 1909-1912. While there, he also had the opportunity to work with National Guard and militia units. MacArthur then returned to Washington to serve on the Army General Staff at the War Department from 1913-1917.

A tour on the General Staff, which consisted of only thirty-eight members at the time, was quite an honor for MacArthur who

had only ten years of service. While there, he worked closely with Army Chief of Staff Major General Leonard Wood. The assignment brought MacArthur into intimate contact with the senior officers of the Army and Navy and afforded him the rare opportunity to participate at the highest level of command at a relatively young age.

He also developed a close relationship with Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and worked closely with him on a variety of strategic matters, to include national mobilization. In addition, because of problems with the media, he was appointed military assistant to the Secretary of War in charge of the Bureau of Information where he served as military censor and worked with the press on a daily basis.

As US entry in World War I grew nearer, a major issue in the War Department was the debate between raising an all-regular force or training and activating the National Guard. MacArthur disagreed with most in War Department who had little faith in the National Guard. MacArthur, like his father who had led several volunteer units beginning in the Civil War, believed strongly in the citizen-soldier and the necessity for National Guard units to be able to fight next to regulars in war.<sup>14</sup> Secretary of War Baker agreed with MacArthur, increasing the closeness of their relationship.

As a result, Baker enlisted MacArthur's assistance in convincing President Woodrow Wilson to activate the National Guard rather than using a more limited military response for World War I. To support the policy, MacArthur recommended the concept and name for the 42nd Division - the Rainbow Division - for deployment to Europe. For his efforts, the Secretary of War promoted him to colonel and made him chief of staff of the division. Upon his promotion to colonel, MacArthur transferred to the Infantry in honor of his father's service with the 24th Wisconsin Infantry.

While with the 42nd Division in World War I, MacArthur gained considerable combat experience and became known for his excellent leadership and unparalleled gallantry in combat. This earned him considerable respect from subordinates, peers, and superiors, both US and Allied, as well as rapid battlefield promotions. After serving as chief of staff of the 42nd Division, MacArthur commanded a brigade and served as the division commander, rising to the rank of brigadier general. General John J. Pershing had recommended him for promotion to major general, but the war ended before Congress acted on the recommendation.

While in France, MacArthur expanded his professional development towards strategic generalship by participating in Allied operations under the command of French Army corps. This experience helped him understand the complexities of coalition operations and the special requirements for dealing with Allies and different cultures. Perhaps even more important, MacArthur developed a close relationship with General Pershing and the group of officers under his command in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) known as the "Chaumont House gang" who were to hold the major leadership positions in the Army during the interwar years. Such officers included Charles P. Summerall, Hunter Liggett, John L. Hines, Robert F. Bullard, Peyton C. March, Fox Conner, and George Marshall, to name a few.<sup>15</sup>

Upon returning from Europe, MacArthur served as the Superintendent of West Point from 1919-1922 where he initiated sweeping reforms. Unlike most of his contemporaries and seniors, MacArthur retained his wartime rank due to his relationship with Secretary Baker. From 1922-1923, MacArthur commanded the District of Manila, where he continued to build his international relations skills. He commanded the Fourth and Third Corps Areas from 1925-1928. MacArthur also served on the court martial of Billy Mitchell in 1927 and headed the US Olympic Committee in 1928. He

returned to command the Department of the Philippines from 1928-1930.

Commanding the Department of the Philippines was MacArthur's first posting as a strategic level general. In Manila, MacArthur was not only responsible for all military operations in the Philippines, but he interacted closely with the civilian governors and the Philippine government to provide guidance on the whole range of political, economic, and social affairs. Upon leaving the Philippines in 1930, MacArthur commanded the Ninth Corps area for a short time before reporting to Washington to become Chief of Staff of the Army.

MacArthur served as Chief of Staff of the Army from 1930-1935. His five year tour aimed at preserving the already meager strength of the Army during the Depression. As Chief of Staff, MacArthur stressed Army deficiencies in personnel and materiel and presided over the development of plans for industrial mobilization and manpower procurement. These topics, which had received considerable hinderance under the previous the Chief of Staff, were thoroughly studied by MacArthur's special assistant, Dwight D. Eisenhower.<sup>16</sup> MacArthur also established an Air Force headquarters and administered Army control over the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

Following his tour as Chief of Staff, MacArthur served as military advisor to the Philippines from 1935 until 1937 to establish adequate defenses for the islands. He retired from the Army in 1937 rather than leave before his job was finished and served as Field Marshall until 1941. He was recalled to active duty in 1941 to serve yet again in the field of strategic generalship during World War II.

## GEORGE C. MARSHALL

George C. Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania on 31 December 1880 and graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1901. During the course of his life, Marshall served at the highest levels of strategic generalship and statesmanship. He served as Chief of Staff of the Army from 1939-1945 where he directed US preparation for and overall strategic direction in World War II. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also served as the principal military advisor to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman during the war.

