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
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THE 1964 CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES:
PUBLIC RESPONSE

BY

MARTHA WILLIS ANDERSON



FOR

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF ARMY

RESEARCH SUBTASK 4812B
OCD-OS-63-48

AUGUST, 1965

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THE 1964 CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES:
PUBLIC RESPONSE

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

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THE CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

The focus of the report The 1964 Civil Defense Postures: Desirability and Probability is the list of six alternative kinds of Civil Defense programs. These six statements are descriptions of some alternative civil defense programs which might be available for adoption by the nation and can be viewed as degrees of entailment with the civil defense programs. Because of this, they are called "Postures," phrased as follows:

1. All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival.
2. There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.
3. In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.
4. There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.
5. In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.
6. There will be a program for the Federal government to pay part of the cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations, such as hospitals and schools.

Respondents were asked to evaluate each of these Postures, separately, in two ways: 1) according to their own assessment of the desirability of each, i.e., how much they personally would like to see the program implemented as a national policy, and 2) according to their perceptions of the probability of each, i.e., how likely it is that a particular program might be implemented.

Perhaps it is obvious why these desirability evaluations are important to consider. The very nature of a Civil Defense program demands that it be fully accepted and endorsed by the American public, whether cooperation is needed to match government funds, to initiate a community

effort, or merely to insure use of a shelter program in the event of an attack. It is vital, then, that public appraisal of any Civil Defense program being considered for adoption is known.

The necessity for knowing public perceptions of the probability of implementation for each program is more subtle. This knowledge does, of course, provide a valuable insight into public reactions to the Civil Defense effort as a whole, and is an assessment of government action in this area up to the present time. It is important to know, then, whether the public views a continuation and extension of Civil Defense programs as probable, not only as an assessment of the program's importance, but further because such perceptions are reflected in attitudes toward Civil Defense. Thus, if a certain program is viewed as having a high likelihood of adoption, the public reaction will be quite different than if it is seen as an impossible alternative. Furthermore, the kind of program which is viewed as being likely has a bearing on public reaction.

When desirability evaluations are taken into consideration along with probability assessments, public reaction becomes more complicated. If a program is seen as being both desirable and probable, the resulting behavior patterns might be expected to be quite different than if the program is seen as being desirable and not probable, not desirable but probable, or neither desirable nor probable.

These evaluations will hopefully provide clues to whether public reactions will be apathetic (a reaction either to something in which they have no interest, or to something which is assumed will or will not happen regardless of any endorsement or attempt at prevention) or will be actively goal-oriented (for example, to prevent something unwanted from occurring or to urge the adoption of some program which they desire but do not feel is highly probable).

Having examined these Postures both singly and as a totality, attitudes toward them can be investigated in the light of corresponding attitudes about the Cold War, other Civil Defense perceptions, and personal characteristics of the respondents. Such an examination will hopefully lead to a depth of understanding about the Civil Defense Posture evaluations: for instance, we might assume that the respondents who see the Postures as desirable and probable would also view a Third World War as being probable and relevant to their own lives.

The following table gives the mean desirability assessments for each of the six Postures based on a -3 to +3 scale on which -3 is an evaluation of highly undesirable, zero is an evaluation of indifference, and +3 means that the Posture is seen as being highly desirable.

Table 1
1964 SURVEY
DESIRABILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Program	Mean
CD-1 All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival.	+2.29
CD-2 There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.	+2.13
CD-3 In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.	+2.05
CD-4 There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.	+2.13
CD-5 In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.	+2.19
CD-6 There will be a program for the Federal government to pay part of the cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations, such as hospitals and schools.	+2.05

It is immediately apparent that all of the Postures are seen as being very desirable programs. Since the range of means is so small, it may be possible to generalize in order to say that Civil Defense as a whole is viewed by the American public as being desirable. While the separate Postures are often very different types of programs, the overall evaluations are very much alike. CD-1, describing the status quo, is given the highest desirability rating. It can probably be assumed that the majority of the respondents did not know that this described the present Civil Defense policy.

Further, the marginal distributions for the six Postures show that the percentage of the sample for whom any single Posture was highly desirable (+3) ranged from 64.9% to 74.1% while 42.3% of the sample consistently gave +3 values for every Posture.

Table 2 gives the mean probability assessment for the six Postures. Probability was given a terminal point of five years (or by 1968),

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and evaluations were gauged on a 0 to 10 scale, zero indicating no probability of occurrence and ten indicating virtual certainty of occurrence.

Table 2
1964 SURVEY
PROBABILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

<u>Program</u>	<u>Mean</u>
CD-1 All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival.	6.70
CD-2 There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.	5.02
CD-3 In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.	6.36
CD-4 There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.	5.94
CD-5 In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.	6.78
CD-6 There will be a program for the Federal government to pay part of the cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations, such as hospitals and schools.	6.74

Again, all Postures appear to be seen as being almost equally likely to be implemented. Each Posture is given an evaluation which places it in the realm of probability as a national Civil Defense program.

The Posture which was given the highest probability value, CD-5, (in addition to shelters, defenses against ballistic missiles) was seen also as the second most desirable program.

It seems obvious that the public is either unable to distinguish among the differing types of Civil Defense programs, or does not

care to do so. The high probability and desirability evaluations given the Postures point to the conclusion that Civil Defense in any form is desired and thought to be somewhat probable.

It is interesting to explore the possibility of a relationship between desirability evaluations, especially the +3 or highly desirable evaluations, and the probability assessments.

It has already been stated that a high percentage of the sample, between 64.9% and 74.1%, assessed each Posture as highly desirable (+3). Table 3 compares the mean probability values for that group with the mean probabilities of those who assessed a Posture as being desirable, undesirable, or were indifferent to it (in other words, those who gave any evaluation less than +3).

Table 3

MEAN PROBABILITY VALUES

	+3		+2 to -3	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
CD-1	7.10	1061	5.58	378
CD-2	5.37	971	4.08	478
CD-3	6.94	936	5.26	494
CD-4	6.30	968	5.20	462
CD-5	7.16	978	5.95	447
CD-6	7.21	928	5.89	502

The mean probabilities for those who saw each Posture as highly desirable are consistently and significantly higher than are the mean values for those who assessed them as less desirable. It appears, then, that there is a definite relationship between a high desirability evaluation and a prediction of probability of occurrence.

Another way to look at this relationship is shown in Table 4, which gives the percentage of those assigning high probability values (10) to each Posture within the two desirability groups

Table 4

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH PROBABILITY VALUES (10)

	+3		+2 to -3	
	%	N	%	N
CD-1	29.5%	1061	11.6%	378
CD-2	15.0	971	3.5	478
CD-3	26.2	936	7.5	494
CD-4	20.0	968	8.0	462
CD-5	27.8	978	12.7	447
CD-6	28.1	928	11.2	502

The difference here becomes even more striking. Those who evaluated the Postures as highly desirable consistently had a far greater percentage of the sample who also assessed the Postures as highly probable than did those who saw it as less desirable. These differences seem to be clearly significant, and point again to the supposition that those who see the Postures to be highly desirable also see them as almost certain to occur.

The evaluations given the six Postures were further broken down by the respondents' answers on other questions pertaining to Cold War outcomes, estimates of effectiveness of our active defenses and of Civil Defense, and general attitudes about fallout shelters and the premises upon which Civil Defense is based. Many of the associations we would have expected to find between the foregoing questions and the Civil Defense assessments have not materialized. We have found very little to help in explaining the high probability and desirability values given to the six Postures. Often the difference in Cold War and shelter perceptions was only a matter of degree and did not actually seem to determine one's Civil Defense evaluations.

The most significant associations which were discovered were within the area of Cold War perceptions, leading us further into the thinking that Civil Defense is inexorably bound, in the public mind, to our active defenses. When questions were asked which isolated attitudes about fallout shelters only, the associations grew less striking.

The following generalizations can be made, if it is kept in mind that the differences between groups were usually very slight.

Those who found Civil Defense desirable and probable as a national program seem to exhibit more desire for a peaceful settlement to the Cold War, with the United States victorious, but do not necessarily believe such outcomes are probable. Rather, they often predict a

nuclear World War about which they worry more than do the other groups. This group differs also in that the respondents tend to be stronger in their intention to use a shelter in the event of a nuclear attack.

Those who view a Civil Defense program as probable but not especially desirable predict a fairly imminent war, within at least five years. This group also believes more strongly than any other that our defenses against enemy bombers, submarines, and guided missiles are good, and further supports especially the placing of anti-missile missiles around American cities in general, and less enthusiastically, around their own cities.

Those who see a Civil Defense program as desirable predict that a war will not occur within at least two years. They also exhibit the greatest faith in the fact that shelters will increase chances of survival in a nuclear war, and believe further that they will make war less likely, disarmament easier to obtain, and will lessen worry about war.

The opposing group, for whom Civil Defense is undesirable (the "not probable" group seemed to have no distinguishing characteristics at all), differed especially on the Cold War Futures: They desire nothing less than total destruction of Communism, the best alternative to which seems to be peaceful surrender on the part of the United States, which they tend to find more probable. On most of the other questions a strong degree of fatalism of this sort is exhibited by at least half of the group. They also were most pessimistic about chances of survival, even with shelters although still assessing them as good, and viewed shelters as increasing the likelihood of war, the difficulty in achieving disarmament, and the amount of worry about war.

Those who were completely indifferent to the Postures showed some interesting attitudes, which unfortunately are made less significant by virtue of the small size of the group itself. They expect no World War and no weapons escalation, and thus worry considerably less about the possibility of such a war. In addition they were more optimistic about survival chances without shelters in the event that there were such a war.

Completely irrelevant to evaluations of Civil Defense seems to be whether or not one's own area is thought to be a potential target.

These patterns in general are what might have been predicted. Yet the conclusions are based on such limited differences as to render them seriously suspect. The plain facts are that nothing in the data has yet yielded any indisputable evidence of definite differences in perceptions between those groups which evaluated the

Postures differently. There has been, in other words, nothing to explain these differences. What has been found and presented in the preceding paragraphs is based on differences in degree and not in orientation.

It seems quite valid, then, to continue the thinking that the natura of a Civil Defense program is of little concern to the American people. Not only do our respondents not distinguish between the differing types of programs, but more importantly, the programs are consistently endorsed as being desirable. Cold War perceptions and other variables such as have been explored seem often to be surprisingly irrelevant to these assessments.

Ostensibly, the public seems to be apathetic about Civil Defense. Yet it must be emphasized that apathy can be a product of wanting something which is also fully expected to occur as well as of disinterest. The Government has advocated Civil Defense and the public seems to view it as an extension of what is perceived to be a successful program of active defenses. Further, the Government is expected to implement a Civil Defense program, lending credence to the general belief that it must be good.

Personal characteristics of the respondents were also considered in relation to their probability and desirability assessments. Again, the data showed nothing highly significant, but it is possible nevertheless to make several tentative statements. In general, the data suggests the following to be true: 1) a high probability of Civil Defense implementation is particularly associated with women, Negroes, Democrats, those who place themselves in the Lower and Working classes, and those with children under 12; 2) a high desirability is associated with women, those with a lower educational level and those with children under 12; 3) low probability was seen to be found most often among the Upper and Middle classes, those with little strength of religious belief and among Professionals; 4) Civil Defense was seen to be of particularly low desirability among those having a high level of education, those who had no small children, those having a high income, those who made their livelihood on a farm, and strangely, among those who placed themselves in the extreme Upper and Lower classes.

The desirability evaluation of each of the six alternative Civil Defense Postures was in terms of those respondents who found it highly desirable, desirable, indifferent or undesirable. For each Posture, a majority of the sample (usually about two-thirds to three-fourths) indicated the highest desirability. Although the composition of this "majority" of highest desirability varied somewhat from Posture to Posture (42.3% found all six highly desirable) some generalizations have been made about this "majority" and their relationship to the remainder of the sample. However, this has shed little light on those respondents for whom the six Postures were either consistently a matter of indifference or were uniformly extremely undesirable.

It was possible to isolate 15 people out of the total sample who greeted every Posture with indifference. A consistent evaluation of extreme undesirability was given by 21 people. Obviously, there can be nothing significant gained by an analysis of these two groups, but by comparing these two "pure" groups with the marginal distributions of the total sample, we may, at least, indicate a direction for further research.

Keeping in mind that we cannot even suspect a significance to any of these findings, we can nevertheless list them, and consider them a clue to validity.

The group of 15 people who were consistently indifferent to the Civil Defense Postures is primarily a male group and has a slightly lower level of education than does the total sample. They exhibit a tendency toward optimism insofar as tension levels are concerned, and seem to see a continuing Cold War situation without resolution. They do not worry about the possibility of nuclear attack, although they admit chances of survival in such a war would be poor. Although they are more opposed to shelters than is our total sample, and would probably not use them, they nevertheless admit shelters would make chances of survival somewhat better. They also feel that shelters would make people worry more about war. This complex of thinking seems to be one of optimism and a grudging admittance of the effectiveness of shelters, which can be easily seen as leading to a feeling of indifference toward Civil Defense.

Those people who gave a value of -3, extreme undesirability, for each of the Civil Defense postures are also predominately male and possess a level of education that is lower than that of the total sample. This group perceives continuing high tensions, lessening only slightly in the future. They see a peaceful end to the Cold War, although such an end may involve some measure of subjugation for the United States. They, too, feel that chances of survival in a nuclear war are poor, although shelters would increase them slightly. However, they also feel that shelters would not only make people worry more about war, but would increase the likelihood of war. These last two perceptions are perhaps the clue to the undesirability values given by this group. Their peaceful but rather fatalistic predictions of the future are surely not otherwise responsible for such assessments of extreme undesirability.

CONCLUSIONS

Three major findings have been the result of this report: 1) the public seems unable to distinguish among the differing alternative programs of Civil Defense; 2) each program was assessed as being almost equally probable and highly desirable, and thus we can generalize that statement to Civil Defense as a whole; 3) we have found very little to explain the high desirability and probability values given Civil Defense.

Despite other answers which might be expected to lead either to a low desirability or low probability assessment, these values remain high. The question is, then, why?

The fact that there was no significant difference among the values given each Posture leads us to believe that the public cannot, or does not care to, distinguish among the differing Civil Defense possibilities. It further leads us into thinking that there has been no thorough, objective thought given Civil Defense by the American public. This may be due to several things.

Civil Defense, to begin with, is inexorably linked to thinking about nuclear war, which is to many people an unthinkable concept. In other words, it is too terrible to think about, and thus there may very well be a saturation point, a point beyond which the public cannot go in thinking about the concept of nuclear war. The same process may be operative when it comes to thinking about Civil Defense. Civil Defense leads to thinking about fallout, blast effects, firestorms, and chemical and biological warfare. It means thinking about hideous deformities caused by a nuclear holocaust and visited upon innocent generations of Americans. It means facing the possibility of the end of an America as we know it, or indeed, of civilization itself. Thus because war is unthinkable, so is Civil Defense.

Yet while there is no question that the American people are hesitant to think about nuclear war because it is too terrible, Civil Defense, which they also seem not to think about, is good.

Obviously it is considered good because it is offered as a defense against the horrors of the unthinkable war. Whether or not it is an effective defense seems often to be irrelevant. Our conjecture is that it is seen as good because the American public has been conditioned to think it is good, and because it represents security and insurance against future dangers.

This is true in part because we are living in an age in which the technology of war, not to mention the peaceful scientific endeavors such as those concerning space, is far beyond the comprehension of the layman. War is unthinkable not only because it is horrible, but

because it is too complicated for the ordinary man to even attempt to understand. Thus, the public does not try to comprehend, but instead places the fate of the country in the hands of those who do comprehend: the scientists who develop our technology and the Government which puts the scientific wonders to use. The conditions of secrecy, the high status given to scientists and defense strategists in Washington, the world focus on Cape Kennedy--all this has created an aura of the fantastic that is almost overwhelming to the ordinary citizen.

Even if the public did understand twentieth century technology, it is often obvious to the man in the street that an individual cannot hope to have any effect in the processes of scientific development or implementation.

More relevant, however, seems to be the reaction to the facts that the Government has endorsed Civil Defense and that Civil Defense is seen as being a part of slightly overwhelming but highly successful technological advances. The public therefore has concluded that a Civil Defense program is worthwhile and good. Because of the consistent, undifferentiated pattern of desirability, the high evaluations of effectiveness of active defenses, and the expected low personal efficacy involved in implementing a Civil Defense program, it is tempting to conclude that the public is apathetic about Civil Defense in general.