Marshall retired from the Army in 1945 at the end of World War II, but President Truman sent him to China as special representative in an effort to seek peace in the civil war there. He then served as Secretary of State from 1947-1949 where he proposed the European Recovery Program, or the Marshall Plan, to rebuild Europe. Marshall served as Secretary of Defense from 1950-1951 before retiring from public life.<sup>17</sup>

Marshall's path to successful strategic generalship was marked by a dedication to professional education through Army service schools, both as a student and instructor, and through constant independent study. In addition, Marshall served in a variety of assignments that provided him with critical experiences that were significant influences upon his intellectual growth, professional development, and advancement.

Marshall was commissioned in the Infantry in 1902 after graduating first in his class at VMI. His professional education came mainly through constant study of his trade. Like most other officers of his generation, Marshall studied the practice of arms rather than its theory and read little in political theory, international economics, or advanced science. However, he maintained a curiosity that kept him constantly investigating new things and was a voluminous reader, which no doubt helped fill the void of his professional schooling.<sup>18</sup>

Marshall's only significant professional schooling in the Army occurred at Fort Leavenworth where he attended the Infantry and Cavalry School (later called the School of the Line) in 1906-1907 when he was a lieutenant. Marshall attended the school intent upon performing well enough to be admitted to the competitive Army Staff School at the post for a second year of study. This marked a critical point in his career, because the minimum rank requirement to attend the school was increased to captain the following year. The curriculum at both schools was in the process of being improved and was carefully monitored by Major General James F. Bell, the new Army Chief of Staff.

Marshall graduated first in his class from the Infantry and Cavalry School in 1907 and attended the Staff School during 1907-1908. Marshall's years of study at Fort Leavenworth laid the foundation for his professional development and gave him clear direction to his career. At Leavenworth, he learned the basics of tactics and solid staff work. Even more important, he "learned how to learn" under the tutelage of the outstanding instructor Major John F. Morrison.

In addition to the important foundation for professional development Marshall acquired through the Army service schools at Fort Leavenworth and subsequent independent study, he gained considerable experience in a variety of key assignments that proved to be critical factors in his intellectual and professional preparation for strategic generalship. The first such assignment was his posting to the Philippines upon entering the Army in 1902.

During his first tour, Marshall served with the 30th Infantry during the last stages of the Philippine Insurrection. This assignment provided Marshall not only with his first exposure to troops, but with his first experience in a foreign culture. During the tour, Marshall gained an initial view of international relations and US global responsibilities that he was to build upon for the rest of his career. In addition, he observed firsthand

the friction between the soldiers and the civilian governors in the Philippines due to differences in perspectives, methods, and objectives.<sup>19</sup>

Marshall departed the Philippines in 1903 and served at Fort Reno from 1903-1906 before studying at Fort Leavenworth from 1906-1908. Graduating first in his class from the Infantry and Cavalry School earned Marshall a posting as an instructor at the Staff School from 1908-1910, after completing the second year course. It also brought him to the attention of Major General Bell, who selected Marshall to help train the Pennsylvania National Guard each summer during his tour at Leavenworth. This began a long relationship with the militia that would give Marshall key insights to and faith in the US citizen-soldier that would prove critical to fighting and winning World Wars I and II.

Marshall's relationship with the Guard and militia also gave him experience in effective staff work to include planning and running field exercises with large and disparate units. In addition, forced to deal with time constraints, maneuver space restrictions, and a different mentality, Marshall learned how to accomplish a tremendous amount in a relatively short time. Because of his experience with the Guard, Major General Bell attempted to make Marshall assistant to the chief of the newly formed Militia Affairs Division on the Army General Staff, but was overruled by the Secretary of War.<sup>20</sup>

While at Fort Leavenworth, in addition to his budding relationship with Major General Bell, Marshall developed many other close contacts that would help him later in his career. For example, when he arrived in France at General Pershing's AEF GHQ in 1918, the chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, and chief of supply had all been his students. In addition, at First Army HQ he had taught the chief of personnel, the chief of intelligence, the chief of operations, and the chief of the Air Service. Other key staff officers had been his classmates, and even others still

had served on the post with him, to include Walter Krueger, Douglas MacArthur, and Hunter Liggett.<sup>21</sup>

Upon completing his tour at Fort Leavenworth in 1910, Marshall toured Europe for four months. Traveling to France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, Marshall added to his knowledge of international affairs an initial appreciation for the European cultures of future US Allies. He also observed British Army maneuvers while in the United Kingdom.

When he returned to the US in 1911, Marshall helped set up and run the Army "Maneuver Division" exercise on the US-Mexico border because of his previous experience with running exercises for the National Guard. He then served as Inspector-General of the Massachusetts National Guard from 1911-1912 where he set up training programs and maneuvers for the militia. During this tour, Marshall ran a major militia exercise in 1912 and was the assistant to future Chief of Staff Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss who served as the exercise umpire. Due to the success of the exercise, Marshall was yet again recognized for his planning and organizational abilities.<sup>22</sup>

In 1913, Marshall returned to the Philippines with the 13th Infantry where he helped plan and run Department wide exercises and became a legend in planning and executing an operation to seize Manila. Even at this early point in his career, Marshall's brilliance in planning and organizing was becoming known throughout the Army. Even though Marshall was behind his contemporaries in rank, he had planned more complex maneuvers in New England, involving more troops than those he planned in the Philippines, and as an assistant umpire and instructor, had had more intellectually challenging assignments.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, Marshall continued to develop his knowledge of international relations and foreign cultures. Following his successful exercise in the Philippines, Marshall took three months of leave where he traveled in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria and

studied and toured the Manchurian battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War. During the tour, Marshall met top Japanese leaders such as General Baron Fukushima, the Governor of Manchuria, and Lieutenant General Akiyama, their great cavalry leader. While meeting with the Japanese, he had the opportunity to discuss their tactics and training methods and to observe various maneuvers. As a result, Marshall gained an appreciation for the Japanese Army and learned many lessons of the Russo-Japanese War.

After completing his tour of Asia in 1916, Marshall served as aide to Brigadier General Hunter Liggett, first as commander of the Provisional Infantry Brigade, then as commander of the Philippine Department. In this position, Marshall continued his field and staff training and studied operations from the Philippine Insurrection to prepare staff rides for officers on topic of a possible Japanese invasion of the Islands through the central Luzon Valley.<sup>24</sup>

Upon returning to the US, Marshall served as aide to Major General Bell, first in the Western Department, then in the Eastern Department, from 1916-1917 as the US prepared to enter World War I. While in the West, Marshall worked again with the militia and civilian training camps, this time in the Monterey-San Francisco area where he gained additional experience in handling civilian-military issues in the Department. He also worked with Brigadier General William L. Sibert who was to command the 1st Division upon its deployment to France. While in the Eastern Department, Marshall took charge and acted in the name of Major General Bell, who had fallen ill, to accomplish what needed to be done to prepare units for deployment to Europe. In this position, Marshall had to deal with political pressure and wealthy civilians who solicited commissions for friends and relatives in the deploying units.

Known for his superior organizational skills, the commander of the 1st Division requested Marshall to be his training officer,

then his chief of operations for World War I. As a result, Marshall was among the first US combat troops sent to Europe and helped plan the first US offensive of the war. However, despite repeated recommendations and requests during the war, Marshall was repeatedly turned down for command because he was deemed to important as an operations officer first for the division, then for higher staffs.

Marshall reported to General Pershing's GHQ in July 1918 and served in the Operations Division under Colonel Fox Conner, becoming a key member of the "Chaumont House gang." At GHQ, Marshall was the principal planner for the St. Mihiel offensive. He then oversaw transfer of over 800,000 Allied troops from St. Mihiel to the Meuse-Argonne front, demonstrating his well-deserved reputation for excellent staff and logistics work. Marshall was named chief of operations for the US First Army under Major General Liggett in October 1918, then Chief of Staff of VIII Corps under Major General Henry T. Allen in November.

By the end of the war, Marshall had participated in the Cantigny, Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne operations. In planning operations and coordinating command and control with Allies, Marshall gained unique and invaluable experience in working with Allies and in creating effective coalition command and control relationships which would be useful in the future. This experience broadened Marshall's knowledge of global affairs and added to his international perspective. Working with Allies, where no solid chain of command existed, also developed the diplomatic and negotiation skills which Marshall had to use extensively to gain consensus and cooperation in operations.

Even though he had not commanded in combat, Marshall's reputation soared, especially in the eyes of General Pershing and Brigadier General Fox Conner. General Pershing recommended him for promotion to brigadier general in 1918, but Congress did not act on the recommendation before the war ended.<sup>25</sup>

Upon his return from Europe, Marshall served as aide to General Pershing from 1919-1924 and began what he called the most unique experience of his life.<sup>26</sup> His first task was to work with Pershing and Conner to prepare Pershing's report to Congress on World War I. Marshall also gained additional foreign experience by traveling with General Pershing to foreign countries and dealing with dignitaries at the highest levels. In addition, he accompanied Pershing on a tour of all the Army posts and war plants in the country, thereby gaining detailed knowledge of military installations and industrial plants, as well as a better knowledge of America and its people.