It must be remembered, however, that this apathy (as has been pointed out before) seems more to be a product of a high desirability coupled with expectation rather than of disinterest. Evaluations of highly desirable (+3) for the Postures ranged between 64.9% and 74.1%, while 42.3% of the sample consistently gave +3 evaluations for the Postures. This is surely indisputable evidence that a Civil Defense program is desirable to the American public.

Further, we have seen that not only are the Postures perceived to be probable, but that those who saw the Postures as being highly desirable tended most often to see them as being also highly probable (Tables 5 and 6). This combination in which the majority of the sample sees a Civil Defense program as both desirable and likely to be implemented naturally manifests itself in an apparent apathy. Since such a program is wanted and is already expected to occur, there is very little that the public needs to do, and thus perhaps, there is a tendency for the issue to be dismissed in importance.

Thus the public has not attempted to form an objective picture of Civil Defense, but has given blanket approval to the concept, relying on the Government to implement it in the best manner possible.

One further point needs consideration. While there can be no question that the public likes the idea of Civil Defense and regards

allocation of money in that direction to be wise, we have not explored the concept of priority. The 1964 questionnaire was concerned only with attitudes toward Civil Defense and did not therefore introduce any other important issues of the day. It would seem to be worthwhile in future studies to attempt to obtain a rank ordering of issues according to their priority. That is, given a list of possible programs to be implemented, such as foreign aid, health research, increment of active defenses, the War on Poverty, the Peace Corps, etc., and including Civil Defense, where does the American public see the most pressing need, and to which does it give the greatest priority?

Without such a list it is possible still to say that Civil Defense obviously has the full endorsement of the public as a necessary and worthwhile program. The Government, in the implementation of such a program, seems to have the complete confidence of the public in the handling of America's defense system.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This report is one in a series of topical reports based on the results obtained from the national opinion surveys conducted for OCD-OS-63-48, STUDIES OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND COLD WAR ATTITUDES. These surveys, based on national probability samples, focus on relevant public attitudes, opinion, information and behavior concerning ongoing and prospective Civil Defense efforts and the Cold War environment to which these Civil Defense efforts are a response.

National surveys are required by the necessity to fully evaluate actual and possible Civil Defense programs in their largest context. More "localized" research, such as study of a community or of a specific group, serves to provide significant insights, especially of process and dynamic, but cannot be regarded as a substitute for nation-wide probes. Only a probabilistic national sample can determine the degree and nature of existing consensus. The nation-wide survey can serve to verify the results of localized efforts, and in turn can provide clues to problem areas that may best be examined in depth via a "local" study. An ability to feel the "pulse of the nation" on critical issues is one of the prerequisites for selection and implementation of the best possible Civil Defense programs. This does not imply that the "best" programs need to be the ones the population is most receptive to at a given time. In fact, such is not likely to be the case. But, the knowledge on the part of the Office of Civil Defense of the most probable strains, the major sources of potential resistance and support, and the images and knowledge affecting actual behavior, should be instrumental in overcoming some of the difficulties necessarily associated with any major nation-wide effort.

To date the Civil Defense surveys have consisted of two annual national studies concerning Civil Defense and Cold War attitudes

conducted in the summers of 1963 and 1964 and a national survey on public acceptance of the proposed NEAR alerting system administered in January 1964. In order to monitor the state of mind of the population with regard to civil defense and to ascertain any trends or drifts of basic opinion the national surveys have been conducted regularly and annually. In view of the fact that all three surveys have indicated very little shift in public response to the basic issues no national survey has been planned for 1965. Instead, efforts are being concentrated on further, more comprehensive analysis of the materials presently available. In the event of a shift in national or international events that suggest alteration of perceptions of civil defense options or basic public images of the Cold War environment we are prepared to respond to a Civil Defense requirement for another national survey.

The major data requirements levied on the basic survey schedule instruments consist of the following considerations:

- (a) It is essential that a portion of the instrument be such that it can be utilized, without alteration (and certainly without major changes), repeatedly. In such repeated observations, the analysis of changes can best be anchored.
- (b) In addition to this core of the instrument, "topical" issues are included pertaining to the circumstances which prevail at the time of the survey (example: Cuban crisis).
- (c) In addition to the core-and-topical portion of the instrument, related items submitted by other researchers working on behalf of the Office of Civil Defense are included.
- (d) Relevant population characteristics are included in the instrument, observations upon what are customarily referred to as "face-sheet" variables (sex, education, etc.). This enables us to pinpoint the characteristics in terms of which our population is homogeneous, and those in terms of which it varies, with regard to the other variables of the inquiry.

The "core" items for the survey schedules primarily consist of sets of alternative future outcomes of the Cold War and of sets of alternative Civil Defense systems of the future. Each component of these sets is assessed by the respondents in the sample as to its probability of occurrence for a given time point in the future and its desirability to the individual respondent. On occasion the respondent is also requested to assess the probability and desirability estimates of relevant others for sets of potential outcomes. The "topical" components are, of course, dependent upon the circumstances prevailing at the time of questionnaire make-up and the interests of the Office of Civil Defense. The 1963 survey included items on the Cuban Crisis

and the 1964 survey modified the "core" items on Civil Defense futures to include the alternative CD Postures presented by Secretary Pittman to the hearing of the Armed Services Subcommittee in mid-1963.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in STUDIES OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND COLD WAR ATTITUDES is essentially that associated with conventional large-scale national surveys modified by elements of Outcomes methodology (the assessment of likelihood and desirability of alternative futures) and certain aspects of systems interpretation of attitudes and behavior based on the interlacing of analyses of perceptions of, and responses to, the Cold War environment and Civil Defense measures as a personal and national response to that environment.

The data-collection and sample design for all three surveys has been handled by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The two annual surveys were national probability samples of 1434 and 1464 Americans and the NEAR study was based on a national sample of 1402 Americans obtained from a probability block sample of 1500. The reports in this series are based on one or both of the two national samples. In a national probability sample every individual in the sampling universe (in these instances every adult American) has an equal and known likelihood of occurring in our final sample. Thus our national samples can be regarded with considerable confidence as "representative" of the total population. On such relatively invariant characteristics as sex and race the various samples are consistent with each other and with the corresponding proportions obtained from the national census. The differences between the original sampling frames of 1500 and the final sample are the result of the near impossibility of obtaining 100% success on "call-backs" (those individuals who were not available on the initial contacts) within a reasonable time period.

Each questionnaire schedule is formatted and pre-coded with regard to possible response categories in such a manner that the data obtained can readily be entered onto punch cards. Upon receipt of these punch cards from the National Opinion Research Center the data contained in them is transferred to magnetic tape in order to facilitate use of the 7070 and 7090 IBM computers for processing of the data for analysis. The basic mode of analysis used in these reports is usually that of multivariate tabular analysis. Here two or more variables are quantified and entered into a table format that permits examination of their mutual effect on each other's distribution of values. On occasion this approach will be supplemented by various statistical devices such as the product-moment correlation coefficient which formally specifies the direction and extent of such relationships when given data characteristics obtain. In view of the relatively large

size of our samples the applications of tests of significance of difference is often not particularly useful in that practically any difference will be found "significant" even though the objective size of the difference is substantively irrelevant.

The analysis performed on the data obtained from the national surveys conducted by this office is supplemented by reference to the results from a variety of studies sponsored by the Office of Civil Defense. In the Data Bank at the University of Pittsburgh we not only have the final reports of most of these research efforts but also in many cases have the "raw" data they are based on. Possession of the actual punch cards allows us to process the data of others so that more precise comparison of related findings can be made.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

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I. INTRODUCTION

In mid-1964 the University of Pittsburgh, with the cooperation of the National Opinion Research Center, conducted a national survey entitled Civil Defense and Cold War Attitudes. This study consisted of a national probability sample of 1464 Americans, and touched upon perceptions of the Cold War in terms of passive and active defense systems and the threat of a Third World War.

The aspect of passive defense is to be the focus of the paper, that is, perceptions concerning a United States Civil Defense program. By means of a series of evaluations of six statements representing the spectrum of alternative kinds of programs, public attitudes toward Civil Defense were tapped. These six statements are, in fact, descriptive of the programs presently under consideration for adoption by the Office of Civil Defense and can be viewed as degrees of entailment with the Civil Defense program. Because of this, they are called "Postures," phrased as follows:

1. All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival.
2. There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.
3. In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.
4. There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.
5. In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.
6. There will be a program for the Federal government to pay part of the cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations, such as hospitals and schools.

Respondents were asked to evaluate each of these Postures, separately, in two ways: 1.) according to their own assessment of the desirability of each, i.e., how much they personally would like to see the

program implemented as a national policy, and 2.) according to their perceptions of the probability of each, i.e., how likely it is that a particular program might be implemented.

Perhaps it is obvious why these desirability evaluations are important to consider. The very nature of a Civil Defense program demands that it be fully accepted and endorsed by the American public, whether cooperation is needed to match government funds, to initiate a community effort, or merely to insure use of a shelter program in the event of an attack. It is vital, then, that public appraisal of any Civil Defense program being considered for adoption is known.

The necessity for knowing public perceptions of the probability of implementation for each program is more subtle. This knowledge does, of course, provide a valuable insight into public reactions to the Civil Defense effort as a whole, and is an assessment of government action in this area up to the present time. It is important to know, then, whether the public views a continuation and extension of Civil Defense programs as probable, not only as an assessment of the program's importance, but further because such perceptions are reflected in attitudes toward Civil Defense. Thus, if a certain program is viewed as having a high likelihood of adoption, the public reaction will be quite different than if it is seen as an impossible alternative. Furthermore, the kind of program which is viewed as being likely has a bearing on public reaction.

When desirability evaluations are taken into consideration along with probability assessments, public reaction becomes more complicated. If a program is seen as being both desirable and probable, the resulting behavior patterns might be expected to be quite different than if the program is seen as being desirable and not probable, not desirable but probable, or neither desirable nor probable.

These evaluations will hopefully provide clues to whether public reactions will be apathetic (a reaction either to something in which they have no interest, or to something which is assumed will or will not happen regardless of any endorsement or attempt or prevention) or will be actively goal-oriented (for example, to prevent something unwanted from occurring or to urge the adoption of some program which they desire but do not feel is highly probable). It is important to keep in mind that a high desirability coupled with a prediction of implementation (high probability) will tend to result in apparent apathy or disinterest, as what is desired is seen as that which is also going to occur.

The principle question is then to be: How does the public feel about each of these Civil Defense alternatives in terms of their desirability and their probability of adoption? Both the assessments given the Postures singly, and the overall pattern of assessments of the Postures as a group or a total set of programs will be of interest.

It is then important to ask why these evaluations are what they are. They can possibly be explained in terms of the Cold War, defense system, and World War III perceptions which were also investigated in the study questionnaire. If, in other words, high desirabilities are found to be assigned to the Postures, it could be assumed that the respondents would view a Third World War as being probable and relevant to their own lives. It might also be assumed that they have a high regard for the effectiveness of shelters and for Civil Defense as a whole. The reverse or a lesser degree of same would be presumed to hold true for those assigning low desirability values to the Postures. The conclusions in the two most recent University of Pittsburgh Civil Defense and Society reports, Threat Perception and Civil Defense, March 1965 by Donna K. Kontos, and Perceived Effectiveness of America's Defenses by Dorothy V. Brodie, March 1965, seem to justify this kind of hypothesis.

Finally, it may be valuable to know more about the respondents themselves; who the people are who are positively oriented toward the Postures and who those are who are negative towards them. This can be discovered by studying the relevant personal data included in the questionnaire.

II. THE CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

A. Desirability

The first question to be answered is simply this: How are these Postures or programs perceived by the American public in terms of the degree to which they would like to see them adopted as national Civil Defense programs? Are there some Postures which are seen as being significantly more desirable than others? Are there some which are seen as highly undesirable alternatives?

The questionnaire provided a seven-point desirability scale on which the respondents might rate each of the Civil Defense statements. This scale ranges from a value of -3.00 to +3.00, -3 meaning highly undesirable, zero indicating indifference, and +3 standing for an evaluation of highly desirable. In order to begin at a level of optimum clarity, it will be best to look first at a table (Table 1) which gives us only the mean desirability value given each Posture. It will then be possible to proceed more easily to the consideration of each Posture separately.

Table 1

1964 SURVEY DESIRABILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

<u>Postures</u>	<u>Means</u>
CD-1 All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival.	+2.29
CD-2 There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.	+2.13
CD-3 In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.	+2.05
CD-4 There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.	+2.13
CD-5 In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.	+2.19
CD-6 There will be a program for the Federal government to pay part of the cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations such as hospitals and schools.	+2.05

It is immediately apparent that each of the Postures is seen as being strongly desirable. The lowest value is +2.05, given to CD-3 and CD-6, the highest being +2.29 (CD-1). There is very little range between the lowest rating and the highest when it is considered that we are dealing with a seven point scale.

Still, it may be possible to explain why CD-3 and CD-6 are the Postures given the lowest rating of the six statements, keeping in mind that a value of +2.05 is only comparatively low. There is presented, in CD-3, the concept of evacuation, one which is in this day rather widely considered as unfeasible and has received a fair amount of publicity as such. The concept of evacuation assumes a considerable amount of time between warning and the actual attack, an assumption which is no longer felt to be realistic. There is the further risk of resultant traffic confusion leading to the breakdown of the evacuation procedure. These things must be considered in the decision as to whether or not to endorse such a program.

There are several reasons which might account for CD-6 having been rated lower than the other Postures. First, this is the only statement which introduces the concept of Federal aid, a concept which might be unpopular with certain segments of the population. In fact, CD-6 is the only statement which mentions actually paying for a shelter program at all. It is most probable, however, that the program as phrased was misconstrued by some respondents as meaning that shelters would be built only in non-profit institutions such as schools and hospitals, to the exclusion of shelters being placed in other buildings.

CD-1, that all available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked and stocked, was given the highest desirability rating of any of the Postures. This is particularly interesting since this statement is descriptive of the status quo, the program presently being implemented by the Office of Civil Defense. It can probably be assumed that a large segment of our population was unaware of this. Further, this program is the only one of the stated Postures which does not entail either any further shelter construction or the adoption of any new type of policy, such as anti-missile missiles. The implication here is that a minimum amount of effort is required on the part of the public.

The remaining three Postures are grouped in the middle range, with fallout shelters for all Americans and fallout shelters for blast and chemical warfare each being given the value of +2.13, and the question of anti-ballistic missiles being given +2.19 desirability rating.

It appears then that any of the foregoing programs would receive adequate endorsement from the American public, and further, that Civil Defense itself, in any form, is desirable. The marginal distributions along for the six Postures show that the percentage of the sample

for whom any single Posture was highly desirable (+3) ranged from 64.9 percent to 74.1 percent. Further, 42.3 percent of the sample consistently gave +3 values for every Posture. In no case was a Posture ranked undesirable in any degree by more than 9.8 percent of the sample.

In December 1963 and January 1964 the University of Pittsburgh conducted a study similar to the Civil Defense and Cold War Attitudes study, but which focused on the acceptability of the proposed NEAR system, and was based on a block sample of 1402 Americans. Included in the NEAR questionnaire were five of the six Civil Defense Postures which were presented in the 1964 Civil Defense questionnaire. Respondents in the NEAR survey were given the same desirability scale as in 1964 and were asked to rate the Postures accordingly. This then provides an excellent basis for comparison. The 1963 mean desirability values are given in Table 2 below.

Table 2

1963 NEAR SURVEY
DESIRABILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures	Means
CD-1 All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival	+1.87
CD-2 There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.	+1.65
CD-3 In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.	+1.45
CD-4 There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.	+1.62
CD-5 In addition to shelters and existing defenses against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.	+1.86

As in 1964, the range of means is small, running from +1.45 to +1.87, and all Postures are assessed as desirable. Once again, CD-3 or

evacuation is given the lowest desirability. CD-6, which was also given the same low desirability value, is not included in the 1963 list. CD-1, which is the status quo, is rated as having the highest desirability in 1963 as it was to be again in 1964.

Thus the pattern of desirability assessment is almost identical for the two years. Each Posture is desirable, and the range is small. However, the difference in the actual desirability values is striking. The highest desirability value in 1963 (+1.87) is considerably less than the lowest desirability rating (+2.05) in 1964. It appears then, that Civil Defense as represented here in the five Postures, became more desirable in the period 1963 to 1964, while there is still little discrepancy among the desirabilities of the separate programs.

B. Probability

For the same list of the 1964 Postures, the respondents were also asked to give an assessment of the likelihood of adoption within the next five years. The probability scale used here ran from a zero, which indicated virtual impossibility of occurrence, to ten, which indicated virtual certainty of occurrence. Probabilities were given a terminal point of five years, i.e., it was asked how likely it was that each of the Postures would be implemented by 1968.

Once again it is possible to look first at the mean probability values given each Posture. These are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
1964 SURVEY
PROBABILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures	Means
CD-1 All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival.	6.70
CD-2 There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.	5.02
CD-3 In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some larger cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.	6.36
CD-4 There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.	5.94
CD-5 In addition to shelters and existing defense against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.	6.78
CD-6 There will be a program for the Federal government to pay part of the cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations, such as hospitals and schools.	6.74

Here again the range is small (5.02 to 6.78 on the zero to ten scale). If five (5.00) is considered to be the dividing point between an evaluation of unlikelihood and one of likelihood, each Posture is then seen to have been assessed as somewhat likely to occur. It cannot be said that these Postures are perceived as approaching certainty of occurrence. The range of probability assessments merely places all Postures within a category in which each has some measure of likelihood of occurrence.

The marginal distributions for the six Postures show the percentage of respondents for whom a Posture was "certain" (10) as ranging from 11.4 percent to 24.9 percent. The percentage of those for whom a Posture was "impossible" (0) ranged from 2.9 percent to 12.9 percent.

With a value of 5.02 the least probable of the alternative programs is CD-2, which is in reality, an extension of the present Civil Defense policy. In many ways, this is a "middle of the road" policy, a compromise between the status quo and a more radical change in protection. No new type of protection is added, no new concept of Civil Defense introduced. Perhaps it is exactly this which causes it to be seen as comparatively improbable. It may be that the American public sees such a step as less probable than a major change in protection, provided we are to undergo any change at all.

The next least probable, Posture CD-4, is nevertheless seen as considerably more probable than CD-2, having a mean value of 5.94. We are here again concerned with further shelter construction, although now the type of protection is being changed also.

Yet CD-6, the building of shelters in non-profit institutions with the help of the Federal government, has a mean probability of 6.74, very close to the highest given probability value of 6.78 (CD-5). This Posture, like CD-2, proposes the building of more shelters without changing the type of protection, and yet receives a much higher probability value. The only new concept introduced in CD-6 is that of Federal aid, which may provide the explanation for the difference in assessment. Since the mention of government funds is explicit in this statement, respondents might be seen as viewing the government as the main actor in the implementation of such a program. Thus the likelihood of such implementation might be seen to be increased.

Most likely of all the Postures, according to our respondents, is CD-5, although it is not significantly higher in probability than CD-6. There is an obvious common element to these two programs. Once again, in endorsing the placing of anti-missile missiles around our large cities and military installations, our respondents were faced with a program whose implementation depends exclusively upon the Federal government. Thus the originator of the program is solely responsible for bringing it about.

There is another important point to consider about this Posture, CD-5. The program it describes is the only one of the six alternatives which can be called an "active defense" in any way. That is, the emphasis is not only on hiding in shelters, but in combatting the offensive at the same time. Possibly this is the orientation in which the public sees our future Civil Defense policy.

Once again the 1964 values can be compared with those given five of the Postures in the 1963 NEAR survey. The 1963 mean probabilities are given in Table 4.

Table 4
1963 NEAR SURVEY
PROBABILITY OF CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

<u>Postures</u>	<u>Means</u>
CD-1 All available spaces which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival	6.70
CD-2 There will be fallout shelters available for all Americans. Existing spaces will be used, other spaces will be altered to provide protection, and as needed, new fallout shelters will be built.	5.13
CD-3 In tense situations which might precede a war, communities near military bases--plus some large cities--will evacuate their people to safer areas where fallout shelters will be available.	6.13
CD-4 There will be fallout shelters throughout the nation, and also shelters against nuclear blast, heat, and chemical and biological agents in large cities.	5.97
CD-5 In addition to shelters and existing defenses against bombers, there will be defenses against ballistic missiles around our large cities and military installations.	7.01

As with desirability, the pattern of probability values remained the same over the 1963-1964 period. A program of fallout shelters and shelters against blast, heat and chemical agent: (CD-5), is seen as being the most probable in both years, followed by the continuation of the status quo. A program of fallout shelters for all Americans is seen as least probable in both years. The range again remains small (5.13 to 7.01 in 1963; 5.02 to 6.78 in 1964).

Each Posture is assessed as being somewhat likely, although the overall values are very slightly diminished in 1964 as compared with the NEAR survey results. However, the difference is so slight as to be negligible, and the important fact here is that in both years all Postures were assessed as having some degree of probability, with very slight differences in the actual values.

C. Relationships Between Probability and Desirability

The question is now what kind of association, if any, is there between the desirability assessments, especially those evaluations of +3 or

highly desirable, and the probability assessments? Does an evaluation of high desirability tend to mean that an evaluation of high probability will also be given?

It has already been stated that a percentage of the sample between 64.9 percent and 74.1 percent assessed each Posture as highly desirable (+3). Table 5 compares the mean probability values for that group with the mean probabilities of those who assessed a Posture as being desirable, undesirable, or were indifferent to it (in other words, those who gave any evaluation less than +3).

Table 5

MEAN PROBABILITY VALUES

	+3		+2 to -3	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
CD-1	7.10	1061	5.58	378
CD-2	5.37	971	4.08	478
CD-3	6.94	936	5.26	494
CD-4	6.30	968	5.20	462
CD-5	7.16	978	5.95	447
CD-6	7.21	928	5.89	502

The mean probabilities for those who saw each Posture as highly desirable are consistently and significantly higher than are the mean values for those who assessed them as less desirable. It appears, then, that there is a definite relationship between a high desirability evaluation and a prediction of probability of occurrence.

Another way to look at this relationship is shown in Table 6, which gives the percentage of those assigning high probability (10) to each Posture within the two desirability groups.

Table 6

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH PROBABILITY VALUES (10)

	+3		+2 to -3	
	%	N	%	N
CD-1	29.5%	1061	11.6%	378
CD-2	15.0	971	3.5	478
CD-3	26.2	936	7.5	494
CD-4	20.0	968	8.0	462
CD-5	27.8	978	12.7	447
CD-6	28.1	928	11.2	502

The difference here becomes even more striking. Those who evaluated the Postures as highly desirable consistently had a far greater percentage of the sample who also assessed the Postures as highly probable than did those who saw it as less desirable. These differences seem to be clearly significant, and point again to the supposition that those who see the Postures to be highly desirable also see them as almost certain to occur.

D. Summary


CD-1, describing the status quo, was assessed as being the most desirable program in the list of alternatives. It also was given a comparatively high probability value. It must be remembered that while this appears to be a conservative prognosis, it cannot be assumed that the respondents were aware that CD-1 did describe the present Civil Defense policy.

The least desirable alternative, CD-3 (evacuation) and CD-6 (shelters in buildings of non-profit organizations), received very different probability values. CD-3 fell into the middle range of comparative probability assessments, and thus, although its desirability value was comparatively low, it still must be considered to be seen as fairly desirable and fairly probable. CD-6, on the other hand, was given a probability value of 6.74, which places it at the top of the Postures in perceived probability. This is then a case of the least desirable Posture being seen as strongly probable.


The Posture which was given the highest probability value (CD-5: in addition to shelters, defenses against ballistic missiles) was seen as the second most desirable program.

It is obvious that all the Postures are seen as both desirable and probable, and most importantly, that there is little difference between the separate assessments of each statement. This can be illustrated most vividly by superimposing the range of each set of mean responses upon the scales of possible responses for each assessment.

Desirability values could range from a -3, highly undesirable, to a +3, highly desirable. The range of responses was from +2.05 to +2.29:



Probability values could range from 0, highly unlikely, to 10, virtual certainty of occurrence. Mean values given by the respondents ranged from 5.02 to 6.78:



The necessary conclusion, based on the mean values and their groupings on the relevant scales, is that the public seems to be unable to distinguish significantly between the different types of Civil Defense programs. The means themselves, naming all Postures desirable and probable, lead to the further conclusion that Civil Defense as a whole is seen as a good concept and a valuable effort.

On the basis of this investigation, using only mean values, it is obvious that it will not be profitable to consider each alternative program or Posture separately. It can be assumed that they are all judged to be fairly much alike.

The question then becomes, why is this so? Why does the public consider Civil Defense in all its forms, indiscriminately desirable and somewhat probable for adoption?

III. COLD WAR AND SHELTER PERCEPTIONS

A. The Cold War

It has previously been established that Civil Defense seems to be generally perceived by the public as a worthwhile placement of this country's energies in terms of constructing a national program. The vast majority of our respondents have testified to this by their evaluations of "highly desirable."

It is possible to explain this in a variety of ways. Initially, it might be presumed that a person having a high regard for Civil Defense would also have a feeling of tension concerning the present state of world affairs, that is, he would expect a nuclear war in the not too distant future, and further, a war which might have a dire effect on not only the United States, but on himself and his surroundings. Since he then chooses a Civil Defense program as a valid action, we would also assume that he would have a high regard for the effectiveness of shelters. The converse would be expected to be true for those for whom Civil Defense is not desirable.

It is possible to explore this hypothesis by means of a number of questions included in the Civil Defense study. Question 5 is a valuable beginning as it provides an overview of Cold War perceptions. Respondents were asked to evaluate a list of possible Cold War futures, or Outcomes, according to the probability and desirability of each. The -3 to +3 desirability scale and the 0 to 10 probability scale were again used and probability was again given a terminal point of five years. The list read as follows:

- F-1 The Cold War will continue indefinitely; no end is in sight at all.
- F-2 The whole world will become Communistic by people accepting Communism.
- F-3 By revolutions, civil wars and small wars, the Communists will come to power in the whole world.
- F-4 World War III will end the Cold War.
- F-5 The Communists are going to lose due to revolutions, civil wars and small wars in Communist nations.
- F-6 The Communists will accept the Western way of life, and the Communist powers will become like the United States, Great Britain or Sweden.
- F-7 The Cold War will end through disarmament or reconciliation.

- F-8 A Third Force will emerge in the world able to control the actions of the Communist nations as well as of the United States.
- F-9 The United States will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by Communist nations that the United States could not possibly win.
- F-10 The Communist nations will have to surrender without war because of the development of such new weapons by the United States that the Communists could not possible win.

In view of the nature of these world futures, it might naturally be assumed that some of the desirability and probability assessments assigned to them might be associated with those given to the six Civil Defense Postures. Table 7 gives the mean desirability values assigned to these Cold War Outcomes by those who were, respectively, indifferent to them (0), or found them undesirable (-3 to -1), desirable (+1 or +2) or highly desirable (+3).¹

1. It is important to mention here that when, in the tables presented, the total number of respondents is less than 1964; it is due to the exclusion of missing data, i.e., the number of respondents who either did not answer the questions or for whom the question was not applicable.

Table 7

MEAN DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE COLD WAR OUTCOMES
BY THE DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures	Mean Desirabilities									
	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-6	F-7	F-8	F-9	F-10
CD-1 Undesirable* Indifferent Desirable Highly Desirable	-1.63	-2.29	-2.34	-1.71	+ .61	+1.05	+1.09	-1.24	-1.99	+ .32
	-2.41	-2.43	-2.84	-1.67	+1.48	+1.86	+1.96	-1.25	-2.52	+1.12
	-1.83	-2.55	-2.58	-2.19	+1.71	+1.54	+2.12	-1.16	-2.55	+1.43
	-2.12	-2.73	-2.62	-1.82	+1.88	+2.05	+2.18	-1.26	-2.59	+1.96
CD-2 Undesirable Indifferent Desirable Highly Desirable	-1.77	-2.28	-2.32	-2.15	+ .74	+1.02	+1.40	-1.09	-2.13	+ .48
	-2.51	-2.65	-2.67	-2.09	+1.42	+1.69	+1.78	-1.47	-2.79	+1.17
	-1.83	-2.67	-2.52	-1.99	+1.58	+1.77	+2.18	-1.10	-2.50	+1.68
	-2.13	-2.71	-2.65	-1.77	+1.95	+2.05	+2.16	-1.29	-2.58	+1.94
CD-3 Undesirable Indifferent Desirable Highly Desirable	-1.86	-2.44	-2.63	-1.81	+ .93	+1.18	+1.41	-1.24	-2.38	+ .43
	-2.11	-2.43	-2.80	-2.26	+2.00	+1.98	+2.11	-1.28	-2.80	+1.71
	-2.00	-2.65	-2.53	-2.08	+1.49	+1.69	+2.03	-1.24	-2.51	+1.60
	-2.10	-2.72	-2.61	-1.77	+1.94	+2.06	+2.20	-1.25	-2.55	+1.97
CD-4 Undesirable Indifferent Desirable Highly Desirable	-1.69	-2.37	-2.48	-2.20	+ .80	+1.13	+1.55	-1.17	-2.26	+ .72
	-2.17	-2.52	-2.64	-2.10	+1.43	+2.05	+2.05	-1.63	-2.83	+ .97
	-1.85	-2.63	-2.46	-1.93	+1.68	+1.63	+2.00	-1.09	-2.43	+1.70
	-2.16	-2.72	-2.65	-1.78	+1.91	+2.06	+2.17	-1.27	-2.41	+1.92
CD-5 Undesirable Indifferent Desirable Highly Desirable	-1.70	-2.35	-2.37	-1.87	+ .53	+1.01	+1.04	-1.37	-2.16	+ .37
	-2.07	-2.49	-2.70	-2.06	+1.56	+1.85	+2.13	-1.47	-2.57	+1.16
	-1.88	-2.63	-2.47	-1.89	+1.63	+1.69	+2.04	-1.85	-2.38	+1.66
	-2.15	2.72	-2.66	-1.84	+1.93	+2.05	+2.20	-1.24	-2.62	+1.93
CD-6 Undesirable Indifferent Desirable Highly Desirable	-1.79	-2.41	-2.33	-1.93	+ .77	+1.11	+1.11	-1.26	-2.13	+ .46
	-2.23	-2.61	-2.70	-2.11	+1.41	+1.67	+2.02	-1.33	-2.74	+1.34
	-2.00	-2.63	-2.46	-1.97	+1.53	+1.75	+2.06	-1.07	-2.53	+1.71
	-2.10	-2.72	-2.67	-1.79	+1.99	+1.07	+2.23	-1.29	-2.28	+1.95

* The range of N's is the following: Undesirable = 100-141
Indifferent = 54-83
Desirable = 209-288
Highly Desirable = 922-1055

F-1, or desirability of the Cold War continuing, was given consistently negative values, as would be expected. While there is probably no significant difference between the mean values given by each of the four groups, those for whom Civil Defense was undesirable consistently assign a higher desirability to continuation of the Cold War than do the other groups.

F-2, the desirability of the world becoming Communistic by people accepting Communism, is also a negatively valued Posture. Once again, there is little difference between the mean values of the four groups although the group for whom each Posture was undesirable again gives higher desirability values to acceptance of Communism. Those for whom the Postures were highly desirable give slightly lower desirability values to such acceptance than to the other groups. There is a consistent pattern of decreasing desirability of the Outcome as desirability of the Postures increase.

F-5, is the desirability of the Communists losing due to revolutions, civil wars or small wars in Communist nations, and as such is a positively valued Posture. In every case but CD-3 (evacuation), desirability of such a Communist loss increases with increased desirability of Civil Defense.

F-6 concerns Communist acceptance of the Western way of life so that the nations of the Communist bloc become as the United States or Britain. This possibility is seen as a desirable one by all groups, although those for whom the Postures were undesirable see the Outcome as generally, though probably not significantly, less desirable.

F-7 predicts an end to the Cold War by disarmament or reconciliation and is consistently given values of positive desirability. Generally, however, the mean desirability values given to disarmament or reconciliation by those for whom the Postures were undesirable, were significantly lower than those given by the other groups. Conversely, those for whom the Postures were in some degree desirable gave F-7 the highest mean desirability score.

F-9 is concerned with the possibility of a necessary United States surrender in the face of Communist technological developments and as might be expected, is thus an undesirable Outcome. Those for whom the Postures were undesirable find the Outcome slightly less undesirable than do the other three groups.

F-10 concerns the opposite situation; a surrender on the part of the Communist nations due to development of new weapons by the United States. While this is assessed as a desirable Outcome, it is significantly less desirable to those people to whom the Postures were undesirable. Generally speaking, such a peaceful surrender on the part of the Communist nations becomes more desirable with increased desirability of the Civil Defense Postures.

Outcomes F-3, F-4, and F-8 show no significant pattern of assessment when broken down by the four Posture desirability groups.

Desirability of the ten Outcomes can also be reviewed in terms of the probability of the Civil Defense Postures. Because the probability distribution for the Postures is not as skewed as was the desirability scale (i.e., a disproportionate number of respondents saw the Postures as highly desirable) it is possible here to use a more simple presentation of the data. Table 8 gives the Pearsonian correlation coefficients among the previously discussed desirabilities of the Cold War Outcomes and the probabilities of the Civil Defense Postures.