When Pershing became Chief of Staff in 1921, Marshall's duties expanded. After the war, reformers in the Army attempted to remedy the country's lack of preparation for national emergencies as had been the case following the Spanish-American War. Marshall, at Pershing's side in Washington, saw at close hand and took part in the Army's struggles. He gained invaluable experience at the strategic level in working within the national political system, especially in dealing with congressmen and congressional committees. This experience provided Marshall with training not only in operating within the national political arena, but in understanding the complexities of the nature of the US democracy, as well.<sup>27</sup>

During this period, Marshall also began to solidify some of his strategic concepts. For example, because of his extensive work with the National Guard and experience in World War I, Marshall believed in the citizen army and the pre-eminent job of the Regular Army officer to prepare it for war. He also believed in joint cooperation between the services, and wanted to exchange staff officers between the Army and the Navy so that each service could understand the other's problems. In addition, according to Fox Conner, Marshall was already developing his thoughts on the proper organization for coalition command and control in war. His

five year tour with General Pershing in Washington was probably the most significant factor in Marshall's intellectual and professional development for, as well as his subsequent advancement to, strategic generalship.

After his tour in Washington, Marshall served as the executive officer and, at times, commander of the 15th Infantry in China from 1924-1927 where he again acquired considerable diplomatic experience and foreign cultural awareness, as well as an appreciation for China's plight. He then served as an instructor at the Army War College in 1927 and Assistant Commandant and Chief of Instruction at the Infantry School from 1927-1932.

At the Infantry School, Marshall had significant influence over the tactical training of the future US Army leaders in World War II. As an instructor there, as in previous teaching assignments, Marshall sought for ways to stimulate the thinking of his students and provided an atmosphere conducive for bold experimentation.<sup>28</sup> In addition, he was able to further develop his military expertise by working with well-trained and well-equipped demonstration units and with the best young infantry officers in the Army.

In 1933, Marshall was promoted to colonel while working with the CCC and commanded the 8th Infantry at Fort Screven. He then became the senior instructor of Illinois National Guard from 1933-1936. Marshall was finally promoted to brigadier general in 1936 and commanded the 5th Infantry Brigade from 1936-1938 at Vancouver Barracks where, again, he spent a large portion of his time supervising the CCC. As post commander, he was also responsible for handling political and social relations with the local communities, which proved to be further training toward the strategic level.

During this five year period before returning to Washington, Marshall worked with brigade and division size units, leading the

red forces each summer in maneuvers. As a result, he became aware of the important changes motorization, mechanization, and airpower could bring to the modern battlefield. Perhaps most important, his duties with the National Guard and the CCC gave him a knowledge of the future citizen soldier unmatched by most senior Army commanders or other Army officers in general.<sup>29</sup>

In 1938, Marshall reported to Washington to head the War Plans Division of the General Staff where he got a firsthand look at projected strategic plans and could assess the ability of the General Staff structure to function effectively in the event of mass mobilization for war. He then served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army from 1938-1939 and became Acting Chief of Staff in mid-1939. When Marshall became Chief of Staff of the Army on 1 September 1939, the day Germany invaded Poland, he was exceptionally well-prepared for strategic generalship.

#### DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Dwight D. Eisenhower was born in Dennison, Texas on 14 October 1890 and graduated from West Point in 1915. During his lifetime, Eisenhower ascended to the highest levels of strategic leadership, both inside and outside the Army. During World War II, he was appointed commander of the European Theater of Operations and commander of US forces in Europe in 1942, served as allied commander for the invasion of French North Africa and Italy during 1942-1943, and, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force from 1943-1945, directed the cross-Channel invasion of France and subsequent operations resulting in the ultimate defeat of Germany.

Following World War II, Eisenhower served as Army Chief of Staff from 1945-1948, retired to become president of Columbia University from 1948-1950, and returned to active duty to serve as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1950-1952. He was elected President of the US in 1952 and 1956, finally leaving public service in 1961.

In examining Eisenhower's path to successful strategic generalship, his dedication to professional education and training stands out as a significant factor in his intellectual growth, professional development, and advancement. Though not a stellar student at West Point, and even developing a distaste for military history there because of rote memorization methods of instruction, early in his military career Eisenhower developed a keen interest in professional education through self-study, mentorship, and Army service schools.<sup>30</sup>

The apparent impetus for Eisenhower's interest in professional education was the close friendship he forged with George S. Patton when they were assigned together at the Infantry Tank School at Camp Meade during 1919-1921. During that time, Patton, eight years Eisenhower's senior and preparing to attend the Army Staff School, invited Eisenhower to join him in an intensive self-study program in tactics. Because of his work with Patton, Eisenhower was a serious student of tactics when Patton introduced him to Brigadier General Fox Conner in 1919. Conner, a charter member of the "Chaumont House gang", had a major influence on Eisenhower as a professional teacher, mentor, and sponsor. Because of Conner's sponsorship, Eisenhower began his association with the "gang" that was to continue with MacArthur and, ultimately, Marshall.<sup>31</sup>

Eisenhower accompanied Conner to Panama in 1922 and served as his chief of staff in the 20th Infantry Brigade. In Panama, Eisenhower developed his keen interest in professional education through a three-year program of self-study with Conner serving as his mentor. Conner not only honed Eisenhower's administrative and tactical skills through daily duties and exercises, but tutored him in analyzing various tactical problems on the terrain in Panama.