Table 8

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG DESIRABILITY OF COLD WAR OUTCOMES AND PROBABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

		Desirability of Cold War Outcomes									
		F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-6	F-7	F-8	F-9	F-10
Probability of CD Postures	CD-1	-.007*	-.017	.051	.070	.021	-.002	-.024	-.015	.013	.091
	CD-2	.007	-.010	-.001	.081	-.023	-.018	-.049	-.012	.008	.072
	CD-3	-.024	.002	-.026	.046	.049	-.018	.004	.007	.008	.076
	CD-4	-.043	-.009	.015	.077	-.020	-.020	-.038	.024	.031	.040
	CD-5	-.017	-.061	-.016	.033	.052	-.029	.016	.025	-.015	.071
	CD-6	-.003	-.030	-.035	.075	.049	-.028	.008	.002	-.006	.080

* All of the correlation coefficients in this table and all following correlation tables are based on N's of from between approximately 1329 and 1427; due to missing data.

A correlation coefficient may fall between -1.00, meaning a perfect negative correlation and +1.00, meaning a perfect positive correlation. On the basis of the data in Table 7, it can be concluded that there are no significant associations at all between the Outcomes desirabilities and the Posture probabilities.

Respondents were also asked to assess the ten Cold War Outcomes according to their probability, and it is possible now to seek for relationships between these probabilities and the probability and desirability values of the Civil Defense Postures.

Table 9 gives the correlation coefficients among Outcome probabilities and the probability values given the Postures:

Table 9

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG PROBABILITY OF COLD WAR
OUTCOMES AND PROBABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

		Probability of Cold War Outcomes									
		F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-6	F-7	F-8	F-9	F-10
Probability of CD Postures	CD-1	.048	.016	.017	.112	.129	.069	.103	.050	.046	.105
	CD-2	-.069	.058	.058	.092	.147	.148	.168	.071	.117	.241
	CD-3	.046	.048	.013	.101	.115	.053	.121	.047	.039	.184
	CD-4	-.005	.016	.034	.096	.129	.133	.116	.079	.082	.178
	CD-5	.067	.018	.040	.061	.105	.091	.097	.065	-.012	.095
	CD-6	.037	-.006	-.003	.045	.102	.072	.073	-.011	.046	.086

Four Outcomes seem to have a slight positive relationship in terms of probability: F-5 (Communist loss due to small wars, etc.), F-6 (Communist acceptance of the Western way of life), F-7 (Disarmament or reconciliation), and F-10 (Communist surrender due to advanced United States technology).

It must be kept in mind for all correlations that in no way do they express cause and effect relationships. They only serve to point out an association of answers, i.e., that two responses seem to be given together in a consistent pattern.

Table 10 gives the mean probability values for the ten Outcomes according to the four Civil Defense Posture desirability groups. The probability scale used for the Outcomes was once again the 0 to 10 scale on which 0 meant impossibility of occurrence and 10 virtual certainty of occurrence. Probabilities were once again given a terminal point of five years.

Table 10

MEAN PROBABILITY VALUES FOR THE COLD WAR OUTCOMES
BY THE DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Mean Probabilities									
		F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-6	F-7	F-8	F-9	F-10
CD-1	Undes.	5.33	2.34	3.02	4.43	4.80	4.11	5.12	3.87	2.65	4.51
	Indif.	5.75	2.00	2.56	3.58	4.75	3.05	3.71	2.57	1.12	4.09
	Des.	5.49	1.75	2.35	3.78	4.99	3.52	4.67	3.37	1.77	4.27
	H. Des.	5.75	1.54	2.26	4.33	5.35	3.37	4.98	3.27	1.65	4.27
CD-2	Undes.	5.29	2.42	3.05	4.27	4.62	3.86	5.05	4.26	2.12	4.08
	Indif.	5.69	1.84	2.40	3.35	5.01	3.31	3.85	2.24	1.15	4.18
	Des.	5.67	1.85	2.40	4.05	4.95	3.37	4.68	3.51	1.98	4.25
	H. Des.	5.73	1.48	2.24	4.33	5.42	3.39	5.00	3.20	1.64	4.32
CD-3	Undes.	5.28	2.03	2.79	4.21	4.67	3.77	4.51	3.75	2.24	4.03
	Indif.	6.03	1.80	2.08	3.48	4.78	2.81	4.26	2.63	1.11	3.86
	Des.	5.74	1.41	2.37	3.96	4.95	3.38	4.83	3.38	1.76	4.00
	H. Des.	5.71	1.65	2.28	4.36	5.44	3.44	5.01	3.26	1.67	4.34
CD-4	Undes.	5.63	2.17	3.20	4.13	4.42	3.87	5.06	3.94	2.60	4.20
	Indif.	5.52	2.10	2.59	3.07	5.02	3.53	3.85	2.25	1.22	3.63
	Des.	5.64	1.61	2.41	3.99	5.18	3.54	4.70	3.21	1.73	4.30
	H. Des.	5.71	1.56	2.20	4.37	5.37	3.32	4.98	3.31	1.63	4.32
CD-5	Undes.	4.85	2.49	3.16	4.21	4.62	3.89	5.08	4.30	2.74	4.52
	Indif.	5.84	1.67	2.24	3.54	5.11	3.14	4.51	2.49	1.07	3.96
	Des.	5.70	1.74	2.61	4.16	5.22	3.68	4.90	3.53	2.01	4.53
	H. Des.	5.78	1.52	2.18	4.28	5.31	3.32	4.90	3.17	1.56	4.20
CD-6	Undes.	5.55	2.17	2.74	4.52	4.80	3.62	4.93	3.70	2.21	4.05
	Indif.	5.28	1.69	2.24	3.27	4.76	3.48	4.26	2.90	1.28	3.72
	Des.	5.80	1.84	2.62	3.92	5.00	3.39	4.68	3.47	1.76	4.28
	H. Des.	5.70	1.50	2.21	4.36	5.42	3.41	5.00	3.23	1.68	4.36

F-1 (continuation of the Cold War) shows no significant difference between the desirability groups as they assessed the probability of the Outcomes.

The probability values for F-2, which is world-wide acceptance of Communism, also show nothing definitely significant, but there is a general pattern present. Those for whom Civil Defense was in some degree desirable give generally lower probability estimates for such peaceful acceptance.

F-3 predicts a Communist take-over in the world through small wars, civil wars and revolutions and is thought to be less probable by those who see Civil Defense as highly desirable. There is some indication of a pattern of decreasing probability as such desirability increases.

F-4 concerns the probability of World War III ending the Cold War, and while the Outcome is consistently given low probability values, those given by the "indifferent" group are consistently lower than those of the other groups.

F-5 predicts a Communist loss due to small wars, etc., and is thought to be slightly more probable by those who found Civil Defense to be desirable.

F-6 concerns Communist acceptance of the Western way of life, and while the probability values seem to show nothing significant, it can be noted that slightly higher probability values are given the Outcome by those for whom Civil Defense is undesirable.

Disarmament or reconciliation (F-7) is given consistently lower probability values by those who are indifferent to Civil Defense. This group also assigns consistently lower probability to F-8 (emergence of a Third Force), F-9 (United States surrender due to technological developments by the Communist nations).

F-9 is also given what may be significantly higher probability values by those for whom Civil Defense is undesirable.

On the basis of the last four tables, and keeping in mind that all differences between groups are matters of degree rather than orientation (i.e., there were no cases where one group's assessment of an Outcome was contradictory to another's; the differences were more or less desirable or more or less probable only), it is now possible to begin to put together some kind of a picture of the kinds of people who differ in their appraisals of the Postures.

Those for whom Civil Defense is undesirable find a continuation of the Cold War, world-wide acceptance of Communism, and a peaceful United States surrender in the face of Communist advances in war technology to be slightly more desirable than do the other groups.

The latter Outcome is also seen as being more probable. This group found the following to be more undesirable than did the other groups: a Communist loss due to small wars and revolutions; disarmament or reconciliation, and a peaceful Communist surrender in the face of advanced United States war technology. Communist acceptance of the Western way of life was also seen as being more undesirable but also more probable by the "undesirable" group than by the other groups.

This presents a picture of people who are on one hand desiring nothing less than total destruction of Communism, and yet on the other, exhibit a fatalism which causes them to find more desirable and probable peaceful surrender on the part of the United States.

Those respondents who are indifferent to Civil Defense showed no distinguishing attitudes on Outcome desirability, but did assess several Outcomes as being less probable than did the rest of the sample. The possibilities of World War III ending the Cold War, disarmament or reconciliation, emergence of a Third Force, and United States or Communist surrender due to the other's technological developments-- all were seen as being less probable by those who were indifferent to Civil Defense. The picture presented here is one of people who do not expect World War III or any tremendous escalation in weapons technology, and who thus might be expected to feel less need for a Civil Defense program than others. The fact that they are indifferent to such an idea rather than antagonistic to it may arise from conflicting attitudes such as a feeling that disarmament or reconciliation is also less probable.

The last group is generally those who find Civil Defense desirable. They saw as more desirable than the other groups: disarmament or reconciliation, a Communist loss in the face of United States technological developments, and a Communist loss due to small wars and revolutions. The latter was also felt to be more probable. Found to be more undesirable and less probable was world-wide acceptance of Communism. Less probable also was a Communist win due to revolutions and small wars.

For this group it is apparent that a peaceful means of ending the Cold War is especially desirable (although not any form of surrender to Communism), while not always considered probable. This attitude seems to fit in nicely with a desire for Civil Defense preparedness.

It is possible also to begin to characterize the group for whom a Civil Defense program of some type was probable. They did not differ on their desirability assessments of the Outcomes, but those who thought Civil Defense to be probable found the following Outcomes also more probable than did those for whom Civil Defense was not probable: a Communist loss due to small wars and revolutions, Communist acceptance of the Western way of life, disarmament or reconciliation, and a Communist surrender due to advance in United States

weapons technology. Thus those who predict a peaceful end to the Cold War, and a victory for the United States, also predict the adoption of some form of Civil Defense.

While there seems to be some indication that predictions and desirabilities of a peaceful victory for the United States in the Cold War differ between Civil Defense desirability groups, thus far there has been no indication that the opposite situation, expectation of a Third World War, has any relationship to attitudes about a Civil Defense program. This is surprising in view of the fact that in other reports dealing with the same material, contradictory results have been presented. The Bureau of Applied Social Research, in a nine-community study dealing with the fallout shelter issue, concluded that views on the probability of nuclear war and opinions on the fallout shelter issue were directly related. Seven out of ten respondents who believed such a war to be likely also favored shelters, while only about half who believed a war to be unlikely did so.²

This discrepancy may be accounted for by at least two things. First, it is important to note that while the Bureau of Applied Social Research respondents were asked merely if they favored or did not favor fallout shelters, the Pittsburgh respondents were asked to give desirability assessments on six definite Civil Defense programs. The vagueness of the evaluative system may well have been in some measure responsible for the difference in responses between the two studies.

Secondly, the terminology "World War III" alone may have had some effect, as the Bureau of Applied Social Research study was concerned with the likelihood of a stated nuclear war. Our respondents were also asked the following question in which the phrase "nuclear" appears: "Right now, how likely do you think it is that we're in for another big world war--one where nuclear bombs would be used--very likely, fairly likely, fairly unlikely, or very unlikely?" Table 11 gives the correlation coefficients among these likelihood assessments and the probability values given the Civil Defense Postures.

2. Levine, Gene N., and Cole, Jonathan, The American Public and the Fallout Shelter Issue: A Nine-Community Study, Volume III, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, prepared for Office of Civil Defense, Department of Defense, Contract No. OCD-OS-62-71, March 1964, p. 34.

Table 11

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR
WORLD WAR AND PROBABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WORLD WAR

Probability of CD Postures	CD-1	.172
	CD-2	.163
	CD-3	.163
	CD-4	.153
	CD-5	.166
	CD-6	.170

Since there is a very slight correlation, it may be assumed that those people who see a Civil Defense program as probable may also perceive a nuclear war to be probable. This supposition is further borne out by Table 12, which presents the probability evaluations in terms of each of the Civil Defense desirability groups.

Table 12

LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WORLD WAR III, BY
DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Likely	Fairly Unlikely	Very Unlikely	N
CD-1	Undesirable	42.6	21.8	35.6	101
	Indifferent	19.2	36.5	44.2	52
	Desirable	36.2	40.6	23.2	207
	Highly Desirable	42.6	30.2	27.3	1031
CD-2	Undesirable	34.5	29.4	36.1	119
	Indifferent	14.3	34.9	50.8	63
	Desirable	37.6	38.0	24.3	263
	Highly Desirable	44.1	29.5	26.4	946
CD-3	Undesirable	42.9	23.6	33.6	140
	Indifferent	24.2	43.5	32.3	62
	Desirable	37.2	37.9	24.9	277
	Highly Desirable	42.6	29.7	27.7	911
CD-4	Undesirable	36.8	25.6	37.6	125
	Indifferent	19.6	41.1	39.3	56
	Desirable	39.1	35.6	25.1	267
	Highly Desirable	42.8	30.4	26.9	942
CD-5	Undesirable	36.8	26.4	36.8	106
	Indifferent	22.4	34.7	42.9	49
	Desirable	43	31.9	24.9	273
	Highly Desirable	4	31.7	27.0	958
CD-6	Undesirable	36.6	29.9	33.6	134
	Indifferent	27.8	29.1	43.0	79
	Desirable	41.5	36.5	22.0	277
	Highly Desirable	42.2	30.2	27.6	900

While those for whom Civil Defense is undesirable seem to be divided fairly equally between a belief that such a war is unlikely and the more fatalistic view that it is likely, both this group and the group which is indifferent to Civil Defense consistently find a nuclear world war much less likely than does the group for whom Civil Defense is desirable. In other words, there does seem now to be a relationship, however slight, between a belief that there is to be no war and a feeling that Civil Defense is undesirable. Further those people for whom Civil Defense is highly desirable are more convinced of the likelihood of a war than is any other group and far less convinced that it is very unlikely.

Such expectation of a nuclear war might be expected to imply a certain amount of concern over such a future. Respondents were asked how much they themselves worried about the possibility of a nuclear attack on the United States--a great deal, some, only a little, or not at all? The correlations among amount of worry and the probabilities of the Civil Defense Postures are presented in Table 13:

Table 13

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG AMOUNT OF WORRY ABOUT
NUCLEAR ATTACK ON U.S. AND PROBABILITIES OF THE SIX
CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR ATTACK

Probability of C.D Postures	CD-1	-.002
	CD-2	.002
	CD-3	-.001
	CD-4	.022
	CD-5	.009
	CD-6	.003

There is no relationship at all between worry about nuclear war and probability evaluations for the Postures. Table 14 explores the amount of worry in terms of the four desirability groups for the six Postures:

Table 14

AMOUNT OF WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR ATTACK ON U.S., BY
DESIRABILITIES OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Great Deal or Some	Little	Not at All	N
CD-1	Undesirable	44.1	18.6	37.3	102
	Indifferent	23.2	21.4	55.4	56
	Desirable	35.4	34.4	30.2	212
	Highly Desirable	46.5	25.5	28.0	1057
CD-2	Undesirable	38.3	24.2	37.5	120
	Indifferent	26.8	16.9	56.3	71
	Desirable	35.4	32.5	32.1	268
	Highly Desirable	48.0	25.4	26.5	963
CD-3	Undesirable	41.8	24.1	34.0	141
	Indifferent	26.2	29.2	44.6	65
	Desirable	40.1	27.9	32.1	287
	Highly Desirable	46.4	25.8	27.8	933
CD-4	Undesirable	40.2	24.4	35.4	127
	Indifferent	25.0	21.7	53.3	60
	Desirable	34.8	34.1	31.1	273
	Highly Desirable	48.0	24.5	27.5	967
CD-5	Undesirable	44.5	19.1	36.4	110
	Indifferent	21.4	32.1	46.4	56
	Desirable	36.4	29.3	34.3	280
	Highly Desirable	46.9	25.8	27.3	976
CD-6	Undesirable	39.3	24.4	36.3	135
	Indifferent	26.5	22.9	50.6	83
	Desirable	38.9	31.1	30.0	283
	Highly Desirable	47.5	25.3	27.2	925

As was the case with expectation of nuclear war, there is not as much relationship between these two variables as might have been expected. Those who are indifferent to Civil Defense worry significantly less than does any other group, and those who find Civil Defense highly desirable worry more. Yet those who find Civil Defense to be undesirable are once again split between not worrying at all and worrying a great deal.

When, however, the percentages are computed the other way, i.e., of those who worry a great deal, little or not at all, how many see the Postures as being highly desirable, the data then shows a greater relationship.

Table 14A

PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO FIND THE SIX POSTURES HIGHLY DESIRABLE, BY WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR ATTACK

	Worry Great Deal or Some	Worry Little	Worry Not at All
CD-1	77%	72%	69%
CD-2	75%	66%	60%
CD-3	69%	64%	61%
CD-4	78%	65%	64%
CD-5	74%	67%	62%
CD-6	70%	62%	59%

Of those respondents who worried a great deal or some, a consistently higher percentage found the Postures to be highly desirable than of those who worried little or not at all.

These findings seem to be slightly less stronger than the findings of other, similar reports: The Bureau of Applied Social Research: Nine-Community Study included in 1964 evidence that the more a citizen worried about nuclear war, the more likely he was to favor shelters. Of those respondents who worried "a great deal" 75 percent favored shelters, while only 49 percent of those who did not worry at all also favored shelters.³

In Table 14A while the percentages of those worrying a great deal are much the same, those who worried not at all and still found the Postures highly desirable are a much higher percentage. Also, the University of Pittsburgh Civil Defense and Society survey in 1964 reported 71.3 percent of those respondents who worried a great deal about nuclear war strongly favored shelters, while of those who did not worry at all, only 37.5 percent strongly favored them.⁴

There are two possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, in both cases cited, only a favor/not favor assessment was asked for, while in the case of the Postures, six separate and differing types of Civil Defense protection were to be evaluated. This may have caused a higher percentage of high desirability despite amount of worry. Secondly, it can be assumed that some answers to the Bureau of Applied Social Research and University of Pittsburgh studies referred to home or private shelters, while the Postures deal only with federally approved public shelter construction.

3. Ibid., p. 32.

4. Kontos, Donna, Threat Perception and Civil Defense, University of Pittsburgh, prepared for Office of Civil Defense, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Research Subtask 48-21-C, OCD-PS-64-61, March 1965, p. 170

There is another important dimension to this question: the aspect of time. People might be expected to worry less over a nuclear war if it were perceived to be probable only in the distant future. It might further be expected that if such a war is seen as likely to occur in the near future, people would be more concerned not only about the war itself, but about the implementation of a Civil Defense program.

There are several periods of time into which perceptions of World War III occurrence would fall: within six months, within one to two years, within five years, within ten years, within 20 years, and over twenty years. Table 15 gives the mean probability and desirability values for each Posture, according to these predictions.

Table 15

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY TIME OF WORLD WAR III

Postures		Within 6 Months	Within 1 to 2 Years	Within 5 Years	Within 10 Years	Within 20 Years	Over 20 Years
Probability	CD-1	7.13	7.34	6.84	6.49	5.98	6.94
	CD-2	4.80	5.51	5.07	5.08	4.34	4.79
	CD-3	7.00	6.12	6.47	6.46	6.18	6.06
	CD-4	6.87	6.04	6.20	6.02	5.52	5.59
	CD-5	6.80	6.58	6.96	6.88	6.50	6.38
	CD-6	6.27	6.56	6.82	6.32	6.60	6.52
Desirability	CD-1	+1.40	+2.19	+2.33	+2.38	+2.28	+2.36
	CD-2	+1.47	+2.11	+2.28	+2.21	+1.99	+2.02
	CD-3	+1.40	+1.88	+2.05	+2.22	+2.02	+1.98
	CD-4	+1.47	+2.13	+2.23	+2.22	+1.97	+2.14
	CD-5	+1.40	+2.01	+2.31	+2.29	+2.17	+2.31
	CD-6	+1.13	+1.92	+2.17	+2.23	+1.96	+1.72
N:		15	181	418	346	114	119

According to probability assessments, there is a very slight tendency for the high mean values to cluster at the lower end of the scale, that is, among those people who see a more imminent Third World War, and for the low scores to cluster at the opposite end, among those who see that war as more than ten years away. This does suggest that a high probability of Civil Defense and an expectation of World War III occurring within five years go together, although the range of means is very small and thus the difference may not be statistically significant.

Further, there is a tendency for low desirability evaluations to cluster at the lower end of the scale. In fact, the lowest desirability values for each Posture are consistently found among those who see World War III as likely to occur within six months (the very small number of 15 should be noted). The pattern is not as clear as for the highest desirability means, although they are found consistently among those who expect World War III to occur sometime after two years.

Although there is probably no valid generalization that can be made on the basis of this table, there is nevertheless a tendency worth noting. Those who see World War III as slightly more likely to occur within five years than later also see Civil Defense as probable. Those who tend to see World War III as beginning sometime later than two years view the Postures as desirable, while those who are firm in the belief that such a war will occur within 6 months view the Postures as less desirable. In other words, expectations of an imminent World War III seem to be associated with high probability of Civil Defense and low desirability.

Another variable which is related to this question of tensions and the threat of war is that of perception of one's own danger in a nuclear war. Surely if the public feels no sense of personal danger they will not only worry less about such a war but will also be less likely to see a Civil Defense program as either desirable or probable. Thus we would expect a correlation between such assessments and the perception of one's own danger.

The respondents were asked how much danger they felt there to be that their area would be a target in a nuclear war: certain danger, great danger, some danger, little danger, or no danger at all. Table 16 explores the relationship between these perceptions and the Civil Defense probability values:

Table 16

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG DEGREE OF DANGER OF
RESPONDENTS' AREAS AS TARGETS AND PROBABILITY OF
THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

DEGREE OF TARGET DANGER

Probability of CD Postures	CD-1	.044
	CD-2	.055
	CD-3	.029
	CD-4	.052
	CD-5	.045
	CD-6	.044

Once again, it seems to be obvious that there is no relationship at all. In other words, whether or not one sees one's own area as a nuclear target has no association with one's assessment of the probability of Civil Defense implementation.

Table 17 explores these perceptions of danger in terms of the desirability of the Civil Defense Postures.

Table 17

DEGREE OF LOCAL DANGER, BY DESIRABILITY
OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Certain or Great Danger	Some Danger	Little or No Danger	N
CD-1	Undesirable	52.9	31.4	15.7	102
	Indifferent	48.1	29.6	22.2	54
	Desirable	52.2	29.2	18.7	209
	Highly Desirable	55.7	26.4	17.8	1037
CD-2	Undesirable	52.5	31.7	15.8	120
	Indifferent	39.7	33.8	26.5	68
	Desirable	51.9	29.7	18.4	266
	Highly Desirable	57.0	25.6	17.4	948
CD-3	Undesirable	55.7	27.1	17.1	140
	Indifferent	54.8	27.4	17.7	62
	Desirable	50.5	33.6	15.9	283
	Highly Desirable	55.7	25.5	18.8	916
CD-4	Undesirable	59.1	29.1	11.8	127
	Indifferent	46.6	31.0	22.4	58
	Desirable	51.7	26.9	21.4	271
	Highly Desirable	55.6	27.0	17.5	945
CD-5	Undesirable	53.6	30.0	16.4	110
	Indifferent	43.4	32.1	24.5	53
	Desirable	48.2	32.2	19.6	276
	Highly Desirable	57.5	25.3	17.2	957
CD-6	Undesirable	58.5	27.4	14.1	135
	Indifferent	46.9	29.6	23.5	81
	Desirable	53.0	31.3	15.7	281
	Highly Desirable	55.4	25.9	18.7	904

Again, those for whom Civil Defense is undesirable seem to exhibit strong evidence of fatalism in believing that there is certain or great danger of an attack on their area. However, this belief is shared to a generally equal extent by those who assess the Postures as either desirable or highly desirable. Therefore it must be concluded that the threat of one's own area being a nuclear target not only does not effect one's probability perceptions but also has no influence on one's feelings about the desirability of a Civil Defense program.

It is important to remember, however, that the threat of war and the likelihood of and need for Civil Defense do not exist in a vacuum. There is an intervening factor that might keep those two concepts from having any kind of cause and effect relationship: our active defenses. The respondents in this study were questioned about these defenses in two ways, first to establish perceptions of the effectiveness of these defenses, and then to gauge their desirability.

In the first instance, the question asked for a series of evaluations: A.) How good are our defenses against enemy bombers, B.) against enemy guided missiles, C.) against enemy submarines. Answers were given by means of a ten-point scale on which zero meant very bad and ten very good. Table 18 gives the correlations among those answers and the estimates of probability for the Civil Defense Postures.

Table 18

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. DEFENSES AND PROBABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. DEFENSES				
Probability of CD Postures	Against Enemy Bombers	Against Enemy Guided Missiles	Against Enemy Submarines	
	CD-1	.496	.442	.420
CD-2	.494	.439	.421	
CD-3	.485	.432	.407	
CD-4	.513	.458	.435	
CD-5	.480	.466	.400	
CD-6	.525	.463	.443	

It seems indicated that there may be some important relationships among probability assessments and estimates of defense effectiveness. The data indicate that those people assigning high probability to the Postures also see our defenses against bombers, missiles, and submarines as being good.

Table 19 shows that there is also a slight relationship between appraisals of defense effectiveness and evaluations of Posture desirability.

Table 19

MEAN APPRAISAL VALUES FOR U.S. DEFENSES AGAINST ENEMY BOMBERS, MISSILES, AND SUBMARINES, BY DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Mean Values		
		Bombers	Guided Missiles	Submarines
CD-1	Undesirable	7.88	7.01	7.33
	Indifferent	7.68	5.75	6.48
	Desirable	7.90	6.68	7.12
	Highly Desirable	8.35	7.22	7.48
CD-2	Undesirable	7.87	6.83	7.23
	Indifferent	8.09	6.26	6.69
	Desirable	7.94	6.62	7.17
	Highly Desirable	8.35	7.28	7.52
CD-3	Undesirable	8.06	6.66	7.02
	Indifferent	8.12	6.64	6.88
	Desirable	7.98	6.74	7.22
	Highly Desirable	8.33	7.27	7.49
CD-4	Undesirable	7.66	6.63	6.92
	Indifferent	8.33	6.60	7.03
	Desirable	8.06	6.58	7.21
	Highly Desirable	8.34	7.29	7.50
CD-5	Undesirable	7.49	6.68	6.94
	Indifferent	8.04	6.94	7.05
	Desirable	8.11	6.74	7.08
	Highly Desirable	8.35	7.21	7.56
CD-6	Undesirable	7.86	6.67	7.20
	Indifferent	7.84	6.16	7.32
	Desirable	8.01	6.79	7.04
	Highly Desirable	8.37	7.29	7.49

Consistently, the highest appraisals given the three kinds of defenses were those of the group which assessed the Postures as being highly desirable. The relationship is not complete, however, since the lowest appraisals are generally given either by those who are indifferent to Civil Defense or those who find it undesirable. Nevertheless, the appraisals of high desirability group seem to be rather significantly higher than those of the other three groups.

Thus, those who see Civil Defense as being desirable, and to a greater extent, those who see such a program as probable, also believe that our defenses are good. This may be indicative of an inability to distinguish between active and passive defenses. The concept seems to be conceived of as one great effort to protect our population, and the public seems to have some sort of blind faith that our Government will achieve its goal successfully. Thus Civil Defense and our active defenses are both considered probable and desirable.

Respondents were asked further how desirable it was to put these missiles around American cities, and then, around their own city or the city nearest them. Table 20 gives the correlations among these desirabilities and the Posture probabilities:

Table 20

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG DESIRABILITY OF PUTTING ANTI-MISSILE MISSILES AROUND AMERICAN CITIES AND RESPONDENTS' CITY, AND PROBABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

DESIRABILITY OF PLACING ANTI-MISSILE MISSILES		
Probability of CD Postures	Around Our Cities	Around Respondents' City
	CD-1	.183
CD-2	.156	.186
CD-3	.140	.120
CD-4	.147	.121
CD-5	.146	.148
CD-6	.158	.114

For those who saw Civil Defense as probable, placing the missiles in both these areas seems to be desirable, although the correlations are not highly significant.

Tables 21 and 22 present the same desirabilities in terms of the desirabilities of the Civil Defense Postures.

Table 21

DESIRABILITY OF PLACING ANTI-MISSILE MISSILES AROUND
AMERICAN CITIES, BY DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Undesirable	Indifferent	Desirable	Highly Desirable	N
CD-1	Undesirable	23.8	6.9	24.8	44.6	101
	Indifferent	16.7	7.4	14.8	61.1	54
	Desirable	11.0	1.9	39.5	47.6	210
	Highly Desirable	6.8	1.6	24.8	66.7	1052
CD-2	Undesirable	29.4	5.0	21.0	44.5	119
	Indifferent	21.4	4.3	30.0	44.3	70
	Desirable	9.1	2.7	41.8	46.4	263
	Highly Desirable	5.6	1.7	22.9	69.8	965
CD-3	Undesirable	23.0	5.0	18.0	54.0	139
	Indifferent	12.5	1.6	26.6	59.4	64
	Desirable	10.9	1.8	42.3	45.1	284
	Highly Desirable	6.1	1.9	23.1	68.8	929
CD-4	Undesirable	26.4	5.6	20.0	48.0	125
	Indifferent	20.3	3.4	23.7	52.5	59
	Desirable	9.9	2.6	37.9	49.6	272
	Highly Desirable	5.8	1.7	24.4	68.1	960
CD-5	Undesirable	23.9	5.5	24.8	45.9	109
	Indifferent	18.5	9.3	29.6	42.6	54
	Desirable	13.0	2.9	35.4	48.7	277
	Highly Desirable	5.8	1.2	24.1	68.9	972
CD-6	Undesirable	24.1	3.8	24.1	48.1	133
	Indifferent	13.6	4.9	27.2	54.3	81
	Desirable	10.7	2.8	37.0	49.5	281
	Highly Desirable	6.0	1.6	23.8	68.7	922

Table 22

DESIRABILITY OF PLACING ANTI-MISSILE MISSILES AROUND
RESPONDENTS' CITY, BY DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Undesirable	Indifferent	Desirable	Highly Desirable	N
CD-1	Undesirable	13.3	8.4	26.5	51.8	83
	Indifferent	20.8	8.3	22.9	47.9	48
	Desirable	19.2	6.6	37.9	36.4	198
	Highly Desirable	10.6	4.0	32.2	53.1	1005
CD-2	Undesirable	20.6	6.2	28.9	44.3	97
	Indifferent	22.4	12.1	31.0	34.5	58
	Desirable	17.2	7.2	38.8	36.8	250
	Highly Desirable	9.7	3.6	31.1	55.7	929
CD-3	Undesirable	17.8	5.1	24.6	52.5	118
	Indifferent	20.3	6.8	25.4	47.5	59
	Desirable	17.0	5.7	38.9	38.5	265
	Highly Desirable	9.9	4.3	32.0	53.9	891
CD-4	Undesirable	14.9	7.9	30.7	46.5	101
	Indifferent	22.6	11.3	26.4	39.6	53
	Desirable	13.0	5.1	42.5	39.4	254
	Highly Desirable	11.5	3.9	30.5	54.5	925
CD-5	Undesirable	11.1	6.7	27.8	54.4	90
	Indifferent	26.5	12.2	28.6	32.7	49
	Desirable	16.8	7.0	39.5	36.7	256
	Highly Desirable	10.6	3.4	31.3	54.7	934
CD-6	Undesirable	17.5	7.0	30.7	44.7	114
	Indifferent	22.7	8.0	30.7	38.7	75
	Desirable	13.0	6.5	38.2	42.4	262
	Highly Desirable	10.8	3.7	30.9	54.6	883

Those who found the Postures to be highly desirable are appreciably more in favor of placing anti-missile missiles around either American cities in general or around their own city than are the other groups.

In other words, a high desirability evaluation for placement of missiles seems to be associated with both probability and desirability of the Civil Defense Postures.

It is important to note that enthusiasm for placement of these missiles was generally quite high: 62.1% of the sample found placement around American cities to be highly desirable (+3), and 50.3% found placement around their own city to be highly desirable. It is especially interesting to note that the percentage of those finding missile placement highly desirable drops almost 12.0% when one's own city is the object rather than American cities in general.

The concept of anti-missile missiles is thus less vague, and more in direct relation to the personal concerns of each respondent; under these circumstances, this group seems less willing to endorse such a program of active defenses.

The general pattern of belief in Civil Defense associated with an endorsement of anti-missile missiles would have been expected on the basis of the data in Tables 18 and 19. The same faith in Government operations seems to be in effect.