Conner also directed an intensive reading program for Eisenhower that included the classics, contemporary thinkers, and

military writers, to include Carl von Clausewitz whose On War Eisenhower read three times. In Socratic dialogues, Conner and Eisenhower discussed the nature of war and Conner convinced him that flaws in the Treaty of Versailles ending World War I made another major war inevitable within thirty years. Conner also believed the war would be fought by a coalition of which the US would be a part and discussed and analyzed problems in coalition command in World War I with Eisenhower as early as 1924.<sup>32</sup>

As a result, Eisenhower's time in Panama was a period of revolutionary intellectual growth and professional development. His study under Conner established the intellectual foundation upon which he built the powers of analysis, the conceptual frameworks of the nature of war, in general, and coalition warfare in particular, as well as the overall strategic vision which were to serve him so well in the future as a strategic commander.<sup>33</sup>

Upon returning from Panama, Eisenhower sought to continue his professional education by attending the Army Staff School, however, the Chief of Infantry was not overly enamored of Eisenhower and would not send him at what was viewed as such an early point in his career. Fortunately, Brigadier General Conner, then serving as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army to Major General John L. Hines, arranged to have Eisenhower temporarily seconded to the Adjutant General (AG) Corps from the Infantry, ostensibly for recruiting, to get him away from the Chief of Infantry. He then had the Adjutant General send Eisenhower to the Staff School as part of the AG Corps quota in 1925.<sup>34</sup>

Eisenhower considered his year at Fort Leavenworth to be a watershed in his life. He expanded on the foundations of tactics and military history he had developed at Camp Meade and in Panama, especially in the employment of large organizations such as corps. Eisenhower also renewed old friendships and made new ones. In addition, he graduated first in his class in 1926. This was a considerable mark of distinction in the Army at the time, which

also guaranteed him early attendance at the prestigious War College.<sup>35</sup>

At an exceptionally early point in his career (his twelfth year of service), Eisenhower attended the Army War College in 1927-1928 where he was able to expand his studies to even higher levels to include the employment of field armies and examination of strategic issues. Graduation from the War College provided Eisenhower not only with increased intellectual growth and strategic vision, but also provided the opportunity for high level, substantive positions in the War Department. While serving in one such position as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary for War from 1929-1933, Eisenhower attended the Army Industrial School where he studied strategic issues such as mobilization of manpower and industry for war.

In addition to his exceptional intellectual development through education and training, Eisenhower gained considerable experience relatively early in his career that was to complement his academic preparation for strategic generalship. After initially spending two years in Texas learning basic infantry skills from 1915-1917 and being rapidly promoted to Regular Army captain, Eisenhower spent World War I commanding the Army Tank Training Center at Gettysburg, reaching the rank of temporary lieutenant colonel by 1918. His World War I service training the Tank Corps and subsequent assignment with the Tank Corps at Fort Meade in 1919-1922 gave Eisenhower an early familiarity and experience with armored forces few other officers had.

Eisenhower worked closely with Patton at Camp Meade, where they both commanded tank brigades, to develop lessons and doctrine for the future use of tanks on the battlefield. At odds with the conventional wisdom on the employment of tanks, Eisenhower and Patton believed they should be used as a separate arm rather than as infantry support weapons. As a result, Eisenhower earned himself the reputation of a maverick in the Infantry Corps and was

rebuked by the Chief of Infantry for his ideas. However, this familiarity with armored forces and the excellent grounding in handling men and weapons at the tactical level provided Eisenhower with a firm grounding in both basic military operations and the possibilities for the use of mechanized force in the future. This early experience also aided Eisenhower in developing his exceptional organizational and administrative skills for which he was to become famous.<sup>36</sup>

As Conner's Chief of Staff in Panama from 1922-1925, Eisenhower continued to hone his administrative and tactical skills. He also probably gained a measure of appreciation for foreign cultures. Perhaps even more significant was the development of the link with Marshall. Marshall had served on the AEF staff under Conner during World War I and Conner thought Marshall was a genius, particularly when it came to coalition command and control. In fact, in Panama, Conner urged Eisenhower to seek an assignment with Marshall. This recommendation left Eisenhower with considerable respect for Marshall without yet having met him.<sup>37</sup>

After graduating from the Army Staff School, Eisenhower served on the prestigious American Battlefield Monuments Commission under General Pershing in 1926-1927. He rejoined the Commission after graduating from the War College in 1928. In this position, Eisenhower wrote a guide of the World War I battlefields in Europe which required him to study the battles of the war in detail to include visiting France for an extended period beginning in June 1928. In addition to his regular duties, Eisenhower worked directly for General Pershing on a number of matters from speech writing, to aiding him with his memoirs of the war, etc.