B. Shelters

Another important dimension to the Civil Defense question is in one sense completely divorced from either the character of an expected World War III or its imminence. This dimension is simply that of perceived effectiveness of the shelters themselves. No matter how strong the threat of a nuclear war, the public can hardly be expected to endorse a program which they believe to be inadequate or ineffective.

Respondents were first asked to assess the chances of survival in a nuclear war without fallout shelters and then with them. The correlations among these assessments and the probabilities of the six Postures are shown in Table 23.

Table 23

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG CHANCES OF SURVIVAL IN NUCLEAR ATTACK, WITH AND WITHOUT SHELTERS, AND PROBABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

CHANCES OF SURVIVAL		
Probability of CD Postures	Under Present Conditions	With Fallout Shelters
	CD-1	.008
CD-2	.000	.009
CD-3	.006	-.002
CD-4	.024	.006
CD-5	.009	-.015
CD-6	-.022	-.016

It is apparent that the perceived probability of any Civil Defense implementation bears no relation to perceived chances of survival whether people are in shelters or not. In other words, probability estimates for a Civil Defense program are seemingly given without consideration of either the chances of survival at this time or the extent to which shelters would improve them.

Tables 24 and 25 explore the relationship between estimated chances of survival and desirability of the six Postures.

Table 24

CHANCES OF SURVIVAL IN NUCLEAR WAR, BY
DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Good	50 - 50	Bad or No Chance	N
CD-1	Undesirable	26.1	15.2	58.7	92
	Indifferent	31.8	13.6	54.5	44
	Desirable	25.9	16.1	58.0	193
	Highly Desirable	28.3	10.7	61.0	979
CD-2	Undesirable	26.7	14.3	59.0	105
	Indifferent	37.3	20.3	42.4	59
	Desirable	28.9	12.6	58.5	246
	Highly Desirable	27.3	10.9	61.8	899
CD-3	Undesirable	25.8	14.1	60.2	128
	Indifferent	38.2	10.9	50.9	55
	Desirable	26.4	15.1	58.5	265
	Highly Desirable	28.0	10.7	61.3	860
CD-4	Undesirable	20.7	16.2	63.1	111
	Indifferent	33.3	14.6	52.1	48
	Desirable	28.8	15.6	55.6	257
	Highly Desirable	28.3	10.2	61.5	892
CD-5	Undesirable	26.3	15.2	58.6	99
	Indifferent	26.1	10.9	63.0	46
	Desirable	31.0	14.1	54.9	255
	Highly Desirable	27.2	11.1	61.7	903
CD-6	Undesirable	26.1	14.3	59.7	119
	Indifferent	31.0	14.1	54.9	71
	Desirable	28.6	13.0	58.4	262
	Highly Desirable	27.8	11.1	61.1	856

Table 25

CHANCES OF SURVIVAL IN FALLOUT SHELTERS, BY
DESIRABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		Good	50 - 50	Bad or No Chance	N
CD-1	Undesirable	60.6	9.6	29.8	94
	Indifferent	44.9	20.4	34.7	49
	Desirable	65.2	16.9	17.9	201
	Highly Desirable	69.7	13.0	17.3	1029
CD-2	Undesirable	57.5	8.8	33.6	113
	Indifferent	54.7	18.8	26.6	64
	Desirable	66.9	15.6	17.5	257
	Highly Desirable	69.7	13.3	17.0	940
CD-3	Undesirable	59.0	11.2	29.9	134
	Indifferent	55.0	20.0	25.0	60
	Desirable	68.4	15.6	16.0	275
	Highly Desirable	69.2	13.1	17.7	903
CD-4	Undesirable	55.1	12.7	32.2	118
	Indifferent	50.0	20.4	29.6	54
	Desirable	65.0	17.3	17.7	266
	Highly Desirable	70.7	12.3	17.0	935
CD-5	Undesirable	63.5	9.6	26.9	104
	Indifferent	57.1	16.3	26.5	49
	Desirable	64.6	17.5	17.9	268
	Highly Desirable	69.3	12.8	18.0	947
CD-6	Undesirable	64.6	7.1	28.3	127
	Indifferent	63.6	10.4	26.0	77
	Desirable	66.1	17.0	17.0	271
	Highly Desirable	68.6	13.9	17.5	898

Without fallout shelters, chances of survival are assessed as being bad, and there seems to be no significant variance on the part of any of the groups, although those who are indifferent to Civil Defense are slightly more optimistic about their chances in a nuclear war. With fallout shelters, estimates of survival are vastly more optimistic on the part of all groups, while those who are indifferent to Civil Defense or find it undesirable are least willing to believe that chances would be improved. Again, those who see these Civil Defense programs as being highly desirable have the greatest belief in their effectiveness. It is important to note, however, that even the majority (55.1% to 64.6%) of those for whom the Postures are undesirable believe nevertheless that shelters would increase the chances of survival in a nuclear war.

But would they use them? The respondents were asked if they thought that they would try to use a shelter in case of a nuclear attack. An association might be expected between intention to use a shelter and high Civil Defense probability and desirability values.

Table 26 presents the mean probability and desirability values for the Postures according to whether or not the respondents would try to use a fallout shelter in the event of an attack.

Table 26

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES BY PREDICTIONS OF FALLOUT SHELTER USE IN A NUCLEAR ATTACK

Postures		Definitely Try	Probably Try	Probably Not Try	Definitely Not Try
Probability	CD-1	6.89	6.71	5.87	5.74
	CD-2	5.34	4.91	4.02	3.64
	CD-3	6.62	6.27	5.63	5.63
	CD-4	6.21	5.83	5.16	5.00
	CD-5	6.97	6.70	6.28	5.82
	CD-6	6.92	6.83	5.48	6.01
Desirability	CD-1	+2.45	2.22	2.16	1.32
	CD-2	2.38	2.08	1.63	0.86
	CD-3	2.23	2.00	1.79	1.13
	CD-4	2.37	2.08	1.84	0.75
	CD-5	2.39	2.07	2.01	1.40
	CD-6	2.27	1.99	1.61	0.88
N=		756	483	100	72

In every case but one the mean probability and desirability values consistently decrease with reluctance to use a shelter. In other words, as we might have expected, those people who would use a fallout shelter find the Civil Defense Postures both more probable and more desirable than do those who would not use a shelter.

Still, the difference between the highest and the lowest probability and desirability means is often not as strong as might have been expected. It appears that it is possible to view a Civil Defense program as desirable or probable and still not want to use a fallout shelter. This is especially marked in terms of desirability, since every value, however low, is nevertheless still an assessment of desirability. It must be remembered, however, that even the mean differences are affected by the preponderance of those respondents who rated the Postures as +3, or highly desirable, on the desirability scale. Further, a response of "not try" is for some people the most reasonable response--there are those who would not try simply because there is no shelter available. In this light, the relationship becomes slightly stronger.

There is another level to the thinking about fallout shelters. Beyond their effectiveness as defenses, some people feel that they might have a detrimental effect on the psychological environment of this country. In some circles it is believed that a nation-wide program of fallout shelters would, by focusing the attentions of our citizens on what might be construed as a preparation for war, make our thinking war-like, fatalistic, and anxiety-ridden. An atmosphere such as this is then considered a more likely one for war than a peaceful climate. Thus war is made more probable, peaceable goals are less likely to be achieved, and our citizenry is tense and irrational.

It would certainly be expected that any agreement with such a theory on the part of our respondents would be in inverse proportion to desirability and probability assessments of any Civil Defense program. That is, considering the high values given the Postures, we would not expect agreement with the kind of thinking we have just outlined.

Table 27 explores the mean probability and desirability values for the Civil Defense Postures by the effect of shelters on the likelihood of war.

Table 27

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY EFFECT OF SHELTERS ON LIKELIHOOD OF WAR

Postures		More	Less	No Difference
Probability	CD-1	6.55	7.20	6.63
	CD-2	5.00	5.87	4.85
	CD-3	6.10	7.06	6.28
	CD-4	5.69	6.54	5.87
	CD-5	6.84	7.11	6.73
	CD-6	6.52	7.34	6.66
Desirability	CD-1	+1.58	2.53	2.32
	CD-2	1.44	2.46	2.17
	CD-3	1.22	2.26	2.11
	CD-4	1.35	2.49	2.16
	CD-5	1.62	2.49	2.21
	CD-6	1.41	2.38	2.07
	N=	126	175	1096

While there may be no significant difference in terms of probability, it can be noted that those who feel that shelters make war less likely consistently view the Postures as more probable. There is also a definite pattern to the desirability means. The mean desirability values are consistently lower for those who feel that shelters would make war more likely. Further, the means are highest for those who see shelters as lessening the chances of war.

This is certainly what might have been expected: that a belief that shelters would increase the probability of war would be diametrically opposed to desirability of a Civil Defense program. It is also important to note that relatively few people do believe that shelters would have any effect on the chances of war (20.6% of the total sample).

What further effect might a shelter program have on the achievement of such peaceful goals as disarmament? Table 28 shows the mean values for the six Postures in terms of the effect of shelters on the achievement of disarmament.

Table 28

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY EFFECT OF SHELTERS ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF DISARMAMENT

Postures		Make More Difficult	Make Less Difficult	Difference
Probability	CD-1	+6.801	+7.103	+6.616
	CD-2	+5.231	+5.379	+4.896
	CD-3	+6.481	+6.342	+6.322
	CD-4	+5.839	+5.940	+5.919
	CD-5	+7.026	+6.838	+6.752
	CD-6	+7.032	+7.274	+6.644
Desirability	CD-1	+1.872	+2.462	+2.324
	CD-2	+1.628	+2.483	+2.166
	CD-3	+1.545	+2.077	+2.104
	CD-4	+1.561	+2.222	+2.193
	CD-5	+1.755	+2.496	+2.244
	CD-6	+1.590	+2.282	+2.094
N=		156	117	1082

Here the range of probability means is small, and the small differences in their values are undoubtedly not significant. There is no consistent pattern about which any attempt to generalize can be made.

In terms of desirability, the range of means is wider, and the pattern stronger. Those who felt that a shelter program would aid in the achievement of disarmament also saw a shelter program as most desirable. Those who felt that shelters would hinder the achievement of disarmament had significantly lower desirability means. It is important to note that only 18.6% of the total sample felt shelters would make any difference at all to disarmament.

It is possible that there can also be a psychological consequence of a shelter program. Using the same set of responses (more, less, no difference), respondents were asked to gauge the effect of shelters on the amount of worry about a nuclear war. Table 29 gives the mean probability and desirability values.

Table 29

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY EFFECT OF SHELTERS ON AMOUNT OF WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR

Postures		More	Less	No Difference
Probability	CD-1	6.560	7.089	6.633
	CD-2	4.792	5.616	4.903
	CD-3	6.204	6.741	6.351
	CD-4	5.729	6.411	5.925
	CD-5	6.659	7.022	6.799
	CD-6	6.584	7.223	6.643
Desirability	CD-1	+2.064	2.468	2.402
	CD-2	1.921	2.423	2.193
	CD-3	1.780	2.252	2.171
	CD-4	1.915	2.355	2.231
	CD-5	2.010	2.294	2.305
	CD-6	1.772	2.312	2.166
	N=	519	282	597

Again, there is a clear pattern although, especially in terms of probability the range of means is small. Those who feel that shelters would make people worry less about war give higher estimates of likelihood of a shelter program and find such a program more desirable than do the other two groups.

As would then also be expected, those who think that shelters would increase the amount of worry about nuclear war have consistently lower estimates of probability and desirability for such a program.

Still, the differences in means for any of the preceding three tables is probably not highly significant. It is important to remember that it is obviously possible to think that Civil Defense would make war more likely, disarmament more difficult to achieve, and would increase the amount of worry about nuclear war and still think simultaneously that Civil Defense is both probable and desirable.

Interestingly, these items regarding the "social" aspects of shelters do not elicit a response different from Posture evaluations given in regard to items concerning Civil Defense in general.

C. Summary

Perhaps the most important thing to be said in summary is that many of the associations we would have expected to find between the foregoing questions and the Civil Defense assessments have not materialized. We have found very little to help in explaining the high probability and desirability values given to the six Postures. Often the difference in Cold War and shelter perceptions was only a matter of degree and did not actually seem to determine one's Civil Defense evaluations.

The most significant associations which were discovered were within the area of Cold War perceptions, leading us further into the thinking that Civil Defense is inexorably bound, in the public mind, to our active defenses. When questions were asked which isolated attitudes about fallout shelters only, the associations grew less striking.

The following generalizations can be made, if it is kept in mind that the differences between groups were usually very slight.

Those who found Civil Defense desirable and probable as a national program seem to exhibit more desire for a peaceful settlement to the Cold War, with the United States victorious, but do not necessarily believe such outcomes are probable. Rather, they often predict a nuclear world war about which they worry more than do the other groups. This group differs also in that the respondents tend to be stronger in their intention to use a shelter in the event of a nuclear attack.

Those who view a Civil Defense program as merely probable predict a fairly imminent war, within at least five years. This group also believes more strongly than any other that our defense against enemy bombers, submarines and guided missiles are good, and further supports especially the placing of anti-missile missiles around American cities in general, and less enthusiastically, around their own cities.

Those who see a Civil Defense program as desirable predict that a war will not occur within at least two years. They also exhibit the greatest faith in the fact that shelters will increase chances of survival in a nuclear war, and believe further that they will make war less likely, disarmament easier to obtain, and will lessen worry about war.

The opposing group, for whom Civil Defense is undesirable (the "not probable" group seemed to have no distinguishing characteristics at all), differed especially on the Cold War Futures: They desire nothing less than total destruction of Communism, the best alternative to which seems to be peaceful surrender on the part of the United States, which they tend to find more probable. On most of the other questions a strong degree of fatalism of this sort is exhibited by at least half of the group. They also were most pessimistic about

chances of survival, even with shelters although still assessing them as good, and viewed shelters as increasing the likelihood of war, the difficulty in achieving disarmament, and the amount of worry about war.

Those who were completely indifferent to the Postures showed some interesting attitudes, which unfortunately are made less significant by virtue of the small size of the group itself. They expect no world war and no weapons escalation, and thus worry considerably less about the possibility of such a war. In addition they were more optimistic about survival chances without shelters in the event that there was such a war.

Completely irrelevant to evaluations of Civil Defense seems to be whether or not one's own area is thought to be a potential target.

These patterns in general are what might have been predicted. Yet the conclusions are based on such limited differences as to render them seriously suspect. The plain facts are that nothing in the data has yet yielded any indisputable evidence of definite differences in perceptions between those groups which evaluated the Postures differently. There has been, in other words, nothing to explain these differences. What has been found and presented in the preceding paragraphs is based on differences in degree and not in orientation.

It seems quite valid, then, to continue the thinking that the nature of a Civil Defense program is of little concern to the American people. Not only do our respondents not distinguish between the differing types of programs, but more importantly, the programs are consistently endorsed as being desirable. Cold War perceptions and other variables such as have been explored seem often to be surprisingly irrelevant to these assessments.

Ostensibly, the public seems to be apathetic about Civil Defense. Yet it must be repeated that apathy can be a product of wanting something which is also fully expected to occur as well as of disinterest. The Government has advocated Civil Defense and the public seems to view it as an extension of what is perceived to be a successful program of active defenses. Further, the Government is expected to implement a Civil Defense program, lending credence to the general belief that it must be good.

IV. THE EFFECTS OF PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS ON POSTURE EVALUATIONS

A. Personal Data

In the preceding pages, an attempt has been made to explain the probability and desirability assessments of the Civil Defense Postures in terms of the respondents' thinking on Cold War and Civil Defense issues. In this section, we shall shift the focus onto the respondents themselves, and once again attempt to explain their views on the program alternatives, this time in terms of their own personal characteristics. The question now becomes: Are there any personal characteristics which might distinguish one group of respondents from another, for example, the high desirability group from those who gave an evaluation of low desirability?

Table 30 gives the mean probability and desirability values for each of the six Postures by sex.

Table 30

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY SEX

Postures		Male	Female
Probability	CD-1	6.52	6.85
	CD-2	4.63	5.33
	CD-3	6.02	6.64
	CD-4	5.65	6.18
	CD-5	6.75	6.81
	CD-6	6.65	6.82
Desirability	CD-1	+2.12	+2.42
	CD-2	+1.90	+2.32
	CD-3	+1.78	+2.27
	CD-4	+1.96	+2.27
	CD-5	+2.09	+2.28
	CD-6	+1.85	+2.21
	N=	645	786

Females are consistently higher in their probability evaluations than are males, and the difference appear to be fairly significant.

The difference in desirability values is somewhat stronger, again with the females' evaluations consistently higher than those given by the men.

Although these differences may not be highly significant, we can nevertheless make the statement that women seem to find Civil Defense more desirable and more probable than do men.