This tour exposed Eisenhower for the first time to the highest levels of the Army and the various personalities involved. For example, during the tour he met Marshall who was a confidant of General Pershing. In addition, his tour in France was his

first trip to Europe. While there, Eisenhower traveled widely and developed invaluable experience in European cultures.<sup>38</sup>

Eisenhower's early attendance at the Army's most senior school led to his assignment as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War in 1929-1933. He then became special assistant to the Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, from 1933-1935. These critical high level assignments accustomed Eisenhower to dealing with high level, Army-wide issues. He experienced internal Washington politics as MacArthur fought for resources from Congress to maintain and build the Army. Eisenhower also drafted MacArthur's speeches, lobbied Congress, and helped prepare the Chief of Staff's annual reports.

In addition, he was forced to examine world-wide matters and conduct in-depth studies of such subjects as the mobilization and composition of armies, the role of air forces and navies in war, the tendencies toward mechanization, and the acute dependence of all elements of military life upon the industrial capacity of a nation. As a result, more than any other tours, Eisenhower's assignments at the War Department from 1929-1935 were critical in preparing him for future strategic generalship.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, MacArthur called Eisenhower the best staff officer in the Army whose principal strength was the ability to look at problems from the point of view of high command.

Eisenhower accompanied MacArthur to the Philippines as his assistant as military advisor to the Philippine Government in 1935. While there, his duties were as much diplomatic as military due to extensive interaction and coordination with the American High Commissioner and senior members of the Government of the Philippines.<sup>40</sup>

Eisenhower returned to the US in 1939 for two years of key administrative and coordination positions that filled out his professional education. He briefly commanded a battalion in the 15th Infantry and then served as regimental executive officer.

Late in 1940, Eisenhower became chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Lewis. In March 1941, he became chief of staff of the newly activated Ninth Corps, and in June he became chief of staff of the US Third Army in San Antonio commanded by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger.

At Third Army, Eisenhower studied the problems of the expanding Army and grasped the nature of the citizen-soldier force he was helping to build. He believed the discipline and traditions of the old Regular Army would not work for the new force. While the new citizen-soldiers needed tough training, they also needed to understand the reasons for their missions and tasks.<sup>41</sup> In September 1941, Eisenhower participated in the Louisiana Maneuvers as Third Army chief of staff where he gained experience in the organization and movement of large ground forces. He was given a large part of the credit for the success of the maneuvers and promoted to temporary brigadier general.

Eisenhower reported as War Plans officer on the Army General Staff under Marshall following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. While there, he reorganized the War Plans Division into the Operations Division which would serve as Marshall's command post throughout World War II. He also quickly gained Marshall's trust and confidence due to his excellent grasp of joint and strategic matters beginning his meteoric rise to strategic generalship. Eisenhower's career of preparation for the strategic level had served him well.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to Army promotion policies and practices today, all types of generalship are not the same. Instead, there are different types of generalship required for different levels of command and different specialized functions. Unfortunately, it seems clear that the Army's focus on promoting officers to general rank based almost exclusively on service in tactical unit assignments does not address the differences in the requirements

for the different types of generalship, particularly at the strategic level.

The key to understanding the requirements for strategic generalship is to understand the nature of the environment at the strategic level in which strategic generals must operate. An understanding of the nature of the strategic environment makes it clear that the nature of the lower level tactical and operational environments are different and, therefore, have different requirements for generalship than the strategic level.

The key characteristics of the strategic level environment that make it different from lower level environments are the importance of joint, combined, and unified command; the constant international scope; and the considerable interaction in the national political system. These characteristics define the nature of the strategic level environment and are the basis of the requirements for strategic generalship.

The joint, unified, and combined nature of the strategic level requires an understanding of multi-service (joint), national level (unified), and multinational (combined) issues, organizations, and operations. It also requires knowledge of the cultures and languages of other countries, services, and national level organizations to ensure effective communication and operations. Strategic level generalship requires the ability to deal with large, diverse organizations and diffused command, as well as the ability to deal successfully with complex systems and often vague guidance to accomplish missions. Furthermore, the strategic level requires collegial, persuasive leadership and negotiation skills in order to reduce uncertainty and to build consensus and shared vision with representatives of other organizations, services, agencies, and/or countries.

The international scope of the strategic level environment requires an international perspective to understand the impact of global events upon national interests and to interact effectively

with representatives of other nations. Understanding cultural differences and how to deal with them is essential to effectiveness, especially outside of military-only channels. In addition, Strategic generals must have the requisite degree of political, economic, and social knowledge, skill, and sophistication to be at ease, socially and professionally, in meetings and discussions with prominent international political figures.

The considerable interaction within the US national political system required at the strategic level requires a profound national perspective and deep understanding of American society in order to both serve and influence that society. Strategic level generals must have considerable national strategic and political expertise and sophistication to participate effectively at the national level. This is particularly important in developing national military strategy and integrating military operations into that strategy. Strategic generals must also be able to understand the web of complex interactions at the national level in order to evaluate current capabilities, envision future requirements, and develop ways to meet those requirements in concert with national interests and objectives.

While, it is clear that both the nature of the strategic environment and the requirements for strategic generalship are qualitatively different than the environments of and requirements for lower levels of generalship, the key question is how to best develop strategic level generals. Examining the lives and careers of three twentieth century American generals who performed unquestionably well at the strategic level, MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower, reveal indicators of their success in terms of organizational characteristics, education, experience, and selection that may be useful in developing such officers today.

The organizational characteristics of the US Army were similar for MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower. During the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, until World War II, the Army consisted of a small standing regular force that expanded rapidly in time of war. Because of the small size of the force and a slow, seniority-based promotion system, Regular Army officers retained low permanent ranks for extended periods of peacetime service. However, these same officers found themselves briskly promoted and given challenging, high levels of responsibility at relatively short notice during times of war.

Unfortunately, the Army was neither large enough, nor had the resources to prepare officers for higher level duties and command through field training, exercises, and actual command assignments. Instead, considerable emphasis was placed on professional education in Army service schools where officers could increase their professional knowledge and gain experience in higher level military formations.

Furthermore, like today, there was no formal process for preparing officers for the requirements of strategic generalship. In addition to the absence of a formal process, there was also no military institution that provided officer's with the proper preparation in joint and combined operations, international relations, languages, management, or national politics required for strategic generalship. Even though there was an Army War College, few officers were able to attend, and even fewer attended relatively early in their careers when the impact upon their intellectual growth and development of a strategic conceptual framework would have probably been greater.

The same problem exists today because, even though there are excellent opportunities for strategic studies at the various war colleges, through strategic fellowships, etc., officers must run the gauntlet of tactical command for almost two decades before they are eligible for such programs. Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to instill the ability to think in strategic terms during the course of one or two years

of study in officers who have had a predominately tactical focus for twenty years. It would be more effective, as in the cases of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower, to develop such skills over the course of an officer's career.

Lacking the availability of such professional schooling, officers in the era of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower, like many officers today, had to educate and train themselves through a combination of the available service schools, mentorship, independent study, and unique assignments. Unfortunately, while the Army today does offer excellent opportunities for developing skills useful for strategic generalship to officers through graduate level study, language qualification, attache duty, an Army Strategist program, etc., it does not reward officers for such programs. Even more important, officers who take advantage of such opportunities run considerable risk in not completing the tactical command assignments required for promotion.

In examining the careers of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower, it is clear that all three future strategic leaders undertook the critical challenge to educate and train themselves early in their careers, though not in exactly the same ways. For example, MacArthur's professional schooling consisted only of engineer service schools. Instead, he gained most of his preparation for the strategic level through personal experiences and professional assignments. On the other hand, Marshall attended only the Infantry and Cavalry School and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, but augmented his professional education with extensive reading, instructor duties, and other key assignments. In contrast, Eisenhower's professional educational development for strategic generalship included a balance between attendance at the Army's top schools, independent study, intensive study under a mentor, and experience in a wide array of assignments.

A key point in the ultimate advancement of Marshall and Eisenhower to the strategic level was their early interest in

professional education and their relatively early attendance at the Army Staff School. In addition, due to the highly competitive nature of the Staff School, their excellent performance there opened up subsequent assignments at higher levels and increased their chances of sponsorship by senior Army leaders.

In addition to professional schooling, a key factor in shaping the intellectual growth, professional development and achievement of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower was their having the opportunity, as junior officers, to serve in positions that allowed them to gain considerable experience at higher levels. Such jobs as working on the Army General Staff in the War Department or as aides to senior leaders were critical for developing such experience. These assignments gave MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower unique opportunities to view and participate in strategic level military issues, gain an understanding of the political system at the national level, and deal with high level government leaders and dignitaries.

Furthermore, the international situation during this time allowed opportunities for foreign experience through both professional assignments and personal travel. However, unlike the Cold War era where most Army officers served overseas in Europe as part of a huge military presence with little, if any, interaction with high-level foreign officials, MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower often served overseas as aides to senior officers or as part of small forces and, as a result, often had considerable interaction with ranking foreign officials. These experiences afforded them ample opportunity to gain diplomatic skills and understanding of other cultures. Even when MacArthur and Marshall served abroad as part of large units during World War I, their extensive interaction with Allied commanders still afforded them excellent preparation for strategic generalship by providing them with professional foreign military contacts and experience in coalition operations.

In addition, through their duties with the National Guard, the militia, and the CCC, MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower acquired a knowledge and an appreciation of the American citizen-soldier that would prove critical in winning World Wars I and II. This gave the three future strategic leaders key insights as to how to organize, train and fight the eight million man US Army of World War II.