Table 31 provides the mean probability and desirability values for each Posture, according to race:

Table 31

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES
FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY RACE

Postures		Mean	
		White	Negro
Probability	CD-1	6.61	7.37
	CD-2	4.83	6.18
	CD-3	6.26	6.94
	CD-4	5.83	6.63
	CD-5	6.71	7.12
	CD-6	6.67	7.22
Desirability	CD-1	+2.28	+2.30
	CD-2	+2.10	+2.30
	CD-3	+2.05	+2.01
	CD-4	+2.12	+2.18
	CD-5	+2.19	+2.14
	CD-6	+2.01	+2.27
	N=	1225	188

It is obvious that there is no significant difference between the racial groups according to desirability. In terms of probability, however, we can note that for every Posture, the Negro means are higher than for the Whites. In other words it appears that Negroes expect implementation of a Civil Defense program more than do the Whites.

Table 32 shows the mean probability and desirability values for each Posture according to marital status.

Table 32

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY MARITAL STATUS

Postures		Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed	Separated
Probability	CD-1	7.01	6.66	6.19	6.89	7.11
	CD-2	5.10	4.93	5.21	5.25	6.19
	CD-3	6.49	6.33	6.34	6.45	6.50
	CD-4	6.17	5.89	5.69	6.07	6.78
	CD-5	6.78	6.80	6.08	6.78	7.28
	CD-6	7.17	6.71	5.81	6.88	7.50
Desirability	CD-1	+1.91	+2.31	+2.36	+2.34	+2.44
	CD-2	+1.73	+2.15	+2.13	+2.26	+2.25
	CD-3	+1.57	+2.08	+2.08	+2.18	+1.97
	CD-4	+1.83	+2.16	+2.10	+2.16	+2.25
	CD-5	+2.03	+2.21	+2.25	+2.17	+2.14
	CD-6	+1.68	+2.06	+1.96	+2.20	+2.33
	N=	107	1097	53	140	36

While there appears to be no significant difference in terms of probability assessments, we can note that those respondents who were separated from their spouses consistently gave higher probability values than do any of the other groups. The difference, however, is rarely significant.

Those respondents who were single consistently gave the lowest desirability evaluations. This may be indicative of the lack of responsibility inherent in the state of being single. While it might have been expected that conversely, those who were married would have given the highest desirability values, instead these evaluations are most often given by those who were separated, but this cannot be pursued due to the extremely small number.

Table 33 gives the mean values for each Posture according to political party:

Table 33

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES FOR
THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY POLITICAL PARTY

Postures		Republican	Democrat	Independent
Probability	CD-1	6.33	6.83	6.77
	CD-2	4.46	5.23	4.87
	CD-3	6.09	6.47	6.51
	CD-4	5.57	6.03	5.93
	CD-5	6.54	6.81	7.17
	CD-6	6.30	6.90	6.82
Desirability	CD-1	+2.29	+2.31	+2.35
	CD-2	+2.04	+2.17	+2.24
	CD-3	+2.00	+2.06	+2.18
	CD-4	+2.08	+2.16	+2.24
	CD-5	+2.19	+2.25	+2.11
	CD-6	+1.83	+2.17	+2.04
	N=	397	773	141

There seems to be no significant finding in the above table. While there is virtually no difference in desirability values, there is only a very slight difference in terms of probability assessments. We can note that Democrats consistently give higher probability evaluations, which might be expected in the light of the current Democratic administration. The difference, however, is negligible.

Table 34 gives the mean values for the Civil Defense Postures in terms of education:

Table 34
 MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES
 FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY EDUCATION

Postures	No Schooling	Grammar School (1-8 years)	Some High School (9-11 years)	Completed High School (12 years)	College, Graduate		Higher than College
					Incomplete	College	
CD-1	7.00	6.79	6.90	6.81	6.62	5.89	5.79
CD-2	6.87	5.54	5.57	4.87	4.46	3.61	3.49
CD-3	7.00	6.46	6.89	6.37	5.96	5.64	5.25
CD-4	6.69	6.21	6.41	5.88	5.49	5.44	4.39
CD-5	7.25	6.61	7.10	6.57	7.03	6.35	6.54
CD-6	7.06	6.85	7.10	6.70	6.42	6.30	6.25
CD-1	+2.19	+2.09	+2.42	+2.40	+2.45	+2.06	+1.75
CD-2	+2.20	+2.03	+2.32	+2.27	+2.16	+1.77	+1.31
CD-3	+1.81	+1.98	+2.19	+2.17	+2.01	+1.70	+1.47
CD-4	+2.06	+2.00	+2.27	+2.28	+2.19	+1.98	+1.26
CD-5	+2.31	+1.98	+2.31	+2.27	+2.32	+2.21	+1.85
CD-6	+1.69	+2.07	+2.26	+2.18	+1.84	+1.71	+1.23
N=	16	352	295	427	193	86	61

While there is no substantial difference in the probability means given, it is possible to note a fairly consistent pattern in the ranking of these values. With one exception in each case, those respondents with no schooling have given the highest probability assessments, while those with an education higher than college have given the lowest evaluations. Unfortunately, with numbers of 16 and 61 respectively, this cannot be generalized upon.

In terms of desirability, although again the range of means is small, another pattern emerges when these values are put into rank order. In every case but one, those respondents having some high school education view Civil Defense as most desirable. For every Posture, the lowest desirability value is given by those with an education higher than college.

It appears, then, that the higher the educational level, the less desirable a Civil Defense program becomes.

It will be valuable to consider occupation also in this context. Table 35 gives the mean probability and desirability values for the six Postures in terms of occupation:

Table 35
 MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY VALUES
 FOR THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES, BY OCCUPATION

Postures	Professional, Technical		Farmers & Farm Mgrs.,		Mgrs., Officials, Proprietors		Clerical Sales		Craftsmen, Foremen		Operatives		Private Household & Service		Farm Laborers		Other Laborers			
	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability	Probability	Desirability		
CD-1	6.02	+2.25	7.21	+2.00	6.75	+2.39	6.55	+2.23	6.44	+2.09	6.47	+2.36	6.96	+2.44	7.43	+2.13	6.70	+1.76	6.99	+2.48
CD-2	3.92	+2.01	4.24	+1.56	4.51	+2.05	4.89	+2.07	4.49	+1.90	4.95	+2.21	5.73	+2.53	5.99	+2.09	5.29	+1.63	5.58	+2.33
CD-3	5.65	+1.91	5.79	+1.53	6.08	+2.12	6.19	+1.94	5.94	+2.06	6.42	+2.11	6.85	+2.32	6.78	+1.92	6.51	+1.61	6.77	+2.20
CD-4	5.28	+1.92	6.29	+2.03	5.64	+2.18	5.36	+2.15	5.42	+2.08	6.05	+2.26	6.32	+2.39	6.61	+2.02	6.02	+1.63	6.35	+2.18
CD-5	6.67	+2.23	6.12	+1.94	6.35	+2.16	6.17	+2.07	6.74	+2.12	6.83	+2.21	7.17	+2.41	7.30	+2.11	6.83	+1.83	6.96	+2.33
CD-6	6.32	+1.73	7.15	+1.62	6.53	+2.07	6.47	+1.95	6.57	+1.86	6.52	+2.06	7.19	+2.44	7.44	+2.05	6.92	+1.66	6.74	+2.32
N=	182		34		191		109		67		269		216		132		92		141	

For both sets of evaluations, the range of means is small, and thus the most worthwhile analysis can be carried out by the ranking of each set of values.

Private Household and Service workers fairly consistently appraised the Postures as being more probable than did any other groups. Professionals, on the other hand, viewed Civil Defense as least probable. In terms of our findings in Table 34 this would have been expected, as we would assume that Professionals would also have achieved the highest educational level of any group.

Operatives saw Civil Defense as being more desirable than did any other group. The lowest mean desirability values were consistently given by Farmers, Farm Managers, and Farm Laborers, which can easily be understood in terms of the rural environment.

It was possible to run partial correlations on four of the personal data variables, one of which is income level; this seems to fit in naturally with the education-occupation complex. Table 36 gives the correlations among income level and Posture probability:

Table 36

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN INCOME LEVEL
AND PROBABILITY OF THE SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

	Postures	Income Level
Probability	CD-1	.003
	CD-2	-.033
	CD-3	-.005
	CD-4	-.018
	CD-5	.010
	CD-6	-.005

There is no apparent association between income level and estimates of the probability of a Civil Defense program being implemented. Table 37 explores the mean desirability evaluations in terms of income:

Table 37

INCOME, BY DESIRABILITY OF THE
SIX CIVIL DEFENSE POSTURES

Postures		\$4,999 or Below	\$5,000 to \$9,999	\$10,000 or Above	N
CD-1	Undesirable	51.6	39.6	8.8	91
	Indifferent	41.7	33.3	25.0	48
	Desirable	42.6	39.9	17.6	188
	Highly Desirable	40.6	46.5	12.9	991
CD-2	Undesirable	43.4	33.7	17.9	106
	Indifferent	48.3	33.3	18.3	60
	Desirable	39.4	46.7	13.8	246
	Highly Desirable	41.5	45.6	12.9	904
CD-3	Undesirable	50.4	37.0	12.6	127
	Indifferent	38.9	44.4	16.7	54
	Desirable	36.2	50.2	13.6	265
	Highly Desirable	42.3	43.9	13.8	870
CD-4	Undesirable	51.3	32.7	15.9	113
	Indifferent	37.3	41.2	21.6	51
	Desirable	37.5	48.2	14.2	253
	Highly Desirable	41.6	45.5	12.9	899
CD-5	Undesirable	47.4	43.3	9.3	97
	Indifferent	46.0	38.0	16.0	50
	Desirable	42.4	44.3	13.4	262
	Highly Desirable	40.5	45.2	14.3	903
CD-6	Undesirable	44.9	39.0	16.1	118
	Indifferent	39.7	41.1	19.2	73
	Desirable	40.8	45.8	13.4	262
	Highly Desirable	41.5	45.4	13.1	863

Again, there seems to be no significant difference between groups, although it is possible to note that those who are indifferent to Civil Defense generally have the highest proportion of high income people, while those who find the Postures undesirable have the highest proportion of low income respondents. However, neither of these patterns is consistent, and the difference is not very striking. It might be concluded then that there is no significant association between income level and either Posture probabilities or desirabilities.

Table 37A

MEAN POSTURE DESIRABILITIES,
BY INCOME LEVEL

Postures	Desirabilities		
	\$4,999 or Below	\$5,000 to \$9,999	\$10,000 or Above
CD-1	2.20	2.41	2.23
CD-2	2.14	2.26	1.83
CD-3	2.01	2.10	2.00
CD-4	2.10	2.27	1.91
CD-5	2.14	2.24	2.24
CD-6	2.06	2.15	1.76
N=	548	589	238

However, it is possible to look at this relationship in another way. Table 37A gives the mean desirability values given each Posture by each of the income groups. Now it becomes more apparent that high income people are more indifferent to Civil Defense; that is, they consistently give the lowest desirability evaluations.

Respondents were further asked to gauge their own social class: Upper, Middle, Working or Lower. Table 38 gives the probability and desirability means for these groups.

Table 38

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY ASSESSMENTS
BY SELF-ATTRIBUTED SOCIAL CLASS

Postures	Desirability				Probability			
	Upper	Middle	Working	Lower	Upper	Middle	Working	Lower
CD-1	+1.94	2.34	2.30	1.97	6.07	6.55	6.84	7.11
CD-2	1.45	2.18	2.19	1.78	4.87	4.56	5.38	5.61
CD-3	1.77	2.00	2.14	1.70	6.15	5.90	6.75	6.43
CD-4	1.49	2.19	2.19	1.62	5.74	5.57	6.27	6.03
CD-5	1.92	2.26	2.20	2.16	6.32	6.69	6.90	6.81
CD-6	1.62	1.95	2.19	1.81	6.60	6.61	6.88	7.03
N=	53	617	670	37				

Both extreme groups, the Upper and the Lower class categories, give consistently lower desirability evaluations than do the middle groups. Low probability seems to be associated with the Upper and Middle classes and high probability with the Working and Lower classes. In other words, the higher one sees one's social class to be, the lower the probability of Civil Defense implementation, and vice versa.

Table 39 gives the probability and desirability means according to professed strength of religious belief: strong, moderate, not strong.

Table 39

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY ASSESSMENTS,
BY STRENGTH OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Postures	Desirability			Probability		
	Strong	Moderate	Not Strong	Strong	Moderate	Not Strong
CD-1	+2.31	2.34	1.88	6.36	6.59	5.97
CD-2	2.17	2.11	2.05	5.14	5.09	3.75
CD-3	2.13	2.03	1.55	6.52	6.23	5.80
CD-4	2.16	2.17	1.78	6.01	5.95	5.45
CD-5	2.22	2.16	2.09	6.76	6.88	6.55
CD-6	2.10	2.05	1.64	6.83	6.73	6.07
N=	918	399	76			

It might be thought that a strong religious belief, by increasing a sense of responsibility toward one's fellow man, might in turn make a Civil Defense program more desirable or probable. This seems to be generally the case, although what is more striking is the opposite: Those who felt not strongly at all give significantly lower desirability and probability evaluations for all six Postures. In other words, it is not so much the having of a strong religious belief that influences thinking on Civil Defense, but the lack of it, causing one to be more indifferent to it and to expect its implementation less.

Another variable which might be seen as increasing one's sense of responsibility is the possession of small children (under the age of 12). Table 40 gives the mean probability and desirability evaluations according to whether or not the respondent had children of this age.

Table 40

MEAN PROBABILITY AND DESIRABILITY ASSESSMENTS,
BY CHILDREN UNDER 12 IN FAMILY

Postures	Desirability		Probability	
	None	Some	None	Some
CD-1	+2.20	2.39	6.63	6.81
CD-2	2.06	2.24	4.92	5.14
CD-3	2.04	2.05	6.40	6.30
CD-4	2.06	2.24	5.86	6.04
CD-5	2.13	2.28	6.65	6.98
CD-6	1.96	2.16	6.72	6.77
N=	825	597		

In every instance, those who had some children under 12 also had higher mean desirability evaluations than those who had no small children. This is true also in terms of probability evaluations, although the pattern breaks down in the case of CD-3 probability. Generally, these differences seem to be significant: those who have small children in their family tend both to desire a Civil Defense program more strongly and to feel that such a program is probable than do those people who have no small children.

It is possible at this point to make several tentative statements on the basis of our findings. We can state that our data suggests the following to be true: 1) a high probability of Civil Defense implementation is particularly associated with women, Negroes, Democrats, and the self-attributed Lower and Working classes, and those with small children; 2) a high desirability is associated with women, those with a lower educational level, and those with small children; 3) low probability was seen to be found most often among the Upper and Middle class, those with little strength of religious belief and those who are Professionals; 4) Civil Defense was seen to be of particularly low desirability among those having a high level of education, those who had no small children, those having a high income, those who made their livelihood on a farm, and strangely, among those who placed themselves in the extreme Upper and Lower classes

B. Two Deviant Case Samples

We have previously used a collapsed desirability scale which was divided into undesirable, indifferent, and desirable. The respondents

who fell into these groups were those choosing -3 to -1, 0, and 1 to 3 values respectively for each Posture. Thus the actual make-up of the groups varied with the consideration of each alternative program.

We have established certain generalizations about the majority, or desirability group, but we have shed little light on those for whom Civil Defense was extremely undesirable (-3) or for whom the concept engendered no feeling one way or the other. This is difficult to do when the content of the group varies. But what about those people who were consistent in their evaluations, indifferent to every Posture, or for whom each was rated as -3?

It was possible to isolate 15 people out of the total sample of 1464 who greeted every Posture with indifference. Twenty-one people were found to have evaluated every Posture as extremely undesirable or -3. It goes without saying that we cannot hope to find anything that could even pretend to significance in analyzing these two groups. Nevertheless, it may still prove worthwhile to compare the distribution of these two "pure" groups with the marginal distributions of the total sample on several Cold War and Civil Defense issues, and thus attempt to determine the nature of the "opposition." If nothing else, such an analysis may indicate a direction for further research.

Our first consideration would be tension level perceptions, as shown in Table 41. This scale ran from 0, meaning no tensions, to 10, meaning maximum tensions.

Table 41

MEAN TENSION LEVEL PERCEPTIONS FOR
SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Mean Tensions			
	Now	in 2 yrs.	in 5 yrs.	2 yrs. ago
Whole sample	6.92	6.90	6.22	6.57
Indifference	7.80	4.86	5.53	7.00
Undesirability	7.80	6.60	6.25	7.24

It is obvious that there is some difference in perceived tension levels between the three groups. Both the indifference and undesirability extreme groups see tensions as being higher than does the total sample. They also perceive tensions as being higher two years ago, while there is little difference in predictions of future tensions for the undesirability group. The indifference group sees them as being lower in two and five years than do the other two groups.

The indifference group, then, perceives higher world tensions now, and for two years ago, but predicts lower levels in the future. Seemingly this is a pattern of optimism, a view of a world changing for the better and thus not needing Civil Defense.

The undesirability group, while also rating today's tensions and those of two years ago as higher than did the total sample, does not exhibit the optimism shown by the indifference group. Things are seen as getting slightly better, but not more so than as evaluated by the total sample. Still Civil Defense is undesirable; perhaps this group feels such a program can only make the situation worse, or has no faith in its effectiveness.

Another set of indicators of tensions, or perceptions of the world situation are the evaluations of the list of Cold War futures, or Outcomes.

Table 42

MEAN PROBABILITY VALUES FOR THE COLD WAR FUTURES, FOR SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Mean										
	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-6	F-7	F-8	F-9	F-10	N
Total	5.68	1.64	2.34	4.23	5.24	3.44	4.89	3.30	1.73	4.31	1464
Indifference	5.40	1.93	2.33	3.26	5.13	2.60	2.46	1.40	1.13	4.86	15
Undesirability	5.10	2.09	2.07	4.06	4.00	4.04	5.90	4.38	2.80	4.00	21

The indifference group differs from the total sample on the following Outcomes: F-4, World War III ending the Cold War, is seen as less probable; F-6, Communists accepting Western way of life, less probable; F-7, Cold War end through disarmament or reconciliation, much less probable; and F-8, Third Force emergence, much less probable. In other words, those who are indifferent to Civil Defense seem to see an amorphous Cold War continuing without resolution, but not ending violently.

The extreme undesirability group, on the other hand, differs on these Outcomes: F-2, the whole world accepting Communism is seen as a slightly more probable; F-5 Communists losing through small wars and revolutions, less probable; F-6, Communists accepting Western way of life, more probable; F-7, Cold War end through disarmament or reconciliation, more probable; F-8, Third Force emergence, more probable; and F-9, United States surrender due to advanced Communist technology, more probable. This seems to be a world view in which the Cold War will

end in some peaceful way, although not to the benefit of the United States. It may perhaps be characterized not only as pessimistic but as fatalistic.

The prospect of a nuclear Third World War engenders substantially different predictions on the part of our three groups.

Table 43

LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR WORLD WAR III,
FOR SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Very Likely	Fairly Likely	Fairly Unlikely	Very Unlikely	N
Entire population	14.0	27.0	31.1	28.0	1412
Indifference	7.7	23.0	23.0	54.0	13
Undesirability	23.8	14.3	4.8	57.0	21

As we might expect, those who were seen to be indifferent about Civil Defense were more prone to consider a nuclear war unlikely than was the total sample. Those who felt Civil Defense to be undesirable had a greater percentage than the total sample at both ends of the scale, very likely and very unlikely. The clear majority of both the deviant samples however, felt a war to be unlikely.

Table 44

WHEN WORLD WAR III WILL COME, FOR SAMPLE
AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Never	Within 6	Within 1 to 2	Within 5	Within 10	Within 20	Over 20	Depends	N
		Months	Years	Years	Years	Years	Years		
Entire population	6.7	1.2	13.6	31.6	25.9	8.5	8.9	3.6	1343
Indifference	23.0	7.7	15.4	23.0	7.7	7.7	15.4	-	13
Undesirability	20.0	10.0	40.0	20.0	-	10.0	-	-	20

If it were to come, both samples perceive an earlier time of occurrence than does our total sample. Those for whom Civil Defense was undesirable are especially prone to predict an earlier time of occurrence.

Table 45

TIME OF END OF COLD WAR, FOR
SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Never	Within 10 to 20 to Over						N
		2 Years	5 Years	10 Years	20 Years	50 Years	50 Years	
Entire popu- lation	15.0	7.6	23.5	25.3	15.8	6.6	6.2	1363
Indifference	18.2	-	9.2	18.2	27.3	27.3	-	11
Undesirability	15.0	25.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	-	-	20

The undesirability group also predicts a slightly earlier end to the Cold War than does either the indifference group or the total sample. The indifference group, in accordance with their World War III views, see the Cold War as ending later than does the total sample.

Table 46 shows the distribution of the three groups on amount of worry about nuclear attack.

Table 46

WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR ATTACK, FOR SAMPLE
AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Great Deal				N
	Some	A Little	Not at All		
Entire population	15.7	28.5	25.7	30.1	1457
Indifference	13.2	-	13.2	73.6	15
Undesirability	38.0	4.8	14.2	43.0	21

As we would have expected, the indifference group worries virtually not at all about a nuclear attack. Once again the undesirability group is split between the two ends of the scale: worry a great deal, and worry not at all.

Both sample groups are more fatalistic about the chances of survival in a nuclear war than is the total sample.

Table 47

CHANCES OF LOCAL SURVIVAL IN A NUCLEAR WAR,
FOR SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Never Will Happen	Very Good	Fairly Good	50 - 50	Fairly Bad	Very Bad	No Chance at All	N
Entire population	.2	4.7	21.2	11.3	21.0	34.7	6.9	1431
Indifference	7.3	14.3	21.5	7.3	21.5	7.3	21.5	14
Undesirability	-	4.8	24.0	-	24.0	24.0	24.0	21

Again, there seems to be a pattern of fatalistic thinking among these two extreme groups.

Table 48

CHANCES OF SURVIVAL IN NUCLEAR WAR, WITH
SHELTERS, FOR SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Never Will Happen	Very Good	Fairly Good	50 - 50	Fairly Bad	Very Bad	No Chance at All	N
Entire population	.1	18.4	47.4	13.6	10.6	8.0	1.8	1422
Indifference	6.7	26.7	26.7	13.3	6.7	6.7	13.3	15
Undesirability	-	14.3	28.5	4.8	-	38.0	14.3	21

Yet both groups seemingly admit that chances of survival would be increased by the use of shelters. Still, their estimates are far more pessimistic than those of the total sample, especially, as we would expect, for the undesirability sample.

Table 49

OPINIONS OF FALLOUT SHELTERS, FOR SAMPLE
AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Strongly Favor	Somewhat Favor	Somewhat Opposed	Strongly Opposed	N
Entire population	46.8	41.7	7.7	3.8	1423
Indifference	7.2	50.0	21.5	21.5	14
Undesirability	43.5	9.5	-	43.0	21

Table 49 shows the distribution on opinions of fallout shelters, and while a substantially greater percentage in both sample groups is strongly opposed to the concept than in the total sample, we are struck once again with the division in the undesirability group. The indifference group is obviously less enthusiastic about shelters than is the total sample, yet equal percentages of the undesirability group strongly favor and strongly oppose fallout shelters.

This becomes true again when we look at the distribution for use of shelters.

Table 50

PREDICTIONS OF FALLOUT SHELTER USE, FOR SAMPLE
AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Definitely Try	Probably Try	Probably Not	Definitely Not	N
Entire population	53.4	34.2	7.2	5.3	1437
Indifference	30.7	30.7	7.7	30.7	13
Undesirability	40.0	25.0	5.0	30.0	20

While both deviant groups are less prone to use a shelter than the total sample, the undesirability group has a strong percentage in the "definitely try" category. Unfortunately, since the number of people in the sample is so small, it would be a waste of time to try to explain this.

Table 51

EFFECT OF SHELTERS ON AMOUNT OF WORRY ABOUT WAR, FOR SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Worry More	Worry Less	No Difference	N
Entire population	37.1	20.1	42.8	1426
Indifference	50.0	14.3	35.8	14
Undesirability	45.0	20.0	35.0	20

Table 51 shows the perceived effect of shelters on worry about war, and we may note a slightly greater degree of feeling that shelters would make people worry more. This is true on the part of both groups.

Table 52

EFFECT OF SHELTERS ON LIKELIHOOD OF WAR, FOR SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Worry More	Worry Less	No Difference	N
Entire population	9.0	12.4	78.6	1418
Indifference	15.4	7.7	77.0	13
Undesirability	38.0	-	62.0	21

Shelters do seem to have a quite different effect on likelihood of war for the undesirability group, especially, than for the total sample. A much larger percentage maintains that shelters will make war more likely. Hence, Civil Defense is undesirable, as we would expect.

Table 53
EDUCATION, FOR SAMPLE AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Samples	Education Levels							N
	No Schooling	Grammar (1 - 8 yrs.)	Some High School (9 - 11 yrs.)	Complete High School (12 yrs.)	College Incomplete	College Graduate	Higher than College	
Entire population	1.3	25.3	20.3	29.6	13.2	6.0	4.3	1461
Indifference	14.2	14.2	40.0	13.3	6.7	-	-	15
Undesirability	4.8	38.0	28.5	14.3	9.5	4.8	-	21

Table 53 shows the distribution for education, and we can note that both groups seem to have a lower level of education than does the total sample.

Table 54

SEX DISTRIBUTION, FOR SAMPLE
AND TWO DEVIANT CASE SAMPLES

Sample	Male	Female	N
Entire population	44.8	55.2	1464
Indifference	60.0	40.0	15
Undesirability	66.7	33.3	21

Table 54 is especially important since it makes the point that, unlike our total sample, each of the deviant case samples is made up of a majority of men. We may consider this a valid finding as it is substantiated by our previous findings in Table 30.

Keeping in mind that we cannot even suspect a significance to any of these findings, we can nevertheless list them, and consider them a clue to validity.

The group of 15 people who were consistently indifferent to the Civil Defense Postures is primarily a male group and has a slightly lower level of education than does the total sample. They exhibit a tendency toward optimism insofar as tension levels are concerned, and seem to see a continuing Cold War situation without resolution. They do not worry about the possibility of nuclear attack, although they admit chances of survival in such a war would be poor. Although they are more opposed to shelters than is our total sample, and would probably not use them, they nevertheless admit shelters would make chances of survival somewhat better. They also feel that shelters would make people worry more about war. This complex of thinking seems to be one of optimism and a grudging admittance of the effectiveness of shelters, which can be easily seen as leading to a feeling of indifference toward Civil Defense.

Those people who gave a value of -3, extreme undesirability, for each of the Civil Defense postures are also predominately male and possess a level of education that is lower than that of the total sample. This group perceives continuing high tensions, lessening only slightly in the future. They see a peaceful end to the Cold War, although such an end may involve some measure of subjugation for the United States. They, too, feel that chances of survival in a nuclear war are poor, although shelters would increase them slightly. However, they also

feel that shelters would not only make people worry more about war, but would increase the likelihood of war. These last two perceptions are perhaps the clue to the undesirability values given by this group. Their peaceful but rather fatalistic predictions of the future are surely not otherwise responsible for such assessments of extreme undesirability.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Three major findings have been the result of this report: 1) the public seems unable to distinguish among the differing alternative programs of Civil Defense; 2) each program was assessed as being almost equally probable and highly desirable, and thus we can generalize that statement to Civil Defense as a whole, 3) we have found very little to explain the high desirability and probability values given Civil Defense.

Despite other answers which might be expected to lead either to a low desirability or low probability assessment, these values remain high. The question is, then, why?

The fact that there was no significant difference among the values given each Posture leads us to believe that the public cannot, or does not care to, distinguish among the differing Civil Defense possibilities. It further leads us into thinking that there has been no thorough, objective thought given Civil Defense by the American public. This may be due to several things.

Civil Defense, to begin with, is inexorably linked to thinking about nuclear war, which is to many people an unthinkable concept. In other words, it is too terrible to think about, and thus there may very well be a saturation point, a point beyond which the public cannot go in thinking about the concept of nuclear war. The same process may be operative when it comes to thinking about Civil Defense. Civil Defense leads to thinking about fallout, blast effects, firestorms, and chemical and biological warfare. It means thinking about hideous deformities caused by a nuclear holocaust and visited upon innocent generations of Americans. It means facing the possibility of the end of an America as we know it, or indeed, of civilization itself. Thus because war is unthinkable, so is Civil Defense.

Yet while there is no question that the American people are hesitant to think about nuclear war because it is too terrible, Civil Defense, which they also seem not to think about, is good.

Obviously it is considered good because it is offered as a defense against the horrors of the unthinkable war. Whether or not it is an effective defense seems often to be irrelevant. Our conjecture is that it is seen as good because the American public has been conditioned to think it is good, and because it represents security and insurance against future dangers.

This is true in part because we are living in an age in which the technology of war, not to mention the peaceful scientific endeavors such as those concerning space, is far beyond the comprehension of the layman. War is unthinkable not only because it is horrible, but because it is too complicated for the ordinary man to even attempt

to understand. Thus, the public does not try to comprehend, but instead places the fate of the country in the hands of those who do comprehend: the scientists who develop our technology and the Government which puts the scientific wonders to use. The conditions of secrecy, the high status given to scientists and defense strategists in Washington, the world focus on Cape Kennedy--all this has created an aura of the fantastic that is almost overwhelming to the ordinary citizen.

Even if the public did understand twentieth-century technology, it is often obvious to the man in the street that an individual cannot hope to have any effect on the processes of scientific development or implementation.

More relevant, however, seems to be the reaction to the facts that the Government has endorsed Civil Defense and that Civil Defense is seen as being a part of slightly overwhelming but highly successful technological advances. The public, therefore, has concluded that a Civil Defense program is worthwhile and good. Because of the consistent, undifferentiated pattern of desirability, the high evaluations of effectiveness of active defenses, and the expected low personal efficacy involved in implementing a Civil Defense program, it is tempting to conclude that the public is apathetic about Civil Defense in general.

It must be remembered, however, that this apathy (as has been pointed out before) seems more to be a product of a high desirability, coupled with expectation rather than of disinterest. Evaluations of highly desirable (+3) for the Postures ranged between 64.9% and 74.1% while 42.3% of the sample consistently gave +3 evaluations for the Postures. This is surely indisputable evidence that a Civil Defense program is desirable to the American public.

Further, we have seen that not only are the Postures perceived to be probable, but that those who saw the Postures as being highly desirable tended most often to see them as being also highly probable (Tables 5 and 6). This combination in which the majority of the sample sees a Civil Defense program as both desirable and likely to be implemented naturally manifests itself in an apparent apathy. Since such a program is wanted and is already expected to occur, there is very little that the public needs to do, and thus, perhaps, there is a tendency for the issue to be dismissed in importance.

Thus the public has not attempted to form an objective picture of Civil Defense, but has given blanket approval to the concept, relying on the Government to implement it in the best manner possible.

One further point needs consideration. While there can be no question that the public likes the idea of Civil Defense and regards allocation of money in that direction to be wise, we have not explored the concept

of priority. The 1964 questionnaire was concerned only with attitudes toward Civil Defense and did not, therefore, introduce any other important issues of the day. It would seem to be worthwhile in future studies to attempt to obtain a rank ordering of issues according to their priority. That is, given a list of possible programs to be implemented, such as foreign aid, health research, increment of active defenses, the War on Poverty, the Peace Corps, etc., and including Civil Defense, where does the American public see the most pressing need, and to which does it give the greatest priority?

Without such a list it is possible still to say that Civil Defense obviously has the full endorsement of the public as a necessary and worthwhile program. The Government, in the implementation of such a program, seems to have the complete confidence of the public in the handling of America's defense system.

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<p>This paper is an investigation into perceptions of desirability and probability of certain alternative Civil Defense programs. It is one of a series of papers based on data from a University of Pittsburgh national study entitled Civil Defense and Cold War Attitudes, conducted during mid-1964 with a probability sample of 1464 Americans.</p> <p>The focus of the paper is the list of six possible Civil Defense programs, called Postures, presented in the questionnaire. Desirability and probability evaluations were run against other relevant Civil Defense, Cold War and personal characteristic variables in order to attempt to determine the extent and character of support for these differing types of programs.</p> <p>The vast majority of the respondents found all six Postures to be desirable and probable. Between 64.9% and 74.1% assessed each Posture as highly desirable and 42.3% consistently rated every Posture as highly desirable. Although the Postures differed in the type of program suggested, the evaluations given to them were very much the same. Further, few of the variables against which these evaluations were run yielded any explanation of the causes of support. It was concluded that these consistently high evaluations reflected a faith in the government and in any program that it might endorse.</p>	

14	KEY WORDS	LINK A	LINK B	LINK C
		ROLE WT	ROLE WT	ROLE WT
<p>Civil Defense program alternatives Program desirability Program expectation Cold War perceptions Shelters perceptions</p>				

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