It is also important to note that MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower did not ascend to strategic generalship on their own. Each acquired the sponsorship of influential senior Army leaders early in their careers that had a major impact on their eventual selection for strategic generalship. This sponsorship opened up assignments to them that were critical to their intellectual growth, professional development, and ultimate advancement through the ranks. For example, early in his career, MacArthur could count on the influence of his father and the circle of Army leaders who had served with him in addition to the support of Secretary of War Baker. Marshall also had a sponsor in General Bell early in his career, as well as other officers such as General Liggett. However, the critical sponsorship and support for all three officers following World War I was the "Chaumont House gang" of officers who had served under General Pershing. MacArthur and Marshall were charter members of the "gang" and Eisenhower subsequently became a defacto member through his relationships with first, General Conner, then MacArthur, and, ultimately, Marshall.

Finally, even though MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower served as commanders of tactical units, they did not follow traditional paths through those commands. They were initially recognized and ultimately promoted to strategic generalship because of their outstanding staff performance in operations and planning, particularly at high levels. As a result, they advanced in spite of the time spent in tactical units and not because of

it. This is a critical difference from the current Army promotion system based on sequential tactical command.

Perhaps these indicators of success for such successful strategic generals as MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower could be useful for the Army to develop officers for strategic generalship today. However, before they can be useful, some modern day version of the "Chaumont House gang" may have to emerge to discard old mindsets and take action to develop such capable leaders for the future. For that to happen, someone in the current Army leadership must reject the underlying theory behind the current method of promotion that assumes successful command at one level is both necessary before and an accurate predictor of successful command at the next higher level and that there is only one path to all types of generalship - through tactical command. In fact, there are other and, perhaps, better paths to generalship at the strategic level as the careers of MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower demonstrate.

The Army is currently struggling to deal with the uncertainty and turbulence of the changing international security environment, as well as increasing fiscal constraints, brought on by the end of the Cold War and the transition from second wave to third wave warfare. As the Army downsizes to meet the fiscal constraints and reorients to meet the current and future challenges to US national security, it must explore new methods of training, organizing, equipping, and fielding armies. To meet these challenges successfully, the Army must improve its ability to develop competent, intelligent, visionary leaders for the future at the strategic level.

## ENDNOTES

1. The Army Advanced Military Studies Program, the Army Strategist Program, and the Army Foreign Area Officer Program, respectively.
2. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 58.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, Executive Leadership, Army Pamphlet 600-80, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 June 1987). Hereafter referred to as DA PAM 600-80.
4. DA PAM 600-80, p. 12 and Elliot Jacques, et.al., Senior Leadership Performance Requirements at the Executive Level, (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, January 1986), pp. ix-x, 2-3, 10-11 and 26. Hereafter cited as ARI.
5. DA PAM 600-80, pp. 12-13 and ARI, pp. ix, 3-4, 10-11 and 26.
6. DA PAM 600-80, pp. 12-13 and ARI, pp. ix, 3-4, 10-11, 24 and 27.
7. ARI, pp. ix, 4-5 and 10-11.
8. Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., Nineteen Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992), pp. 377-378.
9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell To Friends, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), pp. 200-204.
10. "We were nine months in travel, traversing countless miles of lands so rich in color, so fabled in legend, so vital to history that the experience was without doubt the most important factor of preparation in my entire life. We discussed defense plans behind closed doors and inspected military fortifications and critical areas on the spot. We sat in the chancellories of the strong and the weak. Kings and viceroys and high commissioners lay bare their hopes and fears." Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964), pp. 31-32.
11. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964), pp. 31-32.
12. MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 30-32
13. MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 32-35.
14. MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 39-48.
15. MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 47-55.
16. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Volume I, 1880-1941, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), pp. 340-347.
17. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939, (New York: The Viking Press, 1963)
18. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 346-347.

19. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 79-84.
20. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 103-104.
21. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 93-108.
22. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 115-117.
23. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 121-124.
24. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 127-128.
25. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 176-192.
26. Marshall said to Pershing at the end of his tour, "My five years with you will always remain the unique experience of my life." Pogue, Education of a General, p. 203.
27. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 203-204.
28. Pogue, Education of a General, p. 347.
29. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 347-348.
30. Eisenhower, At Ease, p. 185.
31. Eisenhower, At Ease, pp. 169-173.
32. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), pp. 18-19.
33. In testament to Conner's impact upon him, Eisenhower said, "It is clear now that life with General Conner was a sort of graduate school in military affairs and the humanities, leavened by the comments and discourses of a man who was experienced in his knowledge of men and their conduct...But in a lifetime of association with great and good men, he is the one more or less invisible figure to whom I owe an incalculable debt." Eisenhower, At Ease, p. 187.
34. Eisenhower, At Ease, pp. 196-200
35. Eisenhower, At Ease, p. 200 and Puryear, Nineteen Stars, pp. 162-163.
36. Eisenhower, At Ease, pp. 169-174.
37. Eisenhower, At Ease, p. 195 and Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 18.
38. Eisenhower, At Ease, p. 208.
39. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 19.
40. Eisenhower, Crusade, pp. 14-15.
41. Eisenhower, Crusade, pp. 6-14.

